

SAINT AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO

AGAINST THE ACADEMICS

Contra Academicos

SABBATISMUS

Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430)
Contra Academicos · Against the Academics

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S. AURELII AUGUSTINI HIPPONENSIS EPISCOPI
CONTRA ACADEMICOS LIBRI TRES. (C)

ADMONITIO DE SEQUENTIBUS TRIBUS CONTRA ACADEMICOS LIBRIS.

Rectus ordo postulat, ut libri contra Academicos, qui primi omnium ab Augustino recensiti, et ante caeteros (excepto opere de Pulchro et Apto, qui fetus eo juniore editus statim intercidit) ab eo profecti sunt, huc in proprium locum restituantur. Nempe cum Academicorum contra veri perceptionem argumenta sanctus Doctor dudum imbibisset; ea tum etiam, cum veritatem Dei gratia fuisset assecutus, nonnullam ipsi molestiam facessebant: quibus diluendis, non modo privatim sedulis meditationibus insistere, sed etiam cum amicis disputationem habere animo destinavit. Hanc porro collationem per aliquot dies habitam tres in libros partitus est, et Romaniano suo concivi ac Maecenati, eum ad philosophiae studium adhortando, transmisit.

Liber primus congregientes inter se Licentium et Trygetium exhibet, hunc contra Academicos, illum pro Academicis disputantem: an beata vita in cognitione veri; an contra in sola illius investigatione sit collocanda. Ubi quid sit error, quid sapientia fuse explicatur.

In libro secundo S. Augustinus recenset placita Academicorum; prosequitur Alypius veterem inter novamque Academiam discrimina. Exploditur sententia horum philosophorum, qui cum verum haud posse deprehendi putarent, tamen veri simile sequi se profiterentur.

In tertio libro verum inveniri pro susceptis partibus diffitetur Alypius; probat Augustinus a sapiente cognosci, ut pote qui saltem sapientiam noverit. Hic ipse deinde Zenonis definitionem discutit, et duo illa redarguit Academicorum effata: Nihil percipi posse, et, Nulli rei debere assentiri. Dicit demum videri sibi, Academicos non ita sensisse uti vulgo existimantur.

Scripsit hos libros initio suae conversionis in agro Cassiciaco, pauculis, ut ait, diebus transactis, posteaquam ibi vivere coepit (Lib. 1, c. 1, n. 4); adeoque sub finem anni 386; quo abdicata rhetoricae professione illuc secessit, ut totus purgando animo vacaret, seseque ad sacrum Baptisma digne compararet. Consule annotationem in lib. 3, c. 20.

THREE BOOKS AGAINST THE ACADEMICS BY SAINT AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, BISHOP OF HIPPO.

(C)

ADMONITION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING THREE BOOKS AGAINST THE ACADEMICS.

Correct order requires that the books *Against the Academics*—which were the first of all to be reviewed by Augustine and preceded the others (with the exception of the work *On the Beautiful and the Fitting*, which, being a product of his younger years, perished immediately after publication)—should be restored here to their proper place. Indeed, since the holy Doctor had long ago absorbed the arguments of the Academics against the perception of truth, even when he had attained the truth through the grace of God, they continued to cause him some trouble. To dispel these, he resolved not only to persist in diligent private meditations but also to hold a disputation with his friends. Furthermore, he divided this discussion, held over several days, into three books and sent them to his fellow citizen and patron, Romanianus, exhorting him to the study of philosophy.

The first book presents Licentius and Trygetius engaging with each other, the latter arguing against the Academics, the former in favor of them: whether a happy life is to be placed in the knowledge of truth, or, on the contrary, in its mere investigation. There, what error is and what wisdom is are explained at length.

In the second book, St. Augustine reviews the tenets of the Academics; Alypius pursues the distinctions between the Old and the New Academy. The opinion of these philosophers is exploded, who, while they thought that truth could not be grasped, nevertheless professed to follow what is likely (*veri simile*).

In the third book, Alypius denies that truth can be found according to the parts undertaken; Augustine proves that it is known by the wise man, as one who at least knows wisdom. Here he himself then discusses Zeno's definition, and refutes those two sayings of the Academics: Nothing can be perceived, and, Assent should be given to nothing. Finally, he says it seems to him that the Academics did not think as they are commonly believed to have.

He wrote these books at the beginning of his conversion in the villa of Cassiciacum, after a very few days had passed, as he says, since he began to live there (Lib. 1, c. 1, n. 4); and so towards the end of the year 386, when, having resigned his profession of rhetoric, he retired there so that he might be entirely free for the purging of his mind and worthily prepare himself for holy Baptism. Consult the annotation in lib. 3, c. 20.

S. AUGUSTINUS, EPIST. I, AD HERMOGENIANUM.

Academicos ego ne inter jocandum quidem unquam lacescere auderem - quando enim me tantorum virorum non moveret auctoritas, nisi eos putarem longe in alia, quam vulgo creditum est, fuisse sententia? Quare potius eos imitatus sum quantum valui, quam expugnavi, quod omnino non valeo. Videtur enim mihi satis congruisse temporibus, ut si quid sincerum de fonte Platonico flueret, inter umbrosa et spinosa dumeta potius in pastionem paucissimorum hominum duceretur, quam per aperta manans, irruentibus passim pecoribus nullo modo posset liquidum purumque servari Hoc autem saeculo cum jam nullos videamus philosophos, nisi forte amiculo corporis, quos quidem haud censuerim dignos tam venerabili nomine; reducendi mihi videntur homines, si quos Academicorum per verborum ingenium a rerum comprehensione deterruit sententia, in spem reperiendae veritatis: ne id quod eradicandis altissimis erroribus pro tempore accommodatum fuit, jam incipiat inserendae scientiae impedimento esse Equidem quoquo modo se habeant illae litterae, non tam me delectat, quod, ut scribis, Academicos vicerim (scribis enim hoc amantius forte quam verius); quam quod mihi abruperim odiosissimum retinaculum, quo ab philosophiae ubere desperatione veri, quod est animi pabulum, refrenabar.

EX LIB. XV DE TRINITATE, CAP. XII.

Adversus Academicos . . . qui nihil ab homine scire posse contendunt . . . sunt libri tres nostri, primo nostrae conversionis tempore conscripti: quos qui potuerit et voluerit legere, lectosque intellexerit, nihil eum profecto quae ab eis contra perceptionem veritatis argumenta multa inventa sunt, permovebunt. Vide lib. Enchirid. c. 20.

ST. AUGUSTINE, EPIST. I, TO HERMOGENIANUS.

I would never dare to provoke the Academics even in jest—for when would the authority of such great men not move me, unless I thought they were of a far different opinion than is commonly believed? Therefore, I have rather imitated them as much as I was able, than attacked them, which I am not at all able to do. For it seems to me to have been sufficiently appropriate for the times that, if anything sincere flowed from the Platonic fount, it should be led through shady and thorny thickets for the nourishment of a very few men, rather than, flowing through open places, it could in no way be kept liquid and pure with cattle rushing in from all sides But in this age, when we see no philosophers, except perhaps in the cloak of the body, whom indeed I would hardly judge worthy of so venerable a name; men seem to me to be brought back, if the opinion of the Academics has deterred any by the ingenuity of words from the comprehension of things, into the hope of finding the truth: lest that which was adapted for a time for the eradication of the deepest errors, should now begin to be an impediment to the insertion of knowledge Indeed, in whatever way those letters may be, it does not so much delight me that, as you write, I have conquered the Academics (for you write this perhaps more lovingly than truly); as that I have broken off for myself that most hateful tether by which I was restrained from the breast of philosophy by the despair of truth, which is the food of the mind.

FROM BOOK XV ON THE TRINITY, CHAPTER XII.

Against the Academics . . . who contend that nothing can be known by man . . . are our three books, written at the first time of our conversion: which whoever is able and willing to read, and understands them when read, will certainly not be moved by the many arguments they have invented against the perception of truth. See the book *Enchiridion*, c. 20.

LIBER PRIMUS.

Romamanus ad philosophiam incitatur prooemio libri hujus, in quo ejus filius Licentius cum Trygetio per tres disputationes congredditur. Ille pro Academicis beatam vitam ipsa inquisitione veri, hic contra nonnisi veri comprehensione constare propugnat. Venit in contentionem definitio erroris, necnon definitio sapientiae, quae luculenter explicatur.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

Romanianum ad veram philosophiam cohortatur.

1. O utinam, Romaniane, hominem sibi aptum ita vicissim virtus fortunae repugnanti posset auferre, ut ab ea sibi auferri neminem patitur! jam tibi profecto injecisset manum, suique juris te esse proclamans, et in bonorum certissimorum possessionem traducens, ne prosperis quidem casibus servire permetteret. Sed quoniam ita comparatum est, sive pro meritis nostris, sive pro necessitate naturae (Lib. 1 Retract., c. 1, n. 2), ut divinum animum mortalibus inhaerentem, nequaquam sapientiae portus accipiat, ubi neque adversante fortunae flatu, neque secundante moveatur; nisi eo illum fortuna ipsa, vel secunda, vel quasi adversa perducatur: nihil pro te nobis aliud quam vota restant, quibus ab illo cui haec curae sunt Deo, si possumus, impetremus ut te tibi reddat; ita enim facile reddet et nobis; sinatque mentem illam tuam, quae respirationem jamdiu parturit, aliquando in auras verae libertatis emergere. Etenim fortasse quae vulgo fortuna nominatur, occulto quodam ordine regitur; nihilque aliud in rebus casum vocamus, nisi cujus ratio et causa secreta est (Ibid.): nihilque seu commodi seu incommodi commodi contingit in parte, quod non conveniat et congruat universo. Quam sententiam uberrimarum doctinarum oraculis editam, remotamque longissime ab intellectu profanorum, se demonstraturam veris amatoribus suis, ad quam te invito, philosophia pollicetur. Quamobrem, cum tibi tuo animo indigna multa accidunt; ne te ipse contemnas.

BOOK ONE.

Romanianus is incited to philosophy by the preface of this book, in which his son Licentius engages with Trygetius through three disputations. The former argues on behalf of the Academics that a happy life consists in the mere investigation of truth; the latter, on the contrary, that it consists only in the comprehension of truth. The definition of error comes into contention, as well as the definition of wisdom, which is clearly explained.

CHAPTER ONE.---HE EXHORTS ROMANIANUS TO
TRUE PHILOSOPHY.

1. Oh, would that, Romanianus, virtue could in turn snatch away from opposing fortune a man suited for herself, just as she allows no one to be snatched away from her! By now she would certainly have laid her hand upon you, proclaiming you to be under her own jurisdiction, and, translating you into the possession of the surest goods, she would not permit you to serve even prosperous circumstances. But since it has been so arranged, whether because of our merits or because of the necessity of nature (Lib. 1 *Retract.*, c. 1, n. 2), that the port of wisdom never receives the divine soul clinging to mortals—where it would be moved neither by a contrary blast of fortune nor by a favorable one; unless fortune herself, whether favorable or, so to speak, adverse, leads it there: nothing remains for us on your behalf but vows, by which we may obtain, if we can, from that God to whom these things are a care, that He restore you to yourself; for thus He will easily restore you to us also; and that He allow that mind of yours, which has long been struggling for breath, at last to emerge into the breezes of true liberty. For perhaps what is commonly called fortune is governed by a certain hidden order; and we call nothing else 'chance' in things, except that whose reason and cause is secret (*Ibid.*): and nothing, whether of advantage or disadvantage, happens in a part which does not fit and agree with the whole. This sentiment, issued by the oracles of the richest doctrines and removed very far from the understanding of the profane, philosophy promises to demonstrate to her true lovers, to which I invite you. Therefore, since many things unworthy of your soul happen to you, do not despise yourself.

Nam si divina providentia pertenditur usque ad nos, quod minime dubitandum est; mihi crede, sic tecum agi oportet ut agitur. Nam cum tanta, quantam semper admiror, indole tua, ab ineunte adolescentia adhuc infirmo rationis atque lapsante vestigio humanam vitam errorum omnium plenissimam ingredereris; excepit te circumfluentia divitiarum, quae illam aetatem atque animum, quae pulchra et honesta videbantur avide sequentem, illecebrosis coeperat absorbere gurgitibus, nisi inde te fortunae illi flatus, qui putantur adversi, eripuissent pene mergentem.

2. An vero si edentem te munera ursorum et nunquam ibi antea visa spectacula civibus nostris, theatricus plausus semper prosperrimus accepisset; si stultorum hominum, quorum immensa turba est, conflatis et consentientibus vocibus ferreris ad coelum; si nemo tibi auderet esse inimicus; si municipales tabulae te non solum civium, sed etiam vicinorum patronum aere signarent; collocarentur statucae, influerent honores, adderentur etiam potestates, quae municipalem habitum supercrescerent; conviviis quotidianis mensae opimae struerentur; quod cuique esset necesse, quod cujusque etiam deliciae sitirent, indubitanter peteret, indubitanter hauriret, multa etiam non petentibus funderentur; resque ipsa familiaris diligenter a tuis fideliterque administrata, idoneam se tantis sumptibus paratamque praeberet: tu interea viveres in aedificiorum exquisitissimis molibus, in nitore balnearum, in tesseris quas honestas non respuit, in venatibus, in conviviis, in ore clientium, in ore civium, in ore denique populorum humanissimus, liberalissimus, mundissimus, fortunatissimus, ut fuisti, jactareris: quisquam tibi, Romaniane, beatae alterius vitae, quae sola beata est, quisquam, quaeso, mentionem facere auderet? quisquam tibi persuadere posset, non solum te felicem non esse; sed eo maxime miserum, quo tibi minime videreris? Nunc vero quam te breviter admonendum tot et tanta, quae pertulisti adversa fecerunt? Non enim tibi alienis exemplis persuadendum est quam fluxa et fragilia, et plena calamitatum sint omnia, quae bona mortales putant; cum ita ex aliqua parte bene expertus sis, ut ex te caeteris persuadere possimus.

3. Illud ergo, illud tuum, quo semper decora et honesta desiderasti; quo te liberalem magis quam divitem esse maluisti; quo nunquam concupisti esse potentior quam justior, nunquam adversitatibus improbitatibusque cessisti: illud ipsum, inquam, quod in te divinum nescio quo vitae hujus somno veternoque sopitum est, variis illis durisque jactationibus secreta providentia excitare decrevit.

For if divine providence extends even to us, which is least of all to be doubted, believe me, it is necessary that it be dealt with you as it is being dealt. For when, with your great natural talent, which I always admire, you entered upon human life—full of all errors—from early youth with a still weak and stumbling step of reason, the overflow of riches received you, which had begun to swallow up that age and mind eagerly following what seemed beautiful and honorable in alluring whirlpools, had not those blasts of fortune, which are thought adverse, snatched you away when almost sinking.

2. Or indeed, if, while you were providing games of bears and spectacles never seen there before for our citizens, the theatrical applause had always received you most prosperously; if you were carried to heaven by the joined and consenting voices of foolish men, of whom there is an immense crowd; if no one dared to be your enemy; if the municipal tablets recorded you in bronze as the patron not only of the citizens but also of the neighbors; if statues were set up, honors flowed in, and even powers were added which surpassed the municipal status; if rich tables were spread for daily banquets; if whatever anyone needed, or whatever even anyone's delicacies thirsted for, he would ask without doubt and drink without doubt, and many things were poured out even for those not asking; and if the family estate itself, diligently and faithfully administered by your people, showed itself sufficient and ready for such great expenses: and you meanwhile lived in the most exquisite masses of buildings, in the splendor of baths, in gaming which honesty does not reject, in hunts, in banquets, being touted as most refined, most generous, most elegant, most fortunate, as you were, in the mouths of clients, in the mouths of citizens, and finally in the mouths of peoples: would anyone, Romanianus, anyone, I ask, dare to make mention to you of another happy life, which alone is happy? could anyone persuade you not only that you were not happy, but that you were most miserable in that you least seemed so to yourself? But now, how briefly have so many and such great adversities which you have endured made you to be admonished! For you are not to be persuaded by the examples of others how fleeting and fragile, and full of calamities, are all things which mortals think to be good, since you have so well experienced it from some part that we can persuade others from your case.

3. That, therefore—that quality of yours by which you always desired things becoming and honorable; by which you preferred to be generous rather than rich; by which you never desired to be more powerful than more just, and never yielded to adversities and wickednesses: that very thing, I say, which is divine in you and which has been lulled to sleep by some slumber and lethargy of this life, secret providence has decreed to awaken by those various and hard tossings.

Evigila, evigila, oro te; multum, mihi crede, gratulaberis quod pene nullis prosperitatibus quibus tenentur incauti, mundi hujus tibi dona blandita sunt: quae meipsum capere moliebantur quotidie ista cantantem, nisi me pectoris dolor ventosam professionem abjicere et in philosophiae gremium confugere coegisset. Ipsa me nunc in otio, quod vehementer optavimus, nutrit ac fovet: ipsa me penitus ab illa superstitione, in quam te mecum praecipitem dederam, liberavit. Ipsa enim docet, et vere docet nihil omnino colendum esse, totumque contemni oportere, quidquid mortalibus oculis cernitur, quidquid ullus sensus attingit (Lib. 1 Retract., c. 1, n. 2). Ipsa verissimum et secretissimum Deum perspicue se demonstraturam promittit, et jam jamque quasi per lucidas nubes ostentare dignatur.

4. In hac mecum studiosissime vivit noster Licentius: ad eam totus a juvenilibus illecebris voluptatibusque conversus est, ita ut eum non temere patri audeam imitandum proponere. Philosophia est enim, a cujus uberibus se nulla aetas queretur excludi; ad quam avidius retinendam et hauriendam quo te incitarem, quamvis tuam sitim bene noverim, gustum tamen mittere volui, quem tibi suavissimum, et, ut ita dicam, inductorium fore, peto ne frustra speraverim. Nam disputationem quam inter se Trygetius et Licentius habuerunt, relatam in litteras, tibi misi. Illum enim quoque adolescentem, quasi ad detergendum fastidium disciplinarum aliquantum sibi usurpasset militia, ita nobis magnarum honestarumque artium ardentissimum edacissimumque restituit. Pauculis igitur diebus transactis, posteaquam in agro vivere coepimus, cum eos ad studia hortans atque animans, ultra quam optaveram paratos et prorsus inhiantes viderem, volui tentare pro aetate quid possent: praesertim cum Hortensius liber Ciceronis jam eos ex magna parte conciliasse philosophiae videretur. Adhibito itaque notario, ne aurae laborem nostrum discernerent, nihil perire permisi. Sane in hoc libro res et sententias illorum, mea vero et Alympii etiam verba lecturus es.

DISPUTATIO PRIMA.

CAPUT II.

An ad beatam vitam necessaria sit veri comprehensio, an sola ejus inquisitio.

Awake, awake, I beg you; believe me, you will greatly congratulate yourself that the gifts of this world have flattered you with almost no prosperities by which the unwary are held: which were daily striving to capture me myself even as I was singing these things, had not a pain in my chest forced me to cast aside my windy profession and flee to the bosom of philosophy. She now nourishes and cherishes me in the leisure which we have vehemently desired: she has thoroughly liberated me from that superstition into which I had cast myself headlong with you. For she teaches, and truly teaches, that nothing at all is to be worshipped, and that everything ought to be despised, whatever is discerned by mortal eyes, whatever any sense reaches (Lib. 1 *Retract.*, c. 1, n. 2). She promises that she will clearly demonstrate the truest and most secret God, and already she deigns to show Him as if through clear clouds.

4. In this study our Licentius lives most studiously with me: to it he has been entirely converted from youthful allurements and pleasures, so that I dare not rashly propose him to his father as one to be imitated. For it is philosophy from whose breasts no age will complain that it is excluded; to incite you to retain and drink from her more greedily, although I well know your thirst, I nevertheless wished to send a taste, which I pray I have not hoped in vain will be most sweet and, so to speak, introductory for you. For I have sent to you the disputation which Trygetius and Licentius held between themselves, committed to writing. For that young man too, as if military service had taken for itself some time for wiping away the distaste for disciplines, has been restored to us as most ardent and most voracious for the great and honorable arts. Therefore, after a very few days had passed since we began to live in the country, when I saw them, as I was exhorting and animating them to studies, prepared beyond what I had hoped and indeed gaping for them, I wished to try what they could do according to their age: especially since Cicero's book *Hortensius* seemed already to have won them over in large part to philosophy. And so, having employed a notary, lest the breezes should scatter our labor, I permitted nothing to perish. Truly, in this book you are going to read their matters and opinions, but my words and even those of Alypius. FIRST DISPUTATION.

CHAPTER II.

Whether the comprehension of truth is necessary for a happy life, or its mere investigation.

5. Cum igitur omnes hortatu meo unum in locum ad hoc congregati essemus, ubi opportunum visum est: Numquidnam dubitatis, inquam, verum nos scire oportere? Minime, ait Trygetius: caeterique se vultu ipso approbasse significaverunt. Quid si, inquam, etiam non comprehenso vero beati esse possumus; necessariam veri comprehensionem arbitramini? Hic Alypius: Hujus quaestionis, inquit, iudicem me tutius puto. Cum enim iter mihi in urbem sit constitutum, oportet me onere alicujus suscipiendae partis relevari; simul quod facilius iudicis partes, quam cujusquam defensoris, cuiquam delegare possim. Quare dehinc pro alterutra parte ne a me quidquam expectetis. Quod ei cum concessum esset ab omnibus, et ego rogationem repetissem: Beati certe, inquit Trygetius, esse volumus; et si ad hanc rem possumus absque veritate pervenire, quaerenda nobis veritas non est. Quid hoc ipsum, inquam? Existimatisne beatos nos esse posse, etiam non inventa veritate? Tunc Licentius: Possumus, inquit, si verum quaeramus. Hic cum ego caeterorum sententiam nutu flagitassem: Movet me, inquit Navigius, quod a Licentio dictum est. Potest enim fortasse hoc ipsum esse beate vivere, in veritatis inquisitione vivere. Defini ergo, ait Trygetius, quid sit beata vita, ut ex eo colligam quid respondere conveniat. Quid censes, inquam, esse aliud beate vivere, nisi secundum id quod in homine optimum est, vivere? Temere, inquit, verba non fundam: nam id ipsum optimum quid sit, definiendum mihi abs te puto. Quis, inquam, dubitaverit, nihil aliud esse hominis optimum, quam eam partem animi, cui dominanti obtemperare convenit caetera quaeque in homine sunt? Haec autem, ne aliam postules definitionem, mens aut ratio dici potest (Lib. 1 Retract., cap. 1, n. 2). Quod si tibi non videtur, quaere quomodo ipse definias vel beatam vitam, vel hominis optimum. Assentior, inquit.

6. Quid ergo? ut ad propositum, inquam, redeamus; videturne tibi non invento vero beate posse vivi, si tantum quaeratur? Repeto, inquit, sententiam illam meam: Minime videtur. Vos, inquam, quid opinamini? Tum Licentius: Mihi prorsus, inquit, videtur: nam majores nostri, quos sapientes beatosque accepimus, eo solo quod verum quaerebant, bene beateque vixerunt. Ago gratias, inquam, quod cum Alypio me iudicem fecistis, cui, fateor, invidere jam coeperam. Quoniam igitur alteri vestrum videtur beatam vitam sola investigatione veritatis; alteri, non nisi inventionem posse contingere; Navigius autem paulo ante ostendit in tuam, Licenti, partem se velle transire: magnopere exspecto quales sententiarum vestrarum patroni esse possitis. Res enim magna est, et diligenti discussione dignissima. Si res magna est, ait Licentius, magnos viros desiderat.

5. When, therefore, at my exhortation we had all assembled in one place for this purpose, where it seemed opportune: "Do you at all doubt," I said, "that we ought to know the truth?" "Not at all," said Trygetius; and the others indicated by their very countenances that they approved. "What if," I said, "we can be happy even without truth being comprehended; do you think the comprehension of truth is necessary?" Here Alypius said: "I think it safer for me to be the judge of this question. For since a journey to the city has been arranged for me, I ought to be relieved of the burden of taking any side; at the same time, I can more easily delegate the role of judge than that of any defender to someone. Therefore, from now on do not expect anything from me for either side." When this had been granted to him by all, and I had repeated the question: "Certainly," said Trygetius, "we wish to be happy; and if we can reach this point without truth, truth is not to be sought by us." "What about this very thing?" I said. "Do you think we can be happy even if truth has not been found?" Then Licentius: "We can," he said, "if we seek the truth." Here, when I had signaled for the opinion of the others with a nod: "What was said by Licentius moves me," said Navigius. For perhaps this very thing may be to live happily: to live in the investigation of truth." "Define, therefore," said Trygetius, "what a happy life is, so that I may gather from it what it is fitting to respond." "What do you think to live happily is," I said, "except to live according to that which is best in man?" "I will not pour out words rashly," he said; "for I think that best thing itself ought to be defined by you for me." "Who," I said, "would doubt that nothing else is the best of man than that part of the soul which it is fitting for all other things in man to obey while it rules? This, lest you ask for another definition, can be called mind or reason (Lib. 1 *Retract.*, cap. 1, n. 2). But if it does not seem so to you, seek how you yourself would define either a happy life or the best of man." "I agree," he said.

6. "What then? To return to the proposition," I said, "does it seem to you that one can live happily without truth being found, if it is only sought?" "I repeat," he said, "that opinion of mine: It seems not at all." "What do you all think?" I said. Then Licentius: "To me it certainly seems so," he said; "for our ancestors, whom we have received as wise and happy, lived well and happily by this alone: that they sought the truth." "I give thanks," I said, "that you have made me a judge with Alypius, of whom, I confess, I had already begun to be envious. Since, therefore, to one of you a happy life seems possible by the mere investigation of truth, and to the other only by its discovery—and Navigius showed a little while ago that he wished to cross over to your side, Licentius—I greatly expect to see what kind of patrons of your opinions you can be. For the matter is great and most worthy of diligent discussion." "If the matter is great," said Licentius, "it desires great men."

Noli quaerere, inquam, praesertim in hac villa, quod ubivis gentium reperire difficile est: sed potius explica, cur id quod abs te non temere, ut opinor, prolatum est, et qua tibi ratione videatur: nam et maximae res, cum a parvis quaeruntur, magnos eos solent efficere.

CAPUT III.

Beatitatem in investigatione veri sitam esse pro Academicis propugnatur.

7. Quoniam te, inquit, video magnopere nos urgere, ut adversum invicem disputemus, quod te utiliter velle confido; quaero cur beatus esse non possit, qui verum quaerit, etiamsi minime inveniatur? Quia beatum, inquit Trygetius, volumus esse perfectum in omnibus sapientem. Qui autem adhuc quaerit, perfectus non est. Hunc igitur quomodo asseras beatum, omnino non video. Et ille: Potest apud te, inquit, vivere auctoritas majorum? Non omnium, inquit Trygetius. Quorum tandem? Ille: Eorum scilicet, qui sapientes fuerunt. Tum Licentius: Carneades, inquit, tibi sapiens non videtur? Ego, ait, graecus non sum; nescio Carneades iste qui fuerit. Quid, inquit Licentius, de illo nostro Cicerone, quid tandem existimas? Hic cum diu tacuisset: Sapiens fuit, inquit. Et ille: Ergo ejus de hac re sententia habet apud te aliquid ponderis? Habet, inquit. Accipe igitur quae sit, nam eam tibi excidisse arbitror. Placuit enim Ciceroni nostro, beatum esse qui veritatem investigat, etiamsi ad ejus inventionem non valeat pervenire. Ubi hoc, inquit, Cicero dixit? Et Licentius: Quis ignorat eum affirmasse vehementer, nihil ab homine percipi posse; nihilque remanere sapienti, nisi diligentissimam inquisitionem veritatis: propterea quia si incertis rebus esset assensus, etiam si fortasse verae forent, liberari ab errore non posset? quae maxima est culpa sapientis. Quamobrem si et sapientem necessario beatum esse credendum est, et veritatis sola inquisitio perfectum sapientiae munus est; quid dubitamus existimare beatam vitam, etiam per se ipsa investigatione veritatis posse contingere?

8. Tum ille: Licetne tandem ad ea quae temere concessa sunt, redire rursum? Hic ego: Illi hoc non solent concedere, inquam, quos ad disputandum non inveniendi veri cupiditas, sed ingenii puerilis jactantia impellit. Itaque apud me, praesertim cum adhuc nutriendi educandique sitis, non solum conceditur, sed etiam in praeceptis habeatis volo, ad ea vos discutienda redire oportere, quae concesseritis incautius. Et Licentius: Non parvum in philosophia profectum puto, inquit, cum in comparatione recti verique inveniendi contemnitur a disputante victoria.

"Do not seek," I said, "especially in this villa, what is difficult to find anywhere in the world; but rather explain why that which was put forward by you, not rashly as I think, seems so to you and by what reason; for even the greatest matters, when they are sought by little ones, are accustomed to make them great."

CHAPTER III.

It is argued on behalf of the Academics that happiness consists in the investigation of truth.

7. "Since I see," he said, "that you are greatly urging us to dispute against each other, which I trust you desire for a useful purpose; I ask why he cannot be happy who seeks the truth, even if he does not find it?" "Because," said Trygetius, "we want the happy man to be perfect in all things, a wise man." But he who is still seeking is not perfect. How you can assert that this man is happy, I do not see at all. And the other: "Can the authority of the ancestors," he said, "live in your eyes?" "Not of all," said Trygetius. "Of whom then?" He: "Of those, namely, who were wise." Then Licentius: "Does Carneades not seem wise to you?" "I," he said, "am not a Greek; I do not know who that Carneades was." "What," said Licentius, "about our Cicero, what do you think of him?" After he had been silent for a long time: "He was wise," he said. And the other: "Therefore his opinion on this matter has some weight with you?" "It has," he said. "Take then what it is, for I think it has escaped you." For it pleased our Cicero that he is happy who investigates the truth, even if he cannot attain its discovery. "Where did Cicero say this?" said Trygetius. And Licentius: "Who is ignorant that he vehemently affirmed that nothing can be perceived by man; and that nothing remains for the wise man but the most diligent investigation of truth: because if he were to assent to uncertain things, even if they were perhaps true, he could not be freed from error? which is the greatest fault of a wise man." Wherefore, if it must necessarily be believed that the wise man is happy, and the sole inquiry into truth is the perfect office of wisdom; why do we hesitate to consider the happy life as something that can be attained even by the investigation of truth itself?"

8. Then he said: "Is it permitted at last to return again to those things which were rashly granted?" Here I said: "Those who are impelled to dispute not by the desire of finding the truth, but by the boasting of a childish wit, are not accustomed to grant this." Therefore with me, especially since there is still a thirst for nourishing and educating, not only is it granted, but I also wish you to have it among the precepts, that it is necessary to return to discuss those things which you have granted too incautiously." And Licentius: "I think it is no small progress in philosophy," he said, "when victory is despised by the disputant in comparison with finding what is right and true."

Itaque libenter obsequor praeceptis et sententiae tuae, et Trygetium ad id quod se temere concessisse arbitratur, res enim mei juris est, redire permitto. Tum Alypius: Suscepti a me officii nondum partes esse, vosmetipsi mecum recognoscitis. Sed quoniam id jamdudum disposita profectio interrumpere me compellit, pro meo quoque munere geminatam sibi potestatem particeps mecum iudicii non renuet usque in reditum meum: video enim hoc vestrum certamen longius progressurum. Et cum discississet: Quod, inquit Licentius, temere concesseras, profer. Et ille: Temere dedi, inquit, Ciceronem fuisse sapientem. Ergone Cicero sapiens non fuit, a quo in latina lingua philosophia et inchoata est, et perfecta? Etsi concedam, inquit, esse sapientem, non omnia tamen ejus probo. Atqui oportet multa ejus alia refellas, ut non impudenter hoc de quo agitur, improbare videaris. Quid si hoc solum non recte sensisse illum affirmare paratus sum? Vestra, ut opinor, nihil interest, nisi cujus ponderis ad id quod volo asserendum, rationes afferam. Perge, inquit ille. Quid enim, inquit, audeam contra eum, qui se Ciceronis adversarium profitetur?

9. Hic Trygetius: Volo attendas, ait, tu iudex noster, quemadmodum superius beatam vitam definieris: dixisti namque eum beatum esse, qui secundum eam partem animi vivit, quam caeteris convenit imperare. Tu autem, Licenti, volo vel nunc mihi concedas (jam enim libertate, in quam maxime nos vindicaturam se philosophia pollicetur, jugum illud auctoritatis excussi), perfectum non esse qui adhuc veritatem requirat. Tum ille post diuturnum silentium: Non concedo, inquit. Et Trygetius: Cur, quaeso? explica. Isthic sum enim, et aveo audire, quo pacto possit et perfectus homo esse, et adhuc quaerere veritatem. Hic ille: Qui ad finem inquit, non pervenit, fateor quod perfectus non sit. Veritatem autem illam solum Deum nosse arbitror, aut forte hominis animam, cum hoc corpus, hoc est tenebrosus carcerem, dereliquerit. Hominis autem finis est, perfecte quaerere veritatem: perfectum enim quaerimus, sed tamen hominem. Et Trygetius: Non igitur potest beatus esse homo. Quomodo enim; cum id quod magnopere concupiscit, assequi nequeat? Potest autem homo beate vivere, siquidem potest secundum eam partem animi vivere quam dominari in homine fas est. Potest igitur verum invenire. Aut colligat se, et non concupiscat verum, ne cum id assequi non potuerit, necessario miser sit. At hoc ipsum est beatum hominis, ait ille, perfecte quaerere veritatem: hoc est enim pervenire ad finem, ultra quem non potest progredi. Quisquis ergo minus instanter quam oportet veritatem quaerit, is ad finem hominis non pervenit: quisquis autem tantum quantum homo potest ac debet, dat operam inveniendae veritati, is etiamsi eam non inveniatur, beatus est; totum enim facit, quod ut faciat, ita natus est. Inventio autem si defuerit, id deerit quod natura non dedit. Postremo cum hominem necesse sit aut beatum esse aut miserum, nonne dementis est eum qui dies noctesque quantum potest instat investigandae veritati, miserum dicere? Beatus igitur erit.

Therefore I willingly obey your precepts and opinion, and I permit Trygetius to return to that which he thinks he rashly granted, for the matter is within my right." Then Alypius: "You yourselves recognize with me that it is not yet the part of the office I have undertaken." But since a planned departure already compels me to interrupt, for my duty also, my partner in judgment will not refuse the doubled power for himself until my return: for I see that this contest of yours will proceed further." And when he had departed: "Produce," said Licentius, "what you had rashly granted." And he: "I rashly gave," he said, "that Cicero was wise." "Was Cicero then not wise, by whom philosophy was both begun and perfected in the Latin language?" "Even if I grant," he said, "that he was wise, I do not however approve of all his things." "And yet it is necessary that you refute many other things of his, so that you do not seem to disapprove impudently of this which is being discussed." "What if I am prepared to affirm that he did not think correctly on this alone?" It matters nothing to you, as I think, unless I bring forward reasons of what weight for asserting what I want." "Proceed," said he. "For what," he said, "should I dare against him who professes himself the adversary of Cicero?"

9. Here Trygetius said: "I want you to attend, you our judge, to how you defined the happy life above: for you said that he is happy who lives according to that part of the soul which it is fitting to rule the others." But you, Licentius, I want you to grant me even now (for now I have shaken off that yoke of authority by the liberty in which philosophy especially promises to vindicate us), that he is not perfect who still seeks the truth." Then he, after a long silence: "I do not grant it," he said. And Trygetius: "Why, I ask? explain." For I am right here, and I long to hear in what way a man can be both perfect and still seeking the truth." Here he said: "He who has not reached the end, I confess that he is not perfect." But I think that God alone knows that truth, or perhaps the soul of man when it has left this body, that is, this dark prison. But the end of man is to seek the truth perfectly: for we seek the perfect, but yet a man." And Trygetius: "Therefore a man cannot be happy." For how, since he cannot attain that which he greatly desires?" But a man can live happily if indeed he can live according to that part of the soul which it is right to dominate in man. Therefore he can find the truth. Or let him collect himself, and let him not desire the truth, lest when he cannot attain it, he be necessarily miserable." "But this itself is the happy state of man," said he, "to seek the truth perfectly: for this is to reach the end beyond which he cannot proceed." Whoever, therefore, seeks the truth less insistently than he ought, he does not reach the end of man: but whoever does as much as a man can and ought to do to find the truth, he is happy even if he does not find it; for he does all that he was born to do. But if discovery is lacking, that will be lacking which nature did not give. Finally, since it is necessary for a man to be either happy or miserable, is it not the part of a madman to call him miserable who day and night insists as much as he can on investigating the truth? Therefore he will be happy.

Deinde illa definitio mihi, ut arbitror, uberius suffragatur: nam si beatus est, sicuti est, qui secundum eam partem animi vivit, quam regnare caeteris convenit, et haec pars ratio dicitur; quaero utrum non secundum rationem vivat, qui quaerit perfecte veritatem? Quod si absurdum est, quid dubitamus beatum hominem dicere sola ipsa inquisitione veritatis?

CAPUT IV.

Quid sit error.

10. Mihi, ait ille, nec secundum rationem vivere, nec beatus omnino, quisquis errat videtur. Errat autem omnis qui semper quaerit nec invenit. Unde tibi unum jam e duobus monstrandum est: aut errantem beatum esse posse; aut eum qui quod quaerit nunquam invenit, non errare. Hic ille: Beatus errare non potest. Et cum diu siluisset: Non autem errat, inquit, cum quaerit; quia ut non erret, perfecte quaerit. Et Trygetius: Ut non erret quidem, inquit, quaerit; sed errat, cum minime invenit. Ita autem tibi profuturum putasti, quod errare ille non vult, quasi nemo erret invitus, aut quisquam omnino erret, nisi invitus. Tum ego, cum ille diu cunctaretur quid responderet: Definiendum vobis est, inquam, quid sit error: facilius enim ejus fines potestis videre, in quem jam penitus ingressi estis. Ego, inquit Licentius, definire aliquid idoneus non sum: quamvis errorem definire sit facilius quam finire. Ego, ait ille, definiam; quod mihi facillimum est, non ingenio, sed causa optima. Nam errare est utique semper quaerere, nunquam invenire. Ego, inquit Licentius, si vel istam definitionem facile possem refellere, jamdudum causae meae non defuissem. Sed quoniam aut res ipsa per se ardua est, aut ita mihi apparet; peto a vobis ut usque in crastinam lucem quaestio differatur, si nihil hodie quod respondeam, reperire potuero, cum id sedulo mecum ipse volvam. Quod cum concedendum putarem, non renuentibus caeteris, deambulatum ire surreximus: nobisque inter nos multa variaque sermocinantibus, ille in cogitatione defixus fuit. Quod cum frustra esse sensisset, relaxare animum maluit, et nostro se sermoni miscere. Postea cum jam advesperasceret, in eundem conflictum redierant: sed modum imposui, persuasique ut in alium diem differri paterentur. Inde ad balneas.

DISPUTATIO SECUNDA.

Then that definition, as I think, supports me more abundantly: for if he is happy, as he is, who lives according to that part of the soul which it is fitting to reign over the others, and this part is called reason; I ask whether he does not live according to reason who seeks the truth perfectly? But if this is absurd, why do we hesitate to call a man happy by the mere investigation of truth?"

CHAPTER IV.

What error is.

10. "To me," said he, "neither to live according to reason, nor to be happy at all, does anyone seem who errs." But everyone errs who always seeks and does not find. Whence one of two things must now be shown by you: either that the erring can be happy; or that he who never finds what he seeks does not err." Here he: "A happy man cannot err." And when he had been silent for a long time: "But he does not err," he said, "when he seeks; because that he may not err, he seeks perfectly." And Trygetius: "That he may not err, indeed," he said, "he seeks; but he errs when he does not find at all." But you thought it would profit you that he does not want to err, as if no one errs against his will, or anyone at all errs except against his will." Then I, when he was hesitating for a long time what to answer: "You must define," I said, "what error is: for you can more easily see its boundaries, into which you have already deeply entered." "I," said Licentius, "am not fit to define anything: although it is easier to define error than to end it." "I," said he, "will define it; which is very easy for me, not by my wit, but by an excellent cause." For to err is certainly to always seek and never find." "I," said Licentius, "if I could easily refute even that definition, would not have failed my cause long ago." But since either the matter itself is difficult in itself, or it appears so to me; I ask of you that the question be deferred until tomorrow's light, if I shall have been able to find nothing today to answer, while I carefully turn it over with myself." When I thought this should be granted, the others not refusing, we rose to go for a walk: and while we were talking many and various things among ourselves, he was fixed in thought. When he perceived that this was in vain, he preferred to relax his mind and mingle in our talk. Afterwards, when it was already growing dark, they had returned to the same conflict: but I imposed a limit, and persuaded them to allow it to be deferred to another day. Then to the baths.

SECOND DISPUTATION.

11. Postridie autem cum consedissemus: Proferte, inquam, quod heri coeperatis. Tum Licentius: Distuleramus, inquit, disputationem, nisi fallor, rogatu meo, cum erroris definitio difficillima mihi esset. Hic plane, inquam, non erras, quod ut tibi omen sit ad reliqua, libenter optaverim. Audi ergo, inquit, quod heri etiam nisi intercessisses, protulissem. Error mihi videtur esse falsi pro vero approbatio; in quem nullo pacto incidit, qui veritatem quaerendam semper existimat: falsum enim probare non potest, qui probat nihil; non igitur potest errare. Beatus autem facillime esse potest: nam, ne longius abeam, si nobis ipsis, ut heri licuit, quotidie vivere liceret; nihil mihi occurrit cur nos beatos appellare dubitaremus. Viximus enim magna mentis tranquillitate, ab omni corporis labe animum vindicantes, et a cupiditatum facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, operam rationi; hoc est, secundum illam divinam partem animi viventes, quam beatam vitam esse hesterna inter nos definitione convenit: atque, ut opinor, nihil invenimus, sed tantummodo quaesivimus veritatem. Potest igitur sola inquisitione veritatis, etiamsi eam invenire minime possit, homini beata vita contingere. Nam definitio tua vide quanta facilitate excludatur notione communi. Etenim errare dixisti esse, Semper quaerere, et nunquam invenire. Quid si quisquam nihil quaerat, et interrogatus, verbi gratia, utrumnam modo dies sit, temere statimque noctem esse opinetur atque respondeat? nonne tibi videtur errare? Hoc igitur erroris genus vel immanissimum, non complexa est definitio tua. Quid si etiam non errantes complexa est, potestne definitio ulla esse vitiosior? Nam si quis Alexandriam quaerat, et ad eam recto pergat itinere; non, opinor, potes eum errantem vocare. Quid si eamdem viam, variis impeditus causis, longo agat tempore, et in ea morte praeveniat; nonne et semper quaesivit, et nunquam invenit, nec erravit tamen? Non, inquit ille, semper quaesivit.

12. Recte dicis, ait Licentius, et bene admones. Inde enim prorsus nihil ad rem pertinet definitio tua: non enim ego beatum esse dixi, qui semper quaerat veritatem. Quod ne fieri quidem potest: primo, quia non semper homo est; deinde, quia non ex quo tempore incipit esse homo, eo jam potest, aetate impediante, verum quaerere. Aut si semper id putas dicendum, si nihil temporis quo jam quaerere potest, perire patitur; rursus tibi Alexandriam redeundum est. Fac enim quemquam, ex quo tempore iter agere vel aetate vel negotio sinitur, pergere occipere illam viam, atque, ut supra dixi, cum deviet nusquam, antequam perveniat tamen vita excedere; multum profecto errabis, si tibi errasse iste videbitur, quamvis omni quo potuit tempore, nec quaerere desierit, nec invenire potuerit quo pergebat.

11. But on the following day when we had sat down: "Bring forward," I said, "what you had begun yesterday." Then Licentius: "We had deferred the disputation, if I am not mistaken, at my request, when the definition of error was very difficult for me." Here clearly," I said, "you do not err, which I would gladly wish for you as an omen for the rest." Hear then," he said, "what I would have brought forward even yesterday if you had not intervened." Error seems to me to be the approval of the false for the true; into which he by no means falls who thinks that the truth is always to be sought: for he cannot approve the false who approves nothing; therefore he cannot err. But he can very easily be happy: for, not to go further, if it were permitted to us ourselves to live daily as was permitted yesterday; nothing occurs to me why we should hesitate to call ourselves happy. For we lived with great tranquility of mind, vindicating the soul from every stain of the body, and removed very far from the torches of desires, giving, as much as is permitted to man, attention to reason; that is, living according to that divine part of the soul, which it was agreed among us in yesterday's definition to be the happy life: and, as I think, we found nothing, but only sought the truth. Therefore, by the mere inquiry into truth, even if he cannot find it at all, a happy life can happen to a man. For see with what ease your definition is excluded by common notion. For you said that to err is: To always seek, and never find. What if anyone seeks nothing, and being asked, for example, whether it is now day, should rashly and immediately think and answer that it is night? does it not seem to you that he errs? This kind of error, therefore, even the most monstrous, your definition has not embraced. What if it has even embraced those who do not err, can any definition be more faulty? For if anyone seeks Alexandria, and proceeds on the right journey to it; I do not think you can call him erring. What if he spends a long time on the same way, hindered by various causes, and is overtaken by death in it; has he not both always sought and never found, and yet has not erred? "He did not always seek," said he.

12. "You speak correctly," said Licentius, "and you advise well." For thence your definition pertains not at all to the matter: for I did not say that he is happy who always seeks the truth. Which cannot even happen: first, because a man is not always; then, because not from the time he begins to be a man can he already, hindered by age, seek the truth. Or if you think it should always be said, if he allows no time to perish in which he can already seek; you must return again to Alexandria. For suppose anyone, from the time he is permitted by age or business to make a journey, begins to proceed on that way, and, as I said above, though he deviates nowhere, yet departs from life before he arrives; you will surely err much if it seems to you that this man has erred, although at all the time he could, he neither ceased to seek, nor could he find where he was going.

Quamobrem si et mea descriptio vera est, et secundum eam non errat ille qui perfecte quaerit, quamvis non inveniat veritatem, beatusque est ob eam rem, quod secundum rationem vivit; tua vero definitio et frustrata est, et si non esset, nihil eam curare deberem, si ex eo solum quod ego definivi, satis causa firmata est: cur, quaeso, nondum est ista inter nos quaestio dissoluta?

CAPUT V.

Quidnam sit sapientia.

13. Hic Trygetius: Dasne, inquit, sapientiam rectam viam vitae esse? Do, inquit, sine dubio: sed tamen volo mihi sapientiam definias, ut sciam utrum quae mihi, eadem tibi esse videatur. Et ille: Parum tibi, ait, videtur definita hoc ipso quod nunc interrogatus es? Etiam quod volui concessisti. Si enim non fallor, non falso recta via vitae sapientia nominatur. Tum Licentius: Nihil mihi tam ridiculum, quam ista definitio videtur, inquit. Fortasse, ait ille: pedetentim tamen quaeso, ut ratio praeveniat risum tuum: nihil enim est foedius risu irrisione dignissimo. Quid enim, ait ille, nonne fateris vitae mortem esse contrariam? Fateor, ait. Mihi igitur, inquit ille, via vitae nulla magis videtur, quam ea qua quisque pergit, ne in mortem incidat. Assentiebatur Trygetius. Ergo si viator quispiam diverticulum vitans, quod a latronibus obsideri audierit, recta ire pergat, atque ita evadat interitum; nonne et viam vitae, et rectam secutus est; et eam sapientiam nominat nemo? Quomodo igitur omnis recta vitae via sapientia est? Concessi enim esse, sed non solam. Definitio autem nihil complecti debuit, quod esset alienum. Itaque rursus defini, si placet, quid tibi videtur esse sapientia.

14. Diu ille tacuit; deinde: En, inquit, iterum definio, si hoc tu nunquam finire statuisti. Sapientia est via recta, quae ad veritatem ducat. Similiter et hoc, inquit ille, refellitur: nam dum apud Virgilium Aeneae dictum est a matre: Perge modo, et qua te ducit via dirige gressum. sequens hanc viam ad id quod dictum erat, id est ad verum, pervenit. Contende, si placet, ubi pedem ille incedens posuit, sapientiam posse dici: quanquam stulte prorsus istam descriptionem tuam effringere conor; nam causam meam nulla plus adjuvat.

Wherefore, if both my description is true, and according to it he does not err who seeks perfectly, although he does not find the truth, and is happy for that reason, that he lives according to reason; but your definition is both frustrated, and if it were not, I ought not to care for it at all, if from that alone which I defined, the cause is sufficiently established: why, I ask, is this question between us not yet dissolved?

CHAPTER V.

What wisdom is.

13. Here Trygetius: "Do you grant," he said, "that wisdom is the right way of life?" "I grant it, without doubt," he said; "but yet I want you to define wisdom for me, so that I may know whether the same thing seems to you as to me." And the other: "Does it seem to you," he said, "to be too little defined by this very thing that you have now been asked?" For you have also granted what I wanted. For if I am not mistaken, wisdom is not falsely named the right way of life." Then Licentius: "Nothing seems to me so ridiculous as that definition," he said. "Perhaps," said he; "yet step by step, I ask, so that reason may precede your laughter: for nothing is fouler than laughter worthy of derision." For what," he said, "do you not confess that death is contrary to life?" "I confess it," he said. "To me, therefore," he said, "no way of life seems more so than that by which anyone proceeds lest he fall into death." Trygetius was assenting. "Therefore, if any traveler, avoiding a bypass which he heard was occupied by robbers, proceeds to go straight, and thus escapes destruction; has he not followed both a way of life and a right one; and no one names that wisdom?" How then is every right way of life wisdom? For I granted that it is, but not it alone. But the definition ought to embrace nothing that would be alien. Therefore, define again, if you please, what wisdom seems to you to be."

14. He was silent for a long time; then: "Behold," he said, "I define it again, if you have decided never to finish this." Wisdom is the right way which leads to the truth." "Similarly even this," he said, "is refuted: for while in Virgil it was said to Aeneas by his mother: 'Only proceed, and direct your step where the way leads you,'" following this way he arrived at that which had been said, that is, to the true [place]. Contend, if you please, whether where he placed his foot as he walked can be called wisdom: although I try quite foolishly to break down that description of yours; for nothing helps my cause more.

Etenim sapientiam non ipsam veritatem, sed viam quae ad eam ducat, esse dixisti. Quisquis ergo hac utitur via, sapientia profecto utitur; et qui sapientia utitur, sapiens sit necesse est: sapiens igitur erit ille, qui perfecte quaesierit veritatem, etiamsi ad eam nondum pervenerit. Nam via quae ducit ad veritatem, nulla, uti opinor, intelligitur melius quam diligens inquisitio veritatis. Hac igitur sola via utens, jam iste sapiens erit: at nemo sapiens miser; omnis autem homo aut miser, aut beatus: beatum igitur faciet non tantum invention, sed ipsa per se investigatio veritatis.

15. Tum ille arridens: Merito mihi, inquit, ista contingunt, dum adversario in re non necessaria fidenter assentior: quasi vero ego sim magnus definitor, aut quidquam in disputando magis supervacaneum putem. Quis enim modus erit, si ego rursus velim definiri abs te aliquid, et rursus ejusdem definitionis verba, et consequentium item singillatim omnia, fingens quod nihil intelligam, definiri flagitem? Nam quid planissimum non meo jure definiri cogam, si jure a me sapientiae definitio postulatur? Cujus enim verbi in animis nostris apertiore notionem natura esse voluit quam sapientiae? Sed nescio quomodo, cum mentis nostrae veluti portum notio ipsa reliquerit, et verborum sibi quasi vela tetenderit, occurrant statim calumniarum mille naufragia. Quamobrem aut definitio sapientiae ne requiratur, aut judex noster in ejus patrocinium dignetur descendere. Tum ego, cum jam stilum nox impediret, et quasi de integro magnum quiddam disserendum viderem oboriri, in alium diem distuli: nam disputare coeperamus sole jam in occasum declinante, diesque pene totus cum in rebus rusticis ordinandis, tum in recensione primi libri Virgilii peractus fuit. DISPUTATIO TERTIA.

For you said that wisdom is not truth itself, but the way which leads to it. Whoever, therefore, uses this way, certainly uses wisdom; and he who uses wisdom, must necessarily be wise: therefore he will be wise who has perfectly sought the truth, even if he has not yet arrived at it. For no way which leads to truth, as I think, is better understood than the diligent investigation of truth. Using this way alone, therefore, that man will already be wise: but no wise man is miserable; and every man is either miserable or happy: therefore not only discovery, but the investigation of truth by itself will make him happy."

15. Then he, smiling: "Deservedly," he said, "these things happen to me, while I confidently assent to my adversary in a matter not necessary: as if indeed I were a great definer, or thought anything in disputing more superfluous." For what limit will there be, if I again should want something to be defined by you, and again should demand that the words of the same definition, and likewise all the following things individually, be defined, pretending that I understand nothing? For what very plain thing shall I not by my right compel to be defined, if a definition of wisdom is rightly demanded from me? For of what word did nature wish a clearer notion to be in our minds than of wisdom? But I know not how, when the notion itself has left, as it were, the port of our mind, and has spread for itself its sails of words, a thousand shipwrecks of calumnies immediately occur. Wherefore, either let a definition of wisdom not be required, or let our judge deign to descend into its patronage." Then I, since night was already hindering my pen, and I saw something great arising to be discussed as if from the beginning, deferred it to another day: for we had begun to dispute with the sun already declining to its setting, and almost the whole day had been spent both in ordering rustic matters and in the review of the first book of Virgil. DISPUTATION THIRD.

LIBER SECUNDUS.

Romanianum Maecenatem suum ad amplectendam philosophiam rursus cum grati animi significatione hortatur, tresque illi describit Collationes, in quarum prima explicantur placita Academicorum. In secunda novae ac veteris Academiae discrimina referuntur; et exploditur sententia horum philosophorum, qui cum verum haud posse apprehendi putarent, veri tamen simile se sequi profiterentur. In tertia dicitur quid illi verisimile seu probabile appellarent.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

Contra Academicorum rationes Dei auxilio opus est.

1. Si quam necesse est, disciplina atque scientia sapientiae vacuum esse non posse sapientem, tam eam necesse esset invenire dum quaeritur; omnis profecto Academicorum vel calumnia, vel pertinacia, vel pervicacia, vel, ut ego interdum arbitror, congrua illi temporis ratio, simul cum ipso tempore, et cum ipsius Carneadis Ciceronisque corporibus sepulta foret. Sed quia sive vitae hujus multis variisque jactationibus, Romaniane, ut in eodem te probas, sive ingeniorum quodam stupore, vel socordia vel tarditate torpentium, sive desperatione inveniendi; quia non quam facile oculis ista lux, tam facile mentibus sapientiae sidus oboritur; sive etiam qui error omnium populorum est, falsa opinione inventae a se veritatis, nec diligenter homines quaerunt, si qui quaerunt, et a quaerendi voluntate avertuntur; evenit ut scientia raro paucisque proveniat: eoque fit, ut Academicorum arma, quando cum eis ad manus venit, nec mediocribus viris, sed acutis et bene eruditis, invicta et quasi Vulcania videantur. Quamobrem contra illos fluctus procellasque fortunae, cum obnitendum remis qualiumcumque virtutum, tum in primis divinum auxilium omni devotione atque pietate implorandum est; ut intentio constantissima bonorum studiorum teneat cursum suum, a quo eam nullus casus excutiat, quominus illam philosophiae tutissimus jucundissimusque portus accipiat. Haec prima tua causa est; hinc tibi metuo, hinc te cupio liberari, hinc, si modo dignus sim qui impetrem, quotidianis votis auras tibi prosperas orare non cesso; oro autem ipsam summi Dei Virtutem atque Sapientiam. Quid est enim aliud, quem mysteria nobis tradunt Dei Filium?

BOOK SECOND.

He again exhorts his Romanianus, his Maecenas, to embrace philosophy with an expression of a grateful mind, and describes to him three Collations, in the first of which the opinions of the Academics are explained. In the second, the differences between the New and the Old Academy are related; and the opinion of those philosophers is exploded, who, while they thought that the truth could not be grasped, yet professed to follow the likely. In the third, it is said what they called the likely or the probable.

CHAPTER I.

Divine aid is necessary against the arguments of the Academics.

1. If it were as necessary to find wisdom while seeking it as it is necessary that a wise man cannot be void of the discipline and knowledge of wisdom, then surely all the calumny, or obstinacy, or persistence, or, as I sometimes think, the reasoning of the Academics suited to that time, would have been buried along with the time itself, and with the bodies of Carneades and Cicero. But because, whether by the many and varied tossings of this life, Romanianus, as you prove in your own case, or by a certain stupor of minds, torpid through sloth or slowness, or by despair of finding—because the star of wisdom does not rise as easily for minds as this light does for eyes; or even because of the error common to all peoples, the false opinion of having found the truth themselves, men do not seek diligently, or if they do seek, they are turned away from the will to seek; it happens that knowledge comes rarely and to few. Thus it is that the weapons of the Academics, when one comes to hand-to-hand combat with them, seem invincible and as if forged by Vulcan, not only to mediocre men, but even to the sharp and well-learned. Therefore, against those waves and storms of fortune, one must not only struggle with the oars of whatever virtues one has, but especially implore divine aid with all devotion and piety, so that the most constant intention of good studies may hold its course, from which no chance may shake it, lest the safest and most pleasant harbor of philosophy should not receive it. This is your first cause; for this I fear for you, from this I desire you to be liberated, for this, if only I be worthy to obtain it, I do not cease to pray for prosperous breezes for you with daily vows; and I pray to the very Power and Wisdom of the supreme God. For what else is He whom the mysteries hand down to us as the Son of God?

2. Multum autem me adjuvabis pro te deprecantem, si non nos exaudiri posse desperes, nitarisque nobiscum et tu non solum votis, sed etiam voluntate, atque illa tua naturali mentis altitudine, propter quam te quaero, qua singulariter delector, quam semper admiror, quae in te, proh nefas! illis rerum domesticarum nubibus quasi fulmen involvitur, et multos, ac pene omnes latet: me autem, et alium, vel tertium, familiarissimos tuos latere non potest, qui saepe non solum attente audivimus murmura tua, sed etiam nonnulla fulgura fulminibus propiora conspeximus. Quis enim, ut caetera pro tempore taceam et unum commemorem; quis, inquam, tam subito unquam tantum intonuit, tantumque lumine mentis emicuit, ut sub uno fremitu rationis, et quodam coruscamine temperantiae, uno die illa pridie saevissima penitus libido moreretur? Ergone non erumpet aliquando ista virtus, et multorum desperantium risus in horrorem stuporemque convertet; et locuta in terris quasi quaedam futurorum signa, rursus projecto totius corporis onere recurret in coelum? Ergone Augustinus de Romano frustra ista dixit? Non sinet ille cui me totum dedi, quem nunc recognoscere aliquantum coepi.

CAPUT II.

Romano grati animi obsequium exhibet, eumque ad philosophiam hortatur.

3. Ergo aggredere mecum philosophiam: hic est quidquid te anxium saepe, atque dubitantem mirabiliter solet movere. Non enim metuo aut a socordia morum, aut a tarditate ingenii tui. Quis enim te quando aliquantum respirare concessum est, in sermonibus nostris vigilantior? quis acutior apparuit? Ergone tibi gratiam non repensabo? an fortasse paululum debeo? Tu me adolescentulum pauperem ad peregrina studia pergentem, et domo et sumptu, et, quod plus est, animo excepisti. Tu patre orbatum amicitia consolatus es, hortatione animasti, ope adjuvisti. Tu in nostro ipso municipio, favore, familiaritate, communicatione domus tuae pene tecum clarum primatemque me fecisti. Tu Carthaginem illustrioris professionis gratia remeantem, cum tibi soli et meorum nulli consilium meum spemque aperuissem, quamvis aliquantum illo tibi insito, quia ibi jam docebam, patriae amore cunctatus es: tamen ubi evincere adolescentis cupiditatem, ad ea quae videbantur meliora tendentis, nequisti; ex dehortatore in adiutorem mira benevolentiae moderatione conversus es. Tu necessariis omnibus iter adminiculasti meum.

2. You will help me much, however, as I pray for you, if you do not despair of our being heard, and if you strive with us, not only with vows but also with your will, and with that natural altitude of your mind, for which I seek you, in which I singularly delight, which I always admire, and which in you—oh, the shame!—is enveloped like a lightning bolt in those clouds of domestic affairs, and is hidden from many, and almost all. But it cannot be hidden from me and another, or a third, your most intimate friends, who have often not only listened attentively to your murmurs, but have also seen some flashes closer to lightning bolts. For who, to remain silent about other things for the time being and commemorate one—who, I say, ever thundered so suddenly, and shone so much with the light of the mind, that under a single murmur of reason and a certain flash of temperance, in one day that lust, which was most savage the day before, died out completely? Shall not that virtue break forth at last, and turn the laughter of many despisers into horror and amazement; and having spoken on earth as if some signs of future things, return to heaven once the burden of the whole body is cast aside? Has Augustine said these things about Romanianus in vain? He will not allow it, He to whom I have given myself entirely, whom I have now begun to recognize somewhat.

CHAPTER II.

He shows the service of a grateful mind to Romanianus, and exhorts him to philosophy.

3. Therefore, approach philosophy with me: here is whatever is wont to move you so wonderfully when you are often anxious and doubting. For I do not fear either from sloth of morals or from the slowness of your intellect. For who, when allowed to breathe a little, has appeared more vigilant in our discourses? who more acute? Shall I not then repay my gratitude to you? or do I perhaps owe but little? You received me, a poor youth going to foreign studies, with your home, your wealth, and, what is more, your mind. You consoled me, bereaved of my father, with your friendship; you encouraged me with exhortation, you aided me with help. You, in our own town, through your favor, intimacy, and the sharing of your home, made me almost a distinguished leader along with yourself. When I returned to Carthage for the sake of a more illustrious profession, though I had opened my counsel and hope to you alone and to none of my kin, you hesitated somewhat through that love of country innate in you, because I was already teaching there. Yet when you could not overcome the desire of a youth tending toward those things which seemed better, you were changed from a dissuader into an assistant with a wonderful moderation of benevolence. You supported my journey with all necessities.

Tu ibidem rursus, qui cunabula, et quasi nidum studiorum meorum foveras, jam volare audentis sustentasti rudimenta. Tu etiam cum te absente atque ignorante navigassem, nihil succensens quod non tecum communicassem ut solerem, atque aliud quidvis quam contumaciam suspicans, mansisti inconcussus in amicitia; nec plus ante oculos tuos liberi deserti a magistro, quam nostrae mentis penetralia puritasque versata est.

4. Postremo quidquid de otio meo modo gaudeo; quod a superfluarum cupiditatum vinculis evolavi, quod depositis oneribus mortuarum curarum, respiro, resipisco, redeo ad me; quod quaero intentissimus veritatem, quod invenire jam ingredior, quod me ad summum ipsum modum perventurum esse confido; tu animasti, tu impulisti, tu fecisti. Cujus autem minister fueris, plus adhuc fide concepi, quam ratione comprehendi. Nam cum praesens praesenti tibi exposuissem interiores motus animi mei, vehementerque ac saepius assererem, nullam mihi videri prosperam fortunam, nisi quae otium philosophandi daret; nullam beatam vitam, nisi qua in philosophia viveretur: sed me tanto meorum onere, quorum ex officio meo vita penderet, multisque necessitatibus, vel vani mei pudoris, vel ineptae meorum miseriae refrenari: tam magno es elatus gaudio, tam sancto hujus vitae inflammatus ardore, ut te diceres, si tu ab illarum importunarum litium vinculis aliquo modo eximereris, omnia mea vincula etiam patrimonii tui mecum participatione rupturum.

5. Itaque cum admoto nobis fomite discessisses, nunquam cessavimus inhiantes in philosophiam, atque illam vitam quae inter nos placuit atque convenit, prorsus nihil aliud cogitare: atque id constanter quidem, sed minus acriter agebamus; putabamus tamen satis nos agere. Et quoniam nondum aderat ea flamma, quae summa nos arreptura erat; illamqua lenta aestuabamus, arbitrabamur vel esse maximam. Cum ecce tibi libri quidam pleni, ut ait Celsinus, bonas res arabicas ubi exhalarunt in nos, ubi illi flammulae instillarunt pretiosissimi unguenti guttas paucissimas; incredibile, Romaniane, incredibile, et ultra quam de me fortasse et tu credis; quid amplius dicam? etiam mihi ipsi de meipso incredibile incendium concitarunt. Quis me tunc honor, quae hominum pompa, quae inanis famae cupiditas, quod denique hujus mortalis vitae fomentum atque retinaculum commovebat? Prorsus totus in me cursim redibam. Respexi tantum, confiteor, quasi de itinere in illam religionem, quae pueris nobis insita est, et medullitus implicata: verum autem ipsa me ad se nescientem rapiebat. Itaque titubans, properans, haesitans arripio apostolum Paulum. Neque enim vere isti, inquam, tanta potuissent, vixissentque ita ut eos vixisse manifestum est, si eorum Litterae atque rationes huic tanto bono adversarentur. Perlegi totum intentissime atque cautissime.

There again, you who had cherished the cradle and, as it were, the nest of my studies, sustained the first attempts of one already daring to fly. Even when I had sailed while you were absent and ignorant of it, you were not at all angry that I had not communicated with you as I was wont to do, and suspecting anything rather than contumacy, you remained unshaken in friendship; nor did the children deserted by their master dwell more before your eyes than the inner recesses and purity of our mind.

4. Finally, whatever I now enjoy of my leisure; that I have flown out from the chains of superfluous desires, that having laid aside the burdens of dead cares, I breathe, I come to my senses, I return to myself; that I seek the truth most intently, that I am already entering upon finding it, that I trust I shall reach the very supreme measure; you encouraged, you impelled, you brought it about. Of whom, however, you have been the minister, I have conceived more by faith than I have grasped by reason. For when, being present with you, I had explained the interior motions of my mind, and asserted strongly and repeatedly that no fortune seemed prosperous to me except that which would give leisure for philosophizing; no happy life except that which would be lived in philosophy; but that I was restrained by so great a burden of my kin, whose life depended on my office, and by many necessities, either of my vain shame or the inept misery of my kin: you were uplifted with such great joy, inflamed with such holy ardor for this life, that you said that if you were in any way exempt from the chains of those troublesome lawsuits, you would break all my chains also by the participation of your patrimony with me.

5. And so, when you had departed after the fuel had been applied to us, we never ceased, panting after philosophy and that life which pleased and agreed between us, to think of absolutely nothing else. And indeed we did this constantly, but less sharply; yet we thought we were doing enough. And since that flame was not yet present which was to seize us at the height, we thought that the one with which we were slowly glowing was even the greatest. When, behold, certain books full—as Celsinus says—of good Arabic things, when they exhaled upon us, when they instilled a very few drops of most precious ointment into that little flame; incredible, Romanianus, incredible, and beyond what perhaps even you believe of me; what more shall I say? they excited an incredible conflagration even in me about myself. What honor then, what pomp of men, what empty desire for fame, what, finally, fuel and restraint of this mortal life moved me? I was returning entirely to myself at full speed. I only looked back, I confess, as if from a journey, to that religion which was implanted in us as children and entwined in our very marrow: but it was drawing me to itself without my knowing it. Therefore, stumbling, hurrying, hesitating, I seized the apostle Paul. For indeed, I said, these men could not have done such great things, and lived as it is manifest they lived, if their writings and reasons were opposed to this so great a good. I read through the whole most intently and most cautiously.

6. Tunc vero quantulocumque jam lumine asperso, tanta se mihi philosophiae facies aperuit, ut non dicam tibi, qui ejus incognitae fame semper arsisisti, sed si ipsi adversario tuo, a quo nescio utrum plus exercearis quam impediaris, eam demonstrare potuissem; nae ille et baias, et amoena pomaria, et delicata nitidaque convivia, et domesticos histriones, postremo quidquid eum acriter commovet in quascumque delicias, abjiciens et relinquens, ad ejus pulchritudinem blandus amator et sanctus, mirans, anhelans, aestuans advolaret. Habet enim et ille, quod confitendum est, quoddam decus animi, vel potius decoris quasi sementem, quod erumpere in veram pulchritudinem nitens, tortuose ac deformiter inter scabra vitiorum, et inter opinionum fallacium dumeta frondescit: tamen non cessat frondescere, et paucis acute ac diligenter in densa intuentibus quantum sinitur eminere. Inde est illa hospitalitas, inde in conviviis multa humanitatis condimenta, inde ipsa elegantia, nitor, mundissima facies rerum omnium, et undique cuncta perfluxdens adumbratae venustatis urbanitas.

CAPUT III.---Philocalia et Philosophia. Romanianum rursus ad philosophiam accendit.

7. Philocalia ista vulgo dicitur: ne contemnas nomen hoc ex vulgi nomine: nam philocalia et philosophia prope similiter cognominatae sunt, et quasi gentiles inter se videri volunt, et sunt. Quid est enim philosophia? Amor sapientiae. Quid philocalia? Amor pulchritudinis. Quaere de Graecis. Quid ergo sapientia? nonne ipsa vera est pulchritudo? Germanae igitur istae sunt prorsus, et eodem parente procreatae (Lib. 1 Retract., cap. 1, n. 3): sed illa visco libidinis detracta coelo suo, et inclusa cavea populari, viciniam tamen nominis tenuit, ad commonendum aucupem ne se contemnat. Hanc igitur sine pennis sordidatam et egentem volitans libere soror saepe agnoscit, sed raro liberat: non enim philocalia ista unde genus ducat agnoscit, nisi philosophia. Quam totam fabulam (nam subito Aesopus factus sum) Licentius tibi carmine suavius indicabit: poeta est enim pene perfectus. Ergo ille, si veram pulchritudinem cujus falsae amator est, sanatis renudatisque paululum oculis posset intueri, quanta voluptate philosophiae gremio se involveret? Quomodo ibi te cognitum, sicut verum fratrem amplecteretur? Miraris haec, et forsitan rides. Quid si haec explicarem ut volebam? quid si saltem vox, si adhuc facies videri a te non potest, ipsius philosophiae posset audiri? Mirareris profecto; sed non rideres, non desperares. Crede mihi, de nullo desperandum est, de talibus autem minime. Omnino sunt exempla; facile evadit, facile revolat hoc genus avium, multis inclusis multum mirantibus.

6. Then indeed, with some small light now sprinkled upon me, such a face of philosophy opened itself to me that—I will not say to you, who have always burned with hunger for it though unknown, but if I could have shown it to your very adversary, by whom I know not whether you are more exercised or impeded—surely he, casting aside and leaving both Baiae and pleasant orchards, and delicate and shining banquets, and domestic actors, finally whatever moves him sharply toward any delights, would fly toward its beauty as a charming and holy lover, wondering, panting, and glowing. For he also has, it must be confessed, a certain grace of mind, or rather a sort of seed of grace, which, striving to break forth into true beauty, puts forth leaves tortuously and deformedly among the scabbiness of vices and the thickets of fallacious opinions; yet it does not cease to put forth leaves, and to a few looking sharply and diligently into the dense parts, it stands out as much as it is permitted to emerge. Thence is that hospitality, thence the many seasonings of humanity in banquets, thence that very elegance, splendor, the most clean face of all things, and the urbanity of shadowed beauty pervading everything on all sides.

CHAPTER III.--Philocalia and Philosophy. He inflames Romanianus again for philosophy.

7. That is commonly called philocalia: do not despise this name because of the common name; for philocalia and philosophy are named almost similarly, and wish to be seen as of the same kin between themselves, and they are. For what is philosophy? The love of wisdom. What is philocalia? The love of beauty. Ask the Greeks. What then is wisdom? Is it not itself true beauty? These two are therefore truly sisters, and procreated from the same parent: but that one, drawn down from her heaven by the bird-lime of lust and enclosed in a popular cage, yet kept the vicinity of the name to remind the fowler not to despise her. This one, therefore, soiled without wings and needy, her sister flying freely often recognizes, but rarely liberates: for that philocalia does not recognize whence she draws her race, except by philosophy. Which whole fable (for I have suddenly become Aesop) Licentius will indicate to you more sweetly in a poem: for he is almost a perfect poet. Therefore, if he could behold the true beauty, of which he is a false lover, with his eyes healed and bared a little, with what pleasure would he wrap himself in the bosom of philosophy? How would he embrace you there, known as a true brother? You wonder at these things, and perhaps you laugh. What if I explained these things as I wished? what if at least the voice of philosophy herself could be heard, if her face cannot yet be seen by you? You would surely wonder; but you would not laugh, you would not despair. Believe me, no one is to be despaired of, and least of all of such as these. There are examples altogether; this kind of birds easily escapes, easily flies back, while many enclosed wonder much.

8. Sed ad nos redeamus, nos inquam, Romaniane, philosophemur: reddam tibi gratiam, filius tuus coepit jam philosophari: ego eum reprimo, ut disciplinis necessariis prius excultus vigentior et firmior insurgat, quarum te ne metuas expertem, si bene te novi, auras tibi liberas tantum opto. Nam de indole quid dicam? Utinam non tam rara esset in hominibus, quam certa est in te! Restant duo vitia, et impedimenta invenienda veritatis, a quibus tibi non multum timeo; timeo tamen ne te contemnas, atque inventurum esse desperes, aut certe ne invenisse te credas. Quorum primum, si tamen inest, ista tibi disputatio fortasse detrahet. Saepius enim succensuisti Academicis, eo quidem gravius, quo minus eruditus esses; sed eo libentius, quod veritatis amore illiciebaris. Itaque jam cum Alympio, te fautore, configam, et tibi facile persuadebo quod volo, probabiliter tamen. Nam ipsum verum non videbis, nisi in philosophiam totus intraveris. Illud autem alterum quod te fortasse aliquid invenisse praesumis, quamvis a nobis jam quaerens, dubitansque discesseris, tamen si quid superstitionis in animum revolutum est, ejicietur profecto, vel cum tibi aliquam inter nos disputationem de religione misero, vel cum praesens tecum multa contulero.

9. Ego enim nunc aliud nihil ago, quam me ipse purgo a vanis perniciosisque opinionibus. Itaque non dubito melius mihi esse, quam tibi. Unum tantum est unde invideam fortunae tuae, quod solus frueris Luciliano meo: an et tu invides quia dixi, meo? Sed quid dixi aliud quam tuo, et omnium quicumque unum sumus? De quo tamen ut subvenias desiderio meo, quid te rogem? Tu te ipse pro me roga quantum scis, quia debes. Sed nunc ambobus dico, cavete ne quid vos nosse arbitremini, nisi quod ita didiceritis, saltem ut nostis, unum, duo, tria, quatuor simul collecta in summam fieri decem. Sed item cavete ne vos in philosophia veritatem aut non cognituros, aut nullo modo ita posse cognosci arbitremini. Nam mihi vel potius illi credite qui ait, Quaerite et invenietis (Matth. VII, 7), nec cognitionem desperandam esse, et manifestiorem futuram, quam sunt illi numeri. Nunc ad propositum veniamus. Jam enim sero coepi metuere, ne hoc principium modum excederet, et non est leve. Nam modus procul dubio divinus est: sed fefellerit cum dulciter ducit, ero cautior cum sapiens fuero.

DISPUTATIO PRIMA.

CAPUT IV.---Repetuntur in priore libro disputata. 10.

8. But let us return to ourselves; let us, I say, Romanianus, philosophize: I will repay my gratitude to you; your son has already begun to philosophize: I restrain him, so that having been first cultivated in necessary disciplines, he may rise up more vigorous and firm, of which do not fear to be void; if I know you well, I only desire free breezes for you. For what shall I say of your natural disposition? Would that it were not as rare among men as it is certain in you! There remain two vices and impediments to finding the truth, from which I do not fear much for you; yet I fear lest you should despise yourself and despair of finding it, or certainly lest you should believe you have already found it. The first of which, if indeed it is present, this disputation will perhaps take away from you. For you have often been angry with the Academics, the more heavily indeed as you were less learned; but the more willingly because you were enticed by the love of truth. Therefore now I shall conflict with Alypius, with you as favorer, and I shall easily persuade you of what I wish, probably however. For you will not see the truth itself unless you enter entirely into philosophy. As for that other thing, that you perhaps presume you have found something, although you departed from us already seeking and doubting, yet if anything of superstition has rolled back into your mind, it will surely be cast out, either when I send you some disputation among us about religion, or when being present I confer many things with you.

9. For I am now doing nothing else than purging myself of vain and pernicious opinions. Therefore I do not doubt that it is better for me than for you. There is only one thing for which I envy your fortune, that you alone enjoy my Lucilianus: or do you also envy because I said, mine? But what have I said other than yours, and of all of us who are one? Of whom, however, that you may subvene to my desire, what shall I ask you? Ask him yourself for me as much as you know, because you ought to. But now I say to both of you: beware lest you think you know anything, except what you have learned in such a way as you know that one, two, three, and four collected together make the sum of ten. But likewise beware lest you think either that you will not know the truth in philosophy, or that it can in no way be known in that manner. For believe me, or rather Him who says, "Seek and you shall find" (Matt. VII, 7), that knowledge is not to be despaired of, and that it will be more manifest than those numbers are. Now let us come to our purpose. For I have already begun to fear too late lest this beginning should exceed its measure, and it is no light matter. For measure is without doubt divine: but let it have deceived while it leads sweetly; I shall be more cautious when I am wise.

FIRST DISPUTATION.

CHAPTER IV.---The things disputed in the former book are repeated.

CAPUT IV.---Repetuntur in priore libro disputata. 10. Post primum sermonem, quem in primum librum contulimus, septem fere diebus a disputando fuimus otiosi, cum tres tantum Virgilii libros post primum recenseremus, atque ut in tempore congruere videbatur, tractaremus. Quo tamen opere Licentius in poeticae studium sic inflammatus est, ut aliquantum mihi etiam reprimendus videretur. Jam enim ab hac intentione ad nullam se rem devocari libenter ferebat. Tandem tamen ad retractandam quam distuleramus de Academicis quaestionem, cum a me, quantum potui, lumen philosophiae laudaretur, non invitus accessit: et forte dies ita serenus effulserat, ut nulli prorsus rei magis, quam serenandis animis nostris congruere videretur. Maturius itaque solito lectos reliquimus, paululumque cum rusticis egimus, quod tempus urgebat. Tum Alypius: Antequam vos, inquit, audiam de Academicis disputantes, volo mihi legatur sermo ille vester quem dicitis me absente perfectum: non enim possum aliter, cum inde hujus disceptationis occasio nata sit, in audiendis vobis non aut errare, aut certe laborare. Quod cum factum esset, et in eo pene totum antemeridianum tempus consumptum videremus; redire ab agro, qui deambulantes nos acceperat, domum instituimus. Et Licentius: Quaeso, inquit, ante prandium mihi breviter totam Academicorum sententiam exponendo repetere ne graveris, ne quid in ea me fugiat, quod pro partibus meis sit. Faciam, inquam, et eo libentius quo de hac re cogitans parum prandear. Ne, inquit ille, isthinc securus sis: nam et multos, et maxime patrem meum saepe animadverti eo edaciorum, quo refertior curis esset. Deinde tu quoque de istis metris cogitantem non sic expertus es, ut cura mea mensa segura sit. Quod quidem apud meipsum mirari soleo: quid enim sibi vult, quod tunc cibum pertinacius appetimus cum in aliud intendimus animum? Aut quid est quod manibus et dentibus nostris, occupatis nobis, animus imperiosus fit? Audi potius, inquam, de Academicis quod rogaveras, ne te metra ista volentem, non solum in epulis sine metro, sed etiam in quaestionibus patiar. Si quid autem pro mea parte occultabo, prodet Alypius. Bona fide tua opus est, inquit Alypius: nam si metuendum est, ne aliquid occultes, a me deprehendi difficile posse arbitror eum, a quo me ista didicisse nullus qui me novit ignorat, praesertim cum in prodendo vero non magis victoriae, quam animo tuo consulturus sis.

CAPUT V.

Academicorum placita.

10. After the former discourse, which we have brought together into the first book, we were at leisure from disputing for about seven days, while we reviewed only three books of Virgil after the first, and treated them as seemed to agree with the time. In which work, however, Licentius was so inflamed with the study of poetry that it seemed to me he even had to be somewhat restrained. For now he did not willingly allow himself to be called away from this intention to anything else. At last, however, he approached not unwillingly to review the question about the Academics which we had deferred, since the light of philosophy was being praised by me as much as I could. And by chance the day had shone forth so serene that it seemed to agree with nothing more than the serenading of our minds. Therefore we left our beds earlier than usual, and dealt a little with the country folk, as time pressed. Then Alypius said: "Before I hear you disputing about the Academics, I wish that discourse of yours which you say was finished in my absence to be read to me; for I cannot otherwise, since the occasion of this discussion was born from there, avoid either erring or certainly laboring in hearing you." When this was done, and we saw that almost the whole morning time was consumed in it, we resolved to return home from the field which had received us as we walked. And Licentius said: "I beg you, before lunch, do not be reluctant to repeat by explaining briefly the whole opinion of the Academics, lest anything in it escape me which may be for my part." "I will do so," I said, "and the more willingly so that, thinking on this matter, you may eat little lunch." "Do not be secure on that account," he said; "for I have often noticed many, and especially my father, to be more voracious as he was more stuffed with cares." Then you also have not so experienced me thinking on those meters that my care should make the table secure. Which indeed I am wont to wonder at in myself: for what does it mean that we then seek food more pertinaciously when we intend our mind toward something else? Or what is it that, when our hands and teeth are occupied, the mind becomes imperious? "Listen rather," I said, "to what you had asked about the Academics, lest I suffer you revolving those meters not only without meter at feasts, but even in questions." If, however, I hide anything on my part, Alypius will betray it. "Your good faith is needed," said Alypius; "for if it is to be feared lest you hide anything, I think it is difficult for me to detect him from whom no one who knows me is ignorant that I have learned these things, especially since in bringing forth the truth you will consult not more for victory than for your own mind."

CHAPTER V.

The opinions of the Academics.

11. Agam, inquam, bona fide, quoniam de jure praescribis. Nam et Academicis placuit, nec homini scientiam posse contingere earum duntaxat rerum, quae ad philosophiam pertinent; nam caetera curare se Carneades negabat; et tamen hominem posse esse sapientem, sapientisque totum munus, ut abs te quoque, Licenti, illo sermone dissertum est, in conquisitione veri explicari. Ex quo confici, ut nulli etiam rei sapiens assentiatur: erret enim necesse est, quod sapienti nefas est, si assentiatur rebus incertis. Et omnia incerta esse non dicebant solum, verum etiam copiosissimis rationibus affirmabant. Sed verum non posse comprehendere, ex illa stoici Zenonis definitione arripuisse videbantur, qui ait id verum percipi posse, quod ita esset animo impressum ex eo unde esset, ut esse non posset ex eo unde non esset. Quod brevius planiusque sic dicitur, his signis verum posse comprehendere, quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est. Hoc prorsus non posse inveniri, vehementissime ut convincerent incubuerunt. Inde dissensiones philosophorum, inde sensuum fallaciae, inde somnia furoresque, inde pseudomeni et soritae in illius causae patrocinio viguerunt. Et cum ab eodem Zenone acceperant, nihil esse turpius quam opinari, confecerunt callidissime, ut si nihil percipi posset, et esset opinatio turpissima, nihil unquam sapiens approbaret.

12. Hinc eis invidia magna conflata est: videbatur enim esse consequens, ut nihil ageret, qui nihil approbaret. Unde dormientem semper, et officiorum omnium desertorem, sapientem suum Academici describere videbantur, quem nihil approbare censebant. Hic illi inducto quodam probabili, quod etiam verisimile nominabant, nullo modo cessare sapientem ab officiis asserebant, cum haberet quid sequeretur; veritas autem sive propter naturae tenebras quasdam, sive propter similitudinem rerum, vel obruta, vel confusa latitaret. Quamvis et ipsam refrenationem et quasi suspensionem assensionis magnam prorsus actionem sapientis esse dicebant. Videor mihi breviter totum, ut voluisti, exposuisse, nihilque recessisse a praescriptione, Alypi, tua: id est egisse, ut dicitur, bona fide. Si enim aliquid vel non ita ut est dixi, vel forte non dixi; nihil voluntate a me factum est. Bona ergo fides est, ex animi sententia. Homini enim homo falsus docendus, fallax cavendus debet videri: quorum prius magistrum bonum, posterius discipulum cautum desiderat.

11. "I will act," I said, "in good faith, since you prescribe it by right." For it also pleased the Academics that knowledge cannot happen to man, at least of those things which pertain to philosophy; for Carneades denied that he cared for other things; and yet that a man can be wise, and that the whole duty of the wise man, as was also discussed by you, Licentius, in that discourse, is unfolded in the search for truth. From which it follows that the wise man should not assent to any thing; for he must necessarily err, which is a crime for a wise man, if he should assent to uncertain things. And they did not only say that all things are uncertain, but they also affirmed it with most copious reasons. But they seemed to have snatched the idea that truth cannot be comprehended from that definition of the Stoic Zeno, who says that that truth can be perceived which was so impressed on the mind from that whence it was, that it could not be from that whence it was not. Which is said more briefly and clearly thus: that truth can be comprehended by those signs which a false thing cannot have. They applied themselves most vehemently to convince that this can by no means be found. Thence the dissensions of philosophers, thence the fallacies of the senses, thence dreams and madresses, thence "the liars" (*pseudomeni*) and "heaps" (*soritae*) flourished in the patronage of that cause. And when they had received from the same Zeno that nothing is more shameful than to form an opinion (*opinari*), they concluded most shrewdly that if nothing could be perceived, and opinion-forming was most shameful, the wise man should never approve anything.

12. Hence a great envy was stirred up against them: for it seemed to be a consequence that he who approved nothing should do nothing. Whence the Academics seemed to describe their wise man, whom they thought should approve nothing, as always sleeping and a deserter of all duties (*officiorum*). Here they, having introduced a certain "probable" thing, which they also named "likely" (*verisimile*), asserted that the wise man by no means ceased from duties since he had something to follow; but the truth, either because of certain darknesses of nature or because of the similarity of things, lay hidden either overwhelmed or confused. Although they also said that that very restraint and, as it were, suspension of assent was indeed a great action of the wise man. I seem to myself to have explained the whole briefly, as you wished, and to have receded in nothing from your prescription, Alypius: that is, to have acted, as is said, in good faith. For if I said anything either not as it is, or perhaps did not say it; nothing was done by my will. Good faith, therefore, is according to the mind's judgment. For a false man should seem to a man as one to be taught, and a deceitful man as one to be avoided: the former of which requires a good master, the latter a cautious disciple.

13. Tum Alypius: Gratum, inquit, habeo, cum et Licentio a te satisfactum est, et me onere imposito relevasti. Non enim magis tibi verendum erat, ne quid explorandi mei causa minus a te diceretur (nam alio modo qui fieri poterat?) quam mihi, si in quoquam te prode fuisset necesse. Quare faxis, ut illud quod deest, non tam percontationi, quam ipsi percontanti, de differentia novae ac veteris Academiae, ne te pigeat exponere. Prorsus, inquam, fateor, piget. Quare beneficium dederis (nam et hoc quod commemoras, ad rem maxime pertinere negare non possum), si me paululum conquiescente, apud me distinguere ista nomina, et causam novae Academiae aperire volueris. Crederem, inquit, me quoque a prandio te avocare voluisse, ni te magis a Licentio territum dudum putarem, et ejus postulatio ita nobis praescripsisset, ut ei ante prandium quidquid hujus involutionis esset, expediretur. Et cum reliqua dicere tenderet, mater nostra (nam domi jam eramus) ita nos trudere in prandium coepit, ut verba faciendi locus non esset.

DISPUTATIO SECUNDA.

CAPUT VI.---Academiae novae et veteris discidium.

14. Deinde, cum tantum alimentorum accepissemus, quantum compescendae fami satis esset; ad pratum regressis nobis, Alypius, Paream, inquit, sententiae tuae, nec ausim recusare. Si enim nihil me fugerit, gratabor eum doctrinae tuae, tum etiam memoriae meae. At si in quoquam fortasse aberravero, recurabis id, ut deinceps hujusmodi delegationem non pertimescam. Novae Academiae discidium non tam contra veterem conceptum, quam contra Stoicos arbitror esse commotum. Nec vero discidium est putandum, siquidem a Zenone illatam novam quaestionem dissolvi discutique oportebat. Nam de non percipiendo, quamvis nullis conflictationibus agitata, incolens tamen etiam veterum Academicorum mentes sententia non impudenter existimata est. Quod etiam ipsius Socratis Platonisque ac reliquorum veterum auctoritate probatu facile est, qui se hactenus crediderunt ab errore posse defendi, si se assensionem non temere commisissent: quamvis propriam de hac re disputationem in scholas suas non introduxerint, nec ab illis enucleate aliquando quaesitum sit, percipi, necne veritas possit. Quod cum Zeno rude ac novum intulisset, contenderetque nihil percipi posse, nisi quod verum ita esset, ut dissimilibus notis a falso discerneret, neque opinionem subeundam esse sapienti, atque id Archesilas audiret; negavit hujusmodi quidquam posse ab homine reperiri, neque illi opinionis naufragio sapientis committendam esse vitam. Unde etiam conclusit, nulli rei esse assentiendum.

13. Then Alypius said: "I am grateful, since both Licentius has been satisfied by you, and you have relieved me of the burden imposed." For you did not have more to fear lest anything should be said by you less for the sake of testing me (for in what other way could it happen?) than I, if it had been necessary to betray you in anything. Wherefore see to it that you are not reluctant to explain that which is lacking, not so much to the inquiry as to the inquirer himself, concerning the difference of the New and Old Academy. Indeed," I said, "I confess, I am reluctant. Wherefore you will have done a benefit (for I cannot deny that this which you mention pertains most to the matter) if, while I rest a little, you would be willing to distinguish those names in my presence and open the cause of the New Academy." "I would believe," he said, "that I also wished to call you away from lunch, were I not thinking that you were recently more terrified by Licentius, and his postulation had so prescribed to us that whatever of this involvement there was should be expedited for him before lunch." And when he was tending to say the rest, our mother (for we were already at home) began to push us into lunch so that there was no place for making words.

SECOND DISPUTATION.

CHAPTER VI.---The division of the New and Old Academy.

14. Then, when we had taken as much food as was enough for restraining hunger; having returned to the meadow, Alypius said: "I should obey your opinion, nor should I dare to refuse." For if nothing escapes me, I will be grateful for it to your teaching, and then also to my memory. But if in anything I shall perhaps have wandered, you will care for it again, so that hereafter I may not dread a delegation of this kind. I think that the division of the New Academy was moved not so much against the Old concept as against the Stoics. Nor indeed is it to be thought a division, since it was necessary that the new question introduced by Zeno should be dissolved and discussed. For concerning non-perception, although agitated by no conflicts, the opinion inhabiting even the minds of the Old Academics was not impudently estimated. Which also is easy to prove by the authority of Socrates himself and Plato and the rest of the ancients, who believed that they could be defended from error thus far, if they had not rashly committed themselves to assent: although they did not introduce a proper disputation about this matter into their schools, nor was it ever clearly sought by them whether truth can be perceived or not. When Zeno had introduced this as something rude and new, and contended that nothing can be perceived unless the truth were such that it was discerned from the false by dissimilar signs, and that opinion-forming was not to be undergone by the wise man; and Arcesilaus heard this; he denied that anything of this kind could be found by man, nor that the life of the wise man should be committed to that shipwreck of opinion. Whence he also concluded that one should assent to no thing.

15. Verum cum ita res se haberet, ut vetus Academia magis aucta, quam oppugnata videretur; exstitit Philonis auditor Antiochus, qui, ut nonnullis visus est, gloriae cupidior quam veritatis, in similitudinem adduxit Academiae utriusque sententias. Dicebat enim rem insolitam, et ab opinione veterum remotissimam Academicos novos conatos inducere. In quam rem veterum physicorum aliorumque magnorum philosophorum implorabat fidem; ipsos etiam Academicos oppugnans, qui se verisimile contenderent sequi, cum ipsum verum se ignorare faterentur. Multaque argumenta collegerat, quibus nunc supersedendum arbitror: nihil tamen magis defendebat, quam verum percipere posse sapientem. Hanc puto inter Academicos novos ac veteres controversiam fuisse. Quae si secus se habet, ut Licentium plenissime informes, pro utroque postulaverim. Si vero ita est, ut dicere potui, susceptam disputationem peragite.

CAPUT VII.

Adversus Academicos.

16. Tum ego: Quamdiu, inquam, Licenti, in isto nostro longiore quam putabam sermone conquiescis? Audisti qui sint Academici tui? At ille verecunde arridens, et aliquantum hac compellatione turbator: Poenitet me, inquit, tantopere affirmasse contra Trygetium, beatam vitam in veritatis inquisitione consistere. Nam me ista quaestio ita perturbat, ut vix non miser sim, qui certe vobis, si quid humanitatis geritis, videor miserandus. Sed quid me ipse ineptus crucio? aut quid exhorreo tanta causae bonitate subnixus? Prorsus non cedam nisi veritati. Placentne, inquam, tibi novi Academici? Plurimum, inquit. Ergo verum videntur tibi dicere? Tum ille cum jam esset assensurus, arrisione Alypii cautior factus, haesit aliquantum. Et deinde: Repete, inquit, rogatiunculam. Verumne, inquam, tibi videntur Academici dicere? Et rursum cum diu tacuisset: Utrum, ait, verum sit, nescio: probabile est tamen. Neque enim plus video quod sequar. Probabile, inquam, scisne ab ipsis etiam verisimile nominari? Ita, inquit, videtur. Ergo, inquam, verisimilis est Academicorum sententia. Ita, inquit. Jam quaeso attende, inquam, diligentius. Si quisquam fratrem tuum visum patris tui similem esse affirmet, ipsumque tuum patrem non noverit; nonne tibi insanus, aut ineptus videbitur? Et hic diu tacuit. Tum ait, Non mihi hoc videtur absurdum.

15. But when the matter stood so that the Old Academy seemed rather increased than attacked; there stood forth Antiochus, an auditor of Philo, who, as he seemed to some, more desirous of glory than of truth, brought the opinions of both Academies into a rivalry (*simulatem*). For he said that the New Academics were attempting to introduce an unusual thing and one most remote from the opinion of the ancients. In which matter he implored the faith of the old physicists and other great philosophers; attacking also the Academics themselves, who contended that they followed the likely (*verisimile*), while they confessed that they themselves were ignorant of the truth itself. And he had collected many arguments, which I think should now be omitted: however, he defended nothing more than that the wise man can perceive the truth. I think this was the controversy between the New and Old Academics. Which if it is otherwise, I would ask for both that you inform Licentius most fully. If however it is so, as I have been able to say, complete the disputation undertaken.

CHAPTER VII.

Against the Academics.

16. Then I said: "How long, Licentius, do you rest in that discourse of ours, longer than I thought?" Have you heard who your Academics are?" But he, smiling bashfully, and somewhat more disturbed by this address: "I repent," he said, "of having affirmed so much against Trygetius, that the happy life (*beata vita*) consists in the search for truth. For that question so disturbs me that I am scarcely not wretched, who certainly seem to you, if you bear any humanity, one to be pitied. But why do I, inept, torture myself? Or why do I shudder, supported by such goodness of the cause? Indeed, I will not yield except to the truth." "Do the New Academics please you?" I asked. "Very much," he said. "Therefore, do they seem to you to say what is true?" Then he, when he was already about to assent, having become more cautious by the smile of Alypius, hesitated somewhat. And then he said: "Repeat the little question." "Do the Academics," I said, "seem to you to say what is true?" And again when he had been silent for a long time, he said: "Whether it be true, I know not: yet it is probable. For I see nothing more that I should follow." "The probable," I said, "do you know that it is also named by them 'likely' (*verisimile*)?" "So," he said, "it seems." "Therefore," I said, "the opinion of the Academics is likely." "So," he said. "Now I beg you, attend more diligently. If anyone should affirm that your brother seen is like your father, and he has not known your father himself; will he not seem to you insane or inept?" And here he was silent for a long time. Then he said: "This does not seem absurd to me."

17. Cui ego cum respondere coepissem; Exspecta, inquit, quaeso, paululum. Ac post arridens, Dic mihi, ait, oro te, jamne certus es de victory tua? Tum ego: Fac me, inquam, certum esse: non ideo tamen tu causam tuam debes deserere, praesertim cum haec inter nos disputatio suscepta sit exercendi tui causa, et ad eliminandum animum provocandi. Numquidnam, inquit, aut Academicos legi, aut tot disciplinis eruditus sum, quibus tu ad me instructus adventas? Academicos, inquam, nec illi legerant a quibus primo sententia ista defensa est. Eruditio autem disciplinarumque copia si te deficit, non usque adeo tamen ingenium tuum esse debet invalidum, ut nullo facto impetu paucissimis verbis meis rogationibusque succumbas. Illud enim jam vereri coepi, ne tibi citius quam volo succedat Alypius, quo adversario non ita securus deambulabo. Ergo utinam, inquit ille, jam vincar, ut aliquando vos audiam disserentes, et quod plus est, videam; quo mihi spectaculo nihil potest felicius exhiberi. Nam quoniam placuit vobis ista fundere, potius quam effundere; siquidem ore prorumpentia stilo excipitis, nec in terram, ut dicitur, cadere sinitis; legere etiam vos licebit: sed nescio quomodo, cum admoventur oculis iidem ipsi quos inter sermo caeditur; bona disputatio si non utilius, at certe laetius perfundit animum.

18. Gratum habemus, inquam: sed repentina ista gaudia tua temere illam sententiam evadere coegerunt, qua dixisti, nullum tibi spectaculum exhiberi posse felicius. Quid si enim illum patrem tuum, quo profecto nemo philosophiam est post tam longam sitim hausturus ardentius, nobiscum ista quaerentem ac disserentem videbis; cum ego me fortunatiorem nunquam putabo, quid te tandem sentire ac dicere convenit? Hic vero ille aliquantum lacrymavit, et ubi loqui potuit, porrecta manu coelum suspiciens: Et quando ego, inquit, Deus, hoc videbo? sed nihil est de te desperandum. Hic cum pene omnes ab intentione disputationis remitti in lacrymas coepissemus, obluctans mecum, et vix me colligans: Age potius, inquam, et in vires tuas redi; quas ut congereres unde unde posses, patronus Academiae futurus, longe ante monueram: non opinor ideo ut modo ante tubam tremor occupet artus (Aeneid. lib. 11, v. 424); aut ut visendae alienae pugnae desiderio, tam cito te optes esse captivum. Hic Trygetius, ubi satis attendit jam vultus nostros serenatos: Quidni iste optet, inquit, homo tam sanctus, ut hoc ei Deus ante vota concesserit? Crede jam, Licenti; nam qui non invenis quid respondeas, et adhuc ut vincere optas, parvae fidei mihi videris. Arrisimus. Tum Licentius: Loquere beatus, inquit, non inveniendo verum, sed certe, non quaerendo.

17. To whom when I had begun to respond, he said: "Wait, I beg you, a little while." And after smiling, he said: "Tell me, I pray you, are you now certain of your victory?" Then I: "Suppose me," I said, "to be certain: yet you ought not for that reason to desert your cause, especially since this disputation between us was undertaken for the sake of exercising you and of provoking you to polish your mind." "Have I," he said, "either read the Academics, or been erudite in so many disciplines with which you come instructed to me?" "The Academics," I said, "even those had not read by whom that opinion was first defended." Moreover, if erudition and abundance of disciplines fail you, yet your genius ought not to be so invalid that, having made no onset, you should succumb to my very few words and questions. For I have already begun to fear lest Alypius should succeed you sooner than I wish, with whom as an adversary I shall not walk about so secure." Therefore," he said, "would that I were already conquered, that I might at length hear you discussing, and what is more, see you; than which spectacle nothing more happy can be exhibited to me. For since it has pleased you to pour these things out (*fundere*), rather than to spill them (*effundere*); since you receive the things breaking forth from the mouth with a pen, and do not allow them to fall to the ground, as is said; it will also be allowed to read you: but I know not how, when those very same persons between whom the discourse is cut are moved to the eyes, a good disputation, if not more usefully, at least certainly more joyfully, perfuses the mind.

18. "We are grateful," I said: "but those sudden joys of yours have rashly forced that sentence to escape, in which you said that no spectacle more happy could be exhibited to you. What if you shall see that father of yours, than whom surely no one is going to drink philosophy more ardently after so long a thirst, seeking and discussing those things with us; when I shall never think myself more fortunate, what at length is it fitting for you to feel and say?" Here indeed he wept somewhat, and when he could speak, looking up to heaven with hand outstretched: "And when, O God," he said, "shall I see this? But nothing is to be despaired of concerning you." Here when almost all of us had begun to be relaxed from the intention of the disputation into tears, struggling with myself and scarcely collecting myself: "Come rather," I said, "and return into your strengths; which I had warned you long before to gather from wherever you could, since you were going to be the patron of the Academy: I do not think for this reason, that just now 'tremor should occupy the limbs before the trumpet' (*Aeneid* lib. 11, v. 424); or that from the desire of seeing another's fight, you should wish so quickly to be a captive." Here Trygetius, when he sufficiently noticed our faces already serenely: "Why should he not wish," he said, "a man so holy, that God should grant this to him before his vows? Believe now, Licentius; for you who do not find what you should respond, and still wish that you be conquered, seem to me of little faith." We smiled. Then Licentius: "Speak, happy one," he said, "not by finding the truth, but certainly, by not seeking it."

19. Qua hilaritate adolescentulorum cum essemus laetiores; Attende, inquam, rogationem, et in viam redi firmior et valentior, si potes. En adsum, inquit, quantum possum. Quid enim si ille fratris mei visor fama compertum habeat eum esse similem patris, potest insanus aut ineptus esse, si credit? Stultusne, inquam, saltem dici potest? Non continuo, inquit, nisi se id scire contenderit. Nam si ut probabile sequitur quod crebra fama jactavit, nullius temeritatis argui potest. Tum ego: Rem ipsam paulisper consideremus, et quasi ante oculos constituamus. Ecce fac illum nescio quem hominem quem describimus, esse praesentem: advenit alicunde frater tuus; ibi iste: Cujus hic puer filius? Respondetur: Cujusdam Romaniani. At hic: Quam patri similis est! quam ad me hoc non temere fama detulerat! Hic tu, vel quis alius: Nosti enim Romanianum, bone homo? Non novi, inquit: tamen similis ejus mihi vederur. Poteritne quisquam risum tenere? Nullo modo, inquit. Ergo, inquam, quid sequatur vides. Jamdudum, inquit, video. Sed tamen istam conclusionem abs te audire volo: oportet enim alere incipias, quem cepisti. Quidni, inquam, concludam? Ipsa res clamat similiter ridendos esse Academicos tuos, qui se in vita veri similitudinem sequi dicunt, cum ipsum verum quid sit, ignorent.

CAPUT VIII.

Academicorum cavillatio.

20. Tum Trygetius: Longe mihi, inquit, videtur dissimilis Academicorum cautio ab hujus quem descripsisti ineptia. Illi enim rationibus assequuntur quod dicunt esse verisimile: iste autem ineptus famam secutus est, cujus auctoritate nihil est vilius. Quasi vero, inquam, non ineptior esset, si diceret, Patrem quidem ejus minime novi, nec fama comperi quam sit similis patris, et mihi tamen similis videtur. Ineptior certe, inquit. Sed quorsum ista? Quia tales, inquam, sunt, qui dicunt, Verum quidem non novimus; sed hoc quod videmus, ejus quod non novimus simile est. Probabile, inquit, illi dicunt. Cui ego: Quomodo istuc dicis? An negas eos verisimile dicere? Et ille inquit: Ego ob hoc dicere volui, ut illam similitudinem excluderem. Videbatur enim mihi fama improbe irruisse in quaestionem vestram, cum Academici ne oculis quidem credant humanis, nedum famae mille quidem, ut poetae fingunt, sed monstrosis tamen luminibus. Nam quis ego tandem sum Academiae defensor? An in quaestione ista invidetis securitati meae? En habes Alypium, cujus adventus nobis, quaeso, ferias dederit, quem te jamdudum non frustra formidare arbitramur.

19. At which hilarity of the youths when we were more joyful: "Attend," I said, "to the question, and return into the way firmer and more valiant, if you can." "Lo, I am here," he said, "as much as I can. For what if that observer of my brother should have it found by fame that he is like the father; can he be insane or inept if he believes?" "Can he at least," I asked, "be called foolish?" "Not immediately," he said, "unless he should contend that he knows it. For if he follows as probable what frequent fame has boasted, he can be argued of no temerity." Then I: "Let us consider the matter itself for a little while, and as it were set it before our eyes. Lo, suppose that I know not what man whom we describe is present: your brother arrives from somewhere; there that man asks: 'Whose son is this boy?' It is responded: 'Of a certain Romanianus.' But he: 'How like he is to his father! How not rashly fame had reported this to me!' Here you, or someone else: 'Do you know Romanianus, good man?' 'I do not know him,' he says: 'yet he seems to me like him.' Will anyone be able to hold back laughter?" "By no means," he said. "Therefore," I said, "you see what follows." "For some time now," he said, "I have seen it. But yet I wish to hear that conclusion from you: for it is fitting that you begin to nourish him whom you have taken." "Why should I not," I said, "conclude? The matter itself cries out that your Academics are similarly to be laughed at, who say that they follow the likelihood of truth in life, while they are ignorant of what the truth itself is."

CHAPTER VIII.

The cavil of the Academics.

20. Then Trygetius said: "The caution of the Academics seems to me far dissimilar from the ineptitude of this man whom you have described. For those follow by reasons what they say is likely (*verisimile*): but this inept man followed fame, than whose authority nothing is more vile." "As if indeed," I said, "he would not be more inept if he should say: 'I have not known his father at all, nor have I found by fame how like he is to his father, and yet he seems like him to me.'" More inept certainly," he said. But whither these things?" "Because such," I said, "are those who say: 'We do not know the truth, indeed; but this which we see is like that which we do not know.'" They say 'the probable,'" he said. To whom I: "How do you say that? Or do you deny that they say 'the likely' (*verisimile*)?" And he said: "I wished to say it for this reason, that I might exclude that similarity. For it seemed to me that fame had improperly rushed into your question, since the Academics do not believe even human eyes, let alone fame with its thousand indeed, as poets feign, but yet monstrous eyes (*luminibus*). For who at length am I, a defender of the Academy? Or do you envy my security in that question? Lo, you have Alypius, whose arrival, I beg, should give us holidays, whom we think you have been dreading for some time not in vain."

21. Tum facto silentio, oculos ambo in Alympium contulerunt. Tum ille: Vellem, inquit, quidem, ut meae vires patiuntur, auxiliari aliquatenus partibus vestris, nisi mihi omen vestrum terrori esset. Sed hanc formidinem, ni me spes fefellerit, facile fugem. Simul enim solatur me, quod praesens Academicorum oppugnator, onus Trygetii victi pene subierit, et nunc eum victorem vestra confessione probabile est. Illud magis vereor, ne et deserti officii negligentiam, et invasi impudentiam, devitare non possim. Non enim vos oblitos credo, iudicis mihi munus fuisse delatum. Hic Trygetius: Illud, inquit, aliud, hoc autem aliud est; quare quaesumus, ut te aliquando patiari privatim. Ne renuerim, ait; nedum impudentiam vel negligentiam vitare cupio, in superbiae, quo vitio nihil est immanius, laqueos incidam, si honorem mihi a vobis concessum, diutius quam permittitis teneam.

CAPUT IX.

De Academicorum sententia serio deinceps disputandum.

22. Proinde velim mihi exponas, bone accusator Academicorum, officium tuum; id est, in quorum defensionem hos oppugnes. Metuo enim, ne Academicos refellens, Academicum te probare velis. Accusatorum, inquam, ut opinor, duo genera esse bene nosti: non enim si a Cicerone modestissime dictum est, ita eum Verris esse accusatorem, ut Siculorum defensor esset (Cicero in Verrem, actione 1), propterea necesse est, eum qui aliquem accusat, habere alterum quem defendat. Et ille: Saltem habesne tu quidquam in quo sententia tua jam fundata constiterit? Facile est, inquam, huic rogationi respondere, mihi praesertim cui repentina non est: jam hoc totum mecum egi, et diu multumque versavi animo. Quamobrem audi, Alympi, quod, ut arbitror, jam optime scis: non ego istam disputationem disputandi gratia susceptam volo; satis sit quod cum istis adolescentibus praelusimus, ubi libenter nobiscum philosophia quasi jocata est. Quare auferantur de manibus nostris fabellae pueriles. De vita nostra, de moribus, de animo res agitur; qui se superaturum inimicitias omnium fallaciarum, et veritate comprehensa, quasi in regionem suae originis rediens, triumphaturum de libidinibus, atque ita temperantia velut conjuge accepta regnaturum esse praesumit, securior rediturus in coelum (Lib. 1 Retract., cap. 1, n. 3). Vides quid dicam? Tollamus de medio jam cuncta ista: arma acri facienda viro (Aeneid. lib. 8, v. 304); nec quidquam minus semper optavi, quam inter eos, qui secum multum vixerunt, multumque sermocinati sunt, oriri aliquid, unde novus quasi conflictus exsurgat.

21. Then silence being made, both turned their eyes toward Alypius. Then he said: "I would wish indeed, as much as my strengths allow, to help your parts to some extent, unless your omen were a terror to me. But this dread, unless hope has deceived me, I should easily put to flight. For at the same time it consoles me that the present attacker of the Academics has almost undergone the burden of the conquered Trygetius, and now it is probable that he is the victor by your confession. I fear that more, lest I should not be able to avoid both the negligence of a deserted office and the impudence of an invaded one. For I do not believe you have forgotten that the duty of a judge had been conferred on me." Here Trygetius: "That is one thing," he said, "and this is another; wherefore we beg that you allow yourself at length to be a private citizen." Lest I should refuse," he said; "while I desire to avoid impudence or negligence, I might fall into the snares of pride, than which vice nothing is more monstrous, if I should hold the honor granted to me by you longer than you permit."

CHAPTER IX.

That the opinion of the Academics must be seriously disputed hereafter.

22. "Therefore I should wish you to explain to me, good accuser of the Academics, your office; that is, in whose defense you attack these. For I fear lest, refuting the Academics, you should wish to prove yourself an Academic." "Of accusers," I said, "as I think, you know well that there are two kinds: for if it was said most modestly by Cicero that he was so the accuser of Verres as to be the defender of the Sicilians (*Cicero in Verrem*, action 1), it is not therefore necessary that he who accuses someone should have another whom he defends." And he said: "At least do you have anything in which your opinion already founded has stood firm?" "It is easy," I said, "to respond to this question, especially for me to whom it is not sudden: I have already dealt with this whole thing with myself, and turned it over long and much in my mind. Wherefore hear, Alypius, what, as I think, you already know best: I do not wish that disputation to be undertaken for the sake of disputing; let it be enough that we have precluded with these youths, where philosophy has willingly joked as it were with us. Therefore let childish fables be taken from our hands. The matter is dealt with concerning our life, concerning manners, concerning the mind; which presumes that it will overcome the enmities of all fallacies, and, truth being comprehended, as if returning into the region of its origin, will triumph over lusts, and so, temperance being accepted as a spouse, will reign, about to return more secure into heaven (*Retractions* lib. 1, ch. 1, n. 3). Do you see what I say? Let us take all those things out of the way now: 'arms must be made by a sharp man' (*Aeneid* lib. 8, v. 304); nor have I ever wished anything less than that something should arise among those who have lived much together and talked much, whence a new conflict as it were should arise.

Sed propter memoriam, quae infida custos est excogitatorum, referri in litteras volui, quod inter nos saepe pertractavimus, simul ut isti adolescentes, et in haec attendere discerent, et aggredi ac subire tentarent.

23. Tunc ergo nescis, nihil me certum adhuc habere quod sentiam, sed ab eo quaerendo Academicorum argumentis atque disputationibus impediri? Nescio enim quomodo fecerunt in animo quamdam probabilitatem (ut ab eorum verbo nondum recedam), quod homo verum invenire non possit: unde piger et prorsus segnis effectus eram, nec quaerere audebam, quod acutissimis ac doctissimis viris invenire non licuit. Nisi ergo prius tam mihi persuasero verum posse inveniri, quam sibi illi non posse persuaserunt; non audebo quaerere, nec habeo aliquid quod defendam. Itaque istam interrogationem remove, si placet, et potius discutiamus inter nos, quam sagaciter possumus, utrumnam possit verum inveniri. Et pro parte mea videor mihi habere jam multa, quibus contra rationem Academicorum niti molior: inter quos et me modo interim nihil distat, nisi quod illis probabile visum est, non posse inveniri veritatem; mihi autem inveniri posse probabile est. Nam ignoratio veri, aut mihi, si illi fingeant, peculiaris est, aut certe utrisque communis.

CAPUT X.

Verborum controversia non est quae habetur cum Academicis, sed rerum.

24. Tum Alypius: Jam, inquit, securus incedam: video enim te non tam accusatorem, quam adiutorem fore. Itaque ne longius abeamus, videamus quaeso prius ne per hanc quaestionem in qua successisse videor iis qui tibi cesserunt, in verbi controversiam decidamus, quod te ipso insinuante ex auctoritate illa Tulliana turpissimum esse, saepe confessi sumus. Cum enim, ni fallor, Licentius placuisse sibi diceret de probabilitate Academicorum sententiam, subiecisti quod ille haud dubie confirmavit, sciretne hanc ab eisdem etiam verisimilitudinem nominari. Et bene novi, siquidem ex te mihi nota sunt, non absque te esse Academicorum placita. Quae cum, ut dixi, animo tuo infixae sint; quid verba secteris, ignoro. Non est ista, inquam, mihi crede, verborum, sed rerum ipsarum magna controversia: non enim illos viros eos fuisse arbitror, qui rebus nescirent nomina imponere; sed mihi haec vocabula videntur elegisse, et ad occultandam tardioribus, et ad significandam vigilantioribus sententiam suam. Quod quare et quomodo mihi videatur, exponam, cum prius illa discussero, quae ab eis tanquam cognitionis humanae inimicis dicta homines putant.

But on account of memory, which is an unfaithful guardian of things thought out, I wished those things which we have often handled between us to be brought into letters, at the same time that these youths might learn both to attend to these things and try to approach and undergo them."

23. "Then therefore do you not know that I have nothing certain yet which I feel, but am hindered from seeking it by the arguments and disputations of the Academics? For I know not how they have made a certain probability in the mind (that I may not yet recede from their word) that man cannot find the truth: whence I had become lazy and altogether sluggish, nor did I dare to seek what it was not allowed for the most acute and most learned men to find. Unless therefore I shall first have persuaded myself that the truth can be found as much as they persuaded themselves it cannot; I shall not dare to seek, nor have I anything which I should defend. Therefore remove that interrogation, if it pleases, and let us rather discuss between us, as sagaciously as we can, whether the truth can be found. And for my part I seem to myself already to have many things with which I strive to lean against the reason of the Academics: between whom and me in the meantime nothing differs, except that to them it seemed probable that the truth cannot be found; but to me it is probable that it can be found. For the ignorance of truth is either peculiar to me, if they were feigning, or certainly common to both."

CHAPTER X.

The controversy had with the Academics is not of words, but of things.

24. Then Alypius said: "Now I shall proceed secure: for I see that you will be not so much an accuser as a helper. Therefore, lest we go further, let us see first, I beg, lest through this question in which I seem to have succeeded those who yielded to you, we fall into a controversy of word, which we have often confessed to be most shameful, from that Tullian authority, you yourself insinuating it. For when, unless I am mistaken, Licentius said that the opinion of the Academics about probability pleased him, you added what he confirmed without doubt, whether he knew that this was also named 'likelihood' (*verisimilitudo*) by the same ones. And I know well, since they are known to me from you, that the opinions of the Academics are not without you. Which since, as I said, they are fixed in your mind; why you should follow words, I know not." That is not," I said, "believe me, a great controversy of words, but of things themselves: for I do not think that those men were such as did not know how to impose names on things; but those words seem to me to have been chosen by them both to hide their opinion from the slower and to signify it to the more vigilant. Why and how it seems so to me, I will explain when I shall first have discussed those things which men think were said by them as enemies of human knowledge.

Itaque perlibenter habeo hucusque hodie nostrum processisse sermonem, ut satis quid inter nos quaeretur, aperteque constaret. Nam illi mihi videntur graves omnino ac prudentes viri fuisse. Si quid est autem, quod nunc disputabimus adversus eos erit, qui Academicos inventioni veritatis adversos fuisse crediderunt. Et ne me territum putes, etiam contra eos ipsos non invitatus armabor, si non occultandae sententiae suae causa, ne ab eis temere pollutis mentibus, et quasi profanis, quaedam veritatis sacra proderentur; sed ex animo illa quae in eorum libris legimus, defenderunt. Quod hodie facerem, nisi nos solis occasus jam domum redire compelleret. Hactenus illo die disputatum est.

DISPUTATIO TERTIA.

CAPUT XI.---Probabile quid sit.

25. Postridie autem quamvis non minus blandus tranquillisque dies illuxisset, vix tamen domesticis negotiis evoluti sumus. Nam magnam ejus partem in epistolarum maxime scriptione consumpseramus. Et cum jam duae horae vix reliquae forent, ad pratum processimus. Nam invitabat coeli nimia serenitas, placuitque, ut ne ipsum quidem quod restiterat tempus, perire pateremur. Itaque cum ad arborem solitam ventum esset, et mansissemus loco: Velim vos, inquam, adolescentuli, quoniam non est hodie magna res aggredienda, in memoriam mihi revocetis, quomodo hesterno die rogatiunculae quae vos turbavit, Alypius responderit. Hic Licentius: Tam breve est, inquit, ut nihil negotii sit hoc recordari; quam leve sit autem tu videris. Nam, ut opinor, vetuit te, res cum constaret, de verbis movere quaestionem. Et ego: Hoc ipsum, inquam, quid sit, quamve habeat vim, satis animadvertistis? Videor, inquit, mihi videre quid sit; sed quaeso, tu id paulisper exponas. Nam saepe abs te audiavi, turpe esse disputantibus in verborum quaestione immorari, cum certamen nullum de rebus remanserit. Sed hoc subtilius est, quam ut explicandum a me debeat flagitari.

26. Audite ergo, inquam, quid sit, vos. Id probabile vel verisimile Academici vocant, quod nos ad agendum sine assensione potest invitare. Sine assensione autem dico, Ut id quod agimus non opinemur verum esse, aut non id scire arbitremur; agamus tamen. Ut verbi causa, utrum hesternae nocte tam liquida ac pura, hodie tam laetus sol exorturus esset, si nos quispiam rogaret; credo quod nos id scire negaremus, diceremus tamen ita videri. Talia, inquit Academicus, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel verisimilia putavi nominanda; quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno.

Therefore I am very glad that our discourse has proceeded this far today, so that what was being sought between us might sufficiently and clearly stand firm. For those seem to me to have been altogether grave and prudent men. If there is anything, however, which we shall now dispute, it will be against those who believed that the Academics were adverse to the invention of truth. And lest you think me terrified, I will even be armed not unwillingly against those very ones, if they defended those things which we read in their books from their heart, and not for the sake of hiding their opinion, lest certain sacred things of truth should be rashly betrayed by them to polluted and as it were profane minds. Which I would do today, were not the setting of the sun already compelling us to return home." Thus far it was disputed on that day.

THIRD DISPUTATION.

CHAPTER XI.---What the probable is.

25. On the next day, however, although a no less mild and tranquil day had dawned, yet we were scarcely extricated from domestic businesses. For we had consumed a great part of it especially in the writing of letters. And when now scarcely two hours remained, we proceeded to the meadow. For the excessive serenity of the sky invited us, and it pleased us that we should not allow even that time which had remained to perish. Therefore, when we had come to the accustomed tree and remained in the place: "I should wish you, youths," I said, "since no great matter is to be undertaken today, to recall to my memory how Alypius responded yesterday to the little question which disturbed you." Here Licentius said: "It is so brief that there is no trouble in recording this; but how light it may be, you shall see. For, as I think, he forbade you to move a question about words when the matter stood firm." And I: "Have you sufficiently noticed what this very thing is, or what force it has?" "I seem to myself," he said, "to see what it is; but I beg you to explain it for a little while. For I have often heard from you that it is shameful for disputants to linger in a question of words when no contest concerning things has remained. But this is more subtle than that it ought to be demanded to be explained by me."

26. "Listen therefore, you," I said, "to what it is. The Academics call that 'probable' or 'likely' (*verisimile*) which can invite us to acting without assent. I say 'without assent' in this way, that we should not think that what we do is true, or should not judge that we know it; yet let us act. As for example, if someone should ask us whether, after a night so liquid and pure as yesterday's, the sun would rise today so joyful; I believe that we would deny that we know it, yet we would say that it so seems. 'Such,' says the Academic, 'seem to me all things which I thought should be named probable or likely; which if you wish to call by another name, I do not at all resist.

Satis enim mihi est, te jam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est quibus rebus haec nomina imponam. Non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem. Satisne intellexistis, quomodo mihi ludicra illa quibus vos agitabam, de manibus excussa sint? Hic cum ambo se intellexisse respondissent, vultuque ipso responsionem postularent meam: Quid putatis, inquam? Ciceronem cujus haec verba sunt, inopem fuisse latinae linguae, ut minus apta rebus imponeret, quas sentiebat, nomina?

CAPUT XII.

Rursum de probabili et verisimili.

27. Tum Trygetius: Jam, inquit, placet nobis, cum res nota sit, de verbis nullas calumnias commovere. Quare vide potius quid huic respondeas qui nos liberavit, in quos tu impulsus tentas iterum irruere. Et Licentius: Mane, ait, quaeso: nam mihi subluceat nescio quid, quo videam non tibi tam facile tantum argumentum eripi debuisse. Et cum defixus in cogitatione siluisset aliquantum: Rogo, inquit, nihil mihi videtur esse absurdius, quam dicere, se verisimile sequi, eum qui verum quid sit ignoret: nec illa me tua similitudo conturbat. Nam recte ego interrogatus, utrum ex ista temporie coeli nulla in crastinum pluvia cogatur, respondeo esse verisimile, qui me non nego nosse aliquid veri. Nam scio arborem istam modo argenteam fieri non posse, multaue talia vera non impudenter me scire dico, quorum video esse similia ea quae verisimilia nomino. Tu vero, Carneades, vel quae alia graeca pestis, ut nostris parcam (quid enim dubitem in hanc partem transire ad eum cui captivus debeor jure victoriae?): tu ergo cum te nihil veri scire dicas, unde hoc verisimile sequeris? At enim nomen ei non potui aliud imponere. Quid ergo nobis disputandum est cum eo, qui nec loqui potest?

28. Non ego, inquit Alypius, perfugas metuam: quanto minus ille Carneades, in quem nescio utrum juvenili an puerili levitate commotus, maledicta potius quam aliquod telum putasti esse jaciendum? Nam illi quidem ad roborandam sententiam suam, quae semper tenuis probabili fundata fuit, hoc interim adversum te facile suffecerit, ita nos a veri inventione procul esse positos, ut tu tibi ipse magno argumento esse possis, qui ita una interrogatiuncula loco motus es, ut ubi tibi standum esset, penitus ignores.

For it is enough for me that you have already well received what I say, that is, on what things I impose these names. For it is fitting for the wise man to be not a maker of words, but an inquirer into things.' Have you sufficiently understood how those ludicra with which I was agitating you have been shaken from my hands?" Here when both responded that they understood, and by their very face demanded my response: "What do you think?" I said. That Cicero, whose words these are, was destitute of the Latin tongue, so that he imposed less apt names on the things which he felt?"

CHAPTER XII.

Again concerning the probable and the likely.

27. Then Trygetius said: "It now pleases us, since the matter is known, to move no calumnies about words. Wherefore see rather what you respond to this one who has liberated us, against whom you, having been driven back, attempt to rush again." And Licentius said: "Wait, I beg," he said; "for something or other dawns on me, by which I see that so great an argument ought not to have been snatched from you so easily." And when he had remained silent for some time, fixed in thought: "I ask," he said, "nothing seems to me more absurd than to say that he follows the likely (*verisimile*) who is ignorant of what the true is: nor does that similitude of yours disturb me. For I, having been rightly interrogated whether from this temper of the sky any rain will be gathered for tomorrow, respond that it is likely, I who do not deny that I know something of the true. For I know that that tree cannot just now become silver, and many such true things I say not impudently that I know, of which I see those things to be similar which I name likely. But you, Carneades, or whatever other Greek pest, that I may spare our own (for why should I hesitate to cross over to this side to him to whom I am owed as a captive by the right of victory?): you therefore, since you say that you know nothing of the true, whence do you follow this likely? But forsooth, I could not impose another name on it. Why therefore must we dispute with him who cannot even speak?"

28. "I shall not fear deserters," said Alypius; "how much less that Carneades, against whom, moved by I know not whether youthful or boyish levity, you thought calumnies rather than some weapon should be hurled? For to him indeed, for strengthening his own opinion, which was always founded as far as the probable, this will in the meantime easily have sufficed against you: that we are placed so far from the discovery of the true, that you can be a great argument to yourself, you who were so moved from your place by one little question that you utterly ignored where you should stand.

Sed haec, atque scientiam tuam, quam tibi impressam de hac arbore paulo ante confessus es, in aliud tempus differamus. Quamvis enim jam alias partes delegeris, tamen sedulo docendus es quid paulo ante dixerim. Nondum enim, ut opinor, in eam quaestionem, qui utrum inveniri verum possit quaeritur, progressi fuimus: sed illud tantum in ipso vestibulo defensionis meae praescribendum putavi, in quo te lassum prostratumque prospexeram; hoc est; utrum verisimile, an probabile, an alio si quo nomine appellari potest, quod sibi Academici sat esse dicant, quaerendum non esse. Nam si tu optimus jam inventor veritatis tibi videris, nihil ad me. Postea si ingratus non fueris huic patrocinio meo, eadem fortasse me docebis.

CAPUT XIII.

An Academici dissimularint se scire verum.

29. Hic ego, cum verecunde Licentius Alypii impetum formidaret; Omnia potius, inquam, Alypi, loqui maluisti, quam quemadmodum nobis cum iis, qui loqui nesciant, disputandum sit. Et ille: Quoniam olim tum mihi, tum omnibus notum est, et nunc tua professione satis indicas te loquendi peritum esse; velim explices utilitatem primo hujus inquisitionis suae, quae aut superflua est, ut opinor, et ei multo magis respondere superfluum est; aut si commoda visa fuerit, et a me explicari nequirit, precario abs te impetrem, ut magistri officium ne gravare. Meministi, inquam, heri me esse pollicitum de istis vocabulis post acturum. Et nunc ille sol admonet, ut quae ludicra pueris proposui, redigam in cistas; praesertim cum ea ornandi jam potius quam vendendi gratia proponam. Nunc antequam stilum nostrum tenebrae occupent, quae patronae Academicorum solent esse, volo inter nos hodie plenissime constet, ad quam quaestionem nobis explicandam mane surgendum sit. Itaque responde, quaeso, utrum tibi videantur Academici habuisse certam de veritate sententiam, et eam temere ignotis vel non purgatis animis proderi noluisse; an vero ita senserint, ut eorum disputationes se habent.

30. Tum ille: Quid illis animi fuerit, inquit, non temere confirmabo. Nam quantum ex libris colligi datur, tu melius nosti quae in verba sententiam suam promere soleant: Me autem de meipso si consulis, inventum nondum verum esse puto. Addo etiam quod de Academicis flagitabas, nec posse inveniri me putare, non solum inolita, quam semper fere animadvertisti opinione mea, sed etiam auctoritate magnorum excellentiorumque philosophorum; quibus nos praebere colla sive imbecillitas nostra, sive sagacitas ipsorum, ultra quam nihil jam inveniri posse credendum est, nescio quomodo compellit.

But these things, and your knowledge which you confessed a little while ago was impressed on you concerning this tree, let us defer to another time. For although you have now chosen other parts, yet you are to be diligently taught what I said a little while ago. For not yet, as I think, had we progressed into that question in which it is asked whether the true can be found: but I thought that only that should be prescribed in the very vestibule of my defense, in which I had seen you weary and prostrate; that is, whether it is the likely, or the probable, or by whatever other name it can be called, which the Academics say is enough for them, that should not be asked. For if you now seem to yourself the best discoverer of truth, it is nothing to me. Afterwards, if you shall not have been ungrateful to this patronage of mine, you will perhaps teach me the same things."

CHAPTER XIII.

Whether the Academics dissimulated that they knew the truth.

29. Here I, when Licentius modestly dreaded the attack of Alypius, said: "You have preferred, Alypius, to speak of all things rather than how we must dispute with those who do not know how to speak." And he said: "Since it has long since been known both to me and to all, and you now sufficiently indicate by your profession that you are skilled in speaking; I should wish you to explain the utility first of this inquiry of yours, which either is superfluous, as I think, and it is much more superfluous to respond to it; or if it shall have seemed advantageous, and could not be explained by me, I should precariously obtain from you that you do not grudge the office of a teacher." "You remember," I said, "that I promised yesterday that I would act later concerning those vocabularies. And now the sun warns that I should gather into chests the ludicra which I proposed for the boys; especially since I now propose them rather for the sake of adorning than of selling. Now before darkness, which is accustomed to be the patroness of the Academics, occupies our pen, I wish it to be most fully established among us today for the explanation of which question we must rise in the morning. Therefore respond, I beg, whether it seems to you that the Academics had a certain opinion concerning the truth, and were unwilling to produce it rashly for unknown or unpurged minds; or whether they truly felt as their disputations have themselves."

30. Then he said: "What their mind was," he said, "I will not rashly confirm. For as much as it is given to be collected from books, you know better in what words they were accustomed to produce their opinion: but if you consult me concerning myself, I think that the true has not yet been found. I add also what you were demanding concerning the Academics, that I think it cannot be found, not only from the ingrained opinion of mine which you have almost always noticed, but also from the authority of great and more excellent philosophers; to whom either our weakness, or their sagacity beyond which it is to be believed that nothing can now be found, somehow compels us to offer our necks.

Hoc est, inquam, quod volui. Nam verebar, ne cum tibi quoque id videretur quod mihi; disputatio nostra manca remaneret, nullo existente qui ex altera parte rem venire in manus cogeret, ut diligenter quantum possumus versaretur. Itaque si id evenisset, paratus eram te rogare, ut Academicorum partes ita susciperes, quasi tibi non solum disputasse, sed etiam sensisse viderentur, verum non posse comprehendere. Quaeritur ergo inter nos, utrum illorum argumentis probabile sit nihil percipi posse, ac nulli rei esse assentiendum. Quod si obtinueris, cedam libenter: si autem demonstrare potuero multo esse probabilius, et posse ad veritatem pervenire sapientem, et assensionem non semper esse cohibendam: nihil habebis, ut opinor, cur non te in meam sententiam transire patiaris. Quod cum illi placuisset et caeteris qui aderant, jam vespere obumbrati domum revertimus.

LIBER TERTIUS Exhibet disputationes duas, quarum initio statuitur fortunam nihil sive adjumento sive impedimento esse sapienti. Mox Augustinus, repugnante pro susceptis partibus Alypio, probat nonnihil sciri a sapiente, utpote qui saltem sapientiam noverit. Deinde Zenonis definitionem discutit, et duo illa redarguit Academicorum placita: «Nihil percipi posse;» et, «Nulli rei debere assentiri.» Dicit demum videri sibi Academicos non ita sensisse uti vulgo existimantur.

DISPUTATIO PRIMA.

CAPUT PRIMUM.---Magnopere quaerenda veritas unde pendet vita beata.

1. Cum post illum sermonem quem secundus liber continet, alio die consedissemus in balneis; nam erat tristior quam ut ad pratum liberet descendere; sic exorsus sum: Arbitror vos jam satis animadvertisse qua de re inter nos discutienda quaestio constituta sit. Sed antequam ad partes meas veniam; quae ad eam pertinent explicandam, pauca, quaeso, de spe, de vita, de instituto nostro non ab re abhorrentia libenter audiat. Negotium nostrum non leve aut superfluum, sed necessarium ac summum esse arbitror, magnopere quaerere veritatem: hoc inter me atque Alypium convenit.

"This is," I said, "what I wished. For I feared lest, when that which seemed to me seemed also to you, our disputation would remain maimed, with no one existing who would compel the matter to come into hands from the other side, so that it might be turned as diligently as we can. Therefore if that had happened, I was prepared to ask you that you should so undertake the parts of the Academics as if they seemed to you not only to have disputed, but also to have felt, that the true cannot be comprehended. It is asked therefore between us, whether by their arguments it is probable that nothing can be perceived, and that assent is to be given to no thing. Which if you shall have obtained, I will gladly yield: but if I shall have been able to demonstrate that it is much more probable both that the wise man can arrive at the truth, and that assent is not always to be withheld: you will have nothing, as I think, why you should not allow yourself to cross over into my opinion." When this had pleased him and the others who were present, now shadowed by evening we returned home.

BOOK THREE presents two disputations, at the beginning of which it is established that fortune is nothing, whether for aid or for impediment, to the wise man. Presently Augustine, with Alypius resisting for the parts undertaken, proves that something is known by the wise man, as one who at least has known wisdom. Then he discusses Zeno's definition, and refutes those two decrees of the Academics: "That nothing can be perceived;" and, "That assent should be given to no thing." He says finally that it seems to him that the Academics did not so feel as they are commonly thought.

FIRST DISPUTATION.

CHAPTER ONE.---Truth is to be sought greatly, whence the happy life depends.

1. When, after that discourse which the second book contains, we had sat down on another day in the baths; for it was more gloomy than that it should be pleasing to descend to the meadow; I thus began: "I think you have now sufficiently noticed concerning what matter the question to be discussed between us has been established. But before I come to my parts, which pertain to the explanation of it, I pray you to listen willingly to a few things concerning hope, concerning life, and concerning our institute, not abhorring from the matter. I think that our business is not light or superfluous, but necessary and highest, to seek truth greatly: this is agreed between me and Alypius.

Nam et caeteri philosophi sapientem suum eam invenisse putaverunt; et Academici sapienti suo summo conatu inveniendam esse professi sunt, idque illum agere sedulo; sed quoniam vel lateret obruta, vel confusa non emereret, ad agendam vitam id eum sequi quod probabile ac verisimile occurreret. Id etiam vestra pristina disceptatione confectum est. Nam cum alter inventa veritate beatum fieri asseruerit hominem, alter vero tantum diligenter quaesita; nulli nostrum dubium est, nihil esse a nobis huic negotio praeponendum. Quamobrem qualem vobis, quaeso, hesternum diem videmur duxisse? Vobis quidem in studiis vestris vivere licuit. Nam et tu, Trygeti, Virgilii te carminibus oblectasti, et Licentius fingendis versibus vacavit, quorum amore ita percussus est, ut propter eum maxime mihi istum sermonem inferendum putarem, quo in ejus animo philosophia (nunc enim tempus est) majorem partem, non modo quam poetica, sed quaevis alia disciplina sibi usurpet, ac vindicet.

CAPUT II.

An fortuna sapienti necessaria.

2. Sed quaeso vos, nonne miserti nostri estis, cum pridie ita cubitum issemus, ut ad dilatam quaestionem, et prorsus ad nihil aliud surgeretur; quod tanta de re familiari necessario peragenda exstiterunt, ut his penitus occupati, vix duas extremas diei horas in nosmetipsos respirare possemus? Quare semper fuit sententia mea, sapienti jam homini nihil opus esse; ut autem sapiens fiat, plurimum necessariam esse fortunam (Lib. 1 Retract. cap. 1, n. 1): nisi quid aliud videtur Alypio. Tum ille: Quantum juris, inquit, fortunae tribuas, nondum bene novi. Nam si ad contemnendam fortunam, fortuna ipsa opus esse arbitraris, me quoque comitem in hanc sententiam do tibi. Sin fortunae nihil aliud concedis, quam ea quae corporis necessitati non possunt, nisi ipsa volente, suppetere; non ita sentio. Aut enim licet eadem repugnante atque invita, nondum sapienti, cupido tamen sapientiae, ea sumere quae vitae necessaria confitemur; aut concedendum est etiam in omni sapientis vita eam dominari, cum et ipse sapiens iis quae corpori necessaria sunt, non indigere non possit.

For both the other philosophers thought that their wise man had found it; and the Academics professed that it is to be found by their wise man with the highest effort, and that he does that diligently; but since it either lay hidden overwhelmed, or being confused did not stand out, that for conducting life he follows that which occurred as probable and likely (*verisimile*). That was also completed by your pristine disputation. For when one asserted that a man becomes happy by truth having been found, but the other only by it having been diligently sought; it is a doubt to none of us that nothing is to be preferred by us to this business. Wherefore, I ask, what kind of day do we seem to you to have led yesterday? To you indeed it was permitted to live in your studies. For you too, Trygetius, delighted yourself with the songs of Virgil, and Licentius was vacant for fashioning verses, by the love of which he was so struck that on account of it especially I thought that this discourse should be introduced by me, by which in his mind philosophy (for now is the time) should usurp and vindicate for itself a greater part, not only than poetics, but than any other discipline whatever."

CHAPTER II.

Whether fortune is necessary for the wise man.

2. "But I ask you, did you not pity us when we had gone to bed on the day before in such a way that we should rise for the deferred question, and indeed for nothing else; because such things necessarily to be done concerning family property stood forth, that, being deeply occupied with these, we could scarcely breathe into ourselves in the two extreme hours of the day? Wherefore it has always been my opinion that for the man who is already wise there is no need of fortune; but that he may become wise, fortune is very much necessary: unless something else seems to to Alypius." Then he said: "How much right you attribute to fortune, I do not yet well know. For if you think that for the sake of contemning fortune, fortune itself is necessary, I also give myself to you as a companion in this opinion. But if you concede nothing else to fortune than those things which cannot be supplied for the necessity of the body unless she herself is willing; I do not so think. For either it is permitted, while she is resisting and unwilling, for one not yet wise, yet desirous of wisdom, to take those things which we confess are necessary for life; or it must be conceded that even in all the life of the wise man she dominates, since even the wise man himself cannot not lack those things which are necessary for the body."

3. Dicis ergo, inquam, fortunam esse necessariam studioso sapientiae, sapienti vero negas. Non ab re est eadem repetere, inquit. Itaque nunc etiam abs te quaero, utrum fortunam ad seipsam contemnendam aliquid juvare aestimes. Quod si arbitraris, dico sapientiae cupidum magnopere indigere fortuna. Arbitror, inquam, siquidem per illam erit talis, qualis eam possit contemnere. Nec absurdum est: nam sic etiam parvis nobis ubera necessaria sunt, quibus efficitur, ut sine his postea vivere, ac valere possimus. Sententias, ait, nostras si animi conceptio non dissonat, concordare mihi liquet: nisi forte discernendum cuiquam videtur quod vel fortunae vel uberum, non ipsa ubera seu fortuna, sed alia res quaedam nos faciat contemptores. Nihil magnum est, inquam, alio simili uti. Nam ut sine navi, vel quolibet vehiculo, aut omnino, ne vel ipsum Daedalum timeam, sine ullis ad hanc rem accommodatis instrumentis, aut aliqua occultiore potentia, Aegeum mare nemo transmittit; quamvis nihil aliud, quam pervenire proponat; quod cum ei evenerit, illa omnia quibus advectus est, paratus sit abjicere atque contemnere: ita quisquis ad sapientiae portum, et quasi firmissimum et quietissimum solum pervenire voluerit; quoniam, ut alia omittam, si caecus ac surdus fuerit, non potest, quod positum est in potestate fortunae, necessariam mihi videtur ad id, quod concupivit, habere fortunam. Quod cum obtinuerit, quamvis putetur indigere quibusdam rebus ad corporis valetudinem pertinentibus; illud tamen constat, non his opus esse ut sapiens sit, sed ut inter homines vivat. Imo, ait ille, si caecus ac surdus sit; et sapientiam adipiscendam, et ipsam vitam propter quam sapientia quaeritur, mea sententia, jure contemnet.

4. Tamen, inquam, cum ipsa vita nostra, qua hic vivimus, sit in potestate fortunae; nec nisi vivens quisque sapiens fieri possit: nonne fatendum est opus esse ejus favore, quo ad sapientiam pervehamur? Sed cum sapientia, inquit, non nisi viventibus sit necessaria, remotaque vita nulla sit indigentia sapientiae, nihil in propaganda vita pertimesco fortunam. Etenim quia vivo, propterea volo sapientiam, non quod sapientiam desidero, volo vitam. Unde fortuna si mihi abstulerit vitam, auferet causam quaerendae sapientiae. Nihil igitur habeo, cur ut fiam sapiens, aut favorem optem fortunae, aut impedimenta formidem, nisi alia fortasse protuleris. Tum ego: Non igitur censes sapientiae studiosum posse a fortuna, ne ad sapientiam perveniat, impediri, etiamsi ei non auferat vitam? Non arbitror, inquit.

3. "You say therefore," I said, "that fortune is necessary for the one studious of wisdom, but for the wise man you deny it." "It is not out of place to repeat the same things," he said. "And so now also I ask of you whether you estimate that fortune helps anything toward contemning herself. Which if you think, I say that the one desirous of wisdom greatly lacks fortune." "I think so," I said, "if indeed through her he will be such as can condemn her. Nor is it absurd: for so also for us when small, breasts are necessary, by which it is effected that we can afterwards live and be strong without these." "If the conception of the mind does not disagree," he said, "it is clear to me that our opinions concord: unless perhaps it seems to anyone that it must be discerned that not the breasts themselves or fortune, but some other thing makes us contemnners of either fortune or breasts." "It is no great matter," I said, "to use another similar thing. For as without a ship, or any vehicle whatever, or at all (lest I should fear even Daedalus himself) without any instruments accommodated to this matter, or some more occult power, no one transmits the Aegean Sea, although he proposes nothing else than to arrive; which when it has happened to him, he is ready to cast away and condemn all those things by which he was conveyed: so whoever shall have wished to arrive at the port of wisdom, and as it were at the firmest and quietest soil; since, to omit other things, if he shall have been blind and deaf, he cannot, which is placed in the power of fortune, it seems to me that he has fortune as necessary for that which he has concupiscid. Which when he shall have obtained, although he may be thought to lack certain things pertaining to the health of the body; yet that stands firm, that these are not needed that he may be wise, but that he may live among men." "Nay," said he, "if he should be blind and deaf, he will, in my opinion, rightly condemn both obtaining wisdom and life itself on account of which wisdom is sought."

4. "Yet," I said, "since this very life of ours, by which we live here, is in the power of fortune; and since no one can become wise unless living: must it not be confessed that there is need of her favor, by which we may be conveyed to wisdom?" "But since wisdom," he said, "is not necessary except for the living, and life being removed there is no indigence of wisdom, I dread nothing of fortune in propagating life. For because I live, therefore I wish wisdom; I do not wish life because I desire wisdom. Whence if fortune shall have taken life from me, she will take away the cause of seeking wisdom. I have nothing therefore why, that I may become wise, I should either hope for the favor of fortune or dread her impediments, unless perhaps you shall have brought forward other things." Then I: "Do you not therefore think that the one studious of wisdom can be impeded by fortune, lest he should arrive at wisdom, even if she does not take life from him?" "I do not think so," he said.

CAPUT III.

Differunt sapiens et studiosus. Sapientem nonnihil scire, quia saltem scit sapientiam.

5. Volo, inquam, mihi paululum aperias, quid tibi inter sapientem et philosophum distare videatur? Sapientem a studioso, ait, nulla re differre arbitror; nisi quod quarum rerum in sapiente quidam habitus inest, earum est in studioso sola flagrantia. Quae sunt tandem istae res, inquam? Nam mihi nihil aliud videtur interesse, nisi quod alter scit sapientiam, alter scire desiderat. Si scientiam, inquit, modesto fine determinas, ipsam rem planius clocutus es. Quoquo modo, inquam, eam determinem, illud omnibus placuit, scientiam falsarum rerum esse non posse. In hoc mihi, inquit ille, visa fuit objicienda praescriptio, ne inconsiderata consensione mea facile in principalis illius quaestionis campis tua equitaret oratio. Plane, inquam, mihi nihil ubi equitare possem reliquisti. Nam nisi fallor, quod jamdudum molior, ad ipsum finem pervenimus. Si enim, ut subtiliter vereque dixisti, nihil inter sapientiae studiosum et sapientem interest, nisi quod iste amat, ille autem habet sapientiae disciplinam; unde etiam nomen ipsum, id est, habitum quemdam exprimere non cunctatus es; nemo autem habere disciplinam potest in animo, qui nihil didicit; nihil autem didicit, qui nihil novit; et nosse falsum nemo potest: novit igitur sapiens veritatem, quem disciplinam sapientiae habere in animo, id est habitum jam ipse confessus es. Nescio, inquit, cujus impudentiae sim, si habitum inquisitionis divinarum humanarumque rerum esse in sapiente confessum me negare voluero. Sed qui tibi videatur inventorum probabilium habitus non esse, non video. Concedis mihi, inquam, falsa neminem scire? Facile id quidem, inquit. Dic jam si potes, inquam, sapientem nescire sapientiam. Quid enim, ait, hoc limite universa concludis, ut videri sibi non possit, comprehendisse se sapientiam? Da, inquam, dexteram. Nam si meministi, hoc est quod heri me dixi effecturum, quod nunc non a me conclusum, sed a te ultro mihi oblatum esse gaudeo. Nam cum inter me et Academicos hoc interesse dixissem, quod illis probabile visum est veritatem non posse comprehendere; mihi autem nondum quidem a me inventam, inveniri tamen posse a sapiente videatur: nunc tu cum mea interrogatione urgereris, utrum sapiens nesciat sapientiam, Videtur sibi scire, dixisti. Quid tum postea, inquit? Quia si videtur sibi, inquam, scire sapientiam, non ei videtur nihil scire posse sapientem. Aut si sapientia nihil est, volo affirmes.

CHAPTER III.

The wise man and the studious differ. That the wise man knows something, because at least he knows wisdom.

5. "I wish," I said, "that you would open to me a little, what seems to you to differ between the wise man and the philosopher?" "I think," he said, "that the wise man differs in no thing from the studious one; except that of those things of which a certain habit is in the wise man, in the studious one there is only fragrance." "What, pray, are those things?" I said. "For to me nothing else seems to interest, except that the one knows wisdom, the other desires to know." "If you determine knowledge by a modest end," he said, "you have spoken the thing itself more plainly." "In whatever way," I said, "I may determine it, this has pleased all, that there cannot be knowledge of false things." "In this," he said, "a prescription seemed to me to be objected, lest by my inconsiderate consent your oration should easily ride in the fields of that principal question." "Plainly," I said, "you have left me nothing where I could ride. For unless I am deceived, we have arrived at the very end, which I have long since been laboring for. For if, as you have subtly and truly said, nothing interests between the studious of wisdom and the wise man except that the one loves, but the other has, the discipline of wisdom; whence also you did not hesitate to express the name itself, that is, a certain habit; but no one can have discipline in the mind who has learned nothing; but he has learned nothing who knows nothing; and no one can know the false: therefore the wise man knows the truth, whom you yourself have already confessed has the discipline of wisdom in his mind, that is, a habit." "I know not," he said, "of what impudence I should be if I should wish to deny that I confessed a habit of the inquiry into divine and human things is in the wise man. But how it should seem to you that there is not a habit of probable findings, I do not see." "Do you concede to me," I said, "that no one knows false things?" "That easily indeed," he said. "Say now if you can," I said, "that the wise man does not know wisdom." "Why," he said, "do you conclude all things by this limit, so that it cannot seem to him that he has comprehended wisdom?" "Give," I said, "your right hand. For if you remember, this is what I said yesterday I would effect, which I now rejoice has not been concluded by me, but offered to me by you of your own accord. For when I had said that this interest exists between me and the Academics, that to them it seemed probable that truth cannot be comprehended; but to me, although not yet found by me, it yet seems that it can be found by the wise man: now you, when you were urged by my interrogation whether the wise man does not know wisdom, said: 'It seems to him that he knows.' "What then afterwards?" he said. "Because if it seems to him," I said, "that he knows wisdom, it does not seem to him that the wise man can know nothing. Or if wisdom is nothing, I wish you to affirm it."

6. Crederem vere, inquit, ad calcem nos finemque venisse; sed repente cum dexteram interposuisti, disjunctissimos nos esse et in longum progressos video: videlicet quod hesterno die a nobis nulla alia quaestio constituta videbatur, nisi quod sapientem ad comprehensionem veri pervenire posse, affirmante te, ego negaveram: nunc vero nihil me opinor concessisse tibi, quam videri posse sapienti probabilium rerum se consecutum esse sapientiam: quam tamen sapientiam in investigatione divinarum humanarumque rerum me constituisse nulli nostrum arbitror dubium. Non, inquam, ideo quia involvis, evolveris: videris enim jam mihi exercendi tui causa disputare. Et quia bene nosti istos adolescentulos vix adhuc posse discernere quae acute ac subtiliter disseruntur, tanquam iudicum abuteris ignorantia, ut tibi quantumlibet loqui nullo liceat reclamante. Nam paulo ante dixisti, cum quaererem utrum sciret sapiens sapientiam, scire sibi videri. Cui ergo videtur sapientem, scire sapientiam, non utique videtur nihil scire sapientem. Hoc enim contendere non potest, nisi quisquam dicere audeat, nihil esse sapientiam. Ex quo fit, ut jam hoc tibi, quod etiam mihi, videatur; nam mihi videtur sapientem non nihil scire, et tibi, opinor, cui placet, videri sapienti sapientem scire sapientiam. Tum ille, Non magis me ingenium exercere velle quam te, arbitror; et id miror, non enim tibi ulla in hanc rem exercitatione opus est. Nam mihi adhuc fortasse caeco videtur interesse inter videri sibi scire, et scire; et inter sapientiam quae in investigatione posita est, et veritatem: quae a nobis cum alterutra dicantur, sibi quemadmodum quadrent non invenio. Tum ego, cum jam ad prandium vocaremur; Non, inquam, mihi quod tantum reniteris displicet: aut enim ambo nescimus quid loquamur, et danda est opera ne tam turpes simus; aut unus nostrum, quod item relinquere atque negligere non minus turpe est: sed pomeridianis horis rediemus ad invicem. Mihi enim cum videretur jam nos ad calcem pervenisse, pugnoscere etiam miscuisti. Hic cum arrisissent, discessimus.

DISPUTATIO SECUNDA.

CAPUT IV.---Rursus quod sapiens non est qui nihil scit.

6. "I would truly believe," he said, "that we had come to the goal and the end; but suddenly when you interposed right hands, I see that we are most disjoined and have progressed into the long: evidently because on yesterday no other question seemed to have been established by us, except that, you affirming that the wise man can arrive at the comprehension of the true, I had denied it: but now I think that I have conceded nothing to you, than that it can seem to the wise man that he has attained the wisdom of probable things: which wisdom however I think is a doubt to none of us that I constituted in the investigation of divine and human things." "You are not," I said, "therefore evolved because you involve: for you seem to me now to dispute for the sake of exercising yourself. And because you well know that these youths can scarcely yet discern those things which are discussed acutely and subtly, you abuse, as it were, the ignorance of the judges, so that it is permitted to you to speak as much as you please with no one reclaiming. For a little while ago you said, when I was asking whether the wise man knows wisdom, that it seems to him that he knows. To whom therefore it seems that the wise man knows wisdom, it does not at all seem to him that the wise man knows nothing. For this cannot be contended, unless anyone should dare to say that wisdom is nothing. From which it happens that now this seems to you, which also to me; for it seems to me that the wise man knows not nothing, and to you, I think, to whom it pleases that it seems to the wise man that the wise man knows wisdom." Then he: "I think that I do not wish to exercise my genius more than you; and I wonder at that, for there is no need of any exercise for you in this matter. For to me, perhaps still blind, it seems to interest between 'seeming to oneself to know' and 'knowing'; and between 'wisdom which is placed in investigation' and 'truth': which when they are said by us with either one, I do not find how they square with themselves." Then I, when we were now called to luncheon: "It does not," I said, "displease me that you resist so much: for either we both do not know what we speak, and labor must be given lest we be so base; or one of us, which likewise to leave and neglect is no less base: but in the afternoon hours we will return to each other. For when it seemed to me that we had now arrived at the goal, you even mixed fists." Here when they had laughed, we departed.

SECOND DISPUTATION.

CHAPTER IV.---Again that he is not wise who knows nothing.

7. Et cum redissemus, invenimus Licentium, cui nunquam sitiendi Helicon subvenisset, excogitandis versibus inhiantem. Nam de medio pene prandio, quamvis nostri prandii idem initium qui finis fuit, clam surrexerat, nihilque biberat. Cui ego, Opto quidem, inquam, tibi ut istam poeticam quam concupisti, complectaris aliquando: non quod me nimis delectet ista perfectio; sed quod video te tantum exarsisse, ut nisi fastidio evadere ab hoc amore non possis; quod evenire post perfectionem facile solet. Deinde cum sis bene canorus, malim auribus nostris inculces tuos versus; quam ut in illis graecis tragoediis, more avicularum quas in caveis inclusas videmus, verba quae non intelligis cantes. Admoneo tamen ut pergas potum, si voles, et ad scholam redeas nostram, si tamen aliquid jam de te Hortensius et philosophia meretur, cui dulcissimas primitias jam vestro illo sermone libasti, qui te vehementius quam ista poetica incederat ad magnarum et vere fructuosarum rerum scientiam. Sed dum ad istarum disciplinarum, quibus excoluntur animi, circum revocare vos cupio; metuo ne vobis labyrinthus fiat, et prope me poenitet ab illo te impetu repressisse. Erubuit ille, discessitque ut biberet. Nam et multum sieiebat, et occasio dabatur evitandi me, plura fortasse atque asperiora dicturum.

8. Et cum rediisset, intentis omnibus, sic coepi: Itane est, Alypi, ut inter nos de re jam, ut mihi videtur, manifestissima non conveniat? Non mirum est, inquit, si quod tibi in promptu esse asseris, mihi obscurum sit: siquidem pleraque manifesta, possint aliis manifestiora, et item obscura quaedam, nonnullis obscuriora esse. Nam si et hoc tibi vere manifestum est, mihi crede, esse alium quemquam cui et hoc manifestum tuum manifestius sit; et item alium cui meum obscurum obscurius sit. Sed ne me perpugnacem diutius putes, obsecraverim ut hoc manifestum manifestius edisseras. Attende, inquam, quaeso diligenter, et quasi seposita paululum respondendi cura. Si enim bene me atque te novi, facile data opera clarebit quod dico, et alter alteri cito persuadebit. Dixistine tandem, an fortasse obsurdueram, videri sapienti se scire sapientiam? Annuit. Omittamus, inquam, paululum istum sapientem. Tu ipse sapiens es, an non? Nihil, inquit, minus. Volo tamen, inquam, respondeas mihi quid ipse sentias de sapiente Academico; utrumnam tibi videatur scire sapientiam? Utrum sibi, inquit, scire videatur an sciat, unumne an diversum putas? Metuo enim ne haec confusio cuiquam nostrum suffugium praebeat.

7. And when we had returned, we found Licentius, whom Helicon had subvened to him who was never thirsty, gaping at verses to be thought out. For almost from the middle of luncheon, although the same was the beginning as the end of our luncheon, he had risen secretly and had drunk nothing. To whom I said: "I wish indeed for you that you may at some time embrace that poetics which you have concupiscid: not because that perfection delights me too much; but because I see that you have so flared up that you cannot escape from this love except by fastidiousness; which is accustomed to happen easily after perfection. Then since you are well sonorous, I should prefer that you inculcate your verses in our ears rather than that in those Greek tragedies, in the manner of little birds which we see shut up in cages, you should sing words which you do not understand. I admonish you however that you proceed to drink, if you wish, and return to our school, if indeed Hortensius and philosophy now merit something from you, for which you have already tasted the sweetest first-fruits in that discourse of yours, which had incited you more vehemently than that poetics to the knowledge of great and truly fruitful things. But while I desire to recall you to the circuit of those disciplines by which minds are cultivated, I fear lest it should become a labyrinth to you, and it almost repents me to have repressed you from that impetus." He blushed, and departed that he might drink. For he both thirsted much, and an occasion was given for avoiding me, who was perhaps about to say more and harsher things.

8. And when he had returned, everyone being intent, I thus began: "Is it so, Alypius, that between us there is no agreement concerning a matter now, as it seems to me, most manifest?" "It is not a wonder," he said, "if what you assert to be in promptu for you, is obscure for me: since most manifest things can be more manifest to others, and likewise certain obscure things can be more obscure to some. For if even this is truly manifest to you, believe me, there is another whoever to whom even this manifest of yours is more manifest; and likewise another to whom my obscure is more obscure. But lest you should think me too pugnacious any longer, I should have besought that you should set forth this manifest more manifestly." "Attend, I beg, diligently," I said, "and as if with the care of responding set aside for a little while. For if I well know me and you, what I say will easily become clear with labor given, and one will quickly persuade the other. Did you say finally, or perhaps I had become deaf, that it seems to the wise man that he knows wisdom?" He nodded. "Let us omit for a little while," I said, "that wise man. Are you yourself wise, or not?" "Nothing less," he said. "I wish however," I said, "that you should respond to me what you yourself feel concerning the Academic wise man; whether forsooth it seems to you that he knows wisdom?" "Whether it seems to himself to know," he said, "or whether he knows, do you think they are one or diverse? For I fear lest this confusion should provide a refuge to any of us."

9. Hoc est, inquam, Tuscum illud jurgium quod dici solet, cum quaestioni intentatae non ejus solutio, sed alterius objectio videtur mederi. Quod etiam poeta noster (ut me aliquantum Licentii auribus dedam) decenter in Bucolico carmine hoc rusticanum et plane pastoricum esse judicavit, cum alter alterum interrogat, ubi coeli spatium non amplius quam tres ulnas pateat: ille autem, Dic quibus in terris inscripti nomina regum Nascantur flores. (Virg., Ecloga 3, vv. 105, 106.) Quod quaeso, Alypi, ne in villa nobis licere arbitreris: certe vel istae balneolae aliquam decoris gymnasiorum faciant recordationem: ad id, si placet, quod rogo, responde. Videturne tibi sapiens Academicorum scire sapientiam? Ne verba verbis referendo, inquit, in longum eamus, videtur videri sibi scire. Videtur ergo, inquam, tibi nescire? Nam enim ego quaero quid tibi videatur videri sapienti, sed utrum tibi videatur sapiens scire sapientiam. Potes, ut opinor, hic aut aiere, aut negare. O utinam, inquit, aut ita mihi facile esset ut tibi, aut ita tibi difficile ut mihi! nec tam molestus esses, nec in his quidquam sperares. Nam cum me interrogares, quid mihi de Academico sapiente videatur; respondi, videri mihi quod videatur sibi scire sapientiam, ne aut temere me scire affirmarem, aut illum non minus temere scire dicerem. Pro magno, inquam, beneficio mihi obsecro concedas primo, ut ad id quod ego, non ad id quod tu te interrogas respondere digneris. Deinde ut spem meam, quam tibi non minus curae, quam tuam esse certo scio, nunc paululum omittas. Certe si me ista interrogatione decepero, cito transibo in tuam partem, controversiamque finiemus. Postremo ut pulsa nescio qua sollicitudine, qua te tangi video, diligentius animadvertas, quo facile intelligas quid mihi abs te responderi velim. Dixisti enim ideo te non aut aiere aut negare, quod utique faciendum est ad id quod rogo, ne temere te scire dicas quod nescis: quasi vero ego quid scias quaesierim, et non quid tibi videatur. Itaque nunc idem planius (si tamen planius dici potest) interrogo: Videturne tibi scire sapientiam sapiens, an non videtur? Si inveniri, inquit, sapiens qualem ratio prodit, queat; potest mihi videri scire sapientiam. Ratio igitur, inquam, talem tibi prodit esse sapientem, qui sapientiam non ignoret: et recte isthuc. Non enim aliter decebat videri tibi.

9. "This is," I said, "that Tuscan quarrel, as it is accustomed to be called, when not the solution of it, but the objection of another seems to cure the attempted question." Which even our poet (that I may give myself somewhat to the ears of Licentius) decently judged in a Bucolic poem to be rustic and plainly pastoral, when one interrogates the other where the space of the sky lies open no more than three cubits: but he, "Tell in what lands flowers are born inscribed with the names of kings." Which I beg, Alypius, that you do not think is permitted to us in the villa: certainly even these little baths should make some record of the decorum of gymnasiums: to that which I ask, if it pleases, respond. Does it seem to you that the wise man of the Academics knows wisdom?" "Lest by referring words to words," he said, "we go into the long, it seems that it seems to him that he knows." "Does it therefore seem to you," I said, "that he does not know?" For I do not ask what seems to you to seem to the wise man, but whether it seems to you that the wise man knows wisdom. You can, as I think, here either say yes or deny." "O would that," he said, "it were either so easy for me as for you, or so difficult for you as for me! neither would you be so troublesome, nor would you hope for anything in these. For when you interrogated me what seems to me concerning the Academic wise man; I responded, that it seems to me that it seems to him that he knows wisdom, lest I should either rashly affirm that I know, or should no less rashly say that he knows." "For a great benefit," I said, "I beg that you first concede to me that you deign to respond to that which I, not to that which you, interrogate yourself. Then that you omit for a little while now my hope, which I know for certain is no less a care to you than your own. Certainly if I shall have deceived myself by this interrogation, I will quickly cross over into your part, and we will finish the controversy. Finally, that having pushed away some or other solicitude, by which I see you are touched, you should attend more diligently, by which you may easily understand what I wish to be responded to by you. For you said that you therefore did not either say yes or deny, which is at all to be done to that which I ask, lest you should rashly say that you know what you do not know: as if forsooth I had asked what you know, and not what seems to you. Therefore now I interrogate the same more plainly (if however it can be said more plainly): Does the wise man seem to you to know wisdom, or does he not seem?" "If a wise man such as reason produces can be found," he said, "it can seem to me that he knows wisdom." "Reason therefore," I said, "produces to you that such is the wise man, who is not ignorant of wisdom: and rightly so. For it did not become it to seem otherwise to you."

10. Quaero ergo jam, utrum possit sapiens inveniri. Si enim potest, potest etiam scire sapientiam, omnisque quaestio inter nos dissoluta est. Si autem non posse dicis, jam non quaeretur utrum sapiens aliquid sciat, sed utrum sapiens quisquam esse possit. Quo constituto, jam recedendum erit ab Academicis, et tecum ista quaestio quantum valemus, diligenter cauteque versanda. Nam illis placuit, vel potius visum est, et esse posse hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse. Quare illi sapientem nihil scire affirmarunt. Tibi autem videtur scire sapientiam, quod non est utique nihil scire. Simul enim placuit inter nos, quod etiam inter omnes veteres, interque ipsos Academicos, scire falsa neminem posse: unde illud jam restat, ut aut contendas nihil esse sapientiam, aut talem sapientem ab Academicis describi, qualem ratio non habet, fatearis.

CAPUT V.

Academicorum inane suffugium praecluditur.

11. Et his omissis consentias ut quaeramus, utrum possit homini talis provenire sapientia, qualem prodit ratio. Non enim aliam debemus, aut possumus recte vocare sapientiam. Etsi concedam, inquit, quod te magnopere niti video, sciri a sapiente sapientiam, et aliquid inter nos deprehensum quod sapiens possit percipere; tamen nequaquam mihi occurrit Academicorum labefactata omnis intentio. Prospicio enim defensionis eis locum non minimum reservatum, nec illam assensionis suspensionem esse praecisam, cum hoc ipso causae suae deesse non possint, quo convictos putas. Dicent enim usqueadeo nihil comprehendendi, nullique rei assensionem praebendam, ut etiam hoc de nihil percipiendo, quod tota sibi pene vita usque ad te probabiliter persuaserant, nunc ista conclusione sibi extortum sit: ut sive tunc, sive nunc hujus argumenti vis tarditate ingenii mei, sive revera suo robore invicta sit, eos loco movere non possit, cum audacter affirmare adhuc valeant, ne nunc quidem ulli rei consentiendum esse. Forte enim aliquando contra hoc quoque nonnihil vel a se vel a quopiam reperiri posse, quod acute probabiliterque dicatur: suamque imaginem et quasi speculum quoddam in Proteo illo animadverti oportere, qui traditur eo solere capi quo minime caperetur, investigatoresque ejus nunquam eundem tenuisse, nisi indice alicujusmodi numine. Quod si adsit, et illam nobis veritatem quae tantum curae est demonstrare dignetur, ego quoque vel ipsis invitis, quod minime reor, illos superatos esse confitebor.

10. "I ask therefore now, whether a wise man can be found. For if he can, he can also know wisdom, and the whole question between us is dissolved. But if you say he cannot, now it will not be asked whether the wise man knows anything, but whether any one can be a wise man. Which being established, we must now recede from the Academics, and that question must be turned with you, as much as we are able, diligently and cautiously. For it pleased them, or rather it seemed, both that a wise man can exist, and yet that knowledge cannot fall into a man. Wherefore they affirmed that the wise man knows nothing. But to you it seems that he knows wisdom, which is at all not to know nothing. For at the same time it has pleased us, which also among all the ancients and among the Academics themselves, that no one can know false things: whence that now remains, that you either contend that wisdom is nothing, or you confess that such a wise man is described by the Academics as reason does not have."

CHAPTER V.

The vain refuge of the Academics is precluded.

11. "And these things having been omitted, you should consent that we seek whether such a wisdom can come to a man as reason produces. For we ought not, nor can we rightly call another wisdom." "Even if I should concede," he said, "what I see you are striving for greatly, that wisdom is known by the wise man, and that something has been apprehended between us which the wise man can perceive; yet by no means does every intention of the Academics occur to me as having been shaken. For I foresee that a not minimum place of defense is reserved for them, nor that that suspension of assent has been cut off, since they cannot be lacking to this very cause of theirs by which you think them convicted. For they will say that so much is nothing comprehended, and assent is to be provided to no thing, that even this concerning nothing being perceived, which they had probably persuaded themselves of through almost their whole life up to you, has now been extorted from them by this conclusion: so that whether then or now the force of this argument is unvanquished by the tardiness of my genius or in truth by its own strength, it cannot move them from their place, since they can still prevail to affirm boldly that not even now is assent to be given to any thing. For perhaps at some time something can be found even against this by themselves or by someone, which may be said acutely and probably: and that their image and as it were a certain mirror ought to be noticed in that Proteus, who is handed down to be accustomed to be taken by that by which he would least be taken, and that his investigators never held the same, except by the index of some kind of divinity. Which if it were present, and should deign to demonstrate to us that truth which is of so much care, I also, even they being unwilling, which I least think, will confess that they have been overcome."

12. Bene habet, inquam; prorsus nihil amplius optavi. Nam videte, quaeso, bona mihi quot et quanta provenerint. Primum est, quod Academici jam sic convicti esse dicuntur, ut nihil eis restet ad defensionem, nisi quod fieri non potest. Quis enim hoc aut intelligere ullo modo, aut credere valeat, eum qui victus sit, eo ipso quo victus est, victorem se esse gloriari? Deinde si quid jam remanet cum his conflictionis, non ex eo est quod dicunt, nihil sciri posse, sed ex eo quod nulli rei assentiendum esse contendunt. Nunc itaque concordēs sumus. Nam ut mihi, ita etiam illis videtur, sapientem scire sapientiam. Sed tamen ab assensione illi temperandum monent. Videri enim sibi tantum dicunt; scire autem nullo modo: quasi ego me scire profitear. Mihi quoque videri istud dico: sum enim stultus, ut etiam ipsi, si nesciunt sapientiam. Approbare autem nos debere aliquid puto, id est, veritatem. De quo eos consulo utrum negent, id est, utrum eis placeat veritati assentiendum non esse. Nunquam hoc dicent, sed eam non inveniri asseverabunt. Ergo et hic ex nonnulla parte socium me tenant, quod utrisque non displicet, atque adeo necessario placet, consentiendum esse veritati. Sed quis eam demonstrabit, inquirunt? Ubi ego cum illis non curabo certare; satis mihi est quod jam probabile non est, nihil scire sapientem, ne rem absurdissimam dicere cogantur, aut nihil esse sapientiam, aut sapientiam nescire sapientem.

CAPUT VI.

Veritatem nisi divina ope non percipi.

13. Quis autem verum possit ostendere, abs te Alypi, dictum est, a quo ne dissentiam magnopere mihi laborandum est. Etenim numen aliquod aisti solum posse ostendere homini quid sit verum, cum breviter, tum etiam pie. Nihil itaque in hoc sermone nostro libentius audiui, nihil gravius, nihil probabilius, et, si id numen ut confido adsit, nihil verius. Nam et Proteus ille quanta abs te mentis altitudine commemoratus, quanta intentione in optimum philosophiae genus? Proteus enim ille, ut vos adolescentes non penitus poetas a philosophia contemnendos esse videatis, in imaginem veritatis inducitur. Veritatis, inquam, Proteus in carminibus ostentat sustinetque personam, quam obtinere nemo potest, si falsis imaginibus deceptus comprehensionis nodos vel laxaverit vel dimiserit. Sunt enim istae imagines, quae consuetudine rerum corporalium per istos quibus ad necessaria huius vitae utimur sensus, nos etiam cum veritas tenetur, et quasi habetur in manibus, decipere atque illudere moliantur. Hoc ergo tertium bonum mihi accidit, quod non invenio quanti aestimem.

12. "It is well," I said; "altogether I have wished for nothing more. For see, I beg, how many and how great good things have come to me. The first is, that the Academics are said to be now so convicted that nothing remains to them for defense, except that which cannot happen. For who could either understand this in any way, or prevail to believe it, that he who has been conquered should glory that he is the victor by that very thing by which he was conquered? Then if any conflict now remains with these, it is not from that which they say, that nothing can be known, but from that which they contend that assent is to be given to no thing. Now therefore we are concordant. For as it seems to me, so also to them it seems that the wise man knows wisdom. But yet they admonish that one should temper from assent. For they say that it only seems to them; but that they know in no way: as if I should profess that I know. I say that that also seems to me: for I am foolish, as even they themselves, if they do not know wisdom. But I think that we ought to approve something, that is, the truth. Concerning which I consult them whether they deny it, that is, whether it pleases them that assent is not to be given to the truth. They will never say this, but they will asseverate that it is not found. Therefore here also they have me as a companion from some part, that it does not displease both, and thus necessarily pleases, that assent is to be given to the truth. But who will demonstrate it, they say? Where I will not care to certate with them; it is enough for me that it is no longer probable that the wise man knows nothing, lest they be compelled to say a most absurd thing, either that wisdom is nothing, or that wisdom does not know the wise man."

CHAPTER VI.

Truth is not perceived except by divine aid.

13. "But who could show the true, Alypius, has been said by you, from whom I must labor greatly not to dissent. For you said that some divinity alone can show man what is true, both briefly and also piously. Therefore I have heard nothing in this discourse of ours more willingly, nothing more weighty, nothing more probable, and, if that divinity be present as I trust, nothing more true. For even that Proteus, with how much altitude of mind was he commemorated by you, with how much intention toward the best kind of philosophy? For that Proteus, so that you young men may see that poets are not to be entirely contemned by philosophy, is introduced as an image of truth. Truth's persona, I say, Proteus shows and sustains in the poems, which no one can obtain if, deceived by false images, he shall have either loosened or let go the knots of comprehension. For those images are they which by the custom of corporal things through these senses which we use for the necessities of this life, strive to deceive and illude us even when truth is held, and is as it were had in the hands. This third good therefore has happened to me, which I do not find how much I may estimate.

Mecum enim familiarissimus amicus meus, non solum de probabilitate humanae vitae, verum etiam de ipsa religione concordat, quod est veri amici manifestissimum indicium. Siquidem amicitia rectissime atque sanctissime definita est, rerum humanarum et divinarum cum benevolentia et charitate consensio.

CAPUT VII.

Augustinus Alypii hortatu habet deinceps orationem contra Academicos. Lepidus quidam locus Ciceronis refertur.

14. Tamen ne aut Academicorum argumenta quasdam nebulas videantur offundere, aut doctissimorum virorum auctoritati, inter quos maxime Tullius non movere nos non potest, superbe nonnullis resistere videamur; si vobis placet, prius pauca contra eos disseram, quibus videntur disputationes illae adversari veritati. Deinde ut mihi videtur, ostendam quae causa fuerit Academicis occultandae sententiae suae. Itaque, Alypi, quamvis te totum in meis partibus videam, tamen suscipe pro his paululum, mihi que responde. Quoniam hodie, inquit, auspicato, ut aiunt, processisti, non impediam plenissimam victoriam tuam, et partes illas jam securius, quo abs te imponuntur, tentabo suscipere; si tamen hoc quod interrogationibus te acturum esse significas, in orationem perpetuam (si tibi commodum est) malis convertere; ne vere ut pertinax adversarius, quod a tua humanitate longissimum est, minutis illis telis abs te jam captivus excrucier.

15. Atque ego cum et illos hoc exspectare animadverterem, quasi aliud ingressus exordium: Morem, inquam, vobis geram. Et quamvis post illum laborem scholae rhetoricae in hac me levi armatura nonnihil requieturum esse praesumpseram, ut interrogando ista potius agerem quam dicendo; tamen quia et paucissimi sumus, ut clamare mihi contra valetudinem meam non sit necesse; et istum stilum causa ejusdem salutis quasi aurigam moderatoremque sermonis mei esse volui, ne concitatus rapiar animo quam cura corporis poscit: perpetua, ut vultis, oratione audite quid sentiam. Sed primo illud videamus quale sit, unde amatores Academicorum gloriari nimium solent. Nam est in libris Ciceronis, quos in hujus causae patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam, ut mihi videtur, mira urbanitate conditus, ut nonnullis autem, etiam firmitate roboratus. Difficile est prorsus, ut quemquam non moveat, quod ibi dictum est, Academico sapienti ab omnibus caeterarum sectarum qui sibi sapientes videntur, secundas partes dari, cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse sit. Ex quo posse probabiliter confici, eum recte primum esse iudicio suo, qui omnium caeterorum iudicio sit secundus.

For with me my most familiar friend concordant not only concerning the probability of human life, but even concerning religion itself, which is the most manifest indication of a true friend. Since friendship has been most rightly and most holily defined as the agreement of human and divine things with benevolence and charity."

CHAPTER VII.

Augustine, at the exhortation of Alypius, henceforth holds an oration against the Academics. A certain pleasant passage of Cicero is referred to.

14. "Yet lest either the arguments of the Academics seem to spread certain clouds, or we seem to resist haughtily to some the authority of most learned men, among whom especially Tullius cannot fail to move us; if it pleases you, I will first discuss a few things against those to whom those disputations seem to be adverse to the truth. Then, as it seems to me, I will show what cause there was for the Academics to hide their opinion. Therefore, Alypius, although I see you entirely on my side, yet undertake for these a little while, and answer me." "Since today," he said, "you have proceeded auspiciously, as they say, I will not impede your most full victory, and those parts I will now more securely, in as much as they are imposed by you, try to undertake; if yet this which you signify that you will do by interrogations, you would rather convert into a continuous oration (if it is convenient to you); lest in truth as a pertinacious adversary, which is farthest from your humanity, I being already a captive should be tortured by you with those minute weapons."

15. And when I noticed that they also expected this, as if having entered upon another exordium: "I will do your custom," I said. "And although after that labor of the rhetorical school I had presumed that I would rest somewhat in this light armor, so that I might do these things by interrogating rather than by speaking; yet because we are also very few, so that it is not necessary for me to cry out against my health; and I have wished this pen to be as it were the driver and moderator of my discourse for the cause of the same health, lest I be carried away in mind more excitedly than the care of the body demands: hear in a continuous oration, as you wish, what I think. But first let us see of what sort that is, whence the lovers of the Academics are accustomed to glory too much. For there is in the books of Cicero, which he wrote for the patronage of this cause, a certain place, as it seems to me, seasoned with wonderful urbanity, and as it seems to some, even strengthened by firmness. It is altogether difficult that it should not move anyone, what is said there, that the second parts are given to the Academic wise man by all of the other sects who seem to themselves to be wise, since it is necessary that each one vindicates the first parts for himself. From which it can probably be concluded, that he is rightly first in his own judgment, who is second in the judgment of all others."

16. Fac enim, verbi causa, Stoicum adesse sapientem; nam contra eos potissimum Academicorum exarsit ingenium: ergo Zeno vel Chrysippus si interrogentur, quis sit sapiens; respondebit eum esse quem ipse descripserit. Contra Epicurus vel quis alius adversariorum negabit, suumque potius peritissimum voluptatum aucupem sapientem esse contendet. Inde ad jurgium: clamat Zeno, et tota illa porticus tumultuatur, hominem natum ad nihil esse aliud quam honestatem; ipsam suo splendore in se animos ducere, nullo prorsus commodo extrinsecus posito et quasi lenocinante mercede: voluptatemque illam Epicuri solis inter se pecoribus esse communem; in quorum societatem et hominem et sapientem trudere nefas esse. Contra ille convocata de hortulis in auxilium quasi libera turba temulentorum, quaerentium tamen quem incomptis unguibus bacchantes asperoque ore discerpant, voluptatis nomen, suavitatem, quietem, teste populo, exaggerans, instat acriter, ut nisi ea beatus nemo esse posse videatur. In quorum rixam si Academicus incurrerit, utrosque audiet trahentes se ad suas partes: sed si in illos aut in istos concesserit, ab eis quos deserit, insanus, imperitus, temerariusque clamabitur. Itaque cum et hac et illac aurem diligenter admoverit, interrogatus quid ei videatur, dubitare se dicet. Roga nunc stoicum, quis sit melior; Epicurusne qui delirare illum clamat, an Academicus qui sibi adhuc de re tanta deliberandum esse pronuntiat. Nemo dubitat Academicum praelatum iri. Rursus te ad illum converte, et quaere quem magis amet; Zenonem, a quo bestia nominatur; an Archesilam, a quo audit: Tu fortasse verum dicis, sed requiram diligentius. Nonne apertum est totam illam porticum insanam, Academicos autem prae illis modestos cautosque homines videri Epicuro? Ita peraeque prope de omnibus sectis copiosissime Cicero jucundissimum legentibus quasi spectaculum praebet, velut ostendens nullum illorum esse qui non cum sibi primas partes dederit, quod necesse est, secundas ei dicat dare, quem non repugnare, sed dubitare conspexerit. In quo ego nihil adversabor, nec eis ullam gloriam auferam. Videatur sane quibuslibet Cicero hic non jocatus, sed inania et ventosa quaedam, quod ab ipsorum Graeculorum levitate abhorret, sequi et colligere voluisse.

CAPUT VIII.

Redarguitur locus e Cicerone allatus.

16. "For suppose, for the sake of the word, a Stoic wise man to be present; for against them especially the genius of the Academics flared up: therefore if Zeno or Chrysippus be interrogated, who is the wise man; he will respond that he is the one whom he himself has described. On the other hand Epicurus or any other of the adversaries will deny it, and will contend rather that his own most expert fowler of pleasures is the wise man. Thence to a quarrel: Zeno cries out, and all that porch is in an uproar, that man was born for nothing else than honesty; that she by her own splendor draws minds into herself, with no advantage whatsoever placed outside and as it were a pimping reward: and that that pleasure of Epicurus is common only among beasts; into whose society it is an impiety to thrust both the man and the wise man. Against him, that other, a crowd of drunken people having been called together from the gardens for help as if free, seeking yet whom they may tear apart with uncombed nails as they revel and with a harsh mouth, exaggerating the name of pleasure, sweetness, quiet, with the people as witness, insists sharply, so that unless by it no one seems to be able to be happy. Into whose strife if the Academic shall have run, he will hear both drawing him to their parts: but if he shall have conceded into those or into these, by those whom he deserts, he will be cried out upon as insane, unskilled, and rash. Therefore when he has diligently applied his ear both here and there, having been interrogated what seems to him, he will say that he doubts. Ask now the Stoic, who is better; Epicurus who cries out that he is delirious, or the Academic who pronounces that he is still to deliberate concerning so great a thing. No one doubts that the Academic will be preferred. Turn yourself back to that one, and seek whom he loves more; Zeno, by whom he is named a beast; or Arcesilaus, from whom he hears: 'You perhaps speak the truth, but I will seek more diligently.' Is it not open that all that porch seems insane, but the Academics before them seem modest and cautious men to Epicurus? Thus equally concerning almost all the sects Cicero most copiously provides as it were a most pleasant spectacle for those reading, as if showing that there is none of them who, when he has given the first parts to himself, which is necessary, does not say that he gives the second to him whom he has seen not to repugn, but to doubt. In which I will not be adverse, nor will I take away any glory from them. Let it indeed seem to whomsoever that Cicero here was not joking, but wished to follow and collect certain vain and windy things, which is abhorrent from the levity of the Greeks themselves."

CHAPTER VIII.

The passage brought from Cicero is refuted.

17. Quid enim me impedit, quin si huic vanitati resistere velim, facile ostendam quanto minus malum sit indoctum esse quam indocilem? Unde fit ut cum se ille Academicus jactanticulus quasi discipulum singulis dederit, nemoque illi quod se scire putat, persuadere potuerit; magna illorum postea consensione rideatur. Jam enim quisque alium quemlibet adversariorum suorum nihil didicisse, hunc vero nihil posse discere judicabit. Ex quo deinceps de omnium scholis non ferulis, quod esset deformius quam molestius, sed illorum palliatorum clavis et fustibus projicietur. Non enim magnum negotium erit, contra communem pestem velut Herculea quaedam postulare auxilia Cynicorum. Si autem ista vilissima gloria cum his certare libeat, quod philosophanti mihi jam quidem, sed nondum sapienti faciliore venia concedendum est; quid habebunt quod possint refellere? Ecce enim faciamus me atque Academicum in illas lites philosophorum irruisse: omnes prorsus adsint, exponant breviter pro tempore sententias suas. Quaeratur de Carneade quid sentiat. Dubitare se dicet. Itaque illum singuli praeferent caeteris. Ergo omnes omnibus: magna nimirum atque altissima gloria. Quis istum nolit imitari? et ego itaque interrogatus, idem respondebo; par erit laus. Ea igitur gloria gaudet sapiens, in qua illi stultus aequatur? Quid si cum etiam facile superat? Nihilne agit pudor? Nam istum Academicum jam de judicio discedentem tenebo. Quippe avidior hujusmodi victoriae stultitia est. Ergo eo retento prodam iudicibus quod ignorant, et dicam: Ego, viri optimi, hoc cum isto commune habeo, quod dubitat quis vestrum verum sequatur. Sed habemus etiam proprias sententias, de quibus peto iudicetis. Nam mihi incertum est quidem, quamvis audierim decreta vestra, ubi sit verum: sed ideo quod qui sit in vobis sapiens, ignoro. Iste autem etiam ipsum sapientem negat aliquid scire, ne ipsam quidem, unde sapiens dicitur, sapientiam. Quis non videat palma illa cujus sit? Nam si hoc adversarius meus dixerit, vincam gloria; si autem erubescens confessus fuerit sapientem scire sapientiam, vincam sententia.

CAPUT IX.

Zenonis definitio discutitur.

17. "For what hinders me, if I wish to resist this vanity, from easily showing how much less an evil it is to be unlearned than to be indocile? Whence it happens that when that boastful little Academic has given himself as a disciple to individuals, and no one has been able to persuade him of what he thinks he knows; he is afterward laughed at by a great consensus of those men. For already each one will judge any other of his adversaries to have learned nothing, but this one to be able to learn nothing. From which henceforth he will be projected from the schools of all, not by ferules, which would be more deformed than troublesome, but by the keys and clubs of those cloaked men. For it will not be a great business to demand certain Herculean aids of the Cynics against the common pest. But if it should please one to contend with these concerning that most cheap glory, which indeed to me who am philosophizing, but not yet wise, is to be conceded with easier pardon; what will they have that they can refell? For behold, let us make that I and the Academic have rushed into those strifes of the philosophers: let all altogether be present, let them briefly for the time expose their opinions. Let it be sought from Carneades what he thinks. He will say that he doubts. Therefore the individuals will prefer him to the others. Therefore all to all: a great indeed and most high glory. Who would not wish to imitate him? and I therefore having been interrogated, will respond the same; the praise will be equal. Does the wise man therefore rejoice in that glory, in which the fool is equaled to him? What if even he easily surpasses him? Does shame do nothing? For I will now hold that Academic departing from the judgment. For folly is more greedy of victory of this kind. Therefore, he being retained, I will produce to the judges what they ignore, and I will say: 'I, O best men, have this in common with him, that he doubts which of you follows the true. But we have also our own opinions, concerning which I ask you to judge. For to me indeed it is uncertain, although I have heard your decrees, where the true may be: but for this reason, that who among you is wise, I ignore. This one, however, denies that even the wise man himself knows anything, not even wisdom itself, whence he is called wise.' Who would not see whose that palm is? For if my adversary shall have said this, I will win in glory; if however, blushing, he shall have confessed that the wise man knows wisdom, I will win in opinion."

CHAPTER IX.

The definition of Zeno is discussed.

18. Sed ab hoc jam litigioso tribunali secedamus in aliquem locum, ubi nobis nulla turba molesta sit; atque utinam in ipsam scholam Platonis, quae nomen ex eo dicitur accepisse, quod a populo sit secreta: hic jam non de gloria, quod leve ac puerile est, sed de ipsa vita, et de aliqua spe animi beati, quantum inter nos possumus, disseramus. Negant Academici sciri aliquid posse. Unde hoc vobis placuit, studiosissimi homines atque doctissimi? Movit nos, inquiunt, definitio Zenonis. Cur quaeso? Nam si vera est, nonnihil veri novit, qui vel ipsam novit; sin falsa, non debuit constantissimos commovere. Sed videamus quid ait Zeno. Tale scilicet visum comprehendi et percipi posse, quale cum falso non haberet signa communia. Hoccine te movit, homo Platonicus, ut omnibus viribus ab spe discendi studiosos retraheres, ut totum negotium philosophandi adjuvante quodam etiam mentis ingemiscendo torpore desererent?

19. Sed quomodo illum non permoveret, si et nihil tale inveniri potest, et nisi quid tale est, percipi non potest? hoc si ita est, dicendum potius erat, non posse in hominem cadere sapientiam, quam sapientem nescire cur vivat, nescire quemadmodum vivat, nescire utrum vivat; postremo, quo perversius magisque delirum et insanum dici nihil potest, simul et sapientem esse, et ignorare sapientiam. Quid enim est durius, hominem non posse esse sapientem, an sapientem nescire sapientiam? Nihil hinc disputandum est, si res ipsa ita posita satis non est ad dijudicandum. Sed illud forte si diceretur, penitus homines a philosophando averterentur: nunc vero inducendi sunt sapientiae dulcissimo ac sanctissimo nomine, ut cum contrita aetate nihil didicerint, postea te summis execrationibus prosequantur, quem relictis saltem voluptatibus corporis, ad animi tormenta sunt secuti.

20. Sed videamus per quem potius a philosophia deterreantur. Per eumne qui dixerit: Audi, amice; philosophia non ipsa sapientia, sed studium sapientiae vocatur, ad quam te si contuleris, non quidem dum hic vivis sapiens eris (est enim apud Deum sapientia, nec provenire homini potest), sed cum te tali studio satis exercueris atque mundaveris, animus tuus ea post hanc vitam, id est, cum homo esse desieris, facile perfruetur?

18. "But let us now recede from this litigious tribunal into some place where no crowd may be troublesome to us; and would that it were into that very school of Plato, which is said to have received its name from this, that it is secret from the people: here let us now discuss not concerning glory, which is light and puerile, but concerning life itself, and concerning some hope of a happy mind, as much as we are able among ourselves. The Academics deny that anything can be known. Whence has this pleased you, O most studious and most learned men? The definition of Zeno, they say, has moved us. Why, I beg? For if it is true, he knows something of the true, who knows even it; but if false, it ought not to have moved most constant men. But let us see what Zeno says. Namely, that such a vision can be comprehended and perceived, which would not have signs in common with the false. Has this moved you, O Platonic man, so that with all your strength you would withdraw those studious of learning from hope, so that they would desert the whole business of philosophizing with a certain even to be groaned at torpor of the mind helping?

19. But how should it not move him, if both nothing such can be found, and unless something is such, it cannot be perceived? if this is so, it ought rather to have been said that wisdom cannot fall into man, than that the wise man ignores why he lives, ignores how he lives, ignores whether he lives; finally, than which nothing more perverse and more delirious and insane can be said, that he is at the same time both wise, and ignores wisdom. For what is harsher, that a man cannot be wise, or that a wise man ignores wisdom? Nothing is to be disputed from here, if the thing itself so placed is not enough for judging. But that perhaps if it were said, men would be entirely turned away from philosophizing: now indeed they are to be induced by the most sweet and most holy name of wisdom, so that when they have learned nothing with their age worn away, they may afterward pursue you with the highest execrations, whom they followed to the torments of the mind, having left at least the pleasures of the body.

20. But let us see by whom they are rather deterred from philosophy. By him who shall have said: 'Hear, friend; philosophy is not called wisdom itself, but the study of wisdom, to which if you shall have betaken yourself, you will not indeed be wise while you live here (for wisdom is with God, nor can it come to man), but when you shall have sufficiently exercised and cleansed yourself with such study, your mind will easily enjoy it after this life, that is, when you shall have ceased to be a man'?

An per eum qui dixerit: Venite, mortales, ad philosophiam; magnus hic fructus est: quid enim homini sapientia charius? venite igitur ut sapientes sitis, et sapientiam nesciatis? Non, inquit, a me ita dicitur. Hoc est decipere, nam nihil aliud apud te invenietur. Ita fit ut si hoc dixeris, fugiant tanquam insanum; si alio modo ad hoc adduxeris, facias insanos. Sed credamus, propter utramque sententiam aequae homines nolle philosophari. Si aliquid philosophiae perniciosum Zenonis definitio dicere cogebat, nu homo, idne homini dicendum fuit, unde se doloret; an id, unde te derideret?

21. Tamen quod Zeno definivit, quantum stulti pos sumus, discutiamus. Id visum ait posse comprehendere, quod sic apparet, ut falsum apparere non posset. Manifestum est, nihil aliud in perceptionem venire. Hoc et ego, inquit Archesilas, video, et hoc ipso doceo nihil percipi. Non enim tale aliquid inveniri potest. Fortasse abs te, atque ab aliis stultis: at a sapiente cur non potest? Quanquam et ipsi stulto nihil responderi posse arbitror, si tibi dicat ut illo memorabili acumine tuo hanc ipsam Zenonis definitionem refellas, et ostendas eam etiam falsam esse posse: quod si non potueris, hanc ipsam quam percipias habes; si autem refelleris, unde a percipiendo impediaris non habes. Ego eam refelli posse non video, et omnino verissimam judico. Itaque cum eam scio, quamvis sim stultus, nonnihil scio. Sed fac illam cedere versutiae tuae. Utar complexione securissima. Aut enim vera est, aut falsa: si vera, bene teneo; si falsa, potest aliquid percipi, etiamsi habeat communia signa cum falso. Unde, inquit, potest? Verissime igitur Zeno definivit, nec ei quisquis vel in hoc consensit, erravit. An parvae laudis et sinceritatis definitionem putabimus, quae contra eos qui erant adversum perceptionem multa dicturi, cum designaret quale esset quod percipi posset, seipsam talem esse monstravit? Itaque comprehensibilibus rebus et definitio est, et exemplum. Utrum, ait, etiam ipsa vera sit nescio: sed quia est probabilis, ideo sequens eam ostendo nihil esse tale, quale illa expressit posse comprehendere. Ostendis fortasse praeter ipsam, et vides, ut arbitror, quid sequatur. Quod si etiam ejus incerti sumus, nec ita nos deserit scientia; scimus enim aut veram esse, aut falsam: non igitur nihil scimus. Quanquam nunquam efficiet ut ingratus sim, prorsus ego illam definitionem verissimam judico. Aut enim possunt percipi et falsa, quod vehementius Academici timent, et revera absurdum est; aut nec ea possunt, quae sunt falsis similia: unde illa definitio vera est. Sed jam caetera videamus.

Or by him who shall have said: 'Come, mortals, to philosophy; great is this fruit: for what is dearer to man than wisdom? come therefore so that you may be wise, and ignore wisdom?' 'No,' he says, 'it will not be so said by me.' This is to deceive, for nothing else will be found with you. Thus it happens that if you shall have said this, they flee as if from an insane man; if in another way you shall have led them to this, you make them insane. But let us believe that, on account of both opinions, men equally do not wish to philosophize. If the definition of Zeno compelled one to say something pernicious to philosophy, O man, was that to be said to a man, whence he would grieve; or that, whence he would laugh at you?"

21. "Yet let us discuss what Zeno defined, as much as we are able as fools. He says that that vision can be comprehended, which so appeared that it could not appear false. It is manifest that nothing else comes into perception. 'This I also,' says Arcesilaus, 'see, and by this very thing I teach that nothing is perceived. For nothing such can be found. Perhaps by you, and by other fools: but by the wise man why can it not? Although I think that nothing can be responded even to the fool himself, if he says to you that with that memorable acumen of yours you should refell this very definition of Zeno, and show that it also can be false: which if you shall not have been able to do, you have this very one which you perceive; if however you shall have refelled it, you have nothing whence you may be impeded from perceiving. I do not see that it can be refelled, and I judge it altogether most true. Therefore when I know it, although I am a fool, I know something. But make it yield to your craftiness. I will use a most secure dilemma. For either it is true, or false: if true, I hold it well; if false, something can be perceived, even if it has common signs with the false. 'Whence,' he says, 'can it?' Therefore Zeno defined most truly, nor did whoever consented to him even in this, err. Or shall we think a definition of small praise and sincerity, which against those who were going to say many things against perception, when it designed what sort that was which could be perceived, showed itself to be such? Therefore for comprehensible things there is both a definition and an example. 'Whether,' he says, 'even it itself is true, I know not: but because it is probable, therefore following it I show that there is nothing such, of what sort it expressed can be comprehended.' You show perhaps besides it itself, and you see, as I judge, what follows. But if we are uncertain even of it, not even thus does science desert us; for we know either that it is true, or that it is false: therefore we do not know nothing. Although it will never make me ungrateful, altogether I judge that definition most true. For either even false things can be perceived, which the Academics more vehemently fear, and in truth is absurd; or not even those can, which are similar to false things: whence that definition is true. But let us now see the rest."

CAPUT X.

Duo Academicorum effata.

22. Quamvis haec, nisi fallor, possint ad victoriam satis esse, non tamen fortasse ad victoriae satietatem. Duo sunt quae ab Academicis dicuntur, contra quae, ut valemus, venire instituimus: Nihil posse percipi; et, Nulli rei debere assentiri. De assentiendo mox alias, nunc pauca de perceptione dicemus. Nihilne prorsus dicitis posse comprehendere? Hic evigilavit Carneades: nam nemo istorum minus alte quam ille dormivit, et circumspexit rerum evidentiam. Itaque credo, secum ipse, ut fit, loquens: Ergone, ait, Carneades, dicturus es nescire te utrum homo sis, an formica? Aut de te Chrysippus triumphabit? Dicamus ea nos nescire quae inter philosophos inquiruntur; caetera ad nos non pertinere, ut si in luce titubavero quotidiana et vulgari, ad illas imperitorum tenebras provocem, ubi soli quidam divini oculi vident: qui me etiam si palpitantem atque cadentem aspexerint, caecis prodere nequeant, praesertim arrogantibus, et quos doceri aliquid pudeat. Laute quidem, o graeca industria, succincta et parata procedis; sed non respicis illam definitionem et inventum esse philosophi, et in vestibulo philosophiae fixam atque fundatam. Quam si succidere tentabis, rediet bipennis in crura: illa enim labefactata, non solum potest aliquid percipi, sed etiam id potest quod simillimum falso est, si eam non audebis evertere. Est enim latibulum tuum unde in incautos transire cupientes vehemens erumpis atque exsilis: aliquis te Hercules in tua spelunca tanquam semihominem Cacum suffocabit, et ejusdem molibus opprimet, docens aliquid esse in philosophia quod tanquam simile falso incertum abs te fieri non possit. Certe ad alia properabam; hoc quisquis urget, te ipsum, Carneades, magna afficit contumelia, quem a me veluti mortuum putat ubicumque aut undecumque posse superari. Si autem non putat, immisericors est, qui me passim deserere praesidia et tecum in campo certare cogit: in quem descendere cum coepissem, solo tuo nomine territus pedem retuli, et de superiore loco nescio quid jaculatus sum, quod utrum ad te pervenerit, vel quid egerit, viderint sub quorum examine dimicamus. Sed quid metuo ineptus? Si bene memini, mortuus es, nec jam pro sepulcro tuo jure pugnat Alypius: facile me contra umbram tuam Deus adjuvabit.

CHAPTER X.

Two tenets of the Academics.

22. "Although these things, unless I am deceived, can be enough for victory, yet perhaps not to the satiety of victory. There are two things which are said by the Academics, against which, as we are able, we have instituted to come: 'That nothing can be perceived'; and, 'That one ought to assent to no thing.' Concerning assenting soon elsewhere, now we will say a few things concerning perception. Do you say that nothing whatsoever can be comprehended? Here Carneades awoke: for no one of those slept less deeply than he, and he looked around the evidence of things. Therefore I believe, speaking with himself, as happens: 'Will you then, Carneades, say that you know not whether you are a man, or an ant? Or will Chrysippus triumph over you? Let us say that we know not those things which are sought among philosophers; that the rest do not pertain to us, so that if I shall have stumbled in the daily and vulgar light, I may provoke to those darknesses of the unskilled, where certain divine eyes alone see: who even if they shall have beheld me palpitating and falling, could not betray me to the blind, especially to the arrogant, and those whom it would shame to be taught anything.' Elegantly indeed, O Greek industry, you proceed succinct and prepared; but you do not look back at that definition, both that it is the invention of a philosopher, and fixed and founded in the vestibule of philosophy. Which if you shall attempt to cut down, the axe will return into your legs: for that having been shaken, not only can something be perceived, but even that can which is most similar to the false, if you will not dare to overturn it. For it is your hiding place whence you violently burst and leap out upon those incautious ones desiring to cross over: some Hercules will suffocate you in your cave as a half-man Cacus, and will oppress you with the masses of the same, teaching that there is something in philosophy which cannot be made uncertain by you as similar to the false. Certainly I was hastening to other things; whoever urges this, affects you yourself, Carneades, with great contumely, whom he thinks as if dead can be overcome everywhere or from anywhere by me. If however he does not think so, he is unmerciful, who compels me everywhere to desert my garrisons and to certate with you in the field: into which when I had begun to descend, terrified by your name alone I withdrew my foot, and from a superior place I hurled I know not what, which whether it has reached you, or what it has done, they will have seen under whose examination we fight. But why do I, inept, fear? If I remember well, you are dead, nor does Alypius now fight by right for your sepulcher: God will easily help me against your shadow."

23. Nihil ais in philosophia posse percipi. Et ut orationem tuam large lateque diffundas, arripis rixas, dissensionesque philosophorum, et eas tibi contra illos arma ministrare arbitraris. Quomodo enim inter Democritum et superiores physicos de uno mundo, et innumerabilibus litem dijudicabimus, cum inter haeredemque ejus Epicurum concordia manere nequiverit? Nam iste luxuriosus cum atomos quasi ancillulas suas, id est corpuscula quae in tenebris laetus amplectitur, non tenere viam suam, sed in alienos limites passim sponte declinare permittit; totum patrimonium etiam per jurgia dissipavit. Hoc vero nihil ad me attinet. Si enim ad sapientiam pertinet horum aliquid scire, id non potest latere sapientem. Si autem aliud quiddam est sapientia; illam scit sapiens, ista contemnit. Tamen ego qui longe adhuc absum vel a vicinitate sapientis, in istis physicis nonnihil scio. Certum enim habeo, aut unum esse mundum, aut non unum; et si non unum, aut finiti numeri, aut infiniti. Istam sententiam Carneades falsae esse similem doceat. Item scio mundum istum nostrum, aut natura corporum, aut aliqua providentia sic esse dispositum; eumque aut semper fuisse et fore, aut coepisse esse minime desitutum; aut ortum ex tempore non habere, sed habiturum esse finem; aut et manere coepisse, et non perpetuo esse mansurum: et innumerabilia physica hoc modo novi. Vera enim ista sunt disjuncta, nec similitudine aliqua falsi ea potest quisquam confundere. Sed assume aliquid, ait Academicus. Nolo: nam hoc est dicere, Relinque quod scis, dic quod nescis. Sed pendet sententia. Melius certe pendet quam cadit: nempe plana est; nempe jam potest aut falsa, aut vera nominari. Hanc ergo me scire dico. Tu qui nec ad philosophiam pertinere ista negas, et eorum sciri nihil posse asseris, ostende me ista nescire: dic istas disjunctiones aut falsas esse, aut aliquid commune habere cum falso, per quod discerni omnino non possint.

CAPUT XI.

Ex sensuum imbecillitate non effici ut nihil veri percipiatur. Neque ex somno et furore.

24. Unde, inquit, scis esse istum mundum, si sensus falluntur? Nunquam rationes vestrae ita vim sensuum refellere potuerunt, ut convinceretis nobis nihil videri: nec omnino ausi estis aliquando ista tentare; sed posse aliud esse ac videtur, vehementer persuadere incubuistis. Ego itaque hoc totum, quaecumque est quod nos continet, atque alit; hoc, inquam, quod oculis meis apparet, a meque sentitur habere terram et coelum, aut quasi terram, et quasi coelum, mundum voco. Si dicis nihil mihi videri, nunquam errabo. Is enim errat, qui quod sibi videtur, temere probat.

23. "You say that nothing in philosophy can be perceived. And so that you may diffuse your oration large and wide, you snatch up the strifes and dissensions of the philosophers, and you think that those minister arms to you against them. For how will we judge the strife between Democritus and the superior physicists concerning one world and innumerable worlds, when between him and his heir Epicurus concord could not remain? For that luxurious man, since he permits the atoms as if his own little maidservants, that is the little bodies which he gladly embraces in darkness, not to hold their way, but to decline spontaneously everywhere into alien limits, has dissipated the whole patrimony even through quarrels. This however pertains nothing to me. For if it pertains to wisdom to know any of these, that cannot be hidden from the wise man. If however wisdom is something else, the wise man knows that, and contemns these things. Yet I who am still far off even from the vicinity of the wise man, know something in these physics. For I have it certain, that either the world is one, or not one; and if not one, either of a finite number, or infinite. Let Carneades teach that this opinion is similar to the false. Likewise I know that this world of ours is so disposed either by the nature of bodies or by some providence; and that it either always was and will be, or began to be and is by no means going to cease; or does not have an origin from time, but will have an end; or both began to stay, and will not stay perpetually: and I have known innumerable physical things in this way. For those disjunctions are true, nor can anyone confound them by any similitude of the false. 'But assume something,' says the Academic. I will not: for this is to say, 'Leave what you know, say what you ignore.' But the opinion hangs. Better certainly it hangs than it falls; indeed it is plain; indeed it can now be named either false or true. This therefore I say that I know. You who neither deny that those things pertain to philosophy, and assert that nothing of them can be known, show that I ignore those things: say that those disjunctions either are false, or have something common with the false, through which they cannot be discerned at all."

CHAPTER XI.

*That from the imbecility of the senses it is not effected that nothing of the true is perceived.
Neither from sleep and fury.*

24. "Whence," he says, "do you know that world is, if the senses are deceived?" Your reasons were never able so to refell the force of the senses, that you would convince us that nothing is seen by us: nor did you ever at any time dare to attempt those things; but you have brooded over persuading vehemently that it can be otherwise than it is seen. I therefore call this whole, whatever it is which contains and nourishes us; this, I say, which appears to my eyes, and is felt by me to have earth and heaven, or as it were earth and as it were heaven, I call the world. If you say that nothing is seen by me, I will never err. For he errs, who rashly approves what seems to him.

Posse enim falsum videri a sentientibus dicitis, nihil videri non dicitis. Prorsus enim omnis disputationis causa tolletur, ubi regnare vos libet, si non solum nihil scimus, sed etiam nihil nobis videtur. Si autem hoc quod mihi videtur negas mundum esse, de nomine controversiam facis, cum id a me dixerim mundum vocari.

25. Etiamne, inquires, si dormis, mundus est iste quem vides? Jam dictum est, quidquid tale mihi videtur, mundum appello. Sed si eum solum placet mundum vocare, qui videtur a vigilantibus vel etiam a sanis; illud contende, si potes, eos qui dormiunt ac furiant, non in mundo furere atque dormire. Quamobrem hoc dico, istam totam corporum molem atque machinam in qua sumus, sive dormientes, sive furentes, sive vigilantes, sive sani, aut unam esse, aut non esse unam. Edissere, quomodo possit ista esse falsa sententia. Si enim dormio, fieri potest ut nihil dixerim; aut si etiam ore dormientis verba, ut solet, evaserunt, potest fieri ut non hic, non ita sedens, non istis audientibus dixerim: ut autem hoc falsum sit, non potest. Nec ego illud me percepisse dico, quod vigilem. Potes enim dicere, hoc mihi etiam dormienti videri potuisse; ideoque hoc potest esse falso simillimum. Si autem unus et sex mundi sunt; septem mundos esse, quoquo modo affectus sim, manifestum est, et id me scire non impudenter affirmo. Quare vel hanc connexionem, vel illas superius disjunctiones, doce somno aut furore aut vanitate sensuum posse esse falsas; et me, si expergefactus ista meminero, victum esse concedam. Credo enim jam satis liquere quae per somnium et dementia falsae videantur, ea scilicet quae ad corporis sensus pertinent: nam ter terna novem esse, et quadratum intelligibilium numerorum, necesse est vel genere humano stertente sit verum. Quanquam etiam pro ipsis sensibus multa posse dici video, quae ab Academicis reprehensa non invenimus. Credo enim sensus non accusari, vel quod imaginationes falsae furentes patiuntur, vel quod falsa in somnis videmus. Si enim vera vigilantibus atque sanis renuntiarunt; nihil ad eos, quid sibi animus dormientis insanientisque confingat.

26. Restat ut quaeratur, utrum cum ipsi renuntiant, verum renuntient. Age, si dicat Epicureus quispiam, Nihil habeo quod de sensibus conquerar: injustum est enim ab eis exigere plusquam possunt; quidquid autem possunt videre oculi, verum vident. Ergone verum est quod de remo in aqua vident? Prorsus verum. Nam causa accedente quare ita videretur, si demersus unda remus rectus appareret, magis oculos meos falsae renuntiationis arguerem. Non enim viderent quod talibus existentibus causis videndum fuit.

For you say that the false can be seen by those sensing, you do not say that nothing is seen. For altogether the cause of all disputation will be taken away, where it pleases you to reign, if not only we know nothing, but also nothing seems to us. If however you deny that this which seems to me is the world, you make a controversy concerning the name, since I have said that that is called the world by me.

25. "Is it even so," you will say, "if you sleep, that that which you see is the world?" It has been already said, whatever seems such to me, I call the world. But if it pleases one to call that alone the world, which is seen by those waking or even by those sane; contend that, if you can, that those who sleep and are furious, do not rage and sleep in the world. Wherefore I say this, that this whole mass and machine of bodies in which we are, whether sleeping, or raging, or waking, or sane, is either one, or is not one. Explain, how this can be a false opinion. For if I sleep, it can happen that I have said nothing; or if even words have escaped from the mouth of one sleeping, as is accustomed, it can happen that I have not said it here, not thus sitting, not these hearing; but that this is false, cannot happen. Nor do I say that I have perceived that I wake. For you can say, that this could have seemed to me even sleeping; and therefore this can be most similar to the false. But if there are one and six worlds; that there are seven worlds, in whatever way I may be affected, is manifest, and that I know that I affirm not impudently. Wherefore either this connection, or those disjunctions above, teach that they can be false by sleep or fury or the vanity of the senses; and I, if having been awakened I shall remember those things, will concede that I have been conquered. For I believe that it is already sufficiently clear what things seen through dream and dementia are false, namely those which pertain to the senses of the body: for that three times three are nine, and the square of intelligible numbers, is necessary that it be true even with the human race snoring. Although even for the senses themselves I see that many things can be said, which we have not found reprehended by the Academics. For I believe that the senses are not accused, either because those raging suffer false imaginations, or because we see false things in dreams. For if they reported true things to those waking and sane; it is nothing to them, what the mind of one sleeping and raging may feign for itself."

26. "It remains that it be sought, whether when they themselves report, they report the true. Come, if some Epicurean should say: 'I have nothing of which to complain concerning the senses: for it is unjust to exact from them more than they can; whatever however the eyes can see, they see the true.' Is it therefore true what they see concerning the oar in the water?' Altogether true. For the cause being added why it should so seem, if the oar submerged in the wave appeared straight, I would rather accuse my eyes of a false report. For they would not see what was to be seen with such causes existing.'

Quid multis opus est? Hoc de turrium motu, hoc de pinnulis avium, hoc de caeteris innumerabilibus dici potest. Ego tamen fallor, si assentiar, ait quispiam. Noli plus assentiri, quam ut ita tibi apparere persuadeas; et nulla deceptio est. Non enim video, quomodo refellat Academicus eum qui dicit: Hoc mihi candidum videri scio; hoc auditum meum delectari scio; hoc mihi jucunde olere scio; hoc mihi sapere dulciter scio; hoc mihi esse frigidum scio. Dic potius, utrum per se amarae sint oleastri frondes, quas caper tam pertinaciter appetit. O hominem improbum! nonne est caper ipse modestior? Nescio quales pecori sint, mihi tamen amarae sunt: quid quaeris amplius? Sed est fortasse aliquis etiam hominum, cui non sint amarae. Tendisne in molestiam? Numquidnam ego amaras esse omnibus dixi? mihi dixi, et hoc non semper affirmo. Quid si enim alias alia causa, nunc dulce quidpiam, nunc amarum in ore sentiat? Illud dico, posse hominem cum aliquid gustat, bona fide jurare, se scire palato suo illud suave esse, vel contra, nec ulla calumnia graeca ab ista scientia posse deduci. Quis enim tam impudens sit, qui mihi cum delectatione aliquid ligurienti dicat: Fortasse non gustas, sed hoc somnium est? Numquidnam resisto? Sed me tamen illud in somnis etiam delectaret. Quare illud quod me scire dixi, nulla confundit similitudo falsorum. Et Epicureus, vel Cyrenaici et alia multa fortasse pro sensibus dicant, contra quae nihil dictum esse ab Academicis accepi. Sed quid ad me? Si volunt ista, et si possunt, etiam me favente rescindant. Quidquid enim contra sensus ab eis disputatur, non contra omnes philosophos valet. Sunt enim qui ista omnia, quae corporis sensu accipit animus, opinionem posse gignere confitetur, scientiam vero negant. Quam tamen volunt intelligentia contineri, remotamque a sensibus in mente vivere. Et forte in eorum numero est sapiens ille quem quaerimus. Sed de hoc alias. Nunc ad reliqua pergamus quae propter ista quae jam dicta sunt, paucis, nisi fallor, explicabimus.

CAPUT XII.

Urget Academicos causare frustra sensuum vel somni et furoris deceptiones.

What is the need of many things? This can be said concerning the motion of towers, this concerning the feathers of birds, this concerning the other innumerable things. 'I however am deceived, if I assent,' someone says. Do not assent more, than so as to persuade yourself that it so appears to you; and there is no deception. For I do not see how the Academic refells him who says: 'I know that this seems white to me; I know that my hearing is delighted by this; I know that this smells pleasantly to me; I know that this tastes sweetly to me; I know that this is cold to me.' Say rather, whether the leaves of the wild olive are bitter through themselves, which the goat so pertinaciously seeks. O wicked man! is not the goat himself more modest? I know not of what sort they are to the beast, yet to me they are bitter: what do you seek more? But there is perhaps someone even of men, to whom they are not bitter. Do you tend toward being troublesome? Did I say that they were bitter to all? I said it to myself, and I do not always affirm even this. For what if at another time another cause, now something sweet, now something bitter be felt in the mouth? I say that, that a man can when he tastes something, swear in good faith, that he knows to his palate that that is sweet, or on the contrary, nor can any Greek calumny be deduced from that science. For who would be so impudent, who would say to me when I am licking something with delectation: 'Perhaps you do not taste, but this is a dream'? Do I at all resist? But that would nevertheless delight me even in dreams. Wherefore that which I said that I know, no similitude of false things confounds. And the Epicurean, or the Cyrenaics and many other things perhaps they might say for the senses, against which I have received nothing to have been said by the Academics. But what to me? If they wish those things, and if they can, let them rescind them even with me favoring. For whatever is disputed by them against the senses, does not prevail against all philosophers. For there are those who confess that all those things, which the mind receives by the sense of the body, can beget opinion, but they deny science. Which however they wish to be contained by intelligence, and removed from the senses to live in the mind. And perhaps in their number is that wise man whom we seek. But concerning this elsewhere. Now let us proceed to the rest which on account of these things which have been already said, we will explain in a few words, unless I am deceived."

CHAPTER XII.

It urges that the Academics in vain bring up the deceptions of the senses, or of sleep and madness.

27. Quid enim de moribus inquirentem vel juvat vel impedit corporis sensus? Nisi vero illos ipsos qui summum hominis bonum in voluptate posuere, nihil impedit aut columbae collum, aut vox incerta, aut grave pondus homini quod camelis leve est, aut alia sexcenta, quominus dicant eo quo delectantur delectari se scire, vel eo quo offenduntur offendi (quod refelli posse non video); eum commovebunt qui finem boni mente complectitur. Quid horum tu eligis? Si quid mihi videatur, quaeris; in mente arbitror esse summum hominis bonum. Sed nunc de scientia quaerimus. Ergo interroga sapientem, qui non potest ignorare sapientiam: mihi tamen tardo illi atque stulto licet interim scire, boni humani finem, in quo inhabitet beata vita, aut nullum esse, aut in animo esse, aut in corpore, aut in utroque. Hoc me, si potes, nescire convince; quod notissimae illae vestrae rationes nullo modo faciunt. Quod si non potes, non enim reperies cui falso simile sit, egone concludere dubitabo, recte mihi videri scire sapientem quidquid in philosophia verum est, cum ego inde tam multa vera cognoverim?

28. Sed metuit fortasse ne summum bonum eligat dormiens. Nihil periculi est: cum evigilaverit, repudiabit si displicet, tenebit si placet. Quis enim eum recte vituperabit quod falsum vidit in somnis? Aut fortasse illud formidabit, ne dormiens amittat sapientiam, si pro veris falsa probaverit? Hoc jam ne dormiens quidem audet somnare, ut sapientem vigilantem vocet, neget si dormiat. Haec etiam de furore dici possunt: sed in alia festinat oratio. Haec tamen sine conclusione securissima non relinquo. Aut enim amittitur furore sapientia, et jam non erit sapiens, quem verum ignorare clamatis: aut scientia ejus manet in intellectu, etiamsi pars animi caetera id quod accepit a sensibus velut in somnis imaginetur.

CAPUT XIII.

Multa percipi in dialectica.

29. Restat dialectica, quam certe sapiens bene novit, nec falsum scire quisquam potest. Si vero eam nescit, non pertinet ad sapientiam ejus cognitio, sine qua esse sapiens potuit; et superfluo utrum vera sit, possitve percipi, quaerimus. Hic fortasse aliquis mihi dicat: Soles prodere tu stulte, quid noveris: an de dialectica nihil scire potuisti? Ego vero plura quam de quavis parte philosophiae. Nam primo omnes illas propositiones, quibus supra usus sum, veras esse ista me docuit. Deinde per istam novi alia multa vera. Sed quam multa sint, numerate, si potestis.

27. For what does the sense of the body either help or impede one inquiring concerning morals? Unless indeed nothing impedes those very ones who placed the supreme good of man in pleasure—neither the neck of the dove, nor an uncertain voice, nor a heavy weight to a man which is light to camels, nor six hundred other things—from saying that they know that they are delighted by that by which they are delighted, or offended by that by which they are offended (which I do not see can be refelled); they will move him who embraces the end of the good with the mind. Which of these do you choose? If you ask what seems to me; I think the supreme good of man is in the mind. But now we are inquiring concerning science. Therefore interrogate the wise man, who cannot be ignorant of wisdom: yet it is permitted to me, that slow and foolish one, to know in the meantime, that the end of human good, in which the happy life (*beata vita*) may dwell, is either none, or is in the soul, or in the body, or in both. Convince me, if you can, that I do not know this; which those most known reasons of yours in no way do. Because if you cannot, for you will not find to what false thing it is similar, will I hesitate to conclude, that it rightly seems to me that the wise man knows whatever is true in philosophy, since I have known so many true things from there?

28. But he fears perhaps lest he choose the supreme good while sleeping. There is no danger: when he has awakened, he will repudiate it if it displeases, he will hold it if it pleases. For who will rightly vituperate him because he saw a false thing in dreams? Or perhaps he will dread that, lest while sleeping he lose wisdom, if he has approved false things for true? Not even while sleeping does he dare to dream this already, so as to call him a wise man when waking, but deny it if he sleeps. These things can also be said concerning madness: but the speech hastens to other things. Yet I do not leave these things without a most secure conclusion. For either wisdom is lost by madness, and he will no longer be a wise man, whom you cry out is ignorant of the true: or his science remains in the intellect, even if the rest of the part of the soul imagines that which it received from the senses as if in dreams.

CHAPTER XIII.

Many things are perceived in dialectics.

29. Dialectics remains, which certainly the wise man well knows, nor can anyone know a false thing. If however he does not know it, its cognition does not pertain to his wisdom, without which he could be wise; and superfluously we seek whether it be true, or can be perceived. Here perhaps someone might say to me: 'You are accustomed to betray, o foolish one, what you have known: or have you been able to know nothing concerning dialectics?' I indeed more than concerning any part of philosophy. For first it taught me that all those propositions, which I used above, are true. Then through it I have known many other true things. But how many they are, number them, if you can.

Si quatuor in mundo elementa sunt, non sunt quinque. Si sol unus est, non sunt duo. Non potest una anima et mori et esse immortalis. Non potest homo simul et beatus, et miser esse. Non hic et sol lucet, et nox est. Aut vigilamus nunc, aut dormimus. Aut corpus est, quod mihi videre videor, aut non est corpus. Haec et alia multa, quae commemorare longissimum est, per istam didici vera esse, quoquo modo sese habeant sensus nostri, in se ipsa vera. Docuit me, si cujus eorum quae per connexionem modo proposui pars antecedens assumpta fuerit, trahere necessario id quod annexum est. Ea vero quae per repugnantiam vel disjunctionem a me sunt enuntiata, hanc habere naturam, ut cum auferuntur caetera, sive unum, sive plura sint, restet aliquid quod eorum ablatione firmetur. Docuit etiam me, cum de re constat, propter quam verba dicuntur, de verbis non debere contendere: et quisquis id faciat, si imperitia faciat, docendum esse; si malitia, deserendum: si doceri non potest, monendum ut aliquid aliud potius agat, quam tempus in superfluis operamque consumat; si non obtemperat, negligendum. De captiosis atque fallacibus ratiunculis breve praeceptum est: si male concedendo inferuntur, ad ea quae concessa sunt esse redeundum. Si verum falsumque in una conclusione configunt, accipiendum inde quod intelligitur, quod explicari non potest relinquendum. Si autem modus in aliquibus rebus latet penitus hominem, scientiam ejus non esse quaerendam. Haec quidem habeo a dialectica, et alia multa quae commemorare non est necesse. Neque enim debeo ingratus existere. Verum ille sapiens aut haec negligit, aut si profecto dialectica ipsa scientia veritatis est, sic illam novit ut istorum mendacissimam calumniam: Si verum est, falsum est; si falsum est, verum est: contemnendo, et non miserando fame enecet. Haec de perceptione satis esse propterea puto, quia de assentiendo cum dicere coepero, tota ibi rursum causa versabitur.

CAPUT XIV.

Sapientem oportet sapientiae saltem assentiri.

30. Jam ergo ad eam partem veniamus, in qua dubitare adhuc videtur Alypius. Et primo idipsum perspiciamus quale sit, quod te acutissime atque cautissime movet. Nam si tot tantisque rationibus roboratam (hoc enim dixisti) Academicorum sententiam, qua eis placuit nihil scire sapientem, hoc tuum labefactat inventum, quo cogimur confiteri multo esse probabilius, sapientem scire sapientiam; magis est assensio cohibenda.

If there are four elements in the world, there are not five. If there is one sun, there are not two. One soul cannot both die and be immortal. A man cannot at the same time be both happy and miserable. It is not both that the sun shines here, and it is night. Either we wake now, or we sleep. Either it is a body, what I seem to see, or it is not a body. These and many other things, which it is most long to commemorate, I have learned to be true through it, in whatever way our senses have themselves, true in themselves. It taught me, if of any of those things which I just proposed through connection the antecedent part were assumed, to draw necessarily that which is annexed. Those things however which were enunciated by me through repugnance or disjunction, have this nature, that when the rest are taken away, whether they be one, or more, something remains which is confirmed by their ablation. It taught me also, when it is clear concerning the thing on account of which the words are said, that one ought not to contend concerning words: and whoever does that, if he does it from unskillfulness, he is to be taught; if from malice, to be deserted: if he cannot be taught, to be warned that he act in something else rather, than consume time and labor in superfluous things; if he does not comply, to be neglected. Concerning captious however and fallacious ratiocinations there is a brief precept: if they are inferred by conceding badly, one must return to those things which were conceded. If the true and the false conflict in one conclusion, that is to be accepted from there which is understood, that which cannot be explained to be left. If however a limit in some things lies hidden deeply from man, its science is not to be sought. These things indeed I have from dialectics, and many other things which it is not necessary to commemorate. Nor indeed ought I to exist ungrateful. But that wise man either neglects these, or if indeed dialectics itself is the science of truth, he so knows it that, by contemning that most lying calumny of theirs: 'If it is true, it is false; if it is false, it is true,' he may kill it with hunger by not pitying it. These things I think to be enough concerning perception on this account, because when I begin to speak concerning assenting, the whole cause will again be turned there.

CHAPTER XIV.

It is necessary that the wise man assent at least to wisdom.

30. Now therefore let us come to that part, in which Alypius still seems to doubt. And first let us perceive that itself of what sort it is, which moves you most acutely and most cautiously. For if the opinion of the Academics, strengthened by so many and so great reasons (for this you said), by which it pleased them that the wise man knows nothing, this discovery of yours shakes, by which we are compelled to confess it to be much more probable, that the wise man knows wisdom; more is assent to be withheld.

Hoc enim ipso ostenditur nihil quamlibet copiosissimis subtilissimisque argumentis posse suaderi, cui non ex parte contraria, si adsit ingenium, non minus acriter, vel fortasse acius resistatur. Eo fit, ut cum sit victus Academicus, vicerit. O utinam vincatur! nunquam efficiet quavis arte Pelasga, ut simul a me victus victorque discedat. Certe nihil aliud inveniatur quod adversum ista dici possit, et ultro me victum esse profiteor. Non enim de gloria comparanda, sed de invenienda veritate tractamus. Mihi satis est, quoquo modo molem istam transcendere, quae intrantibus ad philosophiam sese opponit, et nescio quibus receptaculis tenebrascens talem esse philosophiam totam minatur, nihilque in ea lucis inventum iri sperare permittit. Quid autem amplius desiderem, nihil habeo, si jam probabile est, nonnihil scire sapientem. Non enim alia causa veri simile videbatur eum assensionem sustinere debere, nisi quia erat veri simile nihil posse comprehendere. Quo sublato, percipit enim sapiens vel ipsam, ut jam conceditur, sapientiam, nulla jam causa remanebit cur non assentiatur sapiens vel ipsi sapientiae. Est enim sine dubitatione monstrosius sapientem non approbare sapientiam, quam sapientem nescire sapientiam.

31. Nam quaeso, paululum quasi ante oculos tale spectaculum constituamus, si possumus, rixam quamdam sapientis et sapientiae. Quid aliud dicit sapientia, quam se esse sapientiam? At contra iste, Non credo, inquit. Quis ait sapientiae: Non credo esse sapientiam? quis, nisi is cum quo illa loqui potuit, et in quo habitare dignata est, scilicet sapiens? Ite nunc, et me quaerite, qui cum Academicis pugnem: habetis jam novum certamen, sapiens et sapientia secum pugnant. Sapiens non vult consentire sapientiae, ego vobiscum securus exspecto. Quis enim non credat invictam esse sapientiam? Tamen nos aliqua complexione muniamus. Aut enim in hoc certamine Academicus vincet sapientiam: et a me vincetur, quia non erit sapiens: aut ab ea superabitur; et sapientem sapientiae consentire docebimus. Aut igitur sapiens Academicus non est, aut nonnulli rei sapiens assentietur: nisi forte quem dicere pudeat sapientem nescire sapientiam, sapientem non consentire sapientiae dicere non pudebit.

For by this very thing it is shown that nothing can be persuaded by however most copious and most subtle arguments, which is not resisted from the contrary part, if genius be present, not less sharply, or perhaps more sharply. By that it happens, that when the Academic is conquered, he has conquered. O would that he be conquered! he will never effect by any Pelasgian art, that he depart from me at the same time conquered and a conqueror. Certainly let nothing else be found which can be said against those things, and I voluntarily profess that I have been conquered. For we do not treat concerning glory to be compared, but concerning truth to be found. It is enough for me, in whatever way to transcend that mass, which opposes itself to those entering to philosophy, and darkening with I know not what receptacles threatens that all philosophy is such, and permits one to hope that nothing of light will be found in it. What however I should desire more, I have nothing, if now it is probable, that the wise man knows something. For not by another cause did it seem likely (*verisimile*) that he ought to sustain assent, unless because it was likely that nothing can be comprehended. Which being taken away, for the wise man perceives even wisdom itself, as is now conceded, no cause will now remain why the wise man should not assent even to wisdom itself. For it is without doubt more monstrous that the wise man not approve wisdom, than that the wise man not know wisdom.

31. For I ask, let us constitute a little as if before the eyes such a spectacle, if we can, a certain quarrel of the wise man and of wisdom. What else does wisdom say, than that she is wisdom? But on the contrary he says, 'I do not believe.' Who says to wisdom: 'I do not believe that it is wisdom'? who, unless he with whom she could speak, and in whom she deigned to dwell, namely the wise man? Go now, and seek me, who may fight with the Academics: you have now a new contest, the wise man and wisdom fight with themselves. The wise man does not wish to consent to wisdom, I secure expect with you. For who would not believe that wisdom is unconquered? Yet let us fortify ourselves with some complexion. For either in this contest the Academic will conquer wisdom: and he will be conquered by me, because he will not be a wise man: or he will be overcome by her; and we will teach that the wise man consents to wisdom. Either therefore the wise man is not an Academic, or the wise man will assent to some thing: unless perhaps it will not shame him to say that the wise man does not consent to wisdom, whom it shamed to say that the wise man does not know wisdom.

At si jam veri simile est cadere in sapientem vel ipsius sapientiae perceptionem, et nulla causa est, cur non ei quod potest percipi assentiatur; video quod volebam esse veri simile, sapientem scilicet assensurum esse sapientiae. Si quaeres ubi inveniatur ipsam sapientiam; respondebo, In semetipso. Si dicis eum nescire quod habeat, redis ad illud absurdum, sapientem nescire sapientiam. Si sapientem ipsum negas posse inveniri; non jam cum Academicis, sed tecum, quisquis hoc sentis, sermone alio disseremus. Illi enim cum haec disputant, de sapiente profecto disputant. Clamat Cicero, seipsum magnum esse opinatorem, sed de sapiente se quaerere. Quod si adhuc vos, adolescentes, ignotum habetis, certe in Hortensio legistis: Si igitur nec certi est quidquam, nec opinari sapientis est; nihil unquam sapiens approbabit. Unde manifestum est eos de sapiente illis suis disputationibus, contra quas nitimur, quaerere.

32. Ergo arbitror ego sapienti certam esse sapientiam, id est sapientem percepisse sapientiam; et ob hoc eum non opinari, cum assentitur sapientiae: assentitur enim ei rei, quam si non percepisset, sapiens non esset. Nec isti quemquam non debere assentiri, nisi rebus quae non possunt percipi, affirmant. Non autem sapientia nihil est. Cum igitur et scit sapientiam, et assentitur sapientiae; neque nihil scit, neque nulli rei sapiens assentitur. Quid amplius vultis? An de illo errore aliquid quaerimus, quem dicunt penitus evitari, si in nullam rem animum declinet assensio? Errat enim, inquiunt, quisquis non solum rem falsam, sed etiam dubiam, quamvis vera sit, approbat: nihil autem quod dubium non sit invenio. At invenit sapiens ipsam, ut dicebamus, sapientiam.

CAPUT XV.

An qui sequitur in agendo probabile citra assensum, vitet errorem.

33. Sed hinc jam vultis fortasse me discedere. Non sunt facile securissima relinquenda; cum versutissimis hominibus agimus: morem tamen vobis geram. Sed quid hic dicam? quid? quidnam? illud nimirum vetus dicendum est, ubi et ipsi habent quod dicant. Quid enim faciam, quem de castris meis foras truditis? num implorabo auxilia doctiorum, cum quibus si superare nequeo, minus pudebit fortasse superari? Jaciam igitur quibus viribus possum fumosum quidem jam et scabrum, sed nisi fallor, validissimum telum. Qui nihil approbat, nihil agit. O hominem rusticum! Et ubi est probabile? ubi est verisimile?

But if now it is likely that even the perception of wisdom itself falls to the wise man, and there is no cause why he should not assent to that which can be perceived; I see what I wished to be likely, namely that the wise man will assent to wisdom. If you ask where he finds wisdom itself; I will respond, In himself. If you say that he does not know what he has, you return to that absurdity, that the wise man does not know wisdom. If you deny that the wise man himself can be found; we will no longer with the Academics, but with you, whoever feels this, discuss in another speech. For they when they dispute these things, certainly dispute concerning the wise man. Cicero cries out, that he himself is a great former of opinions (*opinatore*), but that he seeks concerning the wise man. Which if yet you, youths, have unknown, certainly you have read in the Hortensius: 'If therefore neither is there anything of certain, nor is it of the wise man to form opinions; the wise man will never approve anything.' Whence it is manifest that they seek concerning the wise man in those disputations of theirs, against which we strive.

32. Therefore I think that wisdom is certain to the wise man, that is that the wise man has perceived wisdom; and on this account that he does not form opinions, when he assents to wisdom: for he assents to that thing, which if he had not perceived, he would not be a wise man. Nor do those ones affirm that anyone ought not to assent, except to things which cannot be perceived. Wisdom however is not nothing. Since therefore he both knows wisdom, and assents to wisdom; neither does he know nothing, nor does the wise man assent to no thing. What more do you wish? Or do we seek anything concerning that error, which they say is deeply avoided, if the assent does not decline the mind into any thing? For he errs, they say, whoever approves not only a false thing, but even a doubtful one, although it be true: I however find nothing which is not doubtful. But the wise man finds wisdom itself, as we were saying.

CHAPTER XV.

Whether he who follows the probable in acting without assent, avoids error.

33. But from here now you wish perhaps that I depart. Things most secure are not easily to be left; when we deal with most crafty men: yet I will humor you. But what shall I say here? what? what indeed? that old thing surely is to be said, where even they themselves have what they may say. For what shall I do, whom you thrust out from my camp? shall I implore the aids of the more learned, with whom if I cannot overcome, it will perhaps less shame me to be overcome? I will hurl therefore with what strengths I can a weapon indeed already smoky and rough, but unless I am deceived, most valid. He who approves nothing, acts nothing. O rustic man! And where is the probable? where is the likely?

Hoc volebatis. Auditisne ut sonent scuta graecanica? Exceptum est quod robustissimum quidem: sed qua manu jaculati sumus? Et nihil mihi potentius isti mei suggerunt; nec aliquid, ut video, vulneris fecimus. Convertam me ad ea quae villa et ager ministrat: onerant me potius maiora quam praeparant.

34. Nam cum otiosus diu cogitasset in isto rure, quonam modo possit isthuc probabile ac veri simile actus nostros ab errore defendere; primo visum est mihi, ut solet videri cum ista vendebam, belle tectum et munitum. Deinde ubi totum cautius circumspexi, visus sum mihi vidisse unum aditum, qua in securos error irrueret. Non enim solum puto eum errare, qui falsam viam sequitur; sed etiam eum qui veram non sequitur. Faciamus enim duos viatores ad unum locum tendentes, quorum alter instituerit nulli credere, alter nimis credulus sit. Ventum est ad aliquod bivium: hic ille credulus pastori qui aderat, vel cuipiam rusticano: Salve, frugi homo; dic quaeso, qua bene in illum locum pergatur. Respondetur: Si hac ibis, nihil errabis. Et ille ad comitem: Verum dicit, hac eamus. Ridet vir cautissimus, et tam cito assensum facetissime illudit, atque interea illo discedente in bivio figitur: et jam incipit videri turpe cessare, cum ecce ex alio viae cornu lautus quidam et urbanus equo insidens eminet, et propinquare occipit: gratulatur iste. Tum advenienti, et salutato indicat propositum, quaerit viam; dicit etiam remansionis suae causam, quo benevolentiores reddat, pastori eum praeferens. Ille autem casu planus erat de iis quos Samardacos jam vulgus vocat. Tenuit suum morem homo pessimus etiam gratis. Hac perge, ait: nam ego inde venio. Decepit, atque abiit. Sed quando iste deciperetur? Non enim monstrationem istam tanquam veram, inquit, approbo; sed quia est veri similis. Et hic otiosum esse nec honestum, nec utile est; hac eam. Interea ille qui assentiendo erravit, tam cito existimans vera esse verba pastoris, in loco illo quo tendebant, jam se reficiebat: iste autem non errans, siquidem probabile sequitur, circumit silvas nescio quas, nec jam cui locus ille notus sit, ad quem venire proposuerat, invenit. Vere vobis dicam, cum ista cogitarem, risum tenere non potui, fieri per Academicorum verba nescio quomodo, ut erret ille qui veram viam vel casu tenet; ille autem qui per avios montes probabiliter ductus est, nec petitam regionem invenit, non videatur errare.

This you wished. Do you hear how the Grecian shields sound? That has been received which is indeed most robust: but by what hand have we hurled? And these ones of mine suggest nothing more powerful to me; nor have we made anything, as I see, of a wound. I will turn myself to those things which the villa and the field minister: greater things rather burden me than prepare me.

34. For when being at leisure I had thought for a long time in that countryside, in what way that probable and likely could defend our acts from error; first it seemed to me, as it is accustomed to seem when I was selling those things, beautifully covered and fortified. Then when I circumspectly looked around the whole more cautiously, I seemed to me to have seen one entrance, where error might rush in upon the secure. For I think not only him to err, who follows a false way; but even him who does not follow the true. For let us make two travelers tending to one place, of whom the one has instituted to believe no one, the other be too credulous. It is come to some crossway: here that credulous one [asks] of a shepherd who was present, or of some rustic: 'Hail, honest man; tell me I pray, by where one may well proceed to that place.' It is responded: 'If you will go by here, you will err in nothing.' And he to his companion: 'He speaks the truth, let us go by here.' That most cautious man laughs, and most facetiously mocks such a quick assent, and meanwhile that one departing he is fixed in the crossway: and now it begins to seem base to cease, when behold from another horn of the way some refined and urban man sitting on a horse appears, and begins to approach: that one congratulates himself. Then to the one arriving, and being saluted, he indicates his purpose, seeks the way; he tells also the cause of his remaining, that he may render him more benevolent, preferring him to the shepherd. He however by chance was a cheat (*planus*) of those whom the common people already call *Samardaci*. The most wicked man held his custom even for nothing. 'Proceed by here,' he says: 'for I come from there.' He deceived, and went away. But when would that one be deceived? 'For I do not approve this showing as true,' he says, 'but because it is likely. And here to be at leisure is neither honest, nor useful; I will go by here.' Meanwhile he who by assenting erred, thinking so quickly the words of the shepherd to be true, in that place to which they were tending, was now refreshing himself: that one however not erring, since indeed he follows the probable, goes around I know not what forests, nor now does he find anyone to whom that place be known, to which he had proposed to come. Truly I will say to you, when I was thinking those things, I could not hold back laughter, it being made through the words of the Academics I know not in what way, that he errs who holds the true way even by chance; he however who through pathless mountains has been lead probably, nor found the region sought, should not seem to err.

Ut enim temerariam consensionem jure condemnem, facilius ambo errant, quam iste non errat. Hinc jam adversum ista verba vigilantior, ipsa facta hominum et mores considerare coepi. Tum vero tam multa mihi et tam capitalia in istos venerunt in mentem, ut jam non riderem, sed partim stomacharer, partim dolerem homines doctissimos et acutissimos in tanta scelera sententiarum et flagitia devolutos.

CAPUT XVI.

Facere quod videtur probabile etiam citra assensum, nefarium est.

35. Certe enim, non fortasse omnis qui errat, peccat; omnis tamen qui peccat, aut errare conceditur, aut aliquid pejus. Quid si ergo aliquis adolescentium cum hos audierit dicentes: Turpe est errare, et ideo nulli rei consentire debemus; sed tamen cum agit quisque quod ei videtur probabile, nec peccat, nec errat: illud tantum meminerit, quidquid occurrit vel animo vel sensibus, non pro vero esse approbandum. Id igitur audiens adolescens, insidiabitur pudicitiae uxoris alienae, Te, te consulo, M. Tulli; de adolescentium moribus vitaque tractamus, cui educandae atque instituendae omnes illae litterae tuae vigilaverunt. Quid aliud dicturus es, quam non tibi esse probabile ut id faciat adolescens? At illi probabile est. Nam si ex alieno probabili vivimus, nec tu debuisti administrare rempublicam; quia Epicuro visum est non esse faciendum. Adulterabit igitur ille juvenis conjugem alienam: qui deprehensus si fuerit, ubi te inveniet a quo defendatur? Quanquam etiam si inveniatur, quid dicturus es? Negabis profecto. Quid si tam clarum est, ut frustra inficere? Persuadebis nimirum, tanquam in Cumano gymnasio atque adeo Neapolitano, nihil eum peccasse, imo etiam nec errasse quidem. Non enim faciendum esse adulterium pro vero sibi persuasit; probabile occurrit, secutus est, fecit: aut fortasse non fecit, sed fecisse sibi visus est. Iste autem maritus, homo fatuus, perturbat omnia litibus pro uxoris castitate proclamans, cum qua forte nunc dormit, et nescit. Hoc illi iudices si intellexerint, aut negligent Academicos, et tanquam crimen verissimum punient; aut eisdem obtemperantes, verisimiliter hominem probabiliterque damnabunt, ut jam quid agat iste patronus prorsus ignoret. Cui enim succenseat non habebit, cum omnes se nihil errasse dicant; quando non assentientes, id quod visum est, probabile fecerint. Ponet igitur personam patroni, et philosophi consolatoris suscipiet: ita facile adolescenti, qui jam tantum in Academia profecerit, persuadebit ut se tanquam in somnis putet esse damnatum.

For so as to condemn justly a rash consent, both err more easily, than that one does not err. From here now more vigilant against those words, I began to consider the very deeds and morals of men. Then indeed so many and so capital things came into my mind against those ones, that I no longer laughed, but was partly stomachful, partly grieved that most learned and most acute men had fallen into such crimes of opinions and disgraces.

CHAPTER XVI.

To do what seems probable even without assent, is wicked.

35. For certainly, not perhaps everyone who errs, sins; yet everyone who sins, is either conceded to err, or something worse. What if therefore some of the youths when they have heard these ones saying: 'It is base to err, and therefore we ought to assent to no thing; but yet when each one acts what seems probable to him, he neither sins, nor errs': let him only remember, whatever occurs either to the mind or to the senses, is not to be approved for true. That therefore the youth hearing, will lie in wait for the chastity of the wife of another. You, you I consult, M. Tullius; we treat concerning the morals and life of youths, to the educating and instituting of which all those letters of yours have watched. What else are you about to say, than that it is not probable to you that the youth do that? But to him it is probable. For if we live from the probable of another, neither ought you to have administered the republic; because it seemed to Epicurus that it was not to be done. Therefore that young man will commit adultery with the spouse of another: who if he shall have been caught, where will he find you by whom he may be defended? Although even if he find, what are you about to say? You will surely deny. What if it is so clear, that you are in vain stained? You will surely persuade, as if in the Cuman gymnasium and even the Neapolitan, that he has sinned in nothing, nay even nor indeed has he erred. For that adultery was to be done he did not persuade himself for true; it occurred as probable, he followed, he did: or perhaps he did not do it, but he seemed to himself to have done it. That husband however, a fatuous man, perturbs all things by litigating, proclaiming for the chastity of his wife, with whom perhaps he now sleeps, and knows not. This those judges if they shall have understood, either they will neglect the Academics, and punish as a most true crime; or complying with the same ones, they will likely (*verisimiliter*) and probably damn the man, so as now that patron entirely ignores what he may act. For he will not have against whom he may be angry, when all say that they have erred in nothing; when not assenting, they have done that which seemed probable. Therefore he will lay aside the person of the patron, and will take up that of the philosopher consoler: so easily he will persuade the youth, who now in the Academy has profited so much, that he think himself to have been damned as if in dreams.

Sed vos me joculari arbitramini: liquet dejerare per omne divinum, nescire me prorsus quomodo iste peccaverit; si, quisquis id egerit quod probabile videtur, non peccat. Nisi forte in totum aliud esse dicunt errare, aliud peccare; seque illis praeceptis egisse ne erremus, peccare autem nihil magnum esse duxisse.

36. Taceo de homicidiis, parricidiis, sacrilegiis, omnibusque omnino, quae fieri aut cogitari possunt, flagitiis aut facinoribus, quae paucis verbis, et quod est gravius, apud sapientissimos iudices defenduntur: Nihil consensi, et ideo non erravi. Quomodo autem non facerem quod probabile visum est? Qui autem non putant ista probabiliter posse persuaderi, legant orationem Catilinae, qua patriae parricidium, quo uno continentur omnia scelera, persuasit. Jam illud quis non ridet? Ipsi dicunt, nihil se in agendo sequi nisi probabile, et quaerunt magnopere veritatem, cum eis sit probabile non posse inveniri. O mirum monstrum! Sed hoc omittamus, minus id ad nos, minus ad vitae nostrae discrimen, minus ad fortunarum periculum pertinet. Illud est capitale, illud formidolosum, illud optimo cuique metuendum, quod nefas omne, si haec ratio probabilis erit, cum probabile cuiquam visum fuerit esse faciendum, tantum nulli quasi vero assentiatur, non solum sine sceleris, sed etiam sine erroris vituperatione committat. Quid ergo? Haec illi non viderunt? Imo solertissime prudentissimeque viderunt, nec mihi ullo pacto tantum arrogaverim, ut M. Tullium aliqua ex parte sequar industria, vigilantia, ingenio, doctrina: cui tamen asserenti, nihil scire posse hominem, si hoc solum diceretur, Scio ita videri mihi; unde id refelleret non haberet.

CAPUT XVII.

Academici quare dissimularint suam sententiam.

37. Quid igitur placuit tantis viris perpetuis et pertinacibus contentione agere, ne in quemquam cadere veri scientia videretur? Audite jam paulo attentius, non quid sciam, sed quid existimem: hoc enim ad ultimum reservabam, ut explicarem, si possem, quale mihi videatur esse totum Academicorum consilium. Plato vir sapientissimus et eruditissimus temporum suorum, qui et ita locutus est, ut quaecumque diceret, magna fierent, et ea locutus est, ut quomodocumque diceret, parva non fierent; dicitur post mortem Socratis magistri sui, quem singulariter dilexerat, a Pythagoreis etiam multa didicisse. Pythagoras autem graeca philosophia non contentus, quae tunc aut pene nulla erat, aut certe occultissima, postquam commotus Pherecydae cujusdam Syri disputationibus, immortalem esse animum credidit, multos sapientes etiam longe lateque peregrinatus audierat.

But you think me to jest: it is clear to swear by all divine, that I entirely know not how that one has sinned; if, whoever has done that which seems probable, does not sin. Unless perhaps they say that to err is entirely one thing, to sin another; and that they have acted by those precepts lest we err, but to sin they have led to be nothing great.

36. I am silent concerning homicides, parricides, sacrileges, and entirely all things, which can be done or thought, disgraces or crimes, which in a few words, and what is more grave, before most wise judges are defended: 'I assented to nothing, and therefore I did not err. How however should I not do what seemed probable?' Those however who do not think those things can be probably persuaded, let them read the oration of Catiline, by which he persuaded the parricide of the fatherland, by which one all crimes are contained. Now who does not laugh at that? They themselves say, that they follow nothing in acting except the probable, and they seek greatly the truth, when it is probable to them that it cannot be found. O miraculous monster! But this let us omit, it pertains less to us, less to the discrimination of our life, less to the danger of our fortunes. That is capital, that is formidablosus, that is to be feared by every best one, that every wickedness, if this reason shall be probable, when it shall have seemed probable to anyone to be done, only as if he assents to no thing for true, he may commit not only without the vituperation of crime, but even without that of error. What therefore? Did they not see these things? Nay most skillfully and most prudently they saw, nor by any pact would I arrogate so much to myself, so as to follow M. Tullius in some part by industry, vigilance, genius, doctrine: to whom yet asserting, that man can know nothing, if this only were said, 'I know that it so seems to me'; whence he should refell it he would not have.

CHAPTER XVII.

Why the Academics concealed their opinion.

37. What therefore did it please such great men to act with perpetual and pertinacious contentions, lest the science of the true seem to fall to anyone? Hear now a little more attentively, not what I know, but what I think: for this I was reserving to the last, so as to explain, if I could, of what sort the whole counsel of the Academics seems to me to be. Plato, a man most wise and most erudite of his times, who both so spoke, that whatever he might say, they became great, and spoke those things, that in whatever way he might say them, they did not become small; is said after the death of Socrates his master, whom he had singularly loved, to have learned many things even from the Pythagoreans. Pythagoras however not content with Grecian philosophy, which then either was almost none, or certainly most hidden, after he was moved by the disputations of a certain Pherecydes a Syrian, believed that the mind is immortal, had heard many wise men even having peregrinated far and wide.

Igitur Plato adjiciens lepori subtilitatisque Socraticae quam in moralibus habuit, naturalium divinarumque rerum peritiam, quam ab eis quos memoravi diligenter acceperat; subjungensque quasi formatricem illarum partium, judicemque dialecticam, quae aut ipsa esset, aut sine qua sapientia omnino esse non posset; perfectam dicitur composuisse philosophiae disciplinam, de qua nunc disserere tempus non est. Sat est enim ad id quod volo, Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos: unum intelligibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitaret; istum autem sensibilem, quem manifestum est nos visu tactuque sentire. Itaque illum verum, hunc veri similem et ad illius imaginem factum. Et ideo de illo in ea, quae se cognosceret, anima velut expoliri et quasi serenari veritatem; de hoc autem in stultorum animis non scientiam, sed opinionem posse generari. Quidquid tamen ageretur in hoc mundo per eas virtutes, quas civiles vocabat, aliarum verarum virtutum similes, quae, nisi paucis sapientibus, ignotae essent, non posse nisi veri simile nominari.

38. Haec et alia hujusmodi mihi videntur inter successores ejus, quantum poterant, esse servata, et pro mysteriis custodita. Non enim aut facile ista percipiuntur, nisi ab eis qui se ab omnibus vitiis mundantes, in aliam quamdam plus quam humanam consuetudinem vindicaverint; aut non graviter peccat quisquis ea sciens quoslibet homines docere voluerit. Itaque Zenonem principem Stoicorum, cum jam quibusdam auditis et creditis, in scholam relictam a Platone venisset, quam tunc Polemo retinebat, suspectum habitum suspicor, nec talem visum cui Platonica illa velut sacrosancta decreta facile prodi committique deberent, priusquam dedicisset ea, quae in illam scholam ab aliis accepta detulerat. Moritur Polemo, succedit ei Archesilas Zenonis quidem condiscipulus, sed sub Polemonis magisterio. Quamobrem cum Zeno sua quadam de mundo, et maxime de anima, propter quam vera philosophia vigilat, sententia delectaretur, dicens eam esse mortalem, nec quidquam esse praeter hunc sensibilem mundum, nihilque in eo agi, nisi corpore; nam et Deum ipsum ignem putabat: prudentissime atque utilissime mihi videntur Archesilas, cum illud late serperet malum, occultasse penitus Academiae sententiam, et quasi aurum inveniendum quandoque posteris obruisse. Quare cum in falsas opiniones ruere turba sit pronior, et consuetudine corporum omnia esse corporea facillime, sed noxie credatur; instituit vir acutissimus atque humanissimus, dedocere potius quos patiebatur male doctos quam docere quos dociles non arbitrabatur. Inde illa omnia nata sunt quae novae Academiae tribuuntur, quia eorum necessitatem veteres non habebant.

Therefore Plato adding to the Socratic grace and subtlety which he had in morals, the skill of natural and divine things, which he had diligently received from those whom I commemorated; and subjoining as if the formatrix of those parts, and the judge dialectics, which either itself were, or without which wisdom entirely could not be; is said to have composed a perfect discipline of philosophy, concerning which now there is no time to discuss. For it is enough for that which I wish, that Plato felt that there are two worlds: one intelligible, in which truth itself might dwell; this sensible one however, which it is manifest that we feel by sight and touch. And therefore that one true, this one likely (*veri simile*) and made to the image of that one. And therefore concerning that one in that soul, which might know itself, the truth to be as if polished and as if cleared; concerning this one however in the minds of the foolish not science, but opinion can be generated. Whatever however were acted in this world through those virtues, which he called civil, similar to other true virtues, which, except to a few wise men, were unknown, could not be named except likely (*veri simile*).

38. These and other things of this sort seem to me to have been served among his successors, as much as they could, and guarded for mysteries. For either those things are not easily perceived, except by those who cleansing themselves from all vices, have vindicated themselves into a certain more than human custom; or he does not gravely sin whoever knowing them shall have wished to teach any men. Therefore Zeno the prince of the Stoics, when already certain things being heard and believed, he had come into the school left by Plato, which then Polemo retained, I suspect was held suspected, nor seemed such to whom those Platonic as if sacrosanct decrees ought easily to be betrayed and committed, before he had unlearned those things, which he had brought received from others into that school. Polemo dies, Archesilas succeeds him, indeed a fellow pupil of Zeno, but under the mastership of Polemo. For which cause since Zeno was delighted by a certain opinion of his concerning the world, and most concerning the soul, on account of which true philosophy watches, saying it to be mortal, nor that there is anything besides this sensible world, and nothing is acted in it, except by body; for he thought even God himself to be fire: Archesilas seems to me most prudently and most usefully, when that evil crept far, to have hidden deeply the opinion of the Academy, and to have buried it as if gold to be found sometime by posterity. Wherefore since the crowd is more prone to rush into false opinions, and by the custom of bodies all things are most easily, but noxiously believed to be corporeal; that most acute and most human man instituted, to un-teach rather those whom he suffered badly taught, than to teach those whom he did not think docile. Thence all those things were born which are attributed to the New Academy, because the ancients did not have the necessity of them.

39. Quod si Zeno expergefactus esset aliquando, et vidisset neque quidquam comprehendere posse, nisi quale ipse definiebat, neque tale aliquid in corporibus posse inveniri, quibus ille tribuebat omnia; olim prorsus hoc genus disputationum, quod magna necessitate flagraverat, fuisset extinctum. Sed Zeno imagine constantiae deceptus, ut ipsis Academicis videbatur, nec mihi etiam non videtur, pertinax fuit: fidesque illa corporum perniciosa quoquo modo potuit pervixit in Chrysippum, qui ei (nam maxime poterat), magnas vires latius se diffundendi dabat; nisi ex illa parte Carneades acrior et vigilantior superioribus caeteris ita restitisset, ut mirer illam opinionem aliquid etiam postea valuisse. Namque Carneades primo illam velut calumniandi impudentiam, qua videbat Archesilam non mediocriter infamatum, deposuit; ne contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis causa videretur: sed ipsos proprie sibi Stoicos, atque Chrysippum convellendos evertendosque proposuit.

CAPUT XVIII.

Quomodo probabile inductum ab Academicis.

40. Deinde cum undique premeretur, si nulli rei esset assensus, nihil acturum esse sapientem (o hominem mirum atque adeo non mirum! ab ipsis enim Platonis fontibus profluebat); attendit sapienter quales illi actiones probarent, easque nescio quarum verarum similes videns, id quod in hoc mundo ad agendum sequeretur, veri simile nominavit. Cui enim esset simile et perite norat, et prudenter tegebat, idque etiam probabile appellabat. Probat enim bene imaginem, quisquis ejus intuetur exemplum. Quomodo enim approbat sapiens, aut quomodo simile sequitur veri, cum ipsum verum quid sit ignoret? Ergo illi norant, et approbabant falsa in quibus imitationem laudabilem rerum verarum animadvertiebant. Sed quia hoc tanquam profanis nec fas, nec facile erat ostendere; reliquerunt posteris, et quibus illo tempore potuerunt, signum quoddam sententiae suae. Illos autem bene dialecticos de verbis movere quaestionem insultantes irridentesque prohibebant. Ob hoc dicitur Carneades etiam tertiae Academiae princeps atque auctor fuisse.

41. Deinde in nostrum Tullium conflictio ista duravit, jam plane saucia et ultimo spiritu latinas litteras inflatura. Nam nihil mihi videtur inflatius, quam tam multa copiosissime atque ornatissime dicere, non ita sentientem. Quibus tamen ventis feneus ille platonicus Antiochus satis, ut mihi videtur, dissipatus atque dispersus est. Nam Epicureorum greges in animis deliciosorum populorum aprica stabula posuerunt.

39. Because if Zeno had awakened sometime, and seen that neither can anything be comprehended, except of such a sort as he himself defined, nor can any such thing be found in bodies, to which he attributed all things; long ago entirely this genus of disputations, which had burned with great necessity, would have been extinguished. But Zeno deceived by the image of constancy, as it seemed to the Academics themselves, nor does it not also seem to me, was pertinacious: and that pernicious faith in bodies in whatever way it could lived through into Chrysippus, who gave to it (for he was most able) great strengths of diffusing itself more widely; unless from that part Carneades more sharp and more vigilant than all the rest had so resisted, that I wonder that that opinion had any value even afterwards. For Carneades first laid aside that as if impudence of calumniating, by which he saw Archesilas not moderately infamed; lest he seem to wish to speak against all things as if for the sake of ostentation: but he proposed specifically the Stoics themselves, and Chrysippus, to be plucked up and overturned.

CHAPTER XVIII.

How the probable was introduced by the Academics.

Then when he was pressed from every side, that if there were assent to no thing, the wise man would act nothing (o miraculous man and even not miraculous! for it flowed from the very fountains of Plato); he wisely attended of what sort those actions they might approve, and seeing those things similar to I know not what true things, that which followed for acting in this world, he named likely (*veri simile*). For to what it was similar he both skillfully knew, and prudently covered, and that he also called probable. For he who gazes upon its exemplar well approves the image. For how does the wise man approve, or how does he follow the likely, when he ignores what the true itself is? Therefore they knew, and approved false things in which they noticed a laudable imitation of true things. But because this to the profane was as if neither right nor easy to show; they left to posterity, and to those to whom at that time they could, a certain sign of their opinion. Those however who were well dialectical they prohibited from moving a question concerning words by insulting and mocking. On account of this Carneades is said even to have been the prince and author of the Third Academy.

Then unto our Tullius that conflict endured, now plainly wounded and about to breathe the last breath into Latin letters. For nothing seems to me more inflated, than to say so many things most copiously and most ornately, not so feeling. By which winds however that straw Platonic Antiochus was sufficiently, as it seems to me, dissipated and dispersed. For the flocks of the Epicureans placed sunny stables in the minds of delicious peoples.

Quippe Antiochus Philonis auditor, hominis quantum arbitror circumspectissimi, qui jam veluti aperire cedentibus hostibus portas coeperat, et ad Platonis auctoritatem Academiam legesque revocare; quanquam et Metrodorus id antea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse confessus, non decreto placuisse Academicis nihil posse comprehendere, sed necessario contra Stoicos hujusmodi eos arma sumpsisse: igitur Antiochus, ut institueram dicere, auditis Philone academico, et Mnesarcho stoico, in Academiam veterem, quasi vacuum defensoribus, et quasi nullo hoste securam, velut adiutor et civis irrepserat, nescio quid inferens mali de Stoicorum cineribus, quod Platonis adita violaret. Sed huic arreptis iterum illis armis et Philon restitit donec moreretur, et omnes ejus reliquias Tullius noster oppressit, se vivo impatiens labefactari vel contaminari quidquid amavisset: adeo post illa tempora non longo intervallo omni pervicacia pertinaciaque demortua, os illud Platonis quod in philosophia purgatissimum est et lucidissimum, dimotis nubibus erroris emicuit, maxime in Plotino, qui platonicus philosophus ita ejus similis judicatus est, ut simul eos vixisse, tantum autem interest temporis ut in hoc ille revixisse putandus sit.

CAPUT XIX.

Multiplex philosophiae genus.

42. Itaque nunc philosophos non fere videmus, nisi aut Cynicos aut Peripateticos aut Platonicos: et Cynicos quidem, quia eos vitae quaedam delectat libertas atque licentia. Quod autem ad eruditionem doctrinamque attinet, et mores quibus consulitur animae, quia non defuerunt acutissimi et solertissimi viri, qui docerent disputationibus suis Aristotelem ac Platonem ita sibi concinere, ut imperitis minusque attentis dissentire videantur; multis quidem saeculis multisque contentionibus, sed tamen eliquata est, ut opinor, una verissimae philosophiae disciplina. Non enim est ista hujus mundi philosophia, quam sacra nostra meritissime detestantur, sed alterius intelligibilis; cui animas multiformibus erroris tenebris caecatas, et altissimis a corpore sordibus oblitas, nunquam ista ratio subtilissima revocaret, nisi summus Deus populari quadam clementia divini intellectus auctoritatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret, atque submitteret; cujus non solum praeceptis, sed etiam factis excitatae animae redire in semetipsas, et respicere patriam, etiam sine disputationum concertatione potuissent.

CAPUT XX.

Conclusio operis.

Since indeed Antiochus a hearer of Philo, a man as much as I think most circumspect, who now had begun as if to open the gates to yielding enemies, and to revoke the Academy and the laws to the authority of Plato; although even Metrodorus had before attempted to do that, who is said to be the first to have confessed, that it had not pleased the Academics by decree that nothing can be comprehended, but that they had taken up arms of this sort against the Stoics by necessity: therefore Antiochus, as I had instituted to say, Philo the Academic and Mnesarchus the Stoic being heard, had crept as if a helper and a citizen into the Old Academy, as if empty of defenders, and as if secure with no enemy, bringing in I know not what of evil from the ashes of the Stoics, which might violate the shrines of Plato. But Philo also resisted this, those arms being again seized, until he died, and our Tullius oppressed all his remains, impatient while he lived that whatever he had loved should be shaken or contaminated: so after those times not by a long interval all pertinacity and obstacy having died out, that mouth of Plato which is most pure and most lucid in philosophy, the clouds of error being moved away, shone forth, especially in Plotinus, who as a Platonic philosopher was judged so similar to him, that they should be thought to have lived together, but there is so much of time that he is to be thought to have lived again in this one.

CHAPTER XIX.

Multiple genus of philosophy.

42. Therefore now we do not commonly see philosophers, except either Cynics or Peripatetics or Platonists: and Cynics indeed, because a certain liberty and license of life delights them. As for what however pertains to erudition and doctrine, and the morals by which the soul is consulted, because there were not wanting most acute and most skillful men, who might teach by their disputations that Aristotle and Plato so harmonize with themselves, that to the unskillful and less attentive they seem to dissent; by many centuries indeed and many contentions, but yet there has been strained out, as I think, one discipline of the most true philosophy. For that is not the philosophy of this world, which our sacred things most deservedly detest, but of the other intelligible world; to which this most subtle reason would never recall souls blinded by the multiform darkness of error, and smeared by most deep filths from the body, unless the supreme God by a certain popular clemency should lower and submit the authority of the divine intellect even unto the human body itself; by whose not only precepts, but also deeds excited souls might have been able to return into themselves, and to look back at the fatherland, even without the contest of disputations.

CAPUT XX.

Conclusion of the work.

43. Hoc mihi de Academicis interim probabiliter, ut potui, persuasi. Quod si falsum est, nihil ad me, cui satis est jam non arbitrari, non posse ab homine inveniri veritatem. Quisquis autem putat hoc sensisse Academicos, ipsum Ciceronem audiat. Ait enim illis morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam, nec eam cuiquam nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixisset, aperire consuesse. Quae sit autem ista, Deus viderit; eam tamen arbitror Platonis fuisse. Sed ut breviter accipiat omne propositum meum; quoquo modo se habeat humana sapientia, eam me video nondum percepisse. Sed cum trigesimum et tertium aetatis annum agam, non me arbitror desperare debere eam me quandoque adepturum. Contemptis tamen caeteris omnibus quae bona mortales putant, huic investigandae inservire porposui. A quo me negotio quoniam rationes Academicorum non leviter deterrebant, satis, ut arbitror, contra eas ista disputatione munitus sum. Nulli autem dubium est gemino pondere nos impelli ad discendum, auctoritatis atque rationis. Mihi autem certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non enim reperio valentiorum. Quod autem subtilissima ratione persequendum est; ita enim jam sum affectus, ut quid sit verum, non credendo solum, sed etiam intelligendo apprehendere impatienter desiderem; apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido.

44. Hic postquam sermonis finem me fecisse aspexerunt, quamquam jam erat nox, et aliquid etiam lucerna illata scriptum erat; tamen illi adolescentes intentissime expectabant, utrum Alypius vel alio die se responsurum esse promitteret. Tum ille: Nihil mihi aliquando, inquit, tam ex sententia provenisse affirmare paratus sum, quam quod hodierna disputatione discedo superatus. Nec istam meam tantum puto debere esse laetitiam. Communicabo ergo eam vobiscum, concertatores mei, vel iudices nostri. Quandoquidem isto se pacto a suis posteris vinci, ipsi etiam fortasse Academici optarunt. Quid enim nobis hoc sermonis lepore jucundius, quid sententiarum gravitate perpensius, quid benevolentia promptius, quid doctrina peritius videri aut exhiberi posset? Prorsus nequaquam digne admirari possum, quod tam facete aspera, tam fortiter desperata, tam moderate convicta, tam dilucide obscura tractata sunt. Quare jam, socii mei, expectationem vestram, qua me ad respondendum provocabatis, certiore spe mecum ad discendum convertite. Habemus ducem qui nos in ipsa veritatis arcana, Deo jam monstrante, perducatur.

43. This meanwhile I have persuaded myself probably about the Academics, as I was able. Which if it is false, it is nothing to me, to whom it is enough now not to think that truth cannot be found by man. Whoever however thinks the Academics felt this, let him hear Cicero himself. For he says that it was their custom to hide their opinion, nor were they accustomed to open it to anyone except him who had lived with them even until old age. What that however might be, God will see; I think it however to have been Plato's. But that you may briefly receive all my purpose; in whatever way human wisdom holds itself, I see that I have not yet perceived it. But since I am in my thirty-third year of age, I do not think I ought to despair that I shall sometime attain it. Contemning however all other things which mortals think good, I have proposed to serve in investigating this. From which business since the reasons of the Academics were not lightly deterring me, I am sufficiently, as I think, fortified against them by this disputation. No one however doubts that we are impelled to learning by a twin weight, of authority and of reason. To me however it is certain never at all to depart from the authority of Christ: for I do not find a stronger one. As for what however is to be pursued by most subtle reason; for I am now so affected, that what is true, I impatiently desire to apprehend not by believing only, but also by understanding; I trust that meanwhile I shall find among the Platonists what is not repugnant to our sacred things.

44. Here after they saw that I had made an end of my speech, although it was already night, and something also had been written with a lamp brought in; yet those youths were most intently expecting whether Alypius would promise that he would respond on another day. Then he: I am prepared to affirm, he said, that nothing ever happened to me so much according to my wish, as that I depart from today's disputation overcome. Nor do I think this ought to be my joy only. I will communicate it therefore with you, my fellow-contestants, or our judges. Since the Academics themselves perhaps also wished to be overcome in this way by their posterity. For what could seem or be exhibited more pleasant to us than this charm of speech, what more weighed by gravity of sentences, what more prompt in benevolence, what more skillful in doctrine? I can by no means worthily admire that rough things were handled so elegantly, desperate things so bravely, convicted things so moderately, obscure things so clearly. Wherefore now, my companions, turn your expectation, by which you were provoking me to respond, with more certain hope to learning with me. We have a leader who may lead us into the very secrets of truth, God now showing the way.

45. Hic ego, cum illi puerili quodam studio, quod Alypius responsurus non videbatur, quasi fraudatos vultu se ostenderent: Invidetis, inquam arridens, laudibus meis? Sed quoniam de Alypii constantia jam securus nihil eum timeo; ut vos quoque mihi gratias agatis, instruo vos adversus illum qui tantam intentionem vestrae expectationis offendit. Legite Academicos; et cum ibi victorem (quid enim facilius?) istarum nugarum (Lib. I *Retract.*, cap. 1, n. 4), Ciceronem inveneritis, cogatur iste a vobis hunc nostrum sermonem contra illa invicta defendere. Hanc tibi, Alypi, duram mercedem pro mea falsa laude restituo. Hic cum arrisissent, finem tantae conflictionis, utrum firmissimum nescio, modestius tamen et citius quam speraveram fecimus.

45. Here I, when they showed themselves by their face as if defrauded by a certain boyish zeal, because Alypius did not seem about to respond: Do you envy, I said smiling, my praises? But since now secure about the constancy of Alypius I fear nothing from him; that you also may give thanks to me, I instruct you against him who offended such intention of your expectation. Read the Academics; and when you shall have found there Cicero as the victor (for what is easier?) of those trifles, let this man be forced by you to defend this speech of ours against those invincible things. I restore to you, Alypius, this hard reward for my false praise. Here when they had smiled, we made an end of so great a conflict, whether most firm I know not, yet more modestly and more quickly than I had hoped.