SAINT AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO

The City of God

De Civitate Dei

VOLUME II · IV

SABBATISMUS

Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430)
De Civitate Dei · The City of God

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Facing-page bilingual edition: Latin on the left-hand pages, English on the right.
Sabbatismus is the imprint of the Inversiones San Juan Diego foundation, San Pedro Sula, Honduras.
Set in EB Garamond and Cinzel.
sabbatismus.com

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LIBER NONUS.

Postquam dixit in superiore libro de abjiciendo daemonum cultu, quippe qui spiritus malos se ipsi prodant tam multis argumentis; in isto jam libro iis occurrit Augustinus, qui daemonum differentiam afferunt aliorum malorum, aliorum bonorum: qua ipse explosa differentia probat nulli omnino daemoni, sed uni Christo munus mediatoris hominum ad beatitudinem posse competere.

Caput Primum.

Ad quem articulum disputatio praemissa pervenerit, et quid discutiendum sit de residua quaestione.

Et bonos et malos deos esse quidam opinati sunt: quidam vero de diis meliora sentientes, tantum eis honoris laudisque tribuerunt, ut nullum deorum malum credere auderent. Sed illi qui deos quosdam bonos, quosdam malos esse dixerunt, daemones quoque appellaverunt nomine deorum: quanquam et deos, sed rarius, nomine daemonum; ita ut ipsum Jovem, quem volunt esse regem ac principem caeterorum, ab Homero fateantur daemonem nuncupatum . Hi autem, qui omnes deos nonnisi bonos esse asserunt, et longe praestantiores eis hominibus qui boni perhibentur merito, moventur daemonum factis, quae negare non possunt, eaque nullo modo a diis, quos omnes bonos volunt, committi posse existimantes, differentiam inter deos et daemones adhibere coguntur; ut quidquid eis merito displicet in operibus vel affectibus pravis, quibus vim suam manifestant occulti spiritus, id credant esse daemonum, non deorum. Sed quia eosdem daemones inter homines et deos ita medios constitutos putant, tanquam nullus deus homini misceatur ut hinc perferant desiderata, inde referant impetrata; atque hoc Platonici praecipui philosophorum ac nobilissimi sentiunt, cum quibus velut cum excellentioribus placuit istam examinare quaestionem, utrum cultus plurimorum deorum prosit ad consequendam vitam beatam, quae post mortem futura est: libro superiore quaesivimus, quo pacto daemones, qui talibus gaudent, qualia boni et prudentes homines aversantur et damnant, id est sacrilega, flagitiosa, facinorosa, non de quolibet homine, sed de ipsis diis figmenta poetarum, et magicarum artium sceleratam puniendamque violentiam, possint quasi propinquiores et amiciores diis bonis conciliare homines bonos; et hoc nulla ratione posse, compertum est.

BOOK NINE

After he has spoken in the preceding book concerning the rejection of the worship of demons, since they betray themselves as evil spirits by so many arguments; in this book now Augustine meets those who bring a difference of demons, some evil, others good: which difference having been exploded by himself, he proves that to no demon at all, but to Christ alone, the office of mediator of men to beatitude can be competent.

Chapter I

To what point the preceding disputation has arrived, and what is to be discussed concerning the remaining question.

Some have thought that there are both good and evil gods: but others feeling better things concerning the gods, attributed so much honor and praise to them, that they dared to believe no god to be evil. But those who said that some gods were good, some evil, also called demons by the name of gods: although [they called] also gods, but more rarely, by the name of demons; so that they confess Jupiter himself, whom they wish to be the king and prince of the others, to have been called a demon by Homer. But these, who assert all gods to be nothing but good, and far more excellent by merit than those men who are reported good, are moved by the deeds of demons, which they cannot deny, and thinking those things can in no way be committed by gods, whom they wish to be all good, they are compelled to apply a difference between gods and demons; so that whatever deservedly displeases them in the works or depraved affections, by which the occult spirits manifest their power, they believe that to be of demons, not of gods. But because they think the same demons are so constituted as middles between men and gods, as if no god were mixed with man so that they might carry from here the things desired, from there report the things obtained; and the Platonists, the chief and most noble of philosophers, feel this, with whom as with the more excellent it has pleased to examine this question, whether the worship of many gods profits for the attaining of the blessed life which is to be after death: in the preceding book we sought, in what way demons, who rejoice in such things as good and prudent men are averse to and damn, that is, sacrilegious, flagitious, criminal fictions of the poets, not concerning any man, but concerning the gods themselves, and the scelerate and to-be-punished violence of the magical arts, can as being closer and more friendly to the good gods reconcile good men; and it has been found that this can be by no reason.

Caput II.

An inter daemones, quibus dii superiores sunt, sit aliqua pars bonorum, quorum praesidio ad veram beatitudinem possit humana anima pervenire.

Proinde hic liber, sicut in illius fine promisimus, disputationem continere debebit de differentia (si quam volunt esse), non deorum inter se, quos omnes bonos dicunt; nec de differentia deorum et daemonum, quorum illos ab hominibus longe lateque sejungunt, istos inter deos et homines collocant; sed de differentia ipsorum daemonum, quod ad praesentem pertinet quaestionem.

[II.] Apud plerosque enim usitatum est dici alios bonos, alios malos daemones: quae sive sit etiam Platonicorum, sive quorumlibet sententia, nequaquam ejus est negligenda discussio, ne quisquam velut daemones bonos sequendos sibi esse arbitretur, per quos tanquam medios, diis quos omnes bonos credit, dum conciliari affectat et studet, ut quasi cum eis possit esse post mortem, irretitus malignorum spirituum deceptusque fallacia, longe aberret a vero Deo, cum quo solo, et in quo solo, et de quo solo, anima humana, id est rationalis et intellectualis, beata est.

Caput III.

Quae daemonibus Apuleius adscribat; quibus cum rationem non subtrahat, nihil virtutis assignat.

Qua igitur est differentia daemonum bonorum et malorum? quandoquidem Platonicus Apuleius, de his universaliter disserens, et tam multa loquens de aeriis eorum corporibus, de virtutibus tacuit animorum, quibus essent praediti, si boni essent. Tacuit ergo beatitudinis causam; indicium vero miseriae tacere non potuit, confitens eorum mentem, qua rationales esse perhibuit, non saltem imbutam munitamque virtute, passionibus animi irrationabilibus nequaquam cedere, sed ipsam quoque, sicut stultarum mentium mos est, procellosis quodammodo perturbationibus agitari. Verba namque ejus de hac re ista sunt: Ex hoc ferme daemonum numero, inquit, poetae solent, haudquaquam procul a veritate, osores et amatores quorumdam hominum deos fingere; hos prosperare et evehere, illos contra adversari et affligere, Igitur et misereri, et indignari, et angi, et laetari, omnemque humani animi faciem pati, simili motu cordis et salo mentis, per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare. Quae omnes turbellae tempestatesque procul a deorum coelestium tranquillitate exsulant (Apuleius in libro De deo Socratis).

Chapter II

Whether among the demons, to whom the gods are superior, there is any part of good ones, by whose protection the human soul can arrive at true beatitude.

Accordingly this book, as we promised at the end of that one, ought to contain a disputation concerning the difference (if they wish any to be), not of the gods among themselves, whom they call all good; nor of the difference of gods and demons, of whom they separate those far and wide from men, these they place between gods and men; but concerning the difference of the demons themselves, which pertains to the present question.

[II.] For it is usual among most to say that some demons are good, others evil: which whether it be even the opinion of the Platonists, or of any others, its discussion is by no means to be neglected, lest anyone should think that good demons as it were are to be followed by himself, through whom as middles, while he affects and studies to be reconciled to the gods whom he believes to be all good, so that he may be as it were with them after death, being entangled in the fallacy and deceived by the deceit of malignant spirits, he should wander far from the true God, with whom alone, and in whom alone, and of whom alone, the human soul, that is, the rational and intellectual, is blessed.

Chapter III.

What Apuleius ascribes to demons; to whom, while he does not withdraw reason, he assigns nothing of virtue.

What, therefore, is the difference between good and evil demons? Since the Platonist Apuleius, in discussing them universally, and saying so much concerning their aerial bodies, was silent concerning the virtues of their minds, with which they would be endowed if they were good. He was silent, therefore, concerning the cause of beatitude; but the indication of misery he could not keep silent, confessing that their mind, by which he asserted they were rational, was not even imbued and fortified with virtue, so as not to yield at all to the irrational passions of the soul, but was itself also, as is the custom of foolish minds, agitated in a certain way by stormy perturbations. For his words concerning this matter are these: "From this number of demons for the most part," he says, "poets are accustomed, by no means far from the truth, to feign gods as haters and lovers of certain men; to prosper and exalt these, but on the contrary to oppose and afflict those;" Therefore also to pity, and to be indignant, and to be distressed, and to rejoice, and to suffer every face of the human mind, and with a similar motion of the heart and sea of the mind, to fluctuate through all the tides of thoughts. All which "turbid storms and tempests are exiled far from the tranquility of the celestial gods" (Apuleius in his book On the God of Socrates).

Num est in his verbis ulla dubitatio, quod non animorum aliquas inferiores partes, sed ipsas daemonum mentes, quibus rationalia sunt animalia, velut procellosum salum dixit passionum tempestate turbari? ut ne hominibus quidem sapientibus comparandi sint, qui hujusmodi perturbationibus animorum, a quibus humana non est immunis infirmitas, etiam cum eas hujus vitae conditione patiuntur, mente imperturbata resistunt, non eis cedentes ad aliquid approbandum vel perpetrandum, quod exorbitet ab itinere sapientiae et lege justitiae: sed stultis mortalibus et injustis, non corporibus, sed moribus similes (ut non dicam deteriores, eo quo vetustiores et debita poena insanabiles), ipsius quoque mentis, ut iste appellavit, salo fluctuant; nec in veritate atque virtute, qua turbulentis et pravis affectionibus repugnatur, ex ulla animi parte consistunt.

Caput IV.

De perturbationibus quae animo accidunt, quae sit Peripateticorum Stoicorumque sententia.

1. Duae sunt sententiae philosophorum, de his animi motibus, quae Graeci pathē, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero (De Finibus, lib. 3, cap. 20; Tuscul. Quaest. lib. 3, cap. 4; lib. 4, capp. 5, 6, alibique), perturbationes, quidam affectiones, vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut iste de graeco expressius, passiones vocant. Has ergo perturbationes, sive affectiones, sive passiones quidam philosophi dicunt etiam in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subjectas, ut eis leges quodammodo, quibus ad necessarium redigantur modum, dominatio mentis imponat. Hoc qui sentiunt, Platonici sunt sive Aristotelici, cum Aristoteles discipulus Platonis fuerit, qui sectam Peripateticam condidit. Aliis autem, sicut Stoicis, cadere ullas omnino hujuscemodi passiones in sapientem non placet. Hos autem, id est Stoicos, Cicero in libris de Finibus bonorum et malorum, verbis magis quam rebus adversus Platonicos seu Peripateticos certare convincit: quandoquidem Stoici nolunt bona appellare, sed commoda corporis et externa; eo quod nullum bonum volunt esse hominis praeter virtutem, tanquam artem bene vivendi, quae nonnisi in animo est. Haec autem isti simpliciter et ex communi loquendi consuetudine appellant bona; sed in comparatione virtutis, qua recte vivitur, parva et exigua. Ex quo fit, ut ab utrisque quodlibet vocentur, seu bona, seu commoda, pari tamen aestimatione pensentur, nec in hac quaestione Stoici delectentur, nisi novitate verborum. Videtur ergo mihi etiam in hoc, ubi quaeritur utrum accidant sapienti passiones animi, an ab eis sit prorsus alienus, de verbis eos potius quam de rebus facere controversiam. Nam et ipsos nihil hinc aliud quam Platonicos et Peripateticos sentire existimo, quantum ad vim rerum attinet, non ad vocabulorum sonum.

Is there in these words any doubt that he said not some inferior parts of the souls, but the very minds of the demons, by which they are rational animals, were disturbed like a stormy sea by the tempest of passions? so that they are not even to be compared to wise men, who resist perturbations of souls of this kind, from which human infirmity is not immune, even when they suffer them by the condition of this life, with an unperturbed mind, not yielding to them for approving or perpetrating anything that deviates from the path of wisdom and the law of justice: but similar to foolish and unjust mortals, not in bodies but in morals (that I may not say worse, in that they are older and incurable by due punishment), they also fluctuate in the sea of the mind itself, as he called it; nor do they consist in any part of the soul in truth and virtue, by which turbulent and depraved affections are resisted.

Chapter IV.

What is the opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics concerning the perturbations that happen to the soul.

1. There are two opinions of philosophers concerning these motions of the soul, which the Greeks call pathē, but some of our own, as Cicero does (On the Ends, book 3, chap. 20; Tusculan Disputations, book 3, chap. 4; book 4, chaps. 5, 6, and elsewhere), call perturbations, some call affections or affects, but some indeed, as this one from the Greek more expressively, call passions. Some philosophers say that these perturbations, or affections, or passions, even happen to the wise man, but moderated and subjected to reason, so that the domination of the mind imposes laws on them, as it were, by which they may be reduced to a necessary measure. Those who feel this are Platonists or Aristotelians, since Aristotle, who founded the Peripatetic sect, was a disciple of Plato. But to others, such as the Stoics, it does not please that any passions of this kind whatsoever should fall upon the wise man. But Cicero, in the books on the Ends of Goods and Evils, convicts these, that is the Stoics, of contending with words rather than things against the Platonists or Peripatetics: since the Stoics do not wish to call them goods, but commodities of the body and external things; because they wish no good of man to be except virtue, as the art of living well, which is only in the soul. But these others call these things goods simply and from the common custom of speaking; but in comparison of virtue, by which one lives rightly, small and slight. From which it happens, that whatever they may be called by both, whether goods or commodities, they are weighed with an equal estimation, nor are the Stoics delighted in this question, except by the novelty of words. It seems to me therefore even in this, where it is asked whether the passions of the soul happen to the wise man, or whether he is entirely alien from them, that they make a controversy of words rather than of things. For I think that even they themselves feel nothing else here than the Platonists and Peripatetics, as far as pertains to the force of things, not to the sound of vocables.

2. Ut enim alia omittam quibus id ostendam, ne longum faciam, aliquid unum quod sit evidentissimum dicam. In libris quibus titulus est Noctium Atticarum, scribit A. Gellius, vir elegantissimi eloquii, et multae ac facundae scientiae, se navigasse aliquando cum quodam philosopho nobili Stoico. Is philosophus, sicut latius et uberius, quod ego breviter attingam, narrat A. Gellius(Lib. 19, cap. 1), cum illud navigium horribili coelo et mari periculosissime jactaretur, vi timoris expalluit. Id animadversum est ab eis qui aderant, quamvis in mortis vicinia, curiosissime attentis, utrumne philosophus animo turbaretur. Deinde tempestate transacta, mox ut securitas praebuit colloquendi vel etiam garriendi locum, quidam ex his, quos navis illa portabat, dives luxuriosus Asiaticus philosophum compellat, illudens quod extimuisset atque palluisset, cum ipse mansisset intrepidus in eo quod impendebat exitio. At ille Aristippi Socratici responsum retulit, qui cum in re simili eadem verba ab homine simili audisset, respondit illum pro anima nequissimi nebulonis merito non fuisse sollicitum, se autem pro Aristippi anima timere debuisse. Hac illo divite responsione depulso, postea quaesivit A. Gellius a philosopho, non exagitandi animo, sed discendi, quaenam illa ratio esset pavoris sui. Qui ut doceret hominem sciendi studio naviter accensum, protulit statim de sarcinula sua Stoici Epicteti librum, in quo ea scripta essent, quae congruerent decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, quos fuisse Stoicorum principes novimus. In eo libro se legisse dicit A. Gellius, hoc Stoicis placuisse, quod animi visa, quas appellant phantasias, nec in potestate est utrum et quando incidant animo; cum veniunt ex terribilibus et formidabilibus rebus, necesse est etiam sapientis animum moveant; ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus mentis et rationis officium: nec ideo tamen in mente fieri opinionem mali, nec approbari ista, eisque consentiri. Hoc enim esse volunt in potestate, idque interesse censent inter animum sapientis et stulti, quod stulti animus eisdem passionibus cedit, atque accommodat mentis assensum; sapientis autem, quamvis eas necessitate patiatur, retinet tamen de his quae appetere vel fugere rationabiliter debet, veram et stabilem inconcussa mente sententiam. Haec ut potui, non quidem commodius A. Gellio, sed certe brevius, et, ut puto, planius exposui, quae ille se in Epieteti libro legisse commemorat, eum ex decretis Stoicorum dixisse atque sensisse.

2. For that I may omit other things by which I might show it, lest I make it long, I will say one thing which is most evident. In the books which have the title of Attic Nights, A. Gellius, a man of most elegant eloquence, and of much and fluent knowledge, writes that he once sailed with a certain noble Stoic philosopher. This philosopher, as A. Gellius relates more broadly and copiously (Attic Nights, book 19, chap. 1), which I will touch upon briefly, when that ship was tossed most dangerously by a horrible sky and sea, turned pale with the force of fear. This was noticed by those who were present, although in the vicinity of death, most curiously attentive whether the philosopher was disturbed in mind. Then, the storm being over, as soon as security provided a place for talking or even for chattering, a certain one of those whom that ship carried, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, calls upon the philosopher, mocking that he had been afraid and had turned pale, since he himself had remained intrepid in the destruction that was impending. But he related the answer of Aristippus the Socratic, who when in a similar case he had heard the same words from a similar man, answered that the other had not been solicitous for the soul of a most worthless knave, as was due, but he himself had had cause to fear for the soul of Aristippus. This rich man being repelled by this response, afterwards A. Gellius asked of the philosopher, not with a mind of harassing but of learning, what that reason of his fear was. Who, that he might teach a man diligently kindled with the study of knowing, brought out immediately from his small bundle a book of the Stoic Epictetus, in which those things were written which agreed with the decrees of Zeno and Chrysippus, whom we know to have been the princes of the Stoics. In that book A. Gellius says he read that this was pleasing to the Stoics: that the visions of the mind, which they call phantasies, it is not in our power whether and when they occur to the mind; when they come from terrible and formidable things, it is necessary that they move even the mind of the wise man; so that for a little while he either trembles with fear, or is contracted with sadness, as these passions prevent the office of the mind and reason: nor yet for all that is an opinion of evil formed in the mind, nor are these approved, and consented to. For they wish this to be in our power, and they think this to interest between the mind of the wise man and the fool, that the mind of the fool yields to the same passions, and accommodates the assent of the mind; but that of the wise man, although he suffers them by necessity, yet retains concerning those things which he ought rationally to seek or flee, a true and stable opinion with an unshaken mind. These things as I was able, not indeed more commodiously than A. Gellius, but certainly more briefly, and, as I think, more plainly have I set forth, which he commemorates that he read in the book of Epictetus, that he said and felt from the decrees of the Stoics.

3. Quae si ita sunt, aut nihil, aut pene nihil distat inter Stoicorum aliorumque philosophorum opinionem de passionibus et perturbationibus animorum: utrique enim mentem rationemque sapientis ab earum dominatione defendunt. Et ideo fortasse dicunt eas in sapientem non cadere Stoici, quia nequaquam ejus sapientiam, qua utique sapiens est, ullo errore obnubilant, aut labe subvertunt. Accidunt autem animo sapientis, salva serenitate sapientiae, propter illa, quae commoda vel incommoda appellant, quamvis ea nolint dicere bona vel mala. Nam profecto si nihili penderet eas res ille philosophus, quas amissurum se naufragio sentiebat, sicuti est vita ista salusque corporis; non ita illud periculum perhorresceret, ut palloris etiam testimonio proderetur. Verumtamen et illam poterat permotionem pati, et fixam tenere mente sententiam, vitam illam salutemque corporis, quorum amissionem minabatur tempestatis immanitas, non esse bona quae illos, quibus inessent, facerent bonos, sicut facit justitia. Quod autem aiunt ea nec bona appellanda esse, sed commoda; verborum certamini, non rerum examini deputandum est. Quid enim interest, utrum aptius bona vocentur, an commoda; dum tamen ne his privetur, non minus Stoicus, quam Peripateticus pavescat et palleat; ea non aequaliter appellando, sed aequaliter aestimando? Ambo sane, si bonorum istorum seu commodorum periculis ad flagitium vel facinus urgeantur, ut aliter ea retinere non possint, malle se dicunt haec amittere quibus natura corporis salva et incolumis habetur, quam illa committere quibus justitia violatur. Ita mens, ubi fixa est ista sententia, nullas perturbationes, etiamsi accidant inferioribus animi partibus, in se contra rationem praevalere permittit: quin imo eis ipsa dominatur, eisque non consentiendo, sed potius resistendo regnum virtutis exercet. Talem describit etiam Virgilius Aeneas, ubi ait: Mens immota manet, lacrymae volvuntur inanes. (Aeneid. lib. 4, vers. 449.)

Caput V.

Quod passiones, quae christianos animos afficiunt, non in vitium trahant, sed virtutem exerceant.

Non est nunc necesse copiose ac diligenter ostendere, quid de istis passionibus doceat Scriptura divina, qua christiana eruditio continetur. Deo quippe illam ipsam mentem subjicit regendam et juvandam, mentique passiones ita moderandas atque frenandas, ut in usus justitiae convertantur. Denique in disciplina nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare irascatur; nec utrum sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis; nec utrum timeat, sed quid timeat.

3. Which if they are so, either nothing, or almost nothing differs between the opinion of the Stoics and of other philosophers concerning the passions and perturbations of souls: for both defend the mind and reason of the wise man from their domination. And for this reason perhaps the Stoics say that they do not fall upon the wise man, because they by no means obscure his wisdom by any error, or subvert it by any stain, by which he is certainly wise. But they happen to the soul of the wise man, with the serenity of wisdom safe, on account of those things which they call commodities or incommodities, although they do not wish to call them goods or evils. For certainly if that philosopher had weighed as nothing those things which he felt he was about to lose in the shipwreck, such as is this life and health of the body; he would not have so greatly dreaded that danger, as to be betrayed even by the testimony of pallor. Nevertheless both could he suffer that perturbation, and hold fixed in his mind the opinion, that that life and health of the body, whose loss the immensity of the storm threatened, were not goods which made those good in whom they were, as justice does. But that they say those things are not even to be called goods, but commodities; it is to be deputed to a contest of words, not to an examination of things. For what does it matter, whether they are more aptly called goods, or commodities; as long as nevertheless, lest he be deprived of these, the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic trembles and turns pale; not by calling them equally, but by estimating them equally? Both indeed, if they should be urged to a disgrace or a crime by the dangers of these goods or commodities, so that they could not retain them otherwise, say that they prefer to lose these things by which the nature of the body is held safe and sound, than to commit those things by which justice is violated. Thus the mind, where that opinion is fixed, permits no perturbations, even if they happen to the inferior parts of the soul, to prevail in itself against reason: nay rather it itself dominates them, and by not consenting to them, but rather by resisting them, exercises the kingdom of virtue. Such a one Virgil also describes Aeneas, where he says: "His mind remains unmoved, the tears roll down in vain" (Aeneid, book 4, verse 449).

Chapter V.

That the passions, which affect Christian souls, do not lead into vice, but exercise virtue.

It is not now necessary to show copiously and diligently what the divine Scripture, in which Christian erudition is contained, teaches concerning these passions. For it subjects that very mind to God to be ruled and helped, and the passions to the mind to be so moderated and bridled, that they may be converted into the uses of justice. In short, in our discipline it is not so much asked whether a pious soul is angry, but why it is angry; nor whether it is sad, but whence it is sad; nor whether it fears, but what it fears.

Irasci enim peccanti, ut corrigatur; constristari pro afflicto, ut liberetur; timere periclitanti, ne pereat; nescio utrum quisquam sana consideratione reprehendat. Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare : sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi, quam timore naufragii! Longe melius et humanius, et piorum sensibus accommodatius Cicero in Caesaris laude locutus est, ubi ait: Nulla de virtutibus tuis nec admirabilior, nec gratior misericordia est (Orat. pro Q. Ligario, cap. 12). Quid est autem misericordia, nisi alienae miseriae quaedam in nostro corde compassio, qua utique, si possumus, subvenire compellimur? Servit autem motus iste rationi, quando ita praebetur misericordia, ut justitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur poenitenti. Hanc Cicero, locutor egregius, non dubitavit appellare virtutem, quam Stoicos inter vitia numerare non pudet: qui tamen, ut docuit liber Epicteti nobilissimi Stoici, ex decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, qui hujus sectae primas habuerunt, hujusmodi passiones in animum sapientis admittunt, quem vitiis omnibus liberum volunt. Unde fit consequens, ut haec ipsa non putent vitia, quando sapienti sic accidunt, ut contra virtutem mentis rationemque nihil possint, et una sit eademque sententia Peripateticorum, vel etiam Platonicorum, et ipsorum Stoicorum: sed, ut ait Tullius, verbi controversia jam diu torqueat homines Graeculos contentionis cupidiores, quam veritatis (De oratore, lib. I, c. 11, § 47). Sed adhuc merito quaeri potest, utrum ad vitae praesentis pertineat infirmitatem, etiam in quibusque bonis officiis hujuscemodi perpeti affectus: sancti vero Angeli et sine ira puniant quos accipiunt aeterna Dei lege puniendos, et miseris sine miseriae compassione subveniant, et periclitantibus eis quos diligunt, sine timore opitulentur; et tamen istarum nomina passionum consuetudine locutionis humanae etiam in eos usurpentur, propter quamdam operum similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem: sicut ipse Deus secundum Scripturas irascitur, nec tamen ulla passione turbatur . Hoc enim verbum vindictae usurpavit effectus, non illius turbulentus affectus.

Caput VI.

Quibus passionibus daemones, confitente Apuleio, exagitentur, quorum ope homines apud deos asserit adjuvari.

For to be angry with a sinner so that he may be corrected; to be saddened for the afflicted so that he may be liberated; to fear for one in danger lest he perish; I know not whether anyone of sound consideration would reprehend. For even mercy the Stoics are accustomed to blame: but how much more honestly was that Stoic perturbed by the mercy of a man to be liberated, than by the fear of a shipwreck! Far better and more humanely, and more accommodately to the senses of the pious, spoke Cicero in the praise of Caesar, where he says: "None of your virtues is either more admirable or more grateful than mercy" (Oration for Q. Ligarius, chap. 12). But what is mercy, except a certain compassion in our heart of another's misery, by which certainly, if we are able, we are compelled to succor? But this motion serves reason, when mercy is so provided that justice is preserved, whether when it is given to the indigent, or when it is forgotten to the penitent. This Cicero, an excellent speaker, did not hesitate to call a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to number among the vices: who nevertheless, as the book of the most noble Stoic Epictetus taught, from the decrees of Zeno and Chrysippus, who held the first places of this sect, admit passions of this kind into the mind of the wise man, whom they wish to be free from all vices. Whence it becomes a consequence, that they do not think these very things to be vices, when they happen to the wise man in such a way that they can do nothing against the virtue of the mind and reason, and one is the same opinion of the Peripatetics, or even of the Platonists, and of the Stoics themselves: but, as Tully says, a controversy of a word has for a long time tormented the little Greeks more desirous of contention than of truth (On the Orator, book I, c. 11, § 47). But still it may be deservedly asked, whether it pertains to the infirmity of the present life, to suffer affects of this kind even in any good offices: but that the holy Angels both punish without anger those whom they receive to be punished by the eternal law of God, and succor the miserable without compassion of misery, and help those whom they love when in danger without fear; and yet the names of these passions are usurped even in them by the custom of human speech, on account of a certain similarity of works, not on account of the infirmity of affections: just as God himself according to the Scriptures is angry, and yet is not perturbed by any passion. For this word has usurped the effect of vengeance, not his turbulent affect.

Chapter VI.

By what passions the demons are agitated, according to the confession of Apuleius, by whose aid he asserts men are helped with the gods.

Qua interim de sanctis Angelis quaestione dilata, videamus quemadmodum dicant Platonici medios daemones inter deos et homines constitutos istis passionum aestibus fluctuare. Si enim mente ab his libera eisque dominante motus hujuscemodi paterentur, non eos diceret Apuleius simili motu cordis et salo mentis per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare (De deo Socratis). Ipsa igitur mens eorum, id est pars animi superior, qua rationales sunt, in qua virtus et sapientia, si ulla eis esset, passionibus turbulentis inferiorum animi partium regendis moderandisque dominaretur; ipsa, inquam, mens eorum, sicut iste Platonicus confitetur, salo perturbationum fluctuat. Subjecta est ergo mens daemonum passionibus libidinum, formidinum, irarum, atque hujuscemodi caeteris. Qua igitur pars in eis libera est composque sapientiae, qua placeant diis, et ad bonorum morum similitudinem hominibus consulant; cum eorum mens passionum vitiis subjugata et oppressa, quidquid rationis naturaliter habet, ad fallendum et decipiendum tanto acrius intendat, quanto eam magis possidet nocendi cupiditas?

Caput VII.

Quod Platonici figmentis poetarum infamatos asserant deos de contrariorum studiorum certamine, cum hae partes daemonum, non deorum sint.

Quod si quisquam dicit, non ex omnium, sed ex malorum daemonum numero esse, quos poetae quorumdam hominum osores et amatores deos non procul a veritate confingunt: hos enim dixit Apuleius, salo mentis per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare: quomodo istud intelligere poterimus, quando, cum hoc diceret, non quorumdam, id est malorum, sed omnium daemonum medietatem propter acria corpora, inter deos et homines describebat? Hoc enim ait fingere poetas, quod ex istorum daemonum numero deos faciunt, et eis deorum nomina imponunt, et quibus voluerint hominibus ex his amicos inimicosque distribuunt ficti carminis impunita licentia; cum deos ab his daemonum moribus, et coelesti loco et beatitudinis opulentia remotos esse perhibeant (De deo Socratis). Haec est ergo fictio poetarum, deos dicere qui dii non sunt, eosque sub deorum nominibus inter se decertare propter homines, quos pro studio partium diligunt vel oderunt.

The question concerning the holy angels being deferred for the time being, let us see how the Platonists say that the demons, constituted as mediators between the gods and men, fluctuate in these tides of passions. For if they suffered motions of this kind while their mind was free from them and dominating them, Apuleius would not say that they fluctuate with a similar motion of the heart and a sea of the mind through all the surges of thoughts (De deo Socratis). Therefore, their very mind, that is, the superior part of the soul by which they are rational, in which virtue and wisdom would reside if they had any, would dominate the turbulent passions of the inferior parts of the soul by ruling and moderating them; their very mind itself, I say, as this Platonist confesses, fluctuates in a sea of perturbations. The mind of demons is therefore subject to the passions of lusts, fears, angers, and others of this kind. What part in them, then, is free and possessed of wisdom, by which they might please the gods and provide for men toward the likeness of good morals; when their mind, subjugated and oppressed by the vices of passions, directs whatever reason it naturally possesses to deceiving and tricking all the more sharply, the more the desire of harming possesses it?

Chapter VII.

That the Platonists assert the gods are defamed by the figments of poets concerning the contest of contrary pursuits, since these parts belong to demons, not to gods.

But if anyone says that it is not from the number of all, but from the number of evil demons, whom the poets, not far from the truth, feign to be gods who are haters and lovers of certain men: for these Apuleius said fluctuate in a sea of the mind through all the surges of thoughts: how shall we be able to understand this, when, while he was saying this, he was describing not of some, that is, the evil ones, but the middle nature of all demons on account of their aerial bodies, between the gods and men? For he says that the poets feign this, that from the number of those demons they make gods, and impose the names of gods upon them, and distribute from these friends and enemies to whichever men they wish with the unpunished license of a feigned song; although they maintain that the gods are remote from these morals of demons, both by their celestial place and by the opulence of their beatitude (De deo Socratis). This, therefore, is the fiction of the poets, to say they are gods who are not gods, and that they contend among themselves under the names of gods for the sake of men, whom they love or hate for the sake of their parties.

Non procul autem a veritate dicit hanc esse fictionem; quoniam deorum appellati vocabulis qui dii non sunt, tales tamen describuntur daemones, quales sunt. Denique hinc esse dicit Homericam illam Minervam, quae mediis coetibus Graiûm cohibendo Achilli intervenit (Ibid.). Quod ergo Minerva illa fuerit, poeticum vult esse figmentum; eo quod Minervam deam putat, eamque inter deos, quos omnes bonos beatosque credit, in alta aetheria sede collocat, procul a conversatione mortalium. Quod autem aliquis daemon fuerit Graecis favens Trojanisque contrarius, sicut alius adversus Graecos Trojanorum opitulator, quem Veneris seu Martis nomine idem poeta commemorat, quos deos iste talia non agentes in coelestibus habitationibus ponit; et hi daemones pro eis quos amabant, contra eos quos oderant, inter se decertaverint, hoc non procul a veritate poetas dixisse confessus est. De his quippe ista dixerunt, quos hominibus simili motu cordis et salo mentis per omnes cogitationum aestus fluctuare testatur, ut possent amores et odia, non pro justitia, sed sicut populus similis eorum in venatoribus et aurigis, secundum suarum studia partium, pro aliis adversus alios exercere . Id enim videtur philosophus curasse Platonicus, ne, cum haec a poetis canerentur, non a daemonibus mediis, sed ab ipsis diis, quorum nomina poetae fingendo ponunt, fieri crederentur.

Caput VIII.

De diis coelestibus et daemonibus aeriis hominibusque terrenis Apuleii Platonici definitio.

Quid illa ipsa definitio daemonum, parumne intuenda est (ubi certe omnes determinando complexus est), quod ait daemones esse genere animalia, animo passiva, mente rationalia, corpore aeria, tempore aeterna (Ibid.)? In quibus quinque commemoratis, nihil dixit omnino, quod daemones cum bonis saltem hominibus id viderentur habere commune, quod non esset in malis. Nam ipsos homines cum aliquanto latius describendo complecteretur, suo loco de illis dicens tanquam de infimis atque terrenis, cum prius dixisset de coelestibus diis; ut commendatis duabus partibus ex summo et infimo ultimis , tertio loco de mediis daemonibus loqueretur: Igitur homines, inquit, ratione cluentes , oratione pollentes, immortalibus animis, moribundis membris, levibus et anxiis mentibus, brutis et obnoxiis corporibus, dissimilibus moribus, similibus erroribus, pervicaci audacia, pertinaci spe, casso labore, fortuna caduca, singillatim mortales, cuncti tamen universo genere perpetui, vicissim sufficienda prole mutabiles, volucri tempore, tarda sapientia, cita morte, querula vita terras incolunt (De deo Socratis).

But he says that this fiction is not far from the truth; since, although called by the names of gods those who are not gods, yet such demons are described as they actually are. Finally, he says that from here is that Homeric Minerva, who intervened in the midst of the Greek assemblies to restrain Achilles (Ibid.). That she was Minerva, therefore, he wishes to be a poetic figment; because he thinks Minerva is a goddess, and places her among the gods, whom he believes to be all good and blessed, in the high ethereal seat, far from the association of mortals. But that it was some demon favoring the Greeks and contrary to the Trojans, just as another was a helper of the Trojans against the Greeks, whom the same poet commemorates by the name of Venus or Mars, whom this man places in celestial habitations not doing such things; and that these demons contended among themselves for those whom they loved, against those whom they hated, he confessed that the poets said this not far from the truth. For they said these things concerning those whom he testifies fluctuate with a motion of the heart and a sea of the mind similar to men through all the surges of thoughts, so that they could exercise loves and hatreds, not for justice, but as the people similar to them do in hunters and charioteers, according to the pursuits of their parties, for some against others. For the Platonist philosopher seems to have taken care of this, lest, when these things were sung by the poets, they should be believed to be done, not by the middle demons, but by the gods themselves, whose names the poets put by feigning.

Chapter VIII.

The definition of Apuleius the Platonist concerning the celestial gods, the aerial demons, and the terrestrial men.

What of that very definition of demons, is it not to be somewhat considered (where certainly he included all by defining them), when he says that demons are animals in genus, passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, eternal in time (Ibid.)? In these five things commemorated, he said nothing at all by which demons would seem to have that in common even with good men which was not in evil ones. For when he included men themselves by describing them somewhat more extensively, speaking of them in their place as of the lowest and terrestrial, after he had first spoken of the celestial gods; so that, having commended the two last parts from the highest and the lowest, he might speak in the third place of the middle demons: "Therefore men," he says, "famous for reason, powerful in speech, with immortal souls, with moribund members, with light and anxious minds, with brute and obnoxious bodies, with dissimilar morals, with similar errors, with pervicacious audacity, with pertinacious hope, with vain labor, with falling fortune, individually mortal, yet all perpetual in their universal genus, changeable by the offspring to be supplied in turn, with flying time, with slow wisdom, with swift death, with a querulous life, inhabit the lands" (De deo Socratis).

Cum hic tam multa diceret, quae ad plurimos homines pertinent, numquid etiam illud tacuit, quod noverat esse paucorum, ubi ait tarda sapientia? quod si praetermisisset, nullo modo recte genus humanum descriptionis hujus tam intenta diligentia terminasset. Cum vero deorum excellentiam commendaret, ipsam beatitudinem, quo volunt homines per sapientiam pervenire, in eis affirmavit excellere. Proinde si aliquos daemones bonos vellet intelligi, aliquid etiam in ipsorum descriptione poneret, unde vel cum diis aliquam beatitudinis partem, vel cum hominibus qualemcumque sapientiam putarentur habere communem. Nunc vero nullum bonum eorum commemoravit, quo boni discernuntur a malis. Quamvis et eorum malitiae liberius exprimendae pepercerit, non tam ne ipsos, quam ne cultores eorum, apud quos loquebatur, offenderet: significavit tamen prudentibus, quid de illis sentire deberent; quandoquidem deos, quos omnes bonos beatosque credi voluit, ab eorum passionibus, atque, ut ait ipse, turbellis omni modo separavit, sola illos corporum aeternitate conjungens; animo autem non diis, sed hominibus similes daemones apertissime inculcans: et hoc non sapientiae bono, cujus et homines possunt esse participes; sed perturbatione passionum, quae stultis malisque dominatur, a sapientibus vero et bonis ita regitur, ut malint eam non habere, quam vincere. Nam si non corporum, sed animorum aeternitatem cum diis habere daemones vellet intelligi, non utique homines ab hujus rei consortio separaret: quia et hominibus aeternos esse animos, procul dubio, sicut Platonicus, sentit. Ideo cum hoc genus animantium describeret, immortalibus animis, moribundis membris dixit esse homines. Ac per hoc si propterea communem cum diis aeternitatem non habent homines, quia corpore sunt mortales: propterea ergo daemones habent, quia corpore sunt immortales.

Caput IX.

An amicitia coelestium deorum per intercessionem daemonum possit homini provideri.

Quales igitur mediatores sunt inter homines et deos, per quos ad deorum amicitias homines ambiant, qui hoc cum hominibus habent deterius, quod est in animante melius, id est animum; hoc autem habent cum diis melius, quod est in animante deterius, id est corpus?

When he said so many things here which pertain to most men, did he even keep silent about that which he knew belonged to few, when he said "slow wisdom"? which if he had omitted, he would by no means have correctly terminated the human genus with such intent diligence of this description. But when he commended the excellence of the gods, he affirmed that beatitude itself, to which men wish to arrive through wisdom, excels in them. Therefore, if he wished some demons to be understood as good, he would also put something in the description of them from which they might be thought to have in common either some part of beatitude with the gods, or some kind of wisdom with men. But now he commemorated no good of theirs by which the good are discerned from the evil. Although he also spared expressing their malice more freely, not so much lest he should offend them, as lest he should offend their worshippers, among whom he was speaking: yet he signified to the prudent what they ought to think of them; since he separated the gods, whom he wished to be believed all good and blessed, from their passions and, as he says himself, disturbances (turbellis) in every way, joining them only by the eternity of their bodies; most openly inculcating that demons are similar in soul not to the gods, but to men: and this not by the good of wisdom, of which even men can be participants; but by the perturbation of passions, which dominates the foolish and the evil, but is so ruled by the wise and the good that they prefer not to have it than to conquer it. For if he wished demons to be understood to have with the gods an eternity not of bodies but of souls, he would certainly not separate men from the fellowship of this thing: because he feels, no doubt as a Platonist, that souls are eternal even for men. Therefore, when he described this genus of living beings, he said men are with immortal souls and moribund members. And through this, if men do not have a common eternity with the gods for the reason that they are mortal in body: therefore demons have it because they are immortal in body.

Chapter IX.

Whether the friendship of the celestial gods can be provided for man through the intercession of demons.

What kind of mediators, then, are they between men and gods, through whom men may seek the friendships of the gods, who have this worse in common with men which is better in a living being, that is, the soul; and have this better in common with the gods which is worse in a living being, that is, the body?

Cum enim animans, id est animal, ex anima constet et corpore, quorum duorum anima est utique corpore melior; etsi vitiosa et infirma, melior certe corpore etiam sanissimo atque firmissimo; quoniam ejus natura excellentior nec labe vitiorum postponitur corpori; sicut aurum etiam sordidum argento seu plumbo, licet purissimo, carius aestimatur: isti mediatores deorum et hominum, per quos interpositos divinis humana junguntur, cum diis habent corpus aeternum, vitiosum autem cum hominibus animum; quasi religio, qua volunt diis homines per daemones jungi, in corpore sit, non in animo, constituta. Quaenam tandem istos mediatores falsos atque fallaces quasi capite deorsum nequitia vel poena suspendit, ut inferiorem animalis partem, id est corpus, cum superioribus, superiorem vero, id est animum, cum inferioribus habeant, et cum diis coelestibus in parte serviente conjuncti, cum hominibus autem terrestribus in parte dominante sint miseri? Corpus quippe servum est, sicut etiam Sallustius ait: Animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur. Adjunxit autem ille, Alterum nobis cum diis, alterum cum belluis commune est (Sallust. in Catil., cap. 1): quoniam de hominibus loquebatur, quibus, sicut belluis, mortale corpus est. Isti autem, quos inter nos et deos mediatores nobis philosophi providerunt , possunt quidem dicere de animo et corpore, Alterum nobis cum diis, alterum cum hominibus commune est: sed, sicut dixi, tanquam in perversum ligati atque suspensi, servum corpus cum diis beatis, dominum animum cum hominibus miseris habentes , parte inferiore exaltati, superiore dejecti. Unde etiam si quisquam propter hoc eos putaverit aeternitatem habere cum diis, quia nulla morte, sicut animalium terrestrium, animi eorum solvuntur a corpore: nec sic existimandum est eorum corpus tanquam honoratorum aeternum vehiculum, sed aeternum vinculum damnatorum .

Caput X.

Quod secundum Plotini sententiam, minus miseri sint homines in corpore mortali, quam daemones in aeterno.

Plotinus certe nostrae memoriae vicinis temporibus, Platonem caeteris excellentius intellexisse laudatur . Is cum de humanis animis ageret, Pater, inquit, misericordem mortalia illis vincula faciebat (Enneadis 4 libro 3, cap. 12). Ita hoc ipsum quod mortales sunt homines corpore, ad misericordiam Dei patris pertinere arbitratus est, ne semper hujus vitae miseria tenerentur. Hac misericordia indigna judicata est iniquitas daemonum, quae in animi passivi miseria, non mortale, sicut homines, sed aeternum corpus accepit.

For since a living being, that is, an animal, consists of soul and body, of which two the soul is certainly better than the body; even if vicious and weak, it is surely better than the body, even the healthiest and firmest; because its nature is more excellent and is not placed after the body by the stain of vices; just as gold, even if dirty, is estimated more dearly than silver or lead, however pure: these mediators of gods and men, through whose interposition human things are joined to divine, have an eternal body with the gods, but a vicious soul with men; as if religion, by which they wish men to be joined to the gods through demons, were constituted in the body, not in the soul. What wickedness or punishment, finally, has suspended these false and fallacious mediators as if head downward, so that they have the inferior part of the animal, that is, the body, with the superior beings, but the superior part, that is, the soul, with the inferior beings, and being joined with the celestial gods in the serving part, they are miserable with terrestrial men in the dominating part? For the body is indeed a servant, as Sallust also says: "We make use rather of the empire of the mind and the service of the body." And he added: "One we have in common with the gods, the other with the beasts" (Sallust in Catil., chap. 1): because he was speaking of men, to whom, as to the beasts, the body is mortal. But these ones, whom the philosophers have provided as mediators for us between ourselves and the gods, can indeed say of the soul and the body: "One we have in common with the gods, the other with men": but, as I said, being as it were bound and suspended in perversion, having a servant body with the blessed gods, and a master soul with miserable men, they are exalted in the inferior part and dejected in the superior. Whence also, even if anyone should think on this account that they have eternity with the gods, because their souls are dissolved from the body by no death, as happens with terrestrial animals: not even thus is their body to be thought of as an eternal vehicle of the honored, but as an eternal bond of the damned.

Chapter X.

That according to the opinion of Plotinus, men are less miserable in a mortal body than demons in an eternal one.

Plotinus certainly, in times near to our memory, is praised for having understood Plato more excellently than others. He, when treating of human souls, said: "The merciful Father made mortal bonds for them" (Enneads IV, book 3, chap. 12). Thus he thought that this very fact that men are mortal in body pertains to the mercy of God the Father, lest they should be held forever by the misery of this life. From this mercy the iniquity of the demons was judged unworthy, which, in the misery of a passive soul, received not a mortal body like men, but an eternal one.

Essent quippe feliciores hominibus, si mortale cum eis haberent corpus, et cum diis beatum animum. Essent autem pares hominibus, si cum animo misero corpus saltem mortale cum eis habere meruissent; si tamen acquirerent aliquid pietatis, ut ab aerumnis vel in morte requiescerent. Nunc vero non solum feliciores hominibus non sunt animo misero, sed etiam miseriores sunt perpetuo corporis vinculo. Non enim aliqua pietatis et sapientiae disciplina proficientes, intelligi voluit ex daemonibus fieri deos, cum apertissime dixerit daemones aeternos.

Caput XI.

De opinione Platonicorum, qua putant animas hominum daemones esse post corpora.

Dicit quidem et animas hominum daemones esse, et ex hominibus fieri Lares, si boni meriti sunt; Lemures, si mali, seu Larvas: Manes autem deos dici, si incertum est bonorum eos, seu malorum esse meritorum. In qua opinione, quantam voraginem aperiant sectandis perditis moribus, quis non videat, si vel paululum attendat? Quandoquidem quamlibet nequam fuerint homines, vel Larvas se fieri dum opinantur, vel dum Manes deos; tanto pejores fiunt, quanto sunt nocendi cupidiores: ut etiam quibusdam sacrificiis tanquam divinis honoribus post mortem se invitari opinentur, ut noceant: Larvas quippe dicit esse noxios daemones ex hominibus factos. Sed hinc alia quaestio est. Inde autem perhibet appellari graece beatos εὐδαίμονας, quod boni sint animi, hoc est boni daemones; animos quoque hominum daemones esse confirmans.

Caput XII.

De ternis contrariis, quibus secundum Platonicos daemonum et hominum natura distinguitur.

Sed nunc de his agimus, quos in natura propria descripsit inter deos et homines genere animalia, mente rationalia, animo passiva, corpore aeria, tempore aeterna.

They would indeed be happier than men if they had a mortal body with them, and a blessed soul with the gods. But they would be equal to men if, with a miserable soul, they had at least deserved to have a mortal body with them; provided that they acquired something of piety, so that they might rest from their hardships even in death. But now not only are they not happier than men with their miserable soul, but they are even more miserable because of the perpetual bond of the body. For he did not wish it to be understood that they become gods from being demons by profiting from some discipline of piety and wisdom, since he most openly said that demons are eternal.

Chapter XI.

Concerning the opinion of the Platonists, in which they think that the souls of men are demons after their bodies.

He also says that the souls of men are demons, and that from men are made Lares if they are of good merit; Lemures or Larvae if of evil merit; but that they are called Manes gods if it is uncertain whether they are of good or evil merits. In which opinion, what a whirlpool they open for following lost morals, who does not see if he attends even a little? Since however wicked men have been, while they think they become either Larvae or Manes gods, they become so much the worse the more they are desirous of harming: so that they even think themselves invited by certain sacrifices as if to divine honors after death, in order to harm: for he says that Larvae are noxious demons made from men. But this is another question. Furthermore, he maintains that the blessed are called in Greek eudaemones, because they are good souls (animi), that is, good demons; confirming that the souls of men are also demons.

Chapter XII.

Concerning the three contraries by which, according to the Platonists, the nature of demons and men is distinguished.

But now we are dealing with those whom he described in their own nature between the gods and men as animals in genus, rational in mind, passive in soul, aerial in body, eternal in time.

Nempe cum prius deos in sublimi coelo, homines autem in terra infima disjunctos locis, et naturae dignitate secerneret, ita conclusit: Habetis, inquit, interim bina animalia; deos ab hominibus plurimum differentes, loci sublimitate, vitae perpetuitate, naturae perfectione; nullo inter se propinquo communicatu, cum et habitacula summa ab infimis tanta intercapedo fastigii dispescat ; et vivacitas illic aeterna et indefecta sit, hic caduca et subcisiva; et ingenia illa ad beatitudinem sublimata, haec ad miserias infimata (De deo Socratis). Hic terna video commemorata contraria de duabus naturae partibus ultimis, id est summis atque infimis. Nam tria quae proposuit de diis laudabilia, eadem repetivit, aliis quidem verbis, ut eis alia tria adversa ex hominibus redderet. Tria deorum haec sunt: loci sublimitas, vitae perpetuitas, perfectio naturae. Haec aliis verbis ita repetivit, ut eis tria contraria humanae conditionis opponeret: Cum et habitacula, inquit, summa ab infimis tanta intercapedo fastigii dispescat: quia dixerat loci sublimitatem. Et vivacitas illic, inquit, aeterna et indefecta sit, hic caduca et subcisiva: quia dixerat vitae perpetuitatem. Et ingenia illa, inquit, ad beatitudinem sublimata, haec ad miserias infimata: quia dixerat naturae perfectionem. Tria igitur ab eo posita sunt deorum, id est, locus sublimis, aeternitas, beatitudo: et his contraria tria hominum, id est, locus infimus, mortalitas, miseria.

Caput XIII.

Quomodo daemones, si nec cum diis beati, nec cum hominibus sunt miseri, inter utramque partem sine utriusque communione sint medii.

1. Inter haec terna deorum et hominum, quoniam daemones medios posuit, de loco nulla est controversia: inter sublimem quippe et infimum, medius locus aptissime habetur et dicitur. Caetera bina restant, quibus cura attentior adhibenda est, quemadmodum vel aliena esse a daemonibus ostendantur, vel sic eis distribuantur, ut medietas videtur exposcere. Sed ab eis aliena esse non possunt. Non enim, sicut dicimus locum medium nec esse summum, nec infimum, ita daemones cum sint animalia rationalia, nec beatos esse, nec miseros, sicuti sunt arbusta vel pecora, quae sunt sensus vel rationis expertia, recte possumus dicere. Quorum ergo ratio mentibus inest, aut miseros esse, aut beatos necesse est. Item non possumus recte dicere, nec mortales esse daemones, nec aeternos. Omnia namque viventia aut in aeternum vivunt, aut finiunt morte quod vivunt. Jam vero iste tempore aeternos daemones dixit.

For when he had first separated the gods in the high heaven and men on the lowest earth, disjoined in places and in the dignity of their nature, he thus concluded: "You have," he says, "meanwhile two kinds of animals; gods differing very much from men in the sublimity of their place, in the perpetuity of their life, in the perfection of their nature; with no close communication between them, since such an interval of height divides the highest habitations from the lowest; and the life there is eternal and unfailing, but here falling and cut short; and those intellects are sublimated to beatitude, but these are debased to miseries" (De deo Socratis). Here I see three contraries commemorated concerning the two last parts of nature, that is, the highest and the lowest. For the three laudable things which he proposed concerning the gods, he repeated the same in other words, so that he might render three other adverse things from men. These three of the gods are: sublimity of place, perpetuity of life, perfection of nature. These he repeated in other words so that he might oppose to them the three contraries of the human condition: "Since," he says, "such an interval of height divides the highest habitations from the lowest," because he had said sublimity of place. "And the life there," he says, "is eternal and unfailing, but here falling and cut short," because he had said perpetuity of life. "And those intellects," he says, "are sublimated to beatitude, but these are debased to miseries," because he had said perfection of nature. Three things, therefore, were placed by him for the gods, that is, sublime place, eternity, beatitude: and three things contrary to these for men, that is, lowest place, mortality, misery.

Chapter XIII.

How the demons, if they are neither blessed with the gods nor miserable with men, are mediators between both parts without the communion of either.

1. Among these three things of gods and men, since he placed the demons as mediators, there is no controversy concerning place: for between the sublime and the lowest, a middle place is most aptly held and spoken of. The other two pairs remain, to which more attentive care must be applied, as to how they may either be shown to be alien to demons, or so distributed to them as mediation seems to require. But they cannot be alien to them. For we cannot correctly say that, just as we say a middle place is neither the highest nor the lowest, so demons, since they are rational animals, are neither blessed nor miserable, as are shrubs or cattle, which are expert of neither sense nor reason. Therefore, those in whose minds reason resides must necessarily be either miserable or blessed. Likewise, we cannot correctly say that demons are neither mortal nor eternal. For all living things either live forever or end their life in death. But now this man has said that demons are eternal in time.

Quid igitur restat, nisi ut hi medii de duobus summis unum habeant, et de duobus infimis alterum? Nam si utraque de imis habebunt, aut utraque de summis, medii non erunt, sed in alterutram partem vel resiliunt, vel recumbunt . Quia ergo his binis, sicut demonstratum est, carere utrisque non possunt, acceptis ex utraque parte singulis mediabuntur. Ac per hoc quia de infimis habere non possunt aeternitatem, quae ibi non est, unum hoc de summis habent: et ideo non est alterum ad complendam medietatem suam, quod de infimis habeant, nisi miseriam.

2. [XIII.] Est itaque, secundum Platonicos, sublimium deorum vel beata aeternitas, vel aeterna beatitudo; hominum vero infirmorum vel miseria mortalis, vel mortalitas misera: daemonum autem mediorum vel misera aeternitas, vel aeterna miseria. Nam et quinque illis, quae in definitione daemonum posuit, non eos medios, sicut promittebat, ostendit; quoniam tria dixit eos habere nobiscum, quod genere animalia, quod mente rationalia, quod animo passiva sunt; cum diis autem unum, quod tempore aeterna; et unum proprium, quod corpore aeria. Quomodo ergo medii, quando unum habent cum summis, tria cum infimis? Quis non videat, relicta medietate, quantum inclinentur et deprimantur ad infima? Sed plane ibi etiam medii possunt ita inveniri, ut unum habeant proprium, quod est corpus aerium, sicut et illi de summis atque infimis singula propria, dii corpus aetherium, hominesque terrenum; duo vero communia sint omnibus, quod genere sunt animalia, et mente rationalia. Nam et ipse cum de diis et hominibus loqueretur, «Habetis» inquit, «bina animalia.» Et non solent isti deos nisi rationales mente perhibere. Duo sunt residua, quod sunt animo passiva, et tempore aeterna: quorum habent unum cum infimis, cum summis alterum, ut proportionali ratione librata medietas neque sustollatur in summa, neque in infima deprimatur. Ipsa est autem illa daemonum misera aeternitas, vel aeterna miseria. Qui enim ait, animo passiva, etiam misera dixisset, nisi eorum cultoribus erubuisset. Porro quia providentia summi Dei, sicut etiam ipsi fatentur, non fortuita temeritate regitur mundus, nunquam esset istorum aeterna miseria, nisi esset magna malitia.

What remains, then, except that these mediators have one from the two highest things, and the other from the two lowest? For if they have both from the lowest, or both from the highest, they will not be mediators, but they will either recoil or lean toward one or the other part. Since, therefore, as has been demonstrated, they cannot lack both of these two, they will be mediated by accepting one from each part. And through this, because they cannot have from the lowest things eternity, which is not there, they have this one from the highest; and therefore there is nothing else to complete their mediation, which they might have from the lowest, except misery.

2. [XIII.] There is therefore, according to the Platonists, for the sublime gods either a blessed eternity or an eternal beatitude; for infirm men either a mortal misery or a miserable mortality: but for the middle demons either a miserable eternity or an eternal misery. For even in those five things which he placed in the definition of demons, he did not show them to be mediators as he promised; since he said they have three in common with us, that they are animals in genus, rational in mind, and passive in soul; but with the gods one, that they are eternal in time; and one of their own, that they are aerial in body. How then are they mediators, when they have one with the highest and three with the lowest? Who does not see, mediation being left behind, how much they are inclined and depressed toward the lowest things? But clearly they can also be found to be mediators there in such a way that they have one thing of their own, which is the aerial body, just as those of the highest and lowest have each their own, the gods an ethereal body, and men a terrestrial one; but two things are common to all, that they are animals in genus and rational in mind. For he himself, when speaking of gods and men, said: "You have two kinds of animals." And these are not accustomed to maintain that the gods are anything but rational in mind. Two remain, that they are passive in soul and eternal in time: of which they have one with the lowest, the other with the highest, so that the mediation, balanced by a proportional reason, is neither lifted up to the highest nor depressed to the lowest. That very thing is the miserable eternity or eternal misery of the demons. For he who said "passive in soul" would also have said "miserable," had he not been ashamed before their worshippers. Furthermore, because the world is not ruled by fortuitous rashness, as even they themselves confess, but by the providence of the highest God, there would never be an eternal misery for them, unless there were a great malice.

3. Si igitur beati recte dicuntur eudaemones, non sunt eudaemones daemones, quos inter homines et deos isti in medio locaverunt. Quis ergo est locus bonorum daemonum, qui supra homines, infra deos, istis praebeant adjutorium, illis ministerium? Si enim boni aeternique sunt, profecto et beati sunt. Aeterna autem beatitudo medios eos esse non sinit, quia multum diis comparat, multumque ab hominibus separat. Unde frustra isti conabuntur ostendere, quomodo daemones boni, si et immortales sunt et beati, recte medii constituantur inter deos immortales ac beatos et homines mortales ac miseros. Cum enim utrumque habeant cum diis, et beatitudinem scilicet et immortalitatem, nihil autem horum cum hominibus et miseris et mortalibus; quomodo non potius remoti sunt ab hominibus, diisque conjuncti, quam inter utrosque medii constituti? Tunc enim medii essent, si haberent et ipsi duo quaedam sua, non cum binis alterutrorum, sed cum singulis utrorumque communia: sicut homo medium quiddam est, sed inter pecora et Angelos; ut, quia pecus est animal irrationale atque mortale, angelus autem rationale et immortale, medius homo esset, inferior Angelis, superior pecoribus, habens cum pecoribus mortalitatem, rationem cum Angelis, animal rationale mortale. Ita ergo cum quaerimus medium inter beatos immortales miserosque mortales, hoc invenire debemus, quod aut mortale sit beatum, aut immortale sit miserum.

Caput XIV.

An homines, cum sint mortales, possint vera beatitudine esse felices.

Utrum autem et beatus et mortalis homo esse possit, magna est inter homines quaestio. Quidam enim conditionem suam humilius inspexerunt, negaveruntque hominem capacem esse posse beatitudinis, quamdiu mortaliter vivit: quidam vero extulerunt se, et ausi sunt dicere, sapientiae compotes, beatos esse posse mortales. Quod si ita est, cur non ipsi potius medii constituuntur inter mortales miseros et immortales beatos, beatitudinem habentes cum immortalibus beatis, mortalitas cum mortalibus miseris? Profecto enim si beati sunt, invident nemini: (nam quid miserius invidentia)? et ideo mortalibus miseris, quantum possunt, ad consequendam beatitudinem consulunt ; ut et etiam immortales valeant esse post mortem, et Angelis immortalibus beatisque conjungi.

Caput XV.

De Mediatore Dei et hominum, homine Christo Jesu.

3. If, therefore, the blessed are correctly called eudaemones, those demons whom they have placed in the middle between men and gods are not eudaemones. Where, then, is the place of good demons, who, being above men and below the gods, provide aid to the former and service to the latter? For if they are good and eternal, they are surely also blessed. But eternal beatitude does not permit them to be mediators, because it compares them much to the gods and separates them much from men. Whence in vain will they attempt to show how good demons, if they are both immortal and blessed, are correctly constituted as mediators between the immortal and blessed gods and mortal and miserable men. For since they have both things with the gods, namely beatitude and immortality, but none of these with miserable and mortal men; how are they not rather remote from men and joined to the gods, than constituted as mediators between both? For they would then be mediators, if they themselves also had two things of their own, common not with two of either side, but with one of each: just as man is a certain middle thing, but between the beasts and the angels; so that, because a beast is an irrational and mortal animal, while an angel is a rational and immortal one, man would be a mediator, inferior to angels and superior to beasts, having mortality with the beasts and reason with the angels, being a rational mortal animal. So, therefore, when we seek a mediator between the blessed immortals and the miserable mortals, we ought to find this: that which is either mortal and blessed, or immortal and miserable.

Chapter XIV.

Whether men, since they are mortal, can be happy with true beatitude.

Whether a man can be both blessed and mortal is a great question among men. For some have inspected their condition more humbly and denied that man can be capable of beatitude as long as he lives mortally: but others have extolled themselves and dared to say that those possessed of wisdom can be blessed though mortal. But if this is so, why are they not rather constituted as mediators between the miserable mortals and the blessed immortals, having beatitude with the blessed immortals and mortality with the miserable mortals? For surely if they are blessed, they envy no one (for what is more miserable than envy?); and therefore they provide for miserable mortals, as much as they can, for the attainment of beatitude; so that they may also be able to be immortal after death and be joined to the immortal and blessed angels.

Chapter XV.

Concerning the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.

1. Si autem, quod multo credibilius et probabilius disputatur, omnes homines, quamdiu mortales sunt, etiam miseri sint necesse est, quaerendus est medius, qui non solum homo, verum etiam Deus sit; ut homines ex mortali miseria ad beatam immortalitatem hujus medii beata mortalitas interveniendo perducat. Quem neque non fieri mortalem oportebat, neque permanere mortalem. Mortalis quippe factus est, non infirmata Verbi divinitate, sed carnis infirmitate suscepta: non autem permansit in ipsa carne mortalis, quam resuscitavit a mortuis: quoniam ipse fructus est mediationis ejus, ut nec ipsi, propter quos liberandos mediator effectus est, in perpetua vel carnis morte remanerent. Proinde mediatorem inter nos et Deum, et mortalitatem habere oportuit transeuntem, et beatitudinem permanentem: ut per id quod transit, congrueret morituris; et ad id quod permanet, transferret ex mortuis. Boni igitur Angeli inter miseros mortales et beatos immortales medii esse non possunt; quia ipsi quoque et beati et immortales sunt: possunt autem medii esse angeli mali quia immortales sunt cum illis, miseri cum istis. His contrarius est Mediator bonus, qui adversus eorum immortalitatem et miseriam, et mortalis esse ad tempus voluit, et beatus in aeternitate persistere potuit: ac sic eos et immortales superbos, et miseros noxios, ne immortalitatis jactantia seducerent ad miseriam, et suae mortis humilitate et suae beatitudinis benignitate destruxit in eis, quorum corda per suam fidem mundans, ab illorum immundissima dominatione liberavit.

2. Homo itaque mortalis et miser longe sejunctus ab immortalibus et beatis, quid eligat medium, per quod immortalitati et beatitudini copuletur? Quod possit delectare in daemonum immortalitate, miserum est: quod possit offendere in Christi mortalitate, jam non est. Ibi ergo cavenda est miseria sempiterna: hic mors timenda non est, quae esse non potuit sempiterna, et beatitudo amanda est sempiterna. Ad hoc quippe se interponit medius immortalis et miser, ut ad immortalitatem beatam transire non sinat, quoniam persistit quod impedit, id est ipsa miseria: ad hoc autem se interposuit mortalis et beatus, ut mortalitate transacta, et ex mortuis faceret immortales, quod in se resurgendo monstravit, et ex miseris beatos, unde nunquam ipse discessit. Alius est ergo medius malus, qui separat amicos; alius bonus, qui reconciliat inimicos. Et ideo multi sunt medii separatores, quia multitudo quae beata est, unius Dei participatione fit beata;

1. If, however, as is argued with much more credibility and probability, all men, as long as they are mortal, must also be miserable, a mediator must be sought who is not only man, but also God; so that the blessed mortality of this mediator, by intervening, may lead men from mortal misery to blessed immortality. It was necessary that He should neither fail to become mortal, nor remain mortal. Indeed, He was made mortal, not by any weakening of the divinity of the Word, but by the assumption of the infirmity of the flesh: but He did not remain mortal in that same flesh, which He raised from the dead: since the very fruit of His mediation is that those for whose liberation He became mediator should not remain in perpetual death, even of the flesh. Therefore, it was necessary for the mediator between us and God to have a passing mortality and a permanent beatitude: so that through that which passes, He might be suited to those who are to die; and to that which remains, He might transfer them from among the dead. The good angels, therefore, cannot be mediators between miserable mortals and blessed immortals, because they themselves are also both blessed and immortal: but the evil angels can be mediators because they are immortal with the former and miserable with the latter. Contrary to these is the good Mediator, who, in opposition to their immortality and misery, chose both to be mortal for a time and was able to persist as blessed in eternity: and thus, by the humility of His death and the benignity of His beatitude, He destroyed in those whose hearts He cleansed through faith in Him, those proud immortals and harmful wretches, so that they might not seduce them to misery by the boast of immortality, and He liberated them from their most foul domination.

2. Therefore, since mortal and miserable man is far separated from the immortal and blessed, what mediator should he choose, through whom he may be joined to immortality and beatitude? That which might delight in the immortality of demons is miserable: that which might offend in the mortality of Christ no longer exists. There, therefore, eternal misery is to be avoided; here death is not to be feared, which could not be eternal, and eternal beatitude is to be loved. For the immortal and miserable mediator interposes himself for this purpose: that he may not allow a passage to blessed immortality, because that which hinders persists, that is, misery itself; but the mortal and blessed mediator interposed himself for this purpose: that when mortality was passed, He might make mortals immortal from among the dead, which He showed by rising in Himself, and make the miserable blessed, from which state He Himself never departed. The one, then, is an evil mediator, who separates friends; the other a good one, who reconciles enemies. And therefore there are many separating mediators, because the multitude which is blessed becomes blessed by the participation of the one God;

cujus participationis privatione misera multitudo malorum angelorum, quae se opponit potius ad impedimentum, quam interponit ad beatitudinis adjutorium, etiam ipsa multitudine obstrepit quodammodo, ne possit ad illud unum beatificum bonum perveniri, ad quod ut perduceremur, non multis, sed uno mediatore opus erat; et hoc eo ipso, cujus participatione simus beati, hoc est Verbo Dei non facto, per quod facta sunt omnia. Nec tamen ob hoc mediator est, quia Verbum: maxime quippe immortale et maxime beatum Verbum longe est a mortalibus miseris; sed mediator per quod homo: eo ipso utique ostendens ad illud non solum beatum, verum etiam beatificum bonum non oportere quaeri alios mediatores, per quos arbitremur nobis perventionis gradus esse moliendos; quia beatus et beatificus Deus factus particeps humanitatis nostrae compendium praebuit participandae divinitatis suae. Neque enim nos a mortalitate et miseria liberans ad Angelos immortales beatosque ita perducit, ut eorum participatione etiam nos immortales et beati simus; sed ad illam Trinitatem, cujus et Angeli participatione beati sunt. Ideo quando in forma servi (Philipp. II, 7), ut mediator esset, infra Angelos esse voluit, in forma Dei supra Angelos mansit: idem in inferioribus via vitae, qui in superioribus vita.

Caput XVI.

An rationabiliter Platonici definierint deos coelestes, declinantes terrena contagia, hominibus non misceri, quibus ad amicitiam deorum daemones suffragentur.

Non enim verum est, quod idem Platonicus ait dixisse Platonem, Nullus deus miscetur homini. Et hoc praecipuum eorum sublimitatis ait esse specimen, quod nulla attrectatione hominum contaminantur (Apuleius, de deo Socratis.). Ergo daemones contami nari fatetur: et ideo eos a quibus contaminantur, mundare non possunt, omnesque immundi pariter fiunt, et daemones contrectatione hominum, et homines cultu daemonum. Aut, si et contrectari miscerique hominibus, nec tamen contaminari, daemones possunt, diis profecto meliores sunt: quia illi, si miscerentur, contaminarentur. Nam hoc deorum dicitur esse praecipuum, ut eos sublimiter separatos humana contrectatio contaminare non possit. Deum quidem summum omnium creatorem, quem nos verum Deum dicimus, sic a Platone praedicari asseverat, quod ipse sit solus qui non possit penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modice comprehendi; vix autem sapientibus viris, cum se vigore animi, quantum licuit, a corpore removerint, intellectum hujus Dei, et id quoque interdum velut in altissimis tenebris rapidissimo coruscamine lumen candidum intermicare (De deo Socratis).

by the privation of which participation the miserable multitude of evil angels, which opposes itself as a hindrance rather than interposes as an aid to beatitude, even by its very multitude clamors, as it were, so that one may not be able to reach that one beatific good, to which we needed not many, but one mediator to be led; and this is He by whose participation we are blessed, that is, the uncreated Word of God, through whom all things were made. Yet He is not mediator because He is the Word: for the Word, being supremely immortal and supremely blessed, is far from miserable mortals; but He is mediator in that He is man: thereby showing, indeed, that for that good which is not only blessed but also beatific, other mediators ought not to be sought, through whom we might think that stages of arrival must be constructed by us; because the blessed and beatific God, having become a partaker of our humanity, has provided a short way to partake of His divinity. For in liberating us from mortality and misery, He does not lead us to the immortal and blessed angels in such a way that by their participation we also become immortal and blessed; but to that Trinity, by whose participation the angels also are blessed. Therefore, when in the form of a servant (Phil. 2:7), that He might be the mediator, He chose to be below the angels, in the form of God He remained above the angels: the same one being the way of life in the lower regions who is life in the higher.

Chapter XVI.

Whether the Platonists reasonably defined that the celestial gods, declining earthly contagions, do not mix with men, for whom the demons act as supporters for friendship with the gods.

For it is not true, what the same Platonist says Plato said, 'No god mixes with man.' And this he calls the chief proof of their sublimity: that they are not contaminated by any contact with men (Apuleius, on the god of Socrates). Therefore he confesses that the demons are contaminated: and therefore they cannot cleanse those by whom they are contaminated, and all become equally unclean: both the demons by contact with men, and men by the worship of demons. Or, if demons can both be touched and mixed with men, and yet not be contaminated, they are surely better than the gods: because the latter, if they were mixed, would be contaminated. For this is said to be the chief property of the gods, that human contact cannot contaminate them, separated as they are in their sublimity. He asserts that the supreme God, the creator of all things, whom we call the true God, is proclaimed by Plato in such a way that He alone cannot be comprehended even in the least by any speech, due to the poverty of human discourse; and that barely to wise men, when they have removed themselves from the body as much as possible with the vigor of the mind, does the understanding of this God come, and even then at times as a white light flashing with a most rapid coruscation in the deepest darkness (On the god of Socrates).

Si ergo supra omnia vere summus Deus intelligibili et ineffabili quadam praesentia, etsi interdum, etsi tanquam rapidissimo coruscamine lumen candidum intermicans, adest tamen sapientium mentibus, cum se, quantum licuit, a corpore removerint, nec ab eis contaminari potest; quid est quod isti dii propterea constituuntur longe in sublimi loco, ne contrectatione contaminentur humana? Quasi vero aliud corpora illa aetheria quam videre sufficiat, quorum luce terra, quantum sufficit, illustratur. Porro si non contaminantur sidera, cum videntur, quos deos omnes visibiles dicit; nec daemones hominum contaminantur aspectu, quamvis de proximo videantur. An forte vocibus humanis contaminarentur, qui acie non contaminantur oculorum; et ideo daemones medios habent, per quos eis voces hominum nuntientur, a quibus longe absunt, ut incontaminatissimi perseverent? Quid jam de caeteris sensibus dicam? Non enim olfaciendo contaminari vel dii possent, si adessent, vel cum adsunt daemones, possunt vivorum corporum vaporibus humanorum, si tantis sacrificiorum cadaverinis non contaminantur nidoribus. In gustandi autem sensum nulla necessitate reficiendae mortalitatis urgentur, ut fame adacti cibos ab hominibus quaerant. Tactus vero in potestate est. Nam licet ab eo potissimum sensu contrectatio dicta videatur, hactenus tamen, si vellent, miscerentur hominibus, ut viderent et viderentur, audirent et audirentur: tangendi autem quae necessitas? nam neque homines id concupiscere auderent, cum deorum vel daemonum bonorum conspectu vel colloquio fruerentur: et, si in tantum curiositas progrederetur, ut vellent; quonam pacto quispiam posset invitum tangere deum, vel daemonem, qui nisi captum non potest passerem?

2. Videndo igitur visibusque se praebendo et loquendo et audiendo, dii corporaliter misceri hominibus possent. Hoc autem modo daemones si miscentur, ut dixi, et non contaminantur, dii autem contaminantur, si miscerentur; incontaminabiles dicunt daemones, et contaminabiles deos. Si autem contaminantur et daemones, quid conferunt hominibus ad vitam post mortem beatam, quos contaminati mundare non possunt, ut eos mundos diis incontaminatis possint adjungere, inter quos et illos medii constituti sunt?

If, then, the truly supreme God is present above all things by a certain intelligible and ineffable presence to the minds of wise men when they have removed themselves as much as possible from the body—even if only at times, even if only as a white light flashing like a most rapid coruscation—and cannot be contaminated by them; what is the reason that these gods are constituted far off in a sublime place, so that they might not be contaminated by human contact? As if, indeed, it were not enough to see those ethereal bodies, by whose light the earth is sufficiently illuminated. Moreover, if the stars are not contaminated when they are seen—all of which he calls visible gods —neither are the demons contaminated by the sight of men, even though they are seen from close at hand. Or perhaps they would be contaminated by human voices, who are not contaminated by the sharpness of the eyes; and is it for this reason that they have demons as mediators, through whom the voices of men may be reported to them from whom they are far distant, so that they may remain most uncontaminated? What shall I say now of the other senses? For neither could the gods be contaminated by smelling if they were present, nor can the demons when they are present, by the vapors of living human bodies, if they are not contaminated by such great cadaverous odors of sacrifices. As for the sense of taste, they are urged by no necessity of refreshing their mortality to seek food from men, driven by hunger. Touch, indeed, is in their power. For although 'contact' seems to be named chiefly from that sense, they could nevertheless, if they wished, mix with men so far as to see and be seen, to hear and be heard: but what necessity is there for touching? for neither would men dare to desire it when they enjoyed the sight or speech of the gods or of good demons: and if curiosity should progress so far that they wished it, how could anyone touch a god or demon against his will, when one cannot touch even a sparrow unless it is caught?

2. By seeing, therefore, and presenting themselves to sight, and by speaking and hearing, the gods could mix corporally with men. But if demons mix in this way, as I have said, and are not contaminated, while the gods would be contaminated if they mixed, they are saying that demons are incontaminable and gods are contaminable. But if the demons also are contaminated, what benefit do they confer on men for a blessed life after death, whom they, being contaminated themselves, cannot cleanse so that they may join them, being clean, to the uncontaminated gods, between whom and men they have been constituted as mediators?

Aut si hoc eis beneficii non conferunt, quid prodest hominibus daemonum amica mediatio? an ut post mortem non ad deos homines per daemones transeant, sed simul vivant utrique contaminati, ac per hoc neutri beati? Nisi forte quis dicat more spongiarum vel hujuscemodi rerum mundare daemones amicos suos, ut tanto ipsi sordidiores fiant, quanto fiunt homines eis velut tergentibus mundiores. Quod si ita est, contaminatioribus dii miscentur daemonibus, qui ne contaminarentur, hominum propinquitatem contrectationemque vitarunt. An forte dii possunt ab hominibus contaminatos mundare daemones, nec ab eis contaminari, et eo modo non possent et homines? Quis talia sentiat, nisi quem fallacissimi daemones deceperunt? Quid, quod si videri et videre contaminat, videntur ab hominibus dii, quos visibiles dicit (De deo Socratis), clarissima mundi lumina (Virgil. Georg. lib. 1, vers. 5, 6) et caetera sidera, tutioresque sunt daemones ab ista hominum contaminatione, qui non possunt videri, nisi velint? Aut si non videri, sed videre contaminat, negent ab istis clarissimis mundi luminibus, quos deos opinantur, videri homines, cum radios suos terras usque pertendant. Qui tamen eorum radii per quaeque immunda diffusi non contaminantur: et dii contaminarentur, si hominibus miscerentur, etiamsi esset necessarius in subveniendo contactus? Nam radiis solis et lunae terra contingitur, nec istam contaminat lucem.

Caput XVII.

Ad consequendam vitam beatam, quae in participatione est summi boni, non tali mediatore indigere hominem qualis est daemon, sed tali qualis unus est Christus.

Miror autem plurimum tam doctos homines, qui cuncta corporea et sensibilia, prae incorporalibus et intelligibilibus, postponenda judicaverunt, cum agitur de beata vita, corporalium contrectationum facere mentionem. Ubi est illud Plotini, ubi ait, Fugiendum est igitur ad charissimam patriam, et ibi pater, et ibi omnia? Quae igitur, inquit, classis aut fuga? Similem deo fieri (Enneadis 1 lib. 6, cap. 8; lib. 2, cap. 3). Si ergo deo quanto similior, tanto fit quisque propinquior; nulla est ab illo alia longinquitas quam ejus dissimilitudo. Incorporali vero illi aeterno et incommutabili tanto est anima hominis dissimilior, quanto rerum temporalium mutabiliumque cupidior. [XVII.] Hoc ut sanetur, quoniam immortali puritati, quae in summo est, ea quae in imo sunt mortalia et immunda convenire non possunt, opus est quidem mediatore; non tamen tali qui corpus quidem habeat immortale propinquum summis, animum autem morbidum similem infimis; quo morbo nobis invideat potius ne sanemur, quam adjuvet ut sanemur:

Or if they do not confer this benefit upon them, of what use to men is the friendly mediation of demons? Is it so that after death men may not pass to the gods through the demons, but that both may live together contaminated, and thereby neither be blessed? Unless perhaps someone should say that, after the manner of sponges or suchlike things, the demons cleanse their friends so that they themselves become as much filthier as men become cleaner by their wiping, as it were. If this is so, the gods mix with more contaminated demons, who, lest they be contaminated, avoided the proximity and contact of men. Or perhaps the gods can cleanse the demons contaminated by men, and not be contaminated by them, and yet they could not do the same for men? Who would think such things, unless one whom the most fallacious demons have deceived? What of the fact that if seeing and being seen contaminates, the gods are seen by men—those whom he calls visible gods, the brightest lights of the world and the other stars; and the demons are safer from this contamination of men, who cannot be seen unless they wish? Or if it is not being seen, but seeing, that contaminates, let them deny that men are seen by those brightest lights of the world, whom they suppose to be gods, when they extend their rays even to the earth. Yet their rays, diffused through whatever foul things, are not contaminated: and would the gods be contaminated if they mixed with men, even if contact were necessary for helping? For the earth is touched by the rays of the sun and moon, and it does not contaminate this light.

Chapter XVII.

That to attain the blessed life, which consists in the participation of the supreme good, man needs not such a mediator as a demon, but such as Christ alone is.

I wonder very much that such learned men, who judged that all corporeal and sensible things are to be postponed to the incorporeal and intelligible when the blessed life is in question, should make mention of corporeal contacts. Where is that saying of Plotinus, where he says: 'We must fly, then, to our most beloved fatherland, and there is the father, and there all things'? 'What fleet, then, or what flight?', he says, 'To become like God' (Ennead 1, lib. 6, cap. 8; lib. 2, cap. 3). If, then, the more like God one becomes, the nearer he is to Him, there is no other distance from Him than unlikeness to Him. Moreover, the soul of man is as much more unlike that incorporeal, eternal, and unchangeable being, as it is more desirous of temporal and changeable things. [XVII.] That this may be healed—since mortal and unclean things which are at the lowest cannot agree with the immortal purity which is at the highest—a mediator is indeed needed; yet not such a one as has indeed an immortal body near to the highest beings, but a morbid mind like the lowest, by which disease he would rather envy us lest we be healed than help us that we might be healed:

sed tali qui nobis infimis ex corporis mortalitate coaptatus, immortali spiritus justitia , per quam non locorum distantia, sed similitudinis excellentia mansit in summis, mundandis liberandisque nobis vere divinum praebeat adjutorium. Qui profecto incontaminabilis Deus absit ut contaminationem timeret ex homine quo indutus est, aut ex hominibus inter quos in homine conversatus est. Non enim parva sunt haec interim duo, quae salubriter sua incarnatione monstravit, nec carne posse contaminari veram divinitatem, nec ideo putandos daemones nobis esse meliores, quia non habent carnem. Hic est, sicut eum praedicat sancta Scriptura, Mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Jesus (I Tim. II, 5), de cujus et divinitate, qua Patri est semper aequalis, et humanitate, qua nobis factus est similis, non hic locus est ut competenter pro nostra facultate dicamus.

Caput XVIII.

Quod fallacia daemonum, dum sua intercessione viam spondet ad Deum, hoc annitatur, ut homines a via veritatis avertat.

Falsi autem illi fallacesque mediatores daemones, qui cum per spiritus immunditiam miseri ac maligni multis effectibus clareant, per corporalium tamen locorum intervalla et per aeriorum corporum levitatem a provectu animorum nos avocare atque avertere moliuntur, non viam praebent ad Deum; sed, ne via teneatur, impediunt. Quandoquidem et in ipsa via corporali, quae falsissima est et plenissima erroris, qua non iter agit justitia; quoniam non per corporalem altitudinem, sed per spiritualem, hoc est incorporalem, similitudinem ad Deum debemus ascendere; in ipsa tamen corporali via, quam daemonum amici per elementorum gradus ordinant, inter aetherios deos et terrenos homines aeriis daemonibus mediis constitutis, hoc deos opinantur habere praecipuum, ut propter hoc intervallum locorum contrectatione non contaminentur humana. Ita daemones contaminari potius ab hominibus, quam homines mundari a daemonibus credunt, et deos ipsos contaminari potuisse, nisi loci altitudine munirentur. Quis tam infelix est, ut ista via mundari se existimet, ubi homines contaminantes daemones contaminati, dii contaminabiles praedicantur; et non potius eligat viam, ubi contaminantes magis daemones evitentur, et ab incontaminabili Deo ad ineundam societatem incontaminatorum Angelorum homines a contaminatione mundentur?

Caput XIX.

Quod appellatio daemonum jam nec apud cultores eorum assumatur in significationem alicujus boni.

but such a one as, being adapted to us at the lowest by the mortality of the body, yet through the immortal righteousness of the spirit—by which He remained at the highest, not by distance of place but by excellence of likeness—might afford us truly divine aid for our cleansing and liberation. Far be it from this truly uncontaminable God to fear contamination from the man with whom He was clothed, or from the men among whom He lived as a man. For these two things, meanwhile, which He wholesomely showed by His incarnation, are not small: that neither can true divinity be contaminated by flesh, nor are demons for that reason to be thought better than us because they do not have flesh. This is He, as the holy Scripture proclaims Him, 'the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus' (1 Tim. 2:5), of whose divinity, by which He is always equal to the Father, and of His humanity, by which He was made like to us, this is not the place to speak adequately according to our ability.

Chapter XVIII.

That the fallacy of demons, while promising a way to God through their intercession, strives for this: to turn men away from the way of truth.

But those false and fallacious mediators, the demons, who, although they appear miserable and malignant in many effects through the impurity of their spirit, yet through the intervals of corporeal places and through the lightness of their aerial bodies strive to call us away and turn us aside from the progress of our souls, do not provide a way to God; but hinder the way from being kept. Since even in that corporeal way, which is most false and full of error, along which righteousness does not travel—for we ought to ascend to God not by corporeal height, but by spiritual, that is, incorporeal likeness—nevertheless, in that corporeal way which the friends of demons ordain through the degrees of the elements, having constituted aerial demons as mediators between the ethereal gods and earthly men, they suppose the gods to have this chief property, that because of this interval of places they are not contaminated by human contact. Thus they believe that demons are rather contaminated by men than men cleansed by demons, and that the gods themselves could have been contaminated had they not been protected by the height of their place. Who is so unhappy as to think he can be cleansed by this way, where men who contaminate, contaminated demons, and contaminable gods are proclaimed; and does not rather choose the way where the contaminating demons are more avoided, and men are cleansed from contamination by the uncontaminable God to enter into the society of the uncontaminated angels?

Chapter XIX.

That the appellation of demons is no longer assumed by their own worshippers in the significance of anything good.

Sed ne de verbis etiam nos certare videamur, quoniam nonnulli istorum, ut ita dixerim, daemonicolarum, in quibus et Labeo est, eosdem perhibent ab aliis angelos dici, quos ipsi daemones nuncupant, jam mihi de bonis Angelis aliquid video disserendum, quos isti esse non negant, sed eos bonos daemones vocare quam Angelos malunt. Nos autem, sicut Scriptura loquitur, secundum quam christiani sumus, Angelos quidem partim bonos, partim malos, nunquam vero bonos daemones legimus: sed ubicumque illarum Litterarum hoc nomen positum reperitur, sive daemones, sive daemonia dicantur, nonnisi maligni significantur spiritus. Et hanc loquendi consuetudinem in tantum populi usquequaque secuti sunt, ut eorum etiam qui Pagani appellantur, et deos multos ac daemones colendos esse contendunt, nullus fere sit tam litteratus et doctus, qui audeat in laude vel servo suo dicere, Daemonem habes : sed cuilibet hoc dicere voluerit, non se aliter accipi, quam maledicere voluisse, dubitare non possit. Quae igitur nos causa compellit, ut post offensionem aurium tam multarum, ut jam pene sint omnium, quae hoc verbum nonnisi in malam partem audire consueverunt, quod diximus cogamur exponere, cum possimus Angelorum nomine adhibito, eamdem offensionem, quae nomine daemonum fieri poterat, evitare?

Caput XX.

De qualitate scientiae, quae daemones superbos facit.

Quanquam etiam ipsa origo hujus nominis, si divinos intueamur Libros, aliquid affert cognitione dignissimum. Δαίμονες enim dicuntur, quoniam vocabulum graecum est, ob scientiam nominati. Apostolus autem Spiritu sancto locutus ait, Scientia inflat, charitas vero aedificat (I Cor. VIII, 1). Quod recte aliter non intelligitur, nisi scientiam tunc prodesse, cum charitas inest; sine hac autem inflare, id est in superbiam inanissimae quasi ventositatis extollere. Est ergo in daemonibus scientia sine charitate, et ideo tam inflati, id est tam superbi, sunt, ut honores divinos et religionis servitutem, quam vero Deo deberi sciunt, sibi sategerint exhiberi, et quantum possunt, et apud quos possunt, adhuc agunt. Contra superbiam porro daemonum, qua pro meritis possidebatur genus humanum, Dei humilitas, quae in forma servi apparuit , quantam virtutem habeat, animae hominum nesciunt immunditia elationis inflatae, daemonibus similes superbia, non scientia.

Caput XXI.

Ad quem modum Dominus voluerit daemonibus innotescere.

But lest we should also seem to strive about words, since some of these, as I might say, demon-worshippers, among whom is Labeo, assert that the same beings are called angels by others whom they themselves call demons, I see that I must now say something about the good angels, whom they do not deny to exist, but prefer to call good demons rather than angels. But we, according to the language of Scripture, by which we are Christians, read of angels partly good and partly evil, but never of good demons: but wherever this name is found in those writings, whether they are called daemones or daemonia, none but malignant spirits are signified. And this custom of speaking has been followed by the people everywhere to such an extent that even among those who are called Pagans, and who contend that many gods and demons ought to be worshipped, there is hardly anyone so literate and learned who would dare to say in praise, even to his own servant: 'You have a demon'; but whoever he might wish to say this to, he could not doubt that it would be taken in no other way than as a wish to curse. What reason, then, compels us that, after offending so many ears —indeed, now almost all—which have become accustomed to hearing this word in no other than a bad sense, we should be forced to explain what we have said, when we could avoid that very offense which might be caused by the name of demons by using the name of angels?

Chapter XX.

On the quality of knowledge which makes demons proud.

Although even the origin of this name itself, if we look into the divine Books, offers something most worthy of knowledge. For they are called 'daemones', since it is a Greek word, being named on account of their knowledge. But the Apostle, speaking by the Holy Spirit, says: 'Knowledge puffs up, but charity edifies' (1 Cor. 8:1). Which is rightly understood in no other way than that knowledge is profitable then, when charity is present; but without this it puffs up, that is, it raises one up into the pride of a most empty and, as it were, windy vanity. There is, then, in the demons knowledge without charity, and for this reason they are so puffed up, that is, so proud, that they have used their best efforts to have divine honors and the service of religion, which they know to be due to the true God, exhibited to themselves, and they still do so as much as they can and among whom they can. Furthermore, against the pride of the demons, by which the human race was possessed according to its merits, the souls of men, puffed up with the impurity of pride, do not know what great power the humility of God has, which appeared in the form of a servant; being like the demons in pride, but not in knowledge.

Chapter XXI.

In what manner the Lord willed to become known to the demons.

Ipsi autem daemones etiam hoc ita sciunt, ut eidem Domino infirmitate carnis induto dixerint: Quid nobis et tibi, Jesu Nazarene? venisti ante tempus perdere nos (Marc. I, 24; et Matth. VIII, 29)? Clarum est in his verbis, quod in eis et tanta scientia erat, et charitas non erat. Poenam quippe suam formidabant ab illo, non in illo justitiam diligebant. Tantum vero eis innotuit, quantum voluit: Tantum autem voluit, quantum oportuit. Sed innotuit, non sicut Angelis sanctis, qui ejus secundum id quod Dei Verbum est, participata aeternitate perfruuntur ; sed sicut eis terrendis innotescendum fuit, ex quorum tyrannica quodammodo potestate fuerat liberaturus praedestinatos in suum regnum et gloriam semper veracem et veraciter sempiternam. Innotuit ergo daemonibus, non per id quod est vita aeterna, et lumen incommutabile quod illuminat pios, cui videndo per fidem, quae in illo est, corda mundantur; sed per quaedam temporalia suae virtutis effecta et occultissimae signa praesentiae, quae angelicis sensibus etiam malignorum spirituum potius quam infirmitati hominum possent esse conspicua. Denique quando ea paululum supprimenda judicavit, et aliquanto altius latuit, dubitavit de illo daemonum princeps, eumque tentavit, an Christus esset explorans, quantum se tentari ipse permisit, ut hominem quem gerebat, ad nostrae imitationis temperaret exemplum. Post illam vero tentationem, cum Angeli, sicut scriptum est, ministrarent ei (Matth. IV, 3-11), boni utique et sancti, ac per hoc spiritibus immundis metuendi et tremendi, magis magisque innotescebat daemonibus quantus esset, ut ei jubenti, quamvis in illo contemptibilis videretur carnis infirmitas, resistere nullus auderet.

Caput XXII.

Quid intersit inter scientiam sanctorum Angelorum, et scientiam daemonum.

His igitur Angelis bonis omnis corporalium temporaliumque rerum scientia, qua inflantur daemones, vilis est: non quod earum ignari sint, sed quod illis Dei, qua sanctificantur, charitas chara est, prae cujus non tantum incorporali, verum etiam incommutabili et ineffabili pulchritudine, cujus sancto amore inardescunt, omnia quae infra sunt, et quod illud est non sunt, seque ipsos inter illa contemnunt, ut ex toto, quod boni sunt, eo bono, ex quo boni sunt, perfruantur.

The demons themselves also know this in such a way that they said to the Lord Himself, clothed in the infirmity of the flesh: 'What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? art thou come to destroy us before the time?' (Mark 1:24; and Matt. 8:29). It is clear from these words that there was in them as much knowledge as there was a lack of charity. For they dreaded their punishment from Him, they did not love righteousness in Him. He became known to them as much as He willed: and He willed as much as was fitting. But He became known, not as to the holy angels, who enjoy His participated eternity according to what He is as the Word of God; but as He needed to become known for the purpose of terrifying those from whose somewhat tyrannical power He was to deliver those predestined for His kingdom and glory, which is always true and truly eternal. He became known to the demons, therefore, not through that which is eternal life, and the unchangeable light that illuminates the pious, for the vision of which hearts are cleansed by the faith that is in Him; but through certain temporal effects of His power and most hidden signs of His presence, which could be conspicuous to the angelic senses even of malignant spirits rather than to the infirmity of men. Finally, when He judged that those signs should be somewhat suppressed, and He lay hid a little more deeply, the prince of demons doubted about Him and tempted Him, exploring whether He were the Christ, as much as He Himself permitted Himself to be tempted, so that He might adapt the man whom He bore to the example for our imitation. But after that temptation, when angels, as it is written, ministered to Him (Matt. 4:3-11)—good and holy ones, indeed, and therefore to be feared and dreaded by unclean spirits—He became more and more known to the demons for how great He was, so that no one dared to resist Him when He commanded, although in Him the infirmity of the flesh seemed contemptible.

Chapter XXII.

What is the difference between the knowledge of the holy angels and the knowledge of demons.

To these good angels, therefore, all knowledge of corporeal and temporal things, with which the demons are puffed up, is vile: not because they are ignorant of them, but because the charity of God, by which they are sanctified, is dear to them; in comparison with whose beauty, which is not only incorporeal but also unchangeable and ineffable, with the holy love of which they burn, they despise all things which are below and are not what He is, and they despise themselves among them, so that they may fully enjoy being good through that Good from which they are good.

Et ideo certius etiam temporalia et mutabilia ista noverunt; quia eorum principales causas in Verbo Dei conspiciunt, per quod factus est mundus: quibus causis quaedam probantur, quaedam reprobantur, cuncta ordinantur. Daemones autem non aeternas temporum causas et quodammodo cardinales in Dei Sapientia contemplantur; sed quorumdam signorum nobis occultorum majore experientia multo plura quam homines futura prospiciunt. Dispositiones quoque suas aliquando praenuntiant. Denique saepe isti, nunquam illi omnino falluntur. Aliud est enim temporalibus temporalia et mutabilibus mutabilia conjectare, eisque temporalem et mutabilem modum suae voluntatis et facultatis inserere, quod daemonibus certa ratione permisum est: aliud autem in aeternis atque incommutabilibus Dei legibus, quae in ejus Sapientia vivunt, mutationes temporum praevidere, Deique voluntatem, quae tam certissima quam potentissima est omnium , Spiritus ejus participatione cognoscere; quod sanctis Angelis recta discretione donatum est. Itaque non solum aeterni, verum etiam beati sunt. Bonum autem quo beati sunt, Deus illis est, a quo creati sunt. Illius quippe indeclinabiliter participatione et contemplatione perfruuntur.

Caput XXIII.

Nomen deorum falso adscribi diis Gentium, quod tamen et Angelis sanctis et hominibus justis ex divinarum Scripturarum auctoritate commune est.

1. Hos si Platonici malunt deos quam daemones dicere, eisque annumerare, quos a summo Deo conditos deos scribit eorum auctor et magister Plato (In Timaeo); dicant quod volunt: non enim cum eis de verborum controversia laborandum est. Si enim sic immortales, ut tamen a summo Deo factos, etsi non per se ipsos, sed ei, a quo facti sunt, adhaerendo, beatos esse dicunt; hoc dicunt quod dicimus, quolibet eos nomine appellent. Hanc autem Platonicorum esse sententiam, sive omnium, sive meliorum, in eorum litteris inveniri potest. Nam et de ipso nomine, quo hujusmodi immortalem beatamque creaturam deos appellant; ideo inter nos et ipsos pene nulla dissensio est, quia et in nostris sacris Litteris legitur, Deus deorum Dominus locutus est (Psal. XLIX, 1): et alibi, Confitemini Deo deorum (Psal. CXXXV, 2). Et alibi, Rex magnus super omnes deos (Psal. XCIV, 3). Illud autem ubi scriptum est, Terribilis est super omnes deos; cur dictum sit, deinceps ostenditur. Sequitur enim, Quoniam omnes dii gentium daemonia, Dominus autem coelos fecit (Psal. XCV, 4, 5).

And therefore they know even these temporal and changeable things more certainly; because they behold their principal causes in the Word of God, through whom the world was made: by which causes some things are approved, others rejected, and all things ordered. But demons do not contemplate the eternal and, as it were, cardinal causes of the times in the Wisdom of God; but through a greater experience of certain signs hidden from us, they foresee many more future things than men do. They also sometimes announce beforehand their own arrangements. Finally, the former are often deceived, the latter never at all. For it is one thing to conjecture temporal things from temporal and changeable from changeable, and to insert into them the temporal and changeable mode of their own will and faculty—which is permitted to demons with a certain reason; it is another thing to foresee the changes of times in the eternal and unchangeable laws of God, which live in His Wisdom, and to know the will of God, which is the most certain and powerful of all, through the participation of His Spirit; which has been given to the holy angels with right discretion. Therefore they are not only eternal, but also blessed. And the Good by which they are blessed is God to them, by whom they were created. Indeed, they enjoy His participation and contemplation unswervingly.

Chapter XXIII.

That the name of gods is falsely ascribed to the gods of the Gentiles, which nevertheless is common both to holy angels and to just men according to the authority of the divine Scriptures.

1. If the Platonists prefer to call these beings gods rather than demons, and to number them among those whom their author and master Plato writes were created as gods by the supreme God (in the Timaeus), let them say what they wish; for we must not labor with them over a controversy of words. For if they call them immortal in such a way that they were nevertheless made by the supreme God, and are blessed not of themselves, but by adhering to Him by whom they were made, they are saying what we say, by whatever name they call them. And that this is the opinion of the Platonists, whether of all or of the better ones, can be found in their writings. For even concerning the name itself, by which they call immortal and blessed creatures of this kind gods, there is almost no dissension between us and them, because in our sacred Letters it is read: 'The Lord God of gods has spoken' (Ps. 49:1); and elsewhere: 'Give thanks to the God of gods' (Ps. 135:2). And elsewhere: 'A great King above all gods' (Ps. 94:3). And where it is written: 'He is terrible above all gods', it is shown subsequently why it was said. For it follows: 'For all the gods of the nations are demons, but the Lord made the heavens' (Ps. 95:4, 5).

Super omnes ergo deos dixit, sed gentium, id est, quos gentes pro diis habent, quae sunt daemonia: ideo terribilis, sub quo terrore Domino dicebant, Venisti perdere nos (Marc. I, 24)? Illud vero ubi dicitur, Deus deorum, non potest intelligi Deus daemoniorum: et Rex magnus super omnes deos, absit ut dicatur Rex magnus super omnia daemonia. Sed homines quoque in populo Dei, eadem Scriptura deos appellat. Ego, inquit, dixi, Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes (Psal. LXXXI, 6). Potest itaque intelligi horum deorum Deus, qui dictus est Deus deorum: et super hoc deos Rex magnus, qui dictus est Rex magnus super omnes deos.

2. Verumtamen cum a nobis quaeritur, si homines dicti sunt dii, quod in populo Dei sunt, quem per Angelos vel per homines alloquitur Deus; quanto magis immortales eo nomine digni sunt, qui ea fruuntur beatitudine, ad quam Deum colendo cupiunt homines pervenire? quid respondebimus, nisi non frustra in Scripturis sanctis expressius homines nuncupatos deos, quam illos immortales et beatos, quibus nos aequales futuros in resurrectione promittitur, ne scilicet propter illorum excellentiam aliquem eorum nobis constituere deum infidelis auderet infirmitas? Quod in homine facile est evitare. Et evidentius dici debuerunt homines dii in populo Dei, ut certi ac fidentes fierent, eum esse Deum suum, qui dictus est Deus deorum: quia, etsi appellentur dii immortales illi et beati, qui in coelis sunt ; non tamen dicti sunt dii deorum, id est dii hominum in populo Dei constitutorum, quibus est dictum, Ego dixi, Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes. Hinc est quod ait Apostolus: Etsi sunt qui dicuntur dii, sive in coelo, sive in terra; sicuti sunt dii multi, et domini multi: nobis tamen unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia, et nos in ipso; et unus Dominus Jesus Christus, per quem omnia, et nos per ipsum (I Cor. VIII, 5, 6).

3. Non multum ergo de nomine disceptandum est, cum res ipsa ita clareat, ut a scrupulo dubitationis aliena sit. Illud vero, quod nos ex eorum immortalium beatorum numero missos Angelos esse dicimus, qui Dei voluntatem hominibus annuntiarent, illis autem non placet, quia hoc ministerium non per illos quos deos appellant, id est immortales et beatos, sed per daemones fieri credunt, quos immortales tantum, non etiam beatos audent dicere; aut certe ita immortales ac beatos, ut tamen daemones bonos, non deos sublimiter collocatos et ab humana contrectatione semotos: quamvis nominis controversia videatur, tamen ita detestabile est nomen daemonum, ut hoc modis omnibus a sanctis Angelis nos removere debeamus. Nunc ergo ita liber iste claudatur, ut sciamus immortales ac beatos, quodlibet vocentur, qui tamen facti et creati sunt, medios non esse ad immortalem beatitudinem perducendis mortalibus miseris, a quibus utraque differentia separantur.

He said, therefore, 'above all gods', but 'of the nations', that is, those whom the nations hold for gods, which are demons; therefore He is 'terrible', under which terror they said to the Lord: 'Art thou come to destroy us?' (Mark 1:24). But where it is said, 'God of gods', it cannot be understood as 'God of demons'; and as for 'a great King above all gods', far be it that it should be said 'a great King above all demons'. But the same Scripture also calls men in the people of God gods. 'I said,' it says, 'Ye are gods, and all of you are children of the Most High' (Ps. 81:6). Therefore He can be understood as the God of these gods, who is called 'the God of gods'; and as the great King over these gods, who is called 'a great King above all gods'.

2. Nevertheless, when it is asked of us: if men are called gods because they are in the people of God, whom God addresses through angels or men, how much more are those immortals worthy of that name, who enjoy that beatitude to which men desire to attain by worshipping God? what shall we answer, but that it is not in vain that in the holy Scriptures men are more expressly called gods than those immortal and blessed beings to whom it is promised that we shall be equal in the resurrection; lest, indeed, because of their excellence, faithless infirmity should dare to constitute any of them as a god for us? Which in the case of a man is easy to avoid. And men in the people of God ought to have been more evidently called gods, so that they might become certain and confident that He is their God, who is called 'the God of gods'; because, although those immortal and blessed beings who are in the heavens are called gods, they are not nevertheless called 'gods of gods', that is, gods of the men constituted in the people of God, to whom it was said: 'I said, Ye are gods, and all of you are children of the Most High'. Hence it is what the Apostle says: 'Though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or in earth, (as there be gods many, and lords many,) but to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by Him' (1 Cor. 8:5, 6).

3. There is therefore no need to dispute much about the name, since the matter itself is so clear as to be far from any doubt. But that which we say, that from the number of those immortal and blessed beings, Angels were sent to announce the will of God to men, does not please them, because they believe that this ministry is performed not by those whom they call gods, that is, the immortal and blessed, but by demons, whom they dare to call only immortal, but not also blessed; or at least so immortal and blessed that they are nevertheless good demons, not gods placed on high and removed from human contact. Although it may seem to be a controversy over a name, yet the name of demons is so detestable that we ought by all means to keep ourselves and the holy Angels removed from it. Now, therefore, let this book be closed in such a way that we may know that the immortal and blessed beings—whatever they may be called—who were nevertheless made and created, are not mediators for bringing wretched mortals to immortal beatitude, from which they are separated by both differences.

Qui autem medii sunt communem habendo immortalitatem cum superioribus, miseriam cum inferioribus, quoniam merito malitiae sunt miseri, beatitudinem quam non habent, invidere nobis possunt potius quam praebere. Unde nihil habent amici daemonum quod nobis dignum afferant, cur eos tanquam adjutores colere debeamus, quos potius ut deceptores evitare debemus. Quos autem bonos, et ideo non solum immortales, verum etiam beatos deorum nomine sacris et sacrificiis propter vitam beatam post mortem adipiscendam colendos putant, qualescumque illi sint, et quolibet vocabulo digni sunt, non eos velle per tale religionis obsequium nisi unum Deum coli, a quo creati et cujus participatione beati sunt, adjuvante ipso, in sequenti libro diligentius disseremus.

But those who are mediators by having immortality in common with the higher beings and misery with the lower, because they are wretched by reason of their malice, can rather envy us for the beatitude they do not possess than provide it to us. Hence the friends of the demons have nothing worthy to bring to us as a reason why we should worship them as helpers, whom we ought rather to avoid as deceivers. But as for those whom they think should be worshipped as good, and therefore not only immortal but also blessed, under the name of gods, with rites and sacrifices for the sake of attaining a blessed life after death—whoever they may be and whatever name they deserve—we shall diligently discuss in the following book, with God's help, that they wish no one to be worshipped by such religious service except the one God, by whom they were created and by whose participation they are blessed.

Liber D

ECIMUS.

In quo docet Augustinus divinum honorem, qui latriae cultus dicitur et sacrificiis agitur, nolle Angelos bonos exhiberi nisi uni Deo, cui et ipsi serviunt. De principio subinde ac via purgandae ac liberandae animae disputat contra Porphyrium.

CAPUT PRIMUM.---Veram beatitudinem sive Angelis, sive hominibus, per unum Deum tribui, etiam Platonicos definisse: sed utrum hi, quos ob hoc ipsum colendos putant, uni tantum Deo, an etiam sibi sacrificari velint, esse quaerendum.

1. Omnium certa sententia est, qui ratione quoquo modo uti possunt, beatos esse omnes homines velle. Qui autem sint, vel unde fiant, dum mortalium quaerit infirmitas, multae magnaeque controversiae concitatae sunt, in quibus philosophi sua studia et otia contriverunt; quas in medium adducere atque discutere, et longum est, et non necessarium. Si enim recolit qui haec legit, quid in libro egerimus octavo in eligendis philosophis, cum quibus haec de beata vita, quae post mortem futura est, quaestio tractaretur, utrum ad eam uni Deo vero, qui etiam est deorum effector, an plurimis diis religione sacrisque serviendo, pervenire possimus; non etiam hic eadem repeti exspectat, praesertim cum possit relegendo, si forte oblitus est, adminiculari memoria. Elegimus enim Platonicos omnium philosophorum merito nobilissimos: propterea, quia sicut sapere potuerunt, licet immortalem ac rationalem vel intellectualem hominis animam, nisi participato lumine illius Dei, a quo et ipsa et mundus factus est, beatam esse non posse; ita illud quod omnes homines appetunt, id est vitam beatam, quemquam isti assecuturum negant, qui non illi uni optimo, qui est incommutabilis Deus, puritate casti amoris adhaeserit.

BOOK TEN.

In which Augustine teaches that the good Angels do not wish divine honor, which is called the worship of latria and is performed by sacrifices, to be rendered except to the one God, whom they also serve. He then disputes concerning the principle and the way of purging and liberating the soul against Porphyry.

CHAPTER I. — That true beatitude, whether to Angels or to men, is bestowed through one God, as even the Platonists have defined: but it must be asked whether these beings, whom for this very reason they think should be worshipped, wish sacrifices to be offered to one God only, or also to themselves.

1. It is the certain opinion of all who can use reason in any way, that all men wish to be blessed. But as for who they are, or how they become so, while the infirmity of mortals inquires, many and great controversies have been stirred up, in which philosophers have worn out their studies and leisure; to bring these forward and discuss them is both long and unnecessary. For if the reader remembers what we did in the eighth book in selecting the philosophers with whom this question concerning the blessed life, which is to be in the future after death, should be treated—whether we can attain to it by serving one true God, who is also the maker of the gods, or many gods with religion and sacrifices—he does not expect the same things to be repeated here, especially since he can assist his memory by rereading, if by chance he has forgotten. For we chose the Platonists as the most noble of all philosophers, because, just as they were able to understand that the immortal and rational or intellectual soul of man cannot be blessed except by participating in the light of that God by whom both it and the world were made; so they deny that anyone will attain that which all men desire, that is, the blessed life, who has not adhered with the purity of chaste love to that one best Being, who is the unchangeable God.

Sed quia ipsi quoque sive cedentes vanitati errorique populorum, sive, ut ait Apostolus, evanescentes in cogitationibus suis (Rom. I, 21), multos deos colendos ita putaverunt, vel putari voluerunt, ut quidam eorum etiam daemonibus divinos honores sacrorum et sacrificiorum deferendos esse censerent, quibus jam non parva ex parte respondimus: nunc videndum ac disserendum est, quantum Deus donat, immortales ac beati in coelestibus sedibus, dominationibus, principatibus, potestatibus constituti, quos isti deos, et ex quibus quosdam vel bonos daemones, vel nobiscum Angelos nominant, quomodo credendi sint velle a nobis religionem pietatemque servari; hoc est, ut apertius dicam, utrum etiam sibi, an tantum Deo suo, qui etiam noster est, placeat eis ut sacra faciamus et sacrificemus, vel aliqua nostra seu nos ipsos religionis ritibus consecremus.

2. Hic est enim divinitati vel, si expressius dicendum est, deitati debitus cultus, propter quem uno verbo significandum, quoniam mihi satis idoneum non occurrit latinum, graeco ubi necesse est insinuo quid velim dicere. Λατρείαν quippe nostri, ubicumque sanctarum Scripturarum positum est, interpretati sunt Servitutem. Sed ea servitus, quae debetur hominibus, secundum quam praecipit Apostolus, servos dominis suis subditos esse debere (Ephes. VI, 5), alio nomine graece nuncupari solet : λατρεία vero secundum consuetudinem qua locuti sunt qui nobis divina eloquia condiderunt, aut semper, aut tam frequenter ut pene semper, ea dicitur servitus quae pertinet ad colendum Deum. Proinde si tantummodo Cultus ipse dicatur, non soli Deo deberi videtur. Dicimur enim colere etiam homines, quos honorifica vel recordatione vel praesentia frequentamus. Nec solum ea quibus nos religiosa humilitate subjicimus, sed quaedam etiam quae subjecta sunt nobis, coli perhibentur. Nam ex hoc verbo et agricolae et coloni et incolae vocantur: et ipsos deos non ob aliud appellant coelicolas, nisi quod coelum colant; non utique venerando, sed inhabitando; tanquam coeli quosdam colonos: non sicut appellantur coloni, qui conditionem debent genitali solo propter agriculture sub dominio possessorum ; sed, sicut ait quidam latini eloquii magnus auctor, Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuere coloni. Ab incolendo enim colonos vocavit, non ab agricultura. Hinc et civitates a majoribus civitatibus velut populorum examinibus conditae, coloniae nuncupantur. Ac per hoc cultum quidem non deberi nisi Deo, propria quadam notione verbi hujus omnino verissimum est: sed quia et aliarum rerum dicitur cultus, ideo latine uno verbo significari cultus Deo debitus non potest.

But because they also, either yielding to the vanity and error of the peoples, or, as the Apostle says, 'becoming vain in their thoughts' (Rom. 1:21), thought that many gods should be worshipped, or wished it to be so thought, so that some of them even judged that divine honors of rites and sacrifices should be deferred to demons, to whom we have already responded in no small part: now we must see and discuss, as far as God grants, how the immortal and blessed beings constituted in celestial seats, dominions, principalities, powers—whom they call gods, and among whom they name some as good demons or, with us, as Angels—are to be believed to wish religion and piety to be observed by us; that is, to speak more clearly, whether it pleases them that we perform rites and sacrifice to them also, or only to their God, who is also ours, or whether we should consecrate some of our things or our very selves by religious rites.

2. For this is the worship due to divinity or, to speak more expressly, to deity; for the sake of signifying which by a single word, since no sufficiently suitable Latin one occurs to me, I explain by the Greek what I mean to say whenever it is necessary. For our writers, wherever it is placed in the holy Scriptures, have interpreted *latreia* as Service. But that service which is due to men, according to which the Apostle commands that servants should be subject to their masters (Eph. 6:5), is usually called by another name in Greek; but *latreia*, according to the custom with which those who composed the divine oracles for us spoke, is either always, or so frequently as to be almost always, called that service which pertains to the worship of God. Accordingly, if only "Worship" (*cultus*) itself is said, it does not seem to be due to God alone. For we are said to worship (*colere*) even men, whom we frequent with either honorable remembrance or presence. Nor is it only those things to which we subject ourselves with religious humility, but even certain things which are subjected to us, that are said to be worshipped. For from this word both farmers (*agricolae*) and tillers (*coloni*) and inhabitants (*incolae*) are named; and they call the gods themselves "heaven-dwellers" (*caelicolae*) for no other reason than that they inhabit (*colant*) heaven —not certainly by venerating it, but by inhabiting it, as if they were certain "tillers" (*coloni*) of heaven; not as those are called *coloni* who owe their condition to their native soil for the sake of agriculture under the dominion of owners; but as a certain great author of Latin eloquence says: "An ancient city there was, which Tyrian *coloni* held". For from inhabiting (*incolendo*) he called them *coloni*, not from agriculture. Hence also cities founded by older cities as if by swarms of people are called colonies (*coloniae*). And through this, while it is altogether most true that worship (*cultum*) indeed is not due except to God by a certain proper notion of this word, yet because the worship (*cultus*) of other things is also spoken of, the worship due to God cannot be signified in Latin by a single word.

3. Nam et ipsa Religio quamvis distinctius non quemlibet, sed Dei cultum significare videatur; unde isto nomine interpretati sunt nostri eam quae grece θρησκεία dicitur : tamen quia latina loquendi consuetudine, non imperitorum , verum etiam doctissimorum, et cognationibus humanis atque affinitatibus et quibusque necessitudinibus dicitur exhibenda religio; non eo vocabulo vitatur ambiguum, cum de cultu deitatis vertitur quaestio, ut fidenter dicere valeamus, religionem non esse nisi Dei cultum; quoniam videtur hoc verbum a significanda observantia propinquitatis humanae insolenter auferri.

Pietas quoque proprie Dei cultus intelligi solet, quam Graeci εὐσέβειαν vocant. Haec tamen et erga parentes officiose haberi dicitur. More autem vulgi hoc nomen etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur: quod ideo arbitror evenisse, quia haec fieri praecipue Deus mandat, eaque sibi vel pro sacrificiis, vel prae sacrificiis placere testatur. Ex qua loquendi consuetudine factum est, ut et Deus ipse dicatur pius (II Par. XXX, 9; Eccli. XI, 13; Judith. VII, 20): quem sane Graeci nullo suo sermonis usu εὐσεβεῖν vocant; quamvis εὐσέβειαν pro misericordia illorum etiam vulgus usurpet. Unde in quibusdam Scripturarum locis, ut distinctio certior appareret, non εὐσέβειαν, quod ex bono cultu, sed θεοσέβειαν, quod ex Dei cultu compositum resonat, dicere maluerunt . Utrumlibet autem horum nos uno verbo enuntiare non possumus. Quae itaque λατρεία graece nuncupatur, et latine interpretatur Servitus, sed ea qua colimus Deum: vel quae θρησκεία graece, latine autem Religio dicitur, sed ea quae nobis est erga Deum: vel quam illi θεοσέβειαν, nos vero non uno verbo exprimere, sed Dei cultum possumus appellare; hanc ei tantum Deo deberi dicimus, qui verus est Deus, facitque suos cultores deos (Psal. LXXXI, 6; Joan. X, 34, 35). Quicumque igitur sunt in coelestibus habitationibus immortales et beati, si nos non amant nec beatos esse nos volunt, colendi utique non sunt. Si autem amant et beatos volunt, profecto inde volunt, unde et ipsi sunt: an aliunde ipsi beati, aliunde nos?

Caput II.

De superna illuminatione quid Plotinus Platonicus senserit.

Sed non est nobis ullus cum his excellentioribus philosophis in hac quaestione conflictus. Viderunt enim, suisque litteris multis modis copiosissime mandaverunt, hinc illos, unde et nos, fieri beatos, objecto quodam lumine intelligibili, quod Deus est illis, et aliud est quam illi, a quo illustrantur, ut clareant, atque ejus participatione perfecti beatique subsistant.

3. For even Religion itself, although it may seem to signify more distinctly not just any worship, but the worship of God—whence our writers have interpreted by this name that which in Greek is called *thrēskeia*—yet because by Latin custom of speaking, not only of the unlearned but even of the most learned, religion is said to be shown towards human kinship and affinities and all kinds of necessities, the ambiguity is not avoided by that term when the question turns upon the worship of the deity, so that we might be able to say confidently that religion is nothing else than the worship of God; since this word seems to be taken away from signifying the observance of human relationship in an unusual manner.

Piety also is properly understood as the worship of God, which the Greeks call *eusebeia*. This, however, is also said to be shown towards parents. But by the custom of the common people, this name is also frequent in works of mercy; which I think has happened because God especially commands these to be done, and testifies that they please Him either instead of sacrifices or above sacrifices. From this custom of speaking it has come about that God Himself is called pious; whom certainly the Greeks call by no usage of their speech *eusebein*, although their common people also usurp *eusebeia* for mercy. Whence in certain places of the Scriptures, so that a more certain distinction might appear, they preferred to say not *eusebeia*, which resonates from "good worship," but *theosebeia*, which resonates from the "worship of God." However, we cannot express either of these in a single word. Therefore, that which is called *latreia* in Greek, and is interpreted in Latin as Service, but that by which we worship God; or that which is called *thrēskeia* in Greek, and in Latin is called Religion, but that which we have towards God; or that which they call *theosebeia*, but we cannot express in one word, but can call the Worship of God; this we say is due only to that God who is the true God, and who makes His worshippers gods (Ps. 81:6; John 10:34, 35). Whoever, therefore, are immortal and blessed in the celestial habitations, if they do not love us nor wish us to be blessed, are certainly not to be worshipped. But if they love us and wish us to be blessed, they surely wish it from that source whence they themselves are: or are they blessed from one source and we from another?

Chapter II.

What Plotinus the Platonist thought concerning the supernal illumination.

But we have no conflict with these more excellent philosophers in this question. For they saw, and have most copiously committed to their writings in many ways, that they become blessed from the same source as we—by the presentation of a certain intelligible light, which is God to them, and is something other than they, by which they are enlightened so that they may be bright, and by participation in which they exist as perfect and blessed beings.

Saepe multumque Plotinus asserit sensum Platonis explanans, ne illam quidem, quam credunt esse universitatis animam, aliunde beatum esse quam nostram: idque esse lumen quod ipsa non est, sed a quo creata est, et quo intelligibiliter illuminante intelligibiliter lucet. Dat etiam similitudinem ad illa incorporea de his coelestibus conspicuis amplisque corporibus, tanquam ille sit sol, et ipsa sit luna. Lunam quippe solis objectu illuminari putant. Dicit ergo ille magnus Platonicus, animam rationalem (sive potius intellectualis dicenda sit, ex quo genere etiam immortalium beatorumque animas esse intelligit, quos in coelestibus sedibus habitare non dubitat) non habere supra se naturam nisi Dei, qui fabricatus est mundum, a quo et ipsa facta est: nec aliunde illis supernis praeberi vitam beatam, et lumen intelligentiae veritatis, quam unde praebetur et nobis; consonans Evangelio, ubi legitur, Fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat Joannes: hic venit in testimonium, ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine, ut omnes crederent per eum. Non erat ille lumen, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Erat lumen verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. In qua differentia satis ostenditur, animam rationalem vel intellectualem, qualis erat in Joanne, sibi lumen esse non posse, sed alterius veri luminis participatione lucere. Hoc et ipse Joannes fatetur, ubi ei perhibens testimonium dicit: Nos omnes de plenitudine ejus accepimus (Joan. I, 6-9, 16).

Caput III.

De vero Dei cultu, a quo Platonici, quamvis creatorem universitatis intellexerint, deviarunt colendo angelos sive bonos sive malos honore divino.

1. Quae cum ita sint, si Platonici, vel quicumque alii ista senserunt, cognoscentes Deum, sicut Deum glorificarent, et gratias agerent, nec evanescerent in cogitationibus suis, nec populorum erroribus partim auctores fierent, partim resistere non auderent; profecto confiterentur, et illis immortalibus ac beatis, et nobis mortalibus ac miseris, ut immortales ac beati esse possimus, unum Deum deorum colendum, qui et noster est et illorum.

Jam igitur scienti diligere se ipsum, cum mandatur de proximo diligendo sicut se ipsum, quid aliud mandatur, nisi ut ei, quantum potest, commendet diligendum Deum ? 2. [IV.] Huic nos servitutem, quae λατρεία graece dicitur, sive in quibusque sacramentis, sive in nobis ipsis debemus. Hujus enim templum simul omnes, et singuli templa sumus (I Cor. III, 16, 17); quia et omnium concordiam, et singulos inhabitare dignatur: non in omnibus quam in singulis major; quoniam nec mole distenditur, nec partitione minuitur.

Often and much Plotinus asserts, explaining the sense of Plato, that not even that which they believe to be the soul of the universe is blessed from any other source than ours is; and that this is a light which it itself is not, but by which it was created, and by whose intelligible illumination it intelligibly shines. He even gives a similitude to those incorporeal things from these celestial, conspicuous, and large bodies, as if that were the sun and it were the moon. For they think that the moon is illuminated by the presentation of the sun. Therefore that great Platonist says that the rational soul (or rather it should be called intellectual, in which genus he also understands the souls of the immortal and blessed beings to be, who he does not doubt dwell in celestial seats) has no nature above it except that of God, who fabricated the world, by whom it also was made; nor is blessed life and the light of the intelligence of truth provided to those supernal beings from any other source than whence it is provided to us; agreeing with the Gospel, where it is read: "There was a man sent from God, whose name was John; this man came for a witness, to bear witness of the light, that all men through him might believe. He was not that light, but was sent to bear witness of that light. That was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into this world." In which difference it is sufficiently shown that the rational or intellectual soul, such as it was in John, cannot be a light to itself, but shines by participation in another true light. This John himself also confesses, where bearing witness to Him he says: "Of His fullness have we all received" (John 1:6-9, 16).

Chapter III.

Concerning the true worship of God, from which the Platonists, although they understood the creator of the universe, deviated by worshipping angels, whether good or evil, with divine honor.

Since these things are so, if the Platonists, or whoever else have thought these things, when they knew God, had glorified Him as God and given thanks, they would not have become vain in their thoughts, nor would they have partly become the authors of the errors of the peoples, and partly not dared to resist them; surely they would have confessed that both for those immortal and blessed beings and for us mortals and wretched ones, so that we may be able to be immortal and blessed, one God of gods is to be worshipped, who is both ours and theirs.

Now, therefore, to one who knows how to love himself, when he is commanded concerning loving his neighbor as himself, what else is commanded but that he should commend to him, as much as he can, the love of God? 2. To Him we owe that service which is called *latreia* in Greek, whether in certain sacraments or in ourselves. For we all together are His temple, and each of us are temples (1 Cor. 3:16, 17); because He deigns to inhabit both the concord of all and each individual. He is not greater in all than in individuals; since He is neither extended by mass nor diminished by partition.

Cum ad illum sursum est, ejus est altare cor nostrum: ejus Unigenito eum sacerdote placamus: ei cruentas victimas caedimus, quando usque ad sanguinem pro ejus veritate certamus: ei suavissimum adolemus incensum , cum in ejus conspectu pio sanctoque amore flagramus: ei dona ejus in nobis, nosque ipsos vovemus, et reddimus: ei beneficiorum ejus solemnitatibus festis et diebus statutis dicamus sacramusque memoriam, ne volumine temporum ingrata subrepat oblivio: ei sacrificamus hostiam humilitatis et laudis in ara cordis igne fervidae charitatis. Ad hunc videndum, sicut videri potest, eique cohaerendum, ab omni peccatorum et cupiditatum malarum labe mundamur, et ejus nomine consecratur. Ipse enim fons nostrae beatitudinis, ipse omnis appetitionis est finis. Hunc eligentes, vel potius religentes, amiseramus enim negligentes: hunc ergo religentes, unde et religio dicta perhibetur , ad eum dilectione tendimus, ut perveniendo quiescamus: ideo beati, quia illo fine perfecti. Bonum enim nostrum, de cujus fine inter philosophos magna contentio est, nullum est aliud, quam illi cohaerere: cujus unius anima intellectualis incorporeo, si dici potest, amplexu, veris impletur fecundaturque virtutibus. Hoc bonum diligere in toto corde, in tota anima, et in tota virtute praecipimur. Ad hoc bonum debemus, et a quibus diligimur duci, et quos diligimus ducere. Sic complentur duo illa praecepta, in quibus tota Lex pendet et Prophetae: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum in toto corde tuo, et in tota anima tua, et in tota mente tua; et, Diliges proximum tuum tanquam te ipsum (Matth. XXII, 37-40). Ut enim homo sese diligere nosset, constitutus est ei finis quo referret omnia quae ageret, ut beatus esset. Non enim qui se diligit, aliud esse vult quam beatus. Hic autem finis est adhaerere Deo (Psal. LXXII, 28). Hic est Dei cultus, haec vera religio, haec recta pietas, haec tantum Deo debita servitus. Quaecumque igitur immortalis potestas quantalibet virtute praedita, si nos diligit sicut se ipsam, ei vult esse subditos, ut beati simus, cui et ipsa subdita beata est . Si ergo non colit Deum, misera est, quia Deo privatur: si autem colit Deum, non vult se coli pro Deo. Illi enim potius divinae sententiae suffragatur, et dilectionis viribus favet, qua scriptum est: Sacrificans diis eradicabitur, nisi Domino soli (Exod. XXII, 20).

Caput IV.

Quod uni vero Deo sacrificium debeatur.

When our heart is lifted up to Him, it is His altar; we appease Him with His Only-begotten as priest; we slay bloody victims to Him when we fight for His truth even unto blood; we burn the sweetest incense to Him when we are on fire with pious and holy love in His sight; to Him we vow and return His gifts in us and our very selves; to Him we dedicate and consecrate the memory of His benefits on solemn feasts and appointed days, lest ungrateful oblivion should creep in through the lapse of time; to Him we sacrifice the victim of humility and praise on the altar of the heart with the fire of fervent charity. For the sake of seeing Him, as He can be seen, and adhering to Him, we are cleansed from every stain of sins and evil desires, and are consecrated in His name. For He Himself is the fountain of our beatitude, He is the end of every appetite. Choosing Him, or rather re-choosing Him—for we had lost Him through neglect—re-choosing Him, therefore, from which also Religion is said to be derived, we tend towards Him with love, so that by arriving we may find rest: therefore blessed, because perfected by that end. For our good, concerning whose end there is great contention among philosophers, is nothing other than to adhere to Him: by whose one incorporeal embrace, if it may be so said, the intellectual soul is filled and made fruitful with true virtues. We are commanded to love this good with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our strength. To this good we ought both to be led by those by whom we are loved, and to lead those whom we love. Thus are fulfilled those two precepts on which the whole Law and the Prophets depend: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind"; and, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 22:37-40). For that man might know how to love himself, an end was established for him to which he should refer all things that he did, so that he might be blessed. For he who loves himself wishes for nothing else than to be blessed. And this end is to adhere to God (Ps. 72:28). This is the worship of God, this is true religion, this is right piety, this is the service due only to God. Whatever immortal power, therefore, endowed with however much virtue, if it loves us as itself, it wishes us to be subject to Him, to whom it also being subject is blessed. If, therefore, it does not worship God, it is wretched because it is deprived of God; but if it worships God, it does not wish itself to be worshipped instead of God. For it rather supports that divine sentence and favors the powers of love by which it is written: "He that sacrificeth to gods shall be rooted out, save unto the Lord only" (Exod. 22:20).

Chapter IV.

That sacrifice is due to the one true God.

Nam, ut alia nunc taceam, quae pertinent ad religionis obsequium, quo colitur Deus; sacrificium certe nullus hominum est qui audeat dicere deberi, nisi Deo . Multa denique de cultu divino usurpata sunt, quae honoribus deferrentur humanis, sive humilitate nimia, sive adulatione pestifera; ita tamen ut quibus ea deferrentur, homines haberentur, qui dicuntur colendi et venerandi; si autem eis multum additur, et adorandi: quis vero sacrificandum censuit, nisi ei quem Deum aut scivit, aut putavit, aut finxit? Quam porro antiquus sit in sacrificando Dei cultus, duo illi fratres Cain et Abel satis indicant, quorum majoris Deus reprobavit sacrificium, minoris aspexit .

Caput V.

De sacrificiis quae Deus non requirit, sed ad significationem eorum observari voluit quae requirit.

Quis autem ita desipiat, ut existimet aliquibus usibus Dei esse necessaria quae in sacrificiis offeruntur? Quod cum multis locis divina Scriptura testetur, ne longum faciamus, breve illud de Psalmo commemorare suffecerit: Dixi Domino, Deus meus es tu; quoniam bonorum meorum mon eges (Psal. XV, 2). Non solum igitur pecore, vel qualibet alia re corruptibili atque terrena, sed ne ipsa quidem justitia hominis Deus egere credendus est, totumque quod recte colitur Deus, homini prodesse, non Deo. Neque enim fonti se quisquam dixerit profuisse , si biberit; aut luci, si viderit. Nec quod ab antiquis patribus talia sacrificia facta sunt in victimis pecorum, quae nunc Dei populus legit, non facit , aliud intelligendum est, nisi rebus illis eas res fuisse significatas, quae aguntur in nobis, ad hoc ut inhaereamus Deo, et ad eumdem finem proximo consulamus. Sacrificium ergo visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum, est. Unde ille poenitens apud prophetam, vel ipse propheta quaerens Deum peccatis suis habere propitium: Si voluisses, inquit, sacrificium, dedissem utique; holocaustis non delectaberis. Sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus; cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non spernet (Psal. L, 18, 19). Intueamur quemadmodum ubi Deum dixit nolle sacrificium, ibi Deum ostendit velle sacrificium. Non vult ergo sacrificium trucidati pecoris, sed vult sacrificium contriti cordis. Illo igitur quod eum nolle dicit, hoc significatur quod eum velle subjecit. Sic itaque illa Deum nolle dixit, quomodo ab stultis ea velle creditur, velut suae gratia voluptatis.

For, to be silent for now about other things that pertain to the service of religion by which God is worshipped, there is certainly no man who would dare to say that sacrifice is due except to God. Finally, many things were usurped from divine worship to be deferred to human honors, whether by excessive humility or by pestilential adulation; yet in such a way that those to whom they were deferred were held to be men, who are said to be worshipped and venerated; but if much is added to them, even to be adored: but who has thought that sacrifice should be offered except to him whom he either knew, or thought, or feigned to be God? Furthermore, how ancient the worship of God in sacrificing is, those two brothers Cain and Abel sufficiently indicate, of whom God rejected the sacrifice of the elder, and looked upon that of the younger.

Chapter V.

Concerning the sacrifices which God does not require, but wished to be observed for the sake of signifying those which He does require.

But who is so foolish as to think that the things which are offered in sacrifices are necessary for any uses of God? Since divine Scripture testifies this in many places, lest we make it long, it will suffice to commemorate that brief word from the Psalm: "I said to the Lord, Thou art my God; for Thou hast no need of my goods" (Ps. 16:2). Therefore God is to be believed to have no need not only of a beast, or any other corruptible and earthly thing, but not even of the justice of man; and that the whole of what God is rightly worshipped for profits man, not God. For neither would anyone say that he has profited a fountain if he drinks, or the light if he sees. Nor is it to be understood otherwise that such sacrifices were made by the ancient fathers in victims of cattle, which the people of God now read of but do not perform, than that by those things were signified those things which are done in us, to this end that we may adhere to God and consult for our neighbor for the same end. Therefore a visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is, a sacred sign, of an invisible sacrifice. Whence that penitent in the prophet, or the prophet himself seeking to have God propitious to his sins: "If Thou hadst desired sacrifice," he says, "I would indeed have given it; Thou wilt not be delighted with burnt offerings. A sacrifice to God is a troubled spirit; a contrite and humbled heart God will not despise" (Ps. 51:18, 19). Let us behold how, where he said that God does not wish sacrifice, there he showed that God does wish sacrifice. Therefore He does not wish the sacrifice of a slaughtered beast, but He wishes the sacrifice of a contrite heart. By that, therefore, which he says He does not wish, this is signified which he subjoined that He does wish. Thus, therefore, he said that God does not wish those things, in the way they are believed by fools to be wished by Him, as if for the sake of His own pleasure.

Nam si ea sacrificia quae vult, quorum hoc unum est, cor contritum et humiliatum dolore poenitendi, nollet eis sacrificiis significari, quae velut sibi delectabilia desiderare putatus est, non utique de his offerendis in Lege vetere praecepisset. Et ideo mutanda erant opportuno certoque jam tempore, ne ipsi Deo desiderabilia, vel certe in nobis acceptabilia, ac non potius quae his significata sunt, crederentur. Hinc et alio loco psalmi alterius: Si esuriero, inquit, non dicam tibi; meus est enim orbis terrae, et plenitudo ejus. Numquid manducabo carnes taurorum, aut sanguinem hircorum potabo (Psal. XLIX, 12 et 13)? tanquam diceret, Utique si mihi necessaria essent, non a te peterem, quae habeo in potestate. Deinde subjungens quid illa significent: Immola, inquit, Deo sacrificium laudis, et redde Altissimo vota tua. Et invoca me in die tribulationis, et eximam te, et glorificabis me (Ibid., 14, 15). Item apud alium prophetam: In quo, inquit, apprehendam Dominum, assumam Deum meum excelsum? Si apprehendam illum in holocaustis, in vitulis anniculis? si acceptaverit Dominus in millibus arietum, aut in denis millibus hircorum pinguium? si dedero primogenita mea pro impietate mea , fructum ventris mei pro peccato animae meae? si annuntiatum est tibi, homo, bonum, aut quid Dominus exquirat a te, nisi facere judicium , et diligere misericordiam, et paratum esse ire cum Domino Deo tuo (Michaeae VI, 6-8)? Et in hujus prophetae verbis utrumque distinctum est, satisque declaratum, illa sacrificia per se ipsa non requirere Deum, quibus significantur haec sacrificia quae requirit Deus. In Epistola quae inscribitur ad Hebraeos , Bene facere, inquit, et communicatores esse nolite oblivisci: talibus enim sacrificiis placetur Deo (Hebr. XIII, 16). Ac per hoc ubi scriptum est, Misericordiam volo quam sacrificium (Oseae VI, 6); nihil aliud quam sacrificio sacrificium praelatum oportet intelligi: quoniam illud quod ab omnibus appellatur sacrificium, signum est veri sacrificii. Porro autem misericordia verum sacrificium est: unde dictum est quod paulo ante commemoravi, Talibus enim sacrificiis placetur Deo. Quaecumque igitur in ministerio tabernaculi sive templi multis modis de sacrificiis leguntur divinitus esse praecepta, ad dilectionem Dei et proximi significandam referuntur. In his enim duobus praeceptis, ut scriptum est, tota Lex pendet et Prophetae (Matth. XXII, 40).

Caput VII.

Quod sanctorum Angelorum ea sit in nos dilectio, ut nos non suos, sed unius veri Dei velint esse cultores.

For if He did not wish those sacrifices which He does wish—of which this is one, a heart contrite and humbled by the grief of repenting—to be signified by those sacrifices which He was thought to desire as if they were delectable to Him, He would not indeed have commanded concerning the offering of these in the old Law. And therefore they were to be changed at a certain and opportune time, lest they should be believed to be desirable to God Himself, or at least acceptable in us, and not rather the things which were signified by them. Hence also in another place of another psalm: "If I shall be hungry," He says, "I will not tell thee; for the world is mine, and the fullness thereof. Shall I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?" (Ps. 50:12, 13); as if He were saying, "Surely if they were necessary to me, I would not ask them of thee, which I have in my power." Then subjoining what those signify: "Offer to God," He says, "the sacrifice of praise, and pay thy vows to the Most High. And call upon me in the day of tribulation, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me" (Ibid., 14, 15). Likewise in another prophet: "Wherewith," he says, "shall I lay hold of the Lord, and lay hold of my high God? Shall I lay hold of Him in burnt offerings, in calves of a year old? if the Lord shall be well pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of fat goats? if I shall give my first-born for my impiety, the fruit of my womb for the sin of my soul? if it has been announced to thee, O man, what is good, or what the Lord requires of thee, but to do judgment, and to love mercy, and to be prepared to go with the Lord thy God?" (Micah 6:6-8). And in the words of this prophet both are distinguished, and it is sufficiently declared that God does not require those sacrifices for their own sake, by which are signified these sacrifices which God does require. In the Epistle which is inscribed to the Hebrews, it says: "To do good and to be communicators forget not: for with such sacrifices God is well pleased" (Heb. 13:16). And through this, where it is written, "I will have mercy rather than sacrifice" (Hos. 6:6); nothing else ought to be understood than that sacrifice is preferred to sacrifice: since that which is called sacrifice by all is a sign of the true sacrifice. But furthermore mercy is the true sacrifice: whence it is said what I commemorated a little before, "For with such sacrifices God is well pleased." Whatever things, therefore, are read to have been divinely commanded in many ways concerning sacrifices in the ministry of the tabernacle or the temple, are referred to signifying the love of God and neighbor. "For on these two precepts," as it is written, "dependeth the whole Law and the Prophets" (Matt. 22:40).

Chapter VII.

That such is the love of the holy Angels toward us, that they wish us to be the worshippers not of themselves, but of the one true God.

Merito illi in coelestibus sedibus constituti, immortales et beati, qui Creatoris sui participatione congaudent, cujus aeternitate firmi, cujus veritate certi, cujus munere sancti sunt; quoniam nos mortales et miseros, ut immortales beatique simus, misericorditer diligunt, nolunt nos sibi sacrificare ; sed ei, cujus et ipsi nobiscum sacrificium se esse noverunt. Cum ipsis enim sumus una civitas Dei, cui dicitur in Psalmo, Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei (Psal. LXXXVI, 3): cujus pars in nobis peregrinatur, pars in illis opitulatur. De illa quippe superna civitate, ubi Dei voluntas intelligibilis atque incommutabilis lex est, de illa superna quodammodo curia (geritur namque ibi cura de nobis) ad nos ministrata per Angelos sancta illa Scriptura descendit , ubi legitur: Sacrificans diis eradicabitur, nisi Domino soli (Exod. XXII, 20). Huic Scripturae, huic legi, talibus praeceptis tanta sunt attestata miracula, ut satis appareat, cui nos sacrificare velint immoratales ac beati, qui hoc nobis volunt esse quod sibi.

Caput VIII.

De miraculis quae Deus ad corroborandam fidem piorum, etiam per Angelorum ministerium, promissis suis adhibere dignatus est.

Nam nimis vetera si commemorem, longius quam sat est revolvere videbor, quae miracula facta sint attestantia promissis Dei, quibus ante annorum millia praedixit Abrahae, quod in semine ejus omnes gentes benedictionem fuerant habiturae (Gen. XVIII, 18). Quis enim non miretur eidem Abrahae filium peperisse conjugem sterilem, eo tempore senectutis, quo parere nec fecunda jam posset (Id. XXI, 2); atque in ejusdem Abrahae sacrificio flammam coelitus factam inter divisas victimas cucurrisse (Id. XV, 17); eidemque Abrahae praedictum ab Angelis coeleste incendium Sodomorum, quos Angelos hominibus similes hospitio susceperat, et per eos de prole ventura Dei promissa tenuerat (Id. XVIII, 20, 14); ipsoque imminente jam incendio, miram de Sodomis per eosdem Angelos liberationem Lot filii fratris ejus; cujus uxor in via retro respiciens, atque in salem repente conversa (Id. XIX, 17, 26), magno admonuit sacramento, neminem in via liberationis suae praeterita desiderare debere?

Deservedly those constituted in celestial seats, immortal and blessed, who together rejoice in the participation of their Creator, by whose eternity they are firm, by whose truth they are certain, by whose gift they are holy; since they mercifully love us, mortal and miserable, that we may be immortal and blessed, they do not wish us to sacrifice to them, but to Him of whom they know that they themselves are a sacrifice with us. For with them we are one City of God, to which it is said in the Psalm, "Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God" (Ps. 87:3): a part of which is on pilgrimage in us, and a part assists in them. For from that supernal city, where the will of God is an intelligible and immutable law—from that supernal court, as it were (for care is taken there for us)—that holy Scripture, ministered to us through Angels, has descended, where it is read: "He that sacrificeth to gods shall be rooted out, save only to the Lord" (Exod. 22:20). To this Scripture, to this law, to such precepts, such great miracles have been attested, that it sufficiently appears to whom those immortal and blessed ones wish us to sacrifice, who wish us to be this which they are to themselves.

Chapter VIII.

Of the miracles which God, for the corroboration of the faith of the pious, even through the ministry of Angels, has deigned to apply to His promises.

For if I should commemorate things too ancient, I shall seem to revolve longer than is sufficient what miracles have been done attesting the promises of God, by which thousands of years ago He foretold to Abraham that in his seed all nations were to have a blessing (Gen. 18:18). For who would not wonder that a sterile wife bore a son to the same Abraham at that time of old age in which one even fruitful could no longer bear (Gen. 21:2); and that in the sacrifice of the same Abraham a flame from heaven ran between the divided victims (Gen. 15:17); and that the celestial burning of Sodom was foretold to the same Abraham by Angels, whom he had received as guests similar to men, and through whom he had held the promises of God concerning the offspring to come (Gen. 18:20, 14); and the burning itself now being imminent, the wonderful liberation from Sodom of Lot, his brother's son, through the same Angels; whose wife, looking back on the way, and suddenly turned into salt (Gen. 19:17, 26), admonished by a great sacrament that no one on the way of his liberation ought to desire past things?

Illa vero quae et quanta sunt, quae jam per Moysen pro populo Dei de jugo servitutis eruendo in Aegypto mirabiliter gesta sunt, ubi magi Pharaonis, hoc est regis Aegypti, qui populum illum dominatione deprimebat, ad hoc facere quaedam mira permissi sunt, ut mirabilius vincerentur? Illi enim faciebant veneficiis et incantationibus magicis, quibus sunt mali angeli, hoc est daemones, dediti: Moyses autem tanto potentius, quanto justius in nomine Domini, qui fecit coelum et terram, servientibus Angelis, eos facile superavit (Exod. VII-VIII, 7). Denique in tertia plaga deficientibus magis, decem plagae per Moysen magna mysteriorum dispositione completae sunt; quibus ad Dei populum dimittendum, Pharaonis et Aegyptiorum dura corda cesserunt (Id. VIII-XII). Moxque poenituit, et cum abscedentes Hebraeos consequi conarentur, illis diviso mari per siccum transeuntibus, unda hinc atque hinc in sese redeunte cooperti et oppressi sunt (Id. XIV). Quid de illis miraculis dicam, quae cum in deserto idem populus ductaretur, stupenda divinitate crebruerunt; aquas quae bibi non poterant, misso in eas, sicut Deus praeceperat, ligno, amaritudine caruisse, sitientesque satiasse (Id. XV, 23-25): manna esurientibus venisse de coelo; et cum esset colligentibus constituta mensura, quidquid amplius quisque collegerat, exortis vermibus putruisse; ante diem vero sabbati duplum collectum, quia sabbato colligere non licebat, nulla putredine violatum: desiderantibus carne vesci, quae tanto populo nulla sufficere posse videbatur, volatilibus castra completa, et cupiditatis ardorem fastidio satietatis exstinctum (Exod. XVI; Num. XI, 31-34): obvios hostes transitumque prohibentes atque praeliantes, orante Moyse, manibusque ejus in figuram crucis extentis, nullo Hebraeorum cadente prostratos (Exod. XVII, 8-16): seditiosos in populo Dei, ac sese ab ordinata divinitus societate dividentes, ad exemplum visibile invisibilis poenae, vivos terra dehiscente submersos (Num. XVI, 23-34): virga percussam petram tantae multitudini abundantia fluenta fudisse (Exod. XVII, 6, 7; Num. XX, 8-11): serpentum morsus mortiferos, poenam justissimam peccatorum, in ligno exaltato atque prospecto aeneo serpente sanatos, ut et populo subveniretur afflicto, et mors morte destructa, velut crucifixae mortis similitudine signaretur (Num. XXI, 6-9)? Quem sane serpentem propter facti memoriam reservatum, cum postea populus errans tanquam idolum colere coepisset, Ezechias rex religiosa potestate Deo serviens, cum magna pietatis laude contrivit (IV Reg. XVIII, 4).

Truly, what and how great are those things which were already wonderfully done through Moses for the people of God for eridicating them from the yoke of servitude in Egypt, where the magicians of Pharaoh, that is, of the king of Egypt, who was depressing that people with domination, were permitted to do certain wonderful things to this end, that they might be more wonderfully conquered? For they did them by venefices and magical incantations, to which the evil angels, that is, demons, are devoted: but Moses, as much more powerfully as more justly in the name of the Lord who made heaven and earth, with the Angels serving, easily surpassed them (Exod. 7-8). Finally, with the magicians failing in the third plague, ten plagues were completed through Moses by a great disposition of mysteries; by which the hard hearts of Pharaoh and the Egyptians yielded for dismissing the people of God (Exod. 8-12). And soon he repented, and when they tried to follow the departing Hebrews, with the sea divided for them passing through the dry land, they were covered and overwhelmed by the wave returning into itself from here and there (Exod. 14). What shall I say of those miracles which, when the same people were being led in the desert, increased by stupendous divinity; that the waters which could not be drunk, with wood cast into them as God had commanded, were freed from bitterness and satiated the thirsty (Exod. 15:23-25): that manna came from heaven for the hungry; and when a measure had been established for those collecting it, whatever more anyone had collected rotted with worms arising; but before the day of the sabbath a double amount was collected, because it was not lawful to collect on the sabbath, and it was violated by no rot: that for those desiring to eat flesh, which seemed to be able to suffice for no such great people, the camp was filled with winged creatures, and the ardor of cupidity was extinguished by the loathing of satiety (Exod. 16; Num. 11:31-34): that the enemies meeting them and prohibiting passage and fighting, with Moses praying and his hands extended in the figure of a cross, were prostrated with no one of the Hebrews falling (Exod. 17:8-16): that the seditious among the people of God, and those dividing themselves from the divinely ordained society, for a visible example of invisible punishment, were submerged alive by the earth opening (Num. 16:23-34): that the rock struck with a rod poured forth abundant streams for so great a multitude (Exod. 17:6, 7; Num. 20:8-11): that the deadly bites of serpents, a most just punishment for sins, were healed by the brazen serpent exalted on wood and looked upon, so that both the afflicted people might be succored, and death destroyed by death, it might be signaled as by the likeness of a crucified death (Num. 21:6-9)? Which serpent indeed, reserved for the memory of the fact, when afterwards the erring people had begun to worship it as if an idol, King Hezekiah, serving God with religious power, broke with great praise of piety (2 Kings 18:4).

Caput IX.

De illicitis artibus erga daemonum cultum, in quibus Porphyrius Platonicus, quaedam probando, quaedam quasi improbando, versatur.

1. Haec et alia multa hujuscemodi, quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, fiebant ad commendandum unius Dei veri cultum, et multorum falsorumque prohibendum. Fiebant autem simplici fide atque fiducia pietatis, non incantationibus et carminibus nefariae curiositatis arte compositis, quam vel magiam, vel detestabiliore nomine goetiam, vel honorabiliore theurgiam vocant qui quasi conantur ista discernere, et illicitis artibus deditos alios damnabiles, quos et maleficos vulgus appellat (hos enim ad goetiam pertinere dicunt); alios autem laudabiles videri volunt, quibus theurgiam deputant; cum sint utrique ritibus fallacibus daemonum obstricti sub nominibus angelorum .

2. Nam et Porphyrius quamdam quasi purgationem animae per theurgiam, cunctanter tamen et pudibunda quodammodo disputatione promittit; reversionem vero ad Deum hanc artem praestare cuiquam negat: ut videas eum inter vitium sacrilegae curiositatis et philosophiae professionem sententiis alternantibus fluctuare. Nunc enim hanc artem tanquam fallacem et in ipsa actione periculosam et legibus prohibitam, cavendam monet : nunc autem velut ejus laudatoribus cedens, utilem dicit esse mundandae parti animae, non quidem intellectuali, qua rerum intelligibilium percipitur veritas, nullas habentium similitudines corporum; sed spirituali, qua corporalium rerum capiuntur imagines . Hanc enim dicit per quasdam consecrationes theurgicas, quas teletas vocant, idoneam fieri atque aptam susceptioni spirituum et Angelorum, et ad videndos deos. Ex quibus tamen theurgicis teletis fatetur intellectuali animae nihil purgationis accedere, quod eam faciat idoneam ad videndum Deum suum, et perspicienda ea quae vere sunt . Ex quo intelligi potest, qualium deorum vel qualem visionem fieri dicat theurgicis consecrationibus, in qua non ea videntur quae vere sunt. Denique animam rationalem, sive quod magis amat dicere, intellectualem, in superna posse dicit evadere, etiamsi quod ejus spirituale est, nulla theurgica fuerit arte purgatum: porro autem a theurgo spiritualem purgari hactenus, ut non ex hoc ad immortalitatem aeternitatemque perveniat. Quanquam itaque discernat a daemonibus Angelos, aeria esse loca daemonum, aetheria vel empyrea disserens Angelorum, et admoneat utendum alicujus daemonis amicitia, quo subvectante vel paulum possit elevari a terra quisque post mortem, aliam vero viam esse perhibeat ad Angelorum superna consortia:

Chapter IX.

Of the illicit arts concerning the worship of demons, in which Porphyry the Platonist is occupied, by some things approving, by some as if disapproving.

1. These and many other things of this kind, all of which it is too long to commemorate, were done for commending the worship of the one true God, and for prohibiting that of many and false ones. But they were done by simple faith and confidence of piety, not by incantations and songs composed by the art of a nefarious curiosity, which they who try as it were to discern these things call either magic, or by a more detestable name goetia, or by a more honorable name theurgy; and they wish some to seem laudable who are devoted to illicit arts, whom the vulgar also call maleficent (for they say these belong to goetia); but others they wish to seem laudable, to whom they depute theurgy; since both are bound to the fallacious rites of demons under the names of angels.

2. For even Porphyry promises a certain as it were purgation of the soul through theurgy, yet hesitatingly and in a somewhat shamefaced disputation; but he denies that this art affords to anyone a return to God: so that you may see him fluctuate with alternating opinions between the vice of sacrilegious curiosity and the profession of philosophy. For now he warns that this art is to be avoided as fallacious and dangerous in its very action and prohibited by laws: but now, as if yielding to its praisers, he says it is useful for cleansing the part of the soul, not indeed the intellectual part, by which the truth of intelligible things is perceived, having no similitudes of bodies; but the spiritual part, by which the images of corporal things are captured. For he says that this part, through certain theurgic consecrations which they call teletae, becomes fit and apt for the reception of spirits and Angels, and for seeing gods. From which theurgic teletae he nevertheless confesses that no purgation approaches the intellectual soul which may make it fit for seeing its God and perceiving those things which truly are. From which it can be understood what kind of gods or what kind of vision he says is made by theurgic consecrations, in which those things are not seen which truly are. Finally, he says that the rational soul, or as he more loves to say, the intellectual soul, can escape into supernal things, even if that which is its spiritual part has been purged by no theurgic art: furthermore, however, the spiritual part is purged by a theurgist only so far that it does not from this arrive at immortality and eternity. Although therefore he distinguishes Angels from demons, discoursing that the aerial places are of demons, the ethereal or empyreal of Angels, and he admonishes that the friendship of some demon is to be used, by whose carrying up anyone can be elevated a little even from the earth after death, but he maintains that there is another way to the supernal consort of Angels:

cavendam tamen daemonum societatem expressa quodammodo confessione testatur, ubi dicit animam post mortem luendo poenas, cultum daemonum a quibus circumveniebatur horrescere; ipsamque theurgiam, quam velut conciliatricem Angelorum deorumque commendat, apud tales agere potestates negare non potuit, quae vel ipsae invideant purgationi animae, vel artibus serviant invidorum, querelam de hac re Chaldaei nescio cujus expromens: Conqueritur, inquit, vir in Chaldaea bonus, purgandae animae magno in molimine frustratos sibi esse successus, cum vir ad eadem potens tactus invidia adjuratas sacris precibus potentias alligasset, ne postulata concederent. Ergo et ligavit ille, inquit, et iste non solvit. Quo indicio dixit apparere theurgiam esse tam boni conficiendi quam mali et apud deos et apud homines disciplinam; pati etiam deos, et ad illas perturbationes passionesque deduci, quas communiter daemonibus et hominibus Apuleius attribuit, deos tamen ab eis aetheriae sedis altitudine separans, et Platonis asserens in illa discretione sententiam.

Caput X.

De theurgia, quae falsam purgationem animis daemonum invocatione promittit.

Ecce nunc alius Platonicus, quem doctiorem ferunt, Porphyrius, per nescio quam theurgicam disciplinam etiam ipsos deos obstrictos passionibus et perturbationibus dicit: quoniam sacris precibus adjurari terrerique potuerunt, ne praestarent animae purgationem, et ita terreri ab eo qui imperabat malum, ut ab illo qui poscebat bonum, per eamdem artem theurgicam solvi illo timore non possent, et ad dandum beneficium liberari . Quis non videat haec omnia fallacium daemonum esse commenta, nisi eorum miserrimus servus et a gratia veri liberatoris alienus? Nam si haec apud deos agerentur bonos, plus ibi utique valeret beneficus purgator animae, quam malevolus impeditor. Aut si diis justis homo, pro quo agebatur, purgatione videbatur indignus, non utique ab invido territi, nec, sicut ipse dicit, per metum valentioris numinis impediti, sed judicio libero id negare debuerunt. Mirum est autem, quod benignus ille Chaldaeus, qui theurgicis sacris animam purgare cupiebat, non invenit aliquem superiorem deum, qui vel plus terreret atque ad benefaciendum cogeret territos deos, vel ab eis terrentem compesceret, ut libere benefacerent: si tamen theurgo bono sacra defuerunt, quibus ipsos deos, quos invocabat animae purgatores, prius ab illa timoris peste purgaret. Quid enim causae est, cur deus potentior adhiberi possit a quo terreantur, nec possit a quo purgentur?

nevertheless he testifies that the society of demons is to be avoided by a somewhat express confession, where he says that the soul after death by paying penalties abhors the worship of demons by whom it was circumvented; and theurgy itself, which he commends as it were a conciliatrix of Angels and gods, he could not deny acts among such powers which either themselves envy the purgation of the soul, or serve the arts of the envious, bringing forth a complaint of I know not what Chaldean concerning this thing: "A good man in Chaldea," he says, "complains that in a great effort for purging the soul his successes were frustrated for him, when a man powerful for the same things, touched by envy, had bound the powers adjured by sacred prayers, lest they should concede the requests." Therefore "the one bound," he says, "and the other did not loose." By which indication he said it appears that theurgy is a discipline for effecting as well good as evil both among gods and among men; and that the gods also suffer and are deduced to those perturbations and passions which Apuleius attributed commonly to demons and men, yet separating the gods from them by the height of the ethereal seat, and asserting the opinion of Plato in that distinction.

Chapter X.

Of theurgy, which promises a false purgation to souls by the invocation of demons.

Behold now another Platonist, whom they report more learned, Porphyry, through I know not what theurgic discipline says that even the gods themselves are bound by passions and perturbations: since they could be adjured and terrified by sacred prayers, lest they should afford purgation to the soul, and so terrified by him who was commanding evil, that they could not be loosed from that fear by him who was asking for good through the same theurgic art, and be liberated for giving a benefit. Who would not see that all these things are the fictions of fallacious demons, unless he be their most miserable slave and alien from the grace of the true Liberator? For if these things were done among good gods, a beneficent purgator of the soul would surely avail more there than a malevolent impeder. Or if the man for whom it was being done seemed unworthy of purgation to just gods, they ought to have denied it by a free judgment, not indeed terrified by an envious one, nor, as he himself says, hindered by the fear of a more powerful deity. It is wonderful, however, that that benign Chaldean, who desired to purge the soul by theurgic rites, did not find some superior god who would either more terrify and compel the terrified gods to do good, or restrain the terrifying one from them, so that they might freely do good: if indeed sacred rites were lacking to the good theurgist by which he might first purge those gods themselves, whom he was invoking as purgators of the soul, from that plague of fear. For what cause is there why a more powerful god can be applied from whom they are terrified, and not one from whom they are purged?

An invenitur deus qui exaudiat invidum, et timorem diis incutiat ne benefaciant; nec invenitur Deus qui exaudiat benevolum, et timorem diis auferat ut benefaciant? O theurgia praeclara! o animae praedicanda purgatio! ubi plus imperat immunda invidentia, quam impetrat pura beneficentia: imo vero malignorum spirituum cavenda et detestanda fallacia, et salutaris audienda doctrina. Quod enim qui has sordidas purgationes sacrilegis ritibus operantur, quasdam mirabiliter pulchras, sicut iste commemorat, vel Angelorum imagines vel deorum, tanquam purgato spiritu vident (si tamen vel tale aliquid vident), illud est quod Apostolus dicit, quoniam satanas transfigurat se velut angelum lucis (II Cor. XI, 14). Ejus enim sunt illa phantasmata, qui miseras animas multorum falsorumque deorum fallacibus sacris cupiens irretire, et a vero veri Dei cultu, quo solo mundantur et sanantur, avertere, sicut de Proteo dictum est, Formas se vertit in omnes, (Virgil. Georg. lib. 4, vers. 411.) hostiliter insequens, fallaciter subveniens, utrobique nocens.

Caput XI.

De epistola Prophyrii ad Anebontem Aegyptium, in qua petit de diversitate daemonum se doceri.

1. Melius sapuit iste Porphyrius, cum ad Anebontem scripsit Aegyptium, ubi consulenti similis et quaerenti, et prodit artes sacrilegas et evertit. Et ibi quidem omnes daemones reprobat, quos dicit ob imprudentiam trahere humidum vaporem, et ideo non in aethere, sed in aere esse sub luna, atque in ipso lunae globo: verumtamen non audet omnes fallacias et malitias et ineptias, quibus merito movetur, omnibus daemonibus dare. Quosdam namque benignos daemones more appellat aliorum, cum omnes generaliter imprudentes esse fateatur. Miratur autem quod non solum dii alliciantur victimis, sed etiam compellantur atque cogantur facere quod homines volunt: et si corpore et incorporalitate dii a daemonibus distinguntur, quomodo deos esse existimandum sit solem et lunam, et visibilia caetera in coelo, quae corpora esse non dubitat; et si dii sunt, quomodo alii benefici, alii malefici esse dicantur; et quomodo incorporabilibus, cum sint corporei, conjungantur. Quaerit etiam veluti dubitans, utrum in divinantibus et quaedam mira facientibus animae sint potentiores , an aliqui spiritus extrinsecus veniant, per quos haec valeant.

Or is a god found who hears the envious and strikes fear into the gods lest they do good; and no God is found who hears the benevolent and takes away fear from the gods that they may do good? O illustrious theurgy! O purgation of the soul to be preached! where impure envy commands more than pure beneficence impetrates: nay rather, the fallacy of malignant spirits to be avoided and detested, and the salutary doctrine to be heard. For that they who operate these sordid purgations by sacrilegious rites see certain wonderfully beautiful images of either Angels or gods, as this one commemorates, as if with a purged spirit (if indeed they see even anything such), it is that which the Apostle says, that "Satan transforms himself as an angel of light" (2 Cor. 11:14). For those are the phantasms of him who, desiring to ensnare miserable souls by the fallacious rites of many and false gods, and to avert them from the true worship of the true God, by which alone they are cleansed and healed, as it has been said of Proteus, "Turns himself into all forms" (Virgil, Georgics, lib. 4, v. 411), pursuing hostilely, succoring fallaciously, hurting in both.

Chapter XI.

Of the letter of Porphyry to Anebo the Egyptian, in which he asks to be taught concerning the diversity of demons.

1. That Porphyry was better wise when he wrote to Anebo the Egyptian, where, similar to one consulting and asking, he both betrays the sacrilegious arts and subverts them. And there indeed he reproves all demons, whom he says because of imprudence draw a humid vapor, and therefore are not in the ether, but in the air under the moon, and in the very globe of the moon: nevertheless he does not dare to give to all demons all fallacies and malices and ineptitudes by which he is deservedly moved. For he calls some demons benign after the manner of others, although he confesses all generally to be imprudent. But he wonders that not only are gods enticed by victims, but even compelled and forced to do what men wish: and if gods are distinguished from demons by body and incorporeality, how the sun and moon and the other visible things in heaven are to be thought to be gods, which he does not doubt to be bodies; and if they are gods, how some are said to be beneficent, others malevolent; and how they are joined to incorporeal things, since they are corporeal. He asks also as if doubting whether in those divining and doing certain wonderful things the souls are more powerful, or whether some spirits come from without through whom these things avail.

Et potius venire extrinsecus conjicit, eo quod lapidibus et herbis adhibitis, et alligent quosdam, et aperiant clausa ostia, vel aliquid ejusmodi mirabiliter operentur. Unde dicit alios opinari esse quoddam genus, cui exaudire sit proprium, natura fallax, omniforme, multimodum, simulans deos et daemones et animas defunctorum; et hoc esse quod efficiat haec omnia quae videntur bona esse vel prava; caeterum circa ea quae vere bona sunt nihil opitulari, imo vero ista nec nosse, sed et male conciliare, et insimulare atque impedire nonnunquam virtutis sedulos sectatores, et plenum esse temeritatis et fastus, gaudere nidoribus, adulationibus capi, et caetera quae de hoc genere fallacium malignorumque spirituum, qui extrinsecus in animam veniunt, humanosque sensus sopitos vigilantesve deludunt, non tanquam sibi persuasa confirmat, sed tam tenuiter suspicatur aut dubitat, ut haec alios asserat opinari. Difficile quippe fuit tanto philosopho cunctam diabolicam societatem vel nosse, vel fidenter arguere, quam quaelibet anicula christiana nec nosse cunctatur , et liberrime detestatur. Nisi forte iste, et ipsum, ad quem scribit, Anebontem tanquam talium sacrorum praeclarissimum antistitem, et alios talium operum tanquam divinorum et ad deos colendos pertinentium admiratores verecundatur offendere.

2. Sequitur tamen, et ea velut inquirendo commemorat, quae sobrie considerata tribui non possunt nisi malignis et fallacibus potestatibus. Quaerit enim cur tanquam melioribus invocatis, quasi pejoribus imperetur, ut injusta hominis praecepta exsequantur: cur attrectatum re venerea non exaudiant imprecantem, cum ipsi ad incestos quosque concubitus quoslibet ducere non morentur: cur animantibus suos antistites oportere abstinere denuntient, ne vaporibus profecto corporeis polluantur, ipsi vero et aliis vaporibus illiciantur et nidoribus hostiarum; cumque a cadaveris contactu prohibeatur inspector, plerumque illa cadaveribus celebrentur: quid sit, quod non daemoni vel alicui animae defuncti, sed ipsi soli et lunae aut cuicumque coelestium, homo vitio cuilibet obnoxius intendit minas, eosque territat falso, ut eis extorqueat veritatem. Nam et coelum se collidere comminatur, et caetera similia homini impossibilia, ut illi dii tanquam insipientissimi pueri falsis et ridiculis comminationibus territi, quod imperatur efficiant. Dicit etiam scripsisse Chaeremonem quemdam, talium sacrorum vel potius sacrilegiorum peritum, ea quae apud Aegyptios sunt celebrata rumoribus, vel de Iside, vel de Osiride marito ejus, maximam vim habere cogendi deos, ut faciant imperata, quando ille qui carminibus cogit, ea se prodere vel evertere comminatur, ubi se etiam Osiridis membra dissipaturum terribiliter dicit, si facere jussa neglexerint.

And he rather conjectures that they come from without, from this that with stones and herbs applied, they both bind some and open closed doors, or wonderfully operate something of this kind. Whence he says others opine that there is a certain kind whose property it is to hear, fallacious by nature, omniform, multimodal, simulating gods and demons and the souls of the dead; and that this is what effects all these things which seem to be good or depraved; for the rest, that it assists in nothing concerning those things which are truly good, nay rather that it does not even know these things, but both counsels evil and sometimes insinuates itself and impedes the sedulous followers of virtue, and is full of temerity and fastidiousness, rejoices in smells, is captured by adulations, and other things which he does not confirm as if persuaded to himself concerning this kind of fallacious and malignant spirits who come into the soul from without and delude human senses, whether sleeping or waking, but suspects or doubts so tenuously that he asserts others opine these things. For it was difficult for so great a philosopher either to know or confidently to argue against the whole diabolical society, which any Christian old woman does not hesitate to know and most freely detests. Unless perhaps he is ashamed to offend both Anebo himself, to whom he writes as if to a most illustrious priest of such sacred rites, and others as admirers of such works as if divine and pertaining to the worship of the gods.

2. Nevertheless he follows, and commemorates as if inquiring those things which, soberly considered, cannot be attributed except to malignant and fallacious powers. For he asks why, as if better ones were invoked, they are commanded as if by worse ones, to execute the unjust precepts of a man: why they do not hear one praying who is touched by a venereal matter, when they themselves do not delay to lead any persons to any incestuous concubitus: why they announce that their priests ought to abstain from animal food, lest they be polluted by corporeal vapors, while they themselves are enticed both by other vapors and by the smells of victims; and while the inspector is prohibited from contact with a corpse, for the most part those things are celebrated with corpses: what it is that not to a demon or some soul of the dead, but to the sun itself and the moon or any of the celestial beings, a man obnoxious to any vice intends threats, and terrifies them falsely, so that he may extort the truth from them. For he also threatens that he will collide the heaven, and other similar things impossible to man, so that those gods, as if most foolish boys, terrified by false and ridiculous threats, may effect what is commanded. He says also that a certain Chaeremon wrote, a man skilled in such sacred rites or rather sacrileges, that those things which are celebrated among the Egyptians by rumors, whether concerning Isis or Osiris her husband, have the greatest power of compelling the gods to do what is commanded, when he who compels by charms threatens to betray or subvert them, where he even says terribly that he will dissipate the members of Osiris if they neglect to do the commands.

Haec atque hujusmodi vana et insana hominem diis minari, nec quibuslibet, sed ipsis coelestibus et siderea luce fulgentibus, nec sine effectu, sed violenta potestate cogentem, atque his terroribus ad facienda quae voluerit perducentem, merito Porphyrius admiratur: imo vero sub specie mirantis et causas rerum talium requirentis, dat intelligi illos haec agere spiritus, quorum genus superius sub aliorum opinatione descripsit, non, ut ipse posuit, natura, sed vitio fallaces, qui simulant deos et animas defunctorum, daemones autem non, ut ait ipse, simulant, sed plane sunt. Et quod ei videtur herbis et lapidibus et animantibus et sonis certis quibusdam ac vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis, quibusdam etiam observatis in coeli conversione motibus siderum, fabricari in terra ab hominibus potestates idoneas variis effectibus exsequendis; totum hoc ad eosdem ipsos daemones pertinet ludificatores animarum sibimet subditarum, et voluptuaria sibi ludibria de hominum erroribus exhibentes. Aut ergo revera dubitans et inquirens ista Porphyrius, ea tamen commemorat, quibus convincantur et redarguantur, nec ad eas potestates quae nobis ad beatam vitam capessendam favent, sed ad deceptores daemones pertinere monstrentur: aut, ut meliora de philosopho suspicemur, eo modo voluit hominem Aegyptium talibus erroribus deditum, et aliqua magna se scire opinantem, non superba quasi auctoritate doctoris offendere, nec aperte adversantis altercatione turbare, sed quasi quaerentis et discere cupientis humilitate ad ea cogitanda convertere, et quam sint contemnenda vel etiam devitanda monstrare. Denique prope ad epistolae finem petit se ab eo doceri, quae sit ad beatitudinem via ex Aegyptia sapientia. Caeterum illos quibus conversatio cum diis ad hoc esset, ut ob inveniendum fugitivum vel praedium comparandum, vel propter nuptias vel mercaturam vel quid hujusmodi, mentem divinam inquietarent, frustra eos videri dicit coluisse sapientiam. Illa etiam ipsa numina cum quibus conversarentur, etsi de caeteris rebus vera praedicerent, quoniam tamen de beatitudine nihil cautum nec satis idoneum monerent, nec deos illos esse, nec benignos daemones, sed aut illum qui dicitur fallax, aut humanum omne commentum.

Caput XII.

De miraculis quae per sanctorum Angelorum ministerium Deus verus operatur.

Porphyry deservedly wonders at these and such like vain and insane things, that a man threatens gods, and not just any, but those celestial beings and those shining with starry light, and not without effect, but compelling with violent power, and leading them by these terrors to do what he wished: nay rather, under the appearance of wondering and requiring the causes of such things, he gives it to be understood that those spirits act these things, whose kind he described above under the opinion of others, fallacious not, as he himself put it, by nature, but by vice, who simulate gods and the souls of the dead, but demons they do not, as he himself says, simulate, but clearly are. And what seems to him to be fabricated on earth by men, by herbs and stones and animals and certain fixed sounds and voices, and figurations and figments, with certain motions of the stars observed in the conversion of the heaven, powers suitable for following out various effects; all this belongs to those same demons, mockers of the souls subject to them, and exhibiting to themselves voluptuous mockeries from the errors of men. Either therefore Porphyry, truly doubting and inquiring these things, nevertheless commemorates those things by which they may be convinced and redargued, and shown not to belong to those powers which favor us for attaining the blessed life, but to the deceiver demons: or, that we may suspect better things of the philosopher, he wished in that way not to offend the Egyptian man devoted to such errors and opining that he knew some great things, by the proud authority as of a teacher, nor to disturb him by the altercation of one openly opposing, but as if by the humility of one seeking and desiring to learn, to turn him to thinking upon these things, and to show how much they are to be contemned or even avoided. Finally, near the end of the letter, he asks to be taught by him what is the way to beatitude from Egyptian wisdom. For the rest, those to whom conversation with the gods was for this purpose, that for the sake of finding a fugitive or purchasing a farm, or on account of marriages or trade or something of this kind, they might disquiet the divine mind, he says they seem to have cultivated wisdom in vain. Those very deities also with whom they conversed, even if they predicted true things concerning other matters, since nevertheless they warned nothing certain nor sufficiently suitable concerning beatitude, were neither those gods nor benign demons, but either that one who is called fallacious, or altogether a human fiction.

Chapter XII.

Of the miracles which the true God works through the ministry of the holy Angels.

Verum quia tanta et talia geruntur his artibus, ut universum modum humanae facultatis excedant: quid restat, nisi ut ea quae mirifice tanquam divinitus praedici vel fieri videntur, nec tamen ad unius Dei cultum referuntur, cui simpliciter inhaerere, fatentibus quoque Platonicis et permulta testantibus, solum beatificum bonum est, malignorum daemonum ludibria et seductoria impedimenta, quae vera pietate cavenda sunt, prudenter intelligantur?

Porro autem quaecumque miracula, sive per Angelos, sive quocumque modo ita divinitus fiunt, ut Dei unius, in quo solo beata vita est, cultum religionemque commendent, ea vere ab eis vel per eos, qui nos secundum veritatem pietatemque diligunt, fieri, ipso Deo in illis operante, credendum est. Neque enim audiendi sunt qui Deum invisibilem visibilia miracula operari negant; cum ipse etiam secundum ipsos fecerit mundum, quem certe visibilem negare non possunt. Quidquid igitur mirabile fit in hoc mundo, profecto minus est quam totus hic mundus, id est coelum et terra et omnia quae in eis sunt, quae certe Deus fecit. Sicut autem ipse qui fecit, ita modus quo fecit occultus est et incomprehensibilis homini. Quamvis itaque miracula visibilium naturarum videndi assiduitate viluerint; tamen cum ea sapienter intuemur, inusitatissimis rarissimisque majora sunt. Nam et omni miraculo quod fit per hominem, majus miraculum est homo. Quapropter Deus qui fecit visibilia coelum et terram, non dedignatur facere visibilia miracula in coelo vel in terra, quibus ad se invisibilem colendum excitet animam adhuc visibilibus deditam: ubi vero et quando faciat, incommutabile consilium penes ipsum est, in cujus dispositione jam tempora facta sunt quaecumque futura sunt. Nam temporalia movens, temporaliter non movetur; nec aliter novit facienda, quam facta; nec aliter invocantes exaudit, quam invocaturos videt. Nam et cum exaudiunt Angeli ejus, ipse in eis exaudit, tanquam in vero, nec manufacto templo suo, sicut in hominibus sanctis suis; ejusque temporaliter fiunt jussa, aeterna ejus lege conspecta.

Caput XIII.

De invisibili Deo, qui se visibilem saepe praestiterit, non secundum quod est, sed secundum quod poterant ferre cernentes.

But because such and so great things are done by these arts that they exceed the whole measure of human faculty: what remains but that those things which seem to be wonderfully predicted or done as if divinely, and yet are not referred to the worship of the one God, to whom to cohere simply (as even the Platonists confess and testify in many things) is the only beatific good, should be prudently understood as the mockeries of malignant demons and seductive impediments, which are to be avoided by true piety?

Furthermore, whatever miracles, whether through Angels or in whatever way, are so done divinely that they commend the worship and religion of the one God, in whom alone is the blessed life, it is to be believed that those are truly done by those or through those who love us according to truth and piety, God Himself operating in them. For neither are they to be heard who deny that the invisible God works visible miracles; since He Himself, even according to them, made the world, which certainly they cannot deny to be visible. Whatever wonder, therefore, happens in this world, is certainly less than this whole world, that is, heaven and earth and all things that are in them, which certainly God made. But as He Himself who made it is hidden and incomprehensible to man, so is the mode in which He made it. Therefore, although the miracles of visible natures have become common by the assiduity of seeing them; nevertheless, when we wisely behold them, they are greater than the most unusual and rarest things. For man is a greater miracle than any miracle which is done by man. Wherefore God, who made the visible heaven and earth, does not disdain to work visible miracles in heaven or on earth, by which He may excite the soul, still devoted to visible things, to the worship of Himself the invisible: but where and when He may do so, the unchangeable counsel is with Him, in whose disposition those times which are future are already made. For moving temporal things, He is not moved temporally; nor does He know things to be done otherwise than as things done; nor does He hear those invoking otherwise than as He sees those who will invoke. For even when His Angels hear, He Himself hears in them, as if in His true temple not made with hands, just as in His holy men; and His commands are done temporally, having been beheld in His eternal law.

Chapter XIII.

Of the invisible God, who often showed Himself visible, not according to what He is, but according to what those seeing could bear.

Nec movere debet, quod cum sit invisibilis, saepe visibiliter Patribus apparuisse memoratur. Sicut enim sonus quo auditur sententia in silentio intelligentiae constituta, non est hoc quod ipsa; ita et species qua visus est Deus in natura invisibili constitutus, non erat quod ipse. Verumtamen ipse in eadem specie corporali videbatur, sicut illa sententia ipsa in sono vocis auditur: nec illi ignorabant, invisibilem Deum in specie corporali, quod ipse non erat, se videre. Nam et loquebatur cum loquente Moyses, et ei tamen dicebat, Si inveni gratiam ante te, ostende mihi temetipsum, scienter ut videam te (Exod. XXXIII, 13). Cum igitur oporteret Dei legem in edictis Angelorum terribiliter dari, non uni homini paucisve sapientibus, sed universae genti et populo ingenti, coram eodem populo magna facta sunt in monte, ubi lex per unum dabatur, conspiciente multitudine metuenda ac tremenda quae fiebant. Non enim populus Israel sic Moysi credidit, quemadmodum suo Lycurgo Lacedaemonii, quod a Jove seu Apolline leges, quas condidit, accepisset. Cum enim lex dabatur populo, qua coli unus jubebatur Deus, in conspectu ipsius populi, quantum sufficere divina providentia judicabat, mirabilibus rerum signis ac motibus apparebat, ad eamdem legem dandam Creatori servire creaturam.

Caput XIV.

De uno Deo colendo, non solum propter aeterna, sed etiam propter temporalia beneficia, quia universa in ipsius providentiae potestate consistunt.

Sicut autem unius hominis, ita humani generis, quod ad Dei populum pertinet, recta eruditio per quosdam articulos temporum tanquam aetatum profecit accessibus, ut a temporalibus ad aeterna capienda et a visibilibus ad invisibilia surgeretur; ita sane ut etiam illo tempore quo visibilia promittebantur divinitus praemia, unus tamen colendus commendaretur Deus, ne mens humana vel pro ipsis terrenis vitae transitoriae beneficiis cuiquam nisi vero animae Creatori ac Domino subderetur. Omnia quippe quae praestare hominibus vel Angeli vel homines possunt, in unius esse Omnipotentis potestate quisquis diffitetur, insanit. De providentia certe Plotinus Platonicus disputat, eamque a summo Deo, cujus est intelligibilis atque ineffabilis pulchritudo, usque ad haec terrena et ima pertingere, flosculorum atque foliorum pulchritudine comprobat: quae omnia quasi adjecta et velocissime pereuntia decentissimos formarum suarum numeros habere non posse confirmat, nisi inde formentur, ubi forma intelligibilis et incommutabilis simul habens omnia perseverat (Enneadis 3 lib. 2, cap. 13).

Nor ought it to move [us] that, since He is invisible, He is mentioned to have often appeared visibly to the Fathers. For as the sound by which the sentence established in the silence of the intelligence is heard is not that which the sentence itself is; so also the species in which God was seen, being established in an invisible nature, was not what He Himself was. Nevertheless He Himself was seen in the same corporal species, just as that sentence itself is heard in the sound of the voice: nor were they ignorant that they saw the invisible God in a corporal species which He Himself was not. For Moses also spoke with the one speaking, and yet he said to Him: "If I have found grace before thee, show me thyself, that I may knowingly see thee" (Exod. XXXIII, 13). Since therefore it behooved that the law of God should be given terribly in the edicts of Angels, not to one man or to a few wise men, but to a whole nation and a vast people, great things were done before the same people on the mountain where the law was given through one, while the multitude beheld the fearful and tremendous things that were being done. For the people of Israel did not believe Moses in the same way as the Lacedaemonians believed their Lycurgus, that he had received from Jove or Apollo the laws which he founded. For when the law was given to the people, by which one God was commanded to be worshipped, in the sight of the same people, as much as divine providence judged sufficient, He appeared by wonderful signs and motions of things, the creature serving the Creator for the giving of the same law.

Chapter XIV.

Of worshipping the one God, not only on account of eternal, but also on account of temporal benefits, because all things consist in the power of His providence.

But as the right education of one man, so of the human race, which pertains to the people of God, has progressed through certain articles of times as by the accesses of ages, so that there was a rise from temporal things to the grasping of eternal things, and from visible things to invisible things; so indeed that even at that time when visible rewards were divinely promised, nevertheless the one God was commended to be worshipped, lest the human mind, even for those very earthly benefits of this transitory life, should be subject to any but the true Creator and Lord of the soul. For whoever denies that all things which either Angels or men can provide for men are in the power of the one Almighty, is insane. Concerning providence certainly Plotinus the Platonist disputes, and proves that it reaches from the highest God, whose is the intelligible and ineffable beauty, even unto these earthly and lowest things, by the beauty of little flowers and leaves: all which things, being as it were added and most swiftly perishing, he confirms could not have the most becoming numbers of their forms, unless they were formed from thence where the intelligible and unchangeable form, having all things at once, perseveres (Enneads 3 lib. 2, cap. 13).

Hoc Dominus Jesus ibi ostendit, ubi ait: Considerate lilia agri, non laborant, neque nent. Dico autem vobis, quia nec Salomon in tanta gloria sua sic amictus est sicut unum ex eis. Quod si fenum agri, quod hodie est et cras in clibanum mittitur, Deus sic vestit; quanto magis vos, modicae fidei (Matth. VI, 28-30)? Optime igitur anima humana adhuc terrenis desideriis infirma, ea ipsa quae temporaliter exoptat bona infima atque terrena vitae huic transitoriae necessaria, et prae illius vitae sempiternis beneficiis contemnenda, non tamen nisi ab uno Deo exspectare consuescit, ut ab illius cultu etiam in istorum desiderio non recedat, ad quem contemptu eorum et ab eis aversione perveniat.

Caput XV.

De ministerio sanctorum Angelorum, quo providentiae Dei serviunt.

Sic itaque divinae providentiae placuit ordidare temporum cursum, ut quemadmodum dixi, et in Actibus Apostolorum legitur, lex in edictis Angelorum daretur de unius veri Dei cultu (Act. VII, 53). In quibus et persona ipsius Dei, non quidem per suam substantiam, quae semper corruptibilibus oculis invisibilis permanet, sed certis indiciis per subjectam Creatori creaturam visibiliter appareret. Et syllabatim per transitorias temporum morulas humanae linguae vocibus loqueretur, qui in sua natura non corporaliter, sed spiritualiter; non sensibiliter, sed intelligibiliter; non temporaliter, sed, ut ita dicam aeternaliter, nec incipit loqui, nec desinit: quod apud illum sincerius audiunt, non corporis aure, sed mentis, ministri ejus et nuntii, qui ejus veritate incommutabili perfruuntur immortaliter beati; et quod faciendum modis ineffabilibus audiunt, et usque in ista visibilia atque sensibilia perducendum, incunctanter atque indifficulter efficiunt. Haec autem lex distributione temporum data est, quae prius haberet, ut dictum est, promissa terrena, quibus tamen significarentur aeterna, quae visibilibus sacramentis celebrarent multi, intelligerent pauci. Unius tamen Dei cultus apertissima illic et vocum et rerum omnium contestatione praecipitur, non unius de turba, sed qui fecit coelum et terram, et omnem animam, et omnem spiritum qui non est quod ipse. Ille enim fecit, haec facta sunt: atque ut sint et bene se habeant, ejus indigent a quo facta sunt.

CAPUT XVI.---An de promerenda beata vita his angelis sit credendum, qui se coli exigunt honore divino; an vero illis, qui non sibi, sed uni Deo sancta praecipiunt religione serviri.

This the Lord Jesus showed there where He says: "Consider the lilies of the field, they labor not, neither do they spin. But I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. But if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven; how much more you, O ye of little faith?" (Matth. VI, 28-30). Most excellently, therefore, the human soul, still weak with earthly desires, is accustomed to expect those very things which it desires temporally, the lowest and earthly goods necessary for this transitory life, and to be contemned in comparison with the sempiternal benefits of that life, nevertheless only from the one God, so that even in the desire of those things it may not depart from His worship, to whom it may arrive by the contempt of them and by aversion from them.

Chapter XV.

Of the ministry of the holy Angels, by which they serve the providence of God.

Thus therefore it pleased divine providence to ordain the course of times, that, as I have said, and as is read in the Acts of the Apostles, the law was given in the edicts of Angels concerning the worship of the one true God (Acts VII, 53). In which even the person of God Himself appeared visibly, not indeed by His own substance, which always remains invisible to corruptible eyes, but by certain signs through the creature subject to the Creator. And He spoke by the voices of the human tongue, syllable by syllable through transitory intervals of times, who in His own nature speaks not corporally, but spiritually; not sensibly, but intelligibly; not temporally, but, as I may say, eternally, neither beginning to speak nor ceasing: which His ministers and messengers, who immortally blessed enjoy His unchangeable truth, hear more sincerely with Him, not with the ear of the body, but of the mind; and what they hear to be done in ineffable ways, and to be brought even unto these visible and sensible things, they effect without hesitation and without difficulty. But this law was given by the distribution of times, which first should have, as has been said, earthly promises, by which nevertheless eternal things were signified, which many should celebrate in visible sacraments, but few should understand. Nevertheless the worship of the one God is prescribed there by the most open attestation both of voices and of all things, not of one of the crowd, but of Him who made heaven and earth, and every soul, and every spirit which is not what He Himself is. For He made, these were made: and that they may be and may be well, they have need of Him by whom they were made.

CHAPTER XVI.---Whether those angels are to be believed concerning the attainment of the blessed life who demand that they themselves be worshipped with divine honor; or those rather who command that holy religion be served not to themselves, but to the one God.

1. Quibus igitur Angelis de beata et sempiterna vita credendum esse censemus? utrum eis qui se religionis ritibus coli volunt, sibi sacra et sacrificia flagitantes a mortalibus exhiberi; an eis qui hunc omnem cultum uni Deo creatori omnium deberi dicunt, eique reddendum vera pietate praecipiunt, cujus et ipsi contemplatione beati sunt, et nos futuros esse promittunt? Illa namque visio Dei tantae pulchritudinis visio est, et tanto amore dignissima, ut sine hac quibuslibet aliis bonis praeditum atque abundantem, non dubitet Plotinus infelicissimum dicere (Enneadis 1 lib. 6, cap. 7). Cum ergo ad hunc unum quidam Angeli, quidam vero ad se ipsos latria colendos signis mirabilibus excitent; et hoc ita ut illi istos coli prohibeant, isti autem illum prohibere non audeant; quibus potius sit credendum, respondeant Platonici, respondeant quicumque philosophi, respondeant theurgi, vel potius periurgi: hoc enim sunt illae omnes artes vocabulo digniores. Postremo respondeant homines, si ullus naturae suae sensus, quo rationales creati sunt, ex aliqua parte vivit in eis: respondeant, inquam, eisne sacrificandum sit diis vel angelis qui sibi sacrificari jubent, an illi uni, cui jubent hi qui et sibi et istis prohibent? Si nec illi nec isti ulla miracula facerent, sed tantum praeciperent, alii quidem ut sibi sacrificaretur, alii vero id vetarent, sed uni tantum juberent Deo; satis deberet pietas ipsa discernere quid horum de fastu superbiae, quid de vera religione descenderet. Plus etiam dicam: si tantum hi mirabilibus factis humanas permoverent mentes, qui sacrificia sibi expetunt, illi autem qui hoc prohibent, et uni tantum Deo sacrificari jubent, nequaquam ista visibilia miracula facere dignarentur; profecto non sensu corporis, sed ratione mentis praeponenda eorum esset auctoritas: cum vero Deus id egerit ad commendanda eloquia veritatis suae, ut per istos immortales nuntios, non sui fastum, sed majestatem illius praedicantes, faceret majora, certiora, clariora miracula, ne infirmis piis illi qui sacrificia sibi expetunt, falsam religionem facilius persuaderent, eo quod sensibus eorum quaedam stupenda monstrarent; quem tandem ita desipere libeat, ut non vera eligat quae sectetur, ubi et ampliora invenit quae miretur?

2. Illa quippe miracula deorum gentilium, quae commendat historia, non ea dico quae intervallis temporum occultis ipsius mundi causis, verumtamen sub divina providentia constitutis et ordinatis monstrosa contingunt; quales sunt inusitati partus animalium, et coelo terraque rerum insolita facies, sive tantum terrens, sive etiam nocens, quae procurari atque mitigari daemoniacis ritibus fallacissima eorum astutia perhibentur:

1. Which Angels therefore do we think are to be believed concerning the blessed and sempiternal life? Whether those who wish to be worshipped with the rites of religion, demanding that sacred things and sacrifices be exhibited to them by mortals; or those who say that all this worship is due to the one God, the creator of all, and command that it be rendered to Him with true piety, in whose contemplation they themselves are blessed, and promise that we shall be so? For that vision of God is a vision of such great beauty, and most worthy of such great love, that Plotinus does not hesitate to call him most unhappy who, though provided with and abounding in any other goods whatever, is without this (Enneads 1 lib. 6, cap. 7). Since therefore some Angels excite us by wonderful signs to the worship of this one, but some to the worship of themselves by latria; and this in such a way that the former prohibit the latter from being worshipped, but the latter do not dare to prohibit Him; to which rather belief is to be given, let the Platonists answer, let any philosophers whatever answer, let the theurgists answer, or rather the periurgists: for all those arts are more worthy of this name. Finally, let men answer, if any sense of their own nature, by which they were created rational, lives in them in any part: answer, I say, whether sacrifice is to be made to gods or angels who command sacrifice to be made to themselves, or to that one to whom those command it who prohibit it both to themselves and to these? If neither the former nor the latter did any miracles, but only commanded, the ones indeed that sacrifice be made to themselves, the others truly forbade it but commanded it only to the one God; piety itself ought sufficiently to discern which of these descended from the pride of arrogance, which from true religion. I will say even more: if only those who seek sacrifices for themselves moved human minds by wonderful deeds, while those who prohibit this and command sacrifice to be made only to the one God did not at all deign to work these visible miracles; certainly their authority ought to be preferred not by the sense of the body, but by the reason of the mind: but since God has so acted for the commending of the elocutions of His truth, that through these immortal messengers, preaching not their own pride but His majesty, He should work greater, surer, clearer miracles, lest to the weak pious those who seek sacrifices for themselves should more easily persuade a false religion, from this that they showed certain stupendous monsters to their senses; whom at length would it please to be so foolish as not to choose the true things which he may follow, where he also finds more ample things which he may wonder at?

2. For those miracles of the gods of the gentiles which history commends—I do not mean those monstrous things which happen at intervals of times from the hidden causes of the world itself, yet established and ordained under divine providence; such as are the unusual births of animals, and unusual appearances of things in heaven and earth, whether only terrifying or also harmful, which are said to be procured and mitigated by demonic rites by their most fallacious craftiness:

sed ea dico, quae vi ac potestate eorum fieri satis evidenter apparet, ut est quod effigies deorum Penatium quas de Troja Aeneas fugiens advexit, de loco in loco migrasse referuntur; quod cotem Tarquinius novacula secuit; quod Epidaurius serpens Aesculapio naviganti Romam comes adhaesit; quod navim qua simulacrum matris Phrygiae vehebatur, tantis hominum boumque conatibus immobilem redditam, una muliercula zona alligatam, ad suae pudicitiae testimonium movit et traxit; quod virgo Vestalis, de cujus corruptione quaestio vertebatur, aqua impleto cribro de Tiberi, neque perfluente, abstulit controversiam. Haec ergo atque alia hujusmodi nequaquam illis quae in populo Dei facta legimus, virtute ac magnitudine conferenda sunt: quanto minus ea quae illorum quoque populorum, qui tales deos coluerunt, legibus judicata sunt prohibenda atque plectenda, magica scilicet vel theurgica? quorum pleraque specie tenus mortalium sensus imaginaria ludificatione decipiunt, quale est lunam deponere, donec suppositas, ut ait Lucanus, propior despumet in herbas (Phars. l. 6, vers. 503) quaedam vero etsi nonnullis piorum factis videantur opere coaequari, finis ipse quo discernuntur, incomparabiliter haec nostra ostendit excellere. Illis enim multi tanto minus sacrificiis colendi sunt, quanto magis haec expetunt: his vero unus commendatur Deus, qui se nullis talibus indigere, et Scripturarum suarum testificatione, et eorumdem postea sacrificiorum remotione demonstrat. Si ergo angeli sibi expetunt sacrificium, praeponendi eis sunt illi qui non sibi, sed Deo creatori omnium, cui serviunt. Hinc enim ostendunt quam sincero amore nos diligunt, quando per sacrificium non sibi, sed ei nos subdere volunt, cujus et ipsi contemplatione beati sunt, et ad eum nos pervenire, a quo ipsi non recesserunt. Si autem angeli qui non uni, sed plurimis sacrificia fieri volunt, non sibi, sed eis diis volunt, quorum deorum angeli sunt; etiam sic eis praeponendi sunt illi qui unius Dei deorum Angeli sunt, cui sacrificari sic jubent, ut alicui alteri vetent; cum eorum nullus huic vetet, cui uni isti sacrificari jubent. Porro si, quod magis indicat eorum superba fallacia, nec boni, nec bonorum deorum angeli sunt, sed daemones mali, qui non unum solum ac summum Deum, sed se ipsos sacrificiis coli volunt; quod majus quam unius Dei contra eos eligendum est praesidium, cui serviunt Angeli boni, qui non sibi, sed illi jubent ut sacrificio serviamus, cujus nos ipsi sacrificium esse debemus?

but I mean those which appear evidently enough to be done by their force and power, such as that the effigies of the household gods (Penates) which Aeneas fleeing from Troy brought with him are reported to have migrated from place to place; that Tarquinius cut a whetstone with a razor; that the Epidaurian serpent adhered as a companion to Aesculapius sailing to Rome; that a ship in which the image of the Phrygian mother was carried, being rendered immobile by so great efforts of men and oxen, one little woman, having bound it with her girdle, moved and drew it for a testimony of her chastity; that a Vestal virgin, concerning whose corruption a question was being turned, having filled a sieve with water from the Tiber, and it not flowing through, took away the controversy. These therefore and other things of this kind are by no means to be compared in virtue and magnitude to those which we read were done among the people of God: how much less those which were judged by the laws of those very peoples who worshipped such gods to be prohibited and punished, namely magical or theurgic things? Most of which deceive the senses of mortals as far as appearance goes by an imaginary mockery, such as it is to bring down the moon, "until," as Lucan says, "being nearer, it foams upon the herbs placed under it" (Phars. l. 6, v. 503); but some things, even if they seem to be equalled in work to some deeds of the pious, the end itself by which they are discerned shows ours incomparably to excel. For to the former, many are so much the less to be worshipped with sacrifices as they the more seek these: but to the latter, the one God is commended, who demonstrates that He needs no such things, both by the testifying of His Scriptures and by the subsequent removal of those same sacrifices. If therefore angels seek sacrifice for themselves, those are to be preferred to them who seek it not for themselves, but for God the creator of all, whom they serve. For hence they show with how sincere a love they love us, when through sacrifice they wish to subject us not to themselves, but to Him in whose contemplation they themselves are blessed, and that we should arrive at Him from whom they themselves have not departed. But if the angels who wish sacrifices to be made not to one, but to very many, wish them not for themselves, but for those gods of whom they are angels; even so those are to be preferred to them who are the Angels of the one God of gods, to whom they so command sacrifice to be made that they forbid it to any other; since none of those forbids it to Him, to whom alone these command it to be made. Furthermore if, as their proud fallacy more indicates, they are neither good nor the angels of good gods, but evil demons, who wish not the one only and highest God, but themselves to be worshipped with sacrifices; what greater protection is to be chosen against them than that of the one God, whom the good Angels serve, who command us to serve with sacrifice not themselves, but Him, whose sacrifice we ourselves ought to be?

Caput XVII.

De arca Testamenti miraculisque signorum, quae ad commendandam Legis ac promissionis auctoritatem divinitus facta sunt.

Proinde lex Dei, quae in edictis data est Angelorum, in qua unus Deus deorum religione sacrorum jussus est coli, alii vero quilibet prohibiti, in Arca erat posita, quae Arca testimonii nuncupata est. Quo nomine satis significatur, non Deum, qui per illa omnia colebatur, circumcludi solere vel contineri loco, cum responsa ejus et quaedam humanis sensibus darentur signa ex illius Arcae loco, sed voluntatis ejus hinc testimonia perhiberi. Quod etiam ipsa lex erat in tabulis conscripta lapideis, et in Arca, ut dixi, posita; quam tempore peregrinationis in eremo, cum Tabernaculo quod similiter appellatum est Tabernaculum testimonii, cum debita sacerdotes veneratione portabant: signumque erat, quod per diem nubes apparebat, quae sicut ignis nocte fulgebat (Exod. XIII, 21) quae nubes cum moveretur, castra movebantur; et ubi staret, castra ponebantur (Id. XL, 34, 35). Reddita sunt autem illi legi magni miraculi testimonia, praeter ista quae dixi, et praeter voces quae ex illius Arcae loco edebantur. Nam cum terram promissionis intrantibus eadem Arca transiret Jordanem, fluvius ex parte superiore subsistens, et ex inferiore decurrens, et ipsi et populo siccum praebuit transeundi locum (Josue III, 16, 17). Deinde civitatis, quae prima hostilis occurrit, more Gentium deos plurimos colens, septies eadem Arca circumacta, muri repente ceciderunt, nulla manu oppugnati, nullo ariete percussi (Id. VI, 20). Post haec etiam cum jam in terra promissionis essent, et eadem Arca propter eorum peccata fuisset ab hostibus capta, hi qui eam ceperant, in templo Dei sui, quem prae caeteris colebant, honorifice collocarunt, abeuntesque clauserunt, apertoque postridie, simulacrum cui supplicabant, invenerunt collapsum deformiterque confractum. Deinde ipsi prodigiis acti, deformiusque puniti, Arcam divini testimonii populo, unde ceperant, reddiderunt. Ipsa autem redditio qualis fuit? Imposuerunt eam plaustro, eique juvencas, a quibus vitulos sugentes abstraxerant, subjunxerunt, et eas quo vellent ire siverunt, etiam hinc vim divinam explorare cupientes. At illae sine homine duce atque rectore, ad Hebraeos viam pertinaciter gradientes, nec revocatae mugitibus esurientium filiorum, magnum sacramentum suis cultoribus reportarunt (I Reg. IV-VI). Haec atque hujusmodi Deo parva sunt, sed magna terrendis salubriter erudiendisque mortalibus.

Chapter XVII.

Of the Ark of the Testament and the miracles of signs which were divinely done for commending the authority of the Law and the promise.

Accordingly, the law of God, which was given in the edicts of Angels, in which the one God of gods was commanded to be worshipped with the religion of sacred things, and any others whatever were prohibited, was placed in the Ark, which was called the Ark of the Testimony. By which name it is sufficiently signified that God, who was worshipped through all those things, was not accustomed to be enclosed or contained in a place, since His responses and certain signs were given to human senses from the place of that Ark, but the testimonies of His will were exhibited from hence. Because also the law itself was written on stone tables, and placed in the Ark, as I have said; which in the time of the pilgrimage in the desert, with the Tabernacle which was similarly called the Tabernacle of the Testimony, the priests carried with due veneration: and there was a sign, that by day a cloud appeared, which shone like fire by night (Exod. XIII, 21), which cloud when it was moved, the camps were moved; and where it stood, the camps were placed (Id. XL, 34, 35). But testimonies of a great miracle were rendered to that law, besides those which I have said, and besides the voices which were uttered from the place of that Ark. For when the same Ark crossed the Jordan as they were entering the land of promise, the river stopping from the upper part, and flowing away from the lower part, provided a dry place for the crossing both to it and to the people (Joshua III, 16, 17). Then of the city which first occurred as hostile, worshipping very many gods after the manner of the Gentiles, the same Ark having been carried around seven times, the walls suddenly fell, attacked by no hand, struck by no ram (Id. VI, 20). After these things also when they were already in the land of promise, and the same Ark had been captured by enemies on account of their sins, those who had taken it placed it honorably in the temple of their god, whom they worshipped above the rest, and departing they closed it, and having opened it the next day, they found the image to which they supplicated collapsed and deformedly broken. Then they themselves being driven by prodigies, and more deformedly punished, restored the Ark of the divine testimony to the people from whom they had taken it. But what kind of restoration was that? They placed it on a cart, and joined to it young cows from whom they had taken away their sucking calves, and let them go where they would, desiring even from hence to explore the divine power. But they, without a human leader and director, pertinaciously walking the way to the Hebrews, and not recalled by the lowing of their hungry offspring, brought back a great sacrament to their worshippers (I Sam. IV-VI). These and such like are small to God, but great for salubriously terrifying and educating mortals.

Si enim philosophi, praecipueque Platonici, rectius caeteris sapuisse laudantur, sicut paulo ante commemoravi, quod devinam providentiam haec quoque rerum infirma atque terrena administrare docuerunt, numerosarum testimonio pulchritudinum, quae non solum in corporibus animalium, verum in herbis etiam fenoque gignuntur: quanto evidentius haec attestantur divinitati, quae ad horam praedicationis ejus fiunt, ubi ea religio commendatur quae omnibus coelestibus, terrestribus, infernis sacrificari vetat, uni Deo tantum jubens, qui solus diligens et dilectus beatos facit, eorumque sacrificiorum tempora imperata praefiniens, eaque per meliorem sacerdotem in melius mutanda praedicens, non ista se appetere, sed per haec alia potiora significare testatur; non ut ipse his honoribus sublimetur, sed ut nos ad eum colendum, eique cohaerendum igne amoris ejus accensi, quod nobis, non illi, bonum est, excitemur.

Caput XVIII.

Contra eos qui de miraculis, quibus Dei populus eruditus est, negant ecclesiasticis Libris esse credendum.

An dicet aliquis ista falsa esse miracula, nec fuisse facta, sed mendaciter scripta? Quisquis hoc dicit, si de his rebus negat omnino ullis litteris esse credendum, potest etiam dicere nec deos ullos curare mortalia. Non enim se aliter colendos esse persuaserunt, nisi mirabilium operum effectibus, quorum et historia gentium testis est, quarum dii se ostentare mirabiles potius quam utiles ostendere potuerunt. Unde hoc opere nostro, cujus hunc jam decimum librum habemus in manibus, non eos suscepimus refellendos, qui vel ullam esse vim divinam negant, vel humana non curare contendunt; sed eos qui nostro Deo conditori sanctae et gloriosissimae civitatis deos suos praeferunt, nescientes eum ipsum esse etiam mundi hujus visibilis et mutabilis invisibilem et incommutabilem conditorem, et vitae beatae non de his quae condidit, sed de se ipso verissimum largitorem. Ejus enim propheta veracissimus ait, Mihi autem adhaerere Deo, bonum est (Psal. LXXII, 28). De fine namque boni inter philosophos quaeritur, ad quod adipiscendum omnia officia referenda sunt. Nec dixit iste, Mihi autem divitiis abundare, bonum est; aut insigniri purpura et sceptro, vel diademate excellere; aut, quod nonnulli etiam philosophorum dicere non erubuerunt, Mihi voluptas corporis bonum est; aut, quod melius velut meliores dicere visi sunt, Mihi virtus animi mei bonum est: sed, Mihi, inquit, adhaerere Deo, bonum est. Hoc eum docuerat, cui uni tantummodo sacrificandum sancti quoque Angeli ejus miraculorum etiam contestatione monuerunt.

For if the philosophers, and especially the Platonists, are praised for having been wiser than the rest, as I commemorated a little before, because they taught that divine providence administers even these weak and earthly things, by the testimony of the numerous beauties which are produced not only in the bodies of animals, but even in herbs and grass: how much more evidently do these things attest to divinity, which happen at the hour of His preaching, where that religion is commended which forbids sacrifice to all celestial, terrestrial, and infernal beings, commanding it to the one God only, who alone, being loved and loving, makes men blessed, and predefining the commanded times of those sacrifices, and predicting that they were to be changed for the better through a better priest, He testifies that He does not seek those things, but signifies other better things through them; not that He Himself may be sublimated by these honors, but that we may be excited to worship Him, and to cohere to Him, being kindled by the fire of His love, which is good for us, not for Him.

Chapter XVIII.

Against those who deny that belief is to be given to the ecclesiastical Books concerning the miracles by which the people of God was educated.

Will some one say that those are false miracles, and were not done, but mendaciously written? Whoever says this, if he denies that belief is to be given to any letters at all concerning these things, can also say that no gods care for mortal things. For they have not persuaded themselves to be worshipped otherwise than by the effects of wonderful works, of which also the history of the gentiles is a witness, whose gods were able to show themselves wonderful rather than to show themselves useful. Whence in this work of ours, of which we have now this tenth book in our hands, we have not undertaken to refel those who either deny that there is any divine power, or contend that it does not care for human things; but those who prefer their own gods to our God, the founder of the holy and most glorious city, being ignorant that He Himself is also the invisible and unchangeable founder of this visible and mutable world, and the most true bestower of the blessed life, not from those things which He founded, but from Himself. For His most true prophet says: "But it is good for me to cohere to God" (Psal. LXXII, 28). For concerning the end of good it is sought among philosophers, to the attainment of which all duties are to be referred. Nor did that man say: "But it is good for me to abound in riches"; or to be distinguished by purple and sceptre, or to excel by a diadem; or, what some even of the philosophers did not blush to say: "Bodily pleasure is my good"; or, what those who seemed better said more excellently: "The virtue of my mind is my good": but, "It is good for me," he says, "to cohere to God." This He had taught him, to whom alone sacrifice was to be made, as His holy Angels also warned even by the attestation of miracles.

Unde et ipse sacrificium ejus factus erat, cujus igne intelligibili correptus ardebat, et in ejus ineffabilem incorporeumque complexum sancto desiderio ferebatur. Porro autem si multorum deorum cultores (qualescumque deos suos esse arbitrentur) ab eis facta esse miracula, vel civilium rerum historiae, vel libris magicis, sive; quod honestius putant, theurgicis credunt; quid causae est, cur illis Litteris nolint credere, ista facta esse, quibus tanto major debetur fides, quanto super omnes est magnus, cui uni soli sacrificandum esse praecipiunt?

Caput XIX.

Quae ratio sit visibilis sacrificii, quod uni vero et invisibili Deo offerri docet vera religio.

Qui autem putant haec visibilia sacrificia diis aliis congruere, illi vero tanquam invisibili invisibilia, et majora majori, meliorique meliora, qualia sunt purae mentis et bonae voluntatis officia; profecto nesciunt, haec ita esse signa illorum, sicut verba sonantia signa sunt rerum. Quocirca, sicut orantes atque laudantes ad eum dirigimus significantes voces, cui res ipsas in corde quas significamus offerimus: ita sacrificantes non alteri visibile sacrificium offerendum esse noverimus, quam illi cujus in cordibus nostris invisibile sacrificium nos ipsi esse debemus. Tunc nobis favent, nobisque congaudent, atque ad hoc ipsum nos pro suis viribus adjuvant Angeli quique Virtutesque superiores et ipsa bonitate ac pietate potentiores. Si autem illis haec exhibere voluerimus, non libenter accipiunt, et cum ad homines ita mittuntur, ut eorum praesentia sentiatur, apertissime vetant. Sunt exempla in Litteris sanctis. Putaverunt quidam deferendum Angelis honorem, vel adorando, vel sacrificando, qui debetur Deo, et eorum sunt admonitione prohibiti, jussique hoc ei deferre, cui uni fas esse noverunt (Judic. XIII, 16; Apoc. XXII, 8, 9) Imitati sunt Angelos sanctos etiam sancti homines Dei. Nam Paulus et Barnabas in Lycaonia facto quodam miraculo sanitatis putati sunt dii, eisque Lycaonii immolare victimas voluerunt; quod a se humili pietate removentes, eis in quem crederent annuntiaverunt Deum (Act. XIV). Nec ob aliud fallaces illi superbe sibi hoc exigunt, nisi quia vero Deo deberi sciunt. Non enim revera, ut ait Porphyrius et nonnulli putant, cadaverinis nidoribus, sed divinis honoribus gaudent. Copiam vero nidorum magnam habent undique, et si amplius vellent, ipsi sibi poterant exhibere.

Whence even he himself had been made His sacrifice, by whose intelligible fire he was seized and burned, and was borne by holy desire into His ineffable and incorporeal embrace. Furthermore, if the worshippers of many gods (whatever they may judge their gods to be) believe that miracles have been done by them, either in the history of civil affairs, or in magical books, or (which they think more honorable) theurgic ones; what cause is there why they should not wish to believe those things have been done in those Letters to which so much greater faith is due, as He is great above all, to whom alone they prescribe sacrifice to be made?

Chapter XIX.

What is the rationale of visible sacrifice, which true religion teaches is to be offered to the one true and invisible God.

But those who think that these visible sacrifices are suitable to other gods, but to Him as invisible, invisible ones, and greater to the greater, and better to the better, such as are the duties of a pure mind and a good will; certainly they are ignorant that these are so signs of those, as sounding words are signs of things. Wherefore, as when praying and praising we direct signifying voices to Him, to whom we offer the things themselves in the heart which we signify: so when sacrificing we should know that a visible sacrifice is to be offered to no other than Him whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves ought to be in our hearts. Then all the Angels and superior Virtues, and those more powerful by goodness and piety itself, favor us and rejoice with us, and assist us unto this very thing according to their powers. But if we should wish to exhibit these things to them, they do not willingly receive them, and when they are so sent to men that their presence is felt, they most openly forbid it. There are examples in the holy Letters. Some thought that honor was to be deferred to Angels, either by adoring or by sacrificing, which is due to God, and they were prohibited by their admonition, and commanded to defer this to Him, to whom alone they knew it was lawful (Judges XIII, 16; Rev. XXII, 8, 9). Even holy men of God have imitated the holy Angels. For Paul and Barnabas in Lycaonia, a certain miracle of healing having been done, were thought to be gods, and the Lycaonians wished to immolate victims to them; which removing from themselves by humble piety, they announced to them the God in whom they should believe (Acts XIV). Nor for any other reason do those fallacious ones proudly demand this for themselves, except because they know it is due to the true God. For they do not truly, as Porphyry says and some think, rejoice in the smells of corpses, but in divine honors. For they have a great abundance of smells everywhere, and if they wished for more, they could exhibit them to themselves.

Qui ergo divinitatem sibi arrogant spiritus, non cujuslibet corporis fumo, sed supplicantis animo delectantur, cui decepto subjectoque dominentur, intercludentes iter ad Deum verum, ne sit homo illius sacrificium, dum sacrificatur cuipiam praeter illum.

Caput XX.

De summo veroque sacrificio, quod ipse Dei et hominum Mediator effectus est.

Unde verus ille Mediator, in quantum formam servi accipiens mediator effectus est Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus, cum in forma Dei sacrificium cum Patre sumat, cum quo et unus Deus est, tamen in forma servi sacrificium maluit esse quam sumere, ne vel hac occasione quisquam existimaret cuilibet sacrificandum esse creaturae. Per hoc et sacerdos est, ipse offerens, ipse et oblatio. Cujus rei sacramentum quotidianum esse voluit Ecclesiae sacrificium: quae cum ipsius capitis corpus sit, se ipsam per ipsum discit offerre. Hujus veri sacrificii multiplicia variaque signa erant sacrificia prisca sanctorum, cum hoc unum per multa figuraretur, tanquam verbis multis res una diceretur, ut sine fastidio multum commendaretur. Huic summo veroque sacrificio cuncta sacrificia falsa cesserunt.

Caput XXI.

De modo potestatis daemonibus datae ad glorificandos sanctos per tolerantiam passionum, qui aerios spiritus non placando ipsos, sed in Deo permanendo vicerunt.

Moderatis autem praefinitisque temporibus, etiam potestas permissa daemonibus, ut hominibus quos possident excitatis, inimicitias adversus Dei civitatem tyrannice exerceant, sibique sacrificia non solum ab offerentibus sumant, et a volentibus expetant, verum etiam ab invitis persequendo violenter extorqueant, non solum perniciosa non est, sed etiam utilis invenitur Ecclesiae, ut martyrum numerus impleatur (Avoc. VI, 11): quos civitas Dei tanto clariores et honoratiores cives habet, quanto fortius adversus impietatis peccatum etiam usque ad sanguinem certant. Hos multo elegantius, si ecclesiastica loquendi consuetudo pateretur, nostros Heroas vocaremus. Hoc enim nomen a Junone dicitur tractum, quod graece Juno Hera appellatur; et ideo nescio quis filius ejus secundum Graecorum fabulas, Heros fuerit nuncupatus: hoc videlicet veluti mysticum significante fabula, quod aer Junoni deputetur, ubi volunt cum daemonibus heroas habitare, quo nomine appellant alicujus meriti animas defunctorum.

Those spirits therefore who arrogate divinity to themselves, are delighted not by the smoke of any body whatever, but by the mind of the supplicant, whom they may dominate as deceived and subjected, intercluding the way to the true God, lest man should be His sacrifice while he is sacrificed to any one besides Him.

Chapter XX.

Of the supreme and true sacrifice, which the Mediator of God and men himself was made.

Whence that true Mediator, in as much as taking the form of a servant (formam servi) he was made the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, although in the form of God (forma Dei) he receives sacrifice with the Father, with whom he is also one God, yet in the form of a servant he chose rather to be a sacrifice than to receive it, lest even by this occasion anyone should think that sacrifice ought to be offered to any creature whatever. By this he is both the priest, himself offering, and himself the oblation. Of which thing he willed the daily sacrifice of the Church to be the sacrament: which, since it is the body of that same Head, learns to offer itself through him. Of this true sacrifice the manifold and various signs were the ancient sacrifices of the saints, since this one thing was figured through many, as if one thing were said by many words, so that it might be commended much without distaste. To this supreme and true sacrifice all false sacrifices have given way.

Chapter XXI.

Of the mode of power given to demons for glorifying the saints through the tolerance of passions, who overcame the aerial spirits not by appeasing them, but by remaining in God.

Moreover, at moderate and predefined times, power is also permitted to demons, so that, having excited the men whom they possess, they may tyrannically exercise enmities against the City of God (civitas Dei), and take sacrifices for themselves not only from those who offer them and expect them from those who are willing, but even violently extort them from the unwilling by persecuting them; it is found not only not to be pernicious, but even useful to the Church, so that the number of martyrs (martyrum) may be fulfilled: whom the City of God holds as citizens all the more illustrious and honored, the more strongly they fight even unto blood against the sin of impiety. These, if the ecclesiastical custom of speaking permitted, we would call our Heroes much more elegantly. For this name is said to be drawn from Juno, because in Greek Juno is called Hera (Ἥρα); and therefore I know not what son of hers, according to the fables of the Greeks, was named a Hero: this fable signifying as it were something mystical, because the air is assigned to Juno, where they will have the heroes to dwell with the demons, by which name they call the souls of the deceased of some merit.

Sed a contrario martyres nostri heroes nuncuparentur, si, ut dixi, usus ecclesiastici sermonis admitteret; non quod eis esset cum daemonibus in aere societas, sed quod eosdem daemones, id est, aerias vincerent potestates; et in eis ipsam, quidquid putatur significare, Junonem, quae non usquequaque inconvenienter a poetis inducitur inimica virtutibus, et coelum petentibus viris fortibus invida. Sed rursus ei succumbit infeliciter ceditque Virgilius, ut cum apud eum illa dicat, Vincor ab Aenea! ipsum Aenean admoneat Helenus quasi consilio religioso, et dicat, Junoni cane vota libens, dominamque potentem Supplicibus supera donis. Ex qua opinione Porphyrius, quamvis non ex sua sententia, sed ex aliorum, bonum dicit deum vel genium non venire in hominem, nisi malus fuerit ante placatus: tanquam fortiora sint apud eos numina mala quam bona; quandoquidem mala impediunt adjutoria bonorum, nisi eis placata dent lecum, malisque nolentibus bona prodesse non possunt; nocere autem mala possunt, non sibi valentibus resistere bonis. Non est ista verae veraciterque sanctae religionis via: non sic Junonem, hoc est aerias potestates piorum virtutibus invidentes, nostri martyres vincunt. Non omnino, si dici usitate posset, heroes nostri supplicibus donis, sed virtutibus divinis Heram superant. Commodius quippe Scipio Africanus est cognominatus, quod virtute Africam vicerit, quam si hostes donis placasset, ut parcerent.

Caput XXII.

Unde sit sanctis adversum daemones potestas, et unde cordis vera purgatio.

Vera pietate homines Dei aeriam potestatem inimicam contrariamque pietati exorcizando ejiciunt, non placando; omnesque tentationes adversitatis ejus vincunt orando, non ipsam, sed suum Deum adversus ipsam. Non enim aliquem vincit, aut subjugat, nisi societate peccati. In ejus ergo nomine vincitur, qui hominem assumpsit, egitque sine peccato, ut in ipso sacerdote ac sacrificio fieret remissio peccatorum, id est per Mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Christum Jesum, per quem facta peccatorum purgatione reconciliamur Deo. Non enim nisi peccatis homines separantur a Deo, quorum in hac vita non fit nostra virtute, sed divina miseratione purgatio; per indulgentiam illius, non per nostram potentiam. Quia et ipsa quantulacumque virtus, quae dicitur nostra, illius est nobis bonitate concessa. Multum autem nobis in hac carne tribueremus, nisi usque ad ejus depositionem sub venia viveremus. Propterea ergo nobis per Mediatorem praestita est gratia, ut polluti carne peccati carnis peccati similitudine mundaremur.

But on the contrary our martyrs would be called heroes, if, as I said, the use of ecclesiastical speech admitted it; not that they had society with demons in the air, but because they overcame the same demons, that is, the aerial powers; and in them Juno herself, whatever she is thought to signify, who is introduced not altogether inconveniently by the poets as an enemy to virtues, and envious of brave men seeking heaven. But again Virgil unhappily succumbs and gives way to her, so that when with him she says, 'I am conquered by Aeneas!' she advises Aeneas himself through Helenus as if by religious counsel, and says, 'To Juno sing vows willingly, and overcome the powerful mistress with suppliant gifts.' From which opinion Porphyry, although not from his own sentiment but from that of others, says that a good god or genius does not come into a man, unless the evil one has been first appeased: as if evil deities were stronger among them than good ones; since indeed the evil ones impede the aids of the good ones, unless being appeased they give them place, and the good ones cannot profit the unwilling evil ones; but the evil ones can harm, while the good ones are not strong enough to resist them. That is not the way of the true and truly holy religion: not thus do our martyrs conquer Juno, that is, the aerial powers envious of the virtues of the pious. Not at all, if it could be said customarily, do our heroes overcome Hera with suppliant gifts, but with divine virtues. For Scipio Africanus was more conveniently named because he conquered Africa by virtue, than if he had appeased the enemies with gifts so that they might spare him.

Chapter XXII.

Whence the power over demons is to the saints, and whence the true purgation of the heart.

By true piety, the men of God eject the aerial power, which is an enemy and contrary to piety, by exorcising it, not by appeasing it; and they overcome all the temptations of its adversity by praying, not to it, but to their God against it. For it does not overcome or subjugate anyone except by the society of sin. In his name, therefore, is it conquered, who assumed man and acted without sin, so that in the priest and sacrifice themselves there might be the remission of sins, that is, through the Mediator of God and men (Mediator Dei et hominum), the man Christ Jesus, through whom, the purgation of sins being made, we are reconciled to God. For it is only by sins that men are separated from God, of which in this life our purgation is made not by our virtue, but by divine mercy; through his indulgence, not through our power. Because even that virtue, however small, which is called ours, is granted to us by his goodness. We would attribute much to ourselves in this flesh, unless we lived under pardon until its deposition. Therefore, grace was provided to us through the Mediator, so that, being polluted by the flesh of sin, we might be cleansed by the likeness of the flesh of sin.

Hac Dei gratia, qua in nos ostendit magnam misericordiam suam, et in hac vita per fidem regimur, et post hanc vitam per ipsam speciem incommutabilis veritatis ad perfectionem plenissimam perducemur.

Caput XXIII.

De principiis, in quibus Platonici purgationem animae esse profitentur.

Dicit etiam Porphyrius divinis oraculis fuisse responsum, non nos purgari lunae teletis atque solis: ut hinc ostenderetur nullorum deorum teletis hominem posse purgari. Cujus enim teletae purgant, si lunae solisque non purgant, quos inter coelestes deos praecipuos habent? Denique eodem dicit oraculo expressum, principia posse purgare; ne forte cum dictum esset non purgare teletas solis et lunae, alicujus alterius dei de turba valere ad purgandum teletae crederentur. Quae autem dicat esse principia tanquam Platonicus, novimus. Dicit enim Deum Patrem et Deum Filium, quem graece appellat paternum intellectum, vel paternam mentem: de Spiritu autem sancto, aut nihil, aut non aperte aliquid dicit: quamvis quem alium dicat horum medium, non intelligo. Si enim tertiam, sicut Plotinus, ubi de tribus principalibus substantiis disputat (Enneadis 5 lib. 1), animae naturam etiam iste vellet intelligi, non utique diceret horum medium, id est Patris et Filii medium. Postponit quippe Plotinus animae naturam paterno intellectui: iste autem cum dicit medium, non postponit, sed interponit. Et nimirum hoc dixit ut potuit, sive ut voluit, quod nos Spiritum sanctum, nec Patris tantum, nec Filii tantum, sed utriusque Spiritum dicimus. Liberis enim verbis loquuntur philosophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficillimis offensionem religiosarum aurium pertimescunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia etiam de rebus quae his significantur, impiam gignat opinionem.

Caput XXIV.

De uno veroque principio, quod solum naturam humanam purgat et renovat.

Nos itaque ita non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur, sicut nec duos deos vel tres nobis licitum est dicere: quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Patre, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse fateamur; nec dicamus tamen quod haeretici Sabelliani, eumdem esse Patrem, qui est et Filius, et eumdem Spiritum sanctum, qui est et Pater et Filius; sed Patrem esse Filii Patrem, et Filium Patris Filium, et Patris et Filii Spiritum sanctum nec Patrem esse nec Filium.

By this grace of God, by which he shows his great mercy toward us, we are both ruled in this life by faith, and after this life we shall be led to the fullest perfection by the very sight of the immutable truth.

Chapter XXIII.

Of the principles in which the Platonists profess the purgation of the soul to be.

Porphyry also says that it was responded by divine oracles that we are not purged by the teletae of the moon and sun: so that from this it might be shown that by the teletae of no gods can a man be purged. For whose teletae purge, if those of the moon and sun do not purge, whom they hold as chief among the celestial gods? Finally, he says it was expressed by the same oracle that the principles (principia) are able to purge; lest perhaps when it had been said that the teletae of the sun and moon do not purge, the teletae of some other god from the crowd should be believed to be valid for purging. But what he says are the principles as a Platonist, we know. For he says there is God the Father and God the Son, whom in Greek he calls the paternal intellect or paternal mind: but concerning the Holy Spirit, he says either nothing, or nothing plainly: although whom else he says to be the medium of these, I do not understand. For if he wished the nature of the soul to be understood as the third, just as Plotinus where he disputes concerning the three principal substances, he certainly would not say the medium of these, that is, the medium of the Father and the Son. For Plotinus postpones the nature of the soul to the paternal intellect: but this man, when he says the medium, does not postpone it, but interposes it. And doubtless he said this as he could, or as he willed, which we say of the Holy Spirit, that He is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both. For philosophers speak with free words, nor in things most difficult to be understood do they dread the offense of religious ears. But to us it is right to speak according to a certain rule, lest the license of words should generate an impious opinion even concerning the things which are signified by them.

Chapter XXIV.

Of the one true principle, which alone purges and renews human nature.

And so we do not say two or three principles when we speak of God, just as it is not permitted to us to say two gods or three: although speaking of each one, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit, we also confess each single one to be God; nor yet do we say what the Sabellian (Sabelliani) heretics say, that the Father is the same who is also the Son, and the Holy Spirit the same who is both Father and Son; but that the Father is the Father of the Son, and the Son the Son of the Father, and the Holy Spirit of the Father and the Son is neither Father nor Son.

Verum itaque dictum est, non purgari hominem nisi principio, quamvis pluraliter sint apud eos dicta principia. [XXIV.] Sed subditus Porphyrius invidis potestatibus, de quibus et erubescebat, et eas libere redarguere formidabat, noluit intelligere Dominum Christum esse principium, cujus incarnatione purgamur. Eum quippe in ipsa carne contempsit, quam propter sacrificium nostrae purgationis assumpsit; magnum scilicet sacramentum ea superbia non intelligens, quam sua ille humilitate dejecit verus benignusque Mediator, in ea se ostendens mortalitate mortalibus, quam maligni fallacesque mediatores non habendo se superbius extulerunt, miserisque hominibus adjutorium deceptorium velut immortales mortalibus promiserunt. Bonus itaque verusque Mediator ostendit peccatum esse malum, non carnis substantiam vel naturam; quae cum anima hominis et suscipi sine peccato potuit, et haberi, et morte deponi, et in melius resurrectione mutari: nec ipsam mortem, quamvis esset poena peccati, quam tamen pro nobis sine peccato ipse persolvit, peccando esse vitandam; sed potius, si facultas datur, pro justitia perferendam. Ideo enim solvere potuit moriendo peccata, quia et mortuus est, et non pro suo peccato. Hunc ille Platonicus non cognovit esse principium; nam cognosceret purgatorium. Neque enim caro principium est, aut anima humana; sed Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia. Non ergo caro per se ipsam mundat, sed per Verbum a quo suscepta est, cum Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis (Joan. I, 14). Nam de carne sua manducanda mystice loquens, cum hi qui non intellexerunt offensi recederent, dicentes, Durus est hic sermo, quis eum potest audire? respondit manentibus caeteris, Spiritus est qui vivificat, caro autem non prodest quidquam (Id. VI, 61, 64). Principium ergo suscepta anima et carne et animam credentium mundat et carnem. Ideo quaerentibus Judaeis quis esset, respondit se esse principium (Id. VIII, 25). Quod utique carnales, infirmi, peccatis obnoxii, et ignorantiae tenebris obvoluti nequaquam percipere possemus, nisi ab eo mundaremur atque sanaremur, per hoc quod eramus et non eramus. Eramus enim homines, sed justi non eramus: in illius autem incarnatione natura humana erat, sed justa, non peccatrix erat. Haec est mediatio, qua manus lapsis jacentibusque porrecta est: hoc est semen dispositum per Angelos, in quorum edictis et lex dabatur (Galat. III, 19), qua et unus Deus coli jubebatur, et hic Mediator venturus promittebatur.

Caput XXV.

Omnes sanctos et sub Legis tempore, et sub prioribus saeculis, in sacramento et fide Christi justificatos fuisse.

It was therefore truly said that man is not purged except by the principle, although principles have been spoken of by them in the plural. But Porphyry, subjected to the envious powers, of whom he was both ashamed and whom he feared to freely rebuke, did not want to understand that the Lord Christ is the principle, by whose incarnation we are purged. For he despised Him in that very flesh which He assumed for the sacrifice of our purgation; certainly not understanding that great sacrament by that pride which He, the true and benign Mediator (Mediator), cast down by His humility, showing himself in that mortality to mortals, which the malignant and fallacious mediators, not having it, more proudly extolled, and promised a deceptive aid to wretched men as if they were immortals to mortals. Therefore, the good and true Mediator showed that sin is the evil, not the substance or nature of the flesh; which, with the soul of man, could both be received without sin, and be held, and be laid down in death, and be changed for the better in the resurrection: nor that death itself, although it was the punishment of sin, which however He Himself paid for us without sin, was to be avoided by sinning; but rather, if opportunity is given, to be endured for justice. For he could loose sins by dying for this reason, because He also died, and not for His own sin. This Platonist did not know Him to be the principle; for he would have known the purgatory. For neither is the flesh the principle, nor the human soul; but the Word through which all things were made. Therefore the flesh does not cleanse by itself, but through the Word by which it was assumed, when the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. For speaking mystically of His flesh to be eaten, when those who did not understand went away offended, saying, 'This is a hard saying, who can hear it?' He answered the others remaining, 'It is the Spirit that quickeneth, but the flesh profiteth nothing.' The principle, therefore, having assumed soul and flesh, cleanses both the soul and the flesh of believers. Therefore to the Jews asking who he was, he answered that he was the principle. Which certainly we, carnal, weak, obnoxious to sins, and involved in the darkness of ignorance, could in no way perceive, unless we were cleansed and healed by Him, through that which we were and were not. For we were men, but we were not just: but in His incarnation human nature was, but it was just, not sinful. This is the mediation, by which a hand was stretched out to the fallen and prostrate: this is the seed disposed through Angels, in whose edicts also the law was given, by which both the one God was commanded to be worshipped, and this Mediator to come was promised.

Chapter XXV.

That all the saints both under the time of the Law, and under previous ages, were justified in the sacrament and faith of Christ.

Hujus sacramenti fide etiam justi antiqui mundari pie vivendo potuerunt, non solum antequam lex populo Hebraeo daretur (neque enim eis praedicator Deus vel Angeli defuerunt), sed ipsius quoque legis temporibus, quamvis in figuris rerum spiritualium habere videretur promissa carnalia, propter quod vetus dicitur Testamentum. Nam et Prophetae tunc erant, per quos, sicut per Angelos, eadem promissio praedicata est: et ex illorum numero erat, cujus tam magnam divinamque sententiam de boni humani fine paulo ante commemoravi, Mihi autem adhaerere Deo, bonum est. In quo plane psalmo duorum Testamentorum, quae dicuntur vetus et novum, satis est declarata distinctio. Propter carnales enim terrenasque promissiones, cum eas impiis abundare perspiceret, dicit pedes suos pene fuisse commotos, et effusos in lapsum propemodum gressus suos, tanquam frustra Deo ipse servisset, cum ea felicitate, quam de illo exspectabat, contemptores ejus florere perspiceret; seque in rei hujus inquisitione laborasse, volentem cur ita esset apprehendere, donec intraret in sanctuarium Dei, et intelligeret in novissima eorum, qui felices videbantur erranti. Tunc eos intellexit in eo quod se extulerunt, sicut dicit, fuisse dejectos, et defecisse ac perisse propter iniquitates suas; totumque illud culmen temporalis felicitatis ita eis factum tanquam somnium evigilantis, qui se repente invenit suis quae somniabat fallacibus gaudiis destitutum. Et quoniam in hac terra vel civitate terrena magni sibi videbantur, Domine, inquit, in civitate tua imaginem eorum ad nihilum rediges. Quod huic tamen utile fuerit, etiam ipsa terrena nonnisi ab uno vero Deo quaerere, in cujus potestate sunt omnia, satis ostendit, ubi ait, Velut pecus factus sum apud te, et ego semper tecum. Velut pecus dixit, utique non intelligens. Ea quippe a te desiderare debui, quae mihi cum impiis non possunt esse communia; non ea quibus eos cum abundare cernerem, putavi me incassum tibi servisse, quando et illi haec haberent, qui tibi servire noluissent. Tamen ego semper tecum, qui etiam in talium rerum desiderio deos alios non quaesivi. Ac per hoc sequitur: Tenuisti manum dexterae meae, et in voluntate tua deduxisti me, et cum gloria assumpsisti me: tanquam ad sinistram cuncta illa pertineant, quae abundare apud impios cum vidisset, pene collapsus est. Quid enim mihi est, inquit, in coelo? et a te quid volui super terram? Reprehendit se ipsum, justeque sibi displicuit: quia cum tam magnum bonum haberet in coelo (quod post intellexit), rem transitoriam, fragilem, et quodammodo luteam felicitatem a suo Deo quaesivit in terra. Defecit, inquit, cor meum et caro mea, Deus cordis mei: defectu utique bono ab inferioribus ad superna.

By the faith of this sacrament (sacramenti) even the ancient just were able to be cleansed by living piously, not only before the law was given to the Hebrew people (for neither was God the preacher nor Angels wanting to them), but also in the times of the law itself, although it seemed to have carnal promises in figures of spiritual things, for which reason it is called the Old Testament (vetus Testamentum). For the Prophets were also there then, through whom, as through Angels, the same promise was preached: and from their number was he, whose so great and divine a sentiment concerning the end of the human good I commemorated a little before: 'But for me to adhere to God is good.' In which psalm certainly the distinction of the two Testaments, which are called Old and New (vetus et novum), is sufficiently declared. For on account of the carnal and earthly promises, when he perceived them to abound in the impious, he says his feet were almost moved, and his steps were poured out almost into a fall, as if he had served God in vain, when he perceived those who contemned Him to flourish with that felicity which he expected from Him; and that he had labored in the investigation of this matter, wishing to apprehend why it was so, until he entered into the sanctuary of God, and understood in the last things of those who seemed happy to him while erring. Then he understood that in that in which they extolled themselves, as he says, they were cast down, and failed and perished on account of their iniquities; and all that summit of temporal felicity became to them just as the dream of one waking, who suddenly finds himself destitute of those deceptive joys which he was dreaming. And since in this earth or earthly city (civitate terrena) they seemed great to themselves, 'Lord,' he says, 'in thy city thou shalt bring their image to nothing.' Which nevertheless it was useful for this man to seek even those earthly things only from the one true God, in whose power are all things, he sufficiently shows, where he says: 'I was made as a beast before thee, and I am always with thee.' He said 'as a beast,' certainly not understanding. For I ought to have desired those things from thee, which cannot be common to me with the impious; not those which when I saw them to abound with them, I thought that I had served thee in vain, when they also had these things, who were unwilling to serve thee. Nevertheless 'I am always with thee,' who even in the desire of such things did not seek other gods. And by this follows: 'Thou hast held the hand of my right hand, and in thy will thou hast led me, and with glory thou hast assumed me': as if to the left all those things belong, which when he had seen them to abound among the impious, he almost collapsed. 'For what is to me,' he says, 'in heaven? and from thee what have I willed upon earth?' He reproved himself, and justly was he displeased with himself: because when he had so great a good in heaven (which he understood afterward), he sought a transitory, fragile, and in a certain way muddy felicity from his God on earth. 'My heart and my flesh have failed,' he says, 'God of my heart': by a good failure certainly from lower things to the supernal.

Unde in alio psalmo dicitur: Desiderat et deficit anima mea in atria Domini (Psal. LXXXIII, 3). Item in alio: Defecit in salutare tuum anima mea (Psal. CXVIII, 81). Tamen cum de utroque dixisset, id est de corde et carne deficiente, non subjecit, Deus cordis et carnis meae; sed, Deus cordis mei. Per cor quippe caro mundatur. Unde dicit Dominus: Mundate quae intus sunt, et quae foris sunt munda erunt (Matth. XXIII, 26). Partem deinde suam dicit ipsum Deum, non aliquid ab eo, sed ipsum: Deus, inquit, cordis mei, et pars mea Deus in saecula: quod inter multa quae ab hominibus eliguntur, ipse illi placuerit eligendus. Quia ecce, inquit, qui longe se faciunt a te, peribunt: perdidisti omnem qui fornicatur abs te; hoc est, qui multorum deorum vult esse prostibulum. Unde sequitur illud, propter quod et caetera de eodem psalmo dicenda visa sunt: Mihi autem adhaerere Deo, bonum est: non longe ire, non per plurima fornicari. Adhaerere autem Deo tunc perfectum erit, cum totum quod liberandum est, fuerit liberatum. Nunc vero fit illud quod sequitur: Ponere in Deo spem meam. Spes enim quae videtur, non est spes: quod enim videt quis, quid sperat? ait Apostolus. Si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam exspectamus (Rom. VIII, 24, 25). In hac autem spe nunc constituti agamus quod sequitur, et simus nos quoque pro modulo nostro angeli Dei, id est nuntii ejus, annuntiantes ejus voluntatem, et gloriam gratiamque laudantes. Unde cum dixisset, Ponere in Deo spem meam: ut annuntiem, inquit, omnes laudes tuas in portis filiae Sion (Psal. LXXII). Haec est gloriosissima civitas Dei; haec unum Deum novit et colit: hanc Angeli sancti annuntiaverunt, qui nos ad ejus societatem invitaverunt, civesque suos in illa esse voluerunt; quibus non placet ut eos colamus tanquam nostros deos, sed cum eis et illorum et nostrum Deum; nec eis sacrificemus, sed cum ipsis sacrificium Deo simus. Nullo itaque dubitante, qui haec deposita maligna obstinatione considerat, omnes immortales beati, qui nobis non invident (neque enim, si inviderent, essent beati), sed potius nos diligunt, ut et nos cum ipsis beati simus; plus nobis favent, plus adjuvant, quando unum Deum cum illis colimus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, quam si eos ipsos per sacrificia coleremus.

Caput XXVI.

De inconstantia Porphyrii inter confessionem veri Dei et cultum daemonum fluctuantis.

Whence in another psalm it is said: 'My soul longeth and faileth for the courts of the Lord.' Likewise in another: 'My soul has failed for thy salvation.' Yet when he had spoken of both, that is, of the heart and flesh failing, he did not add, God of my heart and flesh; but, 'God of my heart.' For by the heart the flesh is cleansed. Whence the Lord says: 'Cleanse those things which are within, and those which are without shall be clean.' Then he says that God himself is his part, not something from him, but himself: 'God,' he says, 'of my heart, and God my part for ever': because among many things which are chosen by men, he himself pleased him to be chosen. 'Because behold,' he says, 'those who make themselves far from thee shall perish: thou hast destroyed everyone who commits fornication from thee'; that is, who wishes to be the brothel of many gods. Whence follows that for which also the rest from the same psalm seemed to be said: 'But for me to adhere to God is good': not to go far, not to commit fornication through many things. Moreover, to adhere to God will then be perfect, when all that which is to be liberated, shall have been liberated. But now that which follows is done: 'To place my hope in God. For hope which is seen is not hope: for what a man sees, why does he hope for?' says the Apostle. 'But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait through patience.' But now constituted in this hope let us do what follows, and let us also be according to our measure angels of God, that is his messengers, announcing his will, and praising his glory and grace. Whence when he had said, 'To place my hope in God': 'that I may announce,' he says, 'all thy praises in the gates of the daughter of Sion.' This is the most glorious City of God (civitas Dei); she knows and worships one God: the holy Angels announced her, who invited us to her society, and willed us to be their citizens in her; whom it does not please that we should worship them as our gods, but with them their and our God; nor should we sacrifice to them, but with themselves be a sacrifice to God. No one therefore doubting, who considers these things with the malignant obstitancy laid aside, all the immortal blessed, who do not envy us (for neither, if they envied, would they be blessed), but rather love us, that we also may be blessed with them; they favor us more, they help us more, when we worship one God with them, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, than if we were to worship them themselves through sacrifices.

Chapter XXVI.

Of the inconsistency of Porphyry fluctuating between the confession of the true God and the worship of demons.

Nescio quomodo (quantum mihi videtur) amicis suis theurgis erubescebat Porphyrius. Nam ista utcumque sapiebat, sed contra multorum deorum cultum non libere defendebat. Et angelos quippe alios esse dixit, qui deorsum descendentes hominibus theurgicis divina pronuntient; alios autem qui in terris ea quae Patris sunt, et altitudinem ejus profunditatemque declarent. Num igitur hos angelos, quorum ministerium est declarare voluntatem Patris, credendum est velle nos subdi, nisi ei cujus nobis annuntiant voluntatem? Unde optime admonet etiam ipse Platonicus, imitandos eos potius quam invocandos. Non itaque debemus metuere, ne immortales et beatos uni Deo subditos non eis sacrificando offendamus. Quod enim nonnisi uni vero Deo deberi sciunt, cui et ipsi adhaerendo beati sunt, procul dubio neque per ullam significantem figuram, neque per ipsam rem quae sacramentis significatur, sibi exhiberi volunt. Daemonum est haec arrogantia superborum atque miserorum, a quibus longe diversa est pietas subditorum Deo, nec aliunde quam illi cohaerendo beatorum. Ad quod bonum percipiendum etiam nobis sincera benignitate oportet ut faveant, neque sibi arrogent quo eis subjiciamur; sed eum annuntient, sub quo eis in pace sociemur. Quid adhuc trepidas, o philosophe, adversus potestates et veris virtutibus et veri Dei muneribus invidas habere liberam vocem? Jam distinxisti angelos qui Patris annuntiant voluntatem, ab eis angelis qui ad theurgos homines, nescio qua deducti arte, descendunt. Quid adhuc eos honoras, ut dicas pronuntiare divina? Quae tandem divina pronuntiant, qui non voluntatem Patris nuntiant? Nempe illi sunt, quos sacris precibus invidus alligavit, ne praestarent animae purgationem; nec a bono, ut dicis, purgare cupiente ab illis vinculis solvi et suae potestati reddi potuerunt. Adhuc dubitas haec maligna esse daemonia; vel te fingis fortasse nescire, dum non vis theurgos offendere, a quibus curiositate deceptus, ista perniciosa et insana pro magno beneficio didicisti? Audes istam invidam, non potentiam, sed pestilentiam, et non dicam dominam, sed quo tu fateris, ancillam potius invidorum, isto aere transcenso levare in coelum, et inter deos vestros etiam sidereos collocare, vel ipsa quoque sidera his opprobriis infamare?

Caput XXVII.

De impietate Porphyrii, qua etiam Apuleii transcendit errorem.

I know not how (as it seems to me) Porphyry was ashamed before his theurgist friends. For he was wise in these things after a fashion, but he did not freely defend himself against the worship of many gods. For he said that there are some angels who, descending downward, announce divine things to theurgic men; and others who on earth declare those things which are the Father's, and His height and depth. Is it therefore to be believed that these angels, whose ministry is to declare the will of the Father, wish us to be subjected to any but Him whose will they announce to us? Whence that same Platonist most excellently admonishes that they are rather to be imitated than invoked. Therefore we ought not to fear lest we should offend the immortal and blessed ones subjected to the one God by not sacrificing to them. For what they know to be due only to the one true God, by adhering to whom they themselves are blessed, they undoubtedly wish to be exhibited to themselves neither through any signifying figure, nor through the thing itself which is signified by the sacraments. This is the arrogance of proud and wretched demons, from whom the piety of those subjected to God, and blessed by nothing else than by coexisting with Him, is far different. To the perceiving of which good it behooves that they also favor us with sincere benignity, nor should they arrogate to themselves that by which we should be subjected to them; but they should announce Him under whom we may be associated with them in peace. Why do you still tremble, O philosopher, to have a free voice against powers envious both of true virtues and of the gifts of the true God? Already you have distinguished the angels who announce the will of the Father from those angels who descend to theurgic men, led down by I know not what art. Why do you still honor them, so that you say they pronounce divine things? What divine things, finally, do they pronounce, who do not announce the will of the Father? Surely they are those whom an envious man has bound with sacred prayers, lest they should afford the purgation of the soul; nor could they be loosed from those bonds and restored to their own power by a good one wishing to purge, as you say. Do you still doubt that these are malignant demons; or do you perhaps pretend not to know, while you do not wish to offend the theurgists, by whom being deceived by curiosity, you learned these pernicious and insane things as a great benefit? Do you dare to lift up into heaven this envious, I will not say power, but pestilence, and not I will say mistress, but as you confess, rather the handmaid of the envious, this air being transcended, and to place it among your starry gods, or to infame even the stars themselves with these reproaches?

Chapter XXVII.

Of the impiety of Porphyry, by which he transcends even the error of Apuleius.

Quanto humanius et tolerabilius consectaneus tuus Platonicus Apuleius erravit, qui tantummodo daemones a luna et infra ordinatos agitari morbis passionum mentisque turbellis, honorans quidem eos, sed volens nolensque confessus est; deos tamen coeli superiores ad aetheria spatia pertinentes, sive visibiles, quos conspicuos lucere cernebat, solem ac lunam et caetera ibidem lumina, sive invisibiles quos putabat, ab omni labe istarum perturbationum quanta potuit disputatione secrevit (De deo Socratis). Tu autem hoc didicisti non a Platone, sed a Chaldeis magistris, ut in aetherias vel empyreas mundi sublimitates et firmamenta coelestia extolleres vitia humana, ut possent dii vestri theurgis pronuntiare divina: quibus divinis te tamen per intellectualem vitam facis altiorem, ut tibi videlicet tanquam philosopho theurgicae artis purgationes nequaquam necessariae videantur; sed aliis eas tamen importas, ut hanc veluti mercedem reddas magistris tuis, quod eos qui philosophari non possunt, ad ista seducis, quae tibi tanquam superiorum capaci esse inutilia confiteris; ut videlicet quicumque a philosophiae virtute remoti sunt, quae ardua nimis atque paucorum est, te auctore theurgos homines, a quibus non quidem in anima intellectuali, verum saltem in anima spirituali purgentur, inquirant; et quoniam istorum quos philosophari piget, incomparabiliter major est multitudo, plures ad secretos et illicitos magistros tuos, quam ad scholas Platonicas venire cogantur. Hoc enim tibi immundissimi daemones, deos aetherios se esse fingentes, quorum praedicator et angelus factus es, promiserunt; quod in anima spirituali theurgica arte purgati, ad Patrem quidem non redeunt, sed super aerias plagas inter deos aetherios habitabunt. Non audit ista hominum multitudo, propter quos a daemonum dominatu liberandos Christus advenit. In illo enim habent misericordissimam purgationem et mentis et spiritus et corporis sui. Propterea quippe totum hominem sine peccato ille suscepit, ut totum quo constat homo, a peccatorum peste sanaret. Quem tu quoque utinam cognovisses, eique te potius, quam vel tuae virtuti, quae humana, fragilis et infirma est, vel perniciosissimae curiositati sanandum tutius commisisses. Non enim te decepisset, quem vestra, ut tu ipse scribis, oracula sanctum immortalemque confessa sunt. De quo etiam poeta nobilissimus, poetice quidem, quia in alterius adumbrata persona, veraciter tamen, si ad ipsum referas, dixit: Te duce, si qua manent sceleris vestigia nostri, Irrita perpetua solvent formidine terras (Virgil. Eclog. 4, vers. 13, 14).

How much more humanly and tolerably did your fellow Platonist Apuleius err, who only confessed, honored them indeed, but willed or unwilled, that demons ordered from the moon and below are agitated by diseases of passions and the disturbances (turbellis) of the mind; nevertheless he separated the higher gods of heaven pertaining to the ethereal spaces, whether visible, whom he saw shining conspicuously, the sun and moon and other lights in the same place, or invisible whom he thought, from all stain of those perturbations with as much disputation as he could. But you learned this not from Plato, but from your Chaldean masters, so that you might extol human vices into the ethereal or empyrean heights of the world and the celestial firmaments, so that your gods might pronounce divine things to theurgists (theurgis): by which divine things however you make yourself higher through the intellectual life, so that to you, as a philosopher, the purgations of the theurgic art seem in no way necessary; but nevertheless you import them to others, so that you may return this as it were a reward to your masters, that you seduce those who cannot philosophize to these things, which you confess to be useless to you as capable of higher things; so that namely whoever are removed from the virtue of philosophy, which is too arduous and of few, by your authority may inquire for theurgic men, by whom they may be purged, not indeed in the intellectual soul (anima intellectualis), but at least in the spiritual soul (anima spiritualis); and since the multitude of those whom it irks to philosophize is incomparably greater, more are forced to come to your secret and illicit masters than to the Platonic schools. For this the most unclean demons, pretending themselves to be ethereal gods, whose preacher and angel you have become, promised to you; that being purged in the spiritual soul by the theurgic art, they do not indeed return to the Father, but shall dwell above the aerial regions among the ethereal gods. The multitude of men does not hear those things, for whose sake Christ (Christus) came to liberate them from the dominion of demons. For in Him they have a most merciful purgation both of their mind and spirit and body. For this reason indeed He assumed the whole man without sin, so that He might heal the whole of which man consists from the plague of sins. Whom I wish you also had known, and had committed yourself more safely to Him to be healed, than either to your virtue, which is human, fragile and weak, or to your most pernicious curiosity. For He would not have deceived you, whom your oracles, as you yourself write, confessed to be holy and immortal. Of whom even the most noble poet said poetically indeed, because in the adumbrated person of another, yet truly if you refer it to Him: 'With thee as leader, if any vestiges of our crime remain, they shall be made void and loose the lands from perpetual fear.'

Ea quippe dixit, quae etiam multum proficientium in virtute justitiae possunt, propter hujus vitae infirmitatem, etsi non scelera, scelerum tamen manere vestigia, quae nonnisi ab illo Salvatore sanantur, de quo iste versus expressus est. Nam hoc utique non a se ipso se dixisse Virgilius in Eclogae ipsius quarto ferme versu indicat, ubi ait: Ultima Cumaei venit jam carminis aetas. Unde hoc a Cumaea Sybilla dictum esse incunctanter apparet. Theurgi vero illi, vel potius daemones, deorum species figurasque fingentes, inquinant potius quam purgant humanum spiritum falsitate phantasmatum et deceptoria vanarum ludificatione formarum. Quomodo enim purgent hominis spiritum, qui immundum habent proprium? Alioquin nullo modo carminibus invidi hominis ligarentur, ipsumque inane beneficium quod praestaturi videbantur, aut metu premerent, aut simili invidentia denegarent. Sufficit quod purgatione theurgica, neque intellectualem animam, hoc est mentem nostram, dicis posse purgari, et ipsam spiritualem, id est nostrae animae partem mente inferiorem, quam tali arte purgari posse asseris, immortalem tamen aeternamque non posse hac arte fieri confiteris. Christus autem vitam promittit aeternam: unde ad eum mundus, vobis quidem stomachantibus, mirantibus tamen stupentibusque concurrit. Quid prodest quia negare non potuisti errare homines theurgica disciplina, et quamplurimos fallere per caecam insipientemque sententiam, atque esse certissimum errorem, agendo et supplicando ad principes angelosque decurrere; et rursum, quasi ne operam perdidisse videaris ista discendo, mittis homines ad theurgos, ut per eos anima spiritualis purgetur illorum, qui non secundum intellectualem animam vivunt?

Caput XXVIII.

Quibus persuasionibus Porphyrius obcaecatus non potuerit veram sapientiam, quod est Christus, agnoscere.

Mittis ergo homines in errorem certissimum. Neque hoc tantum malum te pudet, cum virtutis et sapientiae profitearis amatorem. Quam si vere ac fideliter amasses, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam cognovisses, nec ab ejus saluberrima humilitate tumore inflatus vanae scientiae resiluisses. Confiteris tamen etiam spiritualem animam sine theurgicis artibus et sine teletis, quibus frustra discendis elaborasti, posse continentiae virtute purgari.

For he said those things, which even of those profiting much in the virtue of justice can, on account of the infirmity of this life, although not crimes, nevertheless vestiges of crimes remain, which are not healed except by that Savior, of whom this verse was expressed. For Virgil indicates that he did not say this of himself in almost the fourth verse of the Eclogue itself, where he says: 'The last age of the Cumaean song has already come.' Whence it appears unhesitatingly that this was said by the Cumaean Sibyl. But those theurgists, or rather demons, feigning the species and figures of gods, defile rather than purge the human spirit by the falsehood of phantasms and the deceptive mockings of vain forms. For how should they purge the spirit of a man, who have an unclean one of their own? Otherwise in no way would they be bound by the songs of an envious man, and they would either press by fear, or deny by a similar envy, that same empty benefit which they seemed about to afford. It suffices that by theurgic purgation, you say neither the intellectual soul, that is our mind, can be purged, and you confess that the spiritual itself, that is the part of our soul inferior to the mind, which you assert can be purged by such an art, nevertheless cannot be made immortal and eternal by this art. But Christ promises eternal life: whence the world, although you are stomachful, yet wondering and stupified, runs together to Him. What does it profit that you could not deny that men err in the theurgic discipline, and deceive very many through a blind and foolish opinion, and that it is a most certain error to run to princes and angels by acting and supplicating; and again, as if lest you should seem to have lost your labor by learning these things, you send men to theurgists, so that through them the spiritual soul of those may be purged, who do not live according to the intellectual soul?

Chapter XXVIII.

By what persuasions the blinded Porphyry could not recognize the true wisdom, which is Christ.

You send men, therefore, into a most certain error. Nor are you ashamed of this great evil, although you profess yourself a lover of virtue and wisdom. If you had loved her truly and faithfully, you would have known Christ (Christus), the power of God and the wisdom of God, nor would you have recoiled from His most salutary humility, puffed up with the tumor of vain knowledge. Yet you confess that even the spiritual soul (anima spiritualis) can be purged by the virtue of continence without theurgic arts and without rites (teletae), in learning which you have labored in vain.

Aliquando etiam dicis, quod teletae non post mortem elevant animam; ut jam nec eidem ipsi, quam spiritualem vocas, aliquid post hujus vitae finem prodesse videantur: et tamen versas haec multis modis et repetis, ad nihil aliud, quantum existimo, nisi ut talium quoque rerum quasi peritus appareas, et placeas illicitarum artium curiosis, vel ad eas facias ipse curiosos. Sed bene, quod metuendam dicis hanc artem vel legum periculis, vel ipsius actionis. Atque utinam hoc saltem abs te miseri audiant, et inde, ne illic absorbeantur, abscedant, aut eo penitus non accedant. Ignorantiam certe et propter eam multa vitia per nullas teletas purgari dicis, sed per solum πατρικὸν νοῦν, id est, paternam mentem sive intellectum, qui paternae est voluntatis conscius. Hunc autem Christum esse non credis: contemnis enim eum propter corpus ex femina acceptum et propter crucis opprobrium, excelsam videlicet sapientiam spretis atque abjectis infimis idoneus de superioribus carpere. At ille implet, quod Prophetae sancti de illo veraciter praedixerunt: Perdam sapientiam sapientium, et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo (Isai. XXIX, 14). Non enim suam in eis perdit et reprobat, quam ipse donavit; sed quam sibi arrogant qui non habent ipsius. Unde commemorato isto prophetico testimonio, sequitur et dicit Apostolus: Ubi sapiens? ubi scriba? ubi conquisitor hujus saeculi? Nonne stultam fecit Deus sapientiam hujus mundi? Nam quoniam in Dei sapientia non cognovit mundus per sapientiam Deum, placuit Deo per stultitiam praedicationis salvos facere credentes, Quoniam quidem Judaei signa petunt, et Graeci sapientiam quaerunt: nos autem, inquit, praedicamus Christum crucifixum; Judaeis quidem scandalum, Gentibus autem stultitiam; ipsis vero vocatis Judaeis et Graecis Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam: quoniam stultum Dei sapientius est hominibus, et infirmum Dei fortius est hominibus (I Cor. I, 19-25). Hoc quasi stultum et infirmum tanquam sua virtute sapientes fortesque contemnunt. Sed haec est gratia, quae sanat infirmos, non superbae jactantes falsam beatitudinem suam, sed humiliter potius veram miseriam confitentes.

Caput XXIX.

De incarnatione Domini nostri Jesu Christi, quam confiteri Platonicorum erubescit impietas.

Sometimes you even say that rites do not elevate the soul after death; so that now they do not even seem to profit anything after the end of this life even that same soul which you call spiritual: and yet you turn these things in many ways and repeat them, for no other purpose, as I think, except that you may appear as if skilled in such things also, and may please the curious of illicit arts, or may yourself make them curious towards them. But it is well that you say this art is to be feared either by the dangers of the laws, or of the action itself. And I wish that at least the wretched would hear this from you, and depart thence, lest they be absorbed there, or not approach there at all. You say certainly that ignorance and on its account many vices are purged by no rites, but by the paternal mind (patrikos nous) alone, that is, the paternal mind or intellect, which is conscious of the paternal will. But you do not believe this to be Christ; for you despise Him on account of the body received from a woman and on account of the reproach of the cross, suitable indeed, with high wisdom, having spurned and cast away the lowest things, to pluck from the higher. But He fulfills what the holy Prophets truly predicted of Him: "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and I will reject the prudence of the prudent" (Isai. XXIX, 14). For He does not destroy and reject His own in them, which He Himself gave; but that which those who do not have His own arrogate to themselves. Whence having commemorated that prophetic testimony, the Apostle follows and says: "Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the searcher of this world?" Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For since in the wisdom of God the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the foolishness of preaching (stultitia praedicationis) to save those who believe, For indeed the Jews seek signs, and the Greeks seek wisdom: but we," he says, "preach Christ crucified; to the Jews indeed a scandal, but to the Gentiles foolishness; but to the called themselves, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God: because the foolish thing of God is wiser than men, and the weak thing of God is stronger than men" (I Cor. I, 19-25). This as it were foolish and weak thing those wise and strong through their own virtue despise. But this is grace (gratia), which heals the weak, not proudly boasting their own false beatitude, but rather humbly confessing their true misery.

Chapter XXIX.

Of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ (Jesus Christus), which the impiety of the Platonists blushes to confess.

1. Praedicas Patrem et ejus Filium, quem vocas paternum intellectum seu mentem; et horum medium, quem putamus te dicere Spiritum sanctum, et more vostro appellas tres deos. Ubi, etsi verbis indisciplinatis utimini, videtis tamen qualitercumque et quasi per quaedam tenuis imaginationis umbracula, quo nitendum sit: sed incarnationem incommutabilis Filii Dei, qua salvamur, ut ad illa quae credimus, vel ex quantulacumque parte intelligimus, venire possimus, non vultis agnoscere. Itaque videtis utcumque, etsi de longinquo, etsi acie caligante, patriam in qua manendum est; sed viam qua eundum est, non tenetis. Confiteris tamen gratiam, quandoquidem ad Deum per virtutem intelligentiae pervenire, paucis dicis esse concessum. Non enim dicis, Paucis placuit; vel, Pauci voluerunt: sed cum dicis esse concessum, procul dubio Dei gratiam, non hominis sufficientiam confiteris. Uteris etiam hoc verbo apertius, ubi, Platonis sententiam sequens, nec ipse dubitas, in hac vita hominem nullo modo ad perfectionem sapientiae pervenire, secundum intellectum tamen viventibus omne quod deest, providentia Dei et gratia, post hanc vitam posse compleri. O si cognovisses Dei gratiam per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, ipsamque ejus incarnationem, qua hominis animam corpusque suscepit, summum esse exemplum gratiae videri potuisses. Sed quid faciam? Scio me frustra loqui mortuo: sed quantum ad te attinet; quantum autem ad eos, qui te magnipendunt, et te vel qualicumque amore sapientiae, vel curiositate artium, quas non debuisti discere, diligunt, quos potius in tua compellatione alloquor, fortasse non frustra. Gratia Dei non potuit gratius commendari, quam ut ipse unicus Dei Filius in se incommutabiliter manens indueret hominem, et spem dilectionis suae daret hominibus, homine medio, quo ad illum ab hominibus veniretur, qui tam longe erat immortalis a mortalibus, incommutabilis a commutabilibus, justus ab impiis, beatus a miseris. Et quia naturaliter indidit nobis, ut beati immortalesque esse cupiamus, manens beatus, suscipiensque mortalem, ut nobis tribueret quod amamus, perpetiendo docuit contemnere quod timemus.

2. Sed huic veritati ut possetis acquiescere, humilitate opus erat, quae cervici vestrae difficillime persuaderi potest. Quid enim incredibile dicitur, praesertim vobis qui talia sapitis, quibus ad hoc credendum vos ipsos admonere debeatis; quid, inquam, vobis incredibile dicitur, cum Deus dicitur assumpsisse humanam animam et corpus? Vos certe tantum tribuitis animae intellectuali, quae anima utique humana est, ut eam consubstantialem paternae illi menti, quem Dei Filium confitemini, fieri posse dicatis.

1. You preach the Father and His Son, whom you call the paternal intellect or mind; and the medium of these, whom we think you call the Holy Spirit (Spiritus sanctus), and after your manner you call them three gods. In which, although you use undisciplined words, you see nevertheless in some way and as if through certain shadows of a thin imagination, where one must strive: but the incarnation (incarnatio) of the unchangeable Son of God, by which we are saved, so that we may be able to come to those things which we believe, or understand from however small a part, you do not wish to recognize. And so you see in some way, although from afar, although with dim sight, the fatherland in which one must remain; but the way by which one must go, you do not hold. Yet you confess grace (gratia), since indeed you say it is granted to a few to arrive at God through the virtue of intelligence. For you do not say, It pleased a few; or, A few willed: but when you say it is granted, without doubt you confess the grace of God, not the sufficiency of man. You even use this word more openly where, following the opinion of Plato, you yourself do not doubt that in this life a man can in no way arrive at the perfection of wisdom, nevertheless to those living according to the intellect all that is lacking can be completed after this life by the providence (providentia) of God and grace. Oh, if you had known the grace of God through Jesus Christ (Jesus Christus) our Lord, and had been able to see that His incarnation itself, by which He assumed the soul and body of man, is the highest example of grace. But what shall I do? I know I speak in vain to a dead man: but as far as it pertains to you; but as far as it pertains to those who esteem you highly, and love you either with some kind of love of wisdom, or with a curiosity for arts which you ought not to have learned, whom I rather address in your compellation, perhaps not in vain. The grace of God could not be more graciously commended than that the only Son of God Himself, remaining inchangeably in Himself, should put on man, and give the hope of His love to men, through the medium of man, by whom He might be come to by men, who was so far away, immortal from mortals, unchangeable from changeables, just from the impious, blessed from the wretched. And because He naturally implanted in us that we should desire to be blessed and immortal, remaining blessed and assuming the mortal, so that He might bestow upon us what we love, by enduring He taught us to despise what we fear.

2. But so that you might be able to acquiesce in this truth, there was need of humility, which can with great difficulty be persuaded to your neck. For what incredible thing is said, especially to you who savor such things, by which you ought to admonish yourselves to believe this; what, I say, is said to you that is incredible, when God is said to have assumed a human soul and body? You certainly attribute so much to the intellectual soul (anima intellectualis), which soul is indeed human, that you say it can become consubstantial (consubstantialis) with that paternal mind, whom you confess to be the Son of God.

Quid ergo incredibile est, si aliqua una intellectualis anima modo quodam ineffabili et singulari pro multorum salute suscepta est? Corpus vero animae cohaerere, ut homo totus et plenus sit, natura nostra ipsa teste cognoscimus. Quod nisi utitatissimum esset, hoc profecto esset incredibilius: facilius quippe in fidem recipiendum est, etsi humanum divino, etsi mutabilem incommutabili, tamen spiritum spiritui, aut, ut verbis utar quae in usu habetis, incorporeum incorporeo quam corpus incorporeo cohaerere. An forte vos offendit inusitatus corporis partus ex virgine? Neque hoc debet offendere, imo potius ad pietatem suscipiendam debet adducere, quod mirabilis mirabiliter natus est. An vero quod ipsum corpus morte depositum, et in melius resurrectione mutatum, jam incorruptibile, neque mortale in superna subvexit? Hoc fortasse credere recusatis, intuentes Porphyrium in his ipsis libris, ex quibus multa posui, quos de regressu animae scripsit, tam crebro praecipere, omne corpus esse fugiendum, ut anima possit beata permanere cum Deo. Sed ipse potius ista sentiens corrigendus fuit, praesertim cum de anima mundi hujus visibilis et tam ingentis corporeae molis, cum illo tam incredibilia sapiatis. Platone quippe auctore (In Timaeo), animal esse dicitis mundum, et animal beatissimum, quod vultis esse etiam sempiternum. Quomodo ergo nec unquam solvetur a corpore, nec unquam carebit beatitudine, si ut anima beata sit, corpus est omne fugiendum? Solem quoque istum et caetera sidera, non solum in libris vestris corpora esse fatemini, quod vobiscum omnes homines et conspicere non cunctantur, et dicere: verum etiam altiore, ut putatis, peritia, haec esse animalia beatissima perhibetis, et cum his corporibus sempiterna. Quid ergo est, quod cum vobis fides christiana suadetur, tunc obliviscimini, aut ignorare vos fingitis, quid disputare aut docere soleatis? Quid causae est cur, propter opiniones vestras, quas vos ipsi oppugnatis, christiani esse nolitis, nisi quia Christus humiliter venit, et vos superbi estis? Qualia sanctorum corpora in resurrectione futura sint, potest aliquando scrupulosius inter christianarum Scripturarum doctissimos disputari: futura tamen sempiterna minime dubitamus; et talia futura, quale sua resurrectione Christus demonstravit exemplum. Sed qualiacumque sint, cum incorruptibilia prorsus et immortalia, nihiloque animae contemplationem, qua in Deo figitur, impedientia praedicentur; vosque etiam dicatis esse in coelestibus immortalia corpora immortaliter beatorum:

What, therefore, is incredible, if some one intellectual soul was assumed in a certain ineffable and singular way for the salvation of many? But that a body coheres to a soul, so that there may be a whole and full man, we know by the testimony of our own nature itself. Which, unless it were most usual, would surely be more incredible: for indeed it is more easily to be received into faith, although human to divine, although changeable to unchangeable, yet spirit to spirit, or, to use the words which you have in use, incorporeal to incorporeal, than a body to the incorporeal. Or perhaps the unusual birth of a body from a virgin offends you? Nor ought this to offend, but rather rather it ought to lead to the undertaking of piety, because the wonderful was born wonderfully. Or indeed that He conveyed into the heights that same body laid down by death, and changed for the better by resurrection (resurrectio), now incorruptible (incorruptibilis) and not mortal? You perhaps refuse to believe this, beholding Porphyry in these very books, from which I have set down many things, which he wrote concerning the return of the soul, so frequently commanding that every body is to be fled, so that the soul may be able to remain blessed with God. But he himself rather feeling those things was to be corrected, especially since you savor such incredible things concerning the soul of this visible world and of so vast a corporeal mass. For with Plato as your author (In Timaeo), you say that the world is an animal, and a most blessed animal, which you wish also to be everlasting. How, therefore, shall it never be loosed from the body, nor ever lack beatitude, if that the soul may be blessed, every body is to be fled? That sun also and the other stars, you confess not only in your books to be bodies, which all men with you do not hesitate both to behold and to say: but also with a higher skill, as you think, you hold these to be most blessed animals, and everlasting with these bodies. What is it, therefore, that when the Christian faith (fides christiana) is persuaded to you, then you forget, or feign that you are ignorant of, what you are accustomed to dispute or teach? What is the cause why, on account of your opinions, which you yourselves oppose, you do not wish to be Christians, except because Christ came humbly, and you are proud? Of what sort the bodies of the saints shall be in the future resurrection, it can sometimes be more scrupulously disputed among the most learned of the Christian Scriptures (Scripturarum): nevertheless that they shall be everlasting we least doubt; and that they shall be such as Christ demonstrated an example by His own resurrection. But of whatever sort they be, since they are preached to be altogether incorruptible and immortal, and in no way hindering the contemplation of the soul, by which it is fixed in God; and you also say that there are in the celestial regions immortal bodies of the immortally blessed:

quid est quod ut beati simus, omne corpus fugiendum esse opinamini, ut fidem christianam quasi rationabiliter fugere videamini; nisi quia illud est, quod iterum dico, Christus est humilis, vos superbi? An forte corrigi pudet? Et hoc vitium nonnisi superborum est. Pudet videlicet doctos homines ex discipulis Platonis fieri discipulos Christi, qui piscatorem suo Spiritu docuit sapere ac dicere, In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum: hoc erat in principio apud Deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat; et vita erat lux hominum, et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Quod initium sancti Evangelii, cui nomen est, Secundum Joannem, quidam Platonicus, sicut a sancto sene Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi Ecclesiae praesedit episcopus, solebamus audire, aureis litteris conscribendum, et per omnes Ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat. Sed ideo viluit superbis Deus ille magister, quia Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis (Joan. I, 1-5, 14): ut parum sit miseris quod aegrotant, nisi se in ipsa etiam aegritudine extollant, et de medicina qua sanari poterant, erubescant. Non enim hoc faciunt ut erigantur, sed ut cadendo gravius affligantur.

Caput XXX.

Quanta Platonici dogmatis Porphyrius refutaverit, et dissentiendo correxerit.

Si post Platonem aliquid emendare existimatur indignum, cur ipse Porphyrius nonnulla et non parva emendavit? Nam Platonem, animas hominum post mortem revolvi usque ad corpora bestiarum, scripsisse certissimum est. Hanc sententiam Porphyrii doctor tenuit et Plotinus (Enneadis 3, lib. 4, cap. 2): Porphyrio tamen jure displicuit. In hominum sane, non sua quae dimiserant, sed alia nova corpora redire humanas animas arbitratus est. Puduit scilicet illud credere, ne mater fortasse filium in mulam revoluta vectaret: et non puduit hoc credere, ubi revoluta mater in puellam filio forsitan nuberet.

what is it that you think that every body is to be fled so that we may be blessed, so that you may seem as if reasonably to flee the Christian faith; unless because it is that which I say again, Christ is humble, you are proud? Or perhaps it shames you to be corrected? And this vice is not except of the proud. It shames, namely, learned men from the disciples of Plato to become disciples of Christ (Christi), who taught a fisherman by His Spirit to know and to say: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word: this was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made. That which was made, in Him was life; and the life was the light of men, and the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it." Which beginning of the holy Gospel, whose name is According to John (Joannem), a certain Platonist, as we used to hear from the holy old man Simplicianus, who afterwards presided as bishop (episcopus) over the Church of Milan (Mediolanensis Ecclesia), used to say was to be written in golden letters, and proposed in the most eminent places through all the Churches. But therefore that God and teacher became cheap to the proud, because "the Word was made flesh (caro factum est), and dwelt among us" (John I, 1-5, 14): so that it is a small thing to the wretched that they are sick, unless they extol themselves even in that very sickness, and blush at the medicine by which they could be healed. For they do not do this so that they may be raised up, but so that by falling they may be more heavily afflicted.

Chapter XXX.

How many things of the Platonic dogma Porphyry refuted, and by dissenting corrected.

If after Plato it is thought unworthy to amend anything, why did Porphyry himself amend some and not small things? For it is most certain that Plato wrote that the souls of men after death are revolved even into the bodies of beasts. This opinion the teacher of Porphyry, Plotinus, also held (Enneadis 3, lib. 4, cap. 2): yet it rightly displeased Porphyry. He thought indeed that human souls return into human bodies, not their own which they had dismissed, but other new ones. He was ashamed, namely, to believe that, lest perhaps a mother revolved into a mule should carry her son: and he was not ashamed to believe this, where a mother revolved into a girl should perhaps marry her son.

Quanto creditur honestius quod sancti et veraces Angeli docuerunt, quod Prophetae Dei Spiritu acti locuti sunt, quod ipse quem venturum Salvatorem praemissi nuntii praedixerunt, quod missi Apostoli qui orbem terrarum Evangelio repleverunt? quanto, inquam, honestius creditur, reverti semel animas ad corpora propria, quam reverti toties ad diversa? Verumtamen, ut dixi, ex magna parte correctus est in hac opinione Porphyrius, ut saltem in solos homines humanas animas praecipitari posse sentiret; belluinos autem carceres evertere, minime dubitaret. Dicit etiam, Deum ad hoc animam mundo dedisse, ut materiae cognoscens mala, ad Patrem recurreret, nec aliquando jam talium polluta contagione teneretur. Ubi etsi aliquid inconvenienter sapit (magis enim data est corpori, ut bona faceret; non enim mala disceret, si non faceret), in eo tamen aliorum Platonicorum opinionem, et non in re parva emendavit, quod mundatam ab omnibus malis animam et cum Patre constitutam, nunquam jam mala mundi hujus passuram esse confessus est. Qua sententia profecto abstulit, quod esse Platonicum maxime perhibetur, ut mortuos ex vivis, ita vivos ex mortuis semper fieri (Plato in Phaedone): falsumque esse ostendit, quod Platonice videtur dixisse Virgilius, in campos Elysios purgatas animas missas (quo nomine tanquam per fabulam videntur significari gaudia beatorum), ad fluvium Letheum evocari, hoc est ad oblivionem praeteritorum: Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant, Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti. (Aeneid. lib. 6, vers. 750, 751.) Merito displicuit hoc Porphyrio: quoniam revera credere stultum est, ex illa vita, quae beatissima esse non poterit nisi de sua fuerit aeternitate certissima, desiderare animas corporum corruptibilium labem, et inde ad ista remeare, tanquam hoc agat summa purgatio, ut inquinatio requiratur. Si enim quod perfecte mundantur, hoc efficit, ut omnium obliviscantur malorum, malorum autem oblivio facit corporum desiderium, ubi rursus implicentur malis: profecto erit infelicitatis causa, summa felicitas: et stultitiae causa, perfectio sapientiae; et immunditiae causa, summa mundatio. Nec veritate ibi beata erit anima, quamdiucumque erit, ubi oportet fallatur, ut beata sit. Non enim beata erit, nisi secura. Ut autem secura sit, falso putabit semper se beatam fore: quoniam aliquando erit et misera. Cui ergo gaudendi causa falsitas erit, quomodo de veritate gaudebit? Vidit hoc Porphyrius, purgatamque animam ob hoc reverti dixit ad Patrem, ne aliquando jam malorum polluta contagione teneatur.

How much more honorably is that believed which the holy and veracious Angels taught, which the Prophets spoke being acted upon by the Spirit of God, which He Himself whom the sent messengers predicted as the coming Savior, which the sent Apostles who filled the orb of the lands with the Gospel? How much more honorably, I say, is it believed that souls return once to their own bodies, than to return so many times to diverse ones? Nevertheless, as I said, Porphyry was corrected in great part in this opinion, so that he felt at least that human souls can be thrust down into humans alone; but he did not hesitate at all to overturn the belluine prisons. He says also that God gave the soul to the world for this purpose, that knowing the evils of matter, it might run back to the Father, nor ever now be held by the polluted contagion of such things. Where although he savors something inconveniently (for it was rather given to the body that it might do good things; for it would not learn evils if it did not do them), yet in that he amended the opinion of other Platonists, and not in a small matter, because he confessed that a soul cleansed from all evils and constituted with the Father, would never now suffer the evils of this world. By which opinion he surely took away what is especially held to be Platonic, that as the dead are always made from the living, so the living from the dead (Plato in Phaedone): and he showed that to be false which Virgil seems to have said Platonically, that cleansed souls sent to the Elysian fields (campos Elysios) (by which name as if through a fable the joys of the blessed seem to be signified), are called forth to the river Lethe (fluvius Letheus), that is to the oblivion of past things: "Namely that unmindful they may revisit the convex heights, and again begin to wish to return into bodies" (Aeneid. lib. 6, vers. 750, 751.) Rightly did this displease Porphyry: since in truth it is foolish to believe that from that life, which cannot be most blessed unless it shall be most certain of its own eternity, souls should desire the stain of corruptible bodies, and thence return to these things, as if the highest purgation acts for this, that defilement be sought. For if that they are perfectly cleansed effects this, that they forget all evils, but the oblivion of evils makes the desire of bodies, where they may again be implicated in evils: surely the highest felicity will be the cause of infelicity: and the perfection of wisdom the cause of foolishness; and the highest cleansing the cause of uncleanness. Nor will the soul be blessed there by truth, however long it shall be, where it behooves it to be deceived so that it may be blessed. For it will not be blessed unless secure. But that it may be secure, it will falsely think that it will always be blessed: since sometimes it will also be wretched. To whom therefore falsehood shall be the cause of rejoicing, how shall it rejoice concerning the truth? Porphyry saw this, and for this reason said that the cleansed soul returns to the Father, lest it should ever now be held by the polluted contagion of evils.

[XXXI.] Falso igitur a quibusdam Platonicis est creditus quasi necessarius orbis ille, ab eisdem abeundi et ad eadem revertendi. Quod etiamsi verum esset, quid hoc scire prodesset, nisi forte inde se nobis auderent praeferre Platonici, quia id nos in hac vita jam nesciremus, quod ipsi in alia meliore vita purgatissimi et sapientissimi fuerant nescituri, et falsum credendo beati futuri? Quod si absurdissimum et stultissimum est dicere, Porphyrii profecto est praeferenda sententia, his qui animarum circulos alternante semper beatitate et miseria suspicati sunt. Quod si ita est, ecce Platonicus in melius a Platone dissentit: ecce vidit, quod ille non vidit, nec post talem ac tantum magistrum refugit correctionem, sed homini praeposuit veritatem.

Caput XXXI.

Contra argumentum Platonicorum, quo animam humanam Deo asserunt esse coaeternam.

Cur ergo non potius divinitati credimus de his rebus, quas humano ingenio pervestigare non possumus, quae animam quoque ipsam non Deo coaeternam, sed creatam dicit esse, quae non erat? Ut enim hoc Platonici nollent credere, hanc utique causam idoneam sibi videbantur afferre, quia nisi quod semper antea fuisset, sempiternum deinceps esse non posset. Quanquam et de mundo et de his quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato (In Timaeo), apertissime dicat eos esse coepisse, et habere initium, finem tamen non habituros, sed per Conditoris potentissimam voluntatem in aeternum permansuros esse perhibeat. Verum id quomodo intelligant, invenerunt, non esse hoc videlicet temporis, sed substitutionis initium. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium; quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset: sic, inquiunt, et mundus atque in illo dii creati, et semper fuerunt semper existente qui fecit, et tamen facti sunt. Numquid ergo si anima semper fuit, etiam miseria ejus semper fuisse dicenda est? Porro si aliquid in illa, quod ex aeterno non fuit, esse coepit ex tempore, cur non fieri potuerit, ut ipsa esset ex tempore, quae antea non fuisset? Deinde beatitudo quoque ejus post experimentum malorum firmior et sine fine mansura, sicut iste confitetur, procul dubio coepit ex tempore, et tamen semper erit, cum antea non fuerit. Illa igitur omnis argumentatio dissoluta est, qua putatur nihil esse posse sine fine temporis, nisi quod initium non habet temporis. Inventa est enim animae beatitudo, quae cum initium temporis habuerit, finem temporis non habebit.

[XXXI.] Falsely therefore by certain Platonists was that circle believed as if necessary, of departing from the same and returning to the same. Which even if it were true, what would it profit to know this, unless perhaps thence the Platonists dared to prefer themselves to us, because we should not know that in this life now, which they themselves most purged and most wise were to not know in another better life, and were to be blessed by believing a falsehood? But if it is most absurd and most foolish to say this, surely the opinion of Porphyry is to be preferred to those who suspected the circles of souls (circuli animarum) by always alternating beatitude and misery. But if it is so, behold a Platonist dissents for the better from Plato: behold he saw what that one did not see, nor after such and so great a master did he flee correction, but preferred truth to man.

Chapter XXXI.

Against the argument of the Platonists, by which they assert the human soul to be coeternal with God.

Why therefore do we not rather believe the divinity concerning these things, which we cannot investigate by human genius, which says that the soul itself is also not coeternal (coaeterna) with God, but created, which was not? For so that the Platonists might not wish to believe this, they surely seemed to themselves to bring this suitable cause, because unless it had always been before, it could not thereafter be everlasting. Although both concerning the world and concerning those gods whom Plato writes were made by God in the world (In Timaeo), he says most openly that they began to be and have a beginning (initium), yet he maintains that they shall not have an end (finem), but shall remain in eternity through the most powerful will of the Creator (Conditor). But how they understand this, they have found, namely that this is not of time, but a beginning of substitution. For just as," they say, "if a foot (pes) had always been from eternity in the dust (pulvere), a footprint (vestigium) would always be under it; which footprint however no one would doubt was made by the one treading (calcante), nor would one be prior to the other, although one was made by the other: so," they say, "both the world and the gods created in it, both always were, He who made them always existing, and yet they were made." Should it therefore be said that if the soul always was, its misery also always was? Furthermore, if something in it, which was not from eternity, began to be from time, why could it not be, that it itself was from time, which before was not? Then its beatitude also after the experience of evils firmer and about to remain without end, as this one confesses, without doubt began from time, and yet it shall always be, when before it was not. That whole argumentation therefore is dissolved, by which it is thought that nothing can be without end of time (finis temporis), except that which does not have a beginning of time (initium temporis). For the beatitude of the soul has been found, which since it shall have had a beginning of time, shall not have an end of time.

Quapropter divinae auctoritati humana cedat infirmitas, eisque beatis et immortalibus de vera religione credamus, qui sibi honorem non expetunt, quem Deo suo, qui etiam noster est, deberi sciunt; nec jubent, ut sacrificium faciamus, nisi ei tantummodo, cujus et nos cum illis, ut saepe dixi et saepe dicendum est, sacrificium esse debemus, per eum sacerdotem offerendi, qui in homine quem suscepit, secundum quem et sacerdos esse voluit, etiam usque ad mortem sacrificium pro nobis dignatus est fieri.

Caput XXXII.

De universali via animae liberandae, quam Porphyrius male quaerendo non reperit, et quam sola gratia christiana reseravit.

1. Haec est religio, quae universalem continet viam animae liberandae; quoniam nulla nisi hac liberari potest. Haec est enim quodam modo regalis via, quae una ducit ad regnum, non temporali fastigio nutabundum, sed aeternitatis firmitate securum. Cum autem dicit Porphyrius in primo juxta finem de Regressu animae libro, nondum receptam unam quamdam sectam, quae universalem contineat viam animae liberandae, vel a philosophia verissima aliqua, vel ab Indorum moribus ac disciplina, aut inductione Chaldaeorum, aut alia qualibet via, nondumque in suam notitiam eamdem viam historiali cognitione perlatam; procul dubio confitetur esse aliquam, sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam. Ita ei non sufficiebat quidquid de anima liberanda studiosissime didicerat, sibique, vel potius aliis nosse ac tenere videbatur. Sentiebat enim adhuc sibi deesse aliquam praestantissimam auctoritatem, quam de re tanta sequi oporteret. Cum autem dicit, vel a philosophia verissima aliqua nondum in suam notitiam pervenisse sectam quae universalem contineat viam animae liberandae; satis, quantum arbitror, ostendit, vel ea philosophia, in qua ipse philosophatus est, non esse verissimam, vel ea non contineri talem viam. Et quomodo jam potest esse verissima, qua non continetur haec via? Nam quae alia via est universalis animae liberandae, nisi qua universae animae liberantur, ac per hoc sine illa nulla anima liberatur? Cum autem addit et dicit, Vel ab Indorum moribus et disciplina, vel ab inductione Chaldaeorum, vel alia qualibet via; manifestissima voce testatur, neque illis quae ab Indis, neque illis quae a Chaldaeis didicerat, hanc universalem viam animae liberandae contineri; et utique se a Chaldaeis oracula divina sumpsisse, quorum assiduam commemorationem facit, tacere non potuit.

Wherefore let human infirmity yield to divine authority, and let us believe those blessed and immortal ones concerning true religion, who do not seek honor for themselves, which they know to be owed to their God, who is also ours; nor do they command that we make sacrifice, except to Him alone, of whom we also with them, as I have often said and it is often to be said, ought to be a sacrifice, to be offered through that priest, who in the man whom He assumed, according to which He also willed to be a priest, deigned to become a sacrifice for us even unto death.

Chapter XXXII.

Of the universal way of the soul to be liberated, which Porphyry by seeking badly did not find, and which Christian grace (gratia) alone has opened.

1. This is the religion (religio) which contains the universal way (universalis via) of the soul to be liberated; since none can be liberated except by this. For this is in a certain way the royal way (regalis via), which alone leads to the kingdom, not wavering with temporal height, but secure with the firmness of eternity. But when Porphyry says in the first book near the end of the Return of the Soul, that a certain one sect has not yet been received which contains the universal way of the soul to be liberated, either from some most true philosophy, or from the customs and discipline of the Indians (Indorum), or the induction of the Chaldeans (Chaldaeorum), or any other way, and that that same way had not yet been brought to his knowledge by historical cognition (historialis cognitio); without doubt he confesses that there is some one, but that it had not yet come to his knowledge. Thus whatever he had most studiously learned concerning the liberation of the soul, and seemed to himself, or rather to others, to know and hold, was not sufficient for him. For he felt that he still lacked some most excellent authority, which it would be necessary to follow concerning so great a matter. But when he says that even from some most true philosophy a sect which contains the universal way of the soul to be liberated had not yet arrived at his knowledge; he shows sufficiently, as I think, either that that philosophy in which he himself philosophized is not the most true, or that such a way is not contained in it. And how now can that be most true, in which this way is not contained? For what other way is universal for the liberation of the soul, except that by which all souls are liberated, and through this without it no soul is liberated? But when he adds and says, "Either from the customs and discipline of the Indians, or from the induction of the Chaldeans, or by any other way"; he testifies with a most manifest voice that neither in those things which he had learned from the Indians, nor in those which he had from the Chaldeans, is this universal way of the soul to be liberated contained; and indeed he could not be silent that he had taken from the Chaldeans divine oracles, of which he makes assiduous commemoration.

Quam vult ergo intelligi animae liberandae universalem viam nondum receptam, vel ex aliqua verissima philosophia, vel ex earum gentium doctrinis, quae magnae velut in divinis rebus habebantur, quia plus apud eas curiositas valuit quorumque angelorum cognoscendorum et colendorum, nondumque in suam notitiam historiali cognitione perlatam? Quaenam ista est universalis via, nisi quae non suae cuique genti propria, sed universis gentibus quae communis esset, divinitus impertita est? Quam certe iste homo non mediocri ingenio praeditus esse non dubitat. Providentiam quippe divinam sine ista universali via liberandae animae genus humanum relinquere potuisse non credit. Neque enim ait non esse, sed hoc tantum bonum tantumque adjutorium nondum receptum, nondum in suam notitiam esse perlatum: nec mirum. Tunc enim Porphyrius erat in rebus humanis, quando ista liberandae animae universalis via, quae non est alia quam religio christiana, oppugnari permittebatur ab idolorum daemonumque cultoribus regibusque terrenis, propter asserendum et consecrandum martyrum numerum, hoc est testium veritatis, per quos ostenderetur, omnia corporalia mala pro fide pietatis et commendatione veritatis esse toleranda. Videbat ergo ista Porphyrius, et per hujusmodi persecutiones cito istam viam perituram, et propterea non esse ipsam liberandae animae universalem putabat, non intelligens hoc quod eum movebat, et quod in ejus electione perpeti metuebat, ad ejus confirmationem robustioremque commendationem potius pertinere.

2. Haec est igitur animae liberandae universalis via, id est universis gentibus divina miseratione concessa; cujus profecto notitia ad quoscumque jam venit, et ad quoscumque ventura est, nec debuit, nec debebit ei dici, Quare modo? et quare sero? quoniam mittentis consilium non est humano ingenio penetrabile. Quod sensit etiam iste, cum dixit, nondum receptum hoc donum Dei, et nondum in suam notitiam fuisse perlatum. Nec enim propterea verum non esse judicavit, quia nondum in suam fidem receptum fuerat, vel in notitiam nondum pervenerat. Haec est, inquam, liberandorum credentium universalis via, de qua fidelis Abraham divinum accepit oraculum: In semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes (Gen. XXII, 18). Qui fuit quidem gente Chaldaeus, sed ut talia promissa perciperet, et ex illo propagaretur sesemen dispositum per Angelos in manu Mediatoris (Galat. III, 19), in quo esset ista liberandae animae universalis via, hoc est omnibus gentibus data, jussus est discedere de terra sua et de cognatione sua et de domo patris sui (Gen. XII, 1).

What universal way therefore of liberating the soul does he wish to be understood as not yet received, either from some most true philosophy, or from the doctrines of those nations which were held as if great in divine matters, because curiosity for knowing and worshipping whatever angels had more weight among them, and not yet brought to his knowledge by historical cognition? What is that universal way, except that which was not proper to each nation of its own, but which should be common to all nations, divinely imparted? Which certainly this man endowed with no mediocre genius does not doubt to be. Since indeed he does not believe that divine providence (providentia) could have left the human race without this universal way of liberating the soul. For he does not say that it is not, but that this so great good and so great help has not yet been received, has not yet been brought to his knowledge: nor is it a wonder. For Porphyry was among human affairs at that time when this universal way of liberating the soul, which is no other than the Christian religion, was permitted to be attacked by the worshippers of idols and demons and by earthly kings, for the sake of asserting and consecrating the number of martyrs (martyrum), that is, witnesses of the truth, through whom it might be shown that all corporeal evils are to be tolerated for the faith of piety and the commendation of the truth. Porphyry therefore saw these things, and that through such persecutions that way would quickly perish, and for that reason he thought it was not the universal way itself of liberating the soul, not understanding that this which moved him, and which he feared to endure in its election, rather pertained to its confirmation and more robust commendation.

2. This is therefore the universal way (universalis via) of the soul to be liberated, that is, granted to all nations by divine commiseration (divina miseratio); the knowledge of which surely has already come to whomsoever, and is to come to whomsoever, nor ought it, nor shall it be necessary to be said to it, Why now? and why late? since the counsel of the Sender is not penetrable by human genius. Which this one also felt when he said that this gift of God was not yet received, and had not yet been brought to his knowledge. For he did not therefore judge it not to be true, because it had not yet been received into his faith, or had not yet arrived at his knowledge. This is, I say, the universal way of believers to be liberated, concerning which faithful Abraham received the divine oracle: "In thy seed shall all nations be blessed" (Gen. XXII, 18). Who was indeed a Chaldean by nation, but so that he might perceive such promises, and from him should be propagated the seed disposed through Angels in the hand of the Mediator (Mediatoris) (Galat. III, 19), in whom should be that universal way of the soul to be liberated, that is, given to all nations, he was commanded to depart from his land and from his kindred and from his father's house (Gen. XII, 1).

Tunc ipse primitus a Chaldaeorum superstitionibus liberatus, unum verum Deum sequendo coluit, cui haec promittenti fideliter credidit. Haec est universalis via, de qua in sancta prophetia dictum est: Deus misereatur nostri, et benedicat nos; illuminet vultum suum super nos, et misereatur nostri: ut cognoscamus in terra viam tuam, in omnibus gentibus salutare tuum (Psal. LXVI, 2 et 3). Unde tanto post ex Abrahae semine carne suscepta, de se ipso ait ipse Salvator: Ego sum via, et veritas, et vita (Joan. XIV, 6). Haec est universalis via, de qua tanto ante tempore prophetatum est: Erit in novissimis diebus manifestus mons domus Domini, paratus in cacumine montium, et extolletur super colles; et venient ad eum universae gentes, et ingredientur nationes multae, et dicent: Venite, ascendamus in montem Domini, et in domum Dei Jacob; et annuntiabit nobis viam suam, et ingrediemur in ea. Ex Sion enim prodiet lex, et Verbum Domini ab Jerusalem (Isai. II, 2 et 3). Via ergo ista non est unius gentis, sed universarum gentium. Et lex verbumque Domini non in Sion et Jerusalem remansit; sed inde processit, ut se per universa diffunderet. Unde ipse Mediator post resurrectionem suam discipulis trepidantibus ait: Oportebat impleri quae scripta sunt in Lege, et Prophetis, et Psalmis de me. Tunc aperuit illis sensum, ut intelligerent Scripturas, et dixit eis, Quia oportebat Christum pati, et resurgere a mortuis tertio die, et praedicari in nomine ejus poenitentiam et remissionem peccatorum per omnes gentes, incipientibus ab Jerusalem (Luc. XXIV, 44-47). Haec est igitur universalis animae liberandae via, quam sancti Angeli sanctique Prophetae prius in paucis hominibus ubi potuerunt Dei gratiam reperientibus, et maxime in Hebraea gente, cujus erat ipsa quodammodo sacrata respublica, in prophetationem et praenuntiationem civitatis Dei ex omnibus gentibus congregandae, et tabernaculo et templo et sacerdotio et sacrificiis significaverunt, et eloquiis quibusdam manifestis, plerisque mysticis, praedixerunt; praesens autem in carne ipse Mediator, et beati ejus Apostoli jam Testamenti novi gratiam revelantes apertius indicarunt, quae aliquanto occultius superioribus sunt significata temporibus, pro aetatum generis humani distributione; sicut eam Deo sapienti placuit ordinare, mirabilium operum divinorum, quorum superius pauca jam posui, contestantibus signis. Non enim apparuerunt tantummodo visiones angelicae, et coelestium ministrorum sola verba sonuerunt:

Then he first, having been liberated from the superstitions of the Chaldeans, worshipped by following the one true God, whom he faithfully believed promising these things. This is the universal way concerning which it was said in the holy prophecy: "God be merciful to us, and bless us; cause His face to shine upon us, and be merciful to us: that we may know Thy way upon earth, Thy salvation among all nations" (Psal. LXVI, 2 and 3). Whence so long after, having assumed flesh from the seed of Abraham, the Savior (Salvator) Himself says of Himself: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life" (John XIV, 6). This is the universal way concerning which it was prophesied so long before: "It shall be in the last days that the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be manifest, prepared on the top of the mountains, and shall be extolled above the hills; and all nations shall come to it, and many nations shall enter, and shall say: Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and He will announce to us His way, and we will enter into it. For out of Sion shall go forth the law, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem" (Isai. II, 2 and 3). This way therefore is not of one nation, but of all nations. And the law and the word of the Lord did not remain in Sion and Jerusalem; but proceeded thence, so that it might diffuse itself through all things. Whence the Mediator Himself after His resurrection said to His trembling disciples: "It behooved those things to be fulfilled which were written in the Law, and the Prophets, and the Psalms concerning me. Then He opened their sense, so that they might understand the Scriptures (Scripturas), and said to them, That it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead on the third day, and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name through all nations, beginning from Jerusalem" (Luke XXIV, 44-47). This is therefore the universal way of the soul to be liberated, which the holy Angels and holy Prophets first signified in a few men where they could find the grace of God, and especially in the Hebrew nation (Hebraea gente), whose very republic was in some way sacred (sacrata respublica), in the prophesying and pre-announcing of the city of God (civitatis Dei) to be gathered out of all nations, and by the tabernacle and temple and priesthood and sacrifices, and predicted by certain manifest utterances, most of them mystical; but the Mediator Himself present in the flesh, and His blessed Apostles now revealing more openly the grace of the New Testament (novum Testamentum), indicated those things which were signified somewhat more hiddenly in the former times, according to the distribution of the ages of the human race; as it pleased the wise God to ordain it, the signs of the wonderful divine works, of which I have already set down a few above, attesting. For not only did angelic visions appear, and only the words of celestial ministers sound:

verum etiam hominibus Dei verbo simplicis pietatis agentibus spiritus immundi de hominum corporibus ac sensibus pulsi sunt; vitia corporis languoresque sanati; fera animalia terrarum et aquarum, volatilia coeli, ligna, elementa, sidera, divina jussa fecerunt, inferna cesserunt, mortui revixerunt: exceptis ipsius Salvatoris propriis singularibusque miraculis, maxime nativitatis et resurrectionis; in quorum uno maternae virginitatis tantummodo sacramentum, in altero autem etiam eorum qui in fine resurrecturi sunt, demonstravit exemplum. Haec via totum hominem mundat, et immortalitati mortalem ex omnibus quibus constat partibus praeparat. Ut enim non alia purgatio ei parti quaereretur, quam vocat intellectualem Porphyrius, alia ei quam vocat spiritualem, aliaque ipsi corpori, propterea totum suscepit veracissimus potentissimusque mundator atque salvator. Praeter hanc viam, quae partim cum haec futura praenuntiantur, partim cum facta nuntiantur, nunquam generi defuit humano, nemo liberatus est, nemo liberatur, nemo liberabitur.

3. Quod autem Porphyrius universalem viam animae liberandae nondum in suam notitiam historiali cognitione dicit esse perlatam: quid hac historia vel illustrius inveniri potest, quae universum orbem tanto apice auctoritatis obtinuit, vel fidelius, in qua ita narrantur praeterita, ut futura etiam praedicantur; quorum multa videmus impleta, ex quibus ea quae restant sine dubio speremus implenda? Non enim potest Porphyrius, vel quicumque Platonici, etiam in hac via quasi terrenarum rerum et ad istam vitam mortalem pertinentium, divinationem praedictionemque contemnere: quod merito in aliis vaticinationibus et quorumlibet modorum vel artium divinationibus faciunt. Negant enim haec vel magnorum hominum, vel magni esse pendenda: et recte. Nam vel inferiorum fiunt praesensione causarum, sicut arte medicinae quibusdam antecedentibus signis plurima eventura valetudini praevidentur; vel immundi daemones sua disposita facta praenuntiant, quorum jus et in mentibus atque cupiditatibus iniquorum ad quaeque congruentia facta ducendis quodam modo sibi vindicant, et in materia infima fragilitatis humanae. Not talia sancti homines in ista universali animarum liberandarum via gradientes, tanquam magna prophetare curarunt: quamvis et ista eos non fugerint, et ab eis saepe praedicta sint, ad eorum fidem faciendam, quae mortalium sensibus non poterant intimari, nec ad experimentum celeri facilitate perduci. Sed alia erant vere magna atque divina, quae quantum dabatur, cognita Dei voluntate, futura nuntiabant.

but also by men acting by the word of God of simple piety, unclean spirits (spiritus immundi) were driven out from the bodies and senses of men; the vices and languors of the body were healed; wild animals of the lands and waters, birds of the heaven, woods, elements, stars, did the divine commands, the infernal regions yielded, the dead lived again: except the proper and singular miracles of the Savior Himself, especially of birth and resurrection; in one of which He demonstrated only the sacrament (sacramentum) of maternal virginity, but in the other an example also of those who are to rise again in the end. This way cleanses the whole man, and prepares the mortal for immortality from all the parts of which he consists. For lest one purgation should be sought for that part which Porphyry calls intellectual, another for that which he calls spiritual, and another for the body itself, for that reason the most true and most powerful cleanser and savior (mundator atque salvator) assumed the whole. Besides this way, which was never lacking to the human race, partly when these things to come are pre-announced, partly when they are announced as done, no one has been liberated, no one is liberated, no one shall be liberated.

3. But as to Porphyry saying that the universal way (universalis via) of the soul to be liberated had not yet been brought to his knowledge by historical cognition (historialis cognitione): what can be found either more illustrious than this history, which has obtained the universal orb with such a height of authority, or more faithful, in which past things are so narrated that future things are also predicted; many of which we see fulfilled, from which we may without doubt hope that those which remain are to be fulfilled? For Porphyry, or any Platonists whatsoever, cannot even in this way as if of earthly things and pertaining to this mortal life, despise divination and prediction: which they rightly do in other prophecies (vaticinationibus) and divinations of any modes or arts whatsoever. For they deny that these are to be weighed either of great men, or as great: and rightly. For they are made either by the presension of inferior causes, just as by the art of medicine many things are foreseen as about to happen to health by certain antecedent signs; or unclean demons pre-announce their own disposed deeds, whose right both in the minds and desires of the iniquitous to deeds congruent to each they in a certain way claim for themselves, and in the lowest matter of human fragility. Not such things did holy men, walking in that universal way of souls to be liberated, care to prophesy as if great: although even those things did not escape them, and were often predicted by them, for the sake of making faith in those things which could not be intimated to the senses of mortals, nor brought to experience with quick facility. But there were other things truly great and divine, which, as much as was given, the will of God being known, they announced as to come.

Christus quippe in carne venturus, et quae in illo tam clara perfecta sunt atque in ejus nomine impleta, poenitentia hominum et ad Deum conversio voluntatum, remissio peccatorum, gratia justitiae, fides piorum et per universum orbem in veram divinitatem multitudo credentium, culturae simulacrorum daemonumque subversio et a tentationibus exercitatio, proficientium purgatio et liberatio ab omni malo, judicii dies, resurrectio mortuorum, societatis impiorum aeterna damnatio, regnumque aeternum gloriosissimae civitatis Dei conspectu ejus immortaliter perfruentis, in hujus viae Scripturis praedicta atque promissa sunt: quorum tam multa impleta conspicimus, ut recta pietate futura esse caetera confidamus. Hujus viae rectitudinem usque ad Deum videndum eique in aeternum cohaerendum, in sanctarum Scripturarum, qua praedicatur atque asseritur, veritate, quicumque non credunt, et ob hoc nec intelligunt, oppugnare possunt, sed expugnare non possunt.

4. Quapropter in decem libris istis, etsi minus quam nonnullorum de nobis exspectabat intentio, tamen quorumdam studio, quantum verus Deus et Dominus adjuvare dignatus est, satisfecimus, refutando contradictiones impiorum, qui Conditori sanctae civitatis, de qua disputare instituimus, deos suos praeferunt. Quorum decem librorum quinque superiores adversus eos conscripti sunt, qui propter bona vitae hujus deos colendos putant; quinque autem posteriores adversus eos qui cultum deorum propter vitam, quae post mortem futura est, servandum existimant. Deinceps itaque, ut in primo libro polliciti sumus, de duarum civitatum, quas in hoc saeculo perplexas diximus invicemque permixtas, exortu et procursu et debitis finibus, quod dicendum arbitror, quantum divinitus adjuvabor, expediam.

Christ (Christus) indeed about to come in the flesh, and those things which in Him were so clearly perfected and fulfilled in His name, the penance of men and the conversion of wills (conversio voluntatum) to God, the remission of sins, the grace of justice, the faith of the pious and through the universal orb the multitude of believers in the true divinity, the subversion of the worship of images and demons and the exercise from temptations, the purgation of those profiting and liberation from every evil, the day of judgment (judicii dies), the resurrection of the dead, the eternal damnation of the society of the impious (societatis impiorum), and the eternal kingdom of the most glorious city of God (civitatis Dei) immortally enjoying His sight, were predicted and promised in the Scriptures (Scripturis) of this way: so many of which we behold fulfilled, that with right piety we trust the rest to be about to be. The rectitude of this way even to the seeing of God and cohering to Him in eternity, in the truth of the holy Scriptures, by which it is preached and asserted, whosoever do not believe, and for this reason neither understand, can attack, but they cannot conquer.

4. Wherefore in these ten books, although less than the intention of some expected of us, yet we have satisfied the study of certain ones, as much as the true God and Lord deigned to help, by refuting the contradictions of the impious, who prefer their own gods to the Creator (Conditori) of the holy city, concerning which we have instituted to dispute. Of which ten books the five former ones were written against those who think gods are to be worshipped on account of the goods of this life; but the five latter ones against those who think the worship of gods is to be maintained on account of the life which is to be after death. Thereafter, therefore, as we promised in the first book, I shall expedite, as much as I shall be divinely helped, what I think is to be said concerning the origin (exortu) and progress (procursu) and deserved ends (debitis finibus) of the two cities, which we said are in this world entangled and mutually mixed.

LIBER UNDECIMUS.

Incipit operis hujus pars altera, quae est de duarum civitatum, terrenae et coelestis, exortu, et procursu, ac debitis finibus. Hoc primum libro civitatum earumdem exordia quomodo in Angelorum bonorum et malorum discretione praecesserint, demonstrat Augustinus, eaque occasione agit de constitutione mundi, quae sacris Litteris in principio libri Geneseos describitur.

Caput Primum.

De ea parte operis, qua duarum civitatum, id est coelestis ac terrenae, initia et fines incipiunt demonstrari.

Civitatem Dei dicimus, cujus ea Scriptura testis est, quae non fortuitis motibus animorum, sed plane summae dispositione providentiae super omnes omnium gentium litteras, omnia sibi genera ingeniorum humanorum divina excellens auctoritate subjecit. Ibi quippe scriptum est: Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei (Psal. LXXXVI, 3). Et in alio psalmo legitur: Magnus Dominus, et laudabilis valde in civitate Dei nostri, in monte sancto ejus, dilatans exsultationes universae terrae. Et paulo post in eodem psalmo: Sicut audivimus, ita et vidimus, in civitate Domini virtutum, in civitate Dei nostri; Deus fundavit eam in aeternum (Psal. XLVII, 2, 3, 9). Item in alio: Fluminis impetus laetificat civitatem Dei, sanctificavit tabernaculum suum Altissimus; Deus in medio ejus, non commovebitur (Psal. XLV, 5 et 6). His atque hujusmodi testimoniis, quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, didicimus esse quamdam civitatem Dei, cujus cives esse concupiscimus illo amore, quem nobis illius Conditor inspiravit. Huic Conditori sanctae civitatis, cives terrenae civitatis deos suos praeferunt, ignorantes eum esse Deum deorum, non deorum falsorum, hoc est impiorum et superborum, qui ejus incommutabili omnibusque communi luce privati, et ob hoc ad quamdam egenam potestatem redacti, suas quodammodo privatas potentias consectantur, honoresque divinos a deceptis subditis quaerunt; sed deorum piorum atque sanctorum, qui potius se ipsos uni subdere quam multos sibi, potiusque Deum colere quam pro Deo coli delectantur.

BOOK ELEVENTH.

The second part of this work begins, which is concerning the origin (exortu), progress (procursu), and deserved ends (debitis finibus) of the two cities, the earthly and the celestial. In this first book Augustine demonstrates how the beginnings (exordia) of those same cities preceded in the distinction of the good and evil angels, and on that occasion he treats of the constitution of the world, which is described in the Holy Scriptures (sacris Litteris) at the beginning of the book of Genesis.

Chapter First.

Of that part of the work in which the beginnings and ends of the two cities, that is, the celestial and the earthly, begin to be demonstrated.

We call that the City of God (civitatem Dei) whose witness is that Scripture which, not by fortuitous motions of minds, but clearly by the highest disposition of providence (providentiae) above all the writings of all nations, has subjected to itself all kinds of human geniuses, excelling by divine authority. For there it is written: Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God (Psal. LXXXVI, 3). And in another psalm it is read: Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised in the city of our God, in His holy mountain, spreading the exultations of the universal earth. And a little after in the same psalm: As we have heard, so also have we seen, in the city of the Lord of virtues, in the city of our God; God has founded it forever (Psal. XLVII, 2, 3, 9). Likewise in another: The impetus of the river gladdens the city of God, the Most High has sanctified His tabernacle; God is in the midst of her, she shall not be moved (Psal. XLV, 5 and 6). By these and such-like testimonies, which it is too long to commemorate all, we have learned that there is a certain city of God, whose citizens we desire to be with that love which its Creator (Conditor) has inspired in us. To this Creator of the holy city, the citizens of the earthly city (terrenae civitatis) prefer their own gods, being ignorant that He is the God of gods, not of false gods, that is, of the impious and proud, who, being deprived of His unchangeable and common light to all, and for this reason reduced to a certain indigent power, pursue in a manner their own private powers, and seek divine honors from their deceived subjects; but of the pious and holy gods, who delight rather to subject themselves to one than many to themselves, and rather to worship God than to be worshipped for God.

Sed hujus sanctae civitatis inimicis, decem superioribus libris, quantum potuimus, Domino et Rege nostro adjuvante, respondimus. Nunc vero quid a me jam exspectetur agnoscens, meique non immemor debiti, de duarum civitatum, terrenae scilicet et coelestis, quas in hoc interim saeculo perplexas quodammodo diximus invicemque permixtas, exortu et excursu et debitis finibus, quantum valuero, disputare, ejus ipsius Domini et Regis nostri ubique opitulatione fretus, aggrediar: primumque dicam quemadmodum exordia duarum istarum civitatum in Angelorum diversitate praecesserint.

Caput II.

De cognoscendo Deo, ad cujus notitiam nemo hominum pervenit, nisi per Mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Jesum Christum.

Magnum est et admodum rarum universam creaturam corpoream et incorpoream consideratam compertamque mutabilem intentione mentis excedere, atque ad incommutabilem Dei substantiam pervenire, et illic discere ex ipso, quod cunctam naturam quae non est quod ipse, non fecit nisi ipse. Sic enim Deus cum homine non per aliquam creaturam loquitur corporalem, corporalibus instrepens auribus, ut inter sonantem et audientem aeria spatia verberentur; neque per ejusmodi spiritualem quae corporum similitudinibus figuratur, sicut in somniis vel quo alio tali modo; nam et sic velut corporis auribus loquitur, quia velut per corpus loquitur et velut interposito corporalium locorum intervallo; multum enim similia sunt talia visa corporibus: sed loquitur ipsa veritate, si quis sit idoneus ad audiendum mente, non corpore. Ad illud enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine caeteris quibus homo constat est melius, et quo ipse Deus solus est melior. Cum enim homo rectissime intelligatur, vel si hoc non potest, saltem credatur factus ad imaginem Dei; profecto ea sui parte est propinquior superiori Deo, qua superat inferiores suas, quas etiam cum pecoribus communes habet. Sed quia ipsa mens, cui ratio et intelligentia naturaliter inest, vitiis quibusdam tenebrosis et veteribus invalida est, non solum ad inhaerendum fruendo, verum etiam ad perferendum incommutabile lumen, donec de die in diem renovata atque sanata fiat tantae felicitatis capax, fide primum fuerat imbuenda atque purganda. In qua ut fidentius ambularet ad veritatem, ipsa veritas Deus Dei Filius homine assumpto, non Deo consumpto, eamdem constituit atque fundavit fidem, ut ad hominis Deum iter esset homini per hominem Deum. Hic est enim mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus.

But to the enemies of this holy city, in the ten former books, as much as we were able, our Lord and King helping us, we have replied. Now truly, recognizing what is already expected of me, and not unmindful of my debt, I shall approach, relying everywhere on the assistance of that same Lord and King of ours, to dispute, as far as I shall be able, concerning the origin (exortu), progress (excursu), and deserved ends (debitis finibus) of the two cities, namely, the earthly and the celestial, which we have said are in this world interim entangled in a manner and mutually mixed; and first I shall tell how the beginnings (exordia) of these two cities preceded in the diversity of the Angels.

Chapter II.

Of the knowing of God, to whose knowledge no one of men reaches, except through the Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ.

It is a great and very rare thing to exceed by the intention of the mind the universal creature, corporeal and incorporeal, considered and found mutable, and to reach to the unchangeable substance of God, and there to learn from Him that the whole nature which is not what He is, none made except Himself. For thus God speaks with man not through some corporeal creature, sounding in corporeal ears, so that between the one sounding and the one hearing the aerial spaces are beaten; nor through that kind of spiritual creature which is figured with likenesses of bodies, as in dreams or in any other such manner; for even thus He speaks as it were to the ears of the body, because He speaks as it were through the body and as it were with an interval of corporeal places interposed; for such visions are very similar to bodies: but He speaks by truth itself, if any one be fit for hearing with the mind, not with the body. For He speaks so to that part of man which is better in man than the rest of the things of which man consists, and than which God alone is better. For since man is most rightly understood, or if this cannot be, at least is believed to have been made in the image of God; surely by that part of himself he is nearer to the superior God, by which he surpasses his own inferior parts, which he has in common even with the beasts. But because the mind itself, in which reason and intelligence are naturally present, is invalid through certain dark and old vices, not only for adhering in enjoying, but even for bearing the unchangeable light, until being renewed and healed from day to day it becomes capable of so great happiness, it had first to be imbued and purged by faith. In order that it might walk more confidently in it toward the truth, the truth itself, God the Son of God, having assumed man, not having consumed God, constituted and founded that same faith, so that the journey to the God of man might be for man through the man-God. For this is the mediator (mediator) of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.

Per hoc enim mediator, per quod homo; per hoc et via. Quoniam si inter eum qui tendit et illud quo tendit, via media est, spes est perveniendi: si autem desit, aut ignoretur qua eundum sit, quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit? Sola est autem adversus omnes errores via munitissima, ut idem ipse sit Deus et homo: quo itur, Deus; qua itur, homo.

Caput III.

De auctoritate canonicae Scripturae a divino Spiritu conditae.

Hic prius per Prophetas, deinde per se ipsum, postea per Apostolos, quantum satis esse judicavit, locutus, etiam Scripturam condidit, quae canonica nominatur, eminentissimae auctoritatis, cui fidem habemus de iis rebus quas ignorare non expedit, nec per nos ipsos nosse idonei sumus. Nam si ea sciri possunt testibus nobis, quae remota non sunt a sensibus nostris sive interioribus sive etiam exterioribus; unde et praesentia dicuntur, quod ita praesto sunt sensibus, sicut praesto est oculis quod prae faciem est: profecto de iis quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris, quoniam nostra testificatione sciri non possunt, de iis alios testes quaerimus, eisque credimus, a quorum sensibus remota esse vel fuisse non credimus. Sicut ergo in rebus visibilibus, quas non vidimus, eis credimus qui viderunt; ita in iis quae animo sentiuntur, si et ipsa remota sunt a sensibus nostris, iis oportet credamus, qui ea in illo incorporeo lumine disposita vel viderunt, vel in eo pariter vident.

Caput IV.

De conditione mundi, quod nec intemporalis sit, nec novo Dei ordinata consilio, quasi postea voluerit, quod antea noluerit.

1. Visibilium omnium maximus est mundus; invisibilium omnium maximus est Deus. Sed mundum esse conspicimus, Deum esse credimus. Quod autem Deus mundum fecerit, nulli tutius credimus, quam ipsi Deo. Ubi eum audivimus? Nusquam interim nos melius quam in Scripturis sanctis, ubi dixit propheta ejus, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram (Gen. I, 1). Numquidnam ibi fuit iste propheta, quando fecit Deus coelum et terram?

For by this he is mediator, by which he is man; by this also he is the way (via). Because if between him who tends and that toward which he tends, there is a middle way, there is hope of reaching: but if it be lacking, or it be unknown by where one must go, what does it profit to know where one must go? But the only most fortified way against all errors is that the very same one be God and man: whither we go, God; by which we go, man.

Chapter III.

Of the authority of the canonical Scripture founded by the divine Spirit.

He, having spoken first through the Prophets, then through Himself, afterwards through the Apostles, as much as He judged to be sufficient, also founded the Scripture which is named canonical, of most eminent authority, in which we have faith concerning those things which it is not expedient to be ignorant of, nor are we fit to know through ourselves. For if those things can be known by us as witnesses which are not remote from our senses, whether interior or even exterior (whence also they are called present, because they are as at hand to the senses as that is at hand to the eyes which is before the face); surely concerning those things which are remote from our senses, since they cannot be known by our own testifying, we seek other witnesses for them, and we believe those from whose senses we do not believe them to be or to have been remote. As therefore in visible things, which we have not seen, we believe those who have seen; so in those things which are perceived by the mind, if they also are remote from our senses, it behooves us to believe those who either saw them disposed in that incorporeal light, or see them in it likewise.

Chapter IV.

Of the condition of the world, that it is neither untemporal, nor ordained by a new counsel of God, as if He afterwards willed what He previously did not will.

1. Of all visible things the greatest is the world; of all invisible things the greatest is God. But we behold that the world is, we believe that God is. But that God made the world, we believe none more safely than God Himself. Where have we heard Him? Nowhere better for the time being than in the Holy Scriptures (Scripturis sanctis), where His prophet said: In the beginning God made heaven and earth (Gen. I, 1). Was that prophet there when God made heaven and earth?

Non: sed ibi fuit Sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quae in animas etiam sanctas se transfert, amicos Dei et Prophetas constituit (Sap. VII, 27), eisque opera sua sine strepitu intus enarrat. Loquuntur eis quoque Angeli Dei, qui semper vident faciem Patris (Matth. XVIII, 10), voluntatemque ejus quibus oportet annuntiant. Ex his unus erat iste propheta, qui dixit et scripsit, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram. Qui tam idoneus testis est per quem Deo credendum sit, ut eodem Spiritu Dei, quo haec sibi revelata cognovit, etiam ipsam fidem nostram futuram tanto ante praedixerit.

2. Sed quid placuit Deo aeterno tunc facere coelum et terram, quae antea non fecisset? Qui hoc dicunt, si mundum aeternum sine ullo initio, et ideo nec a Deo factum videri volunt, nimis aversi sunt a veritate, et letali morbo impietatis insaniunt. Exceptis enim propheticis vocibus, mundus ipse ordinatissima sua mutabilitate et mobilitate et visibilium omnium pulcherrima specie quodammodo tacitus et factum se esse, et nonnisi a Deo ineffabiliter atque invisibiliter magno et ineffabiliter atque invisibiliter pulchro fieri se potuisse proclamat. Qui autem a Deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum volunt temporis habere, sed suae creationis initium, ut modo quodam vix intelligibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, unde sibi Deum videntur velut a fortuita temeritate defendere, ne subito illi venisse credatur in mentem, quod nunquam ante venisset, facere mundum, et accidisse illi voluntatem novam, cum in nullo sit omnino mutabilis: sed non video quomodo eis possit in caeteris rebus ratio ista subsistere, maximeque in anima, quam si Deo coaeternam esse contenderint, unde illi acciderit nova miseria, quae nunquam antea per aeternum, nullo modo poterunt explicare. Si enim alternasse semper ejus miseriam et beatitudinem dixerint, necesse est dicant etiam semper alternaturam: unde illa eos sequetur absurditas, ut etiam cum beata dicitur, in hoc utique non sit beata, si futuram suam miseriam et turpitudinem praevidet; si autem non praevidet, nec se turpem ac miseram fore, sed beatam semper existimat, falsa opinione sit beata: quo dici stultius nihil potest. Si autem semper quidem per saecula retro infinita cum beatitudine alternasse animae miseriam putant, sed nunc jam de caetero cum fuerit liberata, ad miseriam non esse redituram, nihilominus convincuntur nunquam eam fuisse vere beatam, sed deinceps esse incipere nova quadam nec fallaci beatitudine; ac per hoc fatebuntur accidere illi aliquid novi, et hoc magnum atque praeclarum, quod nunquam retro per aeternitatem accidisset.

No: but there was the Wisdom of God, through which all things were made, which transfers itself also into holy souls, constitutes the friends of God and Prophets (Sap. VII, 27), and narrates His works to them inwardly without noise. To them also the Angels of God speak, who always see the face of the Father (Matth. XVIII, 10), and announce His will to whom it is fit. Of these that prophet was one, who said and wrote: In the beginning God made heaven and earth. Who is so fit a witness through whom God is to be believed, that by the same Spirit of God, by which he knew these things revealed to himself, he also predicted our very future faith so long before.

2. But why did it please the eternal God then to make heaven and earth, which He had not made before? Those who say this, if they wish the world to seem eternal without any beginning, and therefore not even made by God, are too much turned away from the truth, and are insane with the lethal disease of impiety. For, the prophetic voices excepted, the world itself, by its most orderly mutability and mobility and by the most beautiful appearance of all visible things, proclaims in a manner silently both that it has been made, and that it could not have been made except by a God ineffably and invisibly great and ineffably and invisibly beautiful. But those who indeed confess that it was made by God, but yet do not wish it to have a beginning of time, but of its creation, so that in a certain scarcely intelligible manner it has always been made, do indeed say something whence they seem to themselves to defend God as if from fortuitous temerity, lest it be believed that it suddenly came into His mind, what had never come before, to make the world, and that a new will happened to Him, whereas in nothing is He at all changeable: but I do not see how that reason can subsist for them in other things, and especially in the soul, which if they contend to be co-eternal with God, they will in no way be able to explain whence a new misery happened to it, which never before through eternity. For if they shall have said that its misery and blessedness have always alternated, it is necessary that they say they will also always alternate: whence that absurdity will follow them, that even when it is called blessed, it is certainly not blessed in this, if it foresees its future misery and baseness; but if it does not foresee it, nor thinks it will be base and miserable, but estimates itself always blessed, it would be blessed by a false opinion: than which nothing more foolish can be said. But if they think that always indeed through infinite ages backwards the misery of the soul has alternated with blessedness, but now already for the rest when it shall have been liberated, it is not to return to misery, nevertheless they are convinced that it was never truly blessed, but thereafter begins to be by a certain new and not fallacious blessedness; and by this they will confess that something new happens to it, and this great and illustrious, which had never happened backwards through eternity.

Cujus novitatis causam si Deum negabunt in aeterno habuisse consilio, simul eum negabunt beatitudinis ejus auctorem; quod nefandae impietatis est: si autem dicent etiam ipsum novo consilio excogitasse, ut de caetero sit anima in aeternum beata, quomodo eum alienum ab ea, quae illis quoque displicet, mutabilitate monstrabunt? Porro, si ex tempore creatam, sed nullo ulterius tempore perituram, tanquam numerum, habere initium, sed non habere finem fatentur, et ideo semel expertam miserias, si ab eis fuerit liberata, nunquam miseram postea futuram, non utique dubitabunt hoc fieri manente incommutabilitate consilii Dei. Si ergo credant et mundum ex tempore fieri potuisse, nec tamen ideo Deum in eo faciendo aeternum consilium voluntatemque mutasse.

Caput V.

Tam non esse cogitandum de infinitis temporum spatiis ante mundum, quam nec de infinitis locorum.

Deinde videndum est istis, qui Deum conditorem mundi esse consentiunt, et tamen quaerunt de mundi tempore quid respondeamus, quid ipsi respondeant de mundi loco. Ita enim quaeritur cur potius tunc et non antea factus sit, quemadmodum quaeri potest cur hic potius ubi est et non alibi. Nam si infinita spatia temporis ante mundum cogitant, in quibus eis non videtur Deus ab opere cessare potuisse, similiter cogitent extra mundum infinita spatia locorum, in quibus si quisquam dicat non potuisse vacare omnipotentem, nonne consequens erit, ut innumerabiles mundos cum Epicuro somniare cogantur; ea tantum differentia, quod eos ille fortuitis motibus atomorum gigni asserit et resolvi, isti autem opere Dei factos dicturi sunt, si eum per interminabilem immensitatem locorum extra mundum circumquaque patentium vacare noluerint, nec eosdem mundos, quod etiam de isto sentiunt, ulla causa posse dissolvi? Cum his enim agimus qui et Deum incorporeum, et omnium naturarum quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; alios autem nimis indignum est ad istam disputationem religionis admittere: maxime quod apud eos qui multis diis sacrorum obsequium deferendum putant, isti philosophos caeteros nobilitate atque auctoritate vicerunt, non ob aliud, nisi quia longo quidem intervallo, verumtamen reliquis propinquiores sunt veritati.

The cause of which novelty if they shall deny God had in His eternal counsel, at the same time they will deny Him to be the author of its blessedness; which is of unspeakable impiety: but if they shall say that He Himself thought it out by a new counsel, that for the rest the soul be blessed forever, how will they show Him alien from that mutability which is displeasing to them also? Furthermore, if they confess it created in time, but in no further time to perish, as a number, to have a beginning but not to have an end, and therefore having once experienced miseries, if it shall have been liberated from them, never to be miserable afterwards, they will certainly not doubt that this happens while the unchangeableness of the counsel of God remains. If therefore they believe this, let them believe also that the world could have been made in time, and yet not therefore that God changed His eternal counsel and will in making it.

Chapter V.

That one must no more think concerning infinite spaces of times before the world, than concerning infinite spaces of places.

Then it must be seen by those who consent that God is the founder of the world, and yet ask what we may answer concerning the time of the world, what they themselves answer concerning the place of the world. For thus it is asked why it was made then rather and not before, just as it can be asked why here rather where it is and not elsewhere. For if they think of infinite spaces of time before the world, in which it does not seem to them that God could have ceased from work, let them similarly think of infinite spaces of places outside the world, in which if any one should say that the Omnipotent could not have been vacant, will it not be a consequence that they are forced to dream of innumerable worlds with Epicurus? only with this difference, that he asserts those to be begotten and dissolved by fortuitous motions of atoms, but these are about to say they were made by the work of God, if they should not will Him to be vacant through the interminable immensity of places lying open everywhere outside the world, nor that those same worlds can be dissolved by any cause, which they also feel concerning this one? For we deal with these who both feel with us that God is incorporeal and the creator of all natures which are not what He is; but others it is too unworthy to admit to this dispute of religion: especially because among those who think that the obsequiousness of sacrifices is to be rendered to many gods, these have surpassed the other philosophers in nobility and authority, for no other reason except that, although by a long interval, nevertheless they are nearer to the truth than the rest.

An forte substantiam Dei, quam nec includunt, nec determinant, nec distendunt loco, sed eam, sicut de Deo sentire dignum est, fatentur incorporea praesentia ubique totam, a tantis locorum extra mundum spatiis absentem esse dicturi sunt, et uno tantum, atque in comparatione illius infinitatis tam exiguo loco, in quo mundus est, occupatam? Non opinor eos in haec vaniloquia progressuros. Cum igitur unum mundum ingenti quidem mole corporea, finitum tamen et loco suo determinatum, et operante Deo factum esse dicant: quod respondent de infinitis extra mundum locis, cur in eis ab opere Deus cesset; hoc sibi respondeant de infinitis ante mundum temporibus, cur in eis ab opere Deus cessaverit. Et sicut non est consequens ut fortuito potius quam ratione divina Deus, non alio, sed isto in quo est loco, mundum constituerit, cum pariter infinitis ubique patentibus nullo excellentiore merito posset hic eligi, quamvis eamdem divinam rationem, qua id factum est, nulla possit humana comprehendere: ita non est consequens ut Deo aliquid existimemus accidisse fortuitum, quod illo potius quam anteriore tempore condidit mundum, cum aequaliter anteriora tempora per infinitum retro spatium praeterissent, nec fuisset aliqua differentia unde tempus tempori eligendo praeponeretur. Quod si dicunt inanes esse hominum cogitationes quibus infinita imaginantur loca, cum locus nullus sit praeter mundum; respondetur eis, isto modo inaniter homines cogitare praeterita tempora vacationis Dei, cum nullum tempus sit ante mundum.

Caput VI.

Creationis mundi et temporum unum esse principium, nec aliud alio praeveniri.

Si enim recte discernuntur aeternitas et tempus, quod tempus sine aliqua mobili mutabilitate non est, in aeternitate autem nulla mutatio est; quis non videat quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret, quae aliquid aliqua motione mutaret; cujus motionis et mutationis cum aliud atque aliud, quae simul esse non possunt, cedit atque succedit, in brevioribus vel productioribus morarum intervallis tempus sequeretur?

Or perhaps they are about to say that the substance of God, which they neither include, nor determine, nor distend in place, but confess it, as it is worthy to feel concerning God, whole everywhere by His incorporeal presence, is absent from such great spaces of places outside the world, and occupied only in one, and in comparison of that infinity so exiguous place, in which the world is? I do not suppose them to be about to proceed into these vaniloquies. Since therefore they say that one world, indeed of huge corporeal mass, yet finite and determined in its own place, and made by the operation of God: what they answer concerning the infinite places outside the world, why in them God ceases from work; let them answer that to themselves concerning the infinite times before the world, why in them God ceased from work. And just as it is not a consequence that God constituted the world rather by chance than by divine reason, not in another, but in this place in which it is, since equally with infinite places lying open everywhere it could be chosen here by no more excellent merit, although no human can comprehend that same divine reason by which it was done: so it is not a consequence that we estimate anything fortuitous to have happened to God, because He founded the world in that rather than in a former time, since equally former times would have passed through infinite space backward, nor would there have been any difference whence a time would be preferred to a time for choosing. But if they say that the thoughts of men are vain by which infinite places are imagined, since there is no place except the world; it is answered to them, in that way men vainly think of past times of God's vacation, since there is no time before the world.

Chapter VI.

That there is one principle of the creation of the world and of times, nor is one preceded by the other.

For if eternity and time are rightly discerned, because time is not without some mobile mutability, whereas in eternity there is no mutation; who does not see that times would not have been, unless a creature were made, which would change something by some motion; from which motion and mutation, when one thing and another, which cannot be together, yield and succeed, time would follow in shorter or more prolonged intervals of delays?

Cum igitur Deus, in cujus aeternitate nulla est omnino mutatio, creator sit temporum et ordinator, quomodo dicatur post temporum spatia mundum creasse, non video; nisi dicatur ante mundum jam aliquam fuisse creaturam, cujus motibus tempora currerent. Porro si Litterae sacrae maximeque veraces ita dicunt, in principio fecisse Deum coelum et terram (Gen. I, 1), ut nihil antea fecisse intelligatur, quia hoc potius in principio fecisse diceretur, si quid fecisset ante caetera cuncta quae fecit; procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore. Quod enim fit in tempore, et post aliquod fit, et ante aliquod tempus; post id quod praeteritum est, ante id quod futurum est: nullum autem posset esse praeteritum; quia nulla erat creatura, cujus mutabilibus motibus ageretur. Cum tempore autem factus est mundus, si in ejus conditione factus est mutabilis motus, sicut videtur se habere etiam ordo ille primorum sex vel septem dierum, in quibus et mane et vespera nominantur, donec omnia quae his diebus Deus fecit, sexto perficiantur die, septimoque in magno mysterio Dei vacatio commendetur. Qui dies cujusmodi sint, aut perdifficile nobis, aut etiam impossibile est cogitare; quanto magis dicere?

Caput VII.

De qualitate primorum dierum, qui antequam sol fieret, vesperam et mane traduntur habuisse.

Videmus quippe istos dies notos non habere vesperam nisi de solis occasu, nec mane nisi de solis exortu: illorum autem priores tres dies sine sole peracti sunt, qui quarto die factus refertur. Et primitus quidem lux verbo Dei facta, atque inter ipsam et tenebras Deus separasse narratur, et eamdem lucem vocasse diem, tenebras autem noctem (Gen. I, 4): sed qualis illa sit lux, et quo alternante motu; qualemque vesperam et mane fecerit, remotum est a sensibus nostris; nec ita ut est, intelligi a nobis potest, quod tamen sine ulla haesitatione credendum est. Aut enim aliqua lux corporea est, sive in superioribus mundi partibus longe a conspectibus nostris, sive unde sol postmodum accensus est: aut lucis nomine significata est sancta civitas, in sanctis Angelis et spiritibus beatis, de qua dicit Apostolus, Quae sursum est Jerusalem, mater nostra aeterna in coelis (Galat. IV, 26). Ait quippe et alio loco, Omnes enim vos filii lucis estis, et filii diei; non sumus noctis neque tenebrarum (I Thess. V, 5). Si tamen et vesperam diei hujus et mane aliquatenus congruenter intelligere valeamus.

Since therefore God, in whose eternity there is no mutation at all, is the creator and ordainer of times, I do not see how He may be said to have created the world after spaces of times; unless it be said that before the world there had already been some creature by whose motions the times might run. Furthermore, if the Holy Scriptures (Litterae sacrae), which are most truthful, say thus, that in the beginning God made heaven and earth (Gen. I, 1), so that He be understood to have made nothing before, because He would rather be said to have made this in the beginning if He had made anything before the rest of all the things which He made; without doubt the world was not made in time, but with time. For what is made in time is made both after some and before some time; after that which is past, before that which is future: but no past could be, because there was no creature by whose mutable motions it might be carried on. But the world was made with time, if in its condition mutable motion was made, as also that order of the first six or seven days seems to have itself, in which both morning and evening are named, until all things which God made in these days are perfected on the sixth day, and on the seventh the vacation of God is commended in a great mystery. What kind of days these may be, is either very difficult for us or even impossible to think; how much more to say?

Chapter VII.

Of the quality of the first days, which are handed down to have had evening and morning before the sun was made.

For we see that these known days do not have evening except from the setting of the sun, nor morning except from the rising of the sun: but the first three of those days were passed without the sun, which is reported to have been made on the fourth day. And at first indeed light was made by the word of God, and God is narrated to have separated between it and the darkness, and to have called that same light day, but the darkness night (Gen. I, 4): but what kind of light that may be, and by what alternating motion; and what kind of evening and morning it made, is remote from our senses; nor can it be understood by us as it is, which nevertheless is to be believed without any hesitation. For either it is some corporeal light, whether in the superior parts of the world far from our sights, or whence the sun was afterwards kindled: or by the name of light is signified the holy city (sancta civitas), in the holy Angels and blessed spirits, concerning which the Apostle says: Which is above is Jerusalem, our eternal mother in the heavens (Galat. IV, 26). For he says also in another place: For all you are children of light, and children of the day; we are not of the night nor of darkness (I Thess. V, 5). If yet we may be able to understand to some extent congruently both the evening of this day and the morning.

Quoniam scientia creaturae in comparatione scientiae Creatoris quodammodo vesperascit: itemque lucescit et mane fit, cum et ipsa refertur ad laudem dilectionemque Creatoris; nec in noctem vergitur, ubi non Creator creaturae dilectione relinquitur. Denique Scriptura cum illos dies dinumeraret ex ordine, nusquam interposuit vocabulum noctis. Non enim ait alicubi, Facta est nox; sed, Facta est vespera, et factum est mane dies unus (Gen. I, 5). Ita dies secundus, et caeteri. Cognitio quippe creaturae in se ipsa decoloratior est, ut ita dicam, quam cum in Dei Sapientia cognoscitur, velut in arte qua facta est. Ideo vespera congruentius quam nox dici potest: quae tamen, ut dixi, cum ad laudandum et amandum refertur Creatorem, recurrit in mane. Et hoc cum facit in cognitione sui ipsius, dies unus est: cum in cognitione firmamenti, quod inter aquas inferiores et superiores coelum appellatum est, dies secundus: cum in cognitione terrae ac maris omniumque gignentium, quae radicibus continuata sunt terrae, dies tertius: cum in cognitione luminarium majoris et minoris omniumque siderum, dies quartus: cum in cognitione omnium ex aquis animalium natatilium atque volatilium, dies quintus: cum in cognitione omnium animalium terrenorum atque ipsius hominis, dies sextus.

Caput VIII.

Quae qualisve intelligenda sit Dei requies, qua post opera sex dierum requievit in septimo.

Cum vero in die septimo requiescit Deus ab omnibus operibus suis, et sanctificat eum; nequaquam est accipiendum pueriliter, tanquam Deus laboraverit operando, qui dixit, et facta sunt (Psal. CXLVIII, 5), verbo intelligibili et sempiterno, non sonabili et temporali. Sed requies Dei requiem significat eorum qui requiescunt in Deo; sicut laetitia domus, laetitiam significat eorum qui laetantur in domo, etiamsi non eos domus ipsa, sed alia res aliqua laetos facit. Quanto magis, si eadem domus pulchritudine sua faciat laetos habitatores, ut non solum eo loquendi modo laeta dicatur, quo significamus per id quod continet id quod continetur; sicut, Theatra plaudunt, prata mugiunt, cum in illis homines plaudant, in his boves mugiant: sed etiam illo quo significatur per efficientem id quod efficitur; sicut laeta epistola dicitur, significans eorum laetitiam, quos legentes efficit laetos? Convenientissime itaque cum Deum requievisse prophetica narrat auctoritas, significatur requies eorum qui in illo requiescunt, et quos facit ipse requiescere.

Because the knowledge of the creature in comparison of the knowledge of the Creator in a manner grows toward evening: and likewise it grows light and becomes morning when it itself is referred to the praise and love of the Creator; nor is it turned into night where the Creator is not left by the love of the creature. Finally, Scripture when it numbered those days in order, nowhere interposed the word of night. For it does not say anywhere: There was made night; but: There was made evening, and there was made morning, one day (Gen. I, 5). Thus the second day, and the rest. For the knowledge of the creature in itself is more discolored, so to speak, than when it is known in the Wisdom of God, as it were in the art by which it was made. Therefore evening can more congruently be said than night: which yet, as I said, when it is referred to praising and loving the Creator, recurs into morning. And when it does this in the knowledge of itself, it is one day: when in the knowledge of the firmament, which between the lower and upper waters was called heaven, the second day: when in the knowledge of the earth and the sea and of all things growing, which are continued by roots to the earth, the third day: when in the knowledge of the luminaries, the greater and the lesser, and of all the stars, the fourth day: when in the knowledge of all animals swimming and flying from the waters, the fifth day: when in the knowledge of all terrestrial animals and of man himself, the sixth day.

Chapter VIII.

What and of what kind the rest of God is to be understood, by which He rested on the seventh day after the works of six days.

But when on the seventh day God rests from all His works, and sanctifies it; it is by no means to be accepted childishly, as if God had labored in working, who spoke, and they were made (Psal. CXLVIII, 5), by an intelligible and everlasting word, not by a soundable and temporal one. But the rest of God signifies the rest of those who rest in God; just as the joy of a house signifies the joy of those who rejoice in the house, even if not the house itself, but some other thing makes them joyful. How much more, if the same house by its beauty should make the inhabitants joyful, so that it be called joyful not only by that manner of speaking by which we signify that which is contained by that which contains it; as, the theaters applaud, the meadows low, when in the former men applaud, in the latter oxen low: but also by that by which it is signified through the efficient that which is effected; as a joyful letter is said, signifying the joy of those whom, in reading, it makes joyful? Most conveniently therefore when the prophetic authority narrates that God rested, the rest of those who rest in Him is signified, and whom He Himself makes to rest.

Hoc etiam hominibus quibus loquitur, et propter quos utique conscripta est, promittente prophetia, quod etiam ipsi post bona opera quae in eis et per eos operatur Deus, si ad illum prius in ista vita per fidem quodammodo accesserint, in illo habebunt requiem sempiternam. Hoc enim et sabbati vacatione ex praecepto legis in vetere Dei populo figuratum est, unde suo loco diligentius arbitror disserendum.

Caput IX.

De Angelorum conditione quid secundum divina testimonia sentiendum sit.

Nunc, quoniam de sanctae civitatis exortu dicere institui, et prius quod ad sanctos Angelos attinet dicendum putavi, quae hujus civitatis et magna pars est, et eo beatior, quod nunquam peregrinata, quae hinc divina testimonia suppetant, quantum satis videbitur, Deo largiente, explicare curabo.

Ubi de mundi constitutione sacrae Litterae loquuntur, non evidenter dicitur utrum vel quo ordine creati sint Angeli: sed si praetermissi non sunt, vel coeli nomine, ubi dictum est, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram (Gen. I, 1); vel potius lucis hujus, de qua loquor, significati sunt. Non autem praetermissos esse hinc existimo, quod scriptum est requievisse Deum in septimo die ab omnibus operibus suis quae fecit; cum liber ipse ita sit exorsus, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram: ut ante coelum et terram nihil aliud fecisse videatur. Cum ergo a coelo et terra coeperit, atque ipsa terra quam primitus fecit, sicut Scriptura consequentur eloquitur, invisibilis et incomposita, nondumque luce facta, utique tenebrae fuerint super abyssum, id est super quamdam terrae et aquae indistinctam confusionem (ubi enim lux non est, tenebrae sint necesse est); deinde omnia creando disposita sint, quae per sex dies consummata narrantur: quomodo Angeli praetermitterentur, tanquam non essent in operibus Dei, a quibus in die septimo requievit?

Opus autem Dei esse Angelos, hic quidem etsi non praetermissum, non tamen evidenter expressum est; sed alibi hoc sancta Scriptura clarissima voce testatur. Nam et in hymno trium in camino virorum cum praedictum esset, Benedicite, omnia opera Domini, Domino; in exsecutione eorumdem operum, etiam Angeli nominati sunt (Dan. III, 57, 58). Et in Psalmo canitur: Laudate Dominum de coelis, laudate eum in excelsis. Laudate eum, omnes Angeli ejus; laudate eum, omnes Virtutes ejus. Laudate eum, sol et luna; laudate eum, omnes stellae et lumen.

This also is promised by prophecy to the men to whom it speaks, and for whom certainly it was written, that they also themselves, after the good works which God works in them and through them, if they shall have approached Him first in this life in a manner through faith, will have everlasting rest in Him. For this was also figured by the vacation of the sabbath (sabbati) by the precept of the law in the ancient people of God, concerning which I think it is to be discussed more diligently in its place.

Chapter IX.

What is to be felt concerning the condition of the Angels according to the divine testimonies.

Now, since I have begun to speak of the origin of the holy city, and I thought that what pertains to the holy Angels should be discussed first, who are a great part of this city, and all the more blessed because they have never been on pilgrimage, I will endeavor to explain, as far as shall seem sufficient, by God's granting, what divine testimonies are available from this source.

Where the Holy Scriptures speak of the constitution of the world, it is not clearly stated whether or in what order the Angels were created: but if they have not been passed over, they are signified either by the name of heaven, where it is said, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth" (Gen. 1:1); or rather by that light of which I speak. For I do not think they were passed over, because it is written that God rested on the seventh day from all His works which He made; since the book itself began thus: "In the beginning God made heaven and earth," so that before heaven and earth He seems to have made nothing else. Therefore, since He began with heaven and earth, and the earth itself which He first made, as the Scripture subsequently declares, was invisible and unformed, and light not yet having been made, darkness was certainly over the abyss, that is, over a certain indistinct confusion of earth and water (for where light is not, darkness must of necessity be); then all things were arranged by creating, which are narrated as being completed through six days: how could the Angels be passed over, as if they were not among the works of God, from which He rested on the seventh day?

Moreover, that the Angels are a work of God, although not passed over here, is nonetheless not clearly expressed; but elsewhere Holy Scripture testifies to this with a very clear voice. For also in the hymn of the three men in the furnace, when it had been said beforehand, "Bless the Lord, all you works of the Lord," in the enumeration of those same works, the Angels were also named (Dan. 3:57, 58). And in the Psalm it is sung: Praise the Lord from the heavens, praise Him in the heights. Praise Him, all His Angels; praise Him, all His Virtues. Praise Him, sun and moon; praise Him, all stars and light.

Laudate eum, coeli et coelorum; et aquae quae super coelos sunt, laudent nomen Domini. Quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt; ipse mandavit, et creata sunt (Psal. CXLVIII, 1-5). Etiam hic apertissime a Deo factos esse Angelos divinitus dictum est, cum eis inter caetera coelestia commemoratis, infertur ad omnia, Ipse dixit, et facta sunt. Quis porro audebit opinari, post omnia ista quae sex diebus enumerata sunt, Angelos factos? Sed et si quisquam ita desipit, redarguit istam vanitatem illa Scriptura paris auctoritatis, ubi Deus dicit, Quando facta sunt sidera, laudaverunt me voce magna omnes Angeli mei (Job XXXVIII, 7, sec. LXX). Jam ergo erant Angeli, quando facta sunt sidera. Facta sunt autem quarto die. Numquidnam ergo die tertio factos esse dicemus? Absit. In promptu est enim, quid illo die factum sit. Ab aquis utique terra discreta est, et distinctas sui generis species duo ista elementa sumpserunt, et produxit terra quidquid ei radicitus inhaeret. Numquidnam secundo? Ne hoc quidem: tunc enim firmamentum factum est inter aquas superiores et inferiores, coelumque appellatum est; in quo firmamento facta sunt sidera quarto die.

Nimirum ergo si ad istorum dierum opera Dei pertinent Angeli, ipsi sunt lux illa quae diei nomen accepit, cujus unitas ut commendaretur, non est dictus dies primus, sed dies unus. Nec alius est dies secundus, aut tertius, aut caeteri: sed idem ipse unus ad implendum senarium vel septenarium numerum repetitus est, propter senariam vel septenariam cognitionem; senariam scilicet operum quae fecit Deus, et septenariam quietis Dei. Cum enim dixit Deus, Fiat lux, et facta est lux; si recte in hac luce creatio intelligitur Angelorum, profecto facti sunt participes lucis aeternae, quod est ipsa incommutabilis Sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quem dicimus unigenitum Dei Filium; ut ea luce illuminati, qua creati, fierent lux, et vocarentur dies participatione incommutabilis lucis et diei, quod est Verbum Dei, per quod et ipsi et omnia facta sunt. Lumen quippe verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum (Joan. I, 9), hoc illuminat et omnem angelum mundum, ut sit lux non in se ipso, sed in Deo: a quo si avertitur angelus, fit immundus; sicut sunt omnes qui vocantur immundi spiritus, nec jam lux in Domino, sed in se ipsis tenebrae, privati participatione lucis aeternae. Mali enim nulla natura est; sed amissio boni, mali nomen accepit.

Caput X.

De simplici et incommutabili Trinitate, Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, unius Dei: cui non est aliud qualitas, aliud substantia.

Praise Him, heavens of heavens; and the waters that are above the heavens, let them praise the name of the Lord. For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created (Ps. 148:1-5). Here also it is most clearly said by divine authority that the Angels were made by God, since when they are mentioned among other celestial things, it is added for all: "He spoke, and they were made." Who, then, will dare to think that the Angels were made after all those things which were enumerated in the six days? But even if anyone is so foolish, that Scripture of equal authority refutes that vanity, where God says, "When the stars were made, all my Angels praised me with a great voice" (Job 38:7, LXX). Therefore the Angels already existed when the stars were made. But they were made on the fourth day. Shall we then say they were made on the third day? Far from it. For it is clear what was done on that day. For the earth was separated from the waters, and those two elements took distinct species of their own kind, and the earth produced whatever adheres to it by its roots. Was it on the second? Not even this: for then the firmament was made between the upper and lower waters, and was called heaven; in which firmament the stars were made on the fourth day.

Undoubtedly, therefore, if the Angels pertain to the works of God of those days, they are that light which received the name of day, whose unity, that it might be commended, was not called the first day, but one day. Nor is the second day, or the third, or the others different: but the same one was repeated to fulfill the number six or seven, on account of a sixfold or sevenfold knowledge; sixfold, namely, of the works which God made, and sevenfold of the rest of God. For when God said, "Let there be light, and there was light," if the creation of the Angels is rightly understood in this light, they were surely made partakers of the eternal light, which is the unchangeable Wisdom of God itself, through which all things were made, whom we call the only-begotten Son of God; so that being illuminated by that light by which they were created, they might become light, and be called day by participation in the unchangeable light and day, which is the Word of God, through which both they and all things were made. For the "true Light, which illuminates every man coming into this world" (John 1:9), this illuminates also every pure angel, that he may be light not in himself, but in God: from whom if the angel is turned away, he becomes impure; as are all who are called impure spirits, and no longer light in the Lord, but in themselves darkness, deprived of participation in the eternal light. For there is no nature of evil; but the loss of good has received the name of evil.

Chapter X.

Of the simple and unchangeable Trinity, of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, one God: in whom quality is not one thing, and substance another.

1. Est itaque bonum solum simplex, et ob hoc solum incommutabile, quod est Deus. Ab hoc bono creata sunt omnia bona, sed non simplicia, et ob hoc mutabilia. Creata sane, inquam, id est facta, non genita. Quod enim de simplici bono genitum est, pariter simplex est, et hoc est quod illud de quo genitum est; quae duo Patrem et Filium dicimus; et utrumque hoc cum Spiritu sancto unus est Deus: qui Spiritus Patris et Filii, Spiritus sanctus propria quadam notione hujus nominis in sacris Litteris nuncupatur. Alius est autem quam Pater et Filius, quia nec Pater est, nec Filius: sed, Alius dixi; non, Aliud; quia et hoc pariter simplex pariterque bonum est incommutabile et coaeternum. Et haec Trinitas unus est Deus: nec ideo non simplex, quia Trinitas. Neque enim propter hoc naturam istam boni simplicem dicimus, quia Pater in ea solus, aut solus Filius, aut solus Spiritus sanctus; aut vero sola est ista nominis Trinitas sine subsistentia personarum, sicut Sabelliani haeretici putaverunt; sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet, hoc est, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, nec tamen ipse est Filius; et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater. In quo ergo ad se ipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet: sicut ad se ipsum dicitur vivens, habendo utique vitam, et eadem vita ipse est.

2. Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod vel possit amittere; vel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet; sicut vas aliquem liquorem, aut corpus colorem, aut aer lucem sive fervorem, aut anima sapientiam. Nihil enim horum est id quod habet: nam neque vas liquor est, nec corpus color, nec aer lux sive fervor, neque anima sapientia est. Hinc est quod etiam privari possunt rebus quas habent, et in alios habitus vel qualitates verti atque mutari, ut et vas evacuetur humore quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur, et aer tenebrescat sive frigescat, et anima desipiat.

Sed etsi sit corpus incorruptibile, quale sanctis in resurrectione promittitur, habet quidem ipsius incorruptionis inamissibilem qualitatem, sed manente substantia corporali non hoc est, quod ipsa incorruptio. Nam illa etiam per singulas partes corporis tota est, nec alibi major, alibi minor; neque enim ulla pars est incorruptior quam altera: corpus vero ipsum majus est in toto quam in parte; et cum alia pars est in eo amplior, alia minor, non ea quae amplior est incorruptior quam ea quae minor.

1. There is, therefore, only one simple good, and for this reason alone unchangeable, which is God. By this good all good things were created, but not simple, and for this reason changeable. Created indeed, I say, that is made, not begotten. For that which is begotten of the simple good is equally simple, and is the same as that from which it was begotten; which two we call the Father and the Son; and both of these with the Holy Spirit are one God: which Spirit of the Father and of the Son is called the Holy Spirit by a certain proper notion of this name in the Holy Scriptures. But He is other than the Father and the Son, because He is neither the Father nor the Son: but I said "other" (Alius), not "another thing" (Aliud); because this also is equally simple and equally the unchangeable and coeternal good. And this Trinity is one God: nor is it not simple because it is a Trinity. For we do not call this nature of good simple because the Father alone is in it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone; or indeed that this is only a Trinity of name without the subsistence of persons, as the Sabellian heretics thought; but it is called simple for this reason, that what it has, this it is, except for what each person is said to be relatively to another. For certainly the Father has a Son, yet He is not Himself the Son; and the Son has a Father, yet He is not Himself the Father. Therefore, in what He is called in respect to Himself, and not to another, He is what He has: as He is called "living" in respect to Himself, certainly by having life, and He Himself is that same life.

2. For this reason, therefore, a nature is called simple, to which it is not something to have what it can either lose; or where the possessor is one thing, and what it possesses another; as a vessel possesses some liquid, or a body color, or the air light or heat, or the soul wisdom. For none of these is that which it possesses: for neither is the vessel the liquid, nor the body the color, nor the air light or heat, nor is the soul wisdom. Hence it is that they can also be deprived of the things they possess, and be turned and changed into other habits or qualities, so that the vessel may be emptied of the humor with which it is full, and the body may lose its color, and the air may grow dark or cold, and the soul may become foolish.

But even if there were an incorruptible body, such as is promised to the saints in the resurrection, it has indeed the inamissible quality of that very incorruption, but while the corporal substance remains, it is not the same thing as that incorruption itself. For that incorruption is also whole through each part of the body, and is not greater in one place, and smaller in another; for no part is more incorrupt than another: but the body itself is greater in the whole than in a part; and when one part in it is larger, and another smaller, the one which is larger is not more incorrupt than that which is smaller.

Aliud est itaque corpus, quod non ubique sui totum est: alia incorruptio, quae ubique ejus tota est; quia omnis pars incorruptibilis corporis etiam caeteris inaequalis aequaliter incorrupta est. Neque enim, verbi gratia, quia digitus minor est quam tota manus, ideo incorruptior manus quam digitus. Ita cum sint inaequales manus et digitus, aequalis est tamen incorruptibilitas manus et digiti. Ac per hoc quamvis a corpore incorruptibili inseparabilis incorruptibilitas sit; aliud est tamen substantia, qua corpus dicitur, aliud qualitas ejus, qua incorruptibile nuncupatur. Et ideo etiam sic non hoc est quod habet. Anima quoque ipsa, etiamsi semper sit sapiens, sicut erit cum liberabitur in aeternum; participatione tamen incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit, quae non est quod ipsa. Neque enim si aer infusa luce nunquam deseratur, ideo non aliud est ipse, aliud lux qua illuminatur. Neque hoc ita dixerim, quasi aer sit anima: quod putaverunt quidam, qui non potuerunt incorpoream cogitare naturam. Sed habent haec ad illa etiam in magna disparilitate quamdam similitudinem, ut non inconvenienter dicatur, sic illuminari animam incorpoream luce incorporea simplicis sapientiae Dei, sicut illuminatur aeris corpus luce corporea; et sicut aer tenebrescit ista luce desertus (nam nihil sunt aliud quae dicuntur locorum quorumcumque corporalium tenebrae, quam aer carens luce), ita tenebrescere animam sapientiae luce privatam.

3. Secundum hoc ergo dicuntur illa simplicia, quae principaliter vereque divina sunt, quod non aliud est in eis qualitas, aliud substantia, nec aliorum participatione vel divina, vel sapientia, vel beata sunt. Caeterum dictus est in Scripturis sanctis Spiritus sapientiae multiplex (Sap. VII, 22), eo quod multa in se habeat: sed quae habet, haec et est, et ea omnia unus est. Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt immensi quidam atque infiniti thesauri rerum intelligibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum, etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt. Quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet homine artifice recte dici potest: porro, si sciens fecit omnia, ea utique fecit quae noverat. Ex quo occurrit animo quiddam mirum, sed tamen verum, quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset; Deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset.

Caput XI.

An ejus beatitudinis, quam sancti Angeli ab initio sui semper habuerunt, etiam illos spiritus qui in veritate non steterunt, participes fuisse credendum sit.

Therefore, the body is one thing, which is not whole everywhere in itself; and incorruption is another, which is whole everywhere in it; because every part of the incorruptible body, even though unequal to the rest, is equally incorrupt. For example, because a finger is smaller than the whole hand, the hand is not for that reason more incorrupt than the finger. Thus, although the hand and finger are unequal, the incorruptibility of the hand and finger is nonetheless equal. And through this, although incorruptibility is inseparable from an incorruptible body, the substance by which it is called a body is nonetheless one thing, and its quality by which it is called incorruptible is another. And therefore, even so, it is not that which it possesses. The soul itself also, even if it were always wise, as it will be when it shall be delivered for eternity, will nonetheless be wise by participation in the unchangeable wisdom, which is not what the soul itself is. For if the air should never be deserted by the infused light, it is not for that reason that it is not one thing itself, and the light by which it is illuminated another. Nor would I say this as if the air were the soul, which some have thought who could not conceive of an incorporeal nature. But these things have, even in great disparity, a certain similitude to those others, so that it may not inconveniently be said that the incorporeal soul is illuminated by the incorporeal light of the simple wisdom of God, just as the body of the air is illuminated by corporal light; and as the air grows dark when deserted by that light (for the darkness of any corporal places is nothing else than air lacking light), so the soul grows dark when deprived of the light of wisdom.

3. According to this, therefore, those things are called simple which are principally and truly divine, because in them quality is not one thing and substance another, nor are they divine, or wise, or blessed by participation in others. Moreover, the Spirit of wisdom is called manifold in the Holy Scriptures (Wisdom 7:22), because it has many things in itself: but what it has, these it also is, and all those things are one. For there are not many wisdoms, but one wisdom, in which are certain immense and infinite treasures of intelligible things, in which are all the invisible and unchangeable reasons of things, even of visible and changeable things, which were made through it. Since God did not make anything being ignorant of it, which cannot even be rightly said of any human craftsman; furthermore, if He made all things knowing them, He certainly made those things which He knew. From which there occurs to the mind something wonderful, yet nonetheless true: that this world could not be known to us unless it existed; but to God, unless it were known, it could not exist.

Chapter XI.

Whether it is to be believed that those spirits also who did not stand in the truth were partakers of that beatitude which the holy Angels have always had from their beginning.

Quae cum ita sint, nullo quidem modo secundum aliquod temporis spatium prius erant illi spiritus tenebrae, quos Angelos dicimus; sed simul ut facti sunt, lux facti sunt: non tamen ita tantum creati, ut quoquo modo essent, et quoquo modo viverent; sed etiam illuminati, ut sapienter beateque viverent. Ab hac illuminatione aversi quidam angeli, non obtinuerunt excellentiam sapientis beataeque vitae, quae procul dubio nonnisi aeterna est aeternitatisque suae certa atque secura: sed et rationalem vitam licet insipientem sic habent, ut eam non possint amittere, nec si velint. Quatenus autem antequam peccassent, illius sapientiae fuerint participes, definire quis potest? In ejus tamen participatione aequales fuisse istos illis, qui propterea vere pleneque beati sunt, quoniam nequaquam de suae beatitudinis aeternitate falluntur, quomodo dicturi sumus? quandoquidem si aequales in ea fuissent, etiam isti in ejus aeternitate mansissent pariter beati, quia pariter certi. Neque enim sicut vita quamdiucumque fuerit, ita aeterna vita veraciter dici poterit, si finem habitura sit: siquidem vita tantummodo vivendo, aeterna vero finem non habendo nominata est. Quapropter, quamvis non quidquid aeternum, continuo beatum sit (dicitur enim etiam poenalis ignis aeternus); tamen si vere perfecteque beata vita nonnisi aeterna est, non erat talis istorum, quandoque desitura, et propterea non aeterna, sive id scirent, sive nescientes aliud putarent: quia scientes timor, nescientes error beatos esse utique non sinebat. Si autem hoc ita nesciebant, ut falsis incertisve non fiderent, sed utrum sempiternum, an quandoque finem habiturum esset bonum suum, in neutram partem firma assensione ferrentur, ipsa de tanta felicitate cunctatio eam beatae vitae plenitudinem, quam in sanctis Angelis esse credimus, non habebat. Neque enim beatae vitae vocabulum ita contrahimus ad quasdam significationis angustias, ut solum Deum dicamus beatum; qui tamen ita vere beatus est, ut major beatitudo esse non possit: in cujus comparatione, quod Angeli beati sunt, sua quadam summa beatitudine, quanta esse in Angelis potest, quid aut quantum est?

Caput XII.

De comparatione beatitudinis justorum, necdum tenentium promissionis divinae praemium, et primorum in paradiso hominum ante peccatum.

Nec ipsos tantum, quod attinet ad rationalem vel intellectualem creaturam, beatos nuncupandos putamus. Quis enim primos illos homines in paradiso negare audeat beatos fuisse ante peccatum, quamvis de sua beatitudine quam diuturna vel utrum aeterna esset incertos (esset autem aeterna, nisi peccassent); cum hodie non impudenter beatos vocemus, quos videmus juste ac pie cum spe futurae immortalitatis hanc vitam ducere sine crimine vastante conscientiam, facile impetrantes peccatis hujus infirmitatis divinam misericordiam.

Since these things are so, those spirits whom we call Angels were in no way darkness first according to any space of time; but as soon as they were made, they were made light: yet not only were they so created that they should exist in some way, and live in some way; but also illuminated, that they might live wisely and blessedly. From this illumination certain angels being turned away, did not obtain the excellence of a wise and blessed life, which without doubt is nothing but eternal and certain and secure of its own eternity: but they nonetheless possess rational life, although foolish, so that they cannot lose it, even if they wished. But as to how far they were partakers of that wisdom before they sinned, who can define? Yet how shall we say that they were equal in participation of it to those who are therefore truly and fully blessed, because they are in no way deceived concerning the eternity of their beatitude? For if they had been equal in it, these also would have remained equally blessed in its eternity, because equally certain. For life, however long it may be, cannot truly be called eternal life if it is to have an end: since life is named only from living, but eternal from having no end. Wherefore, although not everything that is eternal is immediately blessed (for penal fire is also called eternal); yet if a truly and perfectly blessed life is nothing but eternal, the life of these was not such, as it was at some time to cease, and therefore not eternal, whether they knew it, or, not knowing, thought otherwise: because fear to those who knew, and error to those who knew not, certainly did not allow them to be blessed. But if they so knew not this as not to trust in false or uncertain things, but were moved toward neither part with a firm assent as to whether their good was to be everlasting or at some time to have an end, that very hesitation concerning so great a happiness did not possess that fullness of the blessed life which we believe to be in the holy Angels. For we do not so contract the name of the blessed life into certain narrowness of meaning that we say God alone is blessed; who nonetheless is so truly blessed that there cannot be a greater beatitude: in comparison with whom, what or how much is it that the Angels are blessed with their own supreme beatitude, as great as can be in Angels?

Chapter XII.

Of the comparison of the beatitude of the righteous, not yet holding the reward of the divine promise, and of the first men in paradise before sin.

Nor do we think that only they, as pertains to the rational or intellectual creature, are to be called blessed. For who would dare to deny that those first men in paradise were blessed before sin, although they were uncertain how long their beatitude would be, or whether it would be eternal (but it would have been eternal, unless they had sinned); when today we do not impudently call those blessed whom we see leading this life justly and piously with the hope of future immortality without a crime devastating the conscience, easily obtaining divine mercy for the sins of this infirmity.

Qui licet de suae perseverantiae praemio certi sint, de ipsa tamen perseverantia sua reperiuntur incerti. Quis enim hominum se in actione profectuque justitiae perseveraturum usque in finem sciat, nisi aliqua revelatione ab illo fiat certus, qui de hac re justo latentique judicio non omnes instruit, sed neminem fallit? Quantum itaque pertinet ad delectationem praesentis boni, beatior erat primus homo in paradiso, quam quilibet justus in hac infirmitate mortali: quantum autem ad spem futuri, beatior quilibet in quibuslibet cruciatibus corporis, cui non opinione, sed certa veritate manifestum est, sine fine se habiturum omni molestia carentem societatem Angelorum in participatione summi Dei, quam erat ille homo sui casus incertus in magna illa felicitate paradisi.

CAPUT XIII.---An ita unius felicitatis omnes Angeli sint creati, ut neque lapsuros se possent nosse qui lapsi sunt, et post ruinam labentium perseverantiae suae praescientiam acceperint qui steterunt.

Quocirca cuivis jam non difficulter occurrit utroque conjuncto effici beatitudinem, quam recto proposito intellectualis natura desiderat; hoc est, ut et bono incommutabili, quod Deus est, sine ulla molestia perfruatur, et in eo se in aeternum esse mansuram, nec ulla dubitatione cunctetur, nec ullo errore fallatur. Hanc habere Angelos lucis pia fide credimus: hanc nec antequam caderent, habuisse angelos peccatores, qui sua pravitate illa luce privati sunt, consequenti ratione colligimus; habuisse tamen aliquam, etsi non praesciam beatitudinem, si vitam egerunt ante peccatum, profecto credendi sunt. Aut si durum videtur, quando facti sunt Angeli, alios credere ita factos ut non acciperent praescientiam vel perseverantiae vel casus sui, alios autem ita ut veritate certissima aeternitatem suae beatitudinis nossent; sed aequalis felicitatis omnes ab initio creati sunt, et ita fuerunt, donec isti qui nunc mali sunt, ab illo bonitatis lumine sua voluntate cecidissent: procul dubio multo est durius nunc putare Angelos sanctos aeternae suae beatitatis incertos, et ipsos de semetipsis ignorare, quod nos de illis per Scripturas sanctas nosse potuimus. Quis enim catholicus christianus ignorat, nullum novum diabolum ex bonis Angelis ulterius futurum; sicut nec istum in societatem bonorum Angelorum ulterius rediturum? Veritas quippe in Evangelio sanctis fidelibusque promittit quod erunt aequales Angelis Dei (Matth. XXII, 30): quibus etiam promittitur quod ibunt in vitam aeternam (Id. XXV, 46). Porro autem si nos certi sumus, nunquam nos ex illa immortali felicitate casuros, illi vero si certi non sunt; jam potiores, non aequales eis erimus.

Who, although they are certain of the reward of their perseverance, are nonetheless found uncertain of their perseverance itself. For what man knows that he will persevere in the action and progress of justice even unto the end, unless he be made certain by some revelation from Him who, by a just and hidden judgment, does not instruct all on this matter, but deceives no one? Therefore, as much as pertains to the delight of present good, the first man in paradise was more blessed than any righteous man in this mortal infirmity: but as much as pertains to the hope of the future, any man in whatever torments of body is more blessed, to whom it is manifest, not by opinion, but by certain truth, that he shall have without end a society of Angels free from all molestation in participation of the most high God, than was that man uncertain of his fall in that great happiness of paradise.

CHAPTER XIII.---Whether all the Angels were so created in one happiness, that neither those who fell could know they would fall, and those who stood received prescience of their perseverance after the ruin of those who fell.

Wherefore it now occurs without difficulty to anyone that by both joined together that beatitude is effected which the intellectual nature desires with a right purpose; that is, both that it should enjoy the unchangeable good, which is God, without any molestation, and that it should not hesitate with any doubt, nor be deceived by any error, that it is to remain in it for eternity. That the Angels of light have this we believe with a pious faith: that the sinful angels, who were deprived of that light by their own depravity, did not have this even before they fell, we gather by consequent reason; yet that they had some beatitude, even if not prescient, if they led a life before sin, is certainly to be believed. Or if it seems hard to believe that when the Angels were made, some were so made that they did not receive prescience either of their perseverance or of their fall, but others so that they knew the eternity of their beatitude by a most certain truth; but that all were created of equal happiness from the beginning, and so remained until those who are now evil should have fallen from that light of goodness by their own will: without doubt it is much harder now to think that the holy Angels are uncertain of their own eternal beatitude, and that they are ignorant of themselves, which we have been able to know concerning them through the Holy Scriptures. For what Catholic Christian is ignorant that no new devil will ever further arise from the good Angels; just as this one will never further return to the society of the good Angels? For the Truth in the Gospel promises to the holy and faithful that they shall be equal to the Angels of God (Matt. 22:30): to whom it is also promised that they shall go into eternal life (Matt. 25:46). Furthermore, if we are certain that we shall never fall from that immortal happiness, but they are not certain; we shall already be superior to them, not equal.

Sed quia nequaquam Veritas fallit, et aequales eis erimus, profecto etiam ipsi certi sunt suae felicitatis aeternae. Cujus illi alii quia certi non fuerunt; non enim erat eorum aeterna felicitas cujus certi essent, quae finem fuerat habitura: restat ut aut impares fuerint, aut si pares fuerunt, post istorum ruinam illis certa scientia suae sempiternae felicitatis accesserit. Nisi forte quis dicat, id quod Dominus ait de diabolo in Evangelio, Ille homicida erat ab initio, et in veritate non stetit (Joan. VIII, 44); sic esse accipiendum, ut non solum homicida fuerit ab initio, id est initio humani generis, ex quo utique homo factus est, quem decipiendo posset occidere: verum etiam ab initio suae conditionis in veritate non steterit; et ideo nunquam beatus cum sanctis Angelis fuerit, suo recusans esse subditus Creatori, et sua per superbiam velut privata potestate laetatus, ac per hoc falsus et fallax; quia nec unquam potestatem Omnipotentis evadit, et qui per piam subjectionem noluit tenere quod vere est, affectat per superbam elationem simulare quod non est: ut sic intelligatur etiam quod beatus Joannes apostolus ait Ab initio diabolus peccat (I Joan. III, 8); hoc est, ex quo creatus est, justitiam recusavit, quam nisi pia Deoque subdita voluntas habere non possit. Huic sententiae quisquis acquiescit, non cum illis haereticis sapit, id est Manichaeis, et si quae aliae pestes ita sentiunt, quod suam quamdam propriam tanquam ex adverso quodam principio diabolus habeat naturam mali: qui tanta vanitate desipiunt, ut cum verba ista evangelica in auctoritate nobiscum habeant, non attendant non dixisse Dominum, A veritate alienus fuit; sed, In veritate non stetit: ubi a veritate lapsum intelligi voluit: in qua utique si stetisset, ejus particeps factus, beatus cum sanctis Angelis permaneret.

Caput XIV.

Quo genere locutionis dictum sit de diabolo, quod in veritate non steterit, quia veritas non est in eo.

Subjecit autem indicium, quasi quaesissemus unde ostendatur quod in veritate non steterit, atque ait, Quia non est veritas in eo. Esset autem in eo, si in illa stetisset. Locutione autem dictum est minus usitata. Sic enim videtur sonare, In veritate non stetit, quia non est veritas in eo (Joan. VIII, 44), tanquam ea sit causa, ut in veritate non steterit, quod in eo veritas non sit: cum potius ea sit causa, ut in eo veritas non sit, quod in veritate non steterit.

But because Truth in no way deceives, and we shall be equal to them, certainly they also are certain of their own eternal happiness. Of which those others were not certain; for their happiness was not eternal, of which they could be certain, as it was to have an end: it remains that either they were unequal, or if they were equal, that after the ruin of those, certain knowledge of their own everlasting happiness came to the others. Unless perhaps someone should say that what the Lord said of the devil in the Gospel, "He was a murderer from the beginning, and stood not in the truth" (John 8:44); is to be so understood that he was not only a murderer from the beginning, that is, from the beginning of the human race, from the time indeed when man was made whom he could kill by deceiving: but also that from the beginning of his own condition he stood not in the truth; and therefore was never blessed with the holy Angels, refusing to be subject to his Creator, and having rejoiced by pride in his own private power as it were, and through this being false and deceitful; because he never escapes the power of the Omnipotent, and he who through pious subjection would not hold what truly is, affects through proud elation to simulate what is not: so that thus also may be understood what the blessed Apostle John says, "From the beginning the devil sins" (1 John 3:8); that is, from the time he was created, he refused justice, which only a pious and God-subjected will can have. Whoever acquiesces in this opinion does not think with those heretics, that is, the Manichaeans, and if there be any other pests who think so, that the devil has a certain proper nature of evil, as if from a certain contrary principle: who are so foolish in their great vanity, that although they hold these evangelical words in authority with us, they do not attend that the Lord did not say, "He was alien from the truth"; but, "He stood not in the truth": where He wished a fall from the truth to be understood: in which certainly if he had stood, having been made a partaker of it, he would remain blessed with the holy Angels.

Chapter XIV.

By what kind of speech it is said of the devil, that he stood not in the truth, because truth is not in him.

Moreover, He added an indication, as if we had asked whence it is shown that he stood not in the truth, and said, "Because there is no truth in him." But truth would be in him, if he had stood in it. But it was said in a less common way of speaking. For it seems thus to sound, "He stood not in the truth, because there is no truth in him" (John 8:44), as if the cause why he stood not in the truth were that there is no truth in him: whereas rather the cause why there is no truth in him is that he stood not in the truth.

Ista locutio est et in Psalmo: Ego clamavi, quoniam exaudisti me, Deus (Psal. XVI, 6): cum dicendum fuisse videatur, Exaudisti me, Deus, quoniam clamavi: Sed cum dixisset, Ego clamavi; tanquam ab eo quaereretur, unde se clamasse monstraret, ab effectu exauditionis Dei clamoris sui ostendit affectum; tanquam diceret, Hinc ostendo clamasse me, quoniam exaudisti me.

Caput XV.

Quid sentiendum sit de eo quod scriptum est, Ab initio diabolus peccat.

Illud etiam quod ait de diabolo Joannes, Ab initio diabolus peccat (I Joan. III, 8); non intelligunt, si naturale est, nullo modo esse peccatum. Sed quid respondetur propheticis testimoniis, sive quod Isaias ait, sub figurata persona principis Babyloniae diabolum notans, Quomodo cecidit Lucifer, qui mane oriebatur (Isai. XIV, 12)? sive quod Ezechiel, In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti, omni lapide pretioso ornatus es? ubi intelligitur fuisse aliquando sine peccato. Nam expressius ei paulo post dicitur: Ambulasti in diebus tuis sine vitio (Ezech. XXVIII, 13, 14). Quae si aliter convenientius intelligi nequeunt, oportet etiam illud quod dictum est, In veritate non stetit, sic accipiamus, quod in veritate fuerit, sed non permanserit. Et illud, quod ab initio diabolus peccat, non ab initio ex quo creatus est peccare putandus est; sed ab initio peccati, quod ab ipsius superbia coeperit esse peccatum. Nec illud quod scriptum est in libro Job, cum de diabolo sermo esset, Hoc est initium figmenti Domini, quod fecit ad illudendum ab Angelis suis (Job. XL, 14, sec. LXX); cui consonare videtur et Psalmus, ubi legitur, Draco hic quem finxisti ad illudendum ei (Psal. CIII, 26); sic intelligendum est, ut existimemus talem ab initio creatum, cui ab Angelis illuderetur, sed in hac poena post peccatum ordinatum. Initium ergo ejus figmentum est Domini: non enim est ulla natura etiam in extremis infimisque bestiolis, quam non ille constituit, a quo est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, sine quibus nihil rerum inveniri vel cogitari potest: quanto magis angelica creatura, quae omnia caetera quae Deus condidit, naturae dignitate praecedit?

Caput XVI.

De gradibus et differentiis creaturarum, quod aliter vendit usus utilitatis, aliter ordo rationis.

This way of speaking is also in the Psalm: "I have cried, because Thou hast heard me, O God" (Ps. 17:6); whereas it seems it should have been said, "Thou hast heard me, O God, because I have cried." But when he had said, "I have cried," as if it were asked of him whence he showed that he had cried, he shows the disposition of his cry from the effect of God's hearing; as if he should say: From this I show that I have cried, because Thou hast heard me.

Chapter XV.

What is to be felt concerning that which is written, "From the beginning the devil sins."

That also which John says of the devil, "From the beginning the devil sins" (1 John 3:8), they do not understand that if it is natural, it is in no way a sin. But what is answered to the prophetic testimonies, whether that which Isaiah says, noting the devil under the figured person of the prince of Babylon, "How is Lucifer fallen, who did rise in the morning" (Isa. 14:12)? or that which Ezekiel says, "Thou hast been in the delights of the paradise of God, thou art adorned with every precious stone"? where it is understood that he was at some time without sin. For it is said to him more expressly a little after: "Thou hast walked in thy days without fault" (Ezek. 28:13, 14). Which things, if they cannot be more conveniently understood otherwise, it behooves us also to take that which was said, "He stood not in the truth," as meaning that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it. And that "from the beginning the devil sins," he is not to be thought to sin from the beginning from which he was created; but from the beginning of sin, because sin began to be from his own pride. Nor is that which is written in the book of Job, when the discourse was concerning the devil, "This is the beginning of the Lord's creation, which He made to be mocked by His Angels" (Job 40:14, LXX); with which the Psalm also seems to agree, where it is read: "This dragon which Thou hast formed to mock him" (Ps. 104:26); to be so understood that we should think him created such from the beginning that he should be mocked by the Angels, but that he was ordained to this penalty after sin. His beginning, therefore, is a creation of the Lord: for there is no nature even in the last and lowest little beasts which He did not constitute, from whom is all mode, all species, all order, without which nothing of things can be found or thought: how much more the angelic creature, which precedes all other things which God made in the dignity of its nature?

Chapter XVI.

Of the degrees and differences of creatures, that the use of utility sells one way, and the order of reason another.

In his enim quae quoquo modo sunt, et non sunt quod Deus est a quo facta sunt, praeponuntur viventia non viventibus; sicut ea quae habent vim gignendi vel etiam appetendi, his quae isto motu carent. Et in his quae vivunt, praeponuntur sentientia non sentientibus, sicut arboribus animalia. Et in his quae sentiunt, praeponuntur intelligentia non intelligentibus, sicut homines pecoribus. Et in his quae intelligunt, praeponuntur immortalia mortalibus, sicut Angeli hominibus. Sed ista praeponuntur naturae ordine: est autem alius atque alius pro suo cujusque usu aestimationis modus, quo fit ut quaedam sensu carentia quibusdam sentientibus praeponamus, in tantum ut si potestas esset, ea prorsus de natura rerum auferre vellemus, sive quem in ea locum habeant ignorantes, sive etiamsi sciamus, nostris ea commodis postponentes. Quis enim non domi suae panem habere quam mures, nummos quam pulices malit? Sed quid mirum, cum ipsorum etiam hominum aestimatione, quorum certe natura tantae est dignitatis, plerumque carius comparetur equus quam servus, gemma quam famula? Ita libertate judicandi plurimum distat ratio considerantis a necessitate indigentis, seu voluptate cupientis, cum ista quid per se ipsum in rerum gradibus pendat, necessitas autem quid propter quid expetat, cogitet; et ista quid verum luci mentis appareat, voluptas vero quid jucundum corporis sensibus blandiatur, exquirat. Sed tantum valet in naturis rationalibus quoddam veluti pondus voluntatis et amoris, ut cum ordine naturae Angeli hominibus, tamen lege justitiae boni homines malis angelis praeferantur.

Caput XVII.

Vitium malitiae non naturam esse, sed contra naturam, cui ad peccandum non Conditor causa est, sed voluntas.

Propter naturam igitur, non propter malitiam diaboli, dictum recte intelligimus, Hoc est initium figmenti Domini (Job XL, 14, sec. LXX): quia sine dubio ubi esset vitium malitiae, natura non vitiata praecessit. Vitium autem ita contra naturam est, ut non possit nisi nocere naturae. Non itaque esset vitium recedere a Deo, nisi naturae, cujus id vitium est, potius competeret esse cum Deo. Quapropter etiam voluntas mala grande testimonium est naturae bonae. Sed Deus sicut naturarum bonarum optimus creator est, ita malarum voluntatum justissimus ordinator; ut cum male illae utuntur naturis bonis, ipse bene utatur etiam voluntatibus malis. Itaque fecit ut diabolus institutione illius bonus, voluntate sua malus, in inferioribus ordinatus illuderetur ab Angelis ejus, id est, ut prosint tentationes ejus sanctis, quibus eas obesse desiderat.

For in these things which exist in any way, and are not what God is from whom they were made, living things are preferred to non-living things; as those which have the power of procreating or even of desiring are preferred to those which lack that motion. And among those which live, sentient things are preferred to non-sentient things, as animals to trees. And among those which feel, intelligent things are preferred to non-intelligent things, as men to cattle. And among those which understand, immortal things are preferred to mortal things, as Angels to men. But these are preferred by the order of nature: but there is one and another mode of estimation for each one's use, by which it happens that we prefer certain things lacking sense to certain sentient things, to such an extent that if the power were ours, we would wish to take them away altogether from the nature of things, either being ignorant of what place they have in it, or even if we know, postponing them to our own conveniences. For who would not rather have bread in his house than mice, or coins than fleas? But what wonder, when even by the estimation of men themselves, whose nature is certainly of such great dignity, a horse is often purchased more dearly than a slave, or a gem than a maid-servant? Thus, in the freedom of judging, the reason of the observer differs greatly from the necessity of the indigent, or the pleasure of the desirer, since reason considers what each thing weighs by itself in the degrees of things, but necessity thinks what it expects for what purpose; and reason seeks what appears true to the light of the mind, but pleasure looks for what is pleasant to the senses of the body. But a certain weight, as it were, of will and love prevails so much in rational natures, that although by the order of nature Angels are preferred to men, yet by the law of justice good men are preferred to evil angels.

Chapter XVII.

That the vice of malice is not a nature, but against nature; for which the Creator is not the cause of sinning, but the will.

Therefore, on account of the nature, not on account of the malice of the devil, we understand that it was rightly said, "This is the beginning of the Lord's creation" (Job 40:14, LXX): because without doubt where there would be a vice of malice, a non-vitiated nature preceded. But vice is so against nature that it cannot but harm nature. Therefore, it would not be a vice to recede from God, unless it more properly belonged to the nature, of which it is the vice, to be with God. Wherefore even an evil will is a great testimony to a good nature. But as God is the best creator of good natures, so is He the most just orderer of evil wills; so that when those use good natures badly, He Himself uses even evil wills well. Therefore He made it so that the devil, good by His institution, but evil by his own will, being ordained in the lower parts, should be mocked by His Angels, that is, that his temptations should profit the saints, whom he desires they should harm.

Et quoniam Deus cum eum conderet, futurae malignitatis ejus non erat utique ignarus, et praevidebat quae bona de malis ejus esset ipse facturus: propterea Psalmus ait, Draco hic, quem finxisti ad illudendum ei (Psal. CIII, 26), ut in eo ipso quod eum finxit, licet per suam bonitatem bonum, jam per suam praescientiam praeparasse intelligatur quomodo illo uteretur et malo.

Caput XVIII.

De pulchritudine universitatis, quae per ordinationem Dei etiam ex contrariorum fit oppositione luculentior.

Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico Angelorum, sed vel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret, atque ita ordinem saeculorum tanquam pulcherrimum carmen ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret. Antitheta enim quae appellantur, in ornamentis elocutionis sunt decentissima, quae latine appellantur opposita , vel quod expressius dicitur, contraposita. Non est apud nos hujus vocabuli consuetudo, cum tamen eisdem ornamentis locutionis etiam sermo latinus utatur, imo linguae omnium gentium. His antithetis et Paulus apostolus in secunda ad Corinthios Epistola, illum locum suaviter explicat, ubi dicit: Per arma justitiae a dextris et a sinistris, per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam; ut seductores, et veraces; ut qui ignoramur, et cognoscimur; quasi morientes, et ecce vivimus; ut coerciti 3, et non mortificati; ut tristes, semper autem gaudentes; sicut egeni, multos autem ditantes; tanquam nihil habentes, et omnia possidentes (II Cor. VI, 7-10.) Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt; ita quadam, non verborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulchritudo componitur. Apertissime hoc positum est in libro Ecclesiastico, hoc modo: Contra malum bonum est, et contra mortem vita: sic contra pium peccator. Et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi, bina et bina, unum contra unum (Eccli.

Caput XIX.

Quid sentiendum videatur de eo quod scriptum est, Divisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras.

And since God, when He created him, was certainly not ignorant of his future malignity, and foresaw what good things He Himself would make out of his evils: therefore the Psalm says, "This dragon, which Thou hast formed to mock him" (Ps. 104:26), so that in that very thing that He formed him, although good by His goodness, He may be understood already by His prescience to have prepared how He would use him even when evil.

Chapter XVIII.

Of the beauty of the universe, which by the ordinance of God becomes more brilliant even from the opposition of contraries.

For neither would God create any, I do not say of Angels, but even of men, whom He had foreknown would be evil, unless He likewise knew to what uses of good He would apply them, and thus would grace the order of the ages like a most beautiful poem with certain as it were antitheses. For what are called antitheses are most becoming in the ornaments of elocution, which in Latin are called opposites (opposita), or what is more expressively called, contraposits (contraposita). There is not among us a custom of this word, though nevertheless the Latin speech uses these same ornaments of locution, indeed the languages of all nations. By these antitheses also the apostle Paul, in the second Epistle to the Corinthians, explains that passage sweetly, where he says: "By the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left, by glory and dishonor, by evil report and good report; as deceivers, and yet true; as unknown, and yet well known; as dying, and behold, we live; as chastened, and not killed; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things" (2 Cor. 6:7-10). As therefore these contraries opposed to contraries render the beauty of speech; so by a certain eloquence, not of words, but of things, the beauty of the age is composed by the opposition of contraries. This is most openly placed in the book of Ecclesiasticus, in this manner: "Good is set against evil, and life against death: so is the sinner against the godly. And so look upon all the works of the Most High, two and two, one against another" (Ecclus. 33:15).

Chapter XIX.

What should be thought concerning that which is written: "God divided between the light and the darkness."

Quamvis itaque divini sermonis obscuritas etiam ad hoc sit utilis, quod plures sententias veritatis parit et in lucem notitiae producit, dum alius eum sic, alius sic intelligit; ita tamen ut quod in obscuro loco intelligitur, vel attestatione rerum manifestarum, vel aliis locis minime dubiis asseratur; sive cum multa tractantur, ad id quoque perveniatur, quod sensit ille qui scripsit; sive id quidem lateat, sed ex occasione tractandae profundae obscuritatis alia quaedam vera dicantur: non mihi videtur ab operibus Dei absurda sententia, si cum lux illa prima facta est, Angeli creati intelliguntur, et inter sanctos Angelos et immundos fuisse discretum, ubi dictum est, Et divisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; et vocavit Deus lucem diem, et tenebras vocavit noctem. Solus quippe ille ista discernere potuit, qui potuit etiam priusquam caderent praescire casuros, et lumine privatos veritatis in tenebrosa superbia remansuros. Nam inter istum nobis notissimum diem et noctem, id est inter hanc lucem et has tenebras, vulgatissima sensibus nostris luminaria coeli ut dividerent, imperavit: Fiant, inquit, luminaria in firmamento coeli, ut luceant super terram, et dividant inter diem et noctem. Et Paulo post: Et fecit, inquit, Deus duo luminaria magna; luminare majus in principia diei, et luminare minus in principia noctis; et stellas: et posuit illa Deus in firmamento coeli, lucere super terram, et praeesse diei et nocti, et dividere inter lucem et tenebras (Gen. I, 4, 5, 14, 16-18). Inter illam vero lucem, quae sancta societas Angelorum est illustratione veritatis intelligibiliter fulgens, et ei contrarias tenebras, id est malorum angelorum aversorum a luce justitiae teterrimas mentes, ipse dividere potuit, cui etiam futurum, non naturae, sed voluntatis malum, occultum aut incertum esse non potuit.

Caput XX.

De eo quod post discretionem lucis atque tenebrarum dictum est, Et vidit Deus lucem, quia bona est.

Denique nec illud est praetereundum silentio, quod ubi dixit Deus, Fiat lux, et facta est lux; continuo subjunctum est, Et vidit Deus lucem quia bona est: non posteaquam separavit inter lucem et tenebras; et vocavit lucem diem, et tenebras noctem, ne simul cum luce etiam talibus tenebris testimonium placiti sui perhibuisse videretur. Nam ubi tenebrae inculpabiles sunt, inter quas et lucem istam his oculis conspicuam luminaria coeli dividunt, non ante, sed post infertur, Et vidit Deus quia bonum est.

Therefore, although the obscurity of the divine word is useful even for this, that it brings forth many sentences of truth and leads them into the light of knowledge, while one understands it thus, and another thus; yet so that what is understood in an obscure place may be asserted either by the attestation of manifest things, or by other places not at all doubtful; whether when many things are treated, that also is arrived at which he who wrote felt; or whether that indeed lies hidden, but on the occasion of treating the profound obscurity certain other true things are said: it does not seem to me an absurd sentence from the works of God, if when that first light was made, the Angels are understood to be created, and that a distinction was made between the holy Angels and the unclean ones, where it was said: "And God divided between the light and the darkness; and God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night." For only He could discern those things, who was able even before they fell to foreknow those who would fall, and who, deprived of the light of truth, would remain in dark pride. For between that day and night most known to us, that is between this light and these darknesses, He commanded that the most common luminaries of heaven should divide, in order that they might divide: "Let there be," He said, "luminaries in the firmament of heaven, that they may shine upon the earth, and divide between the day and the night." And a little after: "And God made," He said, "two great luminaries; the greater luminary to rule the day, and the lesser luminary to rule the night; and the stars: and God set them in the firmament of heaven, to shine upon the earth, and to rule over the day and the night, and to divide between the light and the darkness" (Gen. 1:4, 5, 14, 16-18). But between that light, which is the holy society of Angels shining intelligibly by the illustration of truth, and the darkness contrary to it, that is, the most foul minds of the evil angels turned away from the light of justice, He alone could divide, to whom even the future evil, not of nature, but of the will, could not be hidden or uncertain.

Chapter XX.

Concerning that which was said after the discretion of light and darkness: "And God saw the light, that it was good."

Finally, neither is that to be passed over in silence, that where God said, "Let there be light, and there was light," it was immediately subjoined, "And God saw the light, because it is good": not after He separated between the light and the darkness, and called the light Day and the darkness Night, lest together with the light He should seem to have rendered the testimony of His pleasure even to such darkness. For where the darknesses are blameless, between which and this light conspicuous to these eyes the luminaries of heaven divide, it is not brought in before, but after: "And God saw that it was good."

Et posuit illa, inquit, in firmamento coeli, lucere super terram, et praeesse diei et nocti, et separare inter lucem et tenebras. Et vidit Deus quia bonum est. Utrumque enim placuit, quia utrumque sine peccato est. Ubi autem dixit Deus, Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Et vidit Deus lucem, quia bona est; et postmodum infertur, Et separavit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; vocavitque Deus lucem diem, et tenebras vocavit noctem (Gen. I, 3-5, 17, 18): non hoc loco additum est, Et vidit Deus quia bonum est; ne utrumque appellaretur bonum, cum esset horum alterum malum, vitio proprio, non natura. Et ideo sola ibi lux placuit Conditori: tenebrae autem angelicae, etsi fuerant ordinandae, non tamen fuerant approbandae.

Caput XXI.

De aeterna et incommutabili scientia Dei ac voluntate, qua semper illi universa quae fecit, sic placuerunt facienda, quemadmodum facta.

Quid est enim aliud intelligendum in eo quod per omnia dicitur, Vidit Deus quia bonum est: nisi operis approbatio secundum artem facti, quae Sapientia Dei est? Deus autem usque adeo non cum factum est, tunc didicit bonum, ut nihil eorum fieret, si ei fuisset incognitum. Dum ergo videt quia bonum est, quod nisi vidisset antequam fieret, non utique fieret; docet bonum esse, non discit. Et Plato quidem plus ausus est dicere, elatum esse scilicet Deum gaudio, mundi universitate perfecta (In Timaeo). Ubi et ipse non usque adeo desipiebat, ut putaret Deum sui operis novitate factum beatiorem: sed sic ostendere voluit, artifici suo placuisse jam factum, quod placuerat in arte faciendum; non quod ullo modo Dei scientia varietur, ut aliud in ea faciant quae nondum sunt, aliud quae jam sunt, aliud quae fuerunt. Non enim more nostro ille vel quod futurum est prospicit, vel quod praesens est aspicit, vel quod praeteritum est respicit; sed alio modo quodam a nostrarum cogitationum consuetudine longe alteque diverso. Ille quippe non ex hoc in illud cogitatione mutata, sed omnino incommutabiliter videt; ita ut illa quidem quae temporaliter fiunt, et futura nondum sint, et praesentia jam sint, et praeterita jam non sint, ipse vero haec omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia comprehendat: nec aliter oculis, aliter mente; non enim ex animo constat et corpore: nec aliter nunc, aliter antea, et aliter postea; quoniam non sicut nostra, ita ejus quoque scientia trium temporum, praesentis videlicet et praeteriti vel futuri, varietate mutatur: apud quem non est immutatio, nec momenti obumbratio (Jacobi I, 17).

"And He set them," it says, "in the firmament of heaven, to shine upon the earth, and to rule over the day and the night, and to separate between the light and the darkness. And God saw that it was good." For both pleased Him, because both are without sin. But where God said, "Let there be light, and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good"; and afterwards it is brought in, "And God separated between the light and the darkness; and God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night" (Gen. 1:3-5, 17, 18): it was not added in this place, "And God saw that it was good"; lest both should be called good, when one of these was evil, by its own vice, not by nature. And therefore only the light there pleased the Creator: but the angelic darkness, although it had to be ordered, was not however to be approved.

Chapter XXI.

Concerning the eternal and unchangeable knowledge and will of God, by which all things which He made always pleased Him to be made, just as they were made.

For what else is to be understood in that which is said through all things, "God saw that it was good," except the approval of the work made according to the art, which is the Wisdom of God? But God did not learn that it was good only when it was made, so that none of those things would have been made if it had been unknown to Him. While therefore He sees that it is good, which unless He had seen before it was made, it would certainly not have been made; He teaches that it is good, He does not learn it. And Plato indeed dared to say more, namely, that God was elated with joy when the university of the world was perfected (In Timaeus). Where he himself was not so foolish as to think that God was made more blessed by the novelty of His work: but he wished to show thus, that the work already made had pleased its artificer, which had pleased Him to be made in His art; not that in any way the knowledge of God is varied, so that those things which are not yet, those which already are, and those which have been, produce different effects in it. For He does not in our manner either look forward to what is future, or behold what is present, or look back upon what is past; but in another way far and deeply different from the custom of our thoughts. For He does not see by a thought changed from this to that, but sees altogether unchangeably; so that those things indeed which are done temporally, both those future are not yet, and those present already are, and those past already are not, but He Himself comprehends all these in a stable and sempiternal presence: nor otherwise with eyes, otherwise with mind; for He does not consist of soul and body: nor otherwise now, otherwise before, and otherwise after; since His knowledge also is not changed, as ours is, by the variety of the three times, namely, of the present and the past or future: with whom there is no change, nor shadow of movement (James 1:17).

Neque enim ejus intentio de cogitatione in cogitationem transit, in cujus incorporeo contuitu simul adsunt cuncta quae novit: quoniam tempora ita novit nullis suis temporalibus notionibus, quemadmodum temporalia movet nullis suis temporalibus motibus. Ibi ergo vidit bonum esse quod fecit, ubi bonum esse vidit ut faceret. Nec quia factum vidit, scientiam duplicavit, vel ex aliqua parte auxit, tanquam minoris scientiae fuerit priusquam faceret quod videret: qui tam perfecte non operaretur, nisi tam perfecta scientia, cui nihil ex ejus operibus adderetur. Quapropter, si tantummodo nobis insinuandum esset quis fecerit lucem, sufficeret dicere, Deus fecit lucem. Si autem non solum quis fecerit, verum etiam per quid fecerit; satis esset ita enuntiari, Et dixit Deus, Fiat lux, et facta est lux; ut non tantum Deum, sed etiam per Verbum lucem fecisse nossemus. Quia vero tria quaedam maxime scienda de creatura nobis oportuit intimari, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit: Deus dixit, inquit, Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Et vidit Deus lucem, quia bona est. Si ergo quaerimus quis fecerit, Deus est. Si per quid fecerit, Dixit, Fiat, et facta est. Si quare fecerit, Quia bona est. Nec auctor est excellentior Deo, nec ars efficacior Dei Verbo, nec causa melior quam ut bonum crearetur a Deo bono. Hanc etiam Plato causam condendi mundi justissimam dicit, ut a bono Deo bona opera fierent (In Timaeo): sive ista legerit, sive ab his qui legerant forte cognoverit; sive acerrimo ingenio invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspexerit, sive ab his qui ista conspexerant et ipse didicerit.

Caput XXII.

De his quibus in universitate rerum a bono Creatore bene conditarum quaedam displicent, et putant nonnullam esse naturam malam.

Hanc tamen causam, id est ad bona creanda bonitatem Dei; hanc, inquam, causam tam justam atque idoneam, quae diligenter considerata et pie cogitata omnes controversias quaerentium mundi originem terminat, quidam haeretici non viderunt: quia egenam carnis hujus fragilemque mortalitatem, jam de justo supplicio venientem, dum ei non conveniunt, plurima offendunt; sicut ignis, aut frigus, aut fera bestia, aut quid hujusmodi.

For neither does His intention pass from thought to thought, in whose incorporeal intuition all things which He knows are present together: since He knows times in such a way by no temporal notions of His own, just as He moves temporal things by no temporal motions of His own. There, therefore, He saw that what He made was good, where He saw that it was good to make it. Nor because He saw it made did He double His knowledge, or increase it in any part, as if He were of less knowledge before He made what He saw: who would not work so perfectly, unless with so perfect knowledge, to which nothing would be added from His works. Wherefore, if it were only to be insinuated to us who made the light, it would suffice to say, God made the light. But if not only who made it, but also through what He made it; it would be enough to be thus enunciated, "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light"; so that we might know not only that God, but also through the Word He made the light. But because three certain things were especially necessary to be intimated to us concerning the creature: who made it, through what He made it, why He made it: "God said," it says, "Let there be light, and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good." If therefore we ask who made it, it is "God." If through what He made it, "He said, Let it be, and it was made." If why He made it, "Because it is good." Nor is there an author more excellent than God, nor an art more efficacious than the Word of God, nor a cause better than that good should be created by a good God. This cause also Plato says is the most just for founding the world, that good works should be made by a good God (In Timaeus): whether he read these things, or by chance learned them from those who had read them; or by a most sharp genius he beheld the invisible things of God, understood through those things which were made, or he himself learned from those who had beheld these things.

Chapter XXII.

Concerning those to whom in the university of things well founded by a good Creator certain things are displeasing, and who think that there is some evil nature.

However, this cause, that is, the goodness of God for creating good things; this cause, I say, so just and suitable, which when diligently considered and piously thought upon terminates all the controversies of those seeking the origin of the world, certain heretics have not seen: because many things offend their needy and fragile mortality, already coming from just punishment, while they do not agree with it; such as fire, or cold, or a wild beast, or anything of this kind.

Nec attendunt, quam vel in suis locis naturisque vigeant, pulchroque ordine disponantur; quantumque universitati rerum pro suis portionibus decoris tanquam in communem rempublicam conferant, vel nobis ipsis, si eis congruenter atque scienter utamur, commoditatis attribuant; ita ut venena ipsa, quae per inconvenientiam perniciosa sunt, convenienter adhibita in salubria medicamenta vertantur: quamque a contrario etiam haec quibus delectantur, sicut cibus et potus et ista lux, immoderato et inopportuno usu noxia sentiantur. Unde nos admonet divina providentia, non res insipienter vituperare, sed utilitatem rerum diligenter inquirere; et ubi nostrum ingenium vel infirmitas deficit, ita credere occultam, sicut erant quaedam quae vix potuimus invenire: quia et ipsa utilitatis occultatio, aut humilitatis exercitatio est, aut elationis attritio; cum omnino natura nulla sit malum, nomenque hoc non sit nisi privationis boni: sed a terrenis usque ad coelestia, et a visibilibus usque ad invisibilia sunt aliis alia bona meliora; ad hoc inaequalia, ut essent omnia. Deus autem ita est artifex magnus in magnis, ut minor non sit in parvis: quae parva non sua granditate (nam nulla est), sed artificis sapientia metienda sunt: sicut in specie visibilis hominis, si unum radatur supercilium, quam propemodum nihil corpori, et quam multum detrahitur pulchritudini; quoniam non mole constat, sed parilitate ac dimensione membrorum. Nec sane multum mirandum est, quod hi qui nonnullam malam putant esse naturam suo quodam contrario exortam propagatamque principio, nolunt accipere istam causam creationis rerum, ut bonus Deus conderet bona; credentes eum potius ad haec mundana molimina rebellantis adversum se mali repellendi extrema necessitate perductum, suamque naturam bonam malo coercendo superandoque miscuisse, quam turpissime pollutam et crudelissime captivatam et oppressam labore magno vix mundet ac liberet, non totam tamen; sed quod ejus non potuerit ab illa inquinatione purgari, tegmen ac vinculum futurum hostis victi et inclusi. Sic autem Manichaei non desiperent vel potius insanirent, si Dei naturam, sicuti est, incommutabilem atque omnino incorruptibilem crederent, cui nocere nulla res possit: animam vero quae voluntate mutari in deterius et peccato corrumpi potuit, atque ita incommutabilis veritatis luce privari, non Dei partem, nec ejus naturae quae Dei est, sed ab illo conditam longe imparem Conditori christiana sanitate sentirent.

Caput XXIII.

De errore, in quo Origenis doctrina inculpatur.

Nor do they attend to how they flourish in their own places and natures, and are disposed in a beautiful order; and how much beauty they confer upon the university of things according to their portions, as if into a common republic, or attribute of convenience to ourselves, if we use them congruously and knowingly; so that even poisons themselves, which by incongruity are pernicious, when congruously applied are turned into salutary medicines: and how, on the contrary, even these things in which they are delighted, such as food and drink and this light, are felt to be noxious by immoderate and inopportune use. Whence divine providence admonishes us, not to foolishly blame things, but to diligently inquire into the utility of things; and where our genius or infirmity fails, thus to believe it hidden, just as there were certain things which we could scarcely find out: because even that very hiding of utility is either an exercise of humility, or a wearing down of elation; since altogether no nature is an evil, and this name is nothing but a privation of good: but from earthly things even to celestial, and from visible even to invisible things, some goods are better than others; unequal for this purpose, that all might exist. But God is so great an artificer in great things, that He is not less in small things: which small things are not to be measured by their own greatness (for there is none), but by the wisdom of the artificer: as in the appearance of a visible man, if one eyebrow be shaved, how almost nothing is taken from the body, and how much is taken from its beauty; since it does not consist in mass, but in the parity and dimension of the members. Nor indeed is it much to be wondered at, that those who think that there is some evil nature arisen and propagated from a certain contrary principle of its own, are unwilling to accept this cause of the creation of things, that a good God should found good things; believing that He was rather led by an extreme necessity to these mundane efforts for repelling the evil rebelling against Him, and mixed His own good nature for coercing and overcoming the evil, which polluted most basely and captivated most cruelly and oppressed with great labor He scarcely cleanses and liberates, yet not the whole of it; but that part of it which could not be purged from that defilement, will be the covering and bond of the enemy conquered and shut in. But the Manichaeans would not thus dote, or rather be insane, if they believed the nature of God to be, as it is, unchangeable and altogether incorruptible, whom no thing can harm: but should feel with Christian sanity that the soul, which could be changed for the worse by the will and corrupted by sin, and thus be deprived of the light of inchangeable truth, is not a part of God, nor of that nature which is God's, but was founded by Him far unequal to the Creator.

Chapter XXIII.

Concerning the error in which the doctrine of Origen is blamed.

1. Sed multo est mirandum amplius, quod etiam quidam, qui unum nobiscum credunt omnium rerum esse principium, ullamque naturam, quae non est quod Deus est, nisi ab illo conditore esse non posse; noluerunt tamen istam causam fabricandi mundi tam bonam ac simplicem bene ac simpliciter credere, ut Deus bonus conderet bona, et essent post Deum quae non essent quod est Deus, bona tamen quae non faceret nisi bonus Deus. Sed animas dicunt, non quidem partes Dei, sed factas a Deo, peccasse a Conditore recedendo; et diversis progressibus pro diversitate peccatorum, a coelis usque ad terras, et diversa corpora quasi vincula meruisse: et hunc esse mundum, eamque causam mundi fuisse faciendi, non ut conderetur bona, sed ut mala cohiberentur. Hinc Origenes jure culpatur. In libris enim quos appellat περί Ἀρχῶν, id est, de Principiis, hoc sensit, hoc scripsit. Ubi plus quam dici potest, miror hominem in ecclesiasticis litteris tam doctum et exercitatum, non attendisse, primum quam hoc esset contrarium Scripturae hujus tantae auctoritatis intentioni, quae per omnia opera Dei subjungens, Et vidit Deus, quia bonum est; completisque omnibus inferens, Et vidit Deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona valde (Gen. I): nullam aliam causam faciendi mundi intelligi voluit, nisi ut bona fierent a bono Deo. Ubi si nemo peccasset, tantummodo naturis bonis esset mundus ornatus et plenus: et quia peccatum est, non ideo cuncta sunt impleta peccatis, cum bonorum longe major numerus in coelestibus suae naturae ordinem servet. Nec mala voluntas, quia naturae ordinem servare noluit, ideo justi Dei leges omnia bene ordinantis effugit. Quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro, loco suo posita, ita universitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulchra est, quamvis per se ipsos consideratos sua deformitas turpet.

2. Deinde videre debuit Origenes, et quicumque ita sapiunt, si haec opinio vera esset, mundum ideo factum, ut animae pro meritis peccatorum suorum tanquam ergastula quibus poenaliter includerentur, corpora acciperent, superiora et leviora quae minus, inferiora vero et graviora quae amplius peccaverunt; daemones quibus deterius nihil est, terrena corpora quibus inferius et gravius nihil est, potius quam homines etiam malos habere debuisse. Nunc vero ut intelligeremus animarum merita non qualitatibus corporum esse pensanda, aerium pessimus daemon, homo autem et nunc licet malus, longe minoris mitiorisque malitiae, et certe ante peccatum tamen luteum corpus accepit. Quid autem stultius dici potest, quam per istum solem, ut in uno mundo unus esset, non decori pulchritudinis, vel etiam saluti rerum corporalium consuluisse artificem Deum, sed hoc potius evenisse, quia una anima sic peccaverat, ut tali corpore mereretur includi?

1. But it is much more to be wondered at, that even certain ones, who believe with us that there is one principle of all things, and that no nature, which is not what God is, can exist except from that founder; yet they were unwilling to believe that cause of the fabrication of the world so good and simple well and simply, namely, that a good God should found good things, and that there should be after God things which were not what God is, yet good things which none but a good God would make. But they say that souls, not indeed parts of God, but made by God, sinned by receding from the Creator; and by diverse progressions for the diversity of sins, from the heavens even to the earths, they merited diverse bodies as it were chains: and that this is the world, and that this was the cause of making the world, not that good things should be founded, but that evil things should be coerced. Hence Origen is justly blamed. For in the books which he calls Peri Archōn, that is, of Principles, he felt this, he wrote this. Where more than can be said, I wonder that a man so learned and exercised in ecclesiastical letters did not attend, first to how contrary this was to the intention of this Scripture of such great authority, which subjoining through all the works of God, "And God saw that it was good"; and all things being completed bringing in, "And God saw all things which He made, and behold, they were very good" (Gen. 1): he wished no other cause of making the world to be understood, except that good things should be made by a good God. Where if no one had sinned, the world would be adorned and full only of good natures: and because sin has happened, all things are not therefore filled with sins, since a far greater number of good ones in the celestial parts keep the order of their nature. Nor does an evil will, because it was unwilling to keep the order of nature, therefore escape the laws of a just God ordering all things well. Since just as a painting with black color, placed in its own place, so the university of things, if anyone could behold it, is beautiful even with sinners, although their own deformity makes them foul when considered by themselves.

2. Then Origen ought to have seen, and whoever thus think, if this opinion were true, that the world was made for this purpose, that souls should receive bodies like workhouses in which they should be penally shut up for the merits of their sins, the superior and lighter ones those who sinned less, but the inferior and heavier ones those who sinned more; that the demons, than whom nothing is worse, ought to have had earthy bodies, than which nothing is lower and heavier, rather than even evil men. But now, that we might understand that the merits of souls are not to be weighed by the qualities of bodies, the worst demon is aerial, but man, although now evil, is of far less and milder malice, and certainly before sin however received a clay body. But what more foolish thing can be said, than that concerning this sun, that it should be one in one world, the artificer God did not consult for the decor of beauty, or even for the safety of corporal things, but this rather happened because one soul had so sinned that it merited to be shut up in such a body?

Ac per hoc si contigisset, ut non una, sed duae; imo non duae, sed decem, vel centum, similiter aequaliterque peccassent, centum soles haberet hic mundus. Quod ut non fieret, non opificis provisione mirabili ad rerum corporalium salutem decoremque consultum est; sed contigit potius tanta unius animae progressione peccantis, ut sola corpus tale mereretur. Non plane animarum, de quibus nesciunt quid loquantur, sed eorum ipsorum qui talia sapiunt, multum longe a veritate et merito est coercenda progressio. Haec ergo tria quae superius commendavi, cum in unaquaque creatura requiruntur, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit, ut respondeatur, Deus, per Verbum, Quia bona est, utrum altitudine mystica nobis ipsa Trinitas intimetur, hoc est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; an aliquid occurrat, quod in hoc loco Scripturarum id accipiendum esse prohibeat, multi sermonis est quaestio, nec omnia uno volumine ut explicemus urgendum est.

Caput XXIV.

De Trinitate divina, quae per omnia opera sua significationis suae sparsit indicia.

Credimus, et tenemus, et fideliter praedicamus, quod Pater genuerit Verbum, hoc est Sapientiam, per quam facta sunt omnia, unigenitum Filium, unus unum, aeternus coaeternum, summo bonus aequaliter bonum; et quod Spiritus sanctus simul et Patris et Filii sit Spiritus, et ipse consubstantialls et coaeternus ambobus: atque hoc totum et Trinitas sit propter proprietatem personarum, et unus Deus propter inseparabilem divinitatem, sicut unus omnipotens propter inseparabilem omnipotentiam: ita tamen ut etiam cum de singulis quaeritur, unusquisque eorum et Deus et omnipotens esse respondeatur; cum vero de omnibus simul, non tres dii vel tres omnipotentes, sed unus Deus omnipotens; tanta ibi est in tribus inseparabilis unitas, quae sic se voluit praedicari. Utrum autem boni Patris et boni Filii Spiritus sanctus, quia communis ambobus est, recte bonitas dici possit amborum, non audeo temerariam praecipitare sententiam: verumtamen amborum eum dicere sanctitatem facilius ausus fuero, non amborum quasi qualitatem, sed ipsum quoque substantiam, et tertiam in Trinitate personam. Ad hoc enim me probabilius ducit, quod cum sit et Pater spiritus et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus, et Filius sanctus, proprie tamen ipse vocatur Spiritus sanctus, tanquam sanctitas substantialis et consubstantialis amborum.

And by this if it had happened, that not one, but two; indeed not two, but ten, or a hundred, had similarly and equally sinned, this world would have a hundred suns. Which that it should not happen, was not consulted by the admirable provision of the worker for the safety and decor of corporal things; but it happened rather by so great a progression of one soul sinning, that it alone merited such a body. Clearly not of souls, concerning which they know not what they speak, but of those very ones who think such things, the progression much far from the truth and merit is to be coerced. These three things therefore which I commended above, when they are required in each creature, who made it, through what He made it, why He made it, that it should be answered, God, through the Word, Because it is good, whether by a mystical height the Trinity itself is intimated to us, that is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; or whether something occurs, which in this place of the Scriptures prohibits that it should be taken so, is a question of much speech, nor is it to be urged that we should explain everything in one volume.

Chapter XXIV.

Concerning the divine Trinity, which has scattered the indications of its significance through all its works.

We believe, and hold, and faithfully preach, that the Father generated the Word, that is Wisdom, through which all things were made, the only-begotten Son, one of one, eternal of coeternal, supremely good of equally good; and that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of both the Father and the Son, and Himself consubstantial and coeternal with both: and that this whole is both a Trinity because of the property of the persons, and one God because of the inseparable divinity, just as one omnipotent because of the inseparable omnipotence: yet so that even when inquiry is made concerning each, each one of them is answered to be both God and omnipotent; but when concerning all together, not three gods or three omnipotents, but one God omnipotent; so great is the inseparable unity there in the three, which thus willed itself to be preached. But whether the Holy Spirit of the good Father and the good Son, because He is common to both, can be rightly called the goodness of both, I do not dare to precipitate a rash sentence: nevertheless I shall have dared more easily to call Him the sanctity of both, not as a quality of both, but Himself also a substance, and the third person in the Trinity. For to this I am more probably led by the fact that, since both the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy, He is however properly called the Holy Spirit, as the substantial and consubstantial sanctity of both.

Sed si nihil aliud est bonitas divina quam sanctitas, profecto et illa diligentia rationis est, non praesumptionis audacia, ut in operibus Dei secreto quodam loquendi modo, quo nostra exerceatur intentio, eadem nobis insinuata intelligatur Trinitas, unamquamque creaturam quis fecerit, per quid fecerit, propter quid fecerit. Pater quippe intelligitur Verbi, qui dixit, Fiat. Quod autem illo dicente factum est, procul dubio per Verbum factum est. In eo vero quod dicitur, Vidit Deus quia bonum est; satis significatur, Deum nulla necessitate, nulla suae cujusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est, id est, quia bonum est: quod ideo, posteaquam factum est, dicitur, ut res quae facta est, congruere bonitati propter quam facta est, indicetur. Quae bonitas si Spiritus sanctus recte intelligitur, universa nobis Trinitas in suis operibus intimatur. Inde est civitatis sanctae, quae in sanctis Angelis sursum est, et origo, et informatio, et beatitudo. Nam si quaeratur unde sit, Deus eam condidit: si unde sit sapiens, a Deo illuminatur: si unde sit felix, Deo fruitur: subsistens modificatur, contemplans illustratur, inhaerens jucundatur; est, videt, amat; in aeternitate Dei viget, in veritate Dei lucet, in bonitate Dei gaudet.

Caput XXV.

De tripartita totius philosophiae disciplina.

Quantum intelligi datur, hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripartitam esse voluerunt; imo tripartitam esse animadvertere potuerunt (neque enim ipsi instituerunt ut ita esset, sed ita esse potius invenerunt): cujus una pars appellaretur physica, altera logica, tertia ethica. Quarum nomina latina jam multorum litteris frequentata sunt, ut naturalis, rationalis, moralisque vocarentur: quas etiam in octavo libro breviter perstrinximus (Cap. 4 seqq.). Non quod sit consequens, ut isti in his tribus aliquid secundum Deum de Trinitate cogitaverint. Quamvis Plato primus istam distributionem reperisse et commendasse dicatur, cui neque naturarum omnium auctor nisi Deus visus est, neque intelligentiae dator, neque amoris, quo bene beateque vivitur, inspirator. Sed certe cum et de natura rerum, et de ratione indagandae veritatis, et de boni fine ad quem cuncta quae agimus referre debemus, diversi diversa sentiant: in his tamen tribus magnis et generalibus quaestionibus omnis eorum versatur intentio.

But if the divine goodness is nothing else than sanctity, certainly that also is a diligence of reason, not an audacity of presumption, that in the works of God, by a certain secret mode of speaking by which our intention may be exercised, the same Trinity should be understood to be insinuated to us, in each creature: who made it, through what He made it, on account of what He made it. For the Father of the Word is understood, who said, "Let it be." But what was made by His speaking, was without doubt made through the Word. But in that which is said, "God saw that it was good," it is sufficiently signified that God made what was made by no necessity, by no indigence of any utility of His own, but by goodness alone, that is, because it is good: which therefore is said after it was made, that the thing which was made might be indicated to agree with the goodness on account of which it was made. Which goodness if the Holy Spirit is rightly understood, the whole Trinity is intimated to us in its works. Thence is both the origin, and the information, and the beatitude of the holy city, which is above among the holy Angels. For if it be asked whence it is, God founded it: if whence it is wise, it is illuminated by God: if whence it is happy, it enjoys God: subsisting it is modified, contemplating it is illustrated, inhering it is gladdened; it is, it sees, it loves; in the eternity of God it flourishes, in the truth of God it shines, in the goodness of God it rejoices.

Chapter XXV.

Concerning the tripartite discipline of the whole of philosophy.

As far as it is given to be understood, hence the philosophers willed that the discipline of wisdom should be tripartite; indeed they were able to observe that it was tripartite (for they themselves did not institute that it should be so, but rather found it to be so): of which one part would be called physics, the second logic, the third ethics. The Latin names of these have already been frequent in the letters of many, so that they were called natural, rational, and moral: which we also briefly touched upon in the eighth book (Chap. 4 ff.). Not that it is consequent, that these men thought anything concerning the Trinity according to God in these three. Although Plato is said to have been the first to find and commend that distribution, to whom no author of all natures but God was seen, nor any giver of intelligence, nor inspirer of love, by which one lives well and blessedly. But certainly when different men feel different things concerning the nature of things, and concerning the reason of searching out the truth, and concerning the end of good to which we ought to refer all that we do: yet in these three great and general questions all their intention is turned.

Ita cum in unaquaque earum quid quisque sectetur, multiplex si discrepantia opinionum, esse tamen aliquam naturae causam, scientiae formam, vitae summam, nemo cunctatur. Tria etiam sunt quae in unoquoque homine artifice spectantur, ut aliquid efficiat; natura, doctrina, usus: natura ingenio, doctrina scientia, usus fructu dijudicandus est. Nec ignoro quod proprie fructus fruentis, usus utentis sit; atque hoc interesse videatur, quod ea re frui dicimur, quae nos non ad aliud referenda per se ipsam delectat; uti vero ea re, quam propter aliud quaerimus. Unde temporalibus magis utendum est, quam fruendum, ut frui mereamur aeternis. Non sicut perversi, qui frui volunt nummo, uti autem Deo; quoniam non nummum propter Deum impendunt, sed Deum propter nummum colunt. Verumtamen eo loquendi modo, quem plus obtinuit consuetudo, et fructibus utimur, et usibus fruimur. Nam et fructus jam proprie dicuntur agrorum, quibus utique omnes temporaliter utimur. Hoc itaque more usum dixerim in his tribus quae in homine spectanda commonui, quae sunt natura, doctrina, usus. Ex his propter obtinendam beatam vitam, tripartita, ut dixi, a philosophis inventa est disciplina; naturalis propter naturam, rationalis propter doctrinam, moralis propter usum. Si ergo natura nostra esset a nobis, profecto et nostram nos genuissemus sapientiam, nec eam doctrina, id est aliunde discendo, percipere curaremus; et noster amor a nobis profectus, et ad nos relatus, ad beate vivendum sufficeret, nec bono alio quo frueremur ullo indigeret: nunc vero quia natura nostra, ut esset, Deum habet auctorem; procul dubio ut vera sapiamus, ipsum debemus habere doctorem; ipsum etiam ut beati simus, suavitatis intimae largitorem.

Caput XXVI.

De imagine summae Trinitatis, quae secundum quemdam modum in natura etiam necdum beatificati hominis invenitur.

Et nos quidem in nobis, tametsi non aequalem, imo valde longeque distantem, neque coaeternam, et quo brevius totum dicitur, non ejusdem substantiae, cujus est Deus, tamen qua Deo nihil sit in rebus ab eo factis natura propinquius, imaginem Dei, hoc est summae illius Trinitatis, agnoscimus, adhuc reformatione perficiendam, ut sit etiam similitudine proxima. Nam et sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id esse ac nosse diligimus. In his autem tribus quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas verisimilis turbat.

So when in each of them what each one follows is a manifold discrepancy of opinions, yet that there is some cause of nature, form of science, sum of life, no one hesitates. There are also three things which are beheld in each human artificer, that he may effect something: nature, doctrine, use: nature is to be judged by genius, doctrine by science, use by fruit. Nor am I ignorant that properly fruit is of the one enjoying, use of the one using; and this seems to be the difference, that we are said to enjoy that thing which delights us by itself, not to be referred to another; but to use that thing which we seek on account of another. Whence temporal things are more to be used than enjoyed, that we may merit to enjoy eternal ones. Not like the perverse, who wish to enjoy a coin, but to use God; since they do not expend the coin on account of God, but worship God on account of the coin. Nevertheless, in that mode of speaking which custom has more obtained, we both use fruits and enjoy uses. For even fruits are now properly called of the fields, which certainly we all use temporally. In this manner therefore I should call "use" in those three which I reminded were to be beheld in man, which are nature, doctrine, use. From these, for the purpose of obtaining a blessed life, a tripartite discipline was found by philosophers, as I said: natural on account of nature, rational on account of doctrine, moral on account of use. If therefore our nature were from ourselves, certainly we should also have generated our own wisdom, nor should we care to perceive it by doctrine, that is by learning from elsewhere; and our love proceeding from ourselves, and referred to us, would suffice for living blessedly, nor would it need any other good which we might enjoy: but now because our nature, that it might be, has God as its author; without doubt that we may know true things, we ought to have Him as our teacher; and Him also that we may be blessed, as the bestower of intimate sweetness.

Chapter XXVI.

Concerning the image of the supreme Trinity, which is found according to a certain mode in the nature even of a man not yet beatified.

And we indeed in ourselves, although not equal, indeed very far distant, and not coeternal, and to say the whole more briefly, not of the same substance of which God is, yet that than which nothing is closer to God by nature in the things made by Him, we recognize the image of God, that is of that supreme Trinity, yet to be perfected by reformation, so that it may be even closest in similitude. For we both are, and we know that we are, and we love this, to be and to know. But in these three which I have said, no plausible falsehood disturbs us.

Non enim ea, sicut illa quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, velut colores videndo, sonos audiendo, odores olfaciendo, sapores gustando, dura et mollia contrectando sentimus, quorum sensibilium etiam imagines eis simillimas, nec jam corporeas, cogitatione versamus, memoria tenemus, et per ipsas in istorum desideria concitamur: sed sine ulla phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria, mihi esse me, idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his veris Academicorum argumenta formido, dicentium, Quid, si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest: ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quia ergo sum si fallor, quomodo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem qui fallerer, etiamsi fallerer; procul dubio in eo quod me novi esse, non fallor. Consequens est autem, ut etiam in eo quod me novi nosse, non fallar. Sicut enim novi me esse, ita novi etiam hoc ipsum, nosse me. Eaque duo cum amo, eumdem quoque amorem quiddam tertium, nec imparis aestimationis, eis quas novi rebus adjungo. Neque enim fallor amare me, cum in his quae amo non fallar: quanquam etsi illa falsa essent, falsa me amare verum esset. Nam quo pacto recte reprehenderer et recte prohiberer ab amore falsorum, si me illa amare falsum esset? Cum vero et illa vera atque certa sint, quis dubitet quod eorum, cum amantur, et ipse amor verus et certus est? Tam porro nemo est qui esse se nolit, quam nemo est qui non beatus esse velit. Quomodo enim potest beatus esse, si nihil sit?

Caput XXVII.

De essentia et scientia, et utriusque amore.

1. Ita vero vi quadam naturali ipsum esse jucundum est, ut non ob aliud et hi qui miseri sunt nolint interire, et cum se miseros esse sentiant, non se ipsos de rebus, sed miseriam suam potius auferri velint. Illis etiam qui et sibi miserrimi apparent, et plane sunt, et non solum a sapientibus, quoniam stulti, verum et ab his qui se beatos putant, miseri judicantur, quia pauperes atque mendici sunt, si quis immortalitatem daret, qua nec ipsa miseria moreretur, proposito sibi quod si in eadem miseria semper esse nollent, nulli et nusquam essent futuri, sed omni modo perituri, profecto exsultarent laetitia, et sic semper eligerent esse, quam omnino non esse. Hujus rei testis est notissimus sensus illorum.

For we do not touch those things, as we do those which are without, by any sense of the body, as we feel colors by seeing, sounds by hearing, odors by smelling, savors by tasting, hard and soft things by handling, of which sensible things also we turn over in thought images most like to them, no longer corporeal, we hold them in memory, and through them we are excited into the desires of those things: but without any delusory imagination of phantasies or phantasms, it is most certain to me that I am, and that I know and love this. I fear no arguments of the Academics in these truths, saying: "What if you are deceived?" For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, certainly cannot even be deceived: and by this I am, if I am deceived. Because therefore I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived that I am, when it is certain that I am, if I am deceived? Since therefore I should be he who was deceived, even if I were deceived; without doubt in that which I know myself to be, I am not deceived. But it is consequent, that also in that which I know myself to know, I am not deceived. For as I know that I am, so I also know this very thing, that I know. And when I love those two, I join to those things which I know the same love as a certain third thing, and not of unequal estimation. For neither am I deceived that I love, when in those things which I love I am not deceived: although even if those things were false, it would be true that I loved false things. For in what way should I be rightly reprehended and rightly prohibited from the love of false things, if it were false that I loved them? But since those things are both true and certain, who would doubt that of them, when they are loved, even the love itself is true and certain? Furthermore, there is no one who does not wish to be, just as there is no one who does not wish to be happy. For how can he be happy, if he be nothing?

Chapter XXVII.

Concerning essence and knowledge, and the love of both.

1. But indeed by a certain natural force being itself is so pleasant, that not for any other reason even those who are miserable are unwilling to perish, and when they feel themselves to be miserable, they do not wish themselves to be taken away from things, but rather their misery to be taken away. Even to those who both appear most miserable to themselves, and plainly are, and are judged miserable not only by the wise, because they are fools, but also by those who think themselves happy, because they are poor and beggars, if anyone should give immortality, by which even that misery itself should not die, proposed to them that if they were unwilling to be always in the same misery, they would be nothing and nowhere in the future, but would perish in every way, they would certainly exult with joy, and would thus always choose to be, rather than not to be at all. The most known sense of those people is a witness of this thing.

Unde enim mori metuunt, et malunt in illa aerumna vivere, quam eam morte finire, nisi quia satis apparet quam refugiat natura non esse? Atque ideo cum se noverint esse morituros, pro magno beneficio sibi hanc impendi misericordiam desiderant, ut aliquanto productius in eadem miseria vivant, tardiusque moriantur. Procul dubio ergo indicant immortalitatem saltem talem quae non habeat finem mendicitatis, quanta gratulatione susciperent. Quid? animalia omnia etiam irrationalia, quibus datum non est ista cogitare, ab immensis draconibus usque ad exiguos vermiculos, nonne se esse velle, atque ob hoc interitum fugere omnibus quibus possunt motibus indicant? Quid? arbusta omnesque frutices, quibus nullus est sensus ad vitandam manifesta motione perniciem, nonne ut in auras tutum culminis germen emittant, altius terrae radices affigunt, quo alimentum trahant, atque ita suum quodammodo esse conservent? Ipsa postremo corpora, quibus non solum sensus, sed nec ulla saltem seminalis est vita, ita tamen vel exsiliunt in superna, vel in ima descendunt, vel librantur in mediis, ut essentiam suam, ubi secundum naturam possunt esse, custodiant.

2. Jam vero nosse quantum ametur, quamque falli nolit humana natura, vel hinc intelligi potest, quod lamentari quisque sana mente mavult, quam laetari in amentia. Quae vis magna atque mirabilis mortalibus, praeter homini, animantibus nulla est; licet eorum quibusdam ad istam lucem contuendam multo quam nobis sit acrior sensus oculorum: sed lucem illam incorpoream contingere nequeunt, qua mens nostra quodammodo irradiatur, ut de his omnibus recte judicare possimus. Nam in quantum eam capimus, in tantum id possumus. Verumtamen inest sensibus irrationalium animantium, etsi scientia nullo modo, at certe quaedam scientiae similitudo. Caetera autem rerum corporalium, non quia sentiunt, sed quia sentiuntur, sensibilia nuncupata sunt. Quorum in arbustis hoc simile est sensibus, quod aluntur et gignunt. Verumtamen et haec et omnia corporalia latentes in natura causas habent; sed formas suas, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent, ut pro eo quod nosse non possunt, quasi innotescere velle videantur. Sed nosse ea sensu corporis ita capimus, ut de his non sensu corporis judicemus. Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiorem, quo justa et injusta sentimus: justa, per intelligibilem speciem; injusta, per ejus privationem. Ad hujus sensus officium non acies pupillae, non foramen auriculae, non spiramenta narium, non gustus faucium, non ullus corporeus tactus accedit. Ibi me et esse et hoc nosse certus sum, et haec amo atque amare me similiter certus sum.

For whence do they fear to die, and prefer to live in that tribulation, than to end it by death, unless because it sufficiently appears how much nature flees from not being? And therefore when they know themselves to be about to die, they desire this mercy to be bestowed upon them as a great benefit, that they may live somewhat longer in the same misery, and die later. Without doubt therefore they indicate with how much congratulation they would receive even such an immortality which would have no end of beggary. What? Do not all animals even irrational, to whom it is not given to think these things, from the immense dragons even to the tiny little worms, indicate that they wish to be, and on account of this flee destruction by all the movements they can? What? Do not the groves and all the shrubs, to which there is no sense for avoiding destruction by manifest motion, fix their roots deeper in the earth, that they may send forth a safe germ of their top into the airs, whence they may draw nourishment, and thus in a certain way conserve their own being? Finally, even bodies themselves, to which there is not only no sense, but not even any at least seminal life, nevertheless so either leap forth into the supernal parts, or descend into the lowest, or are balanced in the middle, that they may guard their essence, where they can be according to nature.

2. But now how much knowledge is loved, and how much human nature is unwilling to be deceived, can be understood even from this, that each one of sound mind prefers to lament rather than to rejoice in madness. Which great and wonderful force is in no mortal animals except man; although to some of them for beholding this light the sense of the eyes is much sharper than to us: but they cannot touch that incorporeal light by which our mind is in a certain way irradiated, so that we may be able to judge rightly concerning all these things. For in as much as we receive it, in so much are we able to do that. Nevertheless there is in the senses of irrational animals, even if knowledge in no way, yet certainly a certain similitude of knowledge. But the rest of corporeal things, not because they feel, but because they are felt, are called sensible. Of which in the shrubs this is similar to the senses, that they are nourished and beget. Nevertheless both these and all corporeal things have causes lying hidden in nature; but they offer their forms, by which the structure of this visible world is beautiful, to be felt by the senses, so that for that which they cannot know, they seem as it were to wish to become known. But to know them by the sense of the body we so receive, that we do not judge concerning them by the sense of the body. For we have another sense of the interior man far more excellent than this, by which we feel just and unjust things: just things, through an intelligible species; unjust things, through the privation of it. To the office of this sense neither the sharpness of the pupil, nor the opening of the ear, nor the breathing-holes of the nostrils, nor the taste of the throat, nor any corporeal touch approaches. There I am certain both that I am and that I know this, and I love these and am similarly certain that I love them.

Caput XXVIII.

An etiam ipsum amorem, quo et esse et scire diligimus, diligere debeamus, quo magis divinae Trinitatis imagini propinquamus.

Sed de duobus illis, essentia scilicet et notitia, quantum amentur in nobis, et quemadmodum etiam caeteris rebus quae infra sunt, eorum reperiatur, etsi differens, quaedam tamen similitudo, quantum suscepti hujus operis ratio visa est postulare, satis diximus: de amore autem quo amantur, utrum et ipse amor ametur, non dictum est. Amatur autem: et hinc probamus, quod in hominibus qui rectius amantur, ipse magis amatur. Neque enim vir bonus merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diligit. Cur ego et in nobis ipsis non et ipsum amorem nos amare sentimus, quo amamus quid quid boni amamus? Est enim et amor, quo amatur et quod amandum non est: et istum amorem odit in se, qui illum diligit, quo id amatur quod amandum est. Possunt enim ambo esse in uno homine, et hoc bonum est homini, ut illo proficiente quo bene vivimus, iste deficiat quo male vivimus donec ad perfectum sanetur, et in bonum commutetur omne quod vivimus. Si enim pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum ejus est amaremus; idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum, et secundum hoc cum esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaereremus. Item si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentiente motu amare possemus, verumtamen id quasi appetere videremur, quo feracius essemus uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides, aut fluctus, aut ventus, aut flamma, vel quid ejusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur. Quoniam igitur homines sumus, ad nostri Creatoris imaginem creati, cujus est vera aeternitas, aeterna veritas, aeterna et vera charitas, estque ipsa aeterna et vera et chara Trinitas, neque confusa, neque separata; in iis quidem rebus quae infra nos sunt, quoniam et ipsa nec aliquo modo essent, nec aliqua specie continerentur, nec aliquem ordinem vel appeterent, vel tenerent, nisi ab illo facta essent qui summe est, qui summe sapiens est, qui summe bonus est: tanquam per omnia quae fecit mirabili stabilitate currentes, quasi quaedam ejus alibi magis, alibi minus impressa vestigia colligamus; in nobis autem ipsis ejus imaginem contuentes, tanquam minor ille evangelicus filius ad nosmetipsos reversi surgamus (Luc. XV, 18), ut ad illum redeamus, a quo peccando recesseramus. Ibi esse nostrum non habebit mortem, ibi nosse nostrum non habebit errorem, ibi amare nostrum non habebit offensionem.

Chapter XXVIII.

Whether we ought also to love the very love by which we love both to be and to know, so that we may approach more closely to the image of the divine Trinity.

But concerning those two things, namely essence and knowledge, how much they are loved in us, and in what manner even in other things which are below, a certain similitude of them is found, although differing, we have said enough, as far as the reason of this undertaken work seemed to demand: but concerning the love by which they are loved, whether even love itself is loved, has not been said. But it is loved: and from here we prove it, that in men who are more rightly loved, it is itself loved more. For neither is a man rightly called good who knows what is good, but he who loves it. Why do we not also feel in our own selves that we love love itself, by which we love whatever good we love? For there is also a love by which that is loved which ought not to be loved: and he hates this love in himself who loves that by which that is loved which ought to be loved. For both can be in one man, and this is good for man, that as that one increases by which we live well, this one may decrease by which we live poorly, until all that we live may be healed to perfection and be changed into good. For if we were beasts, we would love the carnal life and that which is according to its sense; and that would be our sufficient good, and according to this when it was well with us, we would seek nothing else. Likewise if we were trees, we could indeed love nothing by any feeling motion, nevertheless we would seem as it were to desire that by which we might be more fertile and more abundantly fruitful. If we were stones, or waves, or wind, or flame, or anything of the sort, without any sense indeed and life, yet there would not be lacking to us as it were a certain appetite of our places and order. For as it were the loves of bodies are the moments of their weights, whether they strive downward by gravity, or upward by levity. For so the body is borne by weight, as the soul is borne by love, wherever it is borne. Since therefore we are men, created to the image of our Creator, whose is true eternity, eternal truth, eternal and true charity, and is itself the eternal and true and dear Trinity, neither confused nor separated; in those things indeed which are below us, since even they themselves would in no way exist, nor be contained by any species, nor desire or hold any order, unless they had been made by Him who supremely is, who is supremely wise, who is supremely good: as if running through all things which He made with wonderful stability, let us collect as it were certain of His footsteps impressed more in some places, less in others; but beholding His image in our very selves, as that younger evangelical son having returned to ourselves let us arise, that we may return to Him from whom we had departed by sinning. There our being will have no death, there our knowing will have no error, there our loving will have no offense.

Nunc autem ista tria nostra quamvis certa teneamus, nec aliis ea credamus testibus, sed nos ipsi praesentia sentiamus, atque interiore veracissimo cernamus aspectu, tamen quamdiu futura, vel utrum nunquam defutura, et quo si bene, quo autem si male agantur, perventura sint, quoniam per nos ipsos nosse non possumus, alios hinc testes vel quaerimus, vel habemus; de quorum fide cur nulla debeat esse dubitatio, non est iste, sed posterior erit diligentius disserendi locus. In hoc autem libro de civitate Dei, quae non peregrinatur in hujus vitae mortalitate, sed immortalis semper in coelis est, id est, de Angelis sanctis Deo cohaerentibus, qui nec fuerunt unquam, nec futuri sunt desertores, inter quos et illos qui aeternam lucem deserentes, tenebrae facti sunt, Deum primitus divisisse jam diximus, illo adjuvante quod coepimus, ut possumus explicemus.

Caput XXIX.

De sanctorum Angelorum scientia, qua Trinitatem in ipsa ejus deitate noverunt, et qua operum causas prius in operantis arte, quam in ipsis operibus artificis intuentur.

Illi quippe Angeli sancti non per verba sonantia Deum discunt; sed per ipsam praesentiam immutabilis veritatis, hoc est, Verbum ejus unigenitum: et ipsum Verbum et Patrem et eorum Spiritum sanctum; eamque esse inseparabilem Trinitatem, singulasque in ea personas esse unam substantiam; et tamen omnes non tres deos esse, sed unum Deum, ita noverunt, ut eis magis ista, quam nos ipsi nobis cogniti sumus. Ipsam quoque creaturam melius ibi, hoc est in sapientia Dei, tanquam in arte qua facta est, quam in ea ipsa sciunt: ac per hoc et se ipsos ibi melius quam in se ipsis, verumtamen et in se ipsis. Facti sunt enim, et aliud sunt quam ille qui fecit. Ibi ergo tanquam in cognitione diurna, in se ipsis autem tanquam in vespertina, sicut supra jam diximus (Cap. 7). Multum enim differt utrum in ea ratione cognoscatur aliquid secundum quam factum est, an in se ipso. Sicut aliter scitur rectitudo linearum seu veritas figurarum, cum intellecta conspicitur, aliter cum in pulvere scribitur; et aliter justitia in veritate incommutabili, aliter in anima justi. Sic deinde caetera, sicut firmamentum inter aquas superiores et inferiores, quod coelum vocatum est; sicut deorsum aquarum congeries terraeque nudatio, et herbarum institutio atque lignorum; sicut solis et lunae stellarumque conditio; sicut ex aquis animalium, volucrum scilicet atque piscium belluarumque natantium; sicut quorumcumque in terra gradientium atque repentium, et ipsius hominis, qui cunctis in terra rebus excelleret.

But now although we hold these three of ours as certain, and do not believe them on the testimony of others, but we ourselves feel them present, and discern them with a most true interior sight, yet as long as we cannot know through ourselves how they shall be in the future, or whether they shall never be lacking, and whither they shall arrive if they are acted well, but whither if poorly, we either seek or have other witnesses for this; concerning whose faith why there ought to be no doubt, this is not the place, but there will be a later place for discussing more diligently. But in this book concerning the City of God, which does not sojourn in the mortality of this life, but is always immortal in the heavens, that is, concerning the holy Angels cohering to God, who neither ever were nor ever shall be deserters, between whom and those who deserting the eternal light became darkness, we have already said that God first divided, let us explain as we are able, He helping what we have begun.

Chapter XXIX.

Concerning the knowledge of the holy Angels, by which they have known the Trinity in His very deity, and by which they behold the causes of works first in the art of the worker, than in the works of the artificer themselves.

For those holy Angels do not learn God through sounding words; but through the very presence of immutable truth, that is, His only-begotten Word: and they so know both the Word Himself and the Father and their Holy Spirit; and that it is an inseparable Trinity, and that the individual persons in it are one substance; and yet that all are not three gods, but one God, so that these things are more known to them than we are known to ourselves. They also know the creature itself better there, that is in the wisdom of God, as if in the art by which it was made, than in the creature itself: and through this they know even themselves better there than in themselves, yet nevertheless also in themselves. For they were made, and they are something other than He who made them. There therefore as if in the daytime knowledge, but in themselves as if in the evening knowledge, just as we have said above. For it differs much whether something is known in that reason according to which it was made, or in itself. Just as the rectitude of lines or the truth of figures is known in one way when it is beheld understood, in another way when it is written in the dust; and justice in one way in immutable truth, in another way in the soul of the just. So then the other things, such as the firmament between the superior and inferior waters, which was called heaven; such as the gathering of the waters below and the baring of the earth, and the institution of herbs and of trees; such as the condition of the sun and the moon and the stars; such as from the waters the animals, namely of the birds and of the fishes and of the swimming monsters; such as of whatever things walking and creeping on the earth, and of man himself, who should excel all things on the earth.

Omnia haec aliter in Verbo Dei cognoscuntur ab Angelis, ubi habent causas rationesque suas, id est secundum quas facta sunt, incommutabiliter permanentes, aliter in se ipsis; illic clariore, hic obscuriore cognitione, velut artis atque operum: quae tamen opera cum ad ipsius Creatoris laudem venerationemque referuntur, tanquam mane lucescit in mentibus contemplantium.

Caput XXX.

De senarii numeri perfectione, qui primus partium suarum quantitate completur.

Haec autem propter senarii numeri perfectione, eodem die sexies repetito, sex diebus perfecta narrantur: non quia Deo necessaria fuerit mora temporum, quasi qui non potuerit creare omnia simul, quae deinceps congruis motibus peragerent tempora; sed quia per senarium numerum est operum significata perfectio. Numerus quippe senarius primus completur suis partibus, id est, sexta sui parte, et tertia, et dimidia, quae sunt unum, et duo, et tria: quae in summam ducta, sex fiunt. Partes autem in hac consideratione numerorum illae intelligendae sunt, quae quotae sint dici potest: sicut dimidia, tertia, quarta, et deinceps ab aliquo numero denominatae. Neque enim, exempli gratia, quia in novenario numero quatuor pars aliqua ejus est, ideo dici potest quota ejus sit: unum autem potest, nam nona ejus est; et tria potest, nam tertia ejus est. Conjunctae vero istae duae partes ejus, nona scilicet atque tertia, id est, unum et tria, longe sunt a tota summa ejus, quod est novem. Itemque in denario quaternarius est aliqua pars ejus; sed quota sit dici non potest: unum autem potest; nam decima pars ejus est. Habet et quintam, quod sunt duo: habet et dimidiam, quod sunt quinque. Sed hae tres partes ejus, decima et quinta et dimidia, id est unum et duo et quinque, simul ductae non complent decem: sunt enim octo. Duodenarii vero partes numeri in summam ductae, transeunt eum: habet enim duodecimam, quod est unum; habet sextam, quae sunt duo; habet quartam, quae sunt tria; habet tertiam quae sunt quatuor; habet et dimidiam, quae sunt sex: unum autem et duo et tria et quatuor et sex, non duodecim, sed amplius, id est, sexdecim fiunt. Hoc breviter commemorandum putavi ad commendandam senarii numeri perfectionem, qui primus, ut dixi, partibus suis in summam redactis ipse perficitur: in quo perfecit Deus opera sua. Unde ratio numeri contemnenda non est, quae in multis sanctarum Scripturarum locis, quam magni aestimanda sit, elucet diligenter intuentibus. Nec frustra in laudibus Dei dictum est, Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti (Sap. XI, 21).

All these things are known in one way in the Word of God by the Angels, where they have their causes and reasons, that is according to which they were made, remaining immutably, in another way in themselves; there with a clearer knowledge, here with a more obscure one, as it were of the art and of the works: which works nevertheless when they are referred to the praise and veneration of the Creator Himself, as it were it becomes light in the morning in the minds of those contemplating.

Chapter XXX.

Concerning the perfection of the number six, which is the first to be completed by the quantity of its own parts.

But these things are narrated as perfected in six days, on account of the perfection of the number six, the same day being repeated six times: not because a delay of times was necessary for God, as if He who could not have created all things at once, which thereafter the times would go through with congruent motions; but because the perfection of works was signified through the number six. For the number six is the first to be completed by its own parts, that is, by its sixth part, and third, and half, which are one, and two, and three: which brought into a sum, become six. But in this consideration of numbers those parts are to be understood which it can be said what fraction they are: such as the half, third, fourth, and thereafter named from some number. For neither, for the sake of example, because in the number nine four is some part of it, can it therefore be said what fraction of it it is: but one can be, for it is the ninth of it; and three can be, for it is the third of it. But those two parts of it joined together, namely the ninth and the third, that is, one and three, are far from its whole sum, which is nine. And likewise in the number ten the number four is some part of it; but what fraction it is cannot be said: but one can be; for it is the tenth part of it. It has also a fifth, which are two: it has also a half, which are five. But these three parts of it, tenth and fifth and half, that is one and two and five, brought together do not complete ten: for they are eight. But the parts of the number twelve brought into a sum, exceed it: for it has a twelfth, which is one; it has a sixth, which are two; it has a fourth, which are three; it has a third which are four; it has also a half, which are six: but one and two and three and four and six, become not twelve, but more, that is, sixteen. I thought this should be briefly commemorated for commending the perfection of the number six, which is the first, as I said, to be perfected itself by its parts redacted into a sum: in which God perfected His works. Whence the reason of number is not to be despised, which in many places of the holy Scriptures, how greatly it is to be esteemed, shines forth to those diligently beholding. Nor in the praises of God was it said in vain, Thou hast disposed all things in measure and number and weight (Wisd. XI, 21).

Caput XXXI.

De die septimo, in quo plenitudo et requies commendatur.

In septimo autem die, id est eodem die septies repetito, qui numerus etiam ipse alia ratione perfectus est, Dei requies commendatur, in qua primum sanctificatio sonat. Ita Deus noluit istum diem in ullis suis operibus sanctificare, sed in requie sua, quae non habet vesperam: neque enim ulla creatura est, ut etiam ipsa aliter in Dei Verbo, aliter in se cognita, faciat aliam velut diurnam, aliam velut vespertinam notitiam. De septenarii porro numeri perfectione dici quidem plura possunt: sed et liber iste jam prolixus est; et vereor ne occasione comperta, scientiolam nostram leviter magis quam utiliter jactare velle videamur. Habenda est itaque ratio moderationis atque gravitatis, ne forte cum de numero multum loquimur, mensuram et pondus negligere judicemur. Hoc itaque satis sit admonere, quod totus impar primus numerus ternarius est, totus par quaternarius: ex quibus duobus septenarius constat. Ideo pro universo saepe ponitur, sicuti est, Septies cadet justus, et resurget (Prov. XXIV, 16): id est, quotiescumque ceciderit, non peribit. Quod non de iniquitatibus, sed de tribulationibus ad humilitatem perducentibus intelligi voluit. Et, Septies in die laudabo te (Psal. CXVIII, 164). Quod alibi alio modo dictum est: Semper laus ejus in ore meo (Psal. XXXIII, 2). Et multa hujusmodi in divinis auctoritatibus reperiuntur, in quibus septenarius numerus, ut dixi, pro cujusque rei universitate poni solet. Propter hoc eodem saepe numero significatur Spiritus sanctus, de quo Dominus ait, Docebit vos omnem veritatem (Joan. XVI, 13). Ibi requies Dei, qua requiescitur in Deo. In toto quippe, id est in plena perfectione, requies; in parte autem labor. Ideo laboramus, quamdiu ex parte scimus; sed cum venerit quod perfectum est, quod ex parte est evacuabitur (I Cor. XIII, 9, 10). Hinc est quod etiam Scripturas istas cum labore rimamur. Sancti vero Angeli, ad quorum societatem et congregationem in hac peregrinatione laboriosissima suspiramus, sicut habent permanendi aeternitatem, ita cognoscendi facilitatem et requiescendi felicitatem. Sine difficultate quippe nos adjuvant; quoniam spiritualibus motibus puris et liberis non laborant.

Caput XXXII.

De opinione eorum qui Angelorum creationem anteriorem volunt esse, quam mundi.

Chapter XXXI.

Concerning the seventh day, in which fullness and rest are commended.

But on the seventh day, that is, on the same day repeated seven times, which number itself is also perfect for another reason, the rest of God is commended, in which first the sound of sanctification is heard. Thus God was unwilling to sanctify that day in any of His works, but in His own rest, which has no evening: for neither is there any creature, so that it itself known in one way in the Word of God, in another way in itself, may make one as it were daytime, another as it were evening knowledge. Moreover, many more things can indeed be said concerning the perfection of the number seven: but even this book is already prolix; and I fear lest, an occasion having been found, we may seem to wish to boast of our little knowledge more lightly than usefully. Therefore a reason of moderation and gravity is to be held, lest perchance when we speak much concerning number, we be judged to neglect measure and weight. Therefore let it be enough to warn of this, that the first whole odd number is three, the first whole even four: from which two the number seven consists. Therefore it is often put for the whole, such as is: The just man shall fall seven times, and shall rise again (Prov. XXIV, 16): that is, as often as he shall fall, he shall not perish. Which he wished to be understood not concerning iniquities, but concerning tribulations leading to humility. And, Seven times in a day will I praise thee (Psal. CXVIII, 164). Which elsewhere is said in another way: His praise shall be always in my mouth (Psal. XXXIII, 2). And many things of this sort are found in the divine authorities, in which the number seven, as I said, is accustomed to be put for the whole of any thing. On account of this the Holy Spirit is often signified by the same number, concerning whom the Lord says: He shall teach you all truth (John XVI, 13). There is the rest of God, by which it is rested in God. For in the whole, that is in full perfection, is rest; but in part is labor. Therefore we labor, as long as we know in part; but when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be evacuated (I Cor. XIII, 9, 10). Hence it is that we also search these Scriptures with labor. But the holy Angels, for whose society and congregation we sigh in this most laborious pilgrimage, as they have the eternity of remaining, so they have the facility of knowing and the felicity of resting. For they help us without difficulty; since they do not labor in pure and free spiritual movements.

Chapter XXXII.

Concerning the opinion of those who wish the creation of the Angels to be earlier than that of the world.

Ne quis autem contendat, et dicat non sanctos Angelos esse significatos, in eo quod scriptum est, Fiat lux, et facta est lux; sed quamlibet lucem tunc primum factam esse corpoream aut opinetur, aut doceat: Angelos autem prius esse factos, non tantum ante firmamentum, quod inter aquas et aquas factum, appellatum est coelum, sed ante illud quod dictum est, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram: atque illud quod dictum est, In principio, non ita dictum tanquam primum hoc factum sit, cum ante fecerit Angelos; sed quia omnia in sapientia fecit, quod est Verbum ejus, et ipsum Scriptura principium nominavit; sicut ipse in Evangelio Judaeis quaerentibus quis esset, respondit se esse principium (Joan. VIII, 25). non e contrario referam contentionem, maxime quia hoc me delectat plurimum, quod etiam in summo exordio sancti libri Geneseos Trinitas commendatur. Cum enim ita dicitur, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram, ut Pater fecisse intelligatur in Filio, sicut attestatur Psalmus, ubi legitur, Quam magnificata sunt opera tua, Domine! omnia in sapientia fecisti (Psal. CIII, 24): convenientissime paulo post commemoratur etiam Spiritus sanctus. Cum enim dictum esset, qualem terram Deus primitus fecerit, vel quam molem materiamve futurae constructionis mundi coeli et terrae nomine nuncupaverit, subjiciendo et addendo, Terra autem erat invisibilis et incomposita, et tenebrae erant super abyssum: mox ut Trinitatis commemoratio compleretur, Et spiritus, inquit, Dei superferebatur super aquam (Gen. I, 1-3). Proinde ut volet quisque accipiat, quod ita profundum est, ut ad exercitationem legentium a fidei regula non aberrantes plures possit generare sententias: dum tamen Angelos sanctos in sublimibus sedibus, non quidem Deo coaeternos, sed tamen de sua sempiterna et vera felicitate securos et certos esse, nemo ambigat. Ad quorum societatem pertinere parvulos suos Dominus docens, non solum illud ait, Erunt aequales Angelis Dei (Matth. XXII, 30): verum ipsi quoque Angeli qua contemplatione fruantur, ostendit, ubi ait, Videte ne contemnatis unum ex pusillis istis: dico enim vobis quia Angeli eorum in coelis semper vident faciem Patris mei, qui in coelis est (Id. XVIII, 10).

Caput XXXIII.

De duabus Angelorum societatibus diversis atque disparibus, quae non incongrue intelliguntur lucis et tenebrarum nominibus nuncupatae.

But lest anyone should contend, and say that the holy Angels were not signified in that which is written, Let there be light, and there was light; but should either think or teach that some corporeal light was then first made: but that the Angels were made before, not only before the firmament, which made between the waters and the waters was called heaven, but before that which was said, In the beginning God made heaven and earth: and that that which was said, In the beginning, was not so said as if this were made first, since He made the Angels before; but because He made all things in wisdom, which is His Word, and the Scripture named it the beginning; just as He Himself in the Gospel to the Jews asking who He was, answered that He was the beginning (John VIII, 25). I will not bring back a contention from the contrary, especially because this delights me very much, that even in the highest origin of the holy book of Genesis the Trinity is commended. For when it is said thus, In the beginning God made heaven and earth, so that the Father is understood to have made in the Son, as the Psalm attests, where it is read: How magnified are thy works, O Lord! thou hast made all things in wisdom (Psal. CIII, 24): most conveniently a little after the Holy Spirit is also commemorated. For when it had been said, what kind of earth God made first, or what mass or matter of the future construction of the world He called by the name of heaven and earth, by subjoining and adding, But the earth was invisible and uncomposed, and darkness was upon the abyss: presently that the commemoration of the Trinity might be completed, And the spirit, it says, of God was borne over the water (Gen. I, 1-3). Therefore let each one accept as he will, that which is so profound, that it can generate many opinions for the exercise of those reading, not wandering from the rule of faith: provided however that no one doubt that the holy Angels are in the sublime seats, not indeed coeternal with God, but nevertheless secure and certain of their own everlasting and true happiness. Teaching that His little ones pertain to their society, the Lord not only said that, They shall be equal to the Angels of God (Matth. XXII, 30): but He also showed by what contemplation they enjoy, where He says, See that you do not despise one of these little ones: for I say to you that their Angels in the heavens always see the face of my Father, who is in the heavens (Id. XVIII, 10).

Chapter XXXIII.

Of the two diverse and disparate societies of Angels, which are not incongruously understood to be called by the names of light and darkness.

Peccasse autem quosdam angelos, et in hujus mundi ima detrusos, qui eis velut carcer est, usque ad futuram in die judicii ultimam damnationem, apostolus Petrus apertissime ostendit, dicens, quod Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercerit, sed carceribus caliginis inferi retrudens tradiderit in judicio puniendos reservari (II Petr. II, 4). Inter hos ergo et illos, Deum vel praescientia vel opere divisisse quis dubitet? illosque lucem merito appellari, quis contradicat? quandoquidem nos adhuc in fide viventes, et eorum aequalitatem adhuc sperantes, utique nondum tenentes, jam lux dicti ab Apostolo sumus: Fuistis enim, inquit, aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino (Ephes. V, 8). Istos vero desertores, tenebras apertissime nuncupari, profecto advertunt, qui pejores esse hominibus infidelibus sive intelligunt, sive credunt. Quapropter, etsi alia lux in isto hujus libri loco intelligenda est, ubi legimus, Dixit Deus, Fiat lux, et facta est lux; et aliae tenebrae significatae sunt in eo quod scriptum est, Divisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras (Gen. I, 3, 4): nos tamen has duas angelicas societates, unam fruentem Deo, alteram tumentem typho : unam cui dicitur, Adorate eum, omnes Angeli ejus (Psal. XCVI, 8); aliam cujus princeps dicit, Haec omnia tibi dabo, si prostratus adoraveris me (Matth. IV, 9): unam Dei sancto amore flagrantem, alteram propriae celsitudinis immundo amore fumantem: et quoniam, sicut scriptum est, Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam (Jacobi IV, 6; I Petr. V, 5), illam in coelis coelorum habitantem, istam inde dejectam in hoc infimo aerio coelo tumultuantem: illam luminosa pietate tranquillam, istam tenebrosis cupiditatibus turbulentam: illam Dei nutu clementer subvenientem, juste ulciscentem; istam suo fastu subdendi et nocendi libidine exaestuantem: illam, ut quantum vult consulat, Dei bonitati ministram; istam, ne quantum vult noceat, Dei potestate frenatam: illam huic illudentem, ut nolens prosit persecutionibus suis; hanc illi invidentem, cum peregrinos colligit suos: nos ergo has duas societates angelicas inter se dispares atque contrarias, unam et natura bonam, et voluntate rectam; aliam vero natura bonam, sed voluntate perversam, aliis manifestioribus divinarum Scripturarum testimoniis declaratas, quod etiam in hoc libro, cui nomen est Genesis, lucis tenebrarumque vocabulis significatas existimavimus,

But that certain angels have sinned, and were thrust down into the lowest parts of this world, which is for them as it were a prison, until the future ultimate damnation on the day of judgment, the apostle Peter most clearly shows, saying, that God did not spare the angels that sinned, but delivering them into the prisons of the darkness of hell, handed them over to be reserved for punishment in judgment (II Pet. II, 4). Among these, therefore, and those, who would doubt that God divided either by foreknowledge or by work? and who would contradict that those are worthily called light? since even we, still living in faith, and still hoping for their equality, although not yet holding it, are already called light by the Apostle: For you were, he says, formerly darkness, but now light in the Lord (Ephes. V, 8). But these deserters, that they are most clearly called darkness, those certainly perceive who either understand or believe that they are worse than faithless men. Wherefore, although another light is to be understood in this place of this book, where we read, God said, Let there be light, and light was made; and other darkness was signified in that which is written, God divided between the light and the darkness (Gen. I, 3, 4): we nevertheless have thought that these two angelic societies, one enjoying God, the other swelling with pride: one to which it is said, Adore Him, all His Angels (Psal. XCVI, 8); another whose prince says, All these things I will give to you, if falling down you will adore me (Matth. IV, 9): one burning with the holy love of God, the other smoking with the foul love of its own loftiness: and since, as it is written, God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble (James IV, 6; I Pet. V, 5), the former dwelling in the heavens of heavens, the latter cast down from there, raising a tumult in this lowest airy heaven: the former tranquil with luminous piety, the latter turbulent with dark desires: the former mercifully helping by the nod of God, justly taking vengeance; the latter seething with its own pride of subjugating and with the lust for harming: the former, so that it may consult as much as it wishes, a minister to the goodness of God; the latter, lest it may harm as much as it wishes, bridled by the power of God: the former mocking the latter, so that it profits unwillingly by its persecutions; the latter envying the former, when it gathers its pilgrims: we therefore have judged that these two angelic societies, disparate and contrary to each other, one both good by nature and upright by will; but the other good by nature, but perverse by will, declared by other more manifest testimonies of the divine Scriptures, were also signified in this book, whose name is Genesis, by the terms of light and darkness,

etiamsi aliud sensit hoc loco forte qui scripsit, non est inutiliter obscuritas hujus pertractata sententiae: quia etsi voluntatem auctoris libri hujus indagare nequivimus, a regula tamen fidei, quae per alias ejusdem auctoritatis sacras Litteras satis fidelibus nota est, non aberravimus . Etsi enim corporalia hic commemorata sunt opera Dei, habent procul dubio nonnullam similitudinem spiritualium, secundum quam dicit Apostolus: Omnes enim vos filii lucis estis et filii diei; non sumus noctis, neque tenebrarum (I Thess. V, 5). Si autem hoc sensit etiam ille qui scripsit, ad perfectiorem disputationis finem nostra pervenit intentio: ut homo Dei tam eximiae divinaeque sapientiae, imo per eum Spiritus Dei in commemorandis operibus Dei, quae omnia sexto die dicit esse perfecta, nullo modo Angelos praetermisisse credatur: sive In principio, quia primo fecit; sive quod convenientius intelligitur, In principio, quia in Verbo unigenito fecit, scriptum sit, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram: quibus nominibus universalis est significata creatura, vel spiritualis et corporalis, quod est credibilius; vel magnae duae mundi partes, quibus omnia quae creata sunt continentur, ut primitus eam totam proponeret, ac deinde partes ejus secundum mysticum dierum numerum exsequeretur.

Caput XXXIV.

De eo quod quidam putant, in conditione firmamenti aquarum discretarum nomine Angelos significatos, et quod quidam aquas existimant non creatas.

Quanquam nonnulli putaverint aquarum nomine significatos quodammodo populos Angelorum ; et hoc esse quod dictum est, Fiat firmamentum inter aquam et aquam (Gen. I, 6): ut supra firmamentum Angeli intelligantur, infra vero vel aquae istae visibiles, vel malorum angelorum multitudo, vel omnium hominum gentes. Quod si ita est, non illic apparet ubi facti sunt Angeli, sed ubi discreti. Quamvis et aquas, quod perversissimae atque impiae vanitatis est, negent quidam factas a Deo, quoniam nusquam scriptum est, Dixit Deus, Fiant aquae . Quod possunt simili vanitate etiam de terra dicere: nusquam enim legitur, Dixit Deus, Fiat terra. Sed, inquiunt, scriptum est, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram. Illic ergo et aqua intelligenda est: uno enim nomine utrumque comprehensum est. Nam ipsius est mare, sicut in Psalmo legitur, et ipse fecit illud, et aridam terram manus ejus finxerunt (Psal. XCIV, 5).

even if he who wrote in this place perhaps felt otherwise, the obscurity of this sentence has not been fruitlessly treated: because even if we have not been able to track down the will of the author of this book, we have not wandered from the rule of faith, which is sufficiently known to the faithful through other sacred Letters of the same authority. For although the corporal works of God are commemorated here, they undoubtedly have some likeness of spiritual things, according to which the Apostle says: For you are all sons of light and sons of the day; we are not of the night, nor of darkness (I Thess. V, 5). If, however, he who wrote also felt this, our intention reaches a more perfect end of the discussion: so that the man of God of such eminent and divine wisdom, or rather through him the Spirit of God in commemorating the works of God, all of which He says were perfected on the sixth day, may in no way be believed to have passed over the Angels: whether it be written, In the beginning, because He made them first; or what is more conveniently understood, In the beginning, because He made them in the only-begotten Word, God made heaven and earth in the beginning: by which names the universal creature was signified, either spiritual and corporal, which is more credible; or the two great parts of the world, in which all things that have been created are contained, so that first He might propose the whole of it, and then follow out its parts according to the mystic number of the days.

Chapter XXXIV.

Of that which some think, that in the condition of the firmament the Angels were signified by the name of the divided waters, and that some think the waters were not created.

Although some have thought that by the name of waters the peoples of the Angels were in some way signified; and that this is what was said, Let a firmament be made between water and water (Gen. I, 6): so that above the firmament the Angels are understood, but below either these visible waters, or the multitude of evil angels, or the nations of all men. Which if it is so, it does not appear there where the Angels were made, but where they were divided. Although some also deny that the waters were made by God, which is of the most perverse and impious vanity, because it is nowhere written, God said, Let waters be made. Which they can say with similar vanity even of the earth: for it is nowhere read, God said, Let the earth be made. But, they say, it is written, In the beginning God made heaven and earth. There, therefore, water also is to be understood: for both are comprehended by one name. For the sea is His, as is read in the Psalm, and He made it, and His hands formed the dry land (Psal. XCIV, 5).

Sed hi qui in nomine aquarum quae super coelos sunt, Angelos intelligi volunt, ponderibus elementorum moventur, et ideo non putant aquarum fluidam gravemque naturam in superioribus mundi locis potuisse constitui: qui secundum rationes suas si ipsi hominem facere possent, non ei pituitam, quod graece φλέγμα dicitur, et tanquam in elementis corporis nostri aquarum vicem obtinet, in capite ponerent. Ibi enim sedes est phlegmatis, secundum Dei opus utique aptissime: secundum istorum autem conjecturam tam absurde, ut si hoc nesciremus, et in hoc libro similiter scriptum esset, quod Deus humorem fluidum et frigidum, ac per hoc gravem, in superiore omnibus caeteris humani corporis parte posuerit, isti trutinatores elementorum nequaquam crederent; et si auctoritati ejusdem Scripturae subditi essent, aliquid aliud ex hoc intelligendum esse censerent. Sed quoniam, si diligenter singula scrutemur atque tractemus, quae in illo divino libro de constitutione mundi scripta sunt, et multa dicenda, et a proposito instituti operis longe digrediendum est; jamque de duabus istis diversis inter se atque contrariis societatibus Angelorum, in quibus sunt quaedam exordia duarum etiam in rebus humanis civitatum, de quibus deinceps dicere institui, quantum satis esse visum est, disputavimus, hunc quoque librum aliquando claudamus.

But these who in the name of the waters which are above the heavens wish the Angels to be understood, are moved by the weights of the elements, and therefore they do not think that the fluid and heavy nature of the waters could have been constituted in the higher places of the world: who according to their own reasons if they themselves could make a man, would not put in his head the phlegm, which in Greek is called φλέγμα, and as it were in the elements of our body holds the place of waters. For there is the seat of the phlegm, according to the work of God certainly most fitly: but according to the conjecture of those men so absurdly, that if we did not know this, and it were similarly written in this book, that God placed a fluid and cold humor, and by this heavy, in the part of the human body higher than all others, these weighers of elements would by no means believe it; and if they were subject to the authority of the same Scripture, they would judge that something else was to be understood from this. But since, if we should diligently scrutinize and treat each thing that is written in that divine book about the constitution of the world, much would have to be said, and we would have to digress far from the purpose of the instituted work; and already about these two societies of Angels diverse and contrary to each other, in which are certain beginnings of two cities even in human affairs, about which I have instituted to speak next, we have disputed as much as seemed to be enough, let us at length close this book also.

Liber D

UODECIMUS.

In quo prius quidem de Angelis inquirit Augustinus, unde nimirum aliis bona voluntas, aliis mala, et quae causa beatitudinis bonorum, quae causa miseriae malorum angelorum fuerit.

Postea vero de hominis institutione agit, docetque cum non ab aeterno, sed in tempore esse conditum, nec alio auctore quam Deo.

Caput Primum.

De una bonorum malorumque angelorum natura.

1. Antequam de institutione hominis dicam, ubi duarum civitatum, quantum ad rationalium mortalium genus attinet, apparebit exortus, sicut superiore libro apparuisse in Angelis jam videtur; prius mihi quaedam de ipsis Angelis video esse dicenda, quibus demonstretur, quantum a nobis potest, quam non inconveniens neque incongrua dicatur esse hominibus Angelisque societas: ut non quatuor, duae scilicet Angelorum totidemque hominum, sed duae potius civitates, hoc est societates, merito esse dicantur; una in bonis, altera in malis, non solum Angelis, verum etiam hominibus constitutae.

2. Angelorum bonorum et malorum inter se contrarios appetitus non naturis principiisque diversis, cum Deus omnium substantiarum bonus auctor et conditor utrosque creaverit, sed voluntatibus et cupiditatibus exstitisse, dubitare fas non est; dum alii constanter in communi omnibus bono, quod ipse illis Deus est, atque in ejus aeternitate, veritate, charitate persistunt; alii sua potestate potius delectati, velut bonum suum sibi ipsi essent, a superiore communi omnium beatifico bono ad propria defluxerunt; et habentes elationis fastum pro excelsissima aeternitate, vanitatis astutiam pro certissima veritate, studia partium pro individua charitate, superbi, fallaces, invidi effecti sunt. Beatitudinis igitur illorum causa est, adhaerere Deo. Quocirca istorum miseriae causa ex contrario est intelligenda, quod est, non adhaerere Deo. Quamobrem, si cum quaeritur quare illi beati sint, recte respondetur, quia adhaerent Deo; et cum quaeritur cur isti sint miseri, recte respondetur, quia non adhaerent Deo: non est creaturae rationalis vel intellectualis bonum, quo beata sit, nisi Deus.

BOOK TWELVE.

In which Augustine first indeed inquires concerning the Angels, whence namely some have a good will, others a evil one, and what was the cause of the happiness of the good, what the cause of the misery of the evil angels.

But afterwards he treats of the institution of man, and teaches that he was created not from eternity, but in time, and by no other author than God.

Chapter First.

Of the one nature of the good and evil angels.

1. Before I speak of the institution of man, where the rise of the two cities will appear as far as pertains to the kind of rational mortals, as it already seems to have appeared in the Angels in the previous book; I see that certain things are first to be said by me about the Angels themselves, by which it may be demonstrated, as much as it can be by us, how not inconvenient nor incongruous it is said to be that there is a society of men and Angels: so that there may be said to be not four, namely two of Angels and as many of men, but rather two cities, that is societies, worthily; one constituted in the good, the other in the evil, not only of Angels, but also of men.

2. That the contrary appetites of the good and evil angels have arisen not from different natures and principles, since God the good author and founder of all substances created both, but from wills and desires, it is not right to doubt; while some constantly persist in the good common to all, which is God Himself to them, and in His eternity, truth, and charity; others delighted rather by their own power, as if they were their own good to themselves, flowed down from the superior common beatific good of all to their own; and having the pride of elation for the most excellent eternity, the craftiness of vanity for the most certain truth, the studies of parties for individual charity, they became proud, deceitful, and envious. The cause of their happiness, therefore, is to adhere to God. Wherefore the cause of the misery of those others is to be understood from the contrary, which is, not to adhere to God. For which reason, if when it is asked why those are happy, it is rightly answered, because they adhere to God; and when it is asked why these are miserable, it is rightly answered, because they do not adhere to God: there is no good for a rational or intellectual creature by which it may be happy, except God.

Ita quamvis non omnis beata possit esse creatura (neque enim hoc munus adipiscuntur aut capiunt ferae, ligna, saxa, et si quid ejusmodi est), ea tamen quae potest, non ex se ipsa potest, quia ex nihilo creata est; sed ex illo, a quo creata est. Hoc enim adepto beata, quo amisso misera est. Ille vero qui non alio, sed se ipso bono beatus est, ideo ipse miser non potest esse, quia non se potest amittere.

3. Dicimus itaque incommutabile bonum non esse, nisi unum verum beatum Deum: ea vero quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo; verumtamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed de nihilo facta sunt. Quanquam ergo summa non sint; quibus est Deus majus bonum: magna sunt tamen ea mutabilia bona, quae adhaerere possunt ut beata sint, immutabili bono; quod usque adeo bonum eorum est, ut sine illo misera esse necesse sit. Nec ideo caetera in hac creaturae universitate meliora sunt, quia misera esse non possunt. Neque enim caetera membra corporis nostri ideo dicendum est oculis esse meliora, quia caeca esse non possunt. Sicut autem melior est natura sentiens et cum dolet, quam lapis qui dolere nullo modo potest: ita rationalis natura praestantior est etiam misera, quam illa quae rationis vel sensus est expers, et ideo in eam non cadit miseria. Quod cum ita sit, huic naturae, quae in tanta excellentia creata est, ut licet ipsa sit mutabilis, inhaerendo tamen incommutabili bono, id est summo Deo, beatitudinem consequatur, nec expleat indigentiam suam nisi utique beata sit, eique explendae non sufficiat nisi Deus, profecto non illi adhaerere, vitium est. Omne autem vitium naturae nocet, ac per hoc contra naturam est. Ab illa igitur quae adhaeret Deo, non natura differt ista, sed vitio: quo tamen etiam vitio valde magna multumque laudabilis ostenditur ipsa natura. Cujus enim recte vituperatur vitium, procul dubio natura laudatur. Nam recta vitii vituperatio est, quod illo dehonestatur natura laudabilis. Sicut ergo cum vitium oculorum dicitur caecitas, id ostenditur, quod ad naturam oculorum pertinet visus; et cum vitium aurium dicitur surditas, ad earum naturam pertinere demonstratur auditus: ita cum vitium creaturae angelicae dicitur, quod non adhaeret Deo, hinc apertissime declaratur, ejus naturae, ut Deo adhaereat, convenire. Quam porro magna sit laus adhaerere Deo, ut ei vivat, inde sapiat, illo gaudeat, tantoque bono sine morte, sine errore, sine molestia perfruatur, quis cogitare digne possit, aut eloqui? Quapropter etiam vitio malorum angelorum, quo non adhaerent Deo, quoniam omne vitium naturae nocet, satis manifestatur Deum tam bonam eorum creasse naturam, cui noxium sit non esse cum Deo.

Thus although not every creature can be happy (for beasts, wood, stones, and if there is anything of this kind, do not obtain or take this gift), yet that which can, can not from itself, because it was created out of nothing; but from Him by whom it was created. For by attaining this it is happy, by losing which it is miserable. But He who is happy not by another, but by Himself as good, cannot therefore be miserable himself, because He cannot lose Himself.

3. We say therefore that the unchangeable good is not, except the one true blessed God: but those things which He made are indeed good, because from Him; nevertheless they are changeable, because they were made not of Him, but of nothing. Although therefore they are not the highest; to which God is a greater good: yet those changeable goods are great which can adhere so that they may be happy, to the unchangeable good; which is so far their good, that without it they must of necessity be miserable. Nor for that reason are the rest in this universe of creatures better, because they cannot be miserable. For it is not to be said that the other members of our body are therefore better than the eyes, because they cannot be blind. But just as the sensing nature even when it grieves is better than a stone which can in no way grieve: so the rational nature is more excellent even when miserable, than that which is void of reason or sense, and therefore misery does not fall upon it. Which since it is so, for this nature, which was created in such excellence, that although it is itself changeable, yet by inhearing in the unchangeable good, that is the supreme God, it may attain happiness, nor may it fulfill its indigence except by being certainly happy, and for its fulfillment nothing suffices except God, surely not to adhere to Him is a vice. Moreover every vice harms nature, and for this reason is against nature. From that nature therefore which adheres to God, this one does not differ by nature, but by vice: by which vice nevertheless the nature itself is shown to be very great and much to be praised. For of whose vice it is rightly blamed, undoubtedly the nature is praised. For the right blame of a vice is, that by it a laudable nature is dishonored. Just as therefore when blindness is said to be a vice of the eyes, it is shown by that, that sight pertains to the nature of the eyes; and when deafness is said to be a vice of the ears, it is demonstrated that hearing pertains to their nature: so when it is said to be a vice of the angelic creature, that it does not adhere to God, from here it is most clearly declared, that it is suitable for its nature to adhere to God. Furthermore how great a praise it is to adhere to God, so that it may live for Him, from Him be wise, in Him rejoice, and enjoy so great a good without death, without error, without molestation, who could worthily think, or speak? Wherefore also by the vice of the evil angels, by which they do not adhere to God, since every vice harms nature, it is sufficiently manifested that God created so good a nature of theirs, for which it is harmful not to be with God.

Caput II.

Nullam essentiam Deo esse contrariam, quia ab eo qui summe est et semper est, hoc totum videtur diversum esse quod non est.

Haec dicta sint, ne quisquam, cum de angelis apostaticis loquimur, existimet eos aliam velut ex alio principio habere potuisse naturam, nec eorum naturae auctorem Deum. Cujus erroris impietate tanto quisque carebit expeditius et facilius, quanto perspicacius intelligere potuerit, quod per angelum dixit Deus, quando Moysen mittebat ad filios Israel: Ego sum, qui sum (Exod. III, 14). Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo immutabilis sit; rebus quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut ipse est; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus; atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia; sic ab eo quod est esse, vocatur essentia: novo quidem nomine, quo usi veteres non sunt latini sermonis auctores, sed jam nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod Graeci appellant *οὐσίαν*. Hoc enim verbum e verbo expressum est, ut diceretur essentia. Ac per hoc ei naturae, quae summe est, qua faciente sunt quaecumque sunt, contraria natura non est, nisi quae non est. Ei quippe quod est, non esse contrarium est. Et propterea Deo, id est summae essentiae, et auctori omnium qualiumcumque essentiarum, essentia nulla contraria est.

Caput III.

De inimicis Dei, non per naturam, sed per contrariam voluntatem, quae cum ipsis nocet, bonae utique naturae nocet: quia vitium si non nocet, non est.

Dicuntur autem in Scripturis inimici Dei, qui non natura, sed vitiis adversantur ejus imperio: nihil ei valentes nocere, sed sibi. Inimici enim sunt resistendi voluntate, non potestate laedendi. Deus namque immutabilis est, et omnimodo incorruptibilis. Idcirco vitium quo resistunt Deo, qui ejus appellantur inimici, non est Deo, sed ipsis malum. Neque hoc ob aliud, nisi quia corrumpit in eis naturae bonum. Natura igitur non est contraria Deo, sed vitium. Quia quod malum est, contrarium est bono , Quis autem neget Deum summe bonum? Vitium ergo contrarium est Deo, tanquam malum bono.

Chapter II.

That no essence is contrary to God, because from Him who supremely is and always is, all this that is not seems to be different.

These things have been said, lest anyone, when we speak of the apostate angels, should think that they could have had another nature as if from another principle, and that God was not the author of their nature. Each person will be free from the impiety of this error so much more expeditiously and easily, the more clearly he can understand what God said through the angel, when He sent Moses to the children of Israel: "I am who I am" (Exod. III, 14). For since God is the supreme essence, that is, supremely is, and therefore is unchangeable; to the things which He created out of nothing, He gave being, but not supreme being, as He Himself is; and to some He gave more being, to others less; and thus He ordered natures by degrees of essences. For just as from that which is "to be wise" (sapere), wisdom (sapientia) is named; so from that which is "to be" (esse), essence (essentia) is named: a new name indeed, which the ancient authors of the Latin language did not use, but already used in our times, lest our language should also lack what the Greeks call ousia. For this word was expressed word for word, so that it might be called essence. And by this, to that nature which supremely is, by whose making are whatever things are, there is no contrary nature, except that which is not. For to that which is, "not to be" is contrary. And therefore to God, that is to the supreme essence, and the author of all essences of whatever kind, no essence is contrary.

Chapter III.

Of the enemies of God, not by nature, but by a contrary will, which, while it harms them, certainly harms a good nature: because if a vice does not harm, it is not a vice.

Moreover, those are called in the Scriptures enemies of God, who oppose His empire not by nature, but by vices: being able to harm Him in nothing, but themselves. For they are enemies by the will of resisting, not by the power of hurting. For God is unchangeable, and in every way incorruptible. Therefore the vice by which they resist God, who are called His enemies, is an evil not to God, but to themselves. Nor for any other reason, except because it corrupts the good of nature in them. Therefore nature is not contrary to God, but vice is. Because what is evil is contrary to good; and who would deny that God is supremely good? Vice, therefore, is contrary to God, as evil to good.

Porro autem bonum est et natura quam vitiat; unde et huic bono utique contrarium est: sed Deo tantummodo tanquam bono malum; naturae vero quam vitiat, non tantum malum, sed etiam noxium. Nulla quippe mala Deo noxia, sed mutabilibus corruptibilibusque naturis, bonis tamen ipsorum quoque testimonio vitiorum. Si enim bonae non essent, eis vitia nocere non possent. Nam quid eis nocendo faciunt, nisi adimunt integritatem, pulchritudinem, salutem, virtutem, et quidquid boni naturae per vitium detrahi sive minui consuevit? Quod si omnino desit, nihil boni adimendo non nocet, ac per hoc nec vitium est. Nam esse vitium, et non nocere, non potest. Unde colligitur, quamvis non possit vitium nocere incommutabili bono, non tamen posse nocere nisi bono: quia non inest, nisi ubi nocet. Hoc etiam isto modo dici potest, vitium esse nec in summo posse bono, nec nisi in aliquo bono. Sola ergo bona alicubi esse possunt, sola mala nusquam: quoniam naturae etiam illae quae ex malae voluntatis vitio vitiatae sunt, in quantum vitiosae sunt, malae sunt; in quantum autem naturae sunt, bonae sunt. Et cum in poenis est natura vitiosa, excepto eo quod natura est, etiam hoc ibi bonum est, quod impunita non est. Hoc enim est justum, et omne justum procul dubio bonum. Non enim quisquam de vitiis naturalibus, sed de voluntariis poenas luit. Nam etiam quod vitium consuetudine nimiove progressu roboratum velut naturaliter inolevit, a voluntate sumpsit exordium. De vitiis quippe nunc loquimur ejus naturae, cui mens inest capax intelligibilis lucis, qua discernitur justum ab injusto.

Caput IV.

De natura irrationalium, aut vita carentium, quae in suo genere atque ordine ab universitatis decore non discrepat.

Caeterum vitia pecorum et arborum, aliarumque rerum mutabilium atque mortalium, vel intellectu, vel sensu, vel vita omnino carentium, quibus eorum dissolubilis natura corrumpitur, damnabilia putare, ridiculum est: cum istae creaturae eum modum nutu Creatoris acceperint, ut cedendo ac succedendo peragant infimam pulchritudinem temporum in genere suo istius mundi partibus congruentem. Neque enim coelestibus fuerant terrena coaequanda, aut ideo universitati deesse ista debuerunt, quoniam sunt illa meliora. Cum ergo in his locis, ubi talia esse competebat, alia aliis deficientibus oriuntur, et succumbunt minora majoribus, atque in qualitates superantium superata vertuntur, rerum est ordo transeuntium. Cujus ordinis decus propterea nos non delectat, quoniam parti ejus pro conditione nostrae mortalitatis intexti, universum, cui particulae quae nos offendunt, satis apte decenterque conveniunt, sentire non possumus.

Furthermore, the nature which it vitiates is also good; hence it is also certainly contrary to this good: but to God only as evil to good; but to the nature which it vitiates, it is not only an evil, but also harmful. For no evils are harmful to God, but to changeable and corruptible natures, which are nevertheless good by the testimony of their own vices. For if they were not good, vices could not harm them. For what do they do by harming them, except take away integrity, beauty, health, virtue, and whatever good of nature is accustomed to be withdrawn or diminished through vice? But if it is altogether absent, it does not harm by taking away any good, and for this reason it is not even a vice. For it cannot be a vice and not harm. From which it is gathered, that although vice cannot harm the unchangeable good, it nevertheless cannot harm except a good: because it is not present except where it harms. This can also be said in this way: that vice can neither be in the supreme good, nor except in some good. Therefore only goods can be anywhere, and only evils nowhere: since even those natures which have been vitiated from the vice of an evil will, in so far as they are vicious, are evil; but in so far as they are natures, they are good. And when a vicious nature is in punishments, besides that it is a nature, this also is a good there, that it is not unpunished. For this is just, and every just thing is undoubtedly good. For no one pays penalties for natural vices, but for voluntary ones. For even that vice which, strengthened by custom or excessive progress, has grown as if naturally, took its beginning from the will. For we are now speaking of the vices of that nature in which there is a mind capable of intelligible light, by which the just is discerned from the unjust.

Chapter IV.

Of the nature of irrational things, or those lacking life, which in its own kind and order does not disagree with the beauty of the universe.

For the rest, it is ridiculous to think that the vices of cattle and trees, and of other changeable and mortal things, lacking either intellect, or sense, or life altogether, by which their dissoluble nature is corrupted, are damnable: since these creatures received that mode by the nod of the Creator, so that by giving way and succeeding they might fulfill the lowest beauty of times in their own kind, suitable to the parts of this world. For neither were earthly things to be made equal to heavenly ones, nor for that reason ought these to have been lacking to the universe, because those others are better. When therefore in these places, where it was fitting for such things to be, some things arise as others fail, and the lesser succumb to the greater, and the overcome are turned into the qualities of the surmounting, it is the order of passing things. The beauty of which order does not delight us for this reason, because being woven into a part of it according to the condition of our mortality, we cannot perceive the whole, with which the particles that offend us agree aptly and decently enough.

Unde nobis, in quibus eam contemplari minus idonei sumus, rectissime credenda praecipitur providentia Conditoris, ne tanti artificis opus in aliquo reprehendere vanitate humanae temeritatis audeamus. Quanquam et vitia rerum terrenarum non voluntaria, neque poenalia, naturas ipsas, quarum nulla omnino est, cujus non sit auctor et conditor Deus, si prudenter attendamus, eadem ratione commendant: quia et in eis hoc nobis per vitium tolli displicet, quod in natura placet: nisi quia hominibus etiam ipsae naturae plerumque displicent, cum eis fiunt noxiae, non eas considerantibus, sed utilitatem suam; sicut illa animalia, quorum abundantia Aegyptiorum superbia vapulavit. Sed isto modo possunt et solem vituperare; quoniam quidam peccantes, vel debita non reddentes, poni a judicibus jubentur ad solem . Non itaque ex commodo vel incommodo nostro, sed per seipsam considerata natura dat artifici suo gloriam. Sic est et natura ignis aeterni sine ulla dubitatione laudabilis, quamvis damnatis impiis futura poenalis. Quid enim est igne flammante, vigente, lucente pulchrius? quid calefaciente, curante, coquente utilius? quamvis eo nihil sit urente molestius. Idem igitur ipse aliter appositus perniciosus, qui convenienter adhibitus commodissimus invenitur. Nam ejus in universo mundo utilitates verbis explicare quis sufficit? Nec audiendi sunt, qui laudant in igne lucem, ardorem autem vituperant: videlicet non ex sui natura, sed ex suo commodo vel incommodo. Videre enim volunt, ardere nolunt. Sed parum attendunt eam ipsam lucem, quae certe et illis placet, oculis infirmis per inconvenientiam nocere; et in illo ardore, qui eis displicet, nonnulla animalia per convenientiam salubriter vivere .

Caput V.

Quod in omni naturae specie ac modo laudabilis sit Creator.

Naturae igitur omnes, quoniam sunt, et ideo habent modum suum, speciem suam, et quamdam secum pacem suam, profecto bonae sunt. Et cum ibi sunt, ubi esse per naturae ordinem debent, quantum acceperunt, suum esse custodiunt. Et quae semper esse non acceperunt, pro usu motuque rerum, quibus Creatoris lege subduntur, in melius deteriusve mutantur, in eum divina providentia tendentes exitum, quem ratio gubernandae universitatis includit: ita ut nec tanta corruptio, quanta usque ad interitum naturas mutabiles mortalesque perducit, sic faciat non esse quod erat, ut non inde fiat consequenter quod esse debeat.

Whence for us, in whom we are less fit to contemplate it, the providence of the Creator is most rightly commanded to be believed, lest we should dare to reprehend the work of so great an artisan in anything by the vanity of human temerity. Although also the vices of earthly things, neither voluntary nor penal, commend the natures themselves, of which there is none at all of which God is not the author and founder, if we attend prudently, by the same reason: because also in them it displeases us that this should be taken away through vice, which pleases in nature: except because to men even the natures themselves for the most part displease, when they become harmful to them, not considering them, but their own utility; like those animals by whose abundance the pride of the Egyptians was scourged. But in this way they can also find fault with the sun; since some who sin, or do not pay their debts, are ordered by judges to be placed in the sun. Therefore nature, considered not from our convenience or inconvenience, but through itself, gives glory to its artisan. So also the nature of eternal fire is without any doubt laudable, although it will be penal for the damned impious. For what is more beautiful than a flaming, vigorous, shining fire? what more useful than its heating, curing, and cooking? although nothing is more troublesome than its burning. The same thing therefore, applied otherwise, is pernicious, which, when suitably employed, is found to be most convenient. For who suffices to explain its utilities in the whole world with words? Nor are they to be heard who praise the light in fire, but find fault with the heat: evidently not from its own nature, but from their own convenience or inconvenience. For they wish to see, but do not wish to burn. But they attend little to the fact that this same light, which certainly pleases them, harms weak eyes through inconvenience; and in that heat, which displeases them, some animals live healthfully through convenience.

Chapter V.

That the Creator is laudable in every species and mode of nature.

Therefore all natures, since they are, and for that reason have their own mode, their own species, and a certain peace of their own with themselves, are certainly good. And when they are there where they ought to be according to the order of nature, they preserve their own being as much as they have received. And those which have not received to be always, are changed for the better or the worse according to the use and motion of things to which they are subjected by the law of the Creator, tending by divine providence to that end which the reason for governing the universe includes: so that not even such great corruption as leads changeable and mortal natures as far as destruction, so makes that not to be which was, that what ought to be should not consequently be made from it.

Quae cum ita sint, Deus qui summe est, atque ob hoc ab illo facta est omnis essentia, quae non summe est (quia neque illi aequalis esse deberet, quae de nihilo facta esset); neque ullo modo esse posset, si ab illo facta non esset: nec ullorum vitiorum offensione vituperandus, et omnium naturarum consideratione laudandus est.

Caput VI.

Quae causa sit beatitudinis Angelorum bonorum, et quae causa sit miseriae angelorum malorum.

Proinde causa beatitudinis Angelorum bonorum ea verissima reperitur, quod ei adhaerent qui summe est. Cum vero causa miseriae malorum angelorum quaeritur, ea merito occurrit, quod ab illo qui summe est aversi, ad se ipsos conversi sunt, qui non summe sunt: et hoc vitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupatur? Initium quippe omnis peccati superbia (Eccli. X, 15). Noluerunt ergo ad illum custodire fortitudinem suam (Psal. LVIII, 10): et qui magis essent, si ei qui summe est adhaererent; se illi praeferendo, id quod minus est praetulerunt. Hic primus defectus et prima inopia primumque vitium ejus naturae, quae ita creata est, ut nec summe esset, et tamen ad beatitudinem habendam, eo qui summe est frui posset, a quo aversa, non quidem nulla, sed tamen minus esset, atque ob hoc misera fieret.

Hujus porro malae voluntatis causa efficiens si quaeratur, nihil invenitur. Quid est enim quod facit voluntatem malam, cum ipsa faciat opus malum? Ac per hoc mala voluntas efficiens est operis mali, male autem voluntatis efficiens est nihil. Quoniam si res aliqua est, aut habet aut non habet aliquam voluntatem: si habet, au bonam profecto habet, aut malam: si bonam, quis ita desipiat, ut dicat quod bona voluntas faciat voluntatem malam? Erit enim, si ita est, bona voluntas causa peccati: quo absurdius putari nihil potest. Si autem res ista quae putatur facere voluntatem malam, ipsa quoque habet voluntatem malam; etiam eam quae fecerit res, consequenter interrogo: atque ut sit aliquis inquirendi modus, causam primae malae voluntatis inquiro. Non est enim prima voluntas mala, quam fecit voluntas mala : sed illa prima est, quam nulla fecit. Nam si praecessit a qua fieret, illa prior est, quae alteram fecit. Si respondetur quod eam nulla res fecerit, et ideo semper fuerit; quaero utrum in aliqua natura fuerit.

Which things since they are so, God, who supremely is, and for this reason every essence which is not supremely was made by Him (because that which was made of nothing ought not to be equal to Him); nor could it in any way be, if it had not been made by Him: is neither to be blamed by the offense of any vices, and is to be praised by the consideration of all natures.

Chapter VI.

What is the cause of the beatitude of the good angels, and what is the cause of the misery of the evil angels.

Therefore the most true cause of the beatitude of the good angels is found to be this: that they adhere to Him who supremely is. But when the cause of the misery of the evil angels is sought, this occurs deservedly: that, turned away from Him who supremely is, they were turned to themselves, who are not supremely: and what else is this vice called but pride? For "the beginning of all sin is pride" (Ecclus. X, 15). They were unwilling, therefore, to keep their strength for Him (Psalm LVIII, 10): and they who would have been more if they had adhered to Him who supremely is; by preferring themselves to Him, they preferred that which is less. This was the first defect and the first indigence and the first vice of that nature, which was so created that it should not be supremely, and yet to have beatitude, it might enjoy Him who supremely is, from whom being turned away, it was not indeed nothing, but yet was less, and for this reason became miserable.

If, furthermore, the efficient cause of this evil will be sought, nothing is found. For what is it that makes a will evil, when it is the will itself that makes the evil work? And by this an evil will is the efficient cause of an evil work, but of an evil will there is no efficient cause. Since if any thing is, either it has or it has not some will: if it has, certainly it has either a good one or an evil one: if a good one, who would be so foolish as to say that a good will makes an evil will? For if it be so, a good will will be the cause of sin: than which nothing can be thought more absurd. But if that thing which is thought to make an evil will, itself also has an evil will; I ask consequently about that one also which made it: and that there may be some limit to inquiring, I inquire for the cause of the first evil will. For that is not the first evil will which an evil will made: but that is the first which no will made. For if one preceded from which it was made, that is prior which made the other. If it is answered that no thing made it, and therefore it always was; I ask whether it was in any nature.

Si enim in nulla fuit, omnino non fuit: si autem in aliqua, vitiabat eam et corrumpebat, eratque illi noxia, ac per hoc bono privabat. Et ideo in mala natura voluntas mala esse non poterat; sed in bona, mutabili tamen, cui vitium hoc posset nocere. Si enim non nocuit, non utique vitium fuit: ac per hoc nec mala voluntas fuisse dicenda est. Porro si nocuit, bonum auferendo vel minuendo utique nocuit. Non igitur esse potuit sempiterna voluntas mala in ea re, in qua bonum naturale praecesserat, quod mala voluntas nocendo posset adimere. Si ergo non erat sempiterna, quis eam fecerit, quaero. Restat ut dicatur, quod ea res fecerit malam voluntatem, in qua nulla voluntas fuit. Haec utrum superior sit, requiro; an inferior, an aequalis. Sed si superior, utique melior: quomodo ergo nullius, ac non potius bonae voluntatis? Hoc idem profecto et aequalis . Duo quippe quandiu sunt pariter voluntatis bonae, non facit alter in altero voluntatem malam. Relinquitur ut inferior res, cui nulla voluntas est, fecerit angelicae naturae, quae prima peccavit, voluntatem malam. Sed etiam res ipsa quaecumque est inferior usque ad infimam terram, quoniam natura et essentia est, procul dubio bona est, habens modum et speciem suam in genere atque ordine suo. Quomodo ergo res bona efficiens est voluntatis malae? quomodo, inquam, bonum est causa mali? Cum enim se voluntas relicto superiore ad inferiora convertit, efficitur mala: non quia malum est, quo se convertit; sed quia perversa est ipsa conversio. Idcirco non res inferior voluntatem malam fecit; sed rem inferiorem prave atque inordinate ipsa quae facta est, appetivit. Si enim aliqui duo aequaliter affecti animo et corpore videant unius corporis pulchritudinem, qua visa unus eorum ad illicite perfruendum moveatur, alter in voluntate pudica stabilis perseveret; quid putamos esse causae, ut in illo fiat, in illo non fiat voluntas mala? Quae illam res fecit, in quo facta est? Neque enim pulchritudo illa corporis; nam eam non fecit in ambobus: quandoquidem amborum non dispariliter occurrit aspectibus. An caro intuentis in causa est? Cur non et illius? An vero animus? Cur non utriusque? Ambos enim et animo et corpore aequaliter affectos fuisse praediximus. An dicendum est, alterum eorum occulta maligni spiritus suggestione tentatum? quasi non eidem suggestioni et qualicumque suasioni propria voluntate consenserit. Hanc igitur consensionem, hanc malam quam male suadenti adhibuit voluntatem, quae in eo res fecerit, quaerimus. Nam ut hoc quoque impedimentum ab ista quaestione tollatur, si eadem tentatione ambo tententur, et unus ei cedat atque consentiat, alter idem qui fuerat perseveret; quid aliud apparet, nisi unum voluisse, alterum noluisse a castitate deficere?

For if it was in none, it was not at all: but if it was in some, it vitiated and corrupted it, and was harmful to it, and for this reason deprived it of good. and therefore in an evil nature an evil will could not be; but in a good one, though changeable, which this vice could harm. For if it did not harm, it was certainly not a vice: and for this reason it is not to be called an evil will. Furthermore, if it harmed, it harmed by taking away or diminishing good. Therefore an eternal evil will could not be in that thing in which a natural good had preceded, which an evil will by harming could take away. If therefore it was not eternal, I ask who made it. It remains to be said, that some thing made the evil will in which there was no will. I ask whether this thing be superior, or inferior, or equal. But if it be superior, it is certainly better: how therefore can it be the cause of no will, and not rather of a good will? The same is certainly true of an equal. For two things, as long as they are equally of a good will, one does not make an evil will in the other. It remains that an inferior thing, which has no will, made an evil will for the angelic nature, which first sinned. But even the inferior thing itself, whatever it is, even down to the lowest earth, since it is nature and essence, is undoubtedly good, having its own mode and species in its own kind and order. How therefore is a good thing the efficient cause of an evil will? how, I say, is good the cause of evil? For when the will, leaving what is superior, turns itself to inferior things, it becomes evil: not because that is evil to which it turns; but because the turning itself is perverted. Therefore an inferior thing did not make the evil will; but the thing itself which was made, desired the inferior thing wickedly and inordinately. For if any two persons equally affected in mind and body see the beauty of one body, which being seen one of them is moved to enjoy it illicitly, while the other perseveres stable in a modest will; what do we think is the cause, that in the one an evil will is made, in the other it is not? What thing made it in him in whom it was made? For not that beauty of the body; for it did not make it in both: since it occurred to the sight of both not differently. Is the flesh of the beholder the cause? Why not also of the other? Or is it the mind? Why not of both? For we said before that both were equally affected in mind and body. Or is it to be said that one of them was tempted by the hidden suggestion of a malignant spirit? as if he did not consent to the same suggestion and whatever persuasion by his own will. We ask, therefore, what thing made in him this consent, this evil will which he applied to the evil persuader. For that this impediment also may be removed from this question, if both be tempted by the same temptation, and one yield to it and consent, while the other persevere the same as he was; what else appears, except that one willed, the other did not will to fall from chastity?

Unde, nisi propria voluntate, ubi eadem fuerat in utroque corporis et animi affectio? Amborum oculis pariter visa est eadem pulchritudo, ambobus pariter institit occulta tentatio: propriam igitur in uno eorum voluntatem malam quae res fecerit scire volentibus, si bene intueantur, nihil occurrit. Si enim dixerimus quod ipse eam fecerit, quid erat ipse ante voluntatem malam nisi natura bona, cujus auctor Deus, qui est incommutabile bonum? Qui ergo dicit eum qui consensit tentanti atque suadenti, cui non consensit alius, ad illicite utendum pulchro corpore, quod videndum ambobus pariter adfuit, cum ante illam visionem ac tentationem similes ambo animo et corpore fuerint, ipsum sibi fecisse voluntatem malam, quia utique bonus ante voluntatem malam fuerit; quaerat cur eam fecerit, utrum quia natura est, an quia ex nihilo facta est: et inveniet voluntatem malam non ex eo esse incipere quod natura est, sed ex eo quod de nihilo natura facta est. Nam si natura causa est voluntatis malae, quid aliud cogimur dicere, nisi a bono fieri malum, et bonum esse causam mali? siquidem a natura bona fit voluntas mala. Quod unde fieri potest, ut natura bona, quamvis mutabilis, antequam habeat voluntatem malam, faciat aliquid mali, hoc est, ipsam voluntatem malam?

CAPUT. VII.---Causam efficientem malae voluntatis non esse quaerendam.

Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis: non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens; quia nec illa effectio est, sed defectio. Deficere namque ab eo quod summe est, ad id quod minus est, hoc est incipere habere voluntatem malam. Causas porro defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint, ut dixi, sed deficientes, velle invenire, tale est ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras, vel audire silentium: quod tamen utrumque nobis notum est; neque illud nisi per oculos, neque hoc nisi per aures; non sane in specie, sed in speciei privatione. Nemo ergo ex me scire quaerat, quod me nescire scio, nisi forte ut nescire discat, quod sciri non posse sciendum est. Ea quippe quae non in specie, sed in ejus privatione sciuntur, si dici aut intelligi potest, quodammodo nesciendo sciuntur, ut sciendo nesciantur. Cum enim acies etiam oculi corporalis currit per species corporales, nusquam tenebras videt, nisi ubi coeperit non videre. Ita etiam non ad aliquem alium sensum, sed ad solas aures pertinet sentire silentium: quod tamen nullo modo nisi non audiendo sentitur. Sic species intelligibiles mens quidem nostra intelligendo conspicit; sed ubi deficiunt, nesciendo condiscit. Delicta enim quis intelligit (Psal. XVIII, 13)?

Caput VIII.

De amore perverso, quo voluntas ab incommutabili bono ad commutabile bonum deficit.

Whence, except from his own will, where there had been the same affection of body and mind in both? The same beauty was seen equally by the eyes of both, the same hidden temptation pressed upon both equally: wishing to know, therefore, what thing made an evil will in one of them, if they look well, nothing occurs. For if we say that he himself made it, what was he himself before the evil will except a good nature, whose author is God, who is the unchangeable good? He therefore who says that he who consented to the tempter and persuader (to whom the other did not consent) to use illicitly the beautiful body which was present for both equally to see, when before that vision and temptation both were alike in mind and body, made for himself an evil will, because certainly he was good before the evil will; let him ask why he made it, whether because he is a nature, or because he was made of nothing: and he will find that an evil will begins to be not from that which is nature, but from that which nature was made out of nothing. For if nature is the cause of an evil will, what else are we compelled to say, except that evil is made by good, and that good is the cause of evil? since an evil will is made from a good nature. Whence can this be, that a good nature, although changeable, before it has an evil will, should make something of evil, that is, the evil will itself?

Chapter VII.

That the efficient cause of an evil will is not to be sought.

Let no one therefore seek the efficient cause of an evil will: for it is not efficient, but deficient; because neither is that an effect, but a defect. For to fail from that which supremely is, to that which is less, this is to begin to have an evil will. Furthermore, to wish to find the causes of these failures, since they are not efficient, as I said, but deficient, is such as if anyone wished to see darkness, or to hear silence: both of which are nevertheless known to us; the former only through the eyes, the latter only through the ears; certainly not in species, but in the privation of species. Let no one therefore seek to know from me what I know that I do not know, unless perhaps that he may learn not to know what must be known to be unable to be known. For those things which are known not in species, but in the privation of it, if it can be said or understood, are in a certain way known by not knowing, so that by knowing they are not known. For when the sharp sight of even the bodily eye runs through bodily species, nowhere does it see darkness, except where it has begun not to see. So also it pertains to no other sense, but to the ears alone to perceive silence: which nevertheless is in no way perceived except by not hearing. So our mind indeed beholds intelligible species by understanding; but where they fail, it learns by not knowing. For "who understands sins?" (Psalm XVIII, 13).

Chapter VIII.

Of perverse love, by which the will fails from the unchangeable good to the changeable good.

Hoc scio, naturam Dei nunquam, nusquam, nulla ex parte posse deficere; et ea posse deficere, quae ex nihilo facta sunt. Quae tamen quanto magis sunt, et bona faciunt (tunc enim aliquid faciunt), causas habent efficientes: in quantum autem deficiunt, et ex hoc mala faciunt, (quid enim tunc faciunt nisi vana?) causas habent deficientes. [VIII.] Itemque scio in quo fit mala voluntas, id in eo fieri, quod si nollet, non fieret: et ideo non necessarios, sed voluntarios defectus justa poena consequitur. Deficitur enim non ad mala, sed male; id est, non ad malas naturas, sed ideo male, quia contra ordinem naturarum ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est. Neque enim auri vitium est avaritia, sed hominis perverse amantis aurum, justitia derelicta, quae incomparabiliter auro debuit anteponi. Nec luxuria est vitium pulchrorum suaviumque corporum, sed animae perverse amantis corporeas voluptates, neglecta temperantia, qua rebus spiritualiter pulchrioribus, et incorruptibiliter suavioribus coaptamur. Nec jactantia vitium est laudis humanae, sed animae perverse amantis laudari ab hominibus, spreto testimonio conscientiae. Nec superbia vitium est dantis potestatem, vel ipsius etiam potestatis, sed animae perverse amantis potestatem suam, potentioris justiore contempta. Ac per hoc qui perverse amat cujuslibet naturae bonum, etiamsi adipiscatur, ipse fit in bono malus, et miser meliore privatus.

Caput IX.

An sancti Angeli quem habent creatorem naturae, eumdem habeant bonae voluntatis auctorem per Spiritum sanctum in eis charitate diffusa.

1. Cum ergo malae voluntatis efficiens naturalis, vel, si dici potest, essentialis nulla sit causa; ab ipsa quippe incipit spirituum mutabilium malum, quo minuitur atque depravatur naturae bonum, nec talem voluntatem facit nisi defectio, qua deseritur Deus, cujus defectionis etiam causa utique deficit: si dixerimus nullam esse efficientem causam etiam voluntatis bonae, cavendum est, ne voluntas bona bonorum Angelorum, non facta, sed Deo coaeterna esse credatur. Cum ergo ipsi facti sint, quomodo illa non esse facta dicetur? Porro quia facta est, utrum cum ipsis facta est, an sine illa fuerunt prius? Sed si cum ipsis, non dubium quod ab illo facta sit, a quo et ipsi; simulque ut facti sunt, ei a quo facti sunt, amore cum quo facti sunt, adhaeserunt. Eoque sunt isti ab illorum societate discreti, quod hi in eadem voluntate bona manserunt, illi ab ea deficiendo mutati sunt, mala scilicet voluntate, hoc ipso quod a bona defecerunt: a qua non defecissent, si utique noluissent.

This I know, that the nature of God can never, nowhere, and in no part fail; and that those things can fail which were made out of nothing. Which, however, the more they are and do good (for then they do something), have efficient causes: but in so far as they fail and from this do evil (for what do they then do but vain things?), they have deficient causes. And likewise I know that in whom an evil will comes to be, it comes to be in him for this reason, that if he were unwilling, it would not happen: and therefore not necessary, but voluntary failures are followed by a just punishment. For the failure is not toward evil things, but evilly; that is, not toward evil natures, but for this reason evilly, because it is against the order of natures, from that which supremely is to that which is less. For avarice is not a vice of gold, but of a man perversely loving gold, having abandoned justice, which ought incomparably to have been preferred to gold. Nor is luxury a vice of beautiful and pleasant bodies, but of a soul perversely loving bodily pleasures, having neglected temperance, by which we are co-adapted to things spiritually more beautiful and incorruptibly more pleasant. Nor is boastfulness a vice of human praise, but of a soul perversely loving to be praised by men, having spurned the testimony of conscience. Nor is pride a vice of him who gives power, or even of power itself, but of a soul perversely loving its own power, while the more powerful just one is despised. And through this, he who perversely loves the good of any nature, even if he obtains it, himself becomes evil in the good, and wretched, being deprived of a better thing.

Chapter IX.

Whether the holy angels, who have God as the creator of their nature, have the same as the author of their good will through the Holy Spirit with charity shed abroad in them.

Since, therefore, there is no natural, or, if it can be said, essential efficient cause of an evil will; for from it indeed begins the evil of mutable spirits, by which the good of nature is diminished and depraved, nor does any other thing make such a will but the failure by which God is deserted, of which failure the cause also certainly fails: if we should say that there is no efficient cause even of a good will, we must beware lest the good will of the good angels be believed not to have been made, but to be coeternal with God. Since, therefore, they themselves were made, how shall it be said that that will was not made? Furthermore, because it was made, was it made with them, or were they without it at first? But if it was made with them, there is no doubt that it was made by Him by whom they also were; and as soon as they were made, they adhered to Him by whom they were made, with the love with which they were made. And by this are these separated from the society of those others, because these remained in the same good will, while those were changed by failing from it, namely, by an evil will, by this very thing that they failed from the good: from which they would not have failed, if indeed they had been unwilling.

Si autem boni Angeli fuerunt prius sine bona voluntate, eamque in se ipsi Deo non operante fecerunt; ergo meliores a se ipsis, quam ab illo facti sunt. Absit. Quid enim erant sine bona voluntate, nisi mali? Aut si propterea non mali, quia nec mala voluntas eis inerat (neque enim ab ea, quam nondum coeperant habere, defecerant), certe nondum tales, nondum tam boni, quam esse cum voluntate bona coeperunt. Aut si non potuerunt se ipsos facere meliores, quam eos ille fecerat, quo nemo melius quidquam facit; profecto et bonam voluntatem, qua meliores essent, nisi operante adjutorio Creatoris, habere non possent. Et cum id egit eorum voluntas bona, ut non ad se ipsos, qui minus erant, sed ad illum qui summe est, converterentur, eique adhaerentes magis essent, ejusque participatione sapienter beateque viverent; quid aliud ostenditur, nisi voluntatem quamlibet bonam inopem fuisse in solo desiderio remansuram, nisi ille qui bonam naturam ex nihilo sui capacem fecerat, ex se ipso faceret implendo meliorem, prius faciens excitando avidiorem?

2. Nam et hoc discutiendum est, si boni Angeli ipsi in se fecerunt voluntatem bonam, utrum aliqua eam, an nulla voluntate fecerunt. Si nulla, utique nec fecerunt. Si aliqua, utrum mala, an bona. Si mala, quomodo esse potuit mala voluntas bonae voluntatis effectrix? Si bona, jam ergo habebant. Et istam quis fecerat, nisi ille qui eos cum bona voluntate, id est cum amore casto, quo illi adhaererent, creavit, simul eis et condens naturam, et largiens gratiam? Unde sine bona voluntate, hoc est Dei amore, nunquam sanctos Angelos fuisse, credendum est. Isti autem, qui cum boni creati essent, tamen mali sunt, mala propria voluntate, quam bona natura non fecit, nisi cum a bono sponte defecit, ut mali causa non sit bonum, sed defectus a bono, aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam, quam illi qui in eadem perstiterunt; aut si utrique boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti, ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde se nunquam casuros certissimi fierent, pervenerunt: sicut jam etiam in libro, quem sequitur iste, tractavimus (cap. 13). Confitendum est igitur cum debita laude Creatoris, non ad solos sanctos homines pertinere, verum etiam de sanctis Angelis posse dici, quod charitas Dei diffusa sit in eis per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est eis (Rom. V, 5); nec tantum hominum, sed primitus praecipueque Angelorum bonum esse, quod scriptum est, Mihi autem adhaerere Deo, bonum est (Psal. LXXII, 28). Hoc bonum quibus commune est, habent et cum illo cui adhaerent et inter se societatem sanctam, et sunt una civitas Dei, eademque vivum sacrificium ejus vivumque templum ejus.

But if the good angels were at first without a good will, and they themselves made it in themselves without God working it; therefore they were made better by themselves than by Him. Far be it. For what were they without a good will, except evil? Or if not evil for this reason, because an evil will was not in them (for they had not failed from that which they had not yet begun to have), certainly they were not yet such, not yet so good, as they began to be with a good will. Or if they could not make themselves better than He had made them, than whom no one makes anything better; surely they could not have a good will, by which they would be better, unless the assistance of the Creator were working it. And since their good will acted so that they should be turned not to themselves, who were less, but to Him who supremely is, and by adhering to Him they should be more, and by participation in Him they should live wisely and blessedly; what else is shown but that any good will would have been destitute and remained in desire alone, unless He who had made a good nature out of nothing capable of Himself, should from Himself make it better by filling it, first making it more eager by exciting it?

2. For this also must be discussed: if the good angels themselves made the good will in themselves, whether they made it by some will, or by none. If by none, surely they did not make it. If by some, whether an evil or a good one. If an evil one, how could an evil will be the effecter of a good will? If a good one, then they already had it. And who had made that one, but He who created them with a good will, that is, with a chaste love, by which they might adhere to Him, at once building their nature and bestowing grace upon them? Whence it is to be believed that without a good will, that is, the love of God, the holy angels have never been. But those who, though they were created good, yet are evil by their own evil will, which a good nature did not make, except when it failed from the good of its own accord, so that the cause of evil is not good, but a failure from the good; either they received a smaller grace of divine love than those who persisted in the same; or if both were created equally good, while these were falling by an evil will, those, more amply aided, arrived at that fullness of beatitude, whence they might be most certain that they would never fall: as we have already discussed in the book which this one follows (Chapter XIII). It must be confessed, therefore, with the due praise of the Creator, that it does not pertain to holy men alone, but it can also be said of the holy angels, that the charity of God is shed abroad in them through the Holy Spirit, who is given to them (Rom. V, 5); and that it is not only the good of men, but first and primarily of the angels, which is written: "But for me to adhere to God is good" (Psalm LXXII, 28). To those to whom this good is common, they have both with Him to whom they adhere and among themselves a holy society, and they are one City of God, and the same is His living sacrifice and His living temple.

Cujus pars quae conjungenda immortalibus Angelis ex mortalibus hominibus congregatur, et nunc mortaliter peregrinatur in terris, vel in eis qui morte obierunt, secretis animarum receptaculis sedibusque requiescit, eodem Deo creante, quemadmodum exorta sit, sicut de Angelis dictum est, jam video esse dicendum. Ex uno quippe homine, quem primum Deus condidit, genus humanum sumpsit exordium, secundum sanctae Scripturae fidem, quae mirabilem auctoritatem non immerito habet in orbe terrarum, atque in omnibus gentibus, quas sibi esse crediturus inter caetera vera quae dixit, vera divinitate praedixit.

Caput X.

De falsitate ejus historiae, quae multa millia annorum praeteritis temporibus adscribat.

1. Omittamus igitur conjecturas hominum nescientium quid loquantur de natura vel institutione generis humani. Alii namque, sicut de ipso mundo crediderunt, semper fuisse homines opinantur. Unde ait et Apuleius, cum hoc animantium genus describeret: «Singillatim mortales, cunctim tamen universo genere perpetui (In libro de deo Socratis). Et cum illis dictum fuerit, si semper humanum genus fuit, quonam modo verum eorum loquatur historia, narrans qui fuerint quarumque rerum inventores, qui primi liberalium disciplinarum aliarumque artium institutores, vel a quibus primum illa vel illa regio parsque terrarum, illa atque illa insula incoli coeperit: respondent, diluviis et conflagrationibus per certa intervalla temporum non quidem omnia, sed plurima terrarum ita vastari, ut redigantur homines ad exiguam paucitatem, ex quorum progenie rursus multitudo pristina reparetur, ac sic identidem reparari et institui quasi prima, cum restituantur potius quae fuerant illis nimiis vastationibus interrupta et exstincta; caeterum hominem nisi ex homine existere omnino non posse. Dicunt autem quod putant, non quod sciunt.

2. Fallunt eos etiam quaedam mendacissimae litterae, quas perhibent in historia temporum multa annorum millia continere: cum ex Litteris sacris ab institutione hominis nondum completa annorum sex millia computemus. Unde, ne multa disputem quemadmodum illarum litterarum, in quibus longe plura annorum millia referuntur, vanitas refellatur, et nulla in illis rei hujus idonea reperiatur auctoritas; illa epistola Alexandri Magni ad Olympiadem matrem suam, quam scripsit narrationem cujusdam Aegyptii sacerdotis insinuans, quam protulit ex litteris quae sacrae apud illos haberentur, continentem regna quae Graeca quoque novit historia: in quibus regnum Assyriorum in eadem epistola Alexandri quinque millia excedit annorum; in Graeca vero historia mille ferme et trecentos habet ab ipsius Beli principatu, quem regem et ille Aegyptius in ejusdem regni ponit exordio.

Whose part, which is gathered from mortal men to be joined to the immortal angels, and now travels mortally on earth, or rests in those who have departed by death in the secret receptacles and seats of souls—how it arose by the creation of the same God, as was said of the angels, I see must now be told. For from one man, whom God first established, the human race took its beginning, according to the faith of the Holy Scripture, which has not undeservedly a wonderful authority in the whole world, and among all nations, which it predicted would believe in it, among other true things which it said, with true divinity.

Chapter X.

Of the falsity of that history which ascribes many thousands of years to past times.

1. Let us, therefore, omit the conjectures of men who know not what they say concerning the nature or institution of the human race. For some, as they have believed concerning the world itself, think that men have always existed. Whence also Apuleius says, when he was describing this genus of living beings: "Individually mortal, yet as a whole in their entire genus perpetual" (In the book on the god of Socrates). And when it has been said to them, if the human race has always been, in what way is their history true, narrating who were the inventors of which things, who were the first institutors of the liberal disciplines and other arts, or by whom first this or that region and part of the earth, this and that island began to be inhabited: they respond that by floods and conflagrations through certain intervals of time not indeed all things, but most things of the earth are so devastated, that men are reduced to a small few, from whose progeny again the pristine multitude is repaired, and thus again and again repaired and instituted as if for the first time, whereas rather those things are restored which had been interrupted and extinguished by those excessive devastations; otherwise a man could not exist at all except from a man. But they say what they think, not what they know.

2. They are also deceived by certain most lying writings, which they claim contain many thousands of years in the history of times: whereas from the Sacred Writings we compute not yet a full six thousand years from the institution of man. Whence, lest I dispute at length how the vanity of those writings, in which many more thousands of years are related, may be refuted, and no suitable authority for this matter be found in them; that letter of Alexander the Great to his mother Olympias, which he wrote suggesting the narrative of a certain Egyptian priest, which he brought forth from writings which were held as sacred among them, containing kingdoms which Greek history also knows: in which the kingdom of the Assyrians in the same letter of Alexander exceeds five thousand years; but in Greek history it has nearly one thousand and three hundred from the reign of Belus himself, whom that Egyptian also places at the beginning of the same kingdom.

Persarum autem et Macedonum imperium usque ad ipsum Alexandrum, cui loquebatur, plus quam octo et annorum millium ille constituit: cum apud Graecos Macedonum usque ad mortem Alexandri quadringenti octoginta quinque reperiantur; Persarum vero, donec ipsius Alexandri victory finiretur, ducenti et triginta tres computentur. Longe itaque hi numeri annorum illis Aegyptiis sunt minores, nec eis, etiamsi ter tantum computarentur, aequarentur. Perhibentur enim Aegyptii quondam tam breves annos habuisse, ut quaternis mensibus finirentur. Unde annus plenior et verior, qualis nunc et nobis et illis est, tres eorum annos complectebatur antiquos. Sed ne sic quidem, ut dixi, Graeca Aegyptiae numero temporum concordat historia, Et ideo Graecae potius fides habenda est: quia veritatem non excedit annorum, qui Litteris nostris, quae vere sacrae sunt continentur. Porro si haec epistola Alexandri, quae maxime innotuit, multum abhorret in spatiis temporum a probabili fide rerum; quanto minus credendum est illis litteris, quas plenas fabulosis velut antiquitatibus proferre voluerint contra auctoritatem notissimorum divinorumque librorum, quae totum orbem sibi crediturum esse praedixit, et cui totus orbis, sicut ab ea praedictum est, credidit; quae vera se narrasse praeterita, ex his quae futura praenuntiavit, cum tanta veritate implentur, ostendit?

Caput XI.

De his qui hunc quidem mundum non sempiternum putant, sed aut innumerabiles, aut eumdem unum certa conclusione saeculorum semper nasci et resolvi opinantur.

Alii vero qui mundum istum non existimant sempiternum, sive non eum solum, sed innumerabiles opinentur, sive solum quidem esse, sed certis saeculorum intervallis innumerabiliter oriri et occidere; necesse est fateantur hominum genus prius sine hominibus gignentibus extitisse. Neque enim ut alluvionibus incendiisque terrarum, quas illi non putant toto prorsus orbe contingere, et ideo paucos homines ex quibus multitudo pristina reparetur, semper remanere contendunt, ita et hi possunt putare, quod aliqui hominum pereunte mundo relinquantur in mundo: sed sicut ipsum mundum ex materia sua renasci existimant, ita in illo ex elementis ejus genus humanum, ac deinde a parentibus progeniem pullulare mortalium, sicut aliorum animalium.

Caput XII.

Quid respondendum sit his, qui primam conditionem hominis tardam esse causantur.

But the empire of the Persians and Macedonians up to Alexander himself, to whom he was speaking, he established at more than eight thousand years: whereas among the Greeks the Macedonians up to the death of Alexander are found to be four hundred and eighty-five; and of the Persians, until they were finished by the victory of Alexander himself, two hundred and thirty-three are computed. These numbers of years, therefore, are far smaller than those of the Egyptians, nor would they be equaled by them, even if they were computed three times as much. For the Egyptians are said to have formerly had such brief years, that they were finished in four months. Whence a fuller and truer year, such as is now both to us and to them, comprised three of their ancient years. But not even thus, as I said, does Greek history agree with the Egyptian in the number of times. And therefore credit is rather to be given to the Greek: because it does not exceed the truth of the years which are contained in our Writings, which are truly sacred. Furthermore, if this letter of Alexander, which is most widely known, differs much in the spaces of times from the probable credit of things; how much less is credit to be given to those writings which they have wished to bring forth full of fabulous, as it were, antiquities against the authority of the most well-known and divine books, which predicted that the whole world would believe in them, and in which the whole world, as was predicted by them, has believed; which show that they have narrated the past truly, from those things which they foretold as future, when they are fulfilled with such great truth?

Chapter XI.

Of those who indeed do not think this world is sempiternal, but either think there are innumerable worlds, or that this same one, by a certain conclusion of ages, is always born and resolved.

But others who do not think this world is sempiternal, whether they think it is not the only one, but innumerable, or indeed that it is the only one, but innumerably arises and falls at certain intervals of ages; must necessarily confess that the genus of men existed before men were begetting. For neither as by floods and conflagrations of lands, which they do not think happen to the entire world at once, and therefore they contend that a few men always remain from whom the pristine multitude is repaired, so can these also think that some of the men are left in the world when the world perishes: but as they think the world itself is reborn from its own matter, so in it from its elements they think the human race, and then from parents the progeny of mortals, like that of other animals, to pullulate.

Chapter XII.

What must be answered to those who complain that the first condition of man was late.

Quod autem respondimus, cum de mundi origine quaestio verteretur, eis qui nolunt credere non eum semper fuisse, sed esse coepisse, sicut etiam Plato apertissime confitetur (In Timaeo), quamvis a nonnullis contra quam loquitur, sensisse credatur: hoc etiam de prima hominis conditione responderim, propter eos qui similiter moventur, cur homo per innumerabilia atque infinita retro tempora creatus non sit, tamque sero sit conditus, ut minus quam sex millia sint annorum, ex quo esse coepisse in sacris Litteris invenitur. Si enim brevitas eos offendit temporis, quod tam pauci eis videntur anni ex quo institutus homo in nostris auctoritatibus legitur; considerent nihil esse diuturnum, in quo est aliquid extremum, et omnia saeculorum spatia definita, si aeternitati interminatae comparentur, non exigua existimanda esse, sed nulla. Ac per hoc, si non quinque vel sex, verum etiam sexaginta millia, sive sexcenta, aut sexagies, aut sexcenties, aut sexcenties millies dicerentur annorum; aut itidem per totidem toties multiplicaretur haec summa, ubi jam nullum numeri nomen haberemus, ex quo Deus hominem fecit; similiter quaeri posset, cur ante non fecerit. Dei quippe ab hominis creatione cessatio retrorsus aeterna sine initio tanta est, ut si ei conferatur quamlibet magna et ineffabilis numerositas temporum, quae tamen fine conclusa certi spatii terminetur, nec saltem tanta videri debeat, quanta si humoris brevissimam guttam universo mari, etiam quantum Oceanus circumfluit, comparemus: quoniam istorum duorum unum quidem perexiguum est, alterum incomparabiliter magnum, sed utrumque finitum; illud vero temporis spatium, quod ab initio aliquo progreditur et aliquo termino coercetur, magnitudine quantacumque tendatur, comparatum illi quod initium non habet, nescio utrum pro minimo, an potius pro nullo deputandum est.

Hinc enim si a fine vel brevissima singillatim momenta detrahantur, decrescente numero, licet tam ingenti, ut vocabulum non inveniat retrorsum redeundo; tanquam si hominis dies ab illo in quo nunc vivit, usque ad illum in quo natus est, detrahas: quandoque ad initium illa detractio perducetur. Si autem detrahantur retrorsus in spatio, quod a nullo coepit exordio, non dico singillatim minuta momenta, vel horarum aut dierum aut mensium aut annorum etiam quantitates; sed tam magna spatia, quanta illa summa comprehendit annorum, quae jam dici a quibuslibet computatoribus non potest, quae tamen momentorum minutatim detractione consumitur; et detrahantur haec tanta spatia, non semel atque iterum saepiusque, sed semper: quid fit, quid agitur, quando nunquam ad initium, quod omnino nullum est, pervenitur?

But as for what we answered, when the question was turned to the origin of the world, to those who do not want to believe that it was not always, but began to be, as Plato also most clearly confesses (In Timaeus), although he is believed by some to have thought contrary to what he says: this I would also answer concerning the first condition of man, on account of those who are similarly moved, why man was not created through innumerable and infinite past times, and was established so late, that there are less than six thousand years from the time he is found in the sacred Writings to have begun to be. For if the brevity of the time offends them, because so few years seem to them since man was instituted in our authorities; let them consider that nothing is long-lasting in which there is something actor, and that all defined spaces of ages, if compared to interminable eternity, are not to be thought of as small, but as nothing. And through this, if not five or six, but even sixty thousand, or six hundred, or sixty times, or six hundred times, or six hundred times a million years were said; or likewise if this sum were multiplied as many times, where we would now have no name for the number, since God made man; it could similarly be asked why He did not make him before. For God's cessation from the creation of man backward, eternal without beginning, is so great, that if any great and ineffable numerosity of times be compared to it, which nevertheless is concluded by the end of a certain space, it ought not even to seem as great as if we should compare the shortest drop of moisture to the universal sea, even as much as the Ocean flows around: since of these two, one indeed is very small, the other incomparably great, but both are finite; but that space of time which proceeds from some beginning and is coerced by some term, by whatever magnitude it is stretched, compared to that which has no beginning, I know not whether it is to be accounted as very small, or rather as nothing.

For from here if from the end even the shortest moments be subtracted one by one, the number decreasing, although so huge that it finds no name in returning backward; just as if you subtract the days of a man from that in which he now lives, back to that in which he was born: eventually that subtraction will be led to the beginning. But if they be subtracted backward in the space which began from no exordium, I do not say one by one the minute moments, or the quantities of hours or days or months or even years; but spaces as great as that sum of years comprises, which already cannot be said by any computers, which nevertheless is consumed by the subtraction of moments little by little; and if these so great spaces be subtracted, not once and again and more often, but always: what happens, what is done, when one never arrives at the beginning, which is altogether none?

Quapropter, quod nos modo quaerimus post quinque millia et quod excurrit annorum, possent et posteri etiam post annorum sexcenties millies eadem curiositate requirere, si in tantum haec mortalitas hominum exoriendo et occumbendo, et imperita perseveraret infirmitas. Potuerunt et qui fuerunt ante nos, ipsis recentibus hominis creati temporibus, istam movere quaestionem. Ipse denique primus homo, vel postridie, vel eodem die posteaquam factus est, potuit inquirere, cur non ante sit factus. Et quandocumque antea factus esset, non vires tunc alias et alias nunc, vel etiam postea, ista de initio rerum temporalium controversia reperiret.

Caput XIII.

De revolutione saeculorum, quibus certo fine conclusis, universa semper in eumdem ordinem eamdemque speciem reditura quidam philosophi crediderunt.

1. Hanc autem se philosophi mundi hujus non aliter putaverunt posse vel debere dissolvere, nisi ut circuitus temporum inducerent, quibus eadem semper fuisse renovata atque repetita in rerum natura, atque ita deinceps fore sine cessatione asseverarent volumina venientium praetereuntiumque saeculorum: sive in mundo permanente isti circuitus fierent, sive certis intervallis oriens et occidens mundus eadem semper quasi nova, quae transacta et quae ventura sunt, exhiberet. A quo ludibrio prorsus immortalem animam, etiam cum sapientiam perceperit, liberare non possunt, euntem sine cessatione ad falsam beatitudinem, et ad veram miseriam sine cessatione redeuntem. Quomodo enim vera beatitudo est, de cujus nunquam aeternitate confiditur, dum anima venturam miseriam aut imperitissime in veritate nescit, aut infelicissime in beatitudine pertimescit? Aut si ad miserias nunquam ulterius reditura, ex his ad beatitudinem pergit; fit ergo aliquid novi in tempore, quod finem non habet temporis. Cur non ergo et mundus? cur non et homo factus in mundo? ut illi nescio qui falsi circuitus a falsis sapientibus fallacibusque comperti, in doctrina sana tramite recti itineris evitentur.

2. Nam quidam et illud quod legitur in libro Salomonis, qui vocatur Ecclesiastes, Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod erit. Et quid est quod factum est? Ipsum quod fiet: et non est omne recens sub sole. Quis loquatur, et dicat, Ecce hoc novum est? Jam fuit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos (Eccle. I, 9, 10); propter hos circuitus in eadem redeuntes et in eadem cuncta revocantes, dictum intelligi volunt: quod ille aut de his rebus dixit, de quibus superius loquebatur, hoc est de generationibus aliis euntibus, aliis venientibus, de solis anfractibus, de torrentium lapsibus; aut certe de omnium rerum generibus, quae oriuntur, atque occidunt. Fuerunt enim homines ante nos, sunt et nobiscum, et erunt post nos; ita quaeque animantia, vel arbusta.

Wherefore, what we now ask after five thousand and some years, posterity could also require with the same curiosity even after six hundred thousand times six hundred years, if this mortality of men should persist in arising and falling, and in unlearned infirmity. Those who were before us, in the very recent times of man's creation, could also move this question. Finally, the first man himself, either on the day after, or on the same day after he was made, could inquire why he was not made before. And whenever before he had been made, that controversy concerning the beginning of temporal things would find not other and other forces then and now, or even later.

Chapter XIII.

Of the revolution of ages, by which some philosophers believed that all things, being concluded within a certain end, would always return into the same order and the same species.

1. Moreover, the philosophers of this world thought they could not or ought not otherwise to dissolve this, unless they introduced circuits of times, by which they asserted that the same things were always renewed and repeated in the nature of things, and so hereafter would be the volumes of coming and passing ages without cessation: whether these circuits were made in a permanent world, or the world rising and falling at certain intervals should always exhibit the same things as if new, which have passed and are to come. From which mockery they certainly cannot liberate the immortal soul, even when it has perceived wisdom, going without cessation to a false beatitude, and returning without cessation to a true misery. For how is it true beatitude, concerning whose eternity one is never confident, while the soul either most unlearnedly in truth does not know the coming misery, or most unhappily in beatitude dreads it? Or if, never again to return to miseries, it goes from these to beatitude; there is made, therefore, something new in time, which has no end of time. Why not therefore also the world? why not also man made in the world? so that those I know not what false circuits, found by false and fallacious wise men, may be avoided in sound doctrine by the path of a straight journey.

2. For some also want it to be understood that what is read in the book of Solomon, which is called Ecclesiastes, What is it that has been? The same that shall be. And what is it that has been done? The same that shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. Who may speak and say, Behold, this is new? It has already been in the ages that were before us (Eccl. I, 9, 10); on account of these circuits returning into the same things and recalling all things into the same, they want it to be understood as said: but he said this either concerning those things of which he was speaking above, that is, concerning other generations passing away and others coming, concerning the turnings of the sun, concerning the fallings of torrents; or certainly concerning the genera of all things which arise and fall. For there were men before us, and they are with us, and they shall be after us; so also each living thing, or groves.

Monstra quoque ipsa, quae inusitata nascuntur, quamvis inter se diversa sint, et quaedam eorum semel facta narrentur, tamen secundum id quod generaliter miracula et monstra sunt, utique et fuerunt, et erunt; nec recens et novum est, ut monstrum sub sole nascatur. Quamvis haec verba quidam sic intellexerint, tanquam in praedestinatione Dei jam facta fuisse omnia, sapiens ille voluisset intelligi, et ideo nihil recens esse sub sole. Absit autem a recta fide, ut his Salomonis verbis illos circuitus significatos esse credamus, quibus illi putant sic eadem temporum temporaliumque rerum volumina repeti, ut, verbi gratia, sicut isto saeculo Plato philosophus in urbe Atheniensi, et in ea schola quae Academia dicta est, discipulos docuit, ita per innumerabilia retro saecula, multum prolixis quidem intervallis, sed tamen certis, et idem Plato et eadem civitas et eadem schola iidemque discipuli repetiti, et per innumerabilia deinde saecula repetendi sint: absit, inquam, ut nos ista credamus. Semel enim Christus mortuus est pro peccatis nostris; resurgens autem a mortuis jam non moritur, et mors ei ultra non dominabitur (Rom. VI, 9): et nos post resurrectionem semper cum Domino erimus (I Thess. IV, 16), cui modo dicimus, quod sacer admonet Psalmus, Tu, Domine, servabis nos, et custodies nos a generatione hac in aeternum. Satis autem istis existimo convenire quod sequitur, In circuitu impii ambulant (Psal. XI, 8, 9): non quia per circulos quos opinantur, eorum vita est recursura; sed quia modo talis est erroris eorum via, id est, falsa doctrine.

Caput XIV.

De temporali conditione generis humani, quam Deus nec novo consilio constituerit, nec mutabili voluntate.

Quid autem mirum est, si in his circuitibus errantes, nec aditum, nec exitum inveniunt? Quia genus humanum atque ista nostra mortalitas, nec quo initio coepta sit sciunt, nec quo fine claudatur; quandoquidem altitudinem Dei penetrare non possunt: quia cum ipse sit aeternus et sine initio, ab aliquo tamen initio exorsus est tempora, et hominem quem nunquam ante fecerat, fecit in tempore, non tamen novo et repentino, sed immutabili aeternoque consilio.

Even monsters themselves, which are born unusually, although they differ among themselves, and some of them are narrated as having been made once, yet according to that which they are generally miracles and monsters, they both have been and shall be; nor is it recent and new for a monster to be born under the sun. Although some have understood these words as if the wise man had wished it to be understood that all things were already made in the predestination of God, and therefore nothing is new under the sun. But far be it from the right faith that we should believe those circuits to be signified by these words of Solomon, by which they think the same volumes of times and temporal things are so repeated, that, for example, just as in this age the philosopher Plato taught his disciples in the city of Athens, and in that school which is called the Academy, so through innumerable past ages, at very long intervals indeed, but yet certain, both the same Plato and the same city and the same school and the same disciples were repeated, and are to be repeated through innumerable ages hereafter: far be it, I say, that we should believe these things. For Christ died once for our sins; but rising from the dead He dies no more, and death shall have no more dominion over Him (Rom. VI, 9): and we after the resurrection shall always be with the Lord (I Thess. IV, 16), to whom we now say, what the sacred Psalm admonishes: "Thou, Lord, shalt keep us, and shalt preserve us from this generation forever." But I think what follows fits these people sufficiently: "The wicked walk in a circuit" (Psalm XI, 8, 9): not because their life is to return through the circles which they imagine; but because such is now the way of their error, that is, false doctrine.

Chapter XIV.

Of the temporal condition of the human race, which God established neither by a new counsel, nor by a mutable will.

What wonder is it, then, if those wandering in these circuits find neither entrance nor exit? Because they know neither by what beginning the human race and this mortality of ours was begun, nor by what end it may be closed; since indeed they cannot penetrate the height of God: because although He Himself is eternal and without beginning, yet from some beginning He started times, and man, whom He had never made before, He made in time, yet not by a new and sudden, but by an immutable and eternal counsel.

Quis hanc valeat altitudinem investigabilem vestigare, et inscrutabilem perscrutari, secundum quam Deus hominem temporalem, ante quem nemo unquam hominum fuit, non mutabili voluntate in tempore condidit, et genus humanum ex uno multiplicavit? Quandoquidem Psalmus ipse cum praemisisset atque dixisset, Tu, Domine, servabis nos, et custodies nos a generatione hac in aeternum; ac deinde repercussisset eos, in quorum stulta impiaque doctrina nulla liberationis et beatitudinis animae servatur aeternitas, continuo subjiciens, In circuitu impii ambulant: tanquam ei diceretur, Quid ergo tu credis, sentis, intelligis? numquidnam existimandum est subito Deo placuisse hominem facere, quem nunquam antea infinita retro aeternitate fecisset, cui nihil novi accidere potest, in quo mutabile aliquid non est? continuo respondit ad ipsum Deum loquens, Secundum altitudinem tuam multiplicasti filios hominum (Ibid.). Sentiant, inquit, homines quod putant, et quod eis placet opinentur et disputent: Secundum altitudinem tuam, quam nullus potest nosse hominum, multiplicasti filios hominum. Valde quippe altum est, et semper Deum fuisse, et hominem quem nunquam fecerat, ex aliquo tempore primum facere voluisse, nec consilium voluntatemque mutasse.

Caput XVI.

Quomodo intelligenda sit promissa homini a Deo vita aeterna ante tempora aeterna.

Quae saecula praeterierint antequam genus institueretur humanum, me fateor ignorare: non tamen dubito nihil omnino creaturae Creatori esse coaeternum. Dicit etiam Apostolus tempora aeterna, nec ea futura, sed, quod magis est mirandum, praeterita. Sic enim ait: In spem vitae aeternae, quam promisit non mendax Deus ante tempora aeterna ; manifestavit autem temporibus suis Verbum suum (Tit. I, 2 et 3). Ecce dixit retro quod fuerint tempora aeterna, quae tamen non fuerint Deo coaeterna. Si quidem ille ante tempora aeterna non solum erat, verum etiam promisit vitam aeternam, quam manifestavit temporibus suis, id est congruis, quid aliud quam Verbum suum? Hoc est enim vita aeterna. Quomodo autem promisit, cum hominibus utique promiserit, qui nondum erant ante tempora aeterna; nisi quia in ipsius aeternitate, atque in ipso ejus Verbo eidem coaeterno, jam praedestinatione fixum erat, quod suo tempore futurum erat?

CAPUT XVII.---Quid de incommutabili consilio aut voluntate Dei fides sana defendat, contra ratiocinationes eorum qui opera Dei ex aeternitate repetita per eosdem semper volunt saeculorum redire circuitus.

Who may avail to investigate this uninvestigable height, and to scrutinize this inscrutable one, according to which God established temporal man, before whom no man ever was, in time by no mutable will, and multiplied the human race from one? Since indeed the Psalm itself, when it had premised and said, "Thou, Lord, shalt keep us, and shalt preserve us from this generation forever;" and then had struck back at those in whose foolish and impious doctrine no eternity of liberation and beatitude of the soul is preserved, immediately subjoining, "The wicked walk in a circuit:" as if it were said to Him, What then do Thou believe, feel, understand? must it be thought that it suddenly pleased God to make man, whom He had never before made in infinite backward eternity, to whom nothing new can happen, in whom there is not anything mutable? immediately responded, speaking to God Himself, "According to Thy height Thou hast multiplied the sons of men" (Ibid.). Let men feel what they think, he says, and let them imagine and dispute what pleases them: "According to Thy height," which no man can know, "Thou hast multiplied the sons of men." For it is exceedingly high both that God was always, and that He willed to make temporal man first from some time, whom He had never made, nor changed his counsel and will.

Chapter XVI.

How the eternal life promised by God to man before eternal times is to be understood.

I confess I am ignorant what ages passed before the human race was established; yet I do not doubt that nothing created is at all coeternal with the Creator. The Apostle also speaks of eternal times, and those not future, but, what is more wonderful, past. For he says: "In hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, promised before eternal times; but in His own times has manifested His Word" (Tit. 1:2, 3). Behold, he said that there were eternal times in the past, which yet were not coeternal with God. If indeed He was not only before eternal times, but also promised eternal life, which He manifested in His own times, that is, in suitable ones, what else than His Word? For this is eternal life. But how did He promise, since He promised to men, who were not yet before eternal times; unless because in His own eternity, and in His very Word coeternal with Him, it was already fixed by predestination, what was to be in its own time?

CHAPTER XVII.---What sound faith defends concerning the immutable counsel or will of God, against the reasonings of those who will that the works of God, repeated from eternity, should always return through the same circuits of ages.

1. Illud quoque non dubito, antequam primus homo creatus esset, nunquam quemquam hominem fuisse: nec eumdem ipsum, nescio quibus circuitibus, nescio quoties revolutum, nec alium aliquem natura similem. Neque ab hac fide me philosophorum argumenta deterrent, quorum acutissimum illud putatur, quod dicunt, nulla infinita ulla scientia posse comprehendi: ac per hoc Deus inquiunt, rerum quas facit , omnium finitarum omnes finitas apud se rationes habet. Bonitas autem ejus nunquam vacua fuisse credenda est, ne sit temporalis ejus operatio, cujus retro fuerit aeterna cessatio, quasi poenituerit eum prioris sine initio vacationis, ac propterea sit operis aggressus initium. Et ideo necesse est, inquiunt, eadem semper repeti, eademque semper repetenda transcurrere: vel manente mundo mutabiliter, qui licet nunquam non fuerit et sine initio temporis tamen factus est; vel ejus quoque ortu et occasu semper illis circuitibus repetito, semperque repetendo: ne videlicet, si aliquando primum Dei opera coepta dicantur, priorem suam sine initio vacationem tanquam inertem ac desidiosam, et ideo sibi displicentem damnasse quodammodo, atque ob hoc mutasse credatur. Si autem semper quidem temporalia, sed alia atque alia perhibetur operatus, ac sic aliquando etiam ad hominem faciendum, quem nunquam antea fecerat, pervenisse: non scientia, qua putant non posse quaecumque infinita comprehendi, sed quasi ad horam, sicut veniebat in mentem, fortuita quadam inconstantia videatur fecisse quae fecit. Porro si illi circuitus admittantur, inquiunt, quibus vel manente mundo, vel ipso quoque revolubiles ortus suos et occasus eisdem circuitibus inserente, eadem temporalia repetuntur, nec ignavum otium, praesertim tam longae sine initio diuturnitatis, Deo tribuitur, nec improvida temeritas operum suorum. Quoniam si non eadem repetantur, non possunt infinita diversitate variata ulla ejus scientia vel praescientia comprehendi.

2. Has argumentationes quibus impii nostram simplicem pietatem, ut cum illis in circuitu ambulemus, de via recta conantur avertere, si ratio refutare non posset, fides irridere deberet. Huc accedit, quod in adjutorio Domini Dei nostri hos volubiles circulos, quos opinio confingit, ratio manifesta confringit. Hinc enim maxime isti errant, ut in circuitu falso ambulare, quam vero et recto itinere malint, quod mentem divinam omnino immutabilem cujuslibet infinitatis capacem, et innumera omnia sine cogitationis alternatione numerantem, de sua humana, mutabili, angustaque metiuntur.

1. I do not doubt this also, that before the first man was created, there never was any man; neither that same one, revolved by I know not what circuits, I know not how many times, nor any other similar in nature. Nor do the arguments of philosophers deter me from this faith, of which that is thought to be most acute, which they say, that no infinite things can be comprehended by any knowledge: and for this reason, they say, God has with Himself all finite reasons of all finite things which He makes. But His goodness is never to be believed to have been empty, lest His operation be temporal, whose cessation backward was eternal, as if He had repented of His prior vacation without beginning, and for that reason had undertaken the beginning of His work. And therefore it is necessary, they say, that the same things be always repeated, and always being about to be repeated pass away: either the world remaining changeably, which although it never was not and yet was made without beginning of time; or its rise and fall also always repeated by those circuits, and always about to be repeated: lest, forsooth, if the works of God are said to have begun for the first time at some point, He be believed to have in a manner condemned His prior vacation without beginning as inert and lazy, and for that reason displeasing to Him, and for this reason changed it. But if He is asserted to have always worked temporal things, but some after others, and so at some time even to have arrived at making man, whom He had never made before: He may seem to have made what He made not by knowledge, by which they think any infinite things cannot be comprehended, but as if for the hour, just as it came into His mind, by some fortuitous inconstancy. Furthermore, if those circuits be admitted, they say, by which either the world remaining, or itself also inserting its revolvable rises and falls in the same circuits, the same temporal things are repeated, neither lazy leisure, especially of so long a duration without beginning, is attributed to God, nor improvident temerity of His works. Because if the same things are not repeated, they cannot, varied by infinite diversity, be comprehended by any knowledge or prescience of His.

2. These argumentations, by which the impious endeavor to turn our simple piety from the right path, that we may walk with them in a circuit, if reason could not refute, faith ought to deride. To this is added, that by the help of the Lord our God, manifest reason shatters these voluble circles which opinion feigns. For in this these men err most of all, so as to prefer walking in a false circuit rather than in the true and straight path, because they measure the divine mind, altogether immutable, capable of any infinity, and numbering all innumerable things without alternation of thought, by their own human, mutable, and narrow mind.

Et fit illis quod ait Apostolus: comparantes enim semetipsos sibimetipsis , non intelligunt (II Cor. X, 12). Nam quia illis quidquid novi faciendum venit in mentem, novo consilio faciunt (mutabiles quippe mentes gerunt); profecto non Deum, quem cogitare non possunt, sed semetipsos pro illo cogitantes, non illum sed se ipsos, nec illi, sed sibi comparant. Nobis autem fas non est credere, aliter Deum affici cum vacat, aliter cum operatur: quia nec affici dicendus est, tanquam in ejus natura fiat aliquid, quod non ante fuerit. Patitur quippe qui afficitur, et mutabile est omne quod aliquid patitur. Non itaque in ejus vacatione cogitetur ignavia, desidia, inertia; sicut nec in ejus opere labor, conatus, industria. Novit quiescens agere, et agens quiescere. Potest ad opus novum, non novum, sed sempiternum adhibere consilium; nec poenitendo quia prius cessa verat, coepit facere quod non fecerat. Sed et si prius cessavit, et posterius operatus est (quod nescio quemadmodum ab homine possit intelligi), hoc procul dubio quod dicitur, prius et posterius, in rebus prius non existentibus et posterius existentibus fuit. In illo autem non alteram praecedentem altera subsequens mutavit aut abstulit voluntatem, sed una eademque sempiterna et immutabili voluntate res quas condidit, et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non fuerunt, et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt: hinc eis qui talia videre possunt mirabiliter fortassis ostendens, quam non eis indiguerit, sed eas gratuita bonitate condiderit, cum sine illis ex aeternitate initio carente in non minore beatitate permansit.

Caput XVIII.

Contra eos qui dicunt, ea quae infinita sunt nec Dei posse scientia comprehendi.

Illud autem aliud quod dicunt, nec Dei scientia quae infinita sunt posse comprehendi; restat eis ut dicere audeant, atque huic se voragini profundae impietatis immergant, quod non omnes numeros Deus noverit. Eos quippe infinitos esse, certissimum est: quoniam in quocumque numero finem faciendum putaveris, idem ipse, non dico uno addito augeri, sed quamlibet sit magnus et quamlibet ingentem multitudinem continens in ipsa ratione atque scientia numerorum, non solum duplicari, verum etiam multiplicari potest. Ita vero suis quisque numerus proprietatibus terminatur, ut nullus eorum par esse cuicumque alteri possit. Ergo et dispares inter se atque diversi sunt, et singuli quique finiti sunt, et omnes infiniti sunt. Itane numeros propter infinitatem nescit omnes Deus ; et usque ad quamdam summam numerorum scientia Dei pervenit, caeteros ignorat? Quis hoc etiam dementissimus dixerit?

And it happens to them what the Apostle says: "For comparing themselves with themselves, they do not understand" (2 Cor. 10:12). For because whatever new thing comes into their mind to be done, they do by a new counsel (for they bear mutable minds); surely thinking not of God, whom they cannot conceive, but of themselves for Him, they compare not Him but themselves, nor to Him, but to themselves. But it is not lawful for us to believe that God is affected otherwise when He is at vacation, otherwise when He works: because He is not to be said to be affected, as if something should happen in His nature which was not before. For he who is affected suffers, and everything that suffers anything is mutable. Therefore, let not laziness, sloth, or inertia be thought of in His vacation; just as in His work let not labor, effort, or industry be thought of. He knows how to act while resting, and to rest while acting. He can apply to a new work a counsel not new, but sempiternal; nor did He begin to do what He had not done by repenting because He had previously ceased. But even if He previously ceased and subsequently worked (which I know not how it can be understood by man), this which is called prior and posterior was undoubtedly in things not existing before and existing afterward. But in Him not one preceding will changed or took away another subsequent one, but by one and the same sempiternal and immutable will He caused that the things which He established should first not be, as long as they were not, and that they should afterward be, when they began to be: hence showing perhaps wonderfully to those who can see such things, how He did not need them, but established them by gratuitous goodness, since without them from eternity lacking beginning He remained in no less beatitude.

Chapter XVIII.

Against those who say that things which are infinite cannot be comprehended even by the knowledge of God.

But that other thing which they say, that things which are infinite cannot be comprehended even by the knowledge of God; it remains for them to dare to say, and to immerse themselves in this deep abyss of impiety, that God does not know all numbers. For that they are infinite is most certain: since in whatever number you think a limit is to be made, that same one can be increased, I do not say by adding one, but however great it may be and containing however vast a multitude in the very reason and science of numbers, it can be not only doubled but even multiplied. Indeed, each number is so terminated by its own properties that none of them can be equal to any other. Therefore, they are both disparate among themselves and diverse, and each individual one is finite, and all are infinite. Does God, then, for the sake of infinitude, not know all numbers; and does the knowledge of God reach to a certain sum of numbers and ignore the rest? Who, even the most demented, would say this?

Nec audebunt isti contemnere numeros, et eos dicere ad Dei scientiam non pertinere, apud quos Plato Deum magna auctoritate commendat mundum numeris fabricantem (In Timaeo): et apud nos Deo dictum legitur, Omnia in mensura, et numero, et pondere disposuisti (Sap. XI, 21)? De quo dicit et propheta, Qui profert numerose saeculum (Isai XL, 26, sec. LXX). Et Salvator in Evangelio, Capilli, inquit, vestri omnes numerati sunt (Matth. X, 30). Absit itaque ut dubitemus, quod ei notus sit omnis numerus, cujus intelligentiae, sicut in Psalmo canitur, non est numerus (Psal. CXLVI, 5). Infinitas itaque numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei cujus intelligentiae non est numerus. Quapropter si, quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis comprehensione finitur; profecto et omnis infinitas quodam ineffabli modo Deo finita est, quia scientiae ipsius incomprehensibilis non est. Quare si infinitas numerorum scientiae Dei, qua comprehenditur, esse non potest infinita; qui tandem nos sumus homunculi, qui ejus scientiae limites figere praesumamus, dicentes quod, nisi eisdem circuitibus temporum eadem temporalia repetuntur, non potest Deus cuncta quae fecit vel praescire ut faciat, vel scire cum fecerit? cujus sapientia simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis, tam incomprehensibili comprehensione omnia incomprehensibilia comprehendit, ut quaecumque nova et dissimilia consequentia praecedentibus si semper facere vellet, inordinata et improvisa habere non posset; nec ea praevideret ex proximo tempore, sed aeterna praescientia contineret.

Caput XIX.

De saeculis saeculorum.

Quod utrum ita faciat , et continuata sibi connexione copulentur quae appellantur saecula saeculorum, alia tamen atque alia, ordinata dissimilitudine procurrentia, eis duntaxat qui ex miseria liberantur in sua beata immortalitate sine fine manentibus; an ita dicantur saecula saeculorum, ut intelligantur saecula in sapientia Dei inconcussa stabilitate manentia, istorum quae cum tempore transeunt tanquam efficientia saeculorum, definire non audeo . Fortassis enim possit dici saeculum, quae sunt saecula; ut nihil aliud perhibeatur saeculum saeculi, quam saecula saeculorum: sicut nihil aliud dicitur coelum coeli, quam coeli coelorum. Nam coelum Deus vocavit firmamentum super quod sunt aquae (Gen. I, 8), et tamen Psalmus, Et aquae, inquit, quae super coelos sunt, laudent nomen Domini (Psal. CXLVIII, 4).

Nor will those dare to despise numbers, and say they do not pertain to God's knowledge, among whom Plato commends God with great authority as fashioning the world by numbers (In Timaeus): and among us it is read as said to God, "Thou hast disposed all things in measure, and number, and weight" (Wisd. 11:21)? Of whom the prophet also says, "Who brings forth the age by number" (Isa. 40:26, sec. LXX). And the Savior in the Gospel says, "All the hairs of your head are numbered" (Matt. 10:30). Far be it, then, that we should doubt that every number is known to Him, "of whose understanding," as is sung in the Psalm, "there is no number" (Ps. 147:5). Therefore, the infinitude of number, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is yet not incomprehensible to Him of whose understanding there is no number. Wherefore, if whatever is comprehended by knowledge is finished by the comprehension of the knower; surely even all infinitude is in a certain ineffable way finite to God, because it is not incomprehensible to His knowledge. Wherefore, if the infinitude of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, by which it is comprehended; who, pray, are we mannikins, who presume to fix limits to His knowledge, saying that unless the same temporal things are repeated in the same circuits of times, God cannot either foreknow all things that He made so as to make them, or know them when He has made them? whose wisdom, simply multiplex and uniformly multiform, comprehends all incomprehensible things with such incomprehensible comprehension, that if He always willed to make any new and dissimilar things consequent upon the preceding, He could not have them inordinate and unforeseen; nor would He foresee them from a near time, but would contain them in eternal prescience.

Chapter XIX.

Of the ages of ages.

Whether He so does, and those which are called ages of ages are coupled together in continued connection, yet one after another, proceeding in an ordered dissimilarity, those at least who are liberated from misery remaining without end in their blessed immortality; or whether the ages of ages are so called that ages remaining in the unshaken stability of the wisdom of God are understood as the efficient causes of these which pass away with time, I do not dare to define. For perhaps it can be said "age" for what are "ages"; so that nothing else is asserted by "age of age" than "ages of ages": just as nothing else is said by "heaven of heaven" than "heavens of heavens." For God called the firmament heaven, above which are the waters (Gen. 1:8), and yet the Psalm says, "And let the waters which are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord" (Ps. 148:4).

Quid ergo istorum duorum sit, an praeter haec duo aliquid aliud de saeculis saeculorum possit intelligi, profundissima quaestio est: neque hoc quod nunc agimus impedit, si indiscussa interim differatur; sive aliquid in ea definire valeamus, sive nos faciat cautiores diligentior ipsa tractatio, ne in tanta obscuritate rerum affirmare aliquid temere audeamus. Nunc enim contra opinionem disputamus, qua illi circuitus asseruntur, quibus semper eadem per intervalla temporum necesse esse repeti existimantur. Quaelibet autem illarum sententiarum de saeculis saeculorum vera sit, ad hos circuitus nihil pertinet: quoniam sive saecula saeculorum sint, non eadem repetita, sed alterum ex altero connexione ordinatissima procurrentia, liberatorum beatitudine sine ullo recursu miseriarum certissima permanente, sive saecula saeculorum aeterna sint temporalium tanquam dominantia subditorum, circuitus illi eadem revolventes locum non habent, quos maxime refellit aeterna vita sanctorum (Matth. XXV, 46).

Caput XX.

De impietate eorum qui asserunt animas summae veraeque beatitudinis participes, iterum atque iterum per circuitus temporum ad easdem miserias laboresque redituras.

Quorum enim aures piorum ferant, post emensam tot tantisque calamitatibus vitam (si tamen ista vita dicenda est, quae potius mors est, ita gravis, ut mors quae ab hac liberat, mortis hujus amore timeatur), post tam magna mala tamque multa et horrenda, tandem aliquando per veram religionem atque sapientiam expiata atque finita, ita pervenire ad conspectum Dei, atque ita fieri beatum contemplatione incorporeae lucis per participationem immutabilis immortalitatis ejus, cujus adipiscendae amore flagramus, ut eam quandoque necesse sit deseri, et eos qui deserunt, ab illa aeternitate, veritate, felicitate dejectos, tartareae mortalitati, turpi stultitiae, miseriis exsecrabilibus implicari, ubi Deus amittatur, ubi odio veritas habeatur, ubi per immundas nequitias beatitudo quaeratur; et hoc itidem atque itidem sine ullo fine priorum et posteriorum certis intervallis et dimensionibus saeculorum factum et futurum; et hoc propterea, ut possint Deo, circuitibus definitis euntibus semper atque redeuntibus per nostras falsas beatitudines et veras miserias, alternatim quidem, sed revolutione incessabili sempiternas, nota esse opera sua; quoniam neque a faciendo quiescere, neque sciendo possit ea quae infinita sunt, indagare? quis haec audiat? quis credat? quis ferat? Quae si vera essent, non solum tacerentur prudentius, verum etiam (ut quomodo valeo dicam quod volo) doctius nescirentur.

Which, then, of these two it is, or whether besides these two something else can be understood of the ages of ages, is a most profound question: nor does it hinder what we are now doing, if it be deferred undiscussed for a while; whether we are able to define anything in it, or whether the more diligent treatment itself makes us more cautious, lest in such obscurity of things we should dare to affirm anything rashly. For now we are disputing against the opinion by which those circuits are asserted, by which it is thought necessary that the same things be always repeated through intervals of times. But whichever of those opinions concerning the ages of ages be true, it pertains nothing to these circuits: because whether there be ages of ages, not the same ones repeated, but one from another proceeding in a most orderly connection, the beatitude of those liberated remaining most certain without any recourse of miseries; or whether the ages of ages be the eternal ones of temporal things as if ruling over subjects, those circuits revolving the same things have no place, which the eternal life of the saints especially refutes (Matt. 25:46).

Chapter XX.

Of the impiety of those who assert that souls, partakers of supreme and true beatitude, will again and again through circuits of times return to the same miseries and labors.

For what ears of the pious would bear that, after a life measured out by so many and such great calamities (if indeed that is to be called life, which is rather death, so heavy that the death which liberates from it is feared through love of this death), after so great evils and so many and horrendous ones, at length some time through true religion and wisdom expiated and finished, one should so arrive at the sight of God, and so become blessed by the contemplation of incorporeal light through participation in His immutable immortality, for the attainment of which we burn with love, that it must sometime be deserted, and those who desert it, cast down from that eternity, truth, and felicity, be involved in Tartarean mortality, base folly, and execrable miseries, where God is lost, where truth is held in hatred, where through unclean wickednesses beatitude is sought; and this likewise and likewise without any end of priors and posteriors by certain intervals and dimensions of ages done and to be done; and this for the sake of this, that his works may be known to God, the defined circuits always going and returning through our false beatitudes and true miseries, alternate indeed, but sempiternal by incessant revolution; since He can neither rest from doing, nor can He, in knowing, search out those things which are infinite? Who would hear these things? Who would believe them? Who would bear them? Which if they were true, not only would they be more prudently kept silent, but also (that I may say how I am able what I wish) more learnedly not known.

Nam si haec illic in memoria non habebimus, et ideo beati erimus, cur hic per eorum scientiam gravatur amplius nostra miseria? Si autem ibi ea necessario scituri sumus, hic saltem nesciamus, ut hic felicior sit exspectatio, quam illic adeptio summi boni: quando hic aeterna vita consequenda exspectatur; ibi autem beata, sed non aeterna, quandoque amittenda cognoscitur.

Si autem dicunt, neminem posse ad illam beatitudinem pervenire, nisi hos circuitus, ubi beatitudo et miseria vicissim alternant, in hujus vitae eruditione cognoverit; quomodo ergo fatentur, quanto plus quisque amaverit Deum, tanto eum facilius ad beatitudinem perventurum, qui ea docent quibus amor ipse torpescat? Nam quis non remissius et tepidius amet eum, quem se cogitat necessario deserturum, et contra ejus veritatem sapientiamque sensurum, et hoc cum ad ejus plenam pro sua capacitate notitiam beatitudinis perfectione pervenerit; quando nec hominem amicum possit quisque amare fideliter, cui se futurum noverit inimicum? Sed absit ut vera sint, quae nobis minantur veram miseriam nunquam finiendam, sed interpositionibus falsae beatitudinis saepe ac sine fine rumpendam. Quid enim illa beatitudine falsius atque fallacius, ubi nos futuros miseros, aut in tanta veritatis luce nesciamus, aut in summa felicitatis arce timeamus? Si enim venturam calamitatem ignoraturi sumus, peritior est hic nostra miseria, ubi venturam beatitudinem novimus. Si autem nos illic clades imminens non latebit, beatius tempora transigit anima misera quibus transactis ad beatitudinem sublevetur, quam beata quibus transactis in miseriam revolvatur. Atque ita spes nostrae infelicitatis est felix et felicitatis infelix. Unde fit, ut quia hic mala praesentia patimur, ibi metuimus imminentia, verius semper miseri quam beati aliquando esse possimus.

3. Sed quoniam haec falsa sunt clamante pietate, convincente veritate (illa enim nobis veraciter promittitur vera felicitas, cujus erit semper retinenda, et nulla infelicitate rumpenda certa securitas); viam rectam sequentes, quae nobis est Christus, eo duce ac salvatore a vano et inepto impiorum circuitu iter fidei mentemque avertamus. Si enim de istis circuitibus et sine cessatione alternantibus itionibus et reditionibus animarum Porphyrius Platonicus suorum opinionem sequi noluit, sive ipsius rei vanitate permotus, sive jam tempora christiana reveritus; et quod in libro decimo commemoravi, (cap. 30), dicere maluit, animam propter cognoscenda mala traditam mundo, ut ab eis liberata atque purgata, cum ad Patrem redierit, nihil ulterius tale patiatur: quanto magis nos istam inimicam christianae fidei falsitatem detestari ac devitare debemus?

For if we shall not have these things there in memory, and therefore we shall be blessed, why is our misery burdened further here through the knowledge of them? But if we are necessarily to know them there, let us at least not know them here, that here the expectation may be happier than the attainment of the supreme good there: when here eternal life is expected to be obtained; but there a blessed life, but not eternal, is known sometime to be lost.

But if they say that no one can arrive at that beatitude unless he has known in the instruction of this life these circuits where beatitude and misery alternately succeed; how then do they confess that by how much more each one shall have loved God, by so much more easily he will arrive at beatitude, who teach those things by which love itself may grow cold? For who would not love Him more remissly and tepidly, whom he thinks he must necessarily desert, and think against His truth and wisdom, and this when he shall have arrived at the full knowledge of Him according to his capacity by the perfection of beatitude; when not even a human friend can anyone love faithfully, to whom he knows he will be an enemy? But far be it that those things be true which threaten us with a true misery never to be finished, but by interpositions of false beatitude often and without end to be broken. For what is more false and fallacious than that beatitude, where we either do not know that we shall be miserable in so great a light of truth, or we fear it in the supreme citadel of felicity? For if we are to be ignorant of the coming calamity, our misery is more skilled here, where we know the coming beatitude. But if the imminent slaughter will not be hidden from us there, the miserable soul passes through times more blessedly by which, having been passed through, it may be raised to beatitude, than the blessed soul by which, having been passed through, it may be revolved into misery. And thus the hope of our unhappiness is happy, and of our happiness unhappy. Whence it happens, that because here we suffer present evils, there we fear imminent ones, we can always be more truly miserable than ever blessed.

3. But since these things are false, piety crying out and truth convicting them (for that true felicity is truly promised to us, of which there will be a certain security to be always retained, and to be broken by no infelicity); following the right way, which is Christ to us, with Him as leader and savior let us avert the journey of faith and the mind from the vain and inept circuit of the impious. For if concerning these circuits and the goings and returnings of souls alternating without cessation Porphyry the Platonist was unwilling to follow the opinion of his own [sect], whether moved by the vanity of the thing itself, or now revering Christian times; and as I have commemorated in the tenth book (ch. 30), he preferred to say that the soul was delivered to the world for the sake of knowing evils, that having been liberated and purged from them, when it shall have returned to the Father, it may suffer nothing such further: how much more ought we to detest and avoid that falsehood inimical to the Christian faith?

His autem circuitibus evacuatis atque frustratis, nulla necessitas nos compellit, ideo putare non habere initium temporis ex quo esse coeperit genus humanum, quia per nescio quos circuitus nihil sit in rebus novi, quod non et antea certis intervallis temporum fuerit, et postea sit futurum. Si enim liberatur anima non reditura ad miserias, sicut nunquam antea liberata est, fit in illa aliquid quod antea nunquam factum est, et hoc quidem valde magnum, id est, quae nunquam desinat aeterna felicitas. Si autem in natura immortali fit tanta novitas, nullo repetita, nullo repetenda circuitu, cur in rebus mortalibus fieri non posse contenditur? Si dicunt non fieri in anima beatitudinis novitatem, quoniam ad eam revertitur in qua semper fuit, ipsa certe liberatio nova fit, cum de miseria liberatur in qua nunquam fuit, et ipsa miseriae novitas in ea facta est quae nunquam fuit. Haec autem novitas si non in rerum, quae divina providentia gubernantur, ordinem venit, sed casu potius evenit, ubi sunt illi determinati dimensique circuitus, in quibus nulla nova fiunt, sed repetuntur eadem quae fuerunt? Si autem et haec novitas ab ordinatione providentiae non excluditur, sive data sit anima, sive lapsa sit, possunt fieri nova, quae neque antea facta sint, nec tamen a rerum ordine aliena sint. Et si potuit anima facere per imprudentiam sibi novam miseriam, quae non esset improvisa divinae providentiae, ut hanc quoque in rerum ordine includeret, et ab hac eam non improvide liberaret; qua tandem temeritate humanae vanitatis audemus negare divinitatem facere posse res, non sibi, sed mundo novas, quas neque antea fecerit, nec unquam habuerit improvisas? Si autem dicunt liberatas quidem animas ad miseriam non reversuras, sed cum hoc fit, in rebus nihil novi fieri, quoniam semper aliae atque aliae liberatae sunt, et liberantur, et liberabuntur: hoc certe concedant, si ita est, novas animas fieri, quibus sit et nova miseria et nova liberatio. Nam si antiquas eas dicunt esse, et retrorsum sempiternas, ex quibus quotidie novi fiant homines, de quorum corporibus, si sapienter vixerint, ita liberentur, ut nunquam ad miserias revolvantur, consequenter dicturi sunt infinitas. Quantuslibet namque finitus numerus fuisset animarum, infinitis retro saeculis sufficere non valeret, ut ex illo semper fierent homines, quorum essent animae ab ista semper mortalitate liberandae, nunquam ad eam deinceps rediturae. Nec ullo modo explicabunt, quomodo in rebus, quas, ut Deo notae esse possint, finitas volunt, infinitus sit numerus animarum.

But these circuits having been evacuated and frustrated, no necessity compels us to think for that reason that the human race has no beginning of time from which it began to be, because through I know not what circuits there is nothing new in things which has not also been before at certain intervals of times, and is to be hereafter. For if the soul is liberated, not to return to miseries, as it was never before liberated, there is done in it something which was never before done, and this indeed a very great thing, that is, an eternal felicity which never ends. But if in an immortal nature so great a novelty is done, repeated by no circuit, to be repeated by none, why is it contended that it cannot be done in mortal things? If they say that a novelty of beatitude is not done in the soul, since it returns to that in which it always was, certainly the liberation itself becomes new, when it is liberated from misery in which it never was, and that very novelty of misery was done in it which never was. But if this novelty does not come into the order of things which are governed by divine providence, but happens rather by chance, where are those determined and measured circuits in which no new things are done, but the same things which were are repeated? But if also this novelty is not excluded from the ordination of providence, whether it was given to the soul, or it fell, new things can be done which were neither done before, nor yet are alien to the order of things. And if the soul could by imprudence make for itself a new misery, which was not unforeseen by divine providence, so as to include this also in the order of things, and not without foresight liberate it from this; with what temerity of human vanity, at length, do we dare to deny that the divinity can make things, new not to itself, but to the world, which it neither made before, nor ever had unforeseen? But if they say that liberated souls indeed will not return to misery, but when this is done, nothing new is done in things, since always others and others have been liberated, and are liberated, and will be liberated: let them certainly concede this, if it is so, that new souls are made, for whom there is both a new misery and a new liberation. For if they say that they are ancient, and sempiternal backwards, from which daily new men are made, from whose bodies, if they have lived wisely, they are so liberated that they are never revolved to miseries, they are consequently going to say that they are infinite. For however great a finite number of souls had been, it would not be able to suffice for infinite ages backwards, so that from it men should always be made, whose souls were always to be liberated from this mortality, never to return to it thereafter. Nor will they in any way explain how, in things which they wish to be finite so that they can be known to God, the number of souls is infinite.

4. Quapropter quoniam circuitus illi jam explosi sunt, quibus ad easdem miserias necessario putabatur anima reditura; quid restat convenientius pietati, quam credere non esse impossibile Deo, et ea quae nunquam fecerit nova facere, et ineffabili praescientia voluntatem mutabilem non habere? Porro autem utrum animarum liberatarum nec ulterius ad miserias rediturarum numerus possit semper augeri, ipsi viderint, qui de rerum infinitate cohibenda tam subtiliter disputant: nos vero ratiocinationem nostram ex utroque latere terminamus. Si enim potest, quid causae est ut negetur creari potuisse quod nunquam antea creatum esset, si liberatarum animarum numerus, qui nunquam antea fuit, non solum factus est semel, sed nunquam fieri desinet? Si autem oportet ut certus sit liberatarum aliquis numerus animarum, quae ad miseriam nunquam redeant, neque iste numerus ulterius augeatur; etiam ipse sine dubio quicumque erit, ante utique nunquam fuit: qui profecto crescere, et ad suae quantitatis terminum pervenire sine aliquo non possit initio; quod initium eo modo antea nunquam fuit. Hoc ergo ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quem nullus fuit.

Caput XXI.

De conditione unius primi hominis, atque in eo generis humani.

Hac igitur quaestione difficillima propter aeternitatem Dei nova creantis sine novitate aliqua voluntatis, quantum potuimus, explicata, non est arduum videre multo fuisse melius quod factum est, ut ex uno homine quem primum condidit, multiplicaret genus humanum, quam si id inchoasset a pluribus. Nam cum animantes alias solitarias, et quodammodo solivagas, id est, quae solitudinem magis appetant, sicuti sunt aquilae, milvi, leones, lupi, et quaecumque ita sunt; alias congreges instituerit, quae congregatae atque in gregibus malint vivere, ut sunt columbi, sturni, cervi, damulae, et caetera hujusmodi: utrumque tamen genus non ex singulis propagavit, sed plura simul jussit existere. Hominem vero, cujus naturam quodammodo mediam inter Angelos bestiasque condebat, ut, si Creatori suo tanquam vero Domino subditus praeceptum ejus pia obedienceia custodiret, in consortium transiret angelicum, sine morte media beatam immortalitatem absque ullo termino consecutus; si autem Dominum Deum suum libera voluntate superbe atque inobedienter usus offenderet, morti addictus bestialiter viveret, libidinis servus aeternoque post mortem supplicio destinatus;

4. Wherefore, since those circuits are now exploded, by which it was thought the soul would necessarily return to the same miseries; what remains more convenient to piety than to believe that it is not impossible for God both to make new things which He never made, and by ineffable foreknowledge not to have a changeable will? Furthermore, whether the number of liberated souls, never further to return to miseries, can be always increased, let them see who dispute so subtly concerning the restraining of the infinity of things: but we terminate our reasoning from both sides. For if it can, what cause is there that it should be denied that that could be created which had never before been created, if the number of liberated souls, which never before was, not only was made once, but will never cease to be made? But if it is necessary that there be some certain number of liberated souls which never return to misery, nor that number be further increased; even that number, without doubt, whatever it shall be, surely never was before: which certainly could not grow and arrive at the term of its quantity without some beginning; which beginning in that manner never before was. That this therefore might be, man was created, before whom there was none.

Chapter XXI.

Of the condition of the one first man, and in him of the human race.

This most difficult question having been explained, therefore, as much as we were able, concerning the eternity of God creating new things without any novelty of will, it is not arduous to see that it was much better what was done, that from one man whom He first established, He should multiply the human race, than if He had begun it from many. For when He instituted other animals, some solitary, and as it were solitary-wandering, that is, which more desire solitude, as are eagles, kites, lions, wolves, and whatever are such; others gregarious, which prefer to live gathered together and in flocks, as are pigeons, starlings, stags, does, and others of this kind: nevertheless, He did not propagate either kind from single individuals, but commanded many to exist at once. But man, whose nature He established as it were medium between Angels and beasts, so that, if being subject to his Creator as to a true Lord, he should keep His precept with pious obedience, he might pass into the angelic fellowship, having attained a blessed immortality without any term and without intervening death; but if, using his free will proudly and disobediently, he should offend the Lord his God, being addicted to death he should live beast-like, the slave of lust and destined to eternal punishment after death;

unum ac singulum creavit, non utique solum sine humana societate deserendum, sed ut eo modo vehementius ei commendaretur ipsius societatis unitas vinculumque concordiae, si non tantum inter se naturae similitudine, verum etiam cognationis affectu homines necterentur; quando nec ipsam quidem feminam copulandam viro, sicut ipsum creare illi placuit, sed ex ipso, ut omne ex homine uno diffunderetur genus humanum.

CAPUT XXII.---Quod praescierit Deus hominem, quem primum condidit, peccaturum; simulque praeviderit quantum piorum populum ex ejus genere in angelicum consortium sua esset gratia translaturus.

Nec ignorabat Deus hominem peccaturum, et morti jam obnoxium morituros propagaturum, eoque progressuros peccandi immanitate mortales, ut tutius atque pacatius inter se rationalis voluntatis expertes bestiae sui generis viverent, quarum ex aquis et terris plurium pullulavit exordium, quam homines, quorum genus ex uno est ad commendandam concordiam propagatum. Neque enim unquam inter se leones, aut inter se dracones, qualia homines, bella gesserunt. Sed praevidebat etiam gratia sua populum piorum in adoptionem vocandum, remissisque peccatis justificatum Spiritu sancto sanctis Angelis in aeterna pace sociandum, novissima inimica morte destructa: cui populo esset hujus rei consideratio profutura, quod ex uno homine Deus ad commendandum hominibus, quam ei grata sit etiam in pluribus unitas, genus instituisset humanum.

Caput XXIII.

De natura humanae animae creatae ad imaginem Dei.

Fecit ergo Deus hominem ad imaginem suam. Talem quippe illi animam creavit, qua per rationem atque intelligentiam omnibus esset praestantior animalibus terrestribus et natatilibus et volatilibus, quae mentem hujusmodi non haberent. Et cum virum terreno formasset ex pulvere, eique animam qualem dixi, sive quam jam fecerat sufflando indidisset, sive potius sufflando fecisset, eumque flatum quem sufflando fecit, (nam quid est aliud sufflare, quam flatum facere?) animam hominis esse voluisset, etiam conjugem illi in adjutorium generandi ex ejus latere osse detracto fecit, ut Deus. Neque enim haec carnali consuetudine cogitanda sunt, ut videre solemus opifices ex materia quacumque terrena corporalibus membris, quod artis industria potuerint, fabricating. Manus Dei potentia Dei est, qui etiam visibilia invisibiliter operatur.

Him He created one and single, not indeed to be left alone without human society, but that in that way the unity of society itself and the bond of concord might be more vehemently commended to him, if men were knit together not only by similarity of nature, but also by the affection of kinship; since it pleased Him to create not even the female herself to be coupled with the man as He did him, but from him, so that the whole human race might be diffused from one man.

CHAPTER XXII.---That God foreknew that the man, whom He first established, would sin; and at the same time foresaw how great a people of the pious from his race He would translate into the angelic fellowship by His grace.

Nor was God ignorant that man would sin, and being now obnoxious to death would propagate those who were to die, and that mortals would proceed to such immensity of sinning, that the beasts of their own kind, devoid of rational will, whose beginning sprouted more numerously from the waters and the lands, would live more safely and peaceably among themselves than men, whose race is propagated from one for the sake of commending concord. For never have lions among themselves, or dragons among themselves, waged such wars as men. But He also foresaw by His grace a people of the pious to be called into adoption, and being justified by the Holy Spirit, their sins having been remitted, to be associated with the holy Angels in eternal peace, the last enemy, death, having been destroyed: to which people the consideration of this thing would be profitable, that God had instituted the human race from one man for the sake of commending to men how grateful to Him is unity even in many.

Chapter XXIII.

Of the nature of the human soul created to the image of God.

God therefore made man to His own image. For He created such a soul for him, by which through reason and intelligence he should be superior to all terrestrial and aquatic and volatile animals, which would not have a mind of this kind. And when He had formed the man from terrestrial dust, and had indwelt in him by breathing such a soul as I have said, whether one which He had already made, or rather had made by breathing, and had willed that breath which He made by breathing (for what else is it to breathe, than to make a breath?) to be the soul of man, He also made a consort for him as an aid for generating, a bone having been drawn from his side, as God. For these things are not to be thought of by carnal custom, as we are accustomed to see artisans fabricating from whatever terrestrial matter, by corporal members, what they could by the industry of art. The hand of God is the power of God, who also works visible things invisibly.

Sed haec fabulosa potius quam vera esse arbitrantur, qui virtutem ac sapientiam Dei, qua novit et potest etiam sine seminibus ipsa certe facere semina, ex his usitatis et quotidianis metiuntur operibus; ea vero quae primitus instituta sunt, quoniam non noverunt, infideliter cogitant: quasi non haec ipsa quae noverunt de humanis conceptibus atque partubus, si inexpertis narrarentur, incredibiliora viderentur; quamvis et ea ipsa plerique magis naturae corporalibus causis, quam operibus divinae mentis assignent.

Caput XXIV.

An ullius vel minimae creaturae possint dici Angeli creatores.

Sed cum his nullum nobis est in his libris negotium, qui divinam mentem facere vel curare ista non credunt. Illi autem qui Platoni suo credunt, non ab illo summo Deo qui fabricatus est mundum, sed ab aliis minoribus, quos quidem ipse creaverit, permissu sive jussu ejus animalia facta esse cuncta mortalia, in quibus homo praecipuum diisque ipsis cognatum teneret locum (In Timaeo); si superstitione careant, qua quaerunt unde juste videantur sacra et sacrificia facere quasi conditoribus suis, facile carebunt etiam hujus opinionis errore. Neque enim fas est ullius naturae quamlibet minimae mortalisque creatorem nisi Deum credere ac dicere, et antequam possit intelligi. Angeli autem, quos illi deos libentius appellant, etiamsi adhibent vel jussi vel permissi operationem suam rebus quae gignuntur in mundo, tamen tam non eos dicimus creatores animalium, quam nec agricolas frugum atque arborum.

Caput XXV.

Omnem naturam et omnem speciem universae creaturae nonnisi opere Dei formari.

Cum enim alia sit species quae adhibetur extrinsecus cuicumque materiae corporali, sicut operantur homines figuli et fabri atque id genus opifices, qui etiam pingunt et effingunt formas similes corporibus animalium; alia vero quae intrinsecus efficientes causas habet de secreto et occulto naturae viventis atque intelligentis arbitrio, quae non solum naturales corporum species, verum etiam ipsas animantium animas, dum non fit, facit:

But those think these things to be fabulous rather than true, who measure the virtue and wisdom of God, by which He knows and is able even without seeds to make the seeds themselves, by these usual and daily works; but those things which were primarily instituted, since they have not known them, they think of unfaithfully: as if these very things which they have known concerning human conceptions and births, if they were narrated to the inexperienced, would not seem more incredible; although many assign even those very things more to the corporal causes of nature than to the works of the divine mind.

Chapter XXIV.

Whether the Angels can be called creators of any, even the least, creature.

But with those we have no business in these books, who do not believe that the divine mind makes or cares for these things. But those who believe their Plato, that not by that supreme God who fabricated the world, but by other lesser ones, whom He indeed created, all mortal animals were made by His permission or command, in which man should hold the chief place and one kindred to the gods themselves (In the Timaeus); if they should be free from superstition, by which they seek whence they may justly seem to offer sacred rites and sacrifices as if to their founders, they will easily be free also from the error of this opinion. For it is not lawful to believe or say that the creator of any nature, however small and mortal, is anyone but God, even before it can be understood. But the Angels, whom they more willingly call gods, although they employ their operation, whether commanded or permitted, upon things which are produced in the world, nevertheless we no more call them creators of animals, than we call farmers [creators] of fruits and trees.

Chapter XXV.

That every nature and every species of the universal creature is formed only by the work of God.

For since there is one species which is applied from without to any corporal matter, as potters and smiths and artisans of that kind work, who also paint and fashion forms similar to the bodies of animals; but another which has efficient causes from within from the secret and hidden judgment of a living and intelligent nature, which not only makes natural species of bodies, but also the very souls of living things, while it is not [made]:

supradicta illa species artificibus quibusque tribuatur; haec autem altera nonnisi uni artifici creatori et conditori Deo, qui mundum ipsum et Angelos sine ullo mundo et sine ullis Angelis fecit. Qua enim vi divina, et, ut ita dicam, effectiva, quae fieri nescit, sed facere, accepit speciem, cum mundus fieret, rotunditas coeli et rotunditas solis; eadem vi divina et effectiva, quae fieri nescit, sed facere, accepit speciem rotunditas oculi et rotunditas pomi, et caeterae figurae naturales quas videmus in rebus quibusque nascentibus non extrinsecus adhiberi, sed intima Creatoris potentia, qui dixit, Coelum et terram ego impleo (Jerem. XXIII, 24): et cujus sapientia est quae attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter (Sap. VIII, 1). Proinde, facti primitus Angeli cujusmodi ministerium praebuerint Creatori caetera facienti, nescio; nec tribuere illis audeo quod forte non possunt, nec debeo derogare quod possunt. Creationem tamen conditionemque omnium naturarum, qua fit ut omnino naturae sint, eis quoque faventibus illi Deo tribuo, cui se etiam ipsi debere quod sunt cum gratiarum actione noverunt. Non solum igitur agricolas non dicimus fructuum quorumque creatores, cum legamus, Neque qui plantat est aliquid, neque qui rigat; sed qui incrementum dat Deus (I Cor. III, 7): sed ne ipsam quidem terram, quamvis mater omnium fecunda videatur, quae germinibus erumpentia promovet, et fixa radicibus continet, cum itidem legamus, Deus illi dat corpus quomodo voluerit, et unicuique seminum proprium corpus (Id. XV, 38). Ita nec feminam sui puerperii creatricem appellare debemus, sed potius illum qui cuidam suo famulo dixit, Priusquam te formarem in utero, novi te (Jerem. I, 5). Et quamvis anima sic vel sic affecta praegnantis valeat aliquibus velut induere qualitatibus fetum, sicut de virgis variatis fecit Jacob, ut pecora colore varia gignerentur (Gen. XXX, 37); naturam tamen illam quae gignitur, tam ipsa non fecit, quam nec ipsa se fecit. Quaelibet igitur corporales vel seminales causae gignendis rebus adhibeantur, sive operationibus Angelorum aut hominum, aut quorumque animalium, sive marium feminarumque mixtionibus; quaelibet etiam desideria motusve animae matris valeant aliquid lineamentorum aut colorum aspergere teneris mollibusque conceptibus, ipsas omnino naturas, quae sic vel sic in suo genere afficiantur, non facit nisi summus Deus: cujus occulta potentia cuncta penetrans incontaminabili praesentia facit esse quidquid aliquo modo est, in quantumcumque est; quia nisi faciente illo, non tale vel tale esset, sed prorsus esse non posset.

let that aforementioned species be attributed to any artisans; but this other only to the one artist creator and founder God, who made the world itself and the Angels without any world and without any Angels. For by what divine and, so to speak, effective power, which knows not to be made, but to make, the roundness of heaven and the roundness of the sun received species when the world was made; by that same divine and effective power, which knows not to be made, but to make, the roundness of the eye and the roundness of an apple, and the other natural figures which we see in any things that are born, received species, not applied from without, but by the intimate power of the Creator, who said, 'I fill heaven and earth' (Jer. 23:24): and whose wisdom it is which 'reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly doth she order all things' (Wisd. 8:1). Accordingly, the Angels having been made first, what kind of ministry they provided to the Creator making other things, I know not; nor do I dare to attribute to them what perhaps they cannot, nor ought I to derogate what they can. Nevertheless, the creation and establishing of all natures, by which it comes to pass that they are entirely natures, I attribute to that God, even with them favoring [it], to whom they themselves also know they owe what they are with thanksgiving. Not only, therefore, do we not call farmers the creators of any fruits, when we read, 'Neither he that planteth is anything, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase' (1 Cor. 3:7): but not even the earth itself, although it seems a fertile mother of all things, which promotes those breaking forth in germs, and contains them fixed by roots, since we likewise read, 'God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body' (1 Cor. 15:38). So neither ought we to call a woman the creatress of her childbed, but rather Him who said to a certain servant of His, 'Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee' (Jer. 1:5). And although the soul of a pregnant woman affected thus or thus may be able to clothe the fetus as if with some qualities, as Jacob did with the varied rods, so that cattle of varied color should be brought forth (Gen. 30:37); nevertheless, that nature which is born, she herself did not make, just as she did not make herself. Whatever corporal or seminal causes, therefore, are applied to things to be generated, whether by the operations of Angels or of men, or of any animals, or by the mixtures of males and females; whatever desires or motions also of the mother's soul may be able to sprinkle something of lineaments or colors upon the tender and soft conceptions, the natures themselves entirely, which are affected thus or thus in their own kind, none makes but the supreme God: whose hidden power penetrating all things by an uncontaminable presence makes to be whatever in any way is, in as much as it is; because unless He made it, it would not be such or such, but would not be able to be at all.

Quapropter, si in illa specie quam forinsecus corporalibus opifices rebus imponunt, urbem Romam et urbem Alexandriam non fabros et architectos, sed reges, quorum voluntate, consilio, imperio fabricatae sunt, illam Romulum, illam Alexandrum habuisse dicimus conditores: quanto potius nonnisi Deum debemus conditorem dicere naturarum, qui neque ex ea materia facit aliquid quam ipse non fecerit, nec operarios habet nisi quos ipse creaverit; et si potentiam suam, ut ita dicam, fabricatoriam rebus subtrahat, ita non erunt, sicut ante quam fierent non fuerunt? Sed ante dico, aeternitate, non tempore. Quis enim alius creator est temporum, nisi qui fecit ea, quorum motibus currerent tempora?

Caput XXVI.

De Platonicorum opinione, qua putaverunt angelos quidem a Deo conditos, sed ipsos esse humanorum corporum conditores.

Ita sane Plato minores et a summo Deo factos deos effectores esse voluit animalium caeterorum, ut immortalem partem ab ipso sumerent, ipsi vero mortalem attexerent (In Timaeo). Proinde animarum nostrarum eos creatores esse noluit, sed corporum. Unde quoniam Porphyrius propter animae purgationem dicit omne corpus fugiendum, simulque cum suo Platone aliisque Platonicis sentit eos, qui immoderate ac inhoneste vixerint, propter luendas poenas ad corpora redire mortalia, Plato quidem etiam ad bestiarum, Porphyrius tantummodo ad hominum; sequitur eos, ut dicant deos istos, quos a nobis volunt quasi parentes et conditores nostros coli, nihil esse aliud quam fabros compedum carcerumve nostrorum; nec institutores, sed inclusores alligatoresque nostros ergastulis aerumnosis et gravissimis vinculis. Aut ergo desinant Platonici poenas animarum ex istis corporibus comminari; aut eos nobis deos colendos non praedicent, quorum in nobis operationem ut, quantum possumus, fugiamus et evadamus, hortantur; cum tamen sit utrumque falsissimum. Nam neque ita luunt poenas animae, cum ad istam vitam denuo revolvuntur; et omnium viventium sive in coelo, sive in terra, nullus est conditor, nisi a quo facta sunt coelum et terra. Nam si nulla causa est vivendi in hoc corpore, nisi propter pudenda supplicia; quomodo dicit idem Plato aliter mundum fieri non potuisse pulcherrimum atque optimum, nisi omnium animalium, id est immortalium et mortalium, generibus impleretur (In Timaeo)? Si autem nostra institutio, qua vel mortales conditi sumus, divinum munus est; quomodo poena est ad ista corpora, id est ad divina beneficia, remeare? Et si Deus, quod assidue Plato commemorat, sicut universi mundi, ita omnium animalium species aeterna intelligentia continebat, quomodo non ipse cuncta condebat?

Wherefore, if in that species which artisans impose from without upon corporal things, we say that the city of Rome and the city of Alexandria had for founders, not the smiths and architects, but the kings, by whose will, counsel, and command they were fabricated, the former Romulus, the latter Alexander: how much more ought we to call none but God the founder of natures, who neither makes anything from that matter which He Himself did not make, nor has workmen except those whom He Himself created; and if He should withdraw His power, so to speak, fabricatory from things, they will so not be, as they were not before they were made? But I say before, in eternity, not in time. For who else is the creator of times, but He who made those things, by whose motions times should run?

Chapter XXVI.

Of the opinion of the Platonists, by which they thought that the Angels indeed were established by God, but that they themselves were the founders of human bodies.

Thus indeed Plato willed that the lesser gods made by the supreme God should be the effectors of the other animals, so that they should take the immortal part from Him, but they themselves should weave the mortal part (In the Timaeus). Accordingly, he willed them not to be the creators of our souls, but of our bodies. Whence since Porphyry says that every body is to be fled from for the sake of the soul's purgation, and at the same time feels with his Plato and other Platonists that those who have lived immoderately and dishonestly return to mortal bodies for the sake of paying penalties, Plato indeed even to those of beasts, Porphyry only to those of men; it follows for them that they say those gods, whom they wish to be worshiped by us as if our parents and founders, are nothing other than the smiths of our shackles or prisons; and not our institutors, but our inclosers and binders in woeful workhouses and most heavy bonds. Either, therefore, let the Platonists cease to threaten the penalties of souls from these bodies; or let them not preach to us that those gods are to be worshiped, whose operation in us they exhort that we, as much as we can, should flee and escape; when nevertheless both are most false. For neither do souls so pay penalties when they are revolved anew to this life; and of all living things whether in heaven or on earth, there is no founder except Him by whom heaven and earth were made. For if there is no cause of living in this body except for the sake of shameful punishments; how does the same Plato say that the world could not otherwise have been made most beautiful and best, unless it were filled with the kinds of all animals, that is, of immortal and mortal ones (In the Timaeus)? But if our institution, by which we were established even as mortals, is a divine gift; how is it a punishment to return to these bodies, that is, to divine benefits? And if God, as Plato assiduously commemorates, contained in His eternal intelligence the species of all animals, just as of the universal world, how was He not Himself the founder of all?

An aliquorum esse artifex nollet, quorum efficiendorum artem ineffabilis ejus et ineffabiliter laudabilis mens haberet?

Caput XXVII.

In primo homine exortam fuisse omnem plenitudinem generis humani, in qua praevidit Deus quae pars honoranda esset praemio, quae damnanda supplicio.

1. Merito igitur vera religio, quae mundi universi eum, animalium quoque universorum, hoc est et animarum et corporum, conditorem agnoscit et praedicat. In quibus terrenis praecipuus ab illo ad ejus imaginem homo propter eam causam, quam dixi, et si qua forte alia major latet, factus est unus, sed non relictus est solus. Nihil enim est quam hoc genus tam discordiosum vitio, tam sociale natura. Neque commodius contra vitium discordiae vel cavendum ne existeret, vel sanandum cum exstitisset, natura loqueretur humana, quam recordationem illius parentis, quem propterea Deus creare voluit unum, de quo multitudo propagaretur, ut hac admonitione etiam in multis concors unitas servaretur. Quod vero femina illi ex ejus latere facta est, etiam hinc satis significatum est quam chara mariti et uxoris debeat esse conjunctio. Haec opera Dei propterea sunt utique inusitata, quia prima. Qui autem ista non credunt, nulla facta prodigia debent credere: neque enim et ipsa, si usitato naturae curriculo gignerentur, prodigia dicerentur. Quid autem sub tanta gubernatione divinae providentiae, quamvis ejus causa lateat, frustra gignitur? Ait quidam psalmus sacer: Venite, et videte opera Domini, quae posuit prodigia super terram (Psal. XLV, 9). Cur ergo ex latere viri femina facta sit, et hoc primum quodammodo prodigium quid praefiguraverit, alio loco, quantum me Deus adjuverit, dicam.

2. [XXVII.] Nunc quoniam liber iste claudendus est, in hoc primo homine, qui primitus factus est, nondum quidem secundum evidentiam, jam tamen secundum Dei praescientiam exortas fuisse existimemus in genere humano societates tanquam civitates duas. Ex illo enim futuri erant homines, alii malis angelis in supplicio, alii bonis in praemio sociandi, quamvis occulto Dei judicio, sed tamen justo. Cum enim scriptum sit, Universae viae Domini, misericordia et veritas (Psal. XXIV, 10): nec injusta ejus gratia, nec crudelis potest esse justitia.

Or would He be unwilling to be the artist of some, of the effecting of whom His ineffable and ineffably laudable mind had the art?

Chapter XXVII.

That in the first man arose all the plenitude of the human race, in which God foresaw what part was to be honored with reward, what damned with punishment.

1. Deservedly, therefore, true religion acknowledges and preaches Him as the founder of the universal world, and also of all animals, that is, both of souls and of bodies. Among which earthly things, man, the chief, was made one by Him to His image for that cause which I have said, and if any other greater perhaps lies hidden, but he was not left alone. For there is nothing so discordant by vice, so social by nature, as this race. Nor would human nature speak more commodiously either for cautioning lest the vice of discord should exist, or for healing it when it had existed, than by the record of that parent whom for that reason God willed to create one, from whom a multitude should be propagated, so that by this admonition a concordant unity might be preserved even in many. But that the female was made for him from his side, even from here it is sufficiently signified how dear the conjunction of husband and wife ought to be. These works of God are indeed unusual because they are the first. But those who do not believe these things ought to believe no prodigies that have been made: for neither would they themselves be called prodigies if they were brought forth by the usual course of nature. But what is brought forth in vain under so great a government of divine providence, although its cause lies hidden? A certain sacred psalm says: 'Come and behold the works of the Lord, what prodigies He hath set upon the earth' (Ps. 46:8). Why, therefore, the female was made from the side of the man, and what this first prodigy, so to speak, prefigured, I shall say in another place, as much as God shall help me.

2. Now since this book is to be closed, let us think that in this first man, who was established first, the societies as if two cities had already arisen in the human race, not yet indeed according to evidence, but yet according to the foreknowledge of God. For from him were to be men, some to be associated with the evil angels in punishment, others with the good in reward, although by the hidden but yet just judgment of God. For since it is written, 'All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth' (Ps. 25:10): neither can His grace be unjust, nor His justice cruel.

Liber D

ECIMUS TERTIUS.

In quo docetur, mortem in hominibus esse poenalem, ortamque ex Adami peccato.

Caput Primum.

De lapsu primi hominis, per quem est contracta mortalitas.

Expeditis de nostri saeculi exortu et de initio generis humani difficillimis quaestionibus, nunc jam de lapsu primi hominis, imo primorum hominum, et de origine ac propagine mortis humanae disputationem a nobis institutam rerum ordo deposcit. Non enim eo modo quo Angelos, condiderat Deus homines; ut etiam si peccassent, mori omnino non possent: sed ita ut perfunctos obedientiae munere sine interventu mortis angelica immortalitas et beata aeternitas sequeretur; inobedientes autem mors plecteret damnatione justissima: quod etiam in libro superiore jam diximus (cap. 21).

Caput II.

De ea morte quae animae semper utcumque victurae accidere potest, et ea cui corpus obnoxium est.

Sed de ipso genere mortis video mihi paulo diligentius disserendum. Quamvis enim humana anima veraciter immortalis perhibeatur, habet tamen quamdam etiam ipsa mortem suam. Nam ideo dicitur immortalis, quia modo quodam quantulocumque non desinit vivere atque sentire: corpus autem ideo mortale, quoniam deseri omni vita potest, nec per se ipsum aliquatenus vivit. Mors igitur animae fit, cum eam deserit Deus: sicut corporis, cum id deserit anima. Ergo utriusque rei, id est totius hominis, mors est cum anima a Deo deserta deserit corpus. Ita enim nec ex Deo vivit ipsa, nec corpus ex ipsa. Hujusmodi autem totius hominis mortem illa sequitur, quam secundam mortem divinorum eloquiorum appellat auctoritas (Apoc. II, 11; XXI, 8). Hanc Salvator significavit, ubi ait: Eum timete, qui habet potestatem et corpus et animam perdere in gehennam (Matth. X, 28). Quod cum ante non fiat, quam cum anima corpori sic fuerit copulata, ut nulla diremptione separentur; mirum videri potest quomodo corpus ea morte dicatur occidi, qua non ab anima deseritur, sed animatum sentiensque cruciatur.

BOOK THIRTEENTH.

In which it is taught that death in men is penal, and arose from the sin of Adam.

Chapter I.

Of the fall of the first man, through which mortality was contracted.

The most difficult questions concerning the rise of our age and the beginning of the human race having been dispatched, the order of things now demands from us an instituted disputation concerning the fall of the first man, or rather of the first men, and concerning the origin and propagation of human death. For God had not created men in that manner in which He created the Angels; so that even if they had sinned, they could not die at all: but in such a way that an angelic immortality and blessed eternity would follow those who performed the duty of obedience without the intervention of death; but death should punish the disobedient with a most just condemnation: which we have already said in the previous book (ch. 21).

Chapter II.

Of that death which can happen to the soul that is in some way always to live, and that to which the body is subject.

But concerning the kind of death itself I see that I must dispute a little more diligently. For although the human soul is truly said to be immortal, yet it also has a certain death of its own. For it is therefore called immortal because in a certain way, however small, it does not cease to live and feel; but the body is therefore mortal because it can be deserted by all life, nor does it live by itself to any extent. Death of the soul, therefore, happens when God deserts it: just as that of the body happens when the soul deserts it. Therefore, the death of both things, that is, of the whole man, is when the soul, deserted by God, deserts the body. For thus it neither lives from God, nor the body from it. But such a death of the whole man is followed by that which the authority of the divine oracles calls the second death (Rev. 2:11; 21:8). The Savior signified this where He says: "Fear Him who has power to destroy both body and soul in Gehenna" (Matt. 10:28). Since this does not happen before the soul has been so joined to the body that they are separated by no severance; it may seem wonderful how the body is said to be killed by that death by which it is not deserted by the soul, but, being animated and feeling, is tortured.

Nam in illa poena ultima ac sempiterna, de qua diligentius suo loco disserendum est, recte mors animae dicitur, quia non vivit ex Deo: mors autem corporis quonam modo, cum vivat ex anima? non enim aliter potest ipsa corporalia, quae post resurrectionem futura sunt, sentire tormenta. An quia vita qualiscumque aliquod bonum est, dolor autem malum, ideo nec vivere corpus dicendum est, in quo anima non vivendi causa est, sed dolendi? Vivit itaque anima ex Deo, cum vivit bene; non enim potest bene vivere, nisi Deo in se operante quod bonum est: vivit autem corpus ex anima, cum anima vivit in corpore; seu vivat ipsa, seu non vivat ex Deo. Impiorum namque in corporibus vita, non animarum, sed corporum vita est: quam possunt eis animae etiam mortuae, hoc est a Deo desertae, quantulacumque propria vita, ex qua et immortales sunt, non desistente, conferre. Verum in damnatione novissima quamvis homo sentire non desinat, tamen quia sensus ipse nec voluptate suavis, nec quiete salubris, sed dolore poenalis est, non immerito mors est potius appellata quam vita. Ideo autem secunda, quia post illam primam est, qua fit cohaerentium diremptio naturarum, sive Dei et animae, sive animae et corporis. De prima igitur corporis morte dici potest, quod bonis bona sit, malis mala. Secunda vero sine dubio sicut nullorum bonorum est, ita nulli bona.

Caput III.

Utrum mors, quae per peccatum primorum hominum in omnes homines pertransiit, etiam sanctis poena peccati sit.

Non autem dissimulanda nascitur quaestio, utrum revera mors, qua separantur anima et corpus, bonis sit bona. Quia si ita est, quomodo poterit obtineri quod etiam ipsa sit poena peccati? Hanc enim primi homines, nisi peccavissent, perpessi utique non fuissent. Quo igitur pacto bona esse possit bonis, quae accidere non posset nisi malis? Sed rursus si nonnisi malis posset accidere, non deberet bonis bona esse, sed nulla. Cur enim esset ulla poena, in quibus non essent ulla punienda? Quapropter fatendum est, primos quidem homines ita fuisse institutos, ut, si non peccassent, nullum mortis experirentur genus: sed eosdem primos peccatores ita fuisse morte mulctatos, ut etiam quidquid de eorum stirpe esset exortum, eidem poenae teneretur obnoxium. Non enim aliud ex eis, quam quod ipsi fuerant, nasceretur. Pro magnitudine quippe culpae illius naturam damnatio mutavit in pejus; ut quod poenaliter praecessit in peccantibus hominibus primis, etiam naturaliter sequeretur in nascentibus caeteris.

For in that last and eternal punishment, concerning which we must dispute more diligently in its own place, the death of the soul is rightly said to be, because it does not live from God; but in what way the death of the body, when it lives from the soul? for it cannot otherwise feel those same corporal torments which are to be in the future after the resurrection. Or because life of any kind is some good, but pain an evil, is the body therefore not to be said to live, in which the soul is not the cause of living, but of grieving? Thus the soul lives from God when it lives well; for it cannot live well unless God works in it what is good: but the body lives from the soul when the soul lives in the body; whether it lives itself, or does not live from God. For the life of the impious in their bodies is the life not of the souls, but of the bodies: which souls even dead, that is, deserted by God, can confer upon them by whatever small proper life of their own, from which they are also immortal, not ceasing. But in the final damnation, although man does not cease to feel, yet because the sense itself is neither sweet with pleasure, nor healthy with rest, but penal with pain, it is not undeservedly called death rather than life. But it is called the second because it is after that first one, by which the severance of the cohering natures is made, whether of God and the soul, or of the soul and the body. Concerning the first death of the body, therefore, it can be said that it is good to the good, and evil to the evil. But the second, without doubt, as it is of no good things, so it is good to no one.

Chapter III.

Whether death, which passed through the sin of the first men into all men, is also a penalty of sin to the saints.

But a question arises not to be dissembled, whether indeed death, by which the soul and body are separated, is good to the good. For if it is so, how can it be maintained that it is itself also the penalty of sin? For the first men, unless they had sinned, would certainly not have suffered this. In what way, therefore, can it be good to the good, which could not happen except to the evil? But again, if it could not happen except to the evil, it ought not to be good to the good, but none at all. For why should there be any penalty in those in whom there were no things to be punished? Wherefore it must be confessed that the first men were so established that, if they had not sinned, they would have experienced no kind of death: but the same first sinners were so punished with death that whatever had arisen from their stock should be held subject to the same penalty. For nothing else would be born from them than what they themselves had been. For according to the magnitude of that fault, the condemnation changed nature for the worse; so that what preceded penally in the first sinning men should also follow naturally in the rest being born.

Neque enim ita homo ex homine, sicut homo ex pulvere. Pulvis namque homini faciendo materies fuit: homo autem homini gignendo parens. Proinde quod est terra, non hoc est caro; quamvis ex terra facta sit caro. Quod est autem parens homo, hoc est et proles homo. In primo igitur homine per feminam in progeniem transiturum universum genus humanum fuit, quando illa conjugum copula divinam sententiam suae damnationis excepit: et quod homo factus est, non cum crearetur, sed cum peccaret et puniretur, hoc genuit, quantum quidem attinet ad peccati et mortis originem. Non enim ad infantilem hebetudinem et infirmitatem animi et corporis, quam videmus in parvulis, peccato vel poena ille redactus est: quae Deus voluit esse tanquam primordia catulorum, quorum parentes in bestialem vitam mortemque dejecerat; sicut scriptum est, Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit; comparatus est pecoribus non intelligentibus, et similis factus est illis (Psal, XLVIII, 13). Nisi quod infantes infirmiores etiam cernimus in usu motuque membrorum et sensu appetendi atque vitandi, quam sunt aliorum tenerrimi fetus animalium: tanquam se tanto attollat excellentius supra caetera animantia vis humana, quanto magis impetum suum, velut sagitta, eum arcus extenditur, retrorsum reducta distulerit. Non ergo ad ista infantilia rudimenta praesumptione illicita et damnatione justa prolapsus vel impulsus est primus homo: sed hactenus in eo natura humana vitiata atque mutata est, ut repugnantem pateretur in membris inobedientiam concupiscendi, et obstringeretur necessitate moriendi; atque ita id quod vitio poenaque factus est, id est, obnoxios peccato mortique generaret. A quo peccati vinculo, si per Mediatoris gratiam solvuntur infantes, hanc solam mortem perpeti possunt, quae animam sejungit a corpore: in secundam vero illam sine fine poenalem liberati a peccati obligatione non transeunt.

Caput IV.

Cur ab his qui per gratiam regenerationis absoluti sunt a peccato, non auferatur mors, id est, poena peccati.

Si quem vero movet, cur vel ipsam patiantur, si et ipsa poena peccati est, quorum per gratiam reatus aboletur; jam ista quaestio in alio nostro opere, quod scripsimus de Baptismo parvulorum, tractata ac soluta est: ubi dictum est, ad hoc relinqui animae experimentum separationis a corpore, quamvis ablato jam criminis nexu; quoniam, si regenerationis Sacramentum continuo sequeretur immortalitas corporis, ipsa fides enervaretur, quae tunc est fides, quando exspectatur in spe quod in re nondum videtur.

For not so is man from man, as man from dust. For dust was the matter for making man: but man the parent for begetting man. Therefore, what is earth is not this flesh; although flesh was made from earth. But what man the parent is, this also man the offspring is. In the first man, therefore, through the female, the universal human race was to pass into progeny, when that copulation of spouses received the divine sentence of its own condemnation: and what man was made, not when he was created, but when he sinned and was punished, this he begot, as much as pertains to the origin of sin and death. For not to the infantile dullness and infirmity of mind and body, which we see in little ones, was he reduced by sin or penalty: which God willed to be as if the beginnings of cubs, whose parents He had cast down into bestial life and death; as it is written, "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he was compared to the unintelligent cattle, and was made like them" (Ps. 49:12). Except that we see infants even weaker in the use and movement of limbs and the sense of seeking and avoiding than are the most tender offspring of other animals: as if human power should raise itself more excellently above the rest of living things, the more it has deferred its own impetus, like an arrow when the bow is stretched, being drawn backwards. Not, therefore, to those infantile rudiments by illicit presumption and just condemnation did the first man fall or was he driven: but so far was human nature vitiated and changed in him, that he suffered a resistant disobedience of concupiscence in his members, and was bound by the necessity of dying; and thus he begot that which he was made by vice and penalty, that is, those subject to sin and death. From which bond of sin, if infants are loosed through the grace of the Mediator, they can suffer this death alone which separates the soul from the body: but they do not pass into that second death penal without end, being liberated from the obligation of sin.

Chapter IV.

Why from those who have been absolved from sin through the grace of regeneration, death, that is, the penalty of sin, is not taken away.

But if anyone is moved as to why they should suffer even death itself, if it is also the penalty of sin, whose guilt is abolished through grace; already this question in another work of ours, which we wrote concerning the Baptism of infants, has been treated and solved: where it was said that the experience of separation of the soul from the body is left to this end, although the bond of crime has already been taken away; since, if the immortality of the body immediately followed the Sacrament of regeneration, faith itself would be enervated, which then is faith when that which is not yet seen in reality is expected in hope.

Fidei autem robore atque certamine, in majoribus duntaxat aetatibus, etiam mortis fuerat superandus timor, quod in sanctis martyribus maxime eminuit: cujus profecto certaminis nulla esset victoria, nulla gloria; quia nec ipsum omnino posset esse certamen, si post lavacrum regenerationis jam sancti non possent mortem perpeti corporalem. Cum parvulis autem baptizandis quis non ad Christi gratiam propterea potius curreret, ne a corpore solveretur? Atque ita non invisibili praemio probaretur fides; sed jam nec fides esset, confestim sui operis quaerendo et sumendo mercedem. Nunc vero majore et mirabiliore gratia Salvatoris in usus justitiae peccati poena conversa est. Tunc enim dictum est homini, Morieris, si peccaveris: nunc dicitur martyri, Morere, ne pecces. Tunc dictum est, Si mandatum transgressi fueritis, morte moriemini (Gen. II, 17): nunc dicitur, Si mortem recusaveritis, mandatum transgrediemini. Quod tunc timendum fuerat, ut non peccaretur; nunc suscipiendum est, ne peccetur. Sic per ineffabilem Dei misericordiam, et ipsa poena vitiorum transit in arma virtutis, et fit justi meritum etiam supplicium peccatoris. Tunc enim mors est acquisita peccando, nunc impletur justitia moriendo. Verum hoc in sanctis martyribus, quibus alterutrum a persecutore proponitur, ut aut deserant fidem, aut sufferant mortem. Justi enim malunt credendo perpeti, quod sunt primi iniqui non credendo perpessi. Nisi enim peccassent illi, non morerentur: peccabunt autem isti, nisi moriantur. Mortui sunt ergo illi, quia peccaverunt: non peccant isti, quia moriuntur. Factum est per illorum culpam, ut veniretur in poenam: fit per istorum poenam, ne veniatur in culpam; non quia mors bonum aliquod facta est, quae antea malum fuit; sed tantam Deus fidei praestitit gratiam, ut mors, quam vitae constat esse contrariam, instrumentum fieret per quod transiretur ad vitam.

Caput V.

Quod sicut iniqui male utuntur lege quae bona est, ita et justi bene utuntur morte quae mala est.

Apostolus cum vellet ostendere, quantum peccatum, gratia non subveniente, ad nocendum valeret, etiam ipsam legem qua prohibetur peccatum, non dubitavit dicere virtutem esse peccati. Aculeus, inquit, mortis est peccatum; virtus autem peccati, lex (I Cor. XV, 56). Verissime omnino. Auget enim prohibitio desiderium operis illiciti, quando justitia non sic diligitur, ut peccandi cupiditas ejus delectatione vincatur. Ut autem diligatur et delectet vera justitia, nonnisi divina subvenit gratia.

But by the strength and contest of faith, at least in those of greater ages, the fear of death was also to be overcome, which was most prominent in the holy martyrs: of which contest indeed there would be no victory, no glory; because neither could it be a contest at all, if after the laver of regeneration the saints could no longer suffer corporal death. But with infants to be baptized, who would not rather run to the grace of Christ for this reason, lest he be loosed from the body? And thus faith would not be proved by an invisible reward; but now it would not even be faith, by seeking and receiving immediately the reward of its own work. But now by a greater and more wonderful grace of the Savior the penalty of sin has been turned into uses of justice. For then it was said to man, "You shall die if you sin": now it is said to the martyr, "Die lest you sin." Then it was said, "If you transgress the command, you shall die the death" (Gen. 2:17): now it is said, "If you refuse death, you shall transgress the command." That which was then to be feared so that one should not sin, must now be undertaken lest one should sin. Thus by the ineffable mercy of God, even the penalty of vices passes into arms of virtue, and even the punishment of the sinner becomes the merit of the just. For then death was acquired by sinning, now justice is fulfilled by dying. But this in the holy martyrs, to whom one of the two is proposed by the persecutor, that they either desert the faith, or suffer death. For the just prefer to suffer by believing what the first unjust suffered by not believing. For unless those had sinned, they would not die: but these will sin unless they die. Those, therefore, died because they sinned: these do not sin because they die. It was brought about by the fault of those that one should come into penalty: it is brought about by the penalty of these that one should not come into fault; not because death has been made some good thing, which before was an evil; but God has bestowed so great a grace on faith that death, which is certain to be contrary to life, should become an instrument through which one should pass to life.

Chapter V.

That as the unjust use the law, which is good, evilly, so also the just use death, which is evil, well.

When the Apostle wished to show how much sin, grace not succoring, was able for harm, he did not hesitate to say that even the law itself by which sin is prohibited is the power of sin. "The sting of death is sin," he said; "but the power of sin is the law" (1 Cor. 15:56). Most truly indeed. For prohibition increases the desire of the illicit work, when justice is not so loved that the cupidity of sinning is conquered by its delight. But so that true justice may be loved and delight, nothing but divine grace succors.

Sed ne propterea lex putaretur malum quoniam virtus est dicta peccati; ideo ipse alio loco versans hujusmodi quaestionem, inquit, Lex quidem sancta, et mandatum sanctum et justum et bonum. Quod ergo bonum est, inquit, mihi factum est morte? Absit. Sed peccatum, ut appareat peccatum, per bonum mihi operatum est mortem, ut fiat supra modum peccator aut peccatum per mandatum (Rom. VII, 12, 13). Supra modum, dixit; quia etiam praevaricatio additur, cum peccandi aucta libidine etiam lex ipsa contemnitur. Cur hoc commemorandum putavimus? Quia scilicet sicut lex non est malum, quando auget peccantium concupiscentiam; ita nec mors bonum est, quando auget patientium gloriam: cum vel illa pro iniquitate deseritur, et efficit praevaricatores; vel ista pro veritate suscipitur, et efficit martyres. Ac per hoc lex quidem bona est, quia prohibitio est peccati; mors autem mala, quia stipendium est peccati: sed quemadmodum injusti male utuntur non tantum malis, sed etiam bonis; ita justi bene non tantum bonis, sed etiam malis. Hinc fit ut et mali male lege utantur, quamvis sit lex bonum; et boni bene moriantur, quamvis sit mors malum.

Caput VI.

De generalis mortis malo, quo animae et corporis societas separatur.

Quapropter, quod attinet ad corporis mortem, id est separationem animae a corpore, cum eam patiuntur qui morientes appellantur, nulli bona est. Habet enim asperum sensum et contra naturam vis ipsa qua utrumque divellitur, quod fuerat in vivente conjunctum atque consertum, quamdiu moratur, donec omnis adimatur sensus, qui ex ipso inerat animae carnisque complexu. Quam totam molestiam nonnunquam unus ictus corporis vel animae raptus intercipit, nec eam sentiri praeveniente celeritate permittit. Ita cum ex hominis primi perpetuata propagine procul dubio sit mors poena nascentis; tamen si pro pietate justitiaque pendatur, fit gloria renascentis: et cum sit mors peccati retributio, aliquando impetrat ut nihil retribuatur peccato. Quidquid tamen illud est in morientibus, quod cum gravi sensu adimit sensum, pie fideliterque tolerando auget meritum patientiae, non aufert vocabulum poenae.

Caput VII.

De morte, quam non regenerati pro Christi confessione suscipiunt.

But lest for that reason the law should be thought an evil because it is called the power of sin; therefore he himself in another place, dealing with a question of this kind, says: "The law indeed is holy, and the command holy and just and good." Did that, therefore, which is good," he says, "become death to me? Far be it. But sin, so that it might appear as sin, has through that which is good worked death to me, so that it may become above measure a sinner or sin through the command" (Rom. 7:12, 13). "Above measure," he said; because transgression is also added, when with the increased lust of sinning even the law itself is contemned. Why did we think this was to be commemorated? Because, forsooth, as the law is not an evil when it increases the concupiscence of those sinning; so neither is death a good when it increases the glory of those suffering: when either that is deserted for iniquity, and makes transgressors; or this is undertaken for truth, and makes martyrs. And by this the law indeed is good, because it is the prohibition of sin; but death evil, because it is the wages of sin: but just as the unjust use evilly not only evil things, but also good things; so the just use well not only good things, but also evil things. Hence it happens that both the evil use the law evilly, although the law is a good; and the good die well, although death is an evil.

Chapter VI.

Of the evil of general death, by which the society of the soul and body is separated.

Wherefore, as pertains to the death of the body, that is, the separation of the soul from the body, when those suffer it who are called dying, it is good to no one. For the power itself by which both are rent asunder has a harsh sense and is against nature, which had been joined and fastened together in the living, as long as it lingers, until all sense is taken away, which was in it from the very complex of soul and flesh. Which whole molestation sometimes one blow of the body or the snatching of the soul intercepts, nor permits it to be felt by the speed preventing it. Thus since from the perpetuated propagation of the first man death is without doubt the penalty of the one being born; yet if it is paid for piety and justice, it becomes the glory of the one being born again: and although death is the retribution of sin, sometimes it obtains that nothing be retributed to sin. Whatever however that is in the dying, which with a grave sense takes away sense, by piously and faithfully tolerating it increases the merit of patience, it does not take away the name of penalty.

Chapter VII.

Of the death which those not regenerated suffer for the confession of Christ.

Nam quicumque etiam non percepto regenerationis lavacro pro Christi confessione moriuntur, tantum eis valet ad dimittenda peccata, quantum si abluerentur sacro fonte Baptismatis. Qui enim dixit, Si quis non renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu sancto, non intrabit in regnum coelorum (Joan. III, 5): alia sententia istos fecit exceptos, ubi non minus generaliter dixit, Qui me confessus fuerit coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram Patre meo qui in coelis est (Matth. X, 32); et alio loco, Qui perdiderit animam suam propter me, inveniet eam (Id. XVI, 25). Hinc est quod scriptum est, Pretiosa in conspectu Domini mors sanctorum ejus (Psal. CXV, 15). Quid enim pretiosius quam mors, per quam fit ut et delicta omnia dimittantur, et merita cumulatius augeantur? Neque enim tanti sunt meriti, qui, cum mortem differre non possent, baptizati sunt, deletisque omnibus peccatis ex hac vita emigrarunt, quanti sunt hi qui mortem, cum possent, ideo non distulerunt, quia maluerunt Christum confitendo finire vitam, quam eum negando ad ejus Baptismum pervenire. Quod utique si fecissent, etiam hoc eis in illo lavacro dimitteretur, quod timore mortis negaverant Christum; in quo lavacro et illis facinus tam immane dimissum est, qui occiderant Christum. Sed quando sine abundantia gratiae Spiritus illius, qui ubi vult spirat (Joan. III, 8), tantum Christum amare possent, ut eum in tanto vitae discrimine tanta sub spe veniae negare non possent? Mors igitur pretiosa sanctorum, quibus cum tanta gratia est praemissa et praerogata mors Christi, ut ad eum acquirendum suam non cunctarentur impendere, in eos usus redactum esse monstravit, quod ad poenam peccantis antea fuerat constitutum, ut inde justitiae fructus uberior nasceretur. Mors ergo non ideo bonum videri debet, quia in tantam utilitatem non vi sua, sed divina opitulatione conversa est; ut quae tunc metuenda proposita est, ne peccatum committeretur, nunc suscipienda proponatur, ut peccatum non committatur, commissumque deleatur, magnaeque victoriae debita justitiae palma reddatur.

Caput VIII.

Quod in sanctis primae mortis pro veritate susceptio, secundae sit mortis absolutio.

For whoever also, the laver of regeneration not having been perceived, die for the confession of Christ, it avails as much to them for the dismissal of sins as if they were washed in the sacred font of Baptism. For He who said, "Unless anyone be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (John 3:5), made these excepted by another sentence, where He said no less generally, "Whoever shall confess me before men, him will I also confess before my Father who is in heaven" (Matt. 10:32); and in another place, "Whoever shall lose his soul for my sake, shall find it" (Matt. 16:25). Hence it is that it is written, "Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His saints" (Ps. 116:15). For what is more precious than death, through which it is brought about that both all faults are dismissed and merits are cumulatively increased? For they are not of so great merit who, when they could not defer death, were baptized, and all sins being deleted emigrated from this life, as are these who did not defer death when they could, because they preferred to end life by confessing Christ than to come to His Baptism by denying Him. Which certainly if they had done, even this would be dismissed to them in that laver, that they had denied Christ for fear of death; in which laver even to those was so great a crime dismissed who had killed Christ. But when, without the abundance of the grace of that Spirit who blows where He wills (John 3:8), could they so love Christ that they could not deny Him in so great a crisis of life under so great a hope of pardon? The precious death of the saints, therefore, to whom the death of Christ was premised and prorogated with so great grace that they did not hesitate to spend their own for the sake of acquiring Him, has shown that it was reduced to those uses which before had been established for the penalty of the sinner, so that from it a more abundant fruit of justice might arise. Death, therefore, ought not to seem a good for this reason, because it has been converted into so great utility not by its own force, but by divine assistance; so that what was then proposed as to be feared lest sin should be committed, is now proposed as to be undertaken so that sin may not be committed, and what has been committed may be deleted, and the due palm of justice be rendered to a great victory.

Chapter VIII.

That the acceptance of the first death for the sake of truth in the saints is an absolution from the second death.

Si enim diligentius consideremus, etiam cum quisque pro veritate fideliter et laudabiliter moritur, mors cavetur. Ideo quippe aliquid ejus suscipitur, ne tota contingat, et secunda insuper, quae nunquam finiatur, accedat. Suscipitur enim animae a corpore separatio, ne Deo ab anima separato etiam ipsa separetur a corpore, ac sic totius hominis prima morte completa, secunda excipiat sempiterna. Quocirca mors quidem, ut dixi, cum eam morientes patiuntur, cumque in eis ut moriantur facit, nemini bona est, sed laudabiliter toleratur pro tenendo vel adipiscendo bono. Cum vero in ea sunt, qui jam mortui nuncupantur, non absurde dicitur et malis mala, et bonis bona. In requie enim sunt animae piorum a corpore separatae; impiorum autem poenas luunt: donec istarum ad aeternam vitam, illarum vero ad aeternam mortem, quae secunda dicitur, corpora reviviscant.

Caput IX.

Tempus mortis, quo vitae sensus aufertur, in morientibus, an in mortuis esse dicendum sit.

Sed id tempus, quo animae a corpore separatae aut in bonis sunt, aut in malis, utrum post mortem potius, an in morte dicendum est? Si enim post mortem est, jam non ipsa mors, quae transacta atque praeterita est, sed post eam vita praesens animae, bona seu mala est. Mors autem tunc eis mala erat, quando erat, hoc est, quando eam patiebantur, cum morerentur: quoniam gravis et molestus eis inerat sensus; quo malo bene utuntur boni. Peracta autem mors quonam modo vel bona, vel mala est, quae jam non est? Porro, si adhuc diligentius attendamus, nec illa mors esse apparebit, cujus gravem ac molestum in morientibus diximus sensum. Quamdiu enim sentiunt, adhuc utique vivunt; et si adhuc vivunt, ante mortem quam in morte potius esse dicendi sunt: quia illa cum venerit, aufert omnem corporis sensum, qui ea propinquante molestus est. Ac per hoc, quomodo morientes dicamus eos qui nondum mortui sunt, sed imminente morte jam extrema et mortifera afflictione jactantur, explicare difficile est: etiamsi recte isti appellantur morientes; quia cum mors quae jam impendet, advenerit, non morientes, sed mortui nuncupantur. Nullus est ergo moriens, nisi vivens; quoniam cum in tanta est extremitate vitae, in quanta sunt quos agere animam dicimus, profecto qui nondum anima caruit, adhuc vivit.

For if we consider more diligently, even when anyone dies faithfully and laudably for the sake of truth, death is avoided. For on that account something of it is undertaken, lest the whole should happen, and the second death besides, which should never end, should be added. For the separation of the soul from the body is undertaken, lest, God being separated from the soul, the soul itself should also be separated from the body, and so, the first death of the whole man being completed, the second eternal death should follow. Wherefore death indeed, as I said, when the dying suffer it, and when it acts in them so that they may die, is good to no one, but it is laudably tolerated for the sake of holding or attaining a good. But when those who are already called dead are in it, it is not absurdly said to be both evil to the evil and good to the good. For the souls of the pious, separated from the body, are at rest; but those of the impious suffer punishments: until the bodies of the former revive unto eternal life, and of the latter unto eternal death, which is called the second.

Chapter IX.

Whether the time of death, in which the sense of life is taken away, is to be said to be in the dying or in the dead.

But that time in which souls separated from the body are either in good or in evil, is it to be said to be after death rather, or in death? For if it is after death, it is no longer death itself, which is transacted and past, but after it the present life of the soul, whether good or evil, exists. But death was then evil to them when it was, that is, when they suffered it, while they were dying: since a heavy and troublesome sense was in them; which evil the good use well. But death being completed, in what way is it either good or evil, which already is not? Furthermore, if we still attend more diligently, even that will not appear to be death, of which we said the sense was heavy and troublesome in the dying. For as long as they feel, they certainly still live; and if they still live, they are to be said to be before death rather than in death: because when that comes, it takes away all sense of the body, which is troublesome as it approaches. And through this, it is difficult to explain how we may call those dying who are not yet dead, but are already tossed by extreme and deadly affliction as death is imminent: even if these are rightly called dying; because when death, which already impends, has arrived, they are called not dying, but dead. No one, therefore, is dying except the living; since when one is in such extremity of life as are those whom we say are giving up the ghost, surely he who has not yet lacked a soul still lives.

Idem ipse igitur simul et moriens est et vivens: sed morti accedens, vita decedens ; adhuc tamen in vita, quia inest anima corpori; nondum autem in morte, quia nondum abscessit a corpore. Sed si cum abscesserit, nec tunc in morte, sed post mortem potius erit; quando sit in morte quis dixerit? Nam neque ullus moriens erit, si moriens et vivens simul esse nullus potest: quamdiu quippe anima in corpore est, non possumus negare viventem. Aut si moriens potius dicendus est, in cujus jam corpore agitur ut moriatur, nec simul quisquam potest esse vivens et moriens; quando sit vivens nescio.

Caput X.

De vita mortalium, quae mors potius quam vita dicenda est.

Ex quo enim quisque in isto corpore morituro esse coeperit, nunquam in eo non agitur ut mors veniat. Hoc enim agit ejus mutabilitas toto tempore vitae hujus (si tamen vita dicenda est), ut veniatur in mortem. Nemo quippe est qui non ei post annum sit, quam ante annum fuit, et cras quam hodie, et hodie quam heri, et paulo post quam nunc, et nunc quam paulo ante propinquior. Quoniam quidquid temporis vivitur, de spatio vivendi demitur; et quotidie fit minus minusque quod restat: ut omnino nihil sit aliud tempus vitae hujus, quam cursus ad mortem, in quo nemo vel paululum stare, vel aliquanto tardius ire permittitur: sed omnes urgentur pari motu, nec diverso impelluntur accessu. Neque enim cui vita brevior fuit, celerius diem duxit, quam ille cui longior: sed cum aequaliter et aequalia momenta raperentur ambobus, alter habuit propius, alter remotius quo non impari velocitate ambo currebant. Aliud est autem amplius viae peregisse, aliud tardius ambulasse. Qui ergo usque ad mortem productiora spatia temporis agit, non lentius pergit, sed plus itineris conficit. Porro si ex illo quisque incipit mori, hoc est esse in morte, ex quo in illo agi coeperit ipsa mors, id est vitae detractio; quia, cum detrahendo finita fuerit, post mortem jam erit, non in morte: profecto ex quo esse incipit in hoc corpore, in morte est. Quid enim aliud diebus, horis, momentisque singulis agitur, donec ea consumpta mors quae agebatur, impleatur; et incipiat jam tempus esse post mortem, quod cum vita detraheretur, erat in morte?

Therefore, the same person is at once both dying and living: but approaching death, departing from life; yet still in life, because the soul is in the body; but not yet in death, because it has not yet departed from the body. But if, when it has departed, it will not even then be in death, but rather after death; who shall say when it is in death? For neither will anyone be dying, if no one can be at once dying and living: for as long as the soul is in the body, we cannot deny him to be living. Or if he is rather to be called dying in whose body it is already being acted that he should die, and no one can be at once living and dying; I know not when he is living.

Chapter X.

Of the life of mortals, which is rather to be called death than life.

For from the moment anyone begins to be in this body destined to die, it is never not being acted in it that death should come. For its mutability during the whole time of this life (if indeed it is to be called life) acts so that death is reached. For there is no one who is not nearer to it after a year than he was a year ago, and tomorrow than today, and today than yesterday, and a little after than now, and now than a little before. Since whatever time is lived, it is taken from the space of living; and daily that which remains becomes less and less: so that the time of this life is altogether nothing else than a race to death, in which no one is permitted to stand even a little while, or to go somewhat more slowly: but all are urged on with equal motion, nor are they impelled with a different approach. For he whose life was shorter did not pass his day more quickly than he whose life was longer: but since equal moments were snatched from both equally, one had it nearer, the other more remote, towards which both were running with no unequal velocity. But it is one thing to have traversed more of the way, and another to have walked more slowly. He, therefore, who spends more extended spaces of time until death, does not proceed more slowly, but accomplishes more of the journey. Furthermore, if everyone begins to die, that is, to be in death, from the moment that death itself begins to be acted in him, that is, the withdrawal of life; because, when by withdrawing it shall have been finished, it will already be after death, not in death: surely from the moment he begins to be in this body, he is in death. For what else is acted in each day, hour, and moment, until, life being consumed, that death which was being acted is fulfilled; and the time begins to be after death, which, while life was being withdrawn, was in death?

Nunquam igitur in vita homo est, ex quo est in corpore isto moriente potius quam vivente, si et in vita et in morte simul non potest esse. An potius et in vita et in morte simul est: in vita scilicet in qua vivit, donec tota detrahatur; in morte autem, qua jam moritur, cum vita detrahitur? Si enim non est in vita, quid est quod detrahitur, donec ejus fiat perfecta consumptio? Si autem non est in morte, quid est vitae ipsa detractio? Non enim frustra, cum vita fuerit corpori tota detracta, post mortem jam dicitur, nisi quia mors erat, cum detraheretur. Nam si ea detracta non est homo in morte, sed post mortem; quando, nisi cum detrahitur, erit in morte?

Caput XI.

An quisquam simul et vivens esse possit, et mortuus.

1. Si autem absurdum est ut hominem, antequam ad mortem perveniat, jam esse dicamus in morte; (cui enim propinquat peragendo vitae suae tempora, si jam in illa est?) maxime quia nimis est insolens, ut simul et vivens esse dicatur et moriens, cum vigilans et dormiens simul esse non possit: quaerendum est quando erit moriens. Etenim antequam mors veniat, non est moriens, sed vivens: cum vero mors venerit, mortuus erit, non moriens. Illud ergo est adhuc ante mortem, hoc jam post mortem. Quando ergo in morte? (tunc enim est moriens:) ut quemadmodum tria sunt cum dicimus, Ante mortem, in morte, post mortem; ita tria singulis singula, Vivens, moriens, mortuusque reddantur. Quando itaque sit moriens, id est in morte, ubi neque sit vivens, quod est ante mortem, neque mortuus, quod est post mortem, sed moriens, id est in morte, difficillime definitur. Quamdiu quippe est anima in corpore, maxime si etiam sensus adsit, procul dubio vivit homo, qui constat ex anima et corpore; ac per hoc adhuc ante mortem, non in morte esse dicendus est: cum vero anima abscesserit, omnemque abstulerit corporis sensum, jam post mortem mortuusque perhibetur. Perit igitur inter utrumque, quo moriens, vel in morte sit: quoniam si adhuc vivit, ante mortem est; si vivere destitit, jam post mortem est. Nunquam ergo moriens, id est in morte esse comprehenditur. Ita etiam in transcursu temporum quaeritur praesens, nec invenitur: quia sine ullo spatio est, per quod transitur ex futuro in praeteritum. Nonne ergo videndum est, ne ista ratione mors corporis nulla esse dicatur? Si enim est, quando est quae in nullo, et in qua ullus esse non potest? quandoquidem si vivitur, adhuc non est; quia hoc ante mortem, non in morte: si autem vivere jam cessatum est, jam non est; quia et hoc post mortem est, non in morte. Sed rursus si nulla mors est ante vel post, quid est quod dicitur ante mortem, sive post mortem? nam et hoc inaniter dicitur, si mors nulla est.

Never, therefore, is man in life, from the moment he is in this body dying rather than living, if he cannot be at once in life and in death. Or is he rather at once both in life and in death: in life, to wit, in which he lives until it is all withdrawn; but in death, by which he is already dying as life is withdrawn? For if he is not in life, what is that which is withdrawn until its perfect consumption occurs? But if he is not in death, what is the withdrawal of life itself? For not in vain, when life has been altogether withdrawn from the body, is it said to be after death, unless because it was death while it was being withdrawn. For if, that being withdrawn, man is not in death, but after death; when, unless while it is being withdrawn, will he be in death?

Chapter XI.

Whether anyone can be at once living and dead.

1. But if it is absurd that we should say a man, before he arrives at death, is already in death; (for whom does he approach by spending the times of his life, if he is already in it?) especially because it is too unusual that one should be said to be at once living and dying, since one cannot be at once waking and sleeping: it must be asked when he will be dying. For before death comes, he is not dying, but living: but when death has come, he will be dead, not dying. The former is still before death, the latter already after death. When, therefore, is he in death? (for then he is dying:) so that just as there are three things when we say, Before death, in death, after death; so three things may be rendered to each: Living, dying, and dead. When, therefore, he may be dying, that is, in death, where he may be neither living, which is before death, nor dead, which is after death, but dying, that is, in death, is most difficultly defined. For as long as the soul is in the body, especially if sense also be present, beyond doubt the man lives, who consists of soul and body; and through this he is to be said to be still before death, not in death: but when the soul has departed, and has taken away all sense of the body, he is already considered after death and dead. Therefore, that point between both, in which he may be dying or in death, perishes: since if he still lives, he is before death; if he has ceased to live, he is already after death. Never, therefore, is he comprehended as dying, that is, in death. Thus also in the passage of times the present is sought, and is not found: because it is without any space through which the passage is made from the future into the past. Must it not, therefore, be seen, lest by this reasoning the death of the body be said to be nothing? For if it is, when is it, which is in no one, and in which no one can be? since if life continues, it is not yet; because this is before death, not in death: but if living has already ceased, it already is not; because this also is after death, not in death. But again, if there is no death before or after, what is that which is called before death or after death? for even this is said in vain, if death is nothing.

Atque utinam in paradiso bene vivendo egissemus, ut revera nulla esset mors. Nunc autem non solum est, verum etiam tam molesta est, ut nec ulla explicari locutione possit, nec ulla ratione vitari.

2. Loquamur ergo secundum consuetudinem ; non enim aliter debemus: et dicamus, Ante mortem, prius quam mors accidat; sicut scriptum est, Ante mortem ne laudes hominem quemquam (Eccli. XI, 30). Dicamus etiam cum acciderit, Post mortem illius vel illius factum est illud vel illud. Dicamus et de praesenti tempore ut possumus, velut cum ita loquimur, Moriens ille testatus est, et illis atque illis illud atque illud moriens dereliquit: quamvis hoc nisi vivens omnino facere non posset, et potius hoc ante mortem fecerit, non in morte. Loquamur etiam sicut loquitur Scriptura divina, quae mortuos quoque non post mortem, sed in morte esse non dubitat dicere. Hinc enim est illud: Quoniam non est in morte, qui memor sit tui (Psal. VI, 6). Donec enim reviviscant, recte dicuntur esse in morte; sicut in somno esse quisque, donec evigilet, dicitur: quamvis in somno positos dicamus dormientes, nec tamen eo modo possumus dicere eos qui jam sunt mortui, morientes. Non enim adhuc moriuntur qui, quantum attinet ad corporis mortem, de qua nunc disserimus, jam sunt a corporibus separati. Sed hoc est quod dixi explicari aliqua locutione non posse, quonam modo vel morientes dicantur vivere, vel jam mortui etiam post mortem adhuc esse dicantur in morte. Quomodo enim post mortem si adhuc in morte? Praesertim cum eos nec morientes dicamus, sicuti eos qui in somno sunt dicimus dormientes; et qui in languore, languentes; et qui in dolore, utique dolentes; et qui in vita, viventes: at vero mortui priusquam resurgant, esse dicuntur in morte, nec tamen possunt appellari morientes. Unde non importune neque incongrue arbitror accidisse, etsi non humana industria, judicio fortasse divino, ut hoc verbum quod est, moritur, in latina lingua nec grammatici potuerint declinare, ea regula qua caetera talia declinantur. Namque ab eo quod est oritur, fit verbum praeteriti temporis, ortus est: et si qua similia sunt, per temporis praeteriti participia declinantur. Ab eo vero quod est moritur, si quaeramus praeteriti temporis verbum, responderi assolet, mortuus est, u littera geminata. Sic enim dicitur mortuus, quomodo fatuus, arduus, conspicuus, et si qua similia, quae non sunt praeteriti temporis, sed quoniam nomina sunt, sine tempore declinantur. Illud autem, quasi ut declinetur quod declinari non potest, pro participio praeteriti temporis ponitur nomen. Convenienter itaque factum est, ut, quemadmodum id quod significat, non potest agendo, ita ipsum verbum declinari loquendo non possit . Agi tamen potest in adjutorio gratiae Redemptoris nostri, ut saltem secundam mortem declinare possimus.

And would that in paradise, by living well, we had acted so that in truth there would be no death. But now not only is it, but it is also so troublesome, that it can neither be explained by any speech, nor avoided by any reason.

2. Let us speak, therefore, according to custom; for we ought not to do otherwise: and let us say, "Before death," before death happens; as it is written, "Before death praise no man" (Ecclus. xi. 30). Let us say also when it has happened, "After death" of such and such a person such and such a thing was done. Let us speak also of the present time as we can, as when we speak thus: "That person dying made his will, and dying left such and such things to such and such persons": although he could not have done this at all unless he were living, and he did it rather before death, not in death. Let us speak also as the divine Scripture speaks, which does not hesitate to say that the dead also are not after death, but in death. For hence is that saying: "For in death there is no one who is mindful of Thee" (Psalm vi. 5). For until they revive, they are rightly said to be in death; just as everyone is said to be in sleep until he awakes: although we call those placed in sleep sleeping, yet we cannot in that way call those who are already dead, dying. For they are not still dying who, as far as pertains to the death of the body, of which we are now treating, are already separated from their bodies. But this is what I said could not be explained by any speech, in what way either the dying may be said to live, or the already dead even after death may still be said to be in death. For how after death, if still in death? Especially since we do not call them dying, as we call those who are in sleep sleeping; and those who are in weakness, weak; and those who are in pain, surely suffering; and those who are in life, living: but indeed the dead, before they rise again, are said to be in death, yet they cannot be called dying. Whence I think it has happened not unseasonably nor incongruously, if not by human industry, perhaps by divine judgment, that this word which is "moritur" (he dies), the grammarians have not been able to decline in the Latin language by that rule by which other such words are declined. For from that which is "oritur" (he arises), is formed the verb of the past tense, "ortus est" (he has arisen): and if there are any similar ones, they are declined by the participles of the past tense. But from that which is "moritur", if we seek the verb of the past tense, the answer is usually given, "mortuus est", with the letter "u" doubled. For "mortuus" is so called as "fatuus", "arduus", "conspicuus", and if there are any similar ones, which are not of the past tense, but because they are nouns, are declined without time. But that, as if to decline what cannot be declined, the noun is put for the participle of the past tense. It has happened conveniently, therefore, that, just as that which it signifies cannot be in acting, so the word itself cannot be declined in speaking. Yet it can be acted by the assistance of the grace of our Redeemer, that we may at least be able to decline the second death.

Illa enim est gravior, et omnium malorum pessima, quae non fit separatione animae et corporis, sed in aeternam poenam potius utriusque complexu. Ibi e contrario non erunt homines ante mortem atque post mortem, sed semper in morte: ac per hoc nunquam viventes, nunquam mortui, sed sine fine morientes. Nunquam enim erit homini pejus in morte, quam ubi erit mors ipsa sine morte.

Caput XII.

Quam mortem primis hominibus Deus, si mandatum ejus transgrederentur, fuerit comminatus.

Cum ergo requiritur, quam mortem Deus primis hominibus fuerit comminatus, si ab eo mandatum transgrederentur acceptum, nec obedientiam custodirent; utrum animae, an corporis, an totius hominis, an illam quae appellatur secunda: respondendum est, Omnes. Prima enim ex duabus constat; secunda ex omnibus tota. Sicut enim universa terra ex multis terris, et universa Ecclesia ex multis constat Ecclesiis; sic universa mors ex omnibus. Quoniam prima constat ex duabus, una animae, altera corporis: ut sit prima totius hominis mors, cum anima sine Deo et sine corpore ad tempus poenas luit; secunda vero, ubi anima sine Deo cum corpore poenas aeternas luit. Quando ergo dixit Deus primo illi homini, quem in paradiso constituerat, de cibo vetito, Quacumque die ederitis ex eo, morte moriemini (Gen. II, 17): non tantum primae mortis partem priorem, ubi anima privatur Deo; nec tantum posteriorem, ubi corpus privatur anima; nec solum ipsam totam primam, ubi anima et a Deo et a corpore separata punitur: sed quidquid mortis est usque ad novissimam, quae secunda dicitur, qua est nulla posterior, comminatio illa complexa est.

Caput XIII.

Praevaricatio primorum hominum, quam primam senserit poenam.

Nam posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt. Unde etiam foliis ficulneis, quae forte a perturbatis prima comperta sunt, pudenda texerunt (Gen. III, 7): quae prius eadem membra erant, sed pudenda non erant. Senserunt ergo novum motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae.

For that is more grievous, and the worst of all evils, which does not occur by the separation of the soul and body, but rather by the embrace of both for eternal punishment. There, on the contrary, men will not be before death and after death, but always in death: and through this never living, never dead, but dying without end. For it will never be worse for man in death, than where death itself will be without death.

Chapter XII.

What death God threatened to the first humans if they should transgress His command.

When, therefore, it is asked what death God threatened to the first humans if they should transgress the command received from Him and not keep obedience; whether of the soul, or of the body, or of the whole man, or that which is called the second: the answer must be, All. For the first consists of two; the second is total from all. For as the whole earth consists of many lands, and the universal Church consists of many churches; so the whole death consists of all. Since the first consists of two, one of the soul, the other of the body: so that the first death of the whole man exists when the soul, without God and without the body, suffers punishments for a time; but the second, where the soul without God with the body suffers eternal punishments. When, therefore, God said to that first man whom He had placed in paradise, concerning the forbidden food, "In whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death" (Gen. ii. 17): that threat embraced not only the first part of the first death, where the soul is deprived of God; nor only the later part, where the body is deprived of the soul; nor only the whole first death itself, where the soul is punished being separated both from God and from the body: but whatever of death there is even to the latest, which is called the second, after which there is no other.

Chapter XIII.

The first punishment which the transgression of the first humans felt.

For after the transgression of the precept was made, immediately, as divine grace deserted them, they were confused by the nakedness of their bodies. Whence also with fig-leaves, which perhaps were the first things found by them in their perturbation, they covered their pudenda (Gen. iii. 7): which before were the same members, but were not shameful. They felt, therefore, a new motion of their disobedient flesh, as if a reciprocal punishment for their own disobedience.

Jam quippe anima libertate in perversum propria delectata, et Deo dedignata servire, pristino corporis servitio destituebatur: et quia superiorem Dominum suo arbitrio deseruerat, inferiorem famulum ad suum arbitrium non tenebat: nec omni modo habebat subditam carnem, sicut semper habere potuisset, si Deo subdita ipsa mansisset. Tunc ergo coepit caro concupiscere adversus spiritum (Galat. V, 17): cum qua controversia nati sumus, trahentes originem mortis, et in membris nostris vitiataque natura contentionem ejus sive victoriam de prima praevaricatione gestantes.

Caput XIV.

Qualis homo sit factus a Deo, et in quam sortem deciderit suae voluntatis arbitrio.

Deus enim creavit hominem rectum, naturarum auctor, non utique vitiorum: sed sponte depravatus justeque damnatus, depravatos damnatosque generavit. Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum, quae de illo facta est ante peccatum. Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed jam natura erat seminalis, ex qua propagaremur: qua scilicet propter peccatum vitiata, et vinculo mortis obstricta, justeque damnata, non alterius conditionis homo ex homine nasceretur. Ac per hoc a liberi arbitrii malo usu series hujus calamitatis exorta est, quae humanum genus origine depravata, velut radice corrupta, usque ad secundae mortis exitium, quae non habet finem, solis eis exceptis qui per gratiam Dei liberantur, miseriarum connexione perducit.

Caput XV.

Quod Adam peccans prius reliquerit Deum, quam relinqueretur a Deo; et primam fuisse animae mortem a Deo recessisse.

Quamobrem etiamsi in eo quod dictum est, Morte moriemini, quoniam non est dictum, Mortibus, eam solam intelligamus, quae fit cum anima deseritur sua vita, quod illi Deus est: (non enim deserta est ut desereret, sed ut desereretur, deseruit: ad malum quippe ejus prior est voluntas ejus; ad bonum vero ejus prior est voluntas Creatoris ejus, sive ut eam faceret quae nulla erat, sive ut reficiat quae lapsa perierat):

For already indeed the soul, delighted with its own perverse liberty, and disdaining to serve God, was deprived of the former service of the body: and because it had deserted its superior Lord by its own will, it did not hold its inferior servant to its own will: nor did it have the flesh subject to it in every way, as it could always have had it, if it had itself remained subject to God. Then, therefore, the flesh began to lust against the spirit (Gal. v. 17): with which controversy we are born, drawing the origin of death, and carrying in our members and in our vitiated nature its contention or its victory from the first prevarication.

Chapter XIV.

What sort of man was made by God, and into what lot he fell by the decision of his own will.

For God created man upright, being the author of natures, not certainly of vices: but he, being spontaneously depraved and justly condemned, generated those who are depraved and condemned. For we all were in that one man, when we all were that one man, who fell into sin through the woman, who was made from him before sin. Not yet was there created and distributed to us individually the form in which we were each to live; but there was already the seminal nature from which we were to be propagated: which being vitiated because of sin, and bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, no man of any other condition could be born of man. And through this, from the evil use of free will, the series of this calamity arose, which leads the human race, with its origin depraved, as if with a corrupt root, even to the destruction of the second death, which has no end, those only being excepted who are delivered by the grace of God through a connection of miseries.

Chapter XV.

That Adam sinning first left God, before he was left by God; and that the first death of the soul was to depart from God.

Wherefore even if in that which was said, "You shall die the death," since it was not said "deaths," we should understand that one alone which occurs when the soul is deserted by its own life, which God is to it: (for it was not deserted so that it should desert, but it deserted so that it should be deserted: for its own will is prior to its own evil; but the will of its Creator is prior to its good, whether that He should make it which was nothing, or that He should remake it which having fallen had perished):

etiamsi ergo hanc intelligamus Deum denuntiasse mortem, in eo quod ait, Qua die ederitis ex illo, morte moriemini; tanquam diceret, Qua die me deserueritis per inobedientiam, deseram vos per justitiam: profecto in ea morte etiam caeterae denuntiatae sunt, quae procul dubio fuerant secuturae. Nam in eo quod inobediens motus in carne animae inobedientis exortus est, propter quem pudenda texerunt, sensa est mors una in qua deseruit animam Deus. Ea significata est verbis ejus, quando timore dementi sese abscondenti homini dixit, Adam, ubi es (Gen. III, 9)? non utique ignorando quaerens, sed increpando admonens, ut attenderet ubi esset in quo non esset Deus. Cum vero corpus anima ipsa deseruit aetate corruptum et senectute confectum, venit in experimentum mors altera, de qua Deus peccatum adhuc puniens homini dixerat, Terra es, et in terram ibis (Ibid., 19): ut ex his duabus mors illa prima, quae totius est hominis, compleretur, quam secunda in ultimo sequitur, nisi homo per gratiam liberetur. Neque enim corpus quod de terra est, rediret in terram, nisi sua morte, quae illi accidit cum deseritur sua vita, id est anima. Unde constat inter Christianos veraciter catholicam tenentes fidem, etiam ipsam nobis corporis mortem, non lege naturae, qua nullam mortem homini Deus fecit, sed merito inflictam esse peccati: quoniam peccatum vindicans Deus, dixit homini, in quo tunc omnes eramus, Terra es, et in terram ibis.

CAPUT XVI.---De philosophis, qui animae separationem a corpore non putant esse poenalem, cum Plato inducat summum Deum diis minoribus promittentem, quod nunquam sint corporibus exuendi.

1. Sed philosophi, contra quorum calumnias defendimus civitatem Dei, hoc est ejus Ecclesiam, sapienter sibi videntur irridere quod dicimus, animae a corpore separationem inter poenas ejus esse deputandam: quia videlicet ejus perfectam beatitudinem tunc illi fieri existimant, cum omni prorsus corpore exuta ad Deum simplex et sola et quodammodo nuda redierit. Ubi si nihil, quo ista refelleretur opinio, in eorum litteris invenirem, operosius mihi disputandum esset, quo demonstrarem non corpus esse animae, sed corruptibile corpus onerosum. Unde illud est quod de Scripturis nostris in superiore libro commemoravimus (cap. 15), Corpus enim corruptibile aggravat animam (Sap. IX, 15). Addendo utique corruptibile, non qualicumque corpore, sed quale factum est ex peccato consequente vindicta, animam perhibuit aggravari. Quod etiamsi non addidisset, nihil aliud intelligere deberemus. Sed cum apertissime Plato deos a summo Deo factos habere immortalia corpora praedicet, eisque ipsum Deum, a quo facti sunt, inducat pro magno beneficio pollicentem, quod in aeternum cum suis corporibus permanebunt, nec ab eis ulla morte solventur:

even if, therefore, we understand that God denounced this death in that which He said, "In what day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death"; as if He were saying, "In what day you shall desert me by disobedience, I will desert you by justice": surely in that death the others also were denounced, which without doubt were to follow. For in that a disobedient motion arose in the flesh of the disobedient soul, because of which they covered their pdf, one death was felt in which God deserted the soul. That was signified by His words, when He said to the man hiding himself with demented fear, "Adam, where are you?" (Gen. iii. 9): not indeed seeking by being ignorant, but admonishing by rebuking, that he might attend to where he was in whom God was not. But when the soul itself deserted the body corrupted by age and worn out by senility, another death came into experience, concerning which God, still punishing sin, had said to man, "Dust you are, and into dust you shall go" (Ibid. 19): so that from these two that first death, which is of the whole man, should be completed, which the second follows in the end, unless man be delivered by grace. For neither would the body which is of the earth return into the earth, except by its own death, which happens to it when it is deserted by its life, that is, the soul. Whence it is established among Christians truly holding the Catholic faith, that even the death of the body itself was inflicted on us not by the law of nature, by which God made no death for man, but by the merit of sin: since God, avenging sin, said to man, in whom we then all were, "Dust you are, and into dust you shall go."

CHAPTER XVI.—Of the philosophers who do not think the separation of the soul from the body is penal, although Plato introduces the supreme God promising to the lesser gods that they should never be stripped of their bodies.

1. But the philosophers, against whose calumnies we defend the City of God, that is, His Church, seem to themselves wisely to mock what we say, that the separation of the soul from the body is to be reckoned among its punishments: because, forsooth, they think that its perfect beatitude happens to it then, when, being stripped of every body whatsoever, it shall have returned to God simple and alone and in a manner naked. Where, if I should find nothing in their own writings by which that opinion might be refuted, I should have to dispute more laboriously to demonstrate that it is not the body that is burdensome to the soul, but the corruptible body. Whence is that which we commemorated from our Scriptures in the preceding book: "For the corruptible body weighs down the soul" (Wisd. ix. 15). By adding "corruptible," he certainly showed that the soul was weighed down not by any body whatsoever, but by such as was made from sin and the following vengeance. Which even if he had not added, we ought to understand nothing else. But since most openly Plato preaches that the gods made by the supreme God have immortal bodies, and introduces God Himself by whom they were made promising them as a great benefit that they shall remain forever with their bodies, nor shall they be dissolved from them by any death:

quid est quod isti ad exagitandam christianam fidem fingunt se nescire quod sciunt; aut etiam sibi repugnantes adversum se ipsos malunt dicere, dum nobis non desinant contradicere? Nempe Platonis haec verba sunt, sicut ea Cicero in latinum vertit , quibus inducit summum Deum deos quos fecit alloquentem ac dicentem: Vos qui deorum satu orti estis, attendite quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum. Haec sunt indissolubilia me invito : quanquam omne colligatum solvi potest. Sed haudquaquam boni est , ratione vinctum velle dissolvere . Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis: nequaquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod majus est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram, quam illa quibus estis, tum cum gignebamini, colligati. Ecce deos Plato dicit et corporis animaeque colligatione mortales, et tamen immortales Dei a quo facti sunt voluntate atque consilio. Si ergo animae poena est in qualicumque corpore colligari, quid est quod eos alloquens Deus tanquam sollicitos, ne forte moriantur, id est dissolvantur a corpore, de sua facit immortalitate securos; non propter eorum naturam, quae sit compacta, non simplex, sed propter suam invictissimam voluntatem, qua potens est facere, ut nec orta occidant, nec connexa solvantur, sed incorruptibiliter perseverent?

2. Et hoc quidem utrum Plato verum de sideribus dicat, alia quaestio est: neque enim ei continuo concedendum est, globos istos luminum sive orbiculos luce corporea super terras, seu die, seu nocte fulgentes, suis quibusdam propriis animis vivere, eisque intellectualibus et beatis, quod etiam de ipso universo mundo, tanquam uno animali maximo, quo cuncta caetera continerentur animalia, instanter affirmat . Sed haec, ut dixi, alia quaestio est, quam nunc discutiendam non suscepimus. Hoc tantum contra istos commemorandum putavi, qui se Platonicos vocari vel esse gloriantur, cujus superbia nominis erubescunt esse Christiani, ne commune illis cum vulgo vocabulum, vilem faciat palliatorum , tanto magis inflatam, cuanto magis exiguam paucitatem: et quaerentes quid in doctrina christiana reprehendant, exagitant aeternitatem corporum, tanquam haec sint inter se contraria, ut et beatitudinem quaeramus animae, et eam semper esse velimus in corpore, velut aerumnoso vinculo colligatam: cum eorum auctor et magister Plato, donum a Deo summo diis ab illo factis dicat esse concessum, ne aliquando moriantur, id est a corporibus, quibus eos connexuit, separentur.

why is it that these, for the sake of harassing the Christian faith, feign not to know what they do know; or even choose to speak against themselves, being repugnant to themselves, while they do not cease to contradict us? Truly these are the words of Plato, as Cicero translated them into Latin, by which he introduces the supreme God addressing the gods whom He made, and saying: "Ye who are sprung from the seed of the gods, attend to those works of which I am the parent and effector. These are indissoluble against my will: although everything bound together can be dissolved. But it is by no means the part of a good being to wish to dissolve what is bound by reason. But since ye are sprung, ye cannot indeed be immortal and indissoluble: nevertheless ye shall by no means be dissolved, nor shall any fates of death destroy you, nor shall they be more powerful than my counsel, which is a greater bond for your perpetuity than those by which ye were bound together then when ye were being brought forth." Behold, Plato says the gods are mortal by the binding together of body and soul, and yet immortal by the will and counsel of God by whom they were made. If, therefore, it is a punishment for the soul to be bound in any body whatsoever, why is it that God, addressing them as if they were anxious lest perhaps they should die, that is, be dissolved from the body, makes them secure of their immortality; not because of their nature, which is composite, not simple, but because of His most invincible will, by which He is able to make it so that neither the things brought forth should perish, nor the things connected be dissolved, but should incorruptibly persevere?

2. And this indeed, whether Plato says what is true concerning the stars, is another question: for it is not to be immediately granted to him that those globes of light or little orbs shining with corporeal light over the lands, whether by day or by night, live by certain souls of their own, and those intellectual and blessed, which he also instantly affirms of the whole world itself, as of one greatest animal by which all other animals were contained. But this, as I said, is another question, which we have not now undertaken to discuss. I thought this only was to be commemorated against those who glory in being called or being Platonists, by the pride of which name they blush to be Christians, lest a common name with the vulgar should make vile the small number of those clad in the pallium, a paucity the more inflated as it is the more small: and seeking what they may find fault with in Christian doctrine, they harass the eternity of bodies, as if these things were contrary to each other, that we should both seek the beatitude of the soul and wish it to be always in the body, as if bound by a calamitous chain: whereas their own author and master, Plato, says that a gift was granted by the supreme God to the gods made by Him, that they should never die, that is, never be separated from the bodies to which He has connected them.

Caput XVII.

Contra eos qui asserunt, terrena corpora incorruptibilia fieri et aeterna non posse.

1. Contendunt etiam isti, terrestria corpora sempiterna esse non posse, cum ipsam universam terram dei sui, non quidem summi, sed tamen magni, id est totius hujus mundi, membrum in medio positum et sempiternum esse non dubitent. Cum ergo Deus ille summus fecerit eis alterum quem putant deum (Plato in Timaeo), id est istum mundum, caeteris diis qui infra eum sunt praeferendum, eumdemque esse existiment animantem, anima scilicet, sicut asserunt, rationali vel intellectuali in tam magna mole corporis ejus inclusa; ipsiusque corporis tanquam membra locis suis posita atque digesta, quatuor constituerit elementa, quorum juncturam, ne unquam deus eorum tam magnus moriatur, insolubilem ac sempiternam velint: quid causae est, ut in corpore majoris animantis tanquam medium membrum aeterna sit terra, et aliorum animantium terrestrium corpora, si, Deus sicut illud velit, aeterna esse non possint? Sed terrae, inquiunt, terra reddenda est, unde animalium terrestria sumpta sunt corpora: ex quo fit, inquiunt, ut ea sit necesse dissolvi et emori; et eo modo terrae stabili ac sempiternae, unde fuerant sumpta, restitui. Si quis hoc etiam de igne similiter affirmet, et dicat reddenda esse universo igni corpora, quae inde sumpta sunt, ut coelestia fierent animalia; nonne immortalitas, quam talibus diis, velut Deo summo loquente, promisit Plato, tanquam violentia disputationis hujus intercidet? An ibi propterea non fit, quia Deus non vult, cujus voluntatem, ut ait Plato, nulla vis vincit? Quid ergo prohibet, ut hoc etiam de terrestribus corporibus Deus possit efficere, quandoquidem ut nec ea quae orta sunt, occidant, nec ea quae sunt juncta solvantur, nec ea quae sunt ex elementis sumpta reddantur, atque ut animae in corporibus constitutae nec unquam ea deserant, et cum eis immortalitate ac sempiterna beatitudine perfruantur, posse Deum facere confitetur Plato? Cur ergo non possit, ut nec terrestria moriantur? An Deus non est potens quousque Christiani credunt, sed quousque Platonici volunt? Nimirum quippe consilium Dei et potestatem potuerunt philosophi, nec potuerunt nosse Prophetae? cum potius e contrario Dei Prophetas ad enuntiandam ejus, quantum dignatus est, voluntatem, Spiritus ejus docuerit; philosophos autem in ea cognoscenda conjectura humana deceperit.

Chapter XVII.

Against those who assert that earthly bodies cannot become incorruptible and eternal.

1. These also contend that terrestrial bodies cannot be everlasting, since they do not doubt that the whole earth itself is an everlasting member placed in the midst of their god, not indeed the supreme, but yet a great one, that is, of this whole world. Since, therefore, that supreme God made for them another whom they think to be a god (as Plato in the Timaeus says), that is, this world, to be preferred to the other gods who are below him, and they think that same world to be a living creature, having, as they assert, a rational or intellectual soul included in so great a mass of his body; and since He has constituted the four elements as members of his body, placed and distributed in their own locations, the union of which they wish to be indissoluble and everlasting, lest their so great god should ever die: what cause is there why the earth should be eternal as a middle member in the body of the greater living creature, and the bodies of other terrestrial living creatures cannot be eternal if God should so will it? But to the earth, they say, earth must be restored, whence the terrestrial bodies of animals were taken: from which it results, they say, that it is necessary they should be dissolved and die, and in that manner be restored to the stable and everlasting earth whence they had been taken. If anyone should affirm this also similarly concerning fire, and say that the bodies which were taken thence to become celestial animals must be restored to the universal fire, will not the immortality which Plato promised to such gods, as if the supreme God were speaking, fall to the ground, as if by the violence of this disputation? Or does it not happen there for this reason, because God does not will it, whose will, as Plato says, no force overcomes? What therefore hinders that God should be able to effect this also concerning terrestrial bodies, since Plato confesses that God is able to make it so that neither the things which have had an origin should perish, nor those that are joined together be dissolved, nor those that are taken from the elements be restored, and that souls constituted in bodies should never desert them, but together with them fully enjoy immortality and everlasting beatitude? Why therefore can He not bring it to pass that terrestrial things should not die? Or is God not powerful as far as Christians believe, but only as far as Platonists will? Could the philosophers forsooth know the counsel and power of God, and could the prophets not know them? when on the contrary His Spirit taught the prophets of God to announce His will, so far as He deigned; but human conjecture deceived the philosophers in their attempt to know it.

2. Verum non usque adeo decipi debuerunt, non solum ignorantia, sed magis etiam pervicacia, ut et sibi apertissime refragentur, magnis disputationum viribus asserentes, animae, ut beata esse possit, non terrenum tantum, sed omne corpus esse fugiendum; et deos rursus dicentes habere beatissimas animas, et tamen aeternis corporibus illigatas, coelestes quidem igneis, Jovis autem ipsius animam, quem mundum istum volunt, omnibus omnino corporeis elementis, quibus haec tota moles a terra in coelum surgit, inclusam. Hanc enim animam Plato ab intimo terrae medio, quod geometrae centrum vocant, per omnes partes ejus usque ad coeli summa et extrema diffundi et extendi per numeros musicos opinatur, ut sit iste mundus animal maximum, beatissimum, sempiternum, cujus anima et perfectam sapientiae felicitatem teneret, et corpus proprium non relinqueret; cujusque corpus et in aeternum ex illa viveret, et eam quamvis non simplex, sed tot corporibus tantisque compactum, hebetare atque tardare non posset. Cum igitur suspicionibus suis ista permittant, cur nolunt credere, divina voluntate atque potentia immortalia corpora fieri posse terrena, in quibus animae nulla ab eis morte separatae, nullis eorum oneribus aggravatae, sempiterne ac feliciter vivant ; quod deos suos posse asserunt in corporibus igneis, Jovemque ipsum regem eorum in omnibus corporeis elementis? Nam si animae, ut beata sit, corpus est omne fugiendum, fugiant dii eorum de globis siderum, fugiat Jupiter de coelo et terra: aut si non possunt, miseri judicentur. Sed neutrum isti volunt, qui neque a corporibus separationem audent dare diis suis, ne illos mortales colere videantur; nec beatitudinis privationem, ne infelices eos esse fateantur. Non ergo ad beatitudinem consequendam omnia fugienda sunt corpora; sed corruptibilia, molesta, gravia, moribunda; non qualia fecit primis hominibus bonitas Dei, sed qualia esse compulit poena peccati .

Caput XVIII.

De terrenis corporibus, quae philosophi affirmant in coelestibus esse non posse; quia quod terrenum est, naturali pondere vocetur ad terram.

Sed necesse est, inquiunt, ut terrena corpora naturale pondus vel in terra teneat, vel cogat ad terram: et ideo in coelo esse non possint . Primi quidem illi homines in terra erant nemorosa atque fructuosa, quae paradisi nomen obtinuit: sed quia et ad hoc respondendum est, vel propter Christi corpus cum quo ascendit in coelum, vel propter sanctorum qualia in resurrectione futura sunt, intueantur paulo attentius pondera ipsa terrena. Si enim ars humana efficit ut ex metallis, quae in aquis posita continuo submerguntur, quibusdam modis vasa fabricata etiam natare possint;

2. But they ought not to have been deceived to such an extent, not only by ignorance, but even more by obstinacy, as to contradict themselves most openly, asserting with great force of disputation that the soul, in order to be blessed, must flee not only an earthly body, but every body whatsoever; and again saying that the gods have most blessed souls, and yet bound to eternal bodies, the celestial indeed to fiery ones, and the soul of Jupiter himself, whom they wish to be this world, included in all the corporeal elements by which this whole mass rises from the earth to the heaven. For Plato opines that this soul is diffused and extended by musical numbers from the inmost middle of the earth, which geometricians call the center, through all its parts even to the highest and extreme parts of heaven, that this world might be a greatest animal, most blessed, everlasting, whose soul should both hold the perfect happiness of wisdom and should not leave its own body; and whose body should both live forever from that soul, and should not be able to dull or retard it, although it be not simple, but compacted of so many and so great bodies. Since therefore they allow these things to their own suspicions, why do they refuse to believe that by divine will and power earthly bodies can become immortal, in which souls, separated from them by no death, and burdened by no weights of theirs, might live everlastingly and happily; which they assert their gods can do in fiery bodies, and Jupiter himself, their king, in all corporeal elements? For if every body must be fled from in order for the soul to be blessed, let their gods flee from the globes of the stars, let Jupiter flee from heaven and earth: or if they cannot, let them be judged miserable. But these men wish for neither, for they neither dare to grant to their gods separation from bodies, lest they should seem to worship mortals; nor the privation of beatitude, lest they should confess them to be unhappy. Therefore, not all bodies are to be fled from in order to attain beatitude, but those that are corruptible, troublesome, heavy, and dying; not such as the goodness of God made for the first men, but such as the punishment of sin compelled them to be.

Chapter XVIII.

Concerning earthly bodies, which the philosophers affirm cannot be in the celestial regions; because that which is earthly is called to the earth by its natural weight.

But it is necessary, they say, that their natural weight should either keep earthly bodies on the earth, or force them towards the earth: and therefore they cannot be in heaven. Certainly those first men were on the wooded and fruitful earth, which obtained the name of paradise: but because this also must be answered, either on account of Christ's body with which He ascended into heaven, or on account of the saints' bodies as they shall be in the future resurrection, let them look a little more closely at those same earthly weights. For if human art effects that from metals, which placed in waters are continually submerged, vessels fabricated in certain ways can even float;

quanto credibilius et efficacius occultus aliquis modus operationis Dei, cujus omnipotentissima voluntate Plato dicit nec orta interire, nec colligata posse dissolvi, cum multo mirabilius incorporea corporeis, quam quaecumque corporea quibuscumque corporibus copulentur, potest molibus praestare terrenis, ut nullo in ima pondere deprimantur; ipsisque animis perfectissime beatis, ut quamvis terrena, tamen incorruptibilia jam corpora ubi volunt ponant, et quo volunt agant, situ motuque facillimo? An vero si hoc Angeli faciant, et quaelibet animalia terrestria rapiant unde libet, constituantque ubi libet, aut eos sine labore non posse, aut onera sentire credendum est? Cur ergo sanctorum perfectos et beatos divino munere spiritus sine ulla difficultate posse ferre quo voluerint, et sistere ubi voluerint sua corpora non credamus? Nam cum terrenorum corporum, sicut onera in gestando sentire consuevimus, quanto major est quantitas, tanto major sit et gravitas, ita ut plura pondo quam pauciora plus premant: membra tamen suae carnis leviora portat anima cum in sanitate robusta sunt, quam in languore cum macra sunt. Et cum aliis gestantibus onerosior sit sanus et validus, quam exilis et morbidus; ipse tamen ad suum corpus movendum atque portandum agilior est, cum in bona valetudine plus habet molis, quam cum in peste vel fame minimum roboris. Tantum valet in habendis etiam terrenis corporibus, quamvis adhuc corruptibilibus atque mortalibus, non quantitatis pondus, sed temperationis modus. Et quis verbis explicet, quantum distet inter praesentem, quam dicimus sanitatem, et immortalitatem futuram? Non itaque nostram fidem redarguant philosophi de ponderibus corporum. Nolo enim quaerere, cur non credant terrenum posse esse corpus in coelo, cum terra universa libretur in nihilo. Fortassis enim de ipso medio mundi loco, eo quod in eum coeant quaeque graviora, etiam argumentatio verisimilior habeatur. Illud dico: si dii minores, quibus inter animalia terrestria caetera etiam hominem faciendum commisit Plato (in Timaeo), potuerunt, sicut dicit, ab igne removere urendi qualitatem, lucendi relinquere quae per oculos emicaret ; itane Deo summo concedere dubitabimus, cujus ille voluntati potestatique ne moriantur concessit quae orta sunt, et tam diversa, tam dissimilia, id est corporea et incorporea, sibimet connexa, nulla possint dissolutione sejungi, ut de carne hominis, cui donat immortalitatem, corruptionem auferat, naturam relinquat, congruentiam figurae membrorumque detineat, detrahat ponderis tarditatem? Sed de fide resurrectionis mortuorum, et de corporibus eorum immortalibus diligentius, si Deus voluerit, in fine hujus operis disserendum est.

how much more credibly and effectively can some hidden mode of God's operation (by whose most omnipotent will Plato says that neither things born perish, nor things bound together can be dissolved, since incorporeal things are much more wonderfully coupled to corporeal than any corporeal things to any other bodies) grant to earthly masses that they be depressed by no weight to the lowest parts; and to those souls most perfectly blessed, that they may place their bodies, though earthly yet now incorruptible, where they will, and move them whither they will, with the easiest position and motion? Or indeed, if Angels should do this, and snatch up any terrestrial animals from whence they please, and place them where they please, is it to be believed that they cannot do it without labor, or that they feel the burdens? Why therefore should we not believe that the perfect and blessed spirits of the saints can by divine gift, without any difficulty, carry their bodies where they will, and station them where they will? For although in terrestrial bodies, as we are accustomed to feel burdens in carrying them, the greater the quantity, the greater also is the weight, so that more pounds press more than fewer; nevertheless the soul carries the members of its own flesh lighter when they are robust in health, than in languor when they are thin. And while to others who carry him, a healthy and strong man is more burdensome than one who is thin and sickly; yet he himself is more agile for moving and carrying his own body when in good health he has more mass, than when in pestilence or famine he has very little strength. So much is the effect, even in having terrestrial bodies although still corruptible and mortal, not of the weight of quantity, but of the mode of temperation. And who could explain in words how great is the distance between this present health, as we call it, and future immortality? Let not the philosophers therefore refute our faith concerning the weights of bodies. For I do not wish to ask why they do not believe an earthly body can be in heaven, when the whole earth is poised upon nothing. For perhaps concerning the very middle place of the world, because into it all heavier things gather, a more plausible argumentation might be held. I say this: if the lesser gods, to whom among the other terrestrial animals Plato committed the making of man also (in the Timaeus), were able, as he says, to remove from fire the quality of burning, and leave that of shining which should flash through the eyes; shall we then doubt to grant to the supreme God (to whose will and power he conceded that things which have had an origin should not die, and that things so diverse and dissimilar, that is, corporeal and incorporeal, connected to each other, can be separated by no dissolution) that from the flesh of man, to whom He gives immortality, He should take away corruption, leave the nature, retain the harmony of the figure and members, and take away the slowness of weight? But concerning the faith of the resurrection of the dead, and concerning their immortal bodies, we must discuss more diligently, if God will, at the end of this work.

Caput XIX.

Contra eorum dogmata, qui primos homines, si non peccassent, immortales futuros fuisse non credunt.

Nunc de corporibus primorum hominum quod instituimus explicemus: quoniam nec mors ista, quae bona perhibetur bonis, nec tantum paucis intelligentibus sive credentibus, sed omnibus nota est, qua fit animae a corpore separatio, qua certe corpus animantis, quod evidenter vivebat, evidenter emoritur, eis potuisset accidere, nisi peccati meritum sequeretur. Licet enim justorum ac piorum animae defunctorum, quod in requie vivant, dubitare fas non sit, usque adeo tamen eis melius esset cum suis corporibus bene valentibus vivere , ut etiam illi qui omni modo esse sine corpore beatissimum existimant, hanc opinionem suam sententia repugnante convincant. Neque enim quisquam audebit illorum sapientes homines, sive morituros, sive jam mortuos, id est, aut carentes corporibus, aut corpora relicturos, diis immortalibus anteponere, quibus Deus summus apud Platonem munus ingens, indissolubilem scilicet vitam, id est aeternum cum suis corporibus consortium, pollicetur. Optime autem cum hominibus agi arbitratur idem Plato, si tamen hanc vitam pie justeque peregerint, ut a suis corporibus separati, in ipsorum deorum, qui sua corpora nunquam deserunt, recipiantur sinum (in Phaedone et Phaedro): Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant, Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti. (Virgil. Aeneid. lib. 6, vers. 750, 751). Quod Virgilius ex Platonico dogmate dixisse laudatur. Ita quippe animas mortalium, nec in suis corporibus semper esse posse existimat, sed mortis necessitate dissolvi; nec sine corporibus durare perpetuo, sed alternantibus vicibus indesinenter vivos ex mortuis, et ex vivis mortuos fieri putat: ut a caeteris hominibus hoc videantur differre sapientes, quod post mortem ferantur ad sidera, ut aliquanto diutius in astro sibi congruo quisque requiescat, atque inde rursus miseriae pristinae oblitus et cupiditate habendi corporis victus, redeat ad labores aerumnasque mortalium; illi vero qui stultam duxerint vitam, ad corpora suis meritis debita, sive hominum, sive bestiarum, de proximo revolvantur (in Phaedro).

Chapter XIX.

Against the dogmas of those who do not believe that the first men, if they had not sinned, would have been immortal.

Now let us explain what we have undertaken concerning the bodies of the first men: since neither that death, which is held to be good for the good, and is known not only to a few intelligent or believing persons but to all, by which the separation of the soul from the body is effected, by which certainly the body of the living creature, which evidently was alive, evidently dies, could have happened to them, unless the merit of sin had followed. For although it is not lawful to doubt that the souls of the righteous and pious deceased live in rest, nevertheless it would be so much better for them to live with their bodies in good health, that even those who in every way think it most blessed to be without a body, are convinced of this their opinion by a conflicting judgment. For none of them will dare to prefer wise men, whether about to die or already dead, that is, either lacking bodies or about to leave their bodies, to the immortal gods, to whom the supreme God in Plato promises a vast gift, namely, indissoluble life, that is, an eternal fellowship with their bodies. Moreover, the same Plato thinks that it goes best with men if they have passed this life piously and justly, so that, separated from their bodies, they may be received into the bosom of those gods who never desert their bodies (in the Phaedo and Phaedrus): Namely, that being forgetful they may revisit the upper vaults, and begin again to wish to return into bodies. (Virgil, Aeneid, bk. 6, lines 750, 751). Which Virgil is praised for having said based on Platonist dogma. For in such a way he thinks that the souls of mortals can neither always be in their bodies, but are dissolved by the necessity of death; nor can they endure perpetually without bodies, but he thinks that by alternating turns living beings are incessantly made from the dead, and the dead from the living: so that the wise seem to differ from other men in this, that after death they are carried to the stars, that each may rest somewhat longer in the star suitable to him, and from there again, having forgotten his former misery and overcome by the desire of having a body, he returns to the labors and calamities of mortals; but those who have led a foolish life are revolved soon after into bodies due to their merits, whether of men or of beasts (in the Phaedrus).

In hac itaque durissima conditione constituit etiam bonas atque sapientes animas, quibus non talia corpora distributa sunt, cum quibus semper atque immortaliter viverent, ut neque in corporibus permanere, neque sine his possint in aeterna puritate durare. De quo Platonico dogmate jam in libris superioribus (Praesertim in lib. 10, cap. 30) diximus christiano tempore erubuisse Porphyrium, et non solum ab humanis animis removisse corpora bestiarum, verum etiam sapientium animas ita voluisse de corporeis nexibus liberari, ut corpus omne fugientes beatae apud Patrem sine fine teneantur. Itaque ne a Christo vinci videretur vitam sanctis pollicente perpetuam, etiam ipse purgatas animas sine ullo ad miserias pristinas reditu in aeterna felicitate constituit: et ut Christo adversaretur, resurrectionem incorruptibilium corporum negans, non solum sine terrenis, sed sine ullis omnino corporibus eas asseruit in sempiternum esse victuras . Nec tamen ista qualicumque opinione praecepit saltem ne diis corporatis religionis obsequio subderentur. Quid ita, nisi quia eas quamvis nulli corpori sociatas, non credidit illis esse meliores? Quapropter, si non audebunt isti , sicut eos ausuros esse non arbitror, diis beatissimis, et tamen in aeternis corporibus constitutis, humanas animas anteponere; cur eis videtur absurdum, quod fides christiana praedicat, et primos homines ita fuisse conditos, ut si non peccassent, nulla morte a suis corporibus solverentur, sed pro meritis obedientiae custoditae immortalitate donati, cum eis viverent in aeternum; et talia sanctos in resurrectione habituros ea ipsa, in quibus hic laboraverunt, corpora, ut nec eorum carni aliquid corruptionis vel difficultatis, nec eorum beatitudini aliquid doloris et infelicitatis possit accidere?

Caput XX.

Quod caro sanctorum, quae nunc requiescit in spe, in meliorem reparanda sit qualitatem, quam fuit primorum hominum ante peccatum.

Proinde nunc sanctorum animae defunctorum ideo non habent gravem mortem, qua separatae sunt a corporibus suis, quia caro eorum requiescit in spe, quaslibet sine ullo jam sensu contumelias accepisse videatur. Non enim, sicut Platoni visum est, corpora oblivione desiderant: sed potius, quia meminerunt quid sibi ab eo sit promissum, qui neminem fallit, qui eis etiam de capillorum suorum integritate securitatem dedit (Luc. XXI, 18), resurrectionem corporum, in quibus multa dura perpessi sunt, nihil in eis ulterius tale sensuri, desiderabiliter et patienter exspectant.

In this most harsh condition, therefore, he placed even good and wise souls, to whom such bodies were not distributed as those with which they might live always and immortally, so that they can neither remain in bodies, nor can they endure without these in eternal purity. Concerning which Platonist dogma we have already said in previous books (especially in bk. 10, ch. 30) that Porphyry blushed in Christian times, and not only removed the bodies of beasts from human souls, but even wished the souls of the wise to be so liberated from corporeal bonds that, fleeing every body, they might be held blessed with the Father without end. Thus, lest he should seem to be conquered by Christ who promises perpetual life to the saints, he himself also placed purified souls in eternal happiness without any return to former miseries: and so that he might oppose Christ, by denying the resurrection of incorruptible bodies, he asserted that they would live forever not only without earthly bodies, but without any bodies at all. And yet, with this opinion whatever it was, he did not even prescribe that they should not be subject to the embodied gods by the compliance of religion. Why so, unless because, although they were associated with no body, he did not believe them to be better than those gods? Wherefore, if these men will not dare, as I do not think they will dare, to prefer human souls to the most blessed gods, and yet constituted in eternal bodies; why does it seem absurd to them what the Christian faith preaches, that the first men were also so created that, if they had not sinned, they would be released from their bodies by no death, but gifted with immortality for the merits of preserved obedience, they would live with them forever; and that the saints in the resurrection will have such bodies, those very ones in which they labored here, that neither can any corruption or difficulty happen to their flesh, nor any pain and unhappiness to their beatitude?

Chapter XX.

That the flesh of the saints, which now rests in hope, is to be restored to a better quality than was that of the first men before sin.

Therefore now the souls of the deceased saints do not have a grievous death on this account, by which they have been separated from their bodies, because their flesh rests in hope, whatever insults it may seem to have received now without any sense. For they do not desire their bodies through forgetfulness, as it seemed to Plato; but rather, because they remember what has been promised to them by Him who deceives no one, who gave them security even concerning the integrity of their hairs (Luke 21:18), they desirably and patiently expect the resurrection of the bodies in which they suffered many hardships, not being about to feel anything such in them hereafter.

Si enim carnem suam non oderant (Ephes. V, 29), quando eam suae menti infirmitate resistentem , spirituali jure coercebant, quanto magis eam diligunt etiam ipsam spiritualem futuram? Sicut enim spiritus carni serviens non incongrue carnalis, ita caro spiritui serviens recte appellabitur spiritualis; non quia in spiritum convertetur, sicut nonnulli putant ex eo quod scriptum est, Seminatur corpus animale, resurget corpus spirituale (I Cor. XV, 42): sed quia spiritui summa et mirabili obtemperandi facilitate subdetur, usque ad immortalitatis indissolubilis securissimam voluntatem omni molestiae sensu, omni corruptibilitate et tarditate detracta. Non solum enim non erit tale, quale nunc est in quavis optima valetudine; sed nec tale quidem, quale fuit in primis hominibus ante peccatum. Qui licet morituri non essent, nisi peccassent; alimentis tamen ut homines utebantur, nondum spiritualia, sed adhuc animalia corpora terrena gestantes. Quae licet senio non veterascerent, ut necessitate perducerentur ad mortem (qui status eis de ligno vitae, quod in medio paradiso cum arbore vetita simul erat, mirabili Dei gratia praestabatur): tamen et alios sumebant cibos praeter unam arborem, quae fuerat interdicta, non quia ipsa erat malum, sed propter commendandum purae et simplicis obedientiae bonum, quae magna virtus est rationalis creaturae sub Creatore Domino constitutae. Nam ubi nullum malum tangebatur, profecto si prohibitum tangeretur, sola inobedientia peccabatur. Alebantur ergo aliis quae sumebant, ne animalia corpora molestiae aliquid esuriendo ac sitiendo sentirent: de ligno autem vitae propterea gustabatur, ne mors eis undecumque subreperet, vel senectute confecta decursis temporum spatiis interirent: tanquam caetera essent alimento, illud sacramento; ut sic fuisse accipiatur lignum vitae in paradiso corporali, sicut in spirituali, hoc est intelligibili paradiso, Sapientia Dei, de qua scriptum est, Lignum vitae est amplectentibus eam (Prov. III, 18).

Caput XXI.

De paradiso, in quo primi homines fuerant, quod recte possit significatione ejus spirituale aliquid intelligi, salva veritate narrationis historicae de corporali loco.

Unde nonnulli totum ipsum paradisum, ubi primi homines parentes generis humani sanctae Scripturae veritate fuisse narrantur, ad intelligibilia referunt, arboresque illas et ligna fructifera in virtutes vitae moresque convertunt: tanquam visibilia et corporalia illa non fuerint, sed intelligibilium significandorum causa eo modo dicta vel scripta sint.

For if they did not hate their own flesh (Eph. 5:29), when they coerced it by spiritual right while it resisted their mind through infirmity, how much more do they love it as it is about to be spiritual itself? For just as the spirit serving the flesh is not incongruously called carnal, so the flesh serving the spirit will rightly be called spiritual; not because it will be converted into spirit, as some think from what is written: "It is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body" (1 Cor. 15:42); but because it will be subjected to the spirit with a most high and wonderful facility of obeying, even unto the most secure will of indissoluble immortality, all sense of trouble, all corruptibility and slowness being taken away. For not only will it not be such as it is now in any best health, but not even such as it was in the first men before sin. Who, although they were not about to die unless they had sinned, nevertheless used food as men, bearing earthly bodies still animal, not yet spiritual. Which, although they did not grow old with age so as to be led to death by necessity (which state was provided for them by the wonderful grace of God from the tree of life, which was in the midst of paradise together with the forbidden tree): nevertheless they also took other foods besides the one tree which had been forbidden, not because it was itself an evil, but for the sake of commending the good of pure and simple obedience, which is a great virtue of a rational creature constituted under the Lord Creator. For where no evil was touched, certainly if the forbidden thing were touched, the sin was from disobedience alone. They were nourished, therefore, by the other things which they took, lest their animal bodies should feel any trouble from hunger and thirst: but they tasted of the tree of life for this reason, lest death should creep upon them from any quarter, or they should perish worn out by old age in the lapse of periods of time: as if the other things were for food, and that for a sacrament; so that the tree of life in the corporeal paradise may be understood to have been thus, as in the spiritual, that is, the intelligible paradise, is the Wisdom of God, of which it is written: "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her" (Prov. 3:18).

Chapter XXI.

Of the paradise in which the first humans were, that something spiritual can rightly be understood by its significance, while preserving the truth of the historical narrative concerning a physical place.

Hence some refer that whole paradise itself, where the first human parents of the human race are narrated to have been by the truth of Holy Scripture, to intelligible things, and turn those trees and fruit-bearing woods into the virtues of life and morals: as if those visible and corporeal things were not, but were spoken or written in that way for the sake of signifying intelligible things.

Quasi propterea non potuerit esse paradisus corporalis, quia potest etiam spiritualis intelligi: tanquam ideo non fuerint duae mulieres, Agar et Sara, et ex illis duo filii Abrahae, unus de ancilla, alius de libera, quia duo Testamenta in eis figurata dicit Apostolus (Galat. IV, 22-24): aut ideo de nulla petra Moyse percutiente aqua defluxerit (Exod. XVII, 6; Num. XX, 11), quia potest illic figurata significatione etiam Christus intelligi, eodem apostolo dicente, Petra autem erat Christus (I Cor. X, 4). Nemo itaque prohibet intelligere paradisum, vitam beatorum; quatuor ejus flumina, quatuor virtutes, prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam, atque justitiam; et ligna ejus, omnes utiles disciplinas; et lignorum fructus, mores piorum; et lignum vitae, ipsam bonorum omnium matrem sapientiam; et lignum scientiae boni et mali, transgressi mandati experimentum. Poenam enim peccatoribus bene utique, quoniam juste, constituit Deus, sed non bono suo experitur homo. Possunt haec etiam in Ecclesia intelligi, ut ea melius accipiamus tanquam prophetica indicia praecedentia futurorum: paradisum scilicet ipsam Ecclesiam, sicut de illa legitur in Cantico canticorum (Cant. IV, 13): quatuor autem paradisi flumina, quatuor Evangelia; ligna fructifera, sanctos; fructus autem eorum, opera eorum; lignum vitae, Sanctum sanctorum, utique Christum; lignum scientiae boni et mali, proprium voluntatis arbitrium. Nec se ipso quippe homo divina voluntate contempta nisi perniciose uti potest: atque ita discit, quid intersit, utrum inhaereat communi omnibus bono, an proprio delectetur. Se quippe amans donatur sibi, ut inde timoribus moeroribusque completus cantet in Psalmo, si tamen mala sua sentit, Ad me ipsum turbata est anima mea (Psal. XLI, 7): correctusque jam dicat: Fortitudinem meam ad te custodiam (Psal. LVIII, 10). Haec, et si qua alia commodius dici possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter paradiso, nemine prohibente dicantur: dum tamen et illius historiae veritas fidelissima rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur.

Caput XXII.

De corporibus sanctorum post resurrectionem, quae sic spiritualia erunt, ut non in spiritum caro vertatur.

As if a physical paradise could not have existed for the reason that a spiritual one can also be understood: as if for that reason there were not two women, Hagar and Sarah, and from them two sons of Abraham, one of the bondwoman, the other of the free, because the Apostle says that two Testaments were figured in them (Gal. 4:22-24): or for that reason water flowed from no rock when Moses struck it (Exod. 17:6; Num. 20:11), because Christ can also be understood there in a figurative significance, the same Apostle saying, "And the rock was Christ" (1 Cor. 10:4). No one therefore prohibits understanding paradise as the life of the blessed; its four rivers as the four virtues: prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice; and its trees as all useful disciplines; and the fruits of the trees as the morals of the pious; and the tree of life as wisdom itself, the mother of all goods; and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil as the experience of a transgressed commandment. For God certainly established punishment for sinners well, because justly, but man does not experience it for his own good. These things can also be understood in the Church, so that we may better receive them as prophetic indications preceding future things: namely, paradise as the Church itself, as we read of her in the Song of Solomon (Song 4:13); the four rivers of paradise as the four Gospels; the fruit-bearing trees as the saints; their fruits as their works; the tree of life as the Holy of Holies, certainly Christ; the tree of the knowledge of good and evil as the proper choice of the will. For indeed, man, having despised the divine will, cannot use himself except perniciously; and thus he learns what difference it makes whether he cleaves to the good common to all, or is delighted by his own. For he who loves himself is given to himself, so that being filled then with fears and sorrows, he sings in the Psalm, if indeed he feels his own evils, "My soul is troubled within me" (Psalm 42:6); and being now corrected, he says: "My strength will I keep for You" (Psalm 59:9). These things, and whatever other things can more commodiously be said concerning the spiritual understanding of paradise, let them be said, with no one prohibiting; provided, however, that the truth of that history, commended by the most faithful narrative of things done, be believed.

Chapter XXII.

Of the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, which will be so spiritual that the flesh is not turned into spirit.

Corpora ergo justorum quae in resurrectione futura sunt, neque ullo ligno indigebunt, quo fiat ut nullo morbo vel senectute inveterata moriantur; neque ullis aliis corporalibus alimentis, quibus esuriendi ac sitiendi qualiscumque molestia devitetur: quoniam certo et omnimodo inviolabili munere immortalitatis induentur, ut nonnisi velint, possibilitate, non necessitate vescantur. Quod Angeli quoque visibiliter et tractabiliter apparentes, non quia indigebant, sed quia volebant et poterant, ut hominibus congruerent sui ministerii quadam humanitate, fecerunt. Neque enim in phantasmate Angelos edisse credendum est, quando eos homines hospitio susceperunt (Gen. XVIII, et Tob. XI): quamvis utrum Angeli essent ignorantibus, consimili nobis indigentia vesci viderentur. Unde est quod ait angelus in libro Tobiae, Videbatis me manducare, sed visu vestro, videbatis (Tob. XII, 19): id est, necessitate reficiendi corporis, sicut vos facitis, me cibum sumere putabatis. Sed si forte de Angelis aliud credibilius disputari potest, certe fides christiana de ipso Salvatore non dubitat, quod etiam post resurrectionem, jam quidem in spirituali carne, sed tamen vera, cibum ac potum cum discipulis sumpsit (Luc. XXIV). Non enim potestas, sed egestas edendi ac bibendi talibus corporibus auferetur. Unde et spiritualia erunt; non quia corpora esse desistent, sed quia spiritu vivificante subsistent.

Caput XXIII.

Quid intelligendum sit de corpore animali et de corpore spirituali: aut qui moriuntur in Adam, qui vero vivificantur in Christo.

1. Nam sicut corpora ista, quae habent animam viventem, nondum spiritum vivificantem, animalia dicuntur corpora; nec tamen animae sunt, sed corpora: ita illa spiritualia vocantur corpora; absit tamen ut spiritus ea credamus futura, sed corpora carnis habitura substantiam, sed nullam tarditatem corruptionemque carnalem spiritu vivificante passura. Tunc jam non terrenus, sed coelestis homo erit: non quia corpus quod de terra factum est, non ipsum erit; sed quia dono coelesti jam tale erit, ut etiam coelo incolendo non amissa natura, sed mutata qualitate conveniat. Primus autem homo de terra terrenus (I Cor. XV, 47), in animam viventem factus est, non in spiritum vivificantem, quod ei per obedientiae meritum servabatur. Ideo corpus ejus, quod cibo ac potu egebat, ne fame afficeretur ac siti, et non immortalitate illa absoluta atque indissolubili, sed ligno vitae a mortis necessitate prohibebatur, atque in juventutis flore tenebatur, non spirituale, sed animale fuisse, non dubium est: nequaquam tamen moriturum, nisi in Dei praedicentis minantisque sententiam delinquendo corruisset.

Therefore, the bodies of the righteous which are to be in the resurrection will neither need any wood to prevent them from dying by any disease or old age; nor any other corporeal nourishments by which any trouble of hunger and thirst might be avoided: since they will be clothed with a certain and in every way inviolable gift of immortality, so that they may eat only if they wish, from possibility, not from necessity. This the Angels also, appearing visibly and tangibly, did, not because they needed to, but because they wished and were able, so that they might correspond to men by a certain humanity of their ministry. For it is not to be believed that the Angels ate in a phantom, when men received them in hospitality (Gen. 18, and Tob. 11): although they seemed to those who were ignorant that they were Angels to be eating from a necessity similar to ours. Hence it is that the Angel says in the book of Tobit: "You saw me eat, but you saw it with your vision" (Tobit 12:19): that is, you thought that I took food from a necessity of refreshing my body, as you do. But if perhaps something else more credible can be disputed concerning the Angels, certainly the Christian faith does not doubt concerning the Savior Himself, that even after the resurrection, now indeed in spiritual flesh, but yet true, He took food and drink with His disciples (Luke 24). For the power, not the need, of eating and drinking will be taken away from such bodies. Hence they will also be spiritual; not because they will cease to be bodies, but because they will subsist by the vivifying spirit.

Chapter XXIII.

What is to be understood concerning the animal body and the spiritual body: or those who die in Adam, and those who are vivified in Christ.

1. For just as these bodies, which have a living soul but not yet a vivifying spirit, are called animal bodies; yet they are not souls, but bodies: so those are called spiritual bodies; yet far be it from us to believe that they will be spirits, but that they will have the substance of fleshly bodies, but will suffer no fleshly slowness or corruption through the vivifying spirit. Then he will no longer be an earthly, but a heavenly man: not because the body which was made from the earth will not be the same; but because by a heavenly gift it will now be such that it may be suitable even for inhabiting heaven, its nature not being lost, but its quality changed. But the first man, of the earth, earthy (1 Cor. 15:47), was made into a living soul, not into a vivifying spirit, which was being reserved for him through the merit of obedience. Therefore his body, which needed food and drink lest it should be affected by hunger and thirst, and was prohibited from the necessity of death not by that absolute and indissoluble immortality, but by the tree of life, and was kept in the flower of youth, was not spiritual, but animal, there is no doubt: by no means, however, to die, unless he had fallen by delinquent conduct against the sentence of God predicting and threatening.

Et alimentis quidem etiam extra paradisum non negatis, a ligno tamen vitae prohibitus, traditus esset tempori vetustatique finiendus, in ea duntaxat vita, quam in corpore licet animali, donec spirituale obedientiae merito fieret, posset in paradiso, nisi peccasset, habere perpetuam. Quapropter, etiamsi mortem istam manifestam, qua fit animae a corpore separatio, intelligamus simul significatam in eo quod Deus dixerat, Qua die ederitis ex illo, morte moriemini (Gen. II, 17); non ideo debet absurdum videri, quia non eo prorsus die a corpore sunt soluti, quo cibum interdictum mortiferumque sumpserunt. Eo quippe die mutata in deterius vitiataque natura, atque a ligno vitae separatione justissima, mortis in eis etiam corporalis necessitas facta est, cum qua nos necessitate nati sumus. Propter quod Apostolus non ait, Corpus quidem moriturum est propter peccatum; sed ait, Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter justitiam. Deinde subjungit: Si autem Spiritus ejus qui suscitavit Christum a mortuis, habitat in vobis; qui suscitavit Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra, per inhabitantem Spiritum ejus in vobis (Rom. VIII, 10, 11). Tunc ergo erit corpus in spiritum vivificantem, quod nunc est in animam viventem; et tamen mortuum dicit Apostolus, quia jam moriendi necessitate constrictum est. Tunc autem ita erat in animam viventem, quamvis non in spiritum vivificantem, ut tamen mortuum dici recte non posset; quia nisi perpetratione peccati necessitatem moriendi habere non posset. Cum vero Deus et dicendo, Adam, ubi es? mortem significaverit animae, quae facta est illo deserente; et dicendo, Terra es, et in terram ibis (Gen. III, 9, 19), mortem significaverit corporis, quae illi fit anima discedente: propterea de morte secunda nihil dixisse credendus est, quia occultam esse voluit propter dispensationem Testamenti novi, ubi secunda mors apertissime declaratur; ut prius ista mors prima, quae communis est omnibus, proderetur ex illo venisse peccato, quod in uno commune factum est omnibus: mors vero secunda non utique communis est omnibus, propter eos qui secundum propositum vocati sunt, quos ante praescivit, et praedestinavit, sicut ait Apostolus, conformes imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus (Rom. VIII, 28 et 29), quos a secunda morte per Mediatorem Dei gratia liberavit.

And although nourishments were not denied even outside of paradise, yet being prohibited from the tree of life, he would have been handed over to time and old age to be finished, at least in that life which, although in an animal body, until it should become spiritual by the merit of obedience, he could have had perpetual in paradise, if he had not sinned. Wherefore, even if we understand that manifest death, by which the separation of the soul from the body takes place, to be signified at the same time in what God had said, "On the day you eat of it, you shall die the death" (Gen. 2:17); it ought not for that reason to seem absurd, because they were not released from the body on that very day on which they took the forbidden and deadly food. For on that day, their nature being changed for the worse and vitiated, and by a most just separation from the tree of life, the necessity of even bodily death was made in them, with which necessity we are born. Because of which the Apostle does not say, The body indeed is to die because of sin; but he says, "The body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness." Then he adds: "But if the Spirit of Him who raised up Christ from the dead dwells in you; He who raised up Christ from the dead will also vivify your mortal bodies, through His Spirit dwelling in you" (Rom. 8:10, 11). Then, therefore, the body will be in a vivifying spirit, which now is in a living soul; and yet the Apostle says it is dead, because it is now constrained by the necessity of dying. But then it was so in a living soul, although not in a vivifying spirit, that yet it could not rightly be called dead; because unless by the perpetration of sin it could not have the necessity of dying. But when God, both by saying, "Adam, where are you?" signified the death of the soul, which was made by his deserting Him; and by saying, "Earth you are, and into earth you shall go" (Gen. 3:9, 19), signified the death of the body, which takes place when the soul departs from it: for that reason He is not to be believed to have said nothing concerning the second death, because He wished it to be hidden on account of the dispensation of the New Testament, where the second death is most openly declared; so that first this first death, which is common to all, might be shown to have come from that sin which in one was made common to all: but the second death is certainly not common to all, on account of those "who are called according to His purpose," "whom He foreknew and predestinated," as the Apostle says, "to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brothers" (Rom. 8:28, 29), whom the grace of God through the Mediator has delivered from the second death.

2. In corpore ergo animali primum hominem factum, sic Apostolus loquitur. Volens enim ab spirituali quod in resurrectione futurum est, hoc quod nunc est animale discernere: Seminatur, inquit, in corruptione, surget in incorruptione; seminatur in contumelia, surget in gloria; seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute; seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale. Deinde ut hoc probaret, Si est, inquit, corpus animale, est et spirituale. Et ut quid esset corpus animale ostenderet, Sic, inquit, scriptum est: Factus est primus homo in animam viventem. Isto igitur modo voluit ostendere quid sit corpus animale, quamvis Scriptura non dixerit de primo homine, qui est appellatus Adam, quando illi anima flatu Dei creata est, Et factus est homo in corpore animali; sed, Factus est homo in animam viventem (Gen. II, 7). In eo ergo quod scriptum est, Factus est primus homo in animam viventem, voluit Apostolus intelligi corpus hominis animale. Spirituale autem quemadmodum intelligendum esset, ostendit addendo, Novissimus autem Adam in spiritum vivificantem: procul dubio Christum significans, qui jam ex mortuis ita resurrexit, ut mori omnino deinceps non possit. Denique sequitur et dicit: Sed non primum quod spirituale est, sed quod animale; postea, spirituale. Ubi multo apertius declaravit, se animale corpus insinuasse in eo quod scriptum est, factum esse primum hominem in animam viventem: spirituale autem in eo quod ait, Novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Prius est enim animale corpus, quale habuit primus Adam, quamvis non moriturum, nisi peccasset; quale nunc habemus et nos, hactenus ejus mutata vitiataque natura, quatenus in illo, posteaquam peccavit, effectum est, unde haberet jam moriendi necessitatem; quale pro nobis etiam Christus primitus habere dignatus est, non quidem necessitate, sed potestate: postea vero spirituale, quale jam praecessit in Christo tanquam in capite nostro, secuturum est autem in membris ejus ultima resurrectione mortuorum.

3. Adjungit deinde Apostolus duorum istorum hominum evidentissimam differentiam, dicens: Primus homo de terra, terrenus; secundus homo de coelo, coelestis. Qualis terrenus, tales et terreni: qualis coelestis, tales et coelestes. Et quomodo induimus imaginem terrem. induamus et imaginem ejus qui de coelo est (I Cor. XV, 42-49). Hoc Apostolus ita posuit, ut nunc quidem in nobis secundum Sacramentum regenerationis fiat; sicut alibi dicit, Quotquot in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis (Galat. III, 27): re autem ipsa tunc perficietur, cum et in nobis quod est animale nascendo, spirituale factum fuerit resurgendo. Ut enim ejus itidem verbis utar, Spe salvi facti sumus (Rom. VIII, 24).

2. That the first man was made in an animal body, the Apostle speaks thus. For wishing to discern this which is now animal from the spiritual which is to be in the resurrection: "It is sown," he says, "in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory; it is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power; it is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body." Then that he might prove this: "If there is," he says, "an animal body, there is also a spiritual one." And that he might show what an animal body was: "So," he says, "it is written: The first man was made into a living soul." In this way, therefore, he wished to show what an animal body is, although the Scripture did not say concerning the first man, who is called Adam, when his soul was created by the breath of God, "And the man was made in an animal body"; but, "The man was made into a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). In that, therefore, which is written, "The first man was made into a living soul," the Apostle wished the animal body of man to be understood. But how the spiritual was to be understood, he showed by adding, "But the last Adam into a vivifying spirit": undoubtedly signifying Christ, who has already risen from the dead in such a way that He can by no means die henceforth. Finally, he follows and says: "But not first what is spiritual, but what is animal; afterwards, spiritual." Where he much more openly declared that he had insinuated the animal body in that which is written, that the first man was made into a living soul: but the spiritual in that which he says, "The last Adam into a vivifying spirit." For first is the animal body, such as the first Adam had, although not to die if he had not sinned; such as we also have now, his nature having been so far changed and vitiated as was effected in him after he sinned, whence he would have now the necessity of dying; such as Christ also first deigned to have for us, not indeed from necessity, but from power: but afterwards the spiritual, such as has already preceded in Christ as in our head, but is to follow in His members at the final resurrection of the dead.

3. Then the Apostle adds the most evident difference between these two men, saying: "The first man from the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly. Such as the earthy is, such also are the earthy: such as the heavenly is, such also are the heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, let us also bear the image of Him who is from heaven (1 Cor. 15:47-49). The Apostle so placed this that it may now indeed be done in us according to the Sacrament of regeneration; as he says elsewhere, "As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ" (Gal. 3:27): but in actual fact it will then be perfected, when that which is animal in us by being born, shall have been made spiritual by rising again. For to use his words again, "By hope we were made saved" (Rom. 8:24).

Induimus autem imaginem terreni hominis propagatione praevaricationis et mortis, quam nobis intulit generatio: sed induimus imaginem coelestis hominis gratia indulgentiae vitaeque perpetuae, quod nobis praestat regeneratio, nonnisi per Mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Jesum Christum (I Tim. II, 5): quem coelestem hominem vult intelligi, quia de coelo venit, ut terrenae mortalitatis corpore vestiretur, quod coelesti immortalitate vestiret. Coelestes vero ideo appellat et alios, quia fiunt per gratiam membra ejus, ut cum illis sit unus Christus, velut caput et corpus. Hoc in eadem Epistola evidentius ita ponit: Per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (I Cor. XV, 21 et 22). Jam utique in corpore spirituali, quod erit in spiritum vivificantem. Non quia omnes qui in Adam moriuntur, membra erunt Christi (ex illis enim multo plures secunda in aeternum morte plectentur); sed ideo dictum est, omnes atque omnes, quia sicut nemo corpore animali nisi in Adam moritur, ita nemo corpore spirituali nisi in Christo vivificatur. Proinde nequaquam putandum est, nos in resurrectione tale corpus habituros, quale habuit homo primus ante peccatum. Neque illud quod dictum est, Qualis terrenus, tales et terreni; secundum illud intelligendum est, quod factum est admissione peccati. Non enim existimandum est, eum prius quam peccasset, spirituale corpus habuisse, et peccati merito in animale mutatum. Ut enim hoc putetur, parum attenduntur tanti verba doctoris, qui ait, Si est corpus animale, est et spirituale; sicut scriptum est, Factus est primus homo Adam in animam viventem. Numquid hoc post peccatum factum est, cum sit ista hominis prima conditio, de qua beatissimus Apostolus ad corpus animale monstrandum, hoc testimonium Legis assumpsit?

Caput XXIV.

Qualiter accipienda sit vel illa insufflatio, in qua primi homo factus est in animam viventem; vel illa quam Dominus fecit, dicens, Accipite Spiritum sanctum.

1. Unde et illud parum considerate quibusdam visum est, in eo quod legitur, Inspiravit Deus in faciem ejus spiritum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem (Gen. II, 7), non tunc animam primo homini datam, sed eam quae jam inerat, Spiritu sancto vivificatam. Movet enim eos, quod Dominus Jesus posteaquam resurrexit a mortuis, insufflavit, dicens discipulis suis, Accipite Spiritum sanctum (Joan. XX, 22). Unde tale aliquid existimant factum, quale tunc factum est: quasi et hic secutus Evangelista dixerit, Et facti sunt in animam viventem.

But we put on the image of the earthy man by the propagation of transgression and death, which generation brought upon us: but we put on the image of the heavenly man by the grace of indulgence and of perpetual life, which regeneration provides for us, only through the Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ (1 Tim. 2:5): whom he wishes to be understood as the heavenly man, because He came from heaven that He might be clothed with the body of earthly mortality, which He might clothe with heavenly immortality. But he calls others heavenly for this reason, because they become His members through grace, so that with them Christ may be one, as it were head and body. This he places more evidently in the same Epistle thus: "Through man death, and through man the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be vivified" (1 Cor. 15:21 and 22). Already, certainly, in a spiritual body, which will be in a vivifying spirit. Not because all who die in Adam will be members of Christ (for of those many more will be punished with the second death forever); but for this reason it was said, "all" and "all," because just as no one dies in an animal body except in Adam, so no one is vivified in a spiritual body except in Christ. Therefore it is by no means to be thought that we are to have such a body in the resurrection as the first man had before sin. Nor is that which was said, "Such as the earthy is, such also are the earthy," to be understood according to that which was made by the admission of sin. For it is not to be estimated that he, before he had sinned, had a spiritual body, and by the merit of sin was changed into an animal one. For that this should be thought, the words of so great a teacher are too little attended to, who says, "If there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual one; as it is written, The first man Adam was made into a living soul." Was this made after sin, when this is that first condition of man, concerning which the most blessed Apostle, to show the animal body, assumed this testimony of the Law?

Chapter XXIV.

How both that insufflation, in which the first man was made into a living soul, or that which the Lord made, saying, "Receive the Holy Spirit," is to be taken.

1. Hence also that has seemed to some with too little consideration, in what is read, "God breathed into his face the spirit of life, and the man was made into a living soul" (Gen. 2:7), that then a soul was not first given to the first man, but that which already was in him was vivified by the Holy Spirit. For it moves them that the Lord Jesus, after He rose from the dead, breathed on them, saying to His disciples, "Receive the Holy Spirit" (John 20:22). Hence they think something similar was done as was done then: as if here also the Evangelist followed and said, And they were made into a living soul.

Quod quidem si dictum esset, hoc intelligeremus, quod animarum quaedam vita sit Spiritus Dei, sine quo animae rationales mortuae deputandae sunt, quamvis earum praesentia vivere corpora videantur. Sed non ita factum, quando est conditus homo, satis ipsa libri verba testantur, quae ita se habent: Et formavit Deus hominem pulverem de terra. Quod quidam planius interpretandum putantes dixerunt, Et finxit Deus hominem de limo terrae. Quoniam superius dictum fuerat, Fons autem ascendebat de terra, et irrigabat omnem faciem terrae (Gen. II, 7, 6): ut ex hoc limus intelligendus videretur, humore scilicet terraque concretus. Ubi enim hoc dictum est, continuo sequitur, Et formavit Deus hominem pulverem de terra: sicut graeci codices habent, unde in latinam linguam Scriptura ista conversa est. Sive autem formavit, sive finxit, quis dicere voluerit, quod graece dicitur ἔπλασεν, ad rem nihil interest: magis tamen proprie dicitur, finxit. Sed ambiguitas visa est devitanda eis, qui formavit dicere maluerunt, eo quod in latina lingua illud magis obtinuit consuetudo, ut hi dicantur fingere, qui aliquid mendacio simulante componunt. Hunc igitur formatum hominem de terrae pulvere, sive limo (erat enim pulvis humectus); hunc, inquam, ut expressius dicam, sicut Scriptura locuta est, pulverem de terra, animale corpus factum esse docet Apostolus cum animam accepit. Et factus est iste homo in animam viventem: id est, formatus iste pulvis factus est in animam viventem.

2. Jam, inquiunt, habebat animam, alioquin non appellaretur homo: quoniam homo non est corpus solum, vel anima sola, sed qui ex anima constat et corpore. Hoc quidem verum est, quod non totus homo, sed pars melior hominis anima est; nec totus homo corpus, sed inferior hominis pars est: sed cum est utrumque conjunctum simul, habet hominis nomen; quod tamen et singula non amittunt, etiam cum de singulis loquimur. Quis enim dicere prohibetur quotidiani quadam lege sermonis, Homo ille defunctus est, et nunc in requie est vel in poenis; cum de anima sola possit hoc dici: et, Illo aut illo loco homo ille sepultus est; cum hoc nisi de solo corpore non possit intelligi? An dicturi sunt, sic loqui Scripturam non solere divinam? Imo vero illa ita nobis in hoc attestatur, ut etiam cum duo ista conjuncta sunt et vivit homo, tamen etiam singula hominis vocabulo appellet; animam scilicet interiorem hominem, corpus vero exteriorem hominem vocans (II Cor. IV, 16), tanquam duo sint homines, cum simul utrumque sit homo unus. Sed intelligendum est, secundum quid dicatur homo ad imaginem Dei, et homo terra atque iturus in terram. Illud enim secundum animam rationalem dicitur, qualem Deus insufflando, vel, si commodius dicitur, inspirando indidit homini, id est hominis corpori: hoc autem secundum corpus, qualem hominem Deus finxit ex pulvere, cui data est anima, ut fieret corpus animale, id est homo in animam viventem.

Which if indeed it had been said, we would understand this, that the life of souls is the Spirit of God, without whom rational souls are to be accounted dead, although bodies seem to live by their presence. But it was not so done when man was created, as the words of the book themselves testify, which are as follows: "And God formed man dust from the earth." Which some, thinking it was to be interpreted more clearly, said, "And God fashioned man from the slime of the earth." Since it had been said above, "But a fountain ascended from the earth, and watered the whole face of the earth" (Gen. 2:7, 6): so that from this the slime might seem to be understood, namely, concreted from moisture and earth. For where this was said, it immediately follows, "And God formed man dust from the earth": as the Greek codices have, from which this Scripture was translated into the Latin language. But whether He "formed" or "fashioned," whichever one would wish to say, what in Greek is said as "eplasen," it makes no difference to the matter: yet more properly it is said, "He fashioned." But the ambiguity seemed to be avoided by those who preferred to say "formed," for the reason that in the Latin language that custom obtained more, that those are said to fashion ("fingere") who compose something with a simulating lie. This man therefore formed from the dust or slime of the earth (for it was moist dust); this man, I say, that I may speak more expressly, as the Scripture has spoken, "dust from the earth," the Apostle teaches to have been made an animal body when he received a soul. And this man was made into a living soul: that is, this formed dust was made into a living soul.

2. Already, they say, he had a soul, otherwise he would not be called a man: since a man is not the body alone, nor the soul alone, but he who consists of soul and body. This indeed is true, that the soul is not the whole man, but the better part of man; nor the whole man the body, but the inferior part of man: but when both are joined together, he has the name of man; which, however, the individual parts do not lose, even when we speak of them individually. For who is prohibited by a certain law of daily speech from saying: That man died, and is now at rest or in punishments; when this can be said of the soul alone: and, In that or that place that man was buried; when this cannot be understood except of the body alone? Or are they going to say that divine Scripture is not accustomed to speak thus? On the contrary, it so attests to us in this matter, that even when these two are joined together and the man lives, yet it calls even the individual parts by the name of man; namely, calling the soul the interior man, but the body the exterior man (2 Cor. 4:16), as if there were two men, though both together be one man. But it is to be understood according to what man is said to be in the image of God, and man earth and about to go into earth. For the former is said according to the rational soul, such as God gave to man, that is to the body of man, by blowing in, or, if it is more commodiously said, by breathing in: but the latter according to the body, such as man God fashioned from dust, to whom the soul was given, that it might become an animal body, that is, man into a living soul.

3. Quapropter in eo quod Dominus fecit, quando insufflavit dicens, Accipite Spiritum sanctum, nimirum hoc intelligi voluit, quod Spiritus sanctus non tantum sit Patris, verum etiam Unigeniti ipsius Spiritus. Idem ipse quippe Spiritus est et Patris et Filii, cum quo est Trinitas Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, non creatura, sed Creator. Neque enim flatus ille corporeus de carnis ore procedens substantia erat Spiritus sancti atque natura, sed potius significatio, qua intelligeremus, ut dixi, Spiritum sanctum Patri esse Filioque communem: quia non sunt eis singulis singuli, sed unus amborum est. Semper autem iste Spiritus in Scripturis sanctis graeco vocabulo πνεῦμα dicitur, sicut eum et hoc loco Dominus appellavit, quando eum corporalis sui oris flatu significans, discipulis suis dedit: et locis omnibus divinorum eloquiorum non mihi aliter unquam nuncupatus occurrit. Hic vero, ubi legitur, Et finxit Deus hominem pulverem de terra, et insufflavit, sive inspiravit in faciem ejus spiritum vitae; non ait graecus πνεῦμα, quod solet dici Spiritus sanctus, sed πνοήν: quod nomen in creatura quam in Creatore frequentius legitur: unde nonnulli etiam Latini, propter differentiam, hoc vocabulum non spiritum, sed flatum appellare maluerunt. Hoc enim est in graeco etiam illo loco apud Isaiam, ubi Deus dicit, Omnem flatum ego feci (Isai. LVII, 16, sec. LXX), omnem animam sine dubitatione significans. Quod itaque graece πνοή dicitur, nostri aliquando flatum, aliquando spiritum, aliquando inspirationem, vel adspirationem, quando etiam Dei dicitur, interpretati sunt: πνεῦμα, vero nunquam nisi spiritum; sive hominis, de quo ait Apostolus, Quis enim scit hominum quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est (I Cor. II, 11)? sive pecoris, sicut in Salomonis libro scriptum est, Quis scit si spiritus hominis ascendat sursum in coelum, et spiritus pecoris descendat deorsum in terram (Eccle. III, 21)? sive istum corporeum, qui etiam ventus dicitur: nam ejus hoc nomen est, ubi in Psalmo canitur, Ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis (Psal. CXLVIII, 8): sive jam non creatum, sed Creatorem, sicut est de quo dicit Dominus in Evangelio, Accipite Spiritum sanctum; eum corporei sui oris significans flatu. Et ubi ait, Ite, baptizate omnes gentes in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti (Matth. XXVIII, 19): ubi ipsa Trinitas excellentissime et evidentissime commendata est. Et ubi legitur, Deus spiritus est (Joan. IV, 24). Et aliis plurimis sacrarum Litterarum locis.

3. Wherefore, in that which the Lord did, when He breathed, saying, "Receive the Holy Spirit," He undoubtedly wished it to be understood that the Holy Spirit is not only the Spirit of the Father, but also of His only-begotten Son. For the same Spirit is of both the Father and the Son, with whom the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the Trinity, not a creature, but the Creator. Nor was that corporeal breath proceeding from the mouth of the flesh the substance and nature of the Holy Spirit, but rather a signification by which we might understand, as I said, that the Holy Spirit is common to the Father and the Son: because they do not have separate ones for each, but one belongs to both. But this Spirit is always called in the Holy Scriptures by the Greek word "pneuma," as the Lord also called Him in this place when, signifying Him by the breath of His corporeal mouth, He gave Him to His disciples: and in all places of the divine utterances, it never occurs to me to be named otherwise. But here, where it is read: "And God fashioned man dust from the earth, and blew," or "breathed into his face the spirit of life"; the Greek does not say "pneuma," which is accustomed to be called the Holy Spirit, but "pnoe": which name is read more frequently in the creature than in the Creator: hence some Latins also, for the sake of difference, preferred to call this word not "spiritus," but "flatus" (breath). For this is in the Greek also in that place in Isaiah, where God says, "I have made every breath" (Isa. 57:16, according to the LXX), signifying every soul without doubt. What therefore is called "pnoe" in Greek, our translators have sometimes interpreted as "flatus," sometimes "spiritus," sometimes "inspiratio," or "adspirationem," even when it is said of God: "pneuma," however, never except as "spiritus"; whether of man, of whom the Apostle says, "For who of men knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him?" (1 Cor. 2:11); or of a beast, as it is written in the book of Solomon: "Who knows if the spirit of man ascends upward into heaven, and the spirit of the beast descends downward into the earth?" (Eccl. 3:21); or this corporeal spirit, which is also called wind: for this is its name where it is sung in the Psalm, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of the tempest" (Psalm 148:8): or now not the created, but the Creator, as is that of which the Lord says in the Gospel, "Receive the Holy Spirit"; signifying Him by the breath of His corporeal mouth. And where He says, "Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 28:19): where the Trinity itself is most excellently and evidently commended. And where it is read, "God is a spirit" (John 4:24). And in very many other places of the sacred Scriptures.

In his quippe omnibus testimoniis Scripturarum, quantum ad Graecos attinet, non πνοήν videamus scriptum esse, sed πνεῦμα: quantum autem ad Latinos, non flatum, sed spiritum. Quapropter in eo quod scriptum est, Inspiravit, vel, si magis proprie dicendum est, Insufflavit in faciem ejus spiritum vitae; si graecus non πνοήν, sicut ibi legitur, sed πνεῦμα posuisset, nec sic esset consequens, ut Creatorem Spiritum, qui proprie dicitur in Trinitate Spiritus sanctus, intelligere cogeremur: quandoquidem πνεῦμα, ut dictum est, non solum de Creatore, sed etiam de creatura dici solere manifestum est.

4. Sed cum dixisset, inquiunt, spiritum, non adderet vitae, nisi illic Spiritum sanctum vellet intelligi: et cum dixisset, Factus est homo in animam, non adderet, viventem, nisi animae vitam significaret, quae illi divinitus impertitur dono Spiritus Dei. Cum enim vivat anima, inquiunt, proprio suae vitae modo, quid opus erat addere viventem, nisi ut ea vita intelligeretur, quae illi per Spiritum sanctum datur? Hoc quid est aliud, nisi diligenter pro humana suspicione contendere, et Scripturas sanctas negligenter attendere? Quid enim magnum erat non ire longius, sed in eodem libro ipso paulo superius legere, Producat terra animam viventem (Gen. I, 24); quando animalia terrestria cuncta creata sunt? Deinde aliquantis interpositis, in eodem tamen ipso libro, quid magnum erat advertere quod scriptum est, Et omnia quae habent spiritum vitae, et omnis qui erat super aridam, mortuus est (Id. VII, 22); cum insinuaret omnia quae vivebant in terra periisse diluvio? Si ergo et animam viventem, et spiritum vitae etiam in pecoribus invenimus, sicut loqui divina Scriptura consuevit; et cum hoc quoque loco, ubi legitur, Omnia quae habent spiritum vitae, non graecus πνεῦμα, sed πνοήν dixerit: cur non dicimus, Quid opus erat ut adderet, viventem, cum anima nisi vivat esse non possit? aut, Quid opus erat ut adderet, vitae, cum dixisset spiritum? Sed intelligemus spiritum vitae, et animam viventem Scripturam suo more dixisse, cum animalia, id est corpora animata, vellet intelligi, quibus inesset per animam perspicuus iste etiam corporis sensus. In hominis autem conditione obliviscimur, quemadmodum loqui Scriptura consueverit, cum suo prorsus more locuta sit: quo insinuaret hominem etiam rationali anima accepta, quam non sicut aliarum carnium aquis et terra producentibus, sed Deo flante creatam voluit intelligi; sic tamen factum, ut in corpore animali, quod fit anima in eo vivente, sicut illa animalia viveret, de quibus dixit, Producat terra animam viventem: et quae itidem dicit habuisse in se spiritum vitae; ubi etiam in graeco non dixit πνεῦμα, sed πνοήν: non utique Spiritum sanctum, sed eorum animam tali exprimens nomine.

For in all these testimonies of the Scriptures, as far as the Greeks are concerned, we do not see "pnoe" written, but "pneuma": and as far as the Latins are concerned, not "flatus," but "spiritus." Wherefore, in that which is written, "He breathed," or if it is to be said more properly, "He blew into his face the spirit of life"; if the Greek had placed not "pnoe," as is read there, but "pneuma," it would not even so be a consequence that we should be compelled to understand the Creator Spirit, who is properly called the Holy Spirit in the Trinity: since it is manifest that "pneuma," as has been said, is accustomed to be said not only of the Creator, but also of the creature.

4. But when it had said "spirit," they say, it would not add "of life," unless it wished the Holy Spirit to be understood there: and when it had said, "Man was made into a soul," it would not add "living," unless it signified the life of the soul which is divinely imparted to it by the gift of the Spirit of God. For since the soul lives, they say, in its own mode of its life, what need was there to add "living," unless so that that life might be understood which is given to it through the Holy Spirit? What else is this, but to contend diligently for human suspicion, and to attend negligently to the Holy Scriptures? For what great thing was it not to go further, but to read in the same book a little above, "Let the earth bring forth a living soul" (Gen. 1:24); when all terrestrial animals were created? Then with some things interposed, in the same book nevertheless, what great thing was it to notice what is written, "And all things which have the spirit of life, and everyone who was upon the dry land, died" (Gen. 7:22); when it insinuated that all things which lived on the earth perished in the flood? If therefore we find both a "living soul" and a "spirit of life" even in beasts, as divine Scripture is accustomed to speak; and since in this place also, where it is read, "All things which have the spirit of life," the Greek said not "pneuma," but "pnoe": why do we not say, What need was there that it should add "living," since a soul cannot be unless it lives? or, What need was there that it should add "of life," when it had said "spirit"? But we understand that Scripture spoke "spirit of life" and "living soul" in its own manner, when it wished animals, that is animated bodies, to be understood, in which this clear sense of the body also would be present through the soul. But in the condition of man we forget how Scripture is accustomed to speak, when it has spoken altogether in its own manner: by which it would insinuate that man also, having received a rational soul, which it wished to be understood as created not like other flesh by the waters and the earth bringing it forth, but by God blowing; yet it was so done that he lived in an animal body, which is made by the soul living in it, just as those animals lived, concerning which it said, "Let the earth bring forth a living soul": and which likewise it says had in themselves the "spirit of life"; where even in the Greek it did not say "pneuma," but "pnoe": certainly not expressing the Holy Spirit, but their soul by such a name.

5. Sed enim Dei flatus, inquiunt, Dei ore exisse intelligitur, quem si animam crediderimus, consequens erit ut ejusdem fateamur esse substantiae, paremque illius Sapientiae, quae dicit, Ego ex ore Altissimi providi (Eccli. XXIV, 5). Non quidem dixit Sapientia ore Dei efflatam se fuisse, sed ex ejus ore prodisse. Sicut autem nos possumus, non de nostra natura qua homines sumus, sed de isto aere circumfuso, quem spirando ac respirando ducimus ac reducimus, flatum facere cum sufflamus: ita omnipotens Deus, non de sua natura, neque de subjacenti creatura, sed etiam de nihilo potuit facere flatum, quem corpori hominis inserendo inspirasse vel insufflasse convenientissime dictus est, incorporeus incorporeum, sed immutabilis mutabilem; quia non creatus creatum. Verumtamen ut sciant isti, qui de Scripturis loqui volunt, et Scripturarum locutiones non advertunt, non hoc solum dici exire ex ore Dei, quod est aequalis ejusdemque naturae, audiant, vel legant quod Deo dicente scriptum est: Quoniam tepidus es, et neque calidus neque frigidus, incipiam te evomere ex ore meo (Apoc. III, 16).

6. Nulla itaque causa est, cur apertissime loquenti resistamus Apostolo, ubi ab spirituali corpore corpus animale discernens, id est, ab illo in quo futuri sumus, hoc in quo nunc sumus, ait: Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale: si est corpus animale, est et spirituale, sicut scriptum est, Factus est primus homo Adam in animam viventem, novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Sed non primum quod spirituale est, sed quod animale; postea, quod spirituale. Primus homo de terra, terrenus; secundus homo de coelo, coelestis. Qualis terrenus, tales et terreni: qualis coelestis, tales et coelestes. Et quomodo induimus imaginem terreni, induamus et imaginem ejus qui de coelo est (I Cor. XV, 44-49). De quibus omnibus apostolicis verbis superius locuti sumus. Corpus igitur animale, in quo primum hominem Adam factum esse dicit Apostolus, sic erat factum, non ut mori omnino non posset; sed ut non moreretur, nisi homo peccasset. Nam illud quod spiritu vivificante spirituale erit et immortale, mori omnino non poterit. Sicut anima creata est immortalis, quae licet peccato mortua perhibeatur carens quadam vita sua, hoc est Dei Spiritu, quo etiam sapienter et beate vivere poterat: tamen propria quadam, licet misera, vita sua non desinit vivere; quia immortalis est creata.

5. But indeed the breath of God, they say, is understood to have come out from the mouth of God, which if we believe to be the soul, it will be a consequence that we confess it to be of the same substance, and equal to that Wisdom which says, "I came out of the mouth of the Most High" (Eccli. 24:5). Wisdom indeed did not say that she had been breathed out by the mouth of God, but that she had proceeded from His mouth. But just as we can make a breath when we blow, not from our nature by which we are men, but from this surrounding air, which we draw in and draw back by breathing and respiring: so almighty God, not from His own nature, nor from an underlying creature, but even out of nothing was able to make a breath, which by inserting into the body of man He is most conveniently said to have breathed or blown in, the incorporeal into the incorporeal, but the immutable into the mutable; because the uncreated created it. Nevertheless, that those who wish to speak about the Scriptures and do not notice the locutions of the Scriptures may know, not this alone is said to come out from the mouth of God which is equal and of the same nature, let them hear or read what was written when God said: "Because you are lukewarm, and neither hot nor cold, I will begin to vomit you out of my mouth" (Rev. 3:16).

6. There is therefore no cause why we should resist the Apostle speaking most openly, where discerning the animal body from the spiritual body, that is, this one in which we now are from that one in which we are to be, he says: "It is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body: if there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual one, as it is written, The first man Adam was made into a living soul, the last Adam into a vivifying spirit. But not first what is spiritual, but what is animal; afterwards, what is spiritual. The first man from the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly. Such as the earthy is, such also are the earthy: such as the heavenly is, such also are the heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, let us also bear the image of Him who is from heaven (1 Cor. 15:44-49). Concerning all these apostolic words we have spoken above. Therefore the animal body, in which the Apostle says the first man Adam was made, was so made, not that he could not die at all; but that he would not die, unless man had sinned. For that which by the vivifying spirit will be spiritual and immortal, will not be able to die at all. Just as the soul was created immortal, which although it may be said to be dead through sin while lacking a certain life of its own, that is, the Spirit of God, by which it could also live wisely and blessedly: nevertheless it does not cease to live with a certain, although miserable, life of its own; because it was created immortal.

Sicut etiam desertores angeli, licet secundum quemdam modum mortui sint peccando; quia fontem vitae deseruerunt, qui Deus est, quem potando, sapienter beateque poterant vivere: tamen non sic mori potuerunt, ut omnnio desisterent vivere atque sentire; quoniam immortales creati sunt: atque ita in secundam mortem post ultimum praecipitabuntur judicium, ut nec illic vita careant; quandoquidem etiam sensu, cum in doloribus futuri sunt, non carebunt. Sed homines ad Dei gratiam pertinentes cives sanctorum Angelorum in beata vita manentium, ita spiritualibus corporibus induentur, ut neque peccent amplius, neque moriantur: ea tamen immortalitate vestiti, quae, sicut Angelorum, nec peccato possit auferri; natura quidem manente carnis, sed nulla omnino carnali corruptibilitate vel tarditate remanente.

7. Sequitur autem quaestio necessario pertractanda, et Domino Deo veritatis adjuvante solvenda. Si libido membrorum inobedientium ex peccato inobedientiae in illis primis hominibus, cum illos divina gratia deseruisset, exorta est; unde in suam nuditatem oculos aperuerunt, id est, eam curiosius adverterunt, et quia impudens motus voluntatis arbitrio resistebat, pudenda texerunt: quomodo essent filios propagaturi, si, ut creati fuerant, sine praevaricatione mansissent. Sed quia et liber iste claudendus est, nec tanta quaestio in sermonis angustias coarctanda, in eum qui sequitur, commodiore dispositione differatur.

Just as also the deserting angels, although they are dead in a certain manner by sinning; because they deserted the fountain of life, which is God, by drinking of whom they could live wisely and blessedly: nevertheless they could not die in such a way that they should altogether cease to live and feel; since they were created immortal: and thus they will be cast into the second death after the final judgment, so that they will not lack life even there; since they will not lack sense even when they are to be in pains. But men belonging to the grace of God, citizens of the holy Angels remaining in the blessed life, will be so clothed with spiritual bodies that they will neither sin anymore, nor die: clothed nevertheless with that immortality which, like that of the Angels, cannot be taken away even by sin; the nature of the flesh indeed remaining, but no fleshly corruptibility or slowness remaining at all.

7. But there follows a question necessarily to be treated, and to be solved with the Lord God of truth helping. If the lust of the disobedient members arose from the sin of disobedience in those first humans, when divine grace had deserted them; whence they opened their eyes to their own nakedness, that is, they noticed it more curiously, and because the impudent motion resisted the choice of the will, they covered their shameful parts: how would they have been about to propagate children, if, as they had been created, they had remained without transgression? But because both this book is to be closed, nor is so great a question to be constrained into the narrows of a discourse, let it be deferred to that which follows, by a more commodious disposition.

LIBER QUARTUS DECIMUS.

Rursum de primi hominis peccato, ex quo vitae carnalis et vitiosorum affectuum causam profluxisse docet Augustinus: sed praesertim libidinis erubescendae malum poenam inobedientiae reciprocam esse ostendit, et quomodo, si non peccasset homo, filios fuisset absque libidine propagaturus, inquirit.

Caput Primum.

Per inobedientiam primi hominis in secundae mortis perpetuitatem ruituros omnes fuisse, nisi multos Dei gratia liberaret.

Diximus jam in superioribus libris ad humanum genus, non solum naturae similitudine sociandum, verum etiam quadam cognationis necessitudine in unitatem concordem pacis vinculo colligandum, ex homine uno Deum voluisse homines instituere: neque hoc genus fuisse in singulis quibusque moriturum, nisi duo primi, quorum creatus est unus ex nullo, altera ex illo, id inobedientia meruissent: a quibus admissum est tam grande peccatum, ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteros obligatione peccati et mortis necessitate transmissa. Mortis autem regnum in homines usque adeo dominatum est, ut omnes in secundam quoque mortem, cujus nullus est finis, poena debita praecipites ageret, nisi inde quosdam indebita Dei gratia liberaret. Ac per hoc factum est, ut cum tot tantaeque gentes per terrarum orbem diversis ritibus moribusque viventes, multiplici linguarum, armorum, vestium sint varietate distinctae; non tamen amplius quam duo quaedam genera humanae societatis existerent, quas civitates duas secundum Scripturas nostras merito appellare possimus. Una quippe est hominum secundum carnem, altera secundum spiritum vivere in sui cujusque generis pace volentium; et cum id quod expetunt assequuntur, in sui cujusque generis pace viventium.

Caput II.

De vita carnali, quae non ex corporis tantum, sed etiam ex animi sit intelligenda vitiis.

BOOK FOURTEENTH.

Again concerning the sin of the first man, from which Augustine teaches the cause of fleshly life and of vitiated affections to have flowed: but especially he shows the evil of shameful lust to be the reciprocal punishment of disobedience, and he inquires how, if man had not sinned, he would have been about to propagate children without lust.

Chapter I.

That all would have rushed into the perpetuity of the second death through the disobedience of the first man, unless the grace of God should deliver many.

We have already said in the preceding books that God willed to institute men from one man, not only to be associated by similarity of nature, but also to be bound together in a concordant unity by the bond of peace through a certain necessity of kinship; nor would this race have been about to die in each individual, unless the first two, of whom one was created from no one, the other from him, had deserved it by disobedience: by whom so great a sin was committed, that human nature was changed for the worse by it, with the obligation of sin and the necessity of death being transmitted even to posterity. Moreover, the kingdom of death has dominated over men to such an extent, that it would drive all headlong into the second death also, of which there is no end, as a due punishment, unless the undue grace of God should deliver some from there. And through this it has come to pass, that although so many and so great nations living through the orb of the lands by diverse rites and customs, are distinguished by a manifold variety of languages, arms, and garments; nevertheless no more than two certain kinds of human society should exist, which we might deservedly call two cities according to our Scriptures. For one is of men willing to live according to the flesh, the other according to the spirit, in the peace of each one's own kind; and when they attain that which they seek, living in the peace of each one's own kind.

Chapter II.

Concerning the fleshly life, which is to be understood as arising not only from the vices of the body, but also from those of the soul.

1. Prius ergo videndum est, quid sit secundum carnem, quid secundum spiritum vivere. Quisquis enim hoc quod diximus prima fronte inspicit, vel non recolens, vel minus advertens quemadmodum Scripturae sanctae loquantur, potest putare philosophos quidem Epicureos secundum carnem vivere, quia summum bonum hominis in corporis voluptate posuerunt; et si qui alii sunt, qui quoquo modo corporis bonum, summum bonum esse hominis opinati sunt; et omne eorum vulgus, qui non aliquo dogmate, vel eo modo philosophamur, sed proclives ad libidinem, nisi ex voluptatibus, quas corporeis sensibus capiunt, gaudere nesciunt: Stoicos autem, qui summum bonum hominis in animo ponunt, secundum spiritum vivere; quia et hominis animus quid est, nisi spiritus? Sed sicut loquitur Scriptura divina, secundum carnem vivere utrique monstrantur. Carnem quippe appellat, non solum corpus terreni atque mortalis animantis: veluti cum dicit, Non omnis caro eadem caro; sed alia quidem hominis, alia autem caro pecoris, alia volucrum, alia piscium (I Cor. XV, 39): sed aliis multis modis significatione hujus nominis utitur, inter quos varios locutionis modos saepe etiam ipsum hominem, id est naturam hominis, carnem nuncupat, modo locutionis a parte totum, quale est, Ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis caro (Rom. III, 20). Quid enim voluit intelligi, nisi omnis homo? Quod apertius paulo post ait, In lege nemo justificatur (Galat. III, 11): et ad Galatas, Scientes quia non justificabitur homo ex operibus legis (Id. II, 16), Secundum hoc intelligitur, Et Verbum caro factum est (Joan. I, 14): id est, homo. Quod non recte accipientes quidam, putaverunt Christo humanam animam defuisse. Sicut enim a toto pars accipitur, ubi Mariae Magdalenae verba in Evangelio leguntur dicentis, Abstulerunt Dominum meum, et nescio ubi posuerunt eum (Id. XX, 13); cum de sola Christi carne loqueretur, quam sepultam de monumento putabat ablatam: ita et a parte totum, carne nominata intelligitur homo; sicuti ea sunt quae supra commemoravimus.

2. Cum igitur multis modis, quos perscrutari et colligere longum est, divina Scriptura nuncupet carnem: quid sit secundum carnem vivere (quod profecto malum est, cum ipsa carnis natura non sit malum) ut indagare possimus, inspiciamus diligenter illum locum Epistolae Pauli apostoli, quam scripsit ad Galatas, ubi ait, Manifesta autem sunt opera carnis, quae sunt adulteria, fornicationes, immunditiae, luxuriae, idolorum servitus, veneficia, inimicitiae, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, dissensiones, haereses, invidiae, ebrietates, comessationes, et his similia;

1. First, therefore, it is to be seen what it is to live according to the flesh, and what to live according to the spirit. For whoever inspects at first glance what we have said, either not recollecting or less noticing how the holy Scriptures speak, may think that the Epicurean philosophers indeed live according to the flesh, because they placed the supreme good of man in the pleasure of the body; and if there are any others who have thought that the good of the body, in whatever way, is the supreme good of man; and all that common crowd of theirs, who do not philosophize by some dogma or in that manner, but prone to lust, do not know how to rejoice except from pleasures which they receive through the bodily senses: but that the Stoics, who place the supreme good of man in the soul, live according to the spirit; because what else is the soul of man but spirit? But as the divine Scripture speaks, both are shown to live according to the flesh. For it calls flesh not only the body of an earthy and mortal living being: as when it says, "Not all flesh is the same flesh; but there is one flesh of man, another flesh of beast, another of birds, another of fishes" (1 Cor. 15:39): but it uses the significance of this name in many other ways, among which various modes of speech it often names even man himself, that is, the nature of man, as flesh, by a mode of speech from the part for the whole, such as is, "From the works of the law shall no flesh be justified" (Rom. 3:20). For what did it wish to be understood, but every man? Which a little after it says more openly, "In the law no one is justified" (Gal. 3:11): and to the Galatians, "Knowing that a man shall not be justified from the works of the law" (Id. 2:16). According to this is understood, "And the Word was made flesh" (John 1:14): that is, man. Not rightly receiving which, some have thought that the human soul was lacking to Christ. For as a part is taken from the whole, where the words of Mary Magdalene are read in the Gospel saying, "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him" (Id. 20:13); although she spoke only of the flesh of Christ, which she thought had been taken away from the monument where it was buried: so also from the part the whole, by naming the flesh, man is understood; as are those things which we have commemorated above.

2. Since, therefore, the divine Scripture names flesh in many ways, which it is long to investigate and collect: in order that we may be able to track down what it is to live according to the flesh (which is surely an evil, although the nature of the flesh itself is not an evil), let us diligently inspect that passage of the Epistle of the Apostle Paul which he wrote to the Galatians, where he says: "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are adulteries, fornications, uncleanness, luxury, service of idols, poisonings, enmities, contentions, emulations, animosities, dissensions, heresies, envies, drunkenness, revelings, and things like these;

quae praedico vobis, sicut et praedixi, quoniam qui talia agunt, regnum Dei non possidebunt (Galat. V, 19-21). Iste totus Epistolae apostolicae locus, quantum ad rem praesentem satis esse videbitur, consideratus, poterit hanc dissolvere quaestionem, quid sit secundum carnem vivere. In operibus namque carnis, quae manifesta esse dixit, eaque commemorata damnavit, non illa tantum invenimus, quae ad voluptatem pertinent carnis, sicuti sunt fornicationes, immunditiae, luxuriae, ebrietates, comessationes; verum etiam illa quibus animi vitia demonstrantur a voluptate carnis aliena. Quis enim servitutem quae idolis exhibetur, veneficia, inimicitias, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, dissensiones, haereses, invidias, non potius intelligat animi vitia esse quam carnis? Quandoquidem fieri potest, ut propter idololatriam vel haeresis alicujus errorem a voluptatibus carnis temperetur: et tamen etiam tunc homo, quamvis carnis libidines continere atque cohibere videatur, secundum carnem vivere hac apostolica auctoritate convincitur; et in eo quod abstinet a voluptatibus carnis, damnabilia opera carnis agere demonstratur. Quis inimicitias non in animo habeat? aut quis ita loquatur, ut inimico suo, vel quem putat inimicum, dicat, Malam carnem, ac non potius, Malum animum habes adversum me? Postremo sicut carnalitates, ut ita dicam, si quis audisset, non dubitasset carni tribuere; ita nemo dubitat animositates ad animum pertinere: cur ergo haec omnia et his similia Doctor Gentium in fide et veritate opera carnis appellat, nisi quia eo locutionis modo, quo totum significatur a parte, ipsum hominem vult nomine carnis intelligi?

Caput III.

Peccati causam ex anima, non ex carne prodiisse, et corruptionem ex peccato contractam, non peccatum esse, sed poenam.

1. Quod si quisquam dicit, carnem causam esse in malis moribus quorumcumque vitiorum, eo quod anima carne affecta sic vivit; profecto non universam hominis naturam diligenter advertit. Nam corpus quidem corruptibile aggravat animam (Sap. IX, 15). Unde etiam idem apostolus agens de hoc corruptibili corpore, de quo paulo ante dixerat, Etsi exterior homo noster corrumpitur (II Cor. IV, 16): Scimus, inquit, quia si terrena nostra domus habitationis dissolvatur, aedificationem habemus ex Deo, domum non manufactam aeternam in coelis.

which I foretell to you, as I have also foretold, because those who do such things shall not possess the kingdom of God" (Gal. 5:19-21). This whole passage of the apostolic Epistle, considered as much as will seem to be sufficient for the present matter, will be able to dissolve this question, what it is to live according to the flesh. For in the works of the flesh, which he said were manifest, and which having been commemorated he condemned, we find not only those which belong to the pleasure of the flesh, such as are fornications, uncleanness, luxury, drunkenness, revelings; but even those by which vices of the soul are shown, alien to the pleasure of the flesh. For who would not rather understand the service which is exhibited to idols, poisonings, enmities, contentions, emulations, animosities, dissensions, heresies, envies, to be vices of the soul than of the flesh? Since it can happen that on account of idolatry or the error of some heresy one may temper himself from the pleasures of the flesh: and yet even then man, although he may seem to contain and restrain the lusts of the flesh, is convicted of living according to the flesh by this apostolic authority; and in that which he abstains from the pleasures of the flesh, he is shown to do damnable works of the flesh. Who would not have enmities in the soul? or who would speak so as to say to his enemy, or to one whom he thinks an enemy: "You have a bad flesh," and not rather: "You have a bad soul against me"? Finally, as if anyone had heard "carnalities," if I may say so, he would not have doubted to attribute them to the flesh; so no one doubts that animosities belong to the soul: why therefore does the Teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth call all these and things like these works of the flesh, unless because by that mode of speech by which the whole is signified from the part, he wishes man himself to be understood by the name of flesh?

Chapter III.

That the cause of sin proceeded from the soul, not from the flesh, and that the corruption contracted from sin is not sin, but punishment.

1. But if anyone says that the flesh is the cause of any vices whatever in bad customs, for the reason that the soul affected by the flesh lives thus; surely he does not diligently notice the universal nature of man. For indeed "the corruptible body aggravates the soul" (Wisd. 9:15). Whence also the same Apostle, treating of this corruptible body, of which he had said a little before, "Even if our exterior man is corrupted" (2 Cor. 4:16): "We know," he says, "that if our earthly house of habitation be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.

Etenim in hoc ingemiscimus, habitaculum nostrum quod de coelo est superindui cupientes: si tamen et induti, non nudi inveniamur. Etenim qui sumus in hac habitatione, ingemiscimus gravati: eo quod nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a vita (II Cor. V, 1-4). Et aggravamur ergo corruptibili corpore, et ipsius aggravationis causam, non naturam substantiamque corporis, sed ejus corruptionem scientes, nolumus corpore exspoliari, sed ejus immortalitate vestiri. Et tunc enim erit, sed quia corruptibile non erit, non gravabit. Aggravat ergo nunc animam corpus corruptibile, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem (Sap. IX, 15). Verumtamen qui omnia animae mala ex corpore putant accidisse, in errore sunt.

2. Quamvis enim Virgilius Platonicam videatur luculentis versibus explicare sententiam, dicens, Igneus est ollis vigor et coelestis origo Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant, Terrenique hebetant artus moribundaque membra; omnesque illas notissimas quatuor animi perturbationes, cupiditatem, timorem, laetitiam, tristitiam, quasi origines omnium peccatorum atque vitiorum volens intelligi ex corpore accidere, subjungat et dicat, Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, nec auras Suspiciunt, clausae tenebris et carcere coeco: (Aeneid. lib. 6, vers. 730-734.) tamen aliter se habet fides nostra. Nam corruptio corporis, quae aggravat animam, non peccati primi est causa, sed poena; nec caro corruptibilis animam peccatricem, sed anima peccatrix fecit esse corruptibilem carnem. Ex qua corruptione carnis licet existant quaedam incitamenta vitiorum, et ipsa desideria vitiosa: non tamen omnia vitae iniquae vitia tribuenda sunt carni, ne ab his omnibus purgemus diabolum, qui non habet carnem. Etsi enim diabolus fornicator vel ebriosus, vel si quid hujusmodi mali est quod ad carnis pertinet voluptates, non potest dici, cum sit etiam talium peccatorum suasor et instigator occultus: est tamen maxime superbus atque invidus. Quae illum vitiositas sic obtinuit, ut propter hanc esset in carceribus caliginosi hujus aeris aeterno supplicio destinatus. Haec autem vitia quae tenent in diabolo principatum, carni tribuit Apostolus, quam certum est diabolum non habere. Dicit enim, inimicitias, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, invidias, opera esse carnis (Galat. V, 20-21): quorum omnium malorum head atque origo superbia est, quae sine carne regnat in diabolo. Quis autem illo est inimicior sanctis? quis adversus eos contentiosior, animosior et magis aemulus atque invidus invenitur? Et haec omnia cum habeat sine carne, quomodo sunt ista opera carnis, nisi quia opera sunt hominis, quem, sicut dixi, nomine carnis appellat?

For in this we groan, desiring to be clothed over with our habitation which is from heaven: if yet also being clothed, we be not found naked. For we who are in this habitation groan, being burdened: for that we would not be despoiled, but clothed over, that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life" (2 Cor. 5:1-4). And we are burdened, therefore, by the corruptible body, and knowing the cause of that very burdening not to be the nature and substance of the body, but its corruption, we do not wish to be despoiled of the body, but to be clothed with its immortality. For then also it will be [the body], but because it will not be corruptible, it will not burden. "The corruptible body," therefore, now "aggravates the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the sense thinking many things" (Wisd. 9:15). Nevertheless, those who think that all the evils of the soul have happened from the body are in error.

2. For although Virgil seems to explain the Platonic opinion in brilliant verses, saying: "Fiery is the vigor in them and a heavenly origin to the seeds, so far as noxious bodies do not retard them, and earthy joints and moribund members do not dull them"; and wishing all those four most known perturbations of the soul, desire, fear, joy, sadness, to be understood as happening from the body as the origins of all sins and vices, he subjoins and says: "Hence they fear and desire, they grieve and rejoice, nor do they look up to the breezes, closed in darkness and a blind prison": (Aeneid, Book 6, verses 730-734) nevertheless our faith has itself otherwise. For the corruption of the body, which aggravates the soul, is not the cause of the first sin, but the punishment; nor did the corruptible flesh make the sinful soul, but the sinful soul made the flesh to be corruptible. From which corruption of the flesh although certain incitements to vices exist, and the vicious desires themselves: nevertheless not all the vices of an iniquitous life are to be attributed to the flesh, lest we should purge from all these the devil, who has no flesh. For even if the devil cannot be said to be a fornicator or a drunkard, or if there is anything of this kind of evil which belongs to the pleasures of the flesh, since he is also the hidden persuader and instigator of such sins: nevertheless he is especially proud and envious. Which vitiosity so obtained him, that on account of this he was destined for eternal punishment in the prisons of this dark air. Moreover, these vices which hold the primacy in the devil, the Apostle attributes to the flesh, which it is certain the devil does not have. For he says that enmities, contentions, emulations, animosities, envies, are works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20-21): of all which evils the head and origin is pride, which reigns without flesh in the devil. For who is more an enemy to the saints than he? who is found more contentious, more animose, and more emulous and envious against them? And since he has all these without flesh, how are those works of the flesh, unless because they are works of man, whom, as I have said, he calls by the name of flesh?

Non enim habendo carnem, quam non habet diabolus; sed vivendo secundum se ipsum, hoc est secundum hominem, factus est homo similis diabolo: quia et ille secundum se ipsum vivere voluit, quando in veritate non stetit; ut non de Dei, sed de suo, mendacium loqueretur, qui non solum mendax, verum etiam mendacii pater est (Joan. VIII, 44). Primus est quippe mentitus, et a quo peccatum, ab illo coepit esse mendacium.

Caput IV.

Quid sit secundum hominem, quidve secundum Deum vivere.

1. Cum ergo vivit homo secundum hominem, non secundum Deum, similis est diabolo. Quia nec angelo secundum angelum, sed secundum Deum vivendum fuit, ut staret in veritate, et veritatem de illius, non de suo mendacium loqueretur. Nam et de homine alio loco idem apostolus ait, Si autem veritas Dei in meo mendacio abundavit (Rom. III, 7). Meum dixit mendacium, veritatem Dei. Cum itaque vivit homo secundum veritatem, non vivit secundum se ipsum, sed secundum Deum. Deus est enim qui dixit, Ego sum veritas (Joan. XIV, 6). Cum vero vivit secundum se ipsum, hoc est secundum hominem, non secundum Deum, profecto secundum mendacium vivit: non quia homo ipse mendacium est, cum sit ejus auctor et creator Deus, qui non est utique auctor creatorque mendacii; sed quia homo ita factus est rectus, ut non secundum se ipsum, sed secundum eum a quo factus est, viveret; id est, illius potius, quam suam faceret voluntatem: non autem ita vivere, quemadmodum est factus ut viveret, hoc est mendacium. Beatus quippe vult esse, etiam non sic vivendo ut possit esse. Quid est ista voluntate mendacius? Unde non frustra dici potest, omne peccatum esse mendacium. Non enim fit peccatum, nisi ea voluntate, qua volumus ut bene sit nobis, vel nolumus ut male sit nobis. Ergo mendacium est, quod cum fiat ut bene sit nobis, hinc potius male est nobis; vel cum fiat ut melius sit nobis, hinc potius pejus est nobis. Unde hoc, nisi quia de Deo potest bene esse homini, quem delinquendo deserit; non de se ipso, secundum quem vivendo delinquit?

2. Quod itaque diximus, hinc exstitisse civitates duas diverse inter se atque contrarias, quod alii secundum carnem, alii secundum spiritum viverent; potest etiam isto modo dici quod alii secundum hominem, alii secundum Deum vivant. Apertissime quippe Paulus ad Corinthios dicit: Cum enim inter vos sint aemulatio et contentio, nonne carnales estis, et secundum hominem ambulatis (I Cor. III, 3)? Quod ergo est ambulare secundum hominem, hoc est esse carnalem; quod a carne, id est a parte hominis, intelligitur homo.

For not by having flesh, which the devil does not have; but by living according to himself, that is, according to man, man was made similar to the devil: because he also willed to live according to himself, when he stood not in the truth; so that he might speak a lie not from God's, but from his own, who is not only a liar, but even the father of lies (John 8:44). For he is the first who lied, and from whom sin began, from him began to be the lie.

Chapter IV.

What it is to live according to man, and what to live according to God.

1. When, therefore, man lives according to man, not according to God, he is similar to the devil. Because neither was an angel to have lived according to an angel, but according to God, that he might stand in the truth, and speak the truth from His [God's], not a lie from his own. For also concerning man in another place the same Apostle says: "But if the truth of God has abounded in my lie" (Rom. 3:7). He called it "my lie," but "the truth of God." When, therefore, man lives according to the truth, he does not live according to himself, but according to God. For it is God who said: "I am the truth" (John 14:6). But when he lives according to himself, that is, according to man, not according to God, surely he lives according to a lie: not because man himself is a lie, since God is his author and creator, who is certainly not the author and creator of a lie; but because man was so made upright, that he should live not according to himself, but according to Him by whom he was made; that is, that he should do His will rather than his own: but not to live so, as he was made to live, this is a lie. For he wishes to be blessed, even by not living so that he can be so. What is more of a lie than this will? Whence not in vain can it be said, that every sin is a lie. For sin is not committed except by that will by which we wish that it be well with us, or do not wish that it be ill with us. Therefore it is a lie, because when it is done that it may be well with us, hence rather it is ill with us; or when it is done that it may be better with us, hence rather it is worse with us. Whence is this, except because it can be well to man from God, whom he deserts by delinquenting; not from himself, according to whom he delinquents by living?

2. What, therefore, we have said, that hence there existed two diverse cities between themselves and contrary, because some lived according to the flesh, others according to the spirit; it can also be said in this way, that some live according to man, others according to God. For most openly Paul says to the Corinthians: "For since there are emulation and contention among you, are you not carnal, and walk according to man?" (1 Cor. 3:3). Therefore what it is to walk according to man, this it is to be carnal; because by the flesh, that is by a part of man, man is understood.

Eosdem ipsos quippe dixit superius animales, quos postea carnales, ita loquens: Quis enim scit, inquit, hominum quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Sic et quae Dei sunt, nemo scit nisi Spiritus Dei. Nos autem, inquit, non spiritum hujus mundi accepimus, sed Spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis; quae et loquimur, non in sapientiae humanae doctis verbis, sed doctis spiritu, spiritualibus spiritualia comparantes. Animalis autem homo non percipit quae sunt Spiritus Dei: stultitia est enim illi (I Cor. II, 11-14). Talibus igitur, id est animalibus, paulo post dicit, Et ego, fratres, non potui loqui vobis quasi spiritualibus, sed quasi carnalibus (Id. III, 1). Et illud ex hoc eodem loquendi modo intelligitur, id est, a parte totum. Et ab anima namque, et a carne, quae sunt partes hominis potest totum significari, quod est homo; atque ita non est aliud animalis homo, aliud carnalis; sed idem ipsum est utrumque, id est, secundum hominem vivens homo. Sicut non aliud quam homines significantur, sive ubi legitur, Ex operibus legis non justificabitur omnis caro (Rom. III, 20): sive quod scriptum est, Septuaginta quinque animae descenderunt cum Jacob in Egyptum (Gen. XLVI, 27). Et ibi enim per omnem carnem omnis homo, et ibi per septuaginta quinque animas septuaginta quinque homines intelliguntur. Et quod dictum est, Non in sapientiae humanae doctis verbis, potuit dici, Non in sapientiae carnalis: sicut quod dictum est, Secundum hominem ambulatis; potuit dici, Secundum carnem. Magis autem hoc apparuit in his quae subjunxit: Cum enim quis dicat, Ego sum Pauli; alius autem, Ego Apollo: nonne homines estis (I Cor. III, 4)? Quod dicebat, Animales estis, et, Carnales estis; expressius dixit, Homines estis: quod est, Secundum hominem vivitis, non secundum Deum; secundum quem si viveretis, dii essetis.

CAPUT V.---Quod de corporis animaeque natura tolerabilior quidem Platonicorum quam Manichaeorum sit opinio; sed et ipsi reprobantur, quoniam vitiorum causas naturae carnis adscribunt.

Non igitur opus est in peccatis vitiisque nostris ad Creatoris injuriam carnis accusare naturam, quae in genere atque ordine suo bona est: sed deserto Creatore bono, vivere secundum creatum bonum, non est bonum; sive quisque secundum carnem, sive secundum animam, sive secundum totum hominem, qui constat ex anima et carne (unde et nomine solius animae, et nomine solius carnis significari potest), eligat vivere. Nam qui velut summum bonum laudat animae naturam, et tanquam malum naturam carnis accusat, profecto et animam carnaliter appetit, et carnem carnaliter fugit: quoniam id vanitate sentit humana, non veritate divina.

For he called those same ones animal [men] above, whom afterwards he called carnal, speaking thus: "For who of men," he says, "knows the things which are of man, except the spirit of man, which is in him? So also the things which are of God, no one knows except the Spirit of God. But we," he says, "have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we may know the things which have been given to us by God; which also we speak, not in the taught words of human wisdom, but in the taught words of the Spirit, comparing spiritual things with spiritual. But the animal man does not perceive the things which are of the Spirit of God: for it is foolishness to him" (1 Cor. 2:11-14). To such, therefore, that is to animal [men], a little after he says: "And I, brethren, could not speak to you as to spiritual, but as to carnal" (Id. 3:1). And that is understood from this same mode of speech, that is, the whole from the part. For from both the soul and from the flesh, which are parts of man, the whole can be signified, which is man; and thus the animal man is not one thing, the carnal man another; but each is the very same thing, that is, man living according to man. Just as no other thing than men are signified, whether where it is read: "From the works of the law shall no flesh be justified" (Rom. 3:20): or what is written: "Seventy-five souls descended with Jacob into Egypt" (Gen. 46:27). For both there by "all flesh" every man, and there by "seventy-five souls" seventy-five men are understood. And what was said, "Not in the taught words of human wisdom," could have been said, "Not in the taught words of carnal wisdom": just as what was said, "You walk according to man," could have been said, "According to the flesh." But this appeared more in those things which he subjoined: "For when anyone says, I am of Paul; but another, I of Apollos: are you not men?" (1 Cor. 3:4). What he was saying, "You are animal," and "You are carnal," he said more expressively, "You are men": which is, "You live according to man, not according to God; according to whom if you lived, you would be gods."

CHAPTER V.---That the opinion of the Platonists concerning the nature of the body and soul is more tolerable than that of the Manichaeans; but even they are reproved, because they ascribe the causes of vices to the nature of the flesh.

There is no need, therefore, in our sins and vices to accuse the nature of the flesh to the injury of the Creator, which in its own kind and order is good: but having deserted the good Creator, to live according to a created good is not good; whether anyone chooses to live according to the flesh, or according to the soul, or according to the whole man, who consists of soul and flesh (whence he can be signified both by the name of the soul alone, and by the name of the flesh alone). For he who praises the nature of the soul as if the supreme good, and accuses the nature of the flesh as if an evil, surely both carnally appetites the soul and carnally flees the flesh: since he perceives that by human vanity, not by divine truth.

Non quidem Platonici, sicut Manichaei desipiunt, ut tanquam mali naturam terrena corpora detestentur; cum omnia elementa, quibus iste mundus visibilis contrectabilisque compactus est, qualitatesque eorum Deo artifici tribuant, Verumtamen ex terrenis artubus moribundisque membris sic affici animas opinantur, ut hinc eis sint morbi cupiditatum et timorum et laetitiae sive tristitiae: quibus quatuor vel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat (Tuscul. quaest. lib. 4, cap.) vel passionibus, ut plerique, verbum e verbo graeco exprimunt, omnis humanorum morum vitiositas continetur. Quod si ita est, quid est quod Aeneas apud Virgilium, cum audisset a patre apud inferos, animas rursus ad corpora redituras, hanc opinionem miratur, exclamans: O pater, anne aliquas ad coelum hinc ire putandum est Sublimes animas, iterumque ad tarda reverti Corpora? Quae lucis miseris tam dira cupido? (Aeneid. lib. 6, vers. 719-721.) Numquidnam haec tam dira cupido ex terrenis artubus moribundisque membris adhuc inest animarum illi praedicatissimae puritati? Nonne ab hujusmodi corporeis, ut dicit, pestibus omnibus eas asserit esse purgatas, cum rursus incipiunt in corpora velle reverti? Unde colligitur, etiamsi ita se haberet, quod est omnino vanissimum, vicissim alternans incessabiliter euntium atque redeuntium animarum mundatio et inquinatio, non potuisse veraciter dici, omnes culpabiles atque vitiosos motus animarum eis ex terrenis corporibus inolescere: siquidem secundum ipsos illa, ut locutor nobilis ait, dira cupido usque adeo non est ex corpore, ut ab omni corporea peste purgatam, et extra omne corpus animam constitutam, ipsam compellat esse in corpore. Unde etiam, illis fatentibus, non ex carne tantum afficitur anima, ut cupiat, metuat, laetetur, aegrescat; verum etiam ex se ipsa his potest motibus agitari.

Caput VI.

De qualitate voluntatis humanae, sub cujus judicio affectiones animi aut pravae habentur, aut rectae.

Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis: quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus: imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt. Nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia, nisi voluntas in eorum consensionem quae volumus? et quid est metus atque tristitia, nisi voluntas in dissensionem ab his quae nolumus? Sed cum consentimus appetendo ea quae volumus, cupiditas; cum autem consentimus fruendo his quae volumus, laetitia vocatur.

The Platonists indeed do not dote as the Manichaeans, so as to detest earthy bodies as if the nature of an evil; since they attribute all the elements of which this visible and tangible world is compacted, and their qualities, to God the artificer. Nevertheless, they think that souls are so affected from earthy joints and moribund members, that hence they have the diseases of desires and fears and of joy or sadness: in which four either "perturbations," as Cicero calls them (Tusc. Quaest. Book 4), or "passions," as most, expressing the Greek word from word [to word], all the vitiosity of human customs is contained. But if it is so, why is it that Aeneas in Virgil, when he had heard from his father among those below that souls would return again to bodies, wonders at this opinion, exclaiming: "O father, is it to be thought that some sublime souls go hence to heaven, and again return to sluggish bodies? What so dire a desire of light is there to the miserable ones?" (Aeneid, Book 6, verses 719-721). Could this so dire a desire from earthy joints and moribund members still be in that most preached purity of souls? Does he not assert that they are purged from all such corporeal plagues, as he says, when they again begin to wish to return into bodies? Whence it is collected, even if it were so, which is altogether most vain, the cleaning and defiling of souls going and returning alternately and incessantly, that it could not have been truthfully said, that all the culpable and vicious motions of souls grow in them from earthy bodies: since according to them that "dire desire," as the noble speaker says, to such an extent is not from the body, that it compels the soul itself, purged from every corporeal plague and constituted outside every body, to be in the body. Whence also, they confessing, the soul is not only affected from the flesh, so that it desires, fears, rejoices, becomes sick; but even from itself it can be agitated by these motions.

Chapter VI.

Concerning the quality of the human will, under whose judgment the affections of the soul are held to be either depraved or upright.

It matters, moreover, of what kind the will of man is: because if it is perverse, it will have these perverse motions; but if it is upright, they will be not only inculpable, but even laudable. For the will is in all of them; rather, all are nothing else than wills. For what is desire and joy, but the will in consent to those things which we will? and what is fear and sadness, but the will in dissent from those things which we do not will? But when we consent by appetiting those things which we will, it is called desire; but when we consent by enjoying those things which we will, it is called joy.

Itemque cum dissentimus ab eo quod accidere nolumus, talis voluntas metus est; cum autem dissentimus ab eo quod nolentibus accidit, talis voluntas tristitia est. Et omnino pro varietate rerum quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur. Quapropter homo qui secundum Deum, non secundum hominem vivit, oportet ut sit amator boni: unde fit consequens ut malum oderit. Et quoniam nemo natura, sed quisquis malus est, vitio malus est: perfectum odium (Psal. CXXXVIII, 22) debet malis, qui secundum Deum vivit; ut nec propter vitium oderit hominem, nec amet vitium propter hominem; sed oderit vitium, amet hominem. Sanato enim vitio, totum quod amare, nihil autem quod debeat odisse, remanebit.

Caput VII.

Amorem et dilectionem indifferenter et in bono et in malo apud sacras Litteras inveniri.

1. Nam cujus propositum est amare Deum, et non secundum hominem, sed secundum Deum amare proximum, sicut etiam se ipsum; procul dubio propter hunc amorem dicitur voluntatis bonae, quae usitatius in Scripturis sacris charitas appellatur: sed amor quoque secundum easdem sacras Litteras dicitur. Nam et amatorem boni dicit Apostolus esse debere, quem regendo populo praecepit eligendum (I Tim. III, 1-10). Et ipse Dominus Petrum apostolum interrogans, cum dixisset, Diligis me plus his? ille respondit, Domine, tu scis quia amo te. Et iterum Dominus quaesivit, non utrum amaret, sed utrum diligeret eum Petrus: at ille respondit iterum, Domine, tu scis quia amo te. Tertia vero interrogatione et ipse Dominus non ait, Diligis me, sed, Amas me? ubi secutus ait Evangelista, Contristatus est Petrus, quia dixit ei tertio, Amas me? cum Dominus non tertio, sed semel dixerit, Amas me? bis autem dixerit, Diligis me? Unde intelligimus, quod etiam cum dicebat Dominus, Diligis me? nihil aliud dicebat, quam, Amas me? Petrus autem non mutavit hujus unius rei verbum, sed etiam tertio, Domine, inquit, tu omnia scis, tu scis quia amo te (Joan. XXI, 15-17).

Likewise, when we dissent from that which we do not will to happen, such a will is fear; but when we dissent from that which happens to us unwilling, such a will is sadness. And altogether according to the variety of things which are appetited and fled, as the will of man is attracted or offended, so it is changed and turned into these or those affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, not according to man, ought to be a lover of the good: whence it follows that he should hate evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice: he who lives according to God owes a perfect hatred (Ps. 138:22) to the evil; so that he should neither hate the man on account of the vice, nor love the vice on account of the man; but should hate the vice, and love the man. For the vice being healed, all that he ought to love, but nothing which he ought to hate, will remain.

Chapter VII.

That love and dilection are found indifferently both in good and in evil in the sacred Scriptures.

1. For he whose purpose is to love God, and to love his neighbor as himself not according to man but according to God; without doubt on account of this love he is said to be of a good will, which more usually in the sacred Scriptures is called charity: but it is also called love according to the same sacred Scriptures. For also the Apostle says that he who is to be chosen for ruling the people ought to be a lover of the good (1 Tim. 3:1-10). And the Lord Himself questioning the Apostle Peter, when He had said: "Do you love [*diligis*] me more than these?" he responded: "Lord, you know that I love [*amo*] you." And again the Lord asked, not whether he loved [*amaret*], but whether he loved [*diligeret*] him: but he responded again: "Lord, you know that I love [*amo*] you." But at the third interrogation the Lord Himself also did not say: "Do you love [*diligis*] me?" but: "Do you love [*amas*] me?" where the Evangelist followed and said: "Peter was saddened, because he said to him the third time, Do you love [*amas*] me?" although the Lord said not the third time, but once: "Do you love [*amas*] me?" and twice he had said: "Do you love [*diligis*] me?" Whence we understand, that even when the Lord was saying: "Do you love [*diligis*] me?" He was saying nothing else than: "Do you love [*amas*] me?" Moreover, Peter did not change the word for this one thing, but even the third time he said: "Lord, you know all things, you know that I love [*amo*] you" (John 21:15-17).

2. Hoc propterea commemorandum putavi, quia nonnulli arbitrantur aliud esse dilectionem sive charitatem, aliud amorem. Dicunt enim dilectionem accipiendam esse in bono, amorem in malo. Sic autem nec ipsos auctores saecularium litterarum locutos esse, certissimum est. Sed viderint philosophi utrum vel qua ratione ista discernant. Amorem tamen eos in bonis rebus et erga ipsum Deum magni pendere, libri eorum satis loquuntur. Sed Scripturas religionis nostrae, quarum auctoritatem caeteris quibusque litteris anteponimus, non aliud dicere amorem, aliud dilectionem vel charitatem, insinuandum fuit. Nam et amorem in bono dici, jam ostendimus. Sed ne quis existimet amorem quidem et in bono et in malo, dilectionem autem nonnisi in bono esse dicendam, illud attendat quod in Psalmo scriptum est: Qui autem diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam (Psal. X, 6). Et illud apostoli Joannis: Si quis dilexerit mundum, non est dilectio Patris in eo (1 Joan. II, 15). Ecce uno loco dilectio et in bono et in malo. Amorem autem in malo (quia in bono jam ostendimus) ne quisquam flagitet, legat quod scriptum est: Erunt enim homines se ipsos amantes, amatores pecuniae (II Tim. III, 2). Recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor, et voluntas perversa malus amor. Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens eoque fruens, laetitia est: fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est: idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia est. Proinde mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si bonus. Quod dicimus, de Scripturis probemus. Concupiscit Apostolus dissolvi, et esse cum Christo (Philipp. 1. 23): et, Concupivit anima mea desiderare judicia tua; vel si accommodatius dicitur, Desideravit anima mea concupiscere judicia tua (Psal. CXVIII, 20);; et, Concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum (Sap. VI, 21). Hoc tamen loquendi obtinuit consuetudo, ut si cupiditas vel concupiscentia dicatur, nec addatur cujus rei sit, non nisi in malo possit intelligi. Laetitia in bono est, Laetamini in Domino, et exsultate justi (Psal. XXXI, 11): et, Dedisti laetitiam in cor meum (Psal. IV, 7): et, Adimplebis me laetitia cum vultu tuo (Psal. XV, 11). Timor in bono est apud Apostolum, ubi ait, Cum timore et tremore vestram ipsorum salutem operamini (Philipp. II, 12): et, Noli altum sapere, sed time (Rom. XI, 20): et, Timeo autem, ne sicut serpens Evam seduxit astutia sua, sic et vestrae mentes corrumpantur a castitate quae est in Christo (II Cor. XI, 3). De tristitia vero, quam Cicero magis aegritudinem appellat (Tuscul. quaest. lib. 3, cap. 10 sqq. et alibi) dolorem autem Virgilius, ubi ait, «Dolent gaudentque,» (sed ideo malui tristitiam dicere, quia aegritudo vel dolor usitatius in corporibus dicitur,) scrupulosior quaestio est, utrum inveniri possit in bono.

2. I have thought this to be commemorated for the reason that some think that dilection or charity is one thing, love another. For they say that dilection is to be received in good, love in evil. But it is most certain that not even the authors of secular literature have spoken thus. But let the philosophers see whether or by what reason they discern these. Nevertheless, their books speak enough that they highly value love in good things and toward God Himself. But it had to be insinuated that the Scriptures of our religion, whose authority we place before any other writings, do not say love is one thing, dilection or charity another. For we have already shown that love is said in good. But lest anyone should estimate that love is indeed to be said both in good and in evil, but dilection not except in good, let him attend to what is written in the Psalm: "But he who loves [*diligit*] iniquity, hates his own soul" (Ps. 10:6). And that of the Apostle John: "If anyone shall have loved [*dilexerit*] the world, the dilection of the Father is not in him" (1 John 2:15). Behold in one place dilection both in good and in evil. Moreover, lest anyone should demand love in evil (since we have already shown it in good), let him read what is written: "For men shall be lovers of themselves [*se ipsos amantes*], lovers of money" (2 Tim. 3:2). Therefore an upright will is a good love, and a perverse will is a bad love. Love, therefore, gaping to have what is loved, is desire; but having it and enjoying it, is joy: fleeing what is adverse to it, is fear: and feeling it if it should happen, is sadness. Hence these things are bad, if the love is bad; good, if it is good. What we say, let us prove from the Scriptures. The Apostle desires [*concupiscit*] to be dissolved and to be with Christ (Phil. 1:23): and: "My soul has coveted [*concupivit*] to desire your judgments"; or if it is said more fittingly: "My soul has desired to covet [*concupiscere*] your judgments" (Ps. 118:20); and: "The concupiscence of wisdom leads to a kingdom" (Wisd. 6:21). Nevertheless, the custom of speaking has obtained, that if desire [*cupiditas*] or concupiscence [*concupiscentia*] is said, nor is it added of what thing it is, it cannot be understood except in evil. Joy is in good: "Be glad in the Lord, and exult, you just" (Ps. 31:11): and: "You have given joy in my heart" (Ps. 4:7): and: "You will fill me with joy with your countenance" (Ps. 15:11). Fear is in good in the Apostle, where he says: "With fear and trembling work out your own salvation" (Phil. 2:12): and: "Be not high-minded, but fear" (Rom. 11:20): and: "But I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his astuteness, so also your minds be corrupted from the chastity which is in Christ" (2 Cor. 11:3). Concerning sadness indeed, which Cicero rather calls sickness [*aegritudinem*], but Virgil pain [*dolorem*] where he says: "They grieve and rejoice," (but I have preferred to say sadness [*tristitiam*] for the reason that sickness or pain is more usually said in bodies), there is a more scrupulous question whether it can be found in good.

Caput VIII.

De tribus perturbationibus, quas in animo sapientis Stoici esse voluerunt, excluso dolore sive tristitia, quam virtus animi sentire non debeat.

1. Quas enim Graeci appellant εὐπαθείας, latine autem Cicero constantias nominavit, Stoici tres esse voluerunt, pro tribus perturbationibus in animo sapientis, pro cupiditate voluntatem, pro laetitia gaudium, pro metu cautionem: pro aegritudine vero vel dolore, quam nos vitandae ambiguitatis gratia, tristitiam maluimus dicere, negaverunt esse posse aliquid in animo sapientis. Voluntas quippe, inquiunt, appetit bonum, quod facit sapiens; gaudium de bono adepto est, quod ubique adipiscitur sapiens; cautio devitat malum, quod debet sapiens devitare: tristitia porro quia de malo est, quod jam accidit, nullum autem malum existimant posse accidere sapienti; nihil in ejus animo pro illa esse posse dixerunt. Sic ergo illi loquuntur, ut velle, gaudere, cavere negent nisi sapientem; stultum autem nonnisi cupere, laetari, metuere, contristari. Et illas tres esse constantias, has autem quatuor perturbationes secundum Ciceronem, secundum plurimos autem passiones. Graece autem illae tres, sicut dixi, appellantur εὐπάθειαι; istae autem quatuor πάθη. Haec locutio utrum Scripturis sanctis congruat, cum quaererem quantum potui diligenter, illud inveni quod ait Propheta, Non est gaulere impiis dicit, Dominus (Isai. LVII, 21, sec. LXX): tanquam impii laetari possint potius quam gaudere de malis; quia gaudium proprie bonorum et piorum est. Item illud in Evangelio, Quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis hominis, haec et vos facite illis (Matth. VII, 12), ita dictum videtur, tanquam nemo possit aliquid male vel turpiter velle, sed cupere. Denique propter consuetudinem locutionis nonnulli interpretes addiderunt, bona, et ita interpretati sunt: Quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines bona. Cavendum enim putaverunt, ne quisquam inhonesta velit sibi fieri ab hominibus, ut de turpioribus taceam, certe luxuriosa convivia, in quibus se, si et ipse illis faciat similia, hoc praeceptum existimet impleturum. Sed in graeco Evangelio, unde in latinum translatum est, non legitur, bona; sed, Quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, haec et vos facite illis: credo propterea, quia in eo quod dixit, vultis, jam voluit intelligi bona. Non enim ait, Cupitis.

Chapter VIII.

Concerning the three perturbations which the Stoics willed to be in the soul of the wise man, excluding pain or sadness, which the virtue of the soul ought not to feel.

1. For those which the Greeks call *eupatheiai* [*εὐπαθείας*], and which Cicero named in Latin "constancies," the Stoics willed to be three, in place of three perturbations in the soul of the wise man: instead of desire [*cupiditate*], will [*voluntatem*]; instead of gladness [*laetitia*], joy [*gaudium*]; instead of fear [*metu*], caution [*cautionem*]: but instead of sickness [*aegritudine*] or pain [*dolore*], which we have preferred to call sadness [*tristitiam*] for the sake of avoiding ambiguity, they denied that anything could be in the soul of the wise man. For the will, they say, appetites the good, which the wise man does; joy is concerning the good attained, which the wise man everywhere attains; caution avoids the evil, which the wise man ought to avoid: furthermore, because sadness is concerning an evil which has already happened, but they estimate that no evil can happen to the wise man, they said that nothing could be in his soul in place of it. Thus therefore they speak, so as to deny that [the acts of] willing, rejoicing, and cautioning belong to any but the wise man; but that the fool does nothing but desire, be glad, fear, and be saddened. And that those three are "constancies," but these four are "perturbations" according to Cicero, or according to most, "passions." Moreover, those three, as I said, are called in Greek *eupatheiai*; but these four, *pathe* [*πάθη*]. Whether this mode of speaking matches the holy Scriptures, when I sought as much as I could diligently, I found that which the Prophet says: "There is no rejoicing for the impious, says the Lord" (Is. 57:21, according to the LXX): as if the impious could be glad [*laetari*] rather than rejoice [*gaudere*] concerning evils; because joy [*gaudium*] is properly of the good and of the pious. Likewise that in the Gospel: "All things whatsoever you will that men should do to you, these also do you to them" (Matt. 7:12), seems so said as if no one could will [*velle*] anything badly or basely, but [only] desire [*cupere*] it. Finally, on account of the custom of speaking, some interpreters have added "good things," and have interpreted it thus: "All good things whatsoever you will that men should do to you." For they thought it had to be cautioned against, lest anyone should will dishonest things to be done to him by men, to say nothing of more base things, certainly luxurious banquets, in which he might estimate himself about to fulfill this precept if he also should do similar things to them. But in the Greek Gospel, whence it was translated into Latin, "good things" is not read; but: "All things whatsoever you will that men should do to you, these also do you to them": I believe for the reason that in that which He said, "you will" [*vultis*], He already willed "good things" to be understood. For He did not say: "You desire" [*cupitis*].

2. Non tamen semper his proprietatibus locutio nostra frenanda est, sed interdum his utendum est: et cum legimus eos quorum auctoritati resultare fas non est, ibi sunt intelligendae, ubi rectus sensus alium exitum non potest invenire; sicut ista sunt quae exempli gratia partim ex Propheta, partim ex Evangelio commemoravimus. Quis enim nescit impios exsultare laetitia? et tamen non est gaudere impiis, dicit Dominus. Unde, nisi quia gaudere aliud est, quando proprie signateque hoc verbum ponitur? Item quis negaverit non recte praecipi hominibus, ut quaecumque sibi ab aliis fieri cupiunt, haec eis et ipsi faciant; ne se invicem turpitudine illicitae voluptatis oblectent? Et tamen saluberrimum verissimumque praeceptum est, Quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, eadem et vos facite illis. Et hoc unde, nisi quia hoc loco modo quodam proprio voluntas posita est, quae in malo accipi non potest? Locutione vero usitatiore, quam frequentat maxime consuetudo sermonis, non utique diceretur, Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium (Eccli. VII, 14); nisi esset et voluntas mala, a cujus pravitate illa distinguitur, quam praedicaverunt Angeli dicentes, Pax in terra hominibus bonae voluntatis (Luc. II, 14). Nam ex abundanti additum est, bona, si esse non potest nisi bona. Quid autem magnum in charitatis laudibus dixisset Apostolus, quod non gaudeat super iniquitate (I Cor. XIII, 6), nisi quia ita malignitas gaudet? Nam et apud auctores saecularium litterarum, talis istorum verborum indifferentia reperitur. Ait enim Cicero orator amplissimus: «Cupio, Patres conscripti, me esse clementem» (Orat. 1 in Catil., cap. 2). Quia id verbum in bono posuit, quis tam perverse doctus existat, qui non eum Cupio, sed Volo potius dicere debuisse contendat? Porro apud Terentium flagitiosus adolescens insana flagrans cupidine: «Nihil volo aliud,» inquit, «nisi Philumenam.» Quam voluntatem fuisse libidinem, responsio quae ibi servi ejus senioris inducitur, satis indicat. Ait namque domino suo: Quanto satius est, te id dare operam, quo istum ex animo amorem amoveas tuo, Quam id loqui quo magis libido frustra accendatur tua? (In Andria, act. 2, scen. 1, vers. 6-8.) Gaudium vero eos et in malo posuisse, ille ipse Virgilianus testis est versus, ubi has quatuor perturbationes summa brevitate complexus est: Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque. (Aeneid. lib. 6. vers. 733.) Dixit etiam idem auctor, «Mala mentis gaudia» (Ibid. vers. 278, 279).

2. Yet our speech is not always to be restrained by these proprieties, but sometimes these terms are to be used; and when we read those whose authority it is not lawful to resist, there they are to be understood where a right sense can find no other outlet; such as those things which, for the sake of example, we have commemorated partly from the Prophet, partly from the Gospel. For who does not know that the impious exult with gladness [*laetitia*]? And yet "there is no rejoicing [*gaudere*] for the impious, says the Lord." Whence [is this], unless because to rejoice is one thing when this word is placed properly and significantly? Likewise, who would deny that men are not rightly commanded that whatsoever things they desire [*cupiunt*] to be done to themselves by others, these things they also should do to them, lest they should delight one another with the baseness of illicit pleasure? And yet it is a most wholesome and most true precept: "All things whatsoever you will [*vultis*] that men should do to you, these same things do you also to them." And whence is this, unless because in this place, in a certain proper way, "will" [*voluntas*] is placed, which cannot be taken in a bad sense? But in more common speech, which the custom of discourse especially frequents, it certainly would not be said: "Be not willing [*velle*] to lie any lie" (Ecclus. 7:14), unless there were also a bad will, from whose depravity that one is distinguished which the Angels proclaimed, saying: "Peace on earth to men of good will" (Luke 2:14). For it was added redundantly, "good," if it cannot be anything but good. Moreover, what great thing would the Apostle have said in the praises of charity, that "it rejoiceth [*gaudeat*] not over iniquity" (1 Cor. 13:6), unless because malignity so rejoices? For even among the authors of secular letters, such an indifference of these words is found. For Cicero, that most ample orator, says: "I desire [*cupio*], conscript fathers, that I be clement" (Cat. 1.2). Because he placed that word in a good sense, who would exist so perversely learned as to contend that he ought not to have said "I desire" [*cupio*], but rather "I will" [*volo*]? Furthermore, in Terence, a scandalous youth burning with insane desire [*cupidine*] says: "I will [*volo*] nothing else but Philumena." That this "will" was lust, the response which is there introduced from his elder servant sufficiently indicates. For he says to his master: "How much more satisfactory it is for you to give your effort to that by which you may remove that love from your soul, than to speak that by which your lust [*libido*] is more in vain inflamed?" (Andr. 2.1). But that they also placed "joy" [*gaudium*] in a bad sense, that very Virgilian verse is witness, where he has embraced these four perturbations with the greatest brevity: "Hence they fear and desire, they grieve and rejoice [*gaudent*]" (Aeneid 6.733). The same author also said: "The bad joys [*gaudia*] of the mind" (Ibid. 6.278, 279).

3. Proinde volunt, cavent, gaudent et boni et mali; atque ut eadem aliis verbis enuntiemus, cupiunt, timent, laetantur et boni et mali: sed illi bene, isti male, sicut hominibus seu recta seu perversa voluntas est. Ipsa quoque tristitia; pro qua Stoici nihil in animo sapientis inveniri posse putaverunt, reperitur in bono, et maxime apud nostros. Nam laudat Apostolus Corinthios, quod contristati fuerint secundum Deum. Sed fortasse quis dixerit, illis Apostolum fuisse congratulatum, quod contristati fuerint poenitendo: qualis tristitia, nisi eorum qui peccaverint, esse non potest. Ita enim dicit: Video quod epistola illa, etsi ad horam contristavit vos, nunc gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad poenitentiam. Contristati enim estis secundum Deum, ut in nullo detrimentum patiamini ex nobis. Quae enim secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentialn in salutem impoenitendam operatur: mundi autem tristitia mortem operatur. Ecce enim idipsum secundum Deum contristari, quantum perficit in vobis industriam (II Cor. VII, 8-11). Ac per hoc possunt Stoici pro suis partibus respondere, ad hoc videri utilem esse tristitiam, ut peccasse poeniteat; in animo autem sapientis ideo esse non posse, quia nec peccatum in eum cadit, cujus poenitentia contristetur, nec ullum aliud malum, quod perpetiendo et sentiendo sit tristis. Nam et Alcibiadem ferunt (si me de nomine hominis memoria non fallit), cum sibi beatus videretur, Socrate disputante, et ei quam miser esset, quoniam stultus esset, demonstrante, flevisse. Huic ergo stultitia fuit causa etiam hujus utilis optandaeque tristitiae, qua homo esse se dolet quod esse non debet. Stoici autem non stultum, sed sapientem aiunt tristem esse non posse.

Caput IX.

De perturbationibus animi, quarum affectus rectos habet vita justorum.

1. Verum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbationibus attinet, jam respondimus in nono hujus operis libro, ostendentes eos non tam de rebus, quam de verbis cupidiores esse contentionis, quam veritatis (Capp. 4, 5). Apud nos autem juxta Scripturas sacras sanamque doctrinam, cives sanctae civitatis Dei in hujus vitae peregrinatione secundum Deum viventes, metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque. Et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent.

3. Accordingly, both the good and the bad will, caution, and rejoice; and that we may express the same things in other words, both the good and the bad desire, fear, and are glad: but the former well, the latter badly, according as men have either a right or a perverse will. Sadness itself also, for which the Stoics thought nothing could be found in the soul of the wise man, is found in a good [man], and especially among our [writers]. For the Apostle praises the Corinthians because they were made sad according to God. But perhaps someone will say that the Apostle congratulated them because they were made sad by repenting: which kind of sadness cannot be except of those who have sinned. For he says thus: "I see that that epistle, although it made you sad for an hour, now I rejoice, not because you were made sad, but because you were made sad unto repentance." For you were made sad according to God, that in nothing you might suffer detriment from us." For the sadness which is according to God works repentance unto salvation not to be repented of; but the sadness of the world works death. For behold this very being made sad according to God, how much industry it accomplishes in you" (2 Cor. 7:8-11). And by this the Stoics can answer for their part, that sadness seems to be useful for this purpose, that one may repent of having sinned; but in the soul of the wise man it cannot be for this reason, because neither does sin fall upon him, of whose repentance he might be made sad, nor any other evil, which by enduring and sensing he might be sad. For they also relate of Alcibiades (if my memory of the man's name does not fail me) that when he seemed to himself happy, Socrates disputing and demonstrating to him how wretched he was because he was a fool, he wept. For him, therefore, folly was the cause even of this useful and desirable sadness, by which a man grieves that he is what he ought not to be. But the Stoics say, not that the fool, but that the wise man cannot be sad.

Chapter IX.

Concerning the perturbations of the soul, whose affections the life of the just has right.

1. But to these philosophers, as far as that question concerning the perturbations of the soul is concerned, we have already responded in the ninth book of this work, showing them to be more desirous of contention than of truth, not so much concerning things as concerning words. But with us, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, living according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, fear and desire, grieve and rejoice. And because their love is right, they have all these affections right.

Metuunt poenam aeternam, cupiunt vitam aeternam: dolent in re, quia ipsi in semetipsis adhuc ingemiscunt, adoptionem exspectantes redemptionem corporis sui (Rom. VIII, 23); gaudent in spe, quia fiet sermo, qui scriptus est, Absorpta est mors in victoriam (I Cor. XV, 54). Item metuunt peccare, cupiunt perseverare: dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis. Ut enim metuant peccare, audiunt, Quoniam abundabit iniquitas, refrigescet charitas multorum (Matth. XXIV, 12). Ut cupiant perseverare, audiunt quod scriptum est, Qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit (Id. X, 22). Ut doleant in peccatis, audiunt, Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est (I Joan. I, 8). Ut gaudeant in operibus bonis, audiunt, Hilarem datorem diligit Deus (II Cor. IX, 7). Item sicuti se infirmitas eorum firmitasque habuerit, metuunt tentari, cupiunt tentari: dolent in tentationibus, gaudent in tentationibus. Ut enim metuant tentari, audiunt, Si quis praeoccupatus fuerit in aliquo delicto, vos qui spirituales estis, instruite hujusmodi in spiritu mansuetudinis; intendens te ipsum, ne et tu tenteris (Galat. VI, 1). Ut autem cupiant tentari, audiunt quemdam virum fortem civitatis Dei dicentem, Proba me, Domine, et tenta me; ure renes meos et cor meum (Psal. XXV, 2). Ut doleant in tentationibus, vident Primum flentem (Matth. XXVI, 75): ut gaudeant in tentationibus, audiunt Jacobum dicentem, Omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, cum in tentationes varias incideritis (Jacobi I, 2).

2. Non solum autem propter se ipsos his moventur affectibus, verum etiam propter eos quos liberari cupiunt, et ne pereant metuunt, et dolent si pereunt, et gaudent si liberantur. Illum quippe optimum et fortissimum virum, qui in suis infirmitatibus gloriatur (II Cor. XII, 5), ut eum potissimum commemoremus, qui in Ecclesiam Christi ex Gentibus venimus, Doctorem Gentium in fide et veritate, qui et plus omnibus suis coapostolis laboravit (I Cor. XV, 10), et pluribus Epistolis populos Dei, non eos tantum qui praesentes ab illo videbantur, verum etiam illos qui futuri praevidebantur, instruxit; illum, inquam, virum, athletam Christi, doctum ab illo, unctum de illo (Galat. I, 12), crucifixum cum illo (Id. II, 19), gloriosum in illo, in theatro hujus mundi, cui spectaculum factus est et Angelis et hominibus (I Cor. IV, 9), legitime magnum agonem certantem, et palmam supernae vocationis in anteriora sectantem (Philipp. III, 14), oculis fidei libentissime spectant, gaudere cum gaudentibus, fleve cum flentibus (Rom. XII, 15), foris habentem pugnas, intus timores (II Cor. VII, 5);

They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life: they grieve in reality, because they themselves still groan within themselves, expecting the adoption, the redemption of their body (Rom. 8:23); they rejoice in hope, because "the word will be done which is written: Death is swallowed up in victory" (1 Cor. 15:54). Likewise they fear to sin, they desire to persevere: they grieve in sins, they rejoice in good works. For that they may fear to sin, they hear: "Because iniquity shall abound, the charity of many shall grow cold" (Matt. 24:12). That they may desire to persevere, they hear what is written: "He that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved" (Id. 10:22). That they may grieve in sins, they hear: "If we shall say that we have no sin, we seduce ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1:8). That they may rejoice in good works, they hear: "God loveth a cheerful giver" (2 Cor. 9:7). Likewise, as their infirmity or firmness has held itself, they fear to be tempted, they desire to be tempted: they grieve in temptations, they rejoice in temptations. For that they may fear to be tempted, they hear: "If any man be overtaken in any fault, you who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness; considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted" (Gal. 6:1). But that they may desire to be tempted, they hear a certain strong man of the city of God saying: "Prove me, O Lord, and try me; burn my reins and my heart" (Psalm 26:2). That they may grieve in temptations, they see Peter weeping (Matt. 26:75): that they may rejoice in temptations, they hear James saying: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations" (James 1:2).

2. Not only, moreover, on account of themselves are they moved by these affections, but also on account of those whom they desire to be liberated, and whom they fear lest they perish, and for whom they grieve if they perish, and in whom they rejoice if they are liberated. For that best and strongest man, who glories in his infirmities (2 Cor. 12:5)—to commemorate him especially, we who have come into the Church of Christ from the Gentiles, the Teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow-apostles (1 Cor. 15:10), and instructed the peoples of God by more Epistles, not only those who were seen by him as present, but also those who were foreseen as future; that man, I say, the athlete of Christ, taught by Him, anointed from Him (Gal. 1:12), crucified with Him (Id. 2:19), glorious in Him, in the theatre of this world, to which he was made a spectacle both to Angels and to men (1 Cor. 4:9), lawfully fighting a great agony, and following after the palm of the supernal vocation in the things that are before (Phil. 3:14), they most willingly behold with the eyes of faith; rejoicing with those who rejoice, weeping with those who weep (Rom. 12:15), having combats without, fears within (2 Cor. 7:5);

cupientem dissolvi, et esse cum Christo (Philipp. I, 23); desiderantem videre Romanos, ut aliquem fructum habeat et in illis, sicut et in caeteris gentibus (Rom. I, 11, 13); aemulantem Corinthios, et ipsa aemulatione metuentem, ne seducantur eorum mentes a castitate quae in Christo est (II Cor. XI, 2, 3); magnam tristitiam et continuum dolorem cordis de Israelitis habentem (Rom. IX, 2), quod ignorantes Dei justitiam, et suam volentes constituere, justitiae Dei non essent subjecti (Id. X, 3); nec solum dolorem, verum etiam luctum suum denuntiantem quibusdam qui ante peccaverunt, et non egerunt poenitentiam super immunditia et fornicationibus suis (II Cor. XII, 21).

3. Hi motus, his affectus de amore boni et de sancta charitate venientes, si vitia vocanda sunt, sinamus ut ea quae vere vitia sunt, virtutes vocentur. Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones, quando ubi oportet adhibentur, quis eas tunc morbos seu vitiosas passiones audeat dicere? Quamobrem etiam ipse Dominus in forma servi agere vitam dignatus humanam, sed nullum habens omnino peccatum, adhibuit eas ubi adhibendas esse judicavit. Neque enim in quo verum erat hominis corpus et verus hominis animus, falsus erat humanus affectus. Cum ergo ejus in Evangelio ista referuntur, quod super duritiam cordis Judaeorum cum ira contristatus sit (Marc. III, 5); quod dixerit, Gaudeo propter vos, ut credatis (Joan. XI, 15); quod Lazarum suscitaturus etiam lacrymas fuderit (Ibid., 35); quod concupiverit cum discipulis suis manducare pascha (Luc. XXII, 15); quod propinquante passione tristis fuerit anima ejus (Matth. XXVI, 38), non falso utique referuntur. Verum ille hos motus certae dispensationis gratia, ita cum voluit suscepit animo humano, ut cum voluit factus est homo.

4. Proinde, quod fatendum est, etiam cum rectas et secundum Deum habemus has affectiones, hujus vitae sunt, non illius quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inviti cedimus. Itaque aliquando, quamvis non culpabili cupiditate, sed laudabili charitate moveamur, etiam dum nolumus, flemus. Habemus ergo eas ex humanae conditionis infirmitate: non autem ita Dominus Jesus, cujus et infirmitas fuit ex potestate. Sed dum vitae hujus infirmitatem gerimus, si eas omnino nullas habeamus, tunc potius non recte vivimus. Vituperabat enim et detestabatur Apostolus quosdam, quos etiam esse dixit sine affectione (Rom. I, 31). Culpavit etiam illos sacer Psalmus, de quibus ait, Sustinui qui simul contristaretur, et non fuit (Psal. LXVIII, 21). Nam omnino non dolere, dum sumus in hoc loco miseriae, profecto, sicut quidam etiam apud saeculi hujus litteratos sensit et dixit, non sine magna mercede contingit, immanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore.

desiring to be dissolved, and to be with Christ (Phil. 1:23); desiring to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit also in them, as also in the rest of the nations (Rom. 1:11, 13); being jealous for the Corinthians, and by that very jealousy fearing lest their minds should be seduced from the chastity which is in Christ (2 Cor. 11:2, 3); having great sadness and continual sorrow of heart concerning the Israelites (Rom. 9:2), because, being ignorant of the justice of God, and willing to establish their own, they were not subject to the justice of God (Id. 10:3); nor only announcing his sorrow, but even his mourning for certain ones who sinned before, and did not act in repentance over their uncleanness and fornications (2 Cor. 12:21).

3. These movements, these affections coming from the love of the good and from holy charity—if they are to be called vices, let us allow those things which are truly vices to be called virtues. But since these affections follow right reason when they are employed where they ought to be, who then would dare to call them diseases or vicious passions? For which reason also the Lord Himself, having deigned to lead a human life in the form of a servant, but having no sin at all, employed them where He judged they ought to be employed. For neither in Him in whom there was a true body of man and a true soul of man, was human affection false. When, therefore, these things are reported of Him in the Gospel: that He was made sad with anger over the hardness of the heart of the Jews (Mark 3:5); that He said, "I rejoice for your sakes, that you may believe" (John 11:15); that about to raise Lazarus He also shed tears (Ibid. 35); that He desired to eat the passover with His disciples (Luke 22:15); that as His passion approached His soul was sad (Matt. 26:38), they are certainly not reported falsely. But He took up these movements into His human soul by the grace of a certain dispensation when He willed, just as when He willed He was made man.

4. Accordingly, as must be confessed, even when we have these affections as right and according to God, they belong to this life, not to that which we hope for as future, and often we yield to them even against our will. Therefore sometimes, although we are moved not by a culpable desire but by a laudable charity, even while we are unwilling, we weep. We have them, therefore, from the infirmity of the human condition: but not so the Lord Jesus, whose infirmity also was from power. But while we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have none of them at all, then rather we do not live rightly. For the Apostle vituperated and detested certain ones, whom he even said were without affection (Rom. 1:31). The sacred Psalm also blamed those of whom it says: "I looked for one that would grieve together with me, and there was none" (Psalm 68:21). For not to grieve at all while we are in this place of misery, surely, as a certain one even among the men of letters of this world felt and said, does not happen without a great price: of inhumanity in the soul, and of stupor in the body.

Quocirca illa quae ἀπάθεια graece dicitur, quae si latine posset, impassibilitas diceretur, si ita intelligenda est (in animo quippe, non in corpore accipitur), ut sine his affectionibus vivatur, quae contra rationem accidunt mentemque perturbant, bona plane et maxime optanda est; sed nec ipsa hujus est vitae. Non enim qualiumcumque hominum vox est, sed maxime piorum multumque justorum atque sanctorum, Si dixerimus quoniam peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est (I Joan. I, 8). Tunc itaque ἀπάθεια ista erit, quando peccatum in homine nullum erit. Nunc vero satis bene vivitur, si sine crimine: sine peccato autem qui se vivere existimat, non id agit, ut peccatum non habeat, sed ut veniam non accipiat. Porro si ἀπάθεια illa dicenda est, cum animum contingere omnino non potest ullus affectus, quis hunc stuporem non omnibus vitiis judicet esse pejorem? Potest ergo non absurde dici perfectam beatitudinem sine stimulo timoris et sine ulla tristitia futuram: non ibi autem futurum amorem gaudiumque quis dixerit, nisi omni modo a veritate seclusus? Si autem ἀπάθεια illa est, ubi nec metus ullus exterret, nec angit dolor, aversanda est in hac vita, si recte, hoc est secundum Deum, vivere volumus: in illa vero beata, quae sempiterna promittitur, plane speranda est.

5. Timor namque ille de quo dicit apostolus Joannes, Timor non est in charitate, sed perfecta charitas foras mittit timorem, quia timor poenam habet; qui autem timet, non est perfectus in charitate (I Joan. IV, 18), non est ejus generis timor, cujus ille quo timebat apostolus Paulus, ne Corinthii serpentina seducerentur astutia (II Cor. XI, 3); hunc enim timorem habet charitas, imo non habet nisi charitas: sed illius est generis timor, qui non est in charitate; de quo ipse apostolus Paulus ait, Non enim accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timorem (Rom. VIII, 15). Timor vero ille castus, permanens in saeculum saeculi (Psal. XVIII, 10), si erit et in futuro saeculo, (nam quo alio modo potest intelligi permanere in saeculum saeculi?) non est timor exterrens a malo, quod accidere potest; sed tenens in bono, quod amitti non potest. Ubi enim boni adepti amor immutabilis est, profecto, si dici potest, mali cavendi timor securus est. Timoris quippe casti nomine ea voluntas significata est, qua nos necesse erit nolle peccare, et non sollicitudine infirmitatis, ne forte peccemus, sed tranquillitate charitatis cavere peccatum. Aut si nullius omnino generis timor esse poterit in illa certissima securitate perpetuorum feliciumque gaudiorum; sic dictum est, Timor Domini castus, permanens in saeculum saeculi, quemadmodum dictum est, Patientia pauperum non peribit in aeternum (Psal. IX, 19). Neque enim aeterna erit ipsa patientia, quae necessaria non est, nisi ubi toleranda sunt mala: sed aeternum erit, quo per patientiam pervenitur. Ita fortasse timor castus in saeculum saeculi dictus est permanere, quia id permanebit, quo timor ipse perducit.

Wherefore that which is called *apatheia* in Greek, which if it could be expressed in Latin would be called "impassibility," if it is to be so understood (for it is accepted in the soul, not in the body) as that one lives without these affections which happen against reason and perturb the mind, it is clearly good and greatly to be desired; but even it does not belong to this life. For it is not the voice of just any men, but especially of the pious and of the very just and holy: "If we shall say that we have no sin, we seduce ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1:8). Then, therefore, will that *apatheia* be, when there will be no sin in man. But now life is lived well enough if it is without crime: but he who thinks that he lives without sin, does not act so that he may not have sin, but so that he may not receive pardon. Furthermore, if that *apatheia* is to be called that when no affection can touch the soul at all, who would not judge this stupor to be worse than all vices? It can, therefore, not absurdly be said that perfect beatitude will be without the sting of fear and without any sadness; but who would say that love and joy will not be there, unless he were excluded in every way from the truth? But if that *apatheia* is where neither any fear terrifies nor any sorrow anguishes, it is to be shunned in this life if we wish to live rightly, that is, according to God; but in that blessed [life] which is promised as eternal, it is clearly to be hoped for.

5. For that fear of which the Apostle John says: "Fear is not in charity, but perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath punishment; and he that feareth is not perfect in charity" (1 John 4:18), is not fear of that kind with which the Apostle Paul was fearing lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the serpent's cunning (2 Cor. 11:3); for charity has this fear, or rather none but charity has it: but it is fear of that kind which is not in charity; concerning which the Apostle Paul himself says: "For you have not received the spirit of servitude again in fear" (Rom. 8:15). But that "chaste fear, remaining forever and ever" (Psalm 18:10), if it shall be also in the future world (for in what other way can it be understood to remain forever and ever?), is not a fear terrifying from an evil which can happen; but holding in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of the good attained is unchangeable, surely, if it can be said, the fear of cautioning against evil is secure. For by the name of chaste fear is signified that will by which it will be necessary for us to be unwilling to sin, and not by the solicitude of infirmity, lest perchance we should sin, but by the tranquility of charity to caution against sin. Or if fear of no kind at all shall be able to be in that certain security of perpetual and happy joys; "the chaste fear of the Lord, remaining forever and ever" was said in the same way as it was said: "The patience of the poor shall not perish forever" (Psalm 9:19). For neither will patience itself be eternal, which is not necessary except where evils are to be tolerated: but that will be eternal to which one arrives through patience. Thus perhaps chaste fear is said to remain forever and ever because that will remain to which fear itself leads.

6. Quae cum ita sint, quoniam recta vita ducenda est, qua perveniendum sit ad beatam, omnes affectus istos vita recta rectos habet, perversa perversos. Beata vero eademque aeterna amorem habebit et gaudium non solum rectum, verum etiam certum; timorem autem ac dolorem nullum. Unde jam apparet utcumque, quales esse debeant in hac peregrinatione cives civitatis Dei, viventes secundum spiritum, non secundum carnem, hoc est, secundum Deum, non secundum hominem: et quales in illa quo tendunt, immortalitate futuri sint. Civitas porro, id est societas, impiorum non secundum Deum, sed secundum hominem viventium, et in ipso cultu falsae, contemptuque verae divinitatis, doctrinas hominum daemonumve sectantium, his affectibus pravis tanquam morbis et perturbationibus quatitur. Et si quos cives habet qui moderari talibus motibus et eos quasi temperare videantur, sic impietate superbi et elati sunt, ut hoc ipso in eis sint majores tumores, quo minores dolores. Et si nonnulli tanto immaniore, quanto rariore vanitate hoc in se ipsis adamaverint, ut nullo prorsus erigantur et excitentur, nullo flectantur atque inclinentur affectu; humanitatem totam potius amittunt, quam veram assequantur tranquillitatem. Non enim quia durum aliquid, ideo rectum; aut quia stupidum est, ideo sanum.

Caput X.

An primos homines in paradiso constitutos nullis perturbationibus, priusquam deliquerint, affectos fuisse credendum sit.

Sed utrum primus homo vel primi homines (duorum erat quippe conjugium) habebant istos affectus in corpore animali ante peccatum, quales in corpore spirituali non habebimus, omni purgato finitoque peccato, non immerito quaeritur. Si enim habebant, quomodo erant beati in illo memorabili beatitudinis loco, id est paradiso? Quis tandem absolute dici beatus potest, qui timore afficitur, vel dolore? Quid autem timere aut dolere poterant illi homines in tantorum tanta affluentia bonorum, ubi nec mors metuebatur, nec ulla corporis mala valetudo; nec aberat quidquam, quod bona voluntas adipisceretur, nec inerat quod carnem animumve hominis feliciter viventis offenderet? Amor erat imperturbatus in Deum, atque inter se conjugum fida et sincera societate viventium, et ex hoc amore grande gaudium, non desistente quod amabatur ad fruendum. Erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente nullum omnino aliunde malum, quod contristaret, irruebat.

6. Since these things are so, because a right life is to be led, by which one must arrive at the blessed life, a right life has all these affections right, and a perverse life has them perverse. But the blessed life, and the same eternal, will have love and joy not only right but also certain; but no fear and no sorrow. Whence it already appears in some way of what sort the citizens of the city of God ought to be in this pilgrimage, living according to the spirit, not according to the flesh, that is, according to God, not according to man: and of what sort they will be in that immortality whither they tend. Furthermore, the city, that is, the society of the impious, not living according to God but according to man, and in the very worship of a false divinity and contempt of the true, following the doctrines of men or of demons, is shaken by these perverse affections as by diseases and perturbations. And if it has some citizens who seem to moderate such movements and, as it were, to temper them, they are so proud and elated by impiety that the tumors in them are greater for the very reason that the sorrows are smaller. And if some, by a vanity all the more monstrous as it is rarer, should have loved this in themselves, that they should be raised and excited by no affection at all, and inclined and bent by none, they rather lose all humanity than attain true tranquility. For it is not because something is hard that it is therefore right; or because it is stupid that it is therefore healthy.

Chapter X.

Whether it is to be believed that the first men established in paradise were affected by no perturbations before they transgressed.

But whether the first man or the first men (for there was the marriage of two) had those affections in an animal body before sin, such as we shall not have in a spiritual body when all sin is purged and finished, is not unmeritedly asked. For if they had them, how were they blessed in that memorable place of beatitude, that is, paradise? Who, finally, can be called absolutely blessed who is affected by fear or by sorrow? But what could those men fear or grieve for in so great an abundance of so many goods, where neither death was feared, nor any bad health of the body; nor was anything absent which a good will might attain, nor was anything present which might offend the flesh or the soul of a man living happily? Love was unperturbed toward God, and between themselves as spouses living in a faithful and sincere society, and from this love a great joy, that which was loved not ceasing for enjoyment. There was a tranquil avoidance of sin, which remaining, no evil at all from elsewhere rushed in which might make them sad.

An forte cupiebant prohibitum lignum ad vescendum contingere, sed mori metuebant; ac per hoc et cupiditas, et metus jam tunc illos homines etiam in illo perturbabat loco? Absit ut hoc existimemus fuisse, ubi nullum erat omnino peccatum. Neque enim nullum peccatum est, ea quae lex Dei prohibet concupiscere, atque ab his abstinere timore poenae, non amore justitiae. Absit, inquam, ut ante omne peccatum jam ibi fuerit tale peccatum, ut hoc de ligno admitterent, quod de muliere Dominus ait, Si quis viderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, jam moechatus est eam in corde suo (Matth. V, 28). Quam igitur felices erant primi homines, et nullis agitabantur perturbationibus animorum, nullis corporum laedebantur incommodis: tam felix universa societas esset humana, si nec illi malum, quod etiam in posteros trajecerunt, nec quisquam ex eorum stirpe iniquitatem committeret, quae damnationem reciperet: atque ista permanente felicitate, donec per illam benedictionem, qua dictum est, Crescite, et multiplicamini (Gen. I, 28), praedestinatorum sanctorum numerus compleretur, alia major daretur, quae beatissimis Angelis data est: ubi jam esset certa securitas peccaturum neminem, neminemque moriturum: et talis esset vita sanctorum, post nullum laboris, doloris, mortis experimentum, qualis erit post haec omnia in incorruptione corporum reddita resurrectione mortuorum.

Caput XI.

De lapsu primi hominis, in quo bene condita natura est, nec potest nisi a suo Auctore reparari.

1. Sed quia Deus cuncta praescivit, et ideo hominem quoque peccaturum ignorare non potuit; secundum id quod praescivit atque disposuit civitatem sanctam, eam debemus asserere, non secundum illud quod in nostram cognitionem pervenire non potuit, quia in Dei dispositione non fuit. Nec enim homo peccato suo divinum potuit perturbare consilium, quasi Deum quod statuerat mutare compulerit: cum Deus praesciendo utrumque praevenerit, id est, et homo, quem bonum ipse creavit, quam malus esset futurus, et quid boni etiam sic de illo esset ipse facturus. Deus enim etsi dicitur statuta mutare (unde tropica locutione in Scripturis sanctis etiam poenituisse legitur Deum [Gen. VI, 6; I Reg. XV, 11]), juxta id dicitur, quod homo speraverat, vel naturalium causarum ordo gestabat; non juxta id quod se Omnipotens facturum esse praesciverat. Fecit itaque Deus, sicut scriptum est, hominem rectum (Eccle. VII, 30): ac per hoc voluntatis bonae. Non enim rectus esset, bonam non habens voluntatem. Bona igitur voluntas opus est Dei: cum ea quippe ab illo factus est homo.

Or perhaps did they desire to touch the forbidden tree for eating, but feared to die; and by this both desire and fear already then perturbed those men even in that place? Far be it from us to estimate that this was so, where there was no sin at all. For it is not no sin to desire those things which the law of God prohibits, and to abstain from them by fear of punishment, not by love of justice. Far be it, I say, that before all sin there should already have been such a sin there, that they should admit this concerning the tree, which the Lord says concerning the woman: "If anyone shall look upon a woman to desire her, he has already committed adultery with her in his heart" (Matt. 5:28). How happy, therefore, were the first men, and they were agitated by no perturbations of souls, and were hurt by no inconveniences of bodies: so happy would the whole human society be, if neither they had committed that evil which they also passed on to their descendants, nor anyone from their stock should commit iniquity which would receive damnation: and while this happiness remained, until through that blessing by which it was said, "Increase and multiply" (Gen. 1:28), the number of the predestined saints should be completed, another greater [happiness] would be given, which was given to the most blessed Angels: where there would already be the certain security that no one would sin, and no one would die: and such would be the life of the saints, after no experience of labor, sorrow, or death, as it will be after all these things in the incorruption of bodies restored by the resurrection of the dead.

Chapter XI.

Concerning the fall of the first man, in whom nature was well established, nor can it be repaired except by its Author.

1. But because God foreknew all things, and therefore could not be ignorant that man also would sin; according to that which He foreknew and disposed we ought to assert the holy city, not according to that which could not arrive at our knowledge, because it was not in the disposition of God. For neither could man by his sin perturb the divine counsel, as if he compelled God to change what He had decreed: since God by foreknowing preceded both, that is, both the man, whom He Himself created good, how bad he was going to be, and what good even so He Himself was going to make out of him. For even if God is said to change His decrees (whence in a tropical locution in the holy Scriptures it is even read that God repented [Gen. 6:6; 1 Kings 15:11]), it is said according to that which man had hoped, or the order of natural causes was bearing; not according to that which the Almighty had foreknown that He Himself was going to do. God therefore made man right, as it is written (Ecclus. 7:30): and by this of a good will. For he would not be right, not having a good will. A good will therefore is the work of God: for with it certainly man was made by Him.

Mala vero voluntas prima, quoniam omnia mala opera praecessit in homine, defectus potius fuit quidam ab opere Dei ad sua opera, quam opus ullum. Et ideo mala opera, quia secundum se, non secundum Deum: ut eorum operum tanquam fructuum malorum voluntas ipsa esset velut arbor mala, aut ipse homo in quantum malae voluntatis. Porro mala voluntas, quamvis non sit secundum naturam, sed contra naturam, quia vitium est; tamen ejus naturae est, cujus est vitium, quod nisi in natura non potest esse: sed in ea quam creavit ex nihilo, non quam genuit Creator de semetipso, sicut genuit Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia. Quia etsi de terrae pulvere Deus finxit hominem; eadem terra omnisque terrena materies omnino de nihilo est, animamque de nihilo factam dedit corpori, cum factus est homo. Usque adeo autem mala vincuntur a bonis, ut quamvis sinantur esse ad demonstrandum quam possit et ipsis bene uti justitia providentissima Creatoris; bona tamen sine malis esse possint, sicut Deus ipse verus et summus, sicut omnis super istum caliginosum aerem coelestis invisibilis visibilisque creatura; mala vero sine bonis esse non possint, quoniam naturae in quibus sunt, in quantum naturae sunt, utique bonae sunt. Detrahitur porro malum, non aliqua natura quae accesserat vel ulla ejus parte sublata, sed ea quae vitiata ac depravata fuerat, sanata atque correcta. Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum vitiis peccatisque non servit. Tale datum est a Deo: quod amissum proprio vitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Unde Veritas dicit, Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis (Joan. VIII, 36). Idipsum est autem, ac si diceret, Si vos Filius salvos fecerit, tunc vere salvi eritis. Inde quippe liberator, unde salvator.

2. Vivebat itaque homo secundum Deum in paradiso, et corporali et spirituali. Neque enim erat paradisus corporalis propter corporis bona, et propter mentis non erat spiritualis; aut vero erat spiritualis quo per interiores, et non erat corporalis quo per exteriores sensus homo frueretur. Erat plane utrumque propter utrumque. Postea vero quam superbus ille angelus, ac per hoc invidus, per eamdem superbiam a Deo ad semetipsum conversus, quodam quasi tyrannico fastu gaudere subditis, quam esse subditus eligens, de spirituali paradiso cecidit (de cujus lapsu sociorumque ejus, qui ex Angelis Dei angeli ejus effecti sunt, in libris undecimo et duodecimo hujus operis satis, quantum potui, disputavi),

But the first bad will, since it preceded all bad works in man, was rather a certain defect from the work of God to its own works, than any work. And therefore bad works, because according to itself, not according to God: so that of those works as of bad fruits the will itself should be as a bad tree, or the man himself insofar as he is of a bad will. Furthermore, a bad will, although it is not according to nature, but against nature, because it is a vice; yet it is of that nature whose vice it is, which cannot be except in a nature: but in that which He created out of nothing, not which the Creator begot from Himself, just as He begot the Word, through whom all things were made. Because even if God fashioned man from the dust of the earth; that same earth and all earthly matter is entirely from nothing, and He gave to the body a soul made out of nothing, when man was made. But to such an extent are bad things conquered by good things, that although they are permitted to be for the purpose of demonstrating how well the most provident justice of the Creator can use even them; nevertheless good things can be without bad things, as God Himself true and supreme, as every celestial invisible and visible creature above this dark air; but bad things cannot be without good things, since the natures in which they are, insofar as they are natures, are certainly good. Furthermore, evil is taken away, not by any nature which had approached or any part of it being removed, but that which had been vitiated and depraved being healed and corrected. Therefore the choice of the will is then truly free, when it does not serve vices and sins. Such was given by God: which having been lost by its own vice, cannot be restored except by Him by whom it could be given. Whence the Truth says: "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed" (John 8:36). But it is the same as if He were to say: If the Son shall make you safe, then you shall be truly safe. For He is the liberator from the same source whence He is the savior.

2. Therefore man was living according to God in paradise, both corporal and spiritual. For neither was paradise corporal on account of the goods of the body, and not spiritual on account of the goods of the mind; or truly was it spiritual whither man might enjoy through his interior senses, and not corporal whither he might enjoy through his exterior senses. Clearly it was both on account of both. But after that proud angel, and for this reason envious, having turned through the same pride from God to himself, choosing rather to rejoice in subjects by a certain tyrannical arrogance than to be a subject, fell from the spiritual paradise (concerning whose fall and that of his companions, who from the Angels of God were made his angels, I have disputed enough, as much as I could, in the eleventh and twelfth books of this work),

malesuada versutia in hominis sensus serpere affectans, cui utique stanti, quoniam ipse ceciderat, invidebat, colubrum in paradiso corporali, ubi cum duobus illis hominibus masculo et femina animalia etiam terrestria caetera subdita et innoxia versabantur, animal scilicet lubricum et tortuosis anfractibus mobile, operi suo congruum, per quem loqueretur, elegit; eoque per angelicam praesentiam praestantioremque naturam spirituali nequitia sibi subjecto, et tanquam instrumento abutens, fallacia sermocinatus est feminae: a parte scilicet inferiore illius humanae copulae incipiens, ut gradatim perveniret ad totum; non existimans virum facile credulum, nec errando posse decipi, sed dum alieno cedit errori. Sicut enim Aaron erranti populo ad idolum fabricandum non consensit inductus, sed cessit obstrictus (Exod. XXXII, 3-5); nec Salomonem credibile est errore putasse idolis esse serviendum, sed blanditiis femineis ad illa sacrilegia fuisse compulsum (III Reg. XI, 4): ita credendum est, illum virum suae feminae, uni unum, hominem homini, conjugem conjugi, ad Dei legem transgrediendam, non tanquam verum loquenti credidisse seductum, sed sociali necessitudine paruisse. Non enim frustra dixit Apostolus, Sed et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta est (I Tim. II, 14): nisi quia illa quod ei serpens locutus est, tanquam verum esset, accepit, ille autem ab unico noluit consortio dirimi, nec in communione peccati; nec ideo minus reus, sed sciens prudensque peccavit. Unde et Apostolus non ait, Non peccavit; sed, Non est seductus. Nam utique ipsum ostendit, ubi dicit, Per unum hominem intravit peccatum in mundum: et paulo post apertius, In similitudine, inquit, praevaricationis Adae (Rom. V, 12, 14). Eos autem seductos intelligi voluit, qui id quod faciunt, non putant esse peccatum: ille autem scivit. Alioquin quomodo verum erit, Adam non est seductus? Sed inexpertus divinae severitatis in eo falli potuit, ut veniale crederet esse commissum. Ac per hoc in eo quidem quo mulier seducta est, non est ille seductus, sed eum fefellit, quomodo fuerat judicandum quod erat dicturus, Mulier quam dedisti mecum, ipsa mihi dedit, et manducavi (Gen. III, 12). Quid ergo pluribus? Etsi credendo non sunt ambo decepti, peccando tamen ambo sunt capti, et diaboli laqueis implicati.

aiming to creep with ill-persuading craftiness into the senses of man, whom surely he envied as he stood because he himself had fallen, he chose in the corporal paradise, where with those two men, male and female, the other terrestrial animals also moved about as subjects and harmless, an animal forsooth slippery and movable with tortuous windings, suitable for his work, through which he might speak; and having that [animal] subject to himself through his angelic presence and more excellent nature by spiritual wickedness, and using it as an instrument, he spoke fallaciously to the woman: beginning forsooth from the lower part of that human couple, so that he might arrive gradually at the whole; not thinking the man to be easily credulous, nor able to be deceived by erring, but while he yields to another's error. For just as Aaron did not consent to the erring people for the fashioning of an idol having been induced, but yielded being constrained (Exod. 32:3-5); nor is it credible that Solomon thought by error that idols ought to be served, but was compelled to those sacrileges by feminine blandishments (1 Kings 11:4): so it is to be believed that that man to his woman, one to one, man to human, spouse to spouse, for the purpose of transgressing the law of God, did not believe having been seduced as if [the serpent] spoke the truth, but obeyed a social necessity. For not in vain did the Apostle say: "And Adam was not seduced, but the woman was seduced" (1 Tim. 2:14): unless because she accepted that which the serpent spoke to her as if it were true, but he willed not to be severed from his unique consort, even in the communion of sin; nor for that reason was he less guilty, but he sinned knowingly and prudently. Whence also the Apostle does not say, "He did not sin"; but, "He was not seduced." For surely he shows him [to have sinned] where he says: "By one man sin entered into the world": and a little after more clearly, "In the likeness," he says, "of the transgression of Adam" (Rom. 5:12, 14). But he willed those to be understood as seduced who do not think that which they do to be sin: but he knew. Otherwise how will it be true, "Adam was not seduced"? But being inexperienced in divine severity, he could be deceived in this, so as to believe that a venial [sin] had been committed. And by this in that indeed in which the woman was seduced, he was not seduced, but it deceived him how that was to be judged which he was about to say: "The woman whom thou gavest me, she gave to me, and I did eat" (Gen. 3:12). What more then? Although by believing they were not both deceived, nevertheless by sinning they were both captured and implicated in the snares of the devil.

2. Manifesto ergo apertoque peccato, ubi factum est quod Deus fieri prohibuerat, diabolus hominem non cepisset, nisi jam ille sibi ipsi placere coepisset. Hinc enim et delectavit quod dictum est, Eritis sicut dii (Gen. III, 5). Quod melius esse possent summo veroque principio cohaerendo per obedientiam, non suum sibi existendo principium per superbiam. Dii enim creati, non sua veritate, sed Dei veri participatione sunt dii. Plus autem appetendo, minus est: qui dum sibi sufficere diligit, ab illo qui ei vere sufficit, deficit. Illud itaque malum, quo cum sibi homo placet, tanquam sit et ipse lumen, avertitur ab eo lumine, quod ei si placeat et ipse fit lumen: illud, inquam, malum praecessit in abdito, ut sequeretur hoc malum quod perpetratum est in aperto. Verum est enim quod scriptum est: Ante ruinam exaltatur cor, et ante gloriam humiliatur (Prov. XVI, 18). Illa prorsus ruina quae fit in occulto, praecedit ruinam quae fit in manifesto, dum illa ruina esse non putatur. Quis enim exaltationem ruinam putat; cum jam ibi sit defectus, quo est relictus Excelsus? Quis autem ruinam esse non videat, quando fit mandati evidens atque indubitata transgressio? Propter hoc Deus illud prohibuit, quod cum esset admissum, nulla defendi posset imaginatione justitiae. Et audeo dicere, superbis esse utile cadere in aliquod apertum manifestumque peccatum, unde sibi displiceant, qui jam sibi placendo ceciderant. Salubrius enim Petrus sibi displicuit quando flevit, quam sibi placuit quando praesumpsit (Matth. XXVI, 75, 33). Hoc dicit et sacer Psalmus: Imple facies eorum ignominia, et quaerent nomen tuum, Domine (Psal. LXXXII, 17): id est, ut tu eis placeas quaerentibus nomen tuum, qui sibi placuerunt quaerendo suum.

Caput XIV.

De superbia transgressionis, quae ipsa fuit transgressione deterior.

Sed est pejor damnabiliorque superbia, qua etiam in peccatis manifestis suffugium excusationis inquiritur: sicut illi primi homines, quorum et illa dixit, Serpens seduxit me, et manducavi; et ille dixit, Mulier quam dedisti mecum, haec mihi dedit a ligno, et edi (Gen. III, 13, 12). Nusquam hic sonat petitio veniae, nusquam imploratio medicinae. Nam licet isti non sicut Cain, quod commiserunt, negent (Id. IV, 9), adhuc tamen superbia in alium quaerit referre, quod perperam fecit: superbia mulieris, in serpentem; superbia viri, in mulierem.

2. Therefore, in that manifest and open sin, where that was done which God had prohibited to be done, the devil would not have captured man unless he had already begun to please himself. For hence also that delighted which was said: "You shall be as gods" (Gen. 3:5). Which they could better be by adhering to the supreme and true principle through obedience, not by existing as their own principle for themselves through pride. For created gods are gods not by their own truth, but by participation in the true God. But by desiring more, he becomes less: who, while he loves to be sufficient for himself, defects from Him who truly suffices for him. Therefore, that evil, by which man pleases himself as if he himself were also light, is turned away from that light which, if it pleases him, he himself also becomes light: that evil, I say, preceded in secret, so that this evil which was perpetrated in the open might follow. For it is true what is written: "Before ruin the heart is exalted, and before glory it is humbled" (Prov. 16:18). That ruin indeed which happens in secret precedes the ruin which happens in the manifest, while that is not thought to be ruin. For who thinks exaltation to be ruin, when there is already a defect there, by which the Most High is abandoned? But who would not see it to be ruin when an evident and indubitable transgression of the command occurs? For this reason God prohibited that which, when it was admitted, could be defended by no imagination of justice. And I dare to say, it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, whence they may displease themselves, who had already fallen by pleasing themselves. For Peter displeased himself more healthfully when he wept than he pleased himself when he presumed (Matt. 26:75, 33). This also the sacred Psalm says: "Fill their faces with ignominy, and they shall seek thy name, O Lord" (Ps. 82:17): that is, so that Thou mayest please them seeking Thy name, who pleased themselves by seeking their own.

Chapter XIV.

Of the pride of the transgression, which was itself worse than the transgression.

But there is a worse and more damnable pride, by which even in manifest sins a refuge of excuse is sought: as those first humans, of whom she said, "The serpent seduced me, and I did eat"; and he said, "The woman whom thou gavest me, she gave me from the tree, and I ate" (Gen. 3:13, 12). Nowhere here sounds a petition for pardon, nowhere an imploration of medicine. For although these do not, like Cain, deny what they committed (Id. 4:9), yet pride still seeks to refer to another what was done wrongly: the pride of the woman to the serpent; the pride of the man to the woman.

Sed accusatio potius quam excusatio vera est, ubi mandati divini est aperta transgressio. Neque enim hoc propterea non fecerunt, quia id mulier serpente suadente, vir muliere impertiente commisit; quasi quidquam Deo, cui vel crederetur, vel cederetur, anteponendum fuerit.

Caput XV.

De justitia retributionis, quam primi homines pro sua inobedientia receperunt.

1. Quia ergo contemptus est Deus jubens, qui creaverat, qui ad suam imaginem fecerat, qui caeteris animalibus praeposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat, qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus oneraverat, sed uno brevissimo atque levissimo ad obedientiae salubritatem adminiculaverat, quo eam creaturam, cui libera servitus expediret, se esse Dominum commonebat: justa damnatio subsecuta est, talisque damnatio, ut homo qui custodiendo mandatum futurus fuerat etiam carne spiritualis, fieret etiam mente carnalis; et qui sua superbia sibi placuerat, Dei justitia sibi donaretur; nec sic ut in sua esset omnimodis potestate, sed a se ipse quoque dissentiens, sub illo cui peccando consensit, pro libertate quam concupivit, duram miseramque ageret servitutem; mortuus spiritu volens, et corpore moriturus invitus: desertor aeternae vitae, etiam aeterna, nisi gratia liberaret, morte damnatus. Quisquis hujusmodi damnationem vel nimiam, vel injustam putat, metiri profecto nescit quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas. Sicut enim Abrahae non immerito magna obedientia praedicatur, quia ut occideret filium, res difficillima est imperata (Gen. XXII, 2): ita in paradiso tanto major inobedientia fuit, quanto id quod praeceptum est, nullius difficultatis fuit. Et sicut obedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior, quo factus est obediens usque ad mortem (Philipp. II, 8): ita inobedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior, quo factus est inobediens usque ad mortem. Ubi enim magna est inobedientiae poena proposita, et res a Creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit, non obedire in re facili, et tantae potestatis imperio, et tanto terrenti supplicio?

But it is an accusation rather than a true excuse where there is an open transgression of the divine command. For they did not therefore not do it because the woman committed it at the serpent's persuasion, and the man at the woman's bestowing; as if anything ought to have been preferred to God, who was either to be believed or to be yielded to.

Chapter XV.

Of the justice of the retribution, which the first humans received for their disobedience.

1. Because, therefore, God was contemned when commanding, He who had created, who had made according to His image, who had set [man] over the other animals, who had established him in paradise, who had provided an abundance of all things and of safety, who had not burdened him with many or great or difficult precepts, but had assisted him with one very brief and very light one for the healthfulness of obedience, by which He reminded that creature, for whom a free servitude was expedient, that He was the Lord: a just damnation followed, and such a damnation that man, who by keeping the command would have been spiritual even in the flesh, became carnal even in the mind; and he who by his own pride had pleased himself, was given over to himself by the justice of God; yet not so that he should be in his own power in all ways, but also dissenting from himself, he should lead a hard and miserable servitude under him to whom by sinning he consented, in place of the liberty which he desired; dead in spirit by willing, and about to die in the body against his will: a deserter of eternal life, condemned even to eternal death, unless grace should deliver him. Whoever thinks this kind of damnation to be either excessive or unjust, surely knows not how to measure how great was the iniquity in sinning where there was so great a facility of not sinning. For just as the great obedience of Abraham is not without merit proclaimed, because a most difficult thing was commanded, that he should kill his son (Gen. 22:2): so in paradise the disobedience was by so much the greater as that which was commanded was of no difficulty. And just as the obedience of the second man is by so much the more commendable as He was made obedient even unto death (Phil. 2:8): so the disobedience of the first man is by so much the more detestable as he was made disobedient even unto death. For where a great penalty of disobedience is proposed, and an easy thing is commanded by the Creator, who indeed could sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter, and under the command of so great a power, and with so great a terrifying punishment?

2. Denique, ut breviter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inobedientiae nisi inobedientia retributu est? Nam quae hominis est alia miseria, nisi adversus eum ipsum inobedientia ejus ipsius, ut quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest velit? In paradiso enim etiamsi non omnia poterat ante peccatum, quidquid tamen non poterat, non volebat; et ideo poterat omnia quae volebat. Nunc vero sicut in ejus stirpe cognoscimus, et divina Scriptura testatur, homo vanitati similis factus est (Psal. CXLIII, 4). Quis enim enumerat, quam multa quae non potest velit, dum sibi ipse, id est voluntati ejus, ipse animus ejus, eoque inferior caro ejus non obtemperat? Ipso namque invito, et animus plerumque turbatur, et caro dolet, et veterascit, et moritur; et quidquid aliud patimur, quod non pateremur inviti, si voluntati nostrae nostra natura omni modo atque ex omnibus partibus obediret. At enim aliquid caro patitur, quo servire non sinitur. Quid interest unde, dum tamen per justitiam dominantis Dei, cui subditi servire noluimus, caro nostra nobis, quae subdita fuerat, non serviendo molesta sit; quamvis nos Deo non serviendo, molesti nobis potuerimus esse, non illi? Neque enim sic ille nostro, ut nos servitio corporis indigemus: et ideo nostra est quod recipimus, non illius poena quod fecimus. Dolores porro qui dicuntur carnis, animae sunt in carne, et ex carne. Quid enim caro per se ipsam sine anima vel dolet, vel concupiscit? Sed quod concupiscere caro dicitur vel dolere, aut ipse homo est, sicut disseruimus; aut aliquid animae, quod carnis afficit passio, vel aspera, ut faciat dolorem; vel lenis, ut voluptatem. Sed dolor carnis tantummodo offensio est animae ex carne, et quaedam ab ejus passione dissensio: sicut animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. Sed tristitiam plerumque praecedit metus, qui et ipse in anima est, non in carne. Dolorem autem carnis non praecedit ullus quasi metus carnis, qui ante dolorem in carne sentiatur. Voluptatem vero praecedit appetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas ejus, sicut fames et sitis, et ea quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale vocabulum omnis cupiditatis. Nam et ipsam iram nihil aliud esse, quam ulciscendi libidinem, veteres definierunt: quamvis nonnunquam homo, ubi vindictae nullus est sensus, etiam rebus inanimis irascatur, ut male scribentem stilum collidat, vel calamum frangat iratus. Verum et ista licet irrationabilior, tamen quaedam ulciscendi libido est, et nescio quae, ut ita dixerim, quasi umbra retributionis, ut qui male faciunt, mala patiantur. Est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur: est libido habendi pecuniam, quae avaritia: est libido quomodocumque vincendi, quae pervicacia: est libido gloriandi, quae jactantia nuncupatur. Sunt multae variaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam vocabula propria, quaedam vero non habent.

2. Finally, to speak briefly, in the punishment of that sin, what was retributed to disobedience but disobedience? For what other is the misery of man but disobedience against himself, so that since he willed not what he could, he wills what he cannot? For in paradise, even if he could not do all things before sin, yet whatever he could not do, he did not will; and therefore he could do all things which he willed. But now, as we know in his offspring and as Divine Scripture testifies, "man is made like to vanity" (Ps. 143:4). For who could enumerate how many things he wills which he cannot do, while he himself, that is, his own mind, and his inferior flesh, does not obey himself, that is, his own will? For against his will, both his mind is often troubled, and his flesh suffers pain, and grows old, and dies; and whatever else we suffer, which we would not suffer against our will if our nature in every way and in all parts obeyed our will. But indeed the flesh suffers something by which it is not permitted to serve. What does it matter whence, provided that through the justice of the dominant God, to whom we as subjects refused to serve, our flesh, which had been subject, is troublesome to us by not serving; although we, by not serving God, could be troublesome to ourselves, not to Him? For He does not stand in need of our service as we stand in need of the service of the body: and therefore what we receive is our punishment, not His, for what we did. Furthermore, the pains which are called of the flesh are of the soul in the flesh, and from the flesh. For what does the flesh by itself without the soul either feel pain or desire? But that the flesh is said to desire or to feel pain, is either the man himself, as we have discussed; or something of the soul which the passion of the flesh affects, either harsh, so as to cause pain, or gentle, so as to cause pleasure. But the pain of the flesh is only an offense of the soul from the flesh, and a certain dissension from its passion: just as the pain of the soul, which is called sadness, is a dissension from those things which happened to us against our will. But sadness is often preceded by fear, which is also in the soul, not in the flesh. But no kind of fear of the flesh, as it were, which might be felt in the flesh before the pain, precedes the pain of the flesh. But pleasure is preceded by a certain appetite which is felt in the flesh as its cupidity, such as hunger and thirst, and that which is more commonly called lust (libido) in the genitals, although this is a general term for every cupidity. For the ancients defined anger itself to be nothing else than the lust for revenging: although sometimes man, where there is no sense of vengeance, is angry even at inanimate things, so that in his anger he smashes a pen that writes poorly or breaks a reed. Truly even this, though more irrational, is still a certain lust for revenging, and some kind of shadow of retribution, as it were, that those who do evil may suffer evil. There is, therefore, a lust for revenging, which is called anger: there is a lust for having money, which is avarice: there is a lust for winning in any way, which is obstinacy: there is a lust for glorying, which is called boasting. There are many and various lusts, of which some have also their own names, but some have not.

Quis enim facile dixerit, quid vocetur libido dominandi, quam tamen plurimum valere in tyrannorum animis, etiam civilia bella testantur?

Caput XVI.

De libidinis malo, cujus nomen cum multis vitiis congruat, proprie tamen motibus obscenis corporis adscribitur.

Cum igitur sint multarum libidines rerum, tamen cum libido dicitur, neque cujus rei libido sit additur, non fere assolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae corporis partes excitantur. Haec autem sibi non solum totum corpus, nec solum extrinsecus, verum etiam intrinsecus vindicat, totumque commovet hominem animi simul affectu cum carnis appetitu conjuncto atque permixto, ut ea voluptas sequatur, qua major in corporis voluptatibus nulla est: ita ut momento ipso temporis, quo ad ejus pervenitur extremum, pene omnis acies et quasi vigilia cogitationis obruatur. Quis autem amicus sapientiae sanctorumque gaudiorum, conjugalem agens vitam, sed, sicut Apostolus monuit, sciens vas suum possidere in sanctificatione et honore, non in morbo desiderii, sicut et Gentes quae ignorant Deum (I Thess. IV, 4, 5), non mallet, si posset, sine hac libidine filios procreare; ut etiam in hoc serendae prolis officio, sic ejus menti ea quae ad hoc opus creata sunt, quemadmodum caetera suis quaeque operibus distributa membra servirent, nutu voluntatis acta, non aestu libidinis incitata? Sed neque ipsi amatores hujus voluptatis, sive ad concubitus conjugales, sive ad immunditias flagitiorum, cum voluerint commoventur: sed aliquando motus ille importunus est nullo poscente, aliquando autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferveat, friget in corpore: atque ita mirum in modum non solum generandi voluntati, verum etiam lasciviendi libidini libido non servit; et cum tota plerumque menti cohibenti adversetur, nonnunquam et adversus se ipsam dividitur, commotoque animo in commovendo corpore se ipsa non sequitur.

Caput XVII.

De nuditate primorum hominum, quam post peccatum turpem pudendamque viderunt.

For who could easily say what the lust for dominating is called, which nevertheless the civil wars testify to have very great power in the minds of tyrants?

Chapter XVI.

Of the evil of lust, whose name though it agrees with many vices, is yet properly ascribed to the obscene motions of the body.

Therefore, although there are lusts for many things, yet when lust is mentioned, and it is not added of what thing it is the lust, it is not usually accustomed to occur to the mind except that by which the obscene parts of the body are excited. But this vindicates for itself not only the whole body, nor only from without, but also from within, and moves the whole man, the affection of the mind being joined and mixed together with the appetite of the flesh, so that that pleasure follows than which none is greater among the pleasures of the body: so that at the very moment of time in which its extreme is reached, almost all the keenness and as it were the vigil of thought is overwhelmed. But who that is a friend of wisdom and of holy joys, leading a conjugal life, but, as the Apostle warned, "knowing how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as also the Gentiles who know not God" (1 Thess. 4:4, 5), would not prefer, if he could, to procreate children without this lust; so that even in this office of sowing offspring, those parts which were created for this work might serve his mind just as the other members distributed each to its own works, being moved by the nod of the will, not incited by the heat of lust? But not even the lovers of this pleasure themselves are moved when they wish, whether for conjugal intercourse or for the impurities of flagitious acts: but sometimes that motion is importunate when no one asks, but sometimes it deserts the one who gasps for it, and while concupiscence burns in the mind, it is cold in the body: and thus in a wondrous manner lust does not serve not only the will for generating, but even the lust for lasciviousness; and while it is for the most part opposed to the mind that restrains it, sometimes it is even divided against itself, and the mind being moved in moving the body, it does not follow itself.

Chapter XVII.

Of the nakedness of the first humans, which after sin they saw to be base and shameful.

Merito hujus libidinis maxime pudet, merito et ipsa membra, quae suo quodam, ut ita dixerim, jure, non omnimodo ad arbitrium nostrum movet, aut non movet, pudenda dicuntur, quod ante peccatum hominis non fuerunt. Nam sicut scriptum est, Nudi erant, et non confundebantur (Gen. II, 25): non quod eis sua nuditas esset incognita, sed turpis nuditas nondum erat; quia nondum libido membra illa praeter arbitrium commovebat, nondum ad hominis inobedientiam redarguendam sua inobedientia caro quodammodo testimonium perhibebat. Neque enim caeci creati erant, ut imperitum vulgus opinatur: quandoquidem et ille vidit animalia, quibus nomina imposuit (Ib. 20); et de illa legitur, Vidit mulier quia bonum lignum in escam, et quia placet oculis ad videndum (Ib. III, 6.) Patebant ergo oculi eorum, sed ad hoc non erant aperti, hoc est non attenti, ut cognocerent quid eis indumento gratiae praestaretur, quando membra eorum voluntati repugnare nesciebant. Qua gratia remota, ut poena reciproca inobedientia plecteretur, exstitit in motu corporis quaedam impudens novitas, unde esset indecens nuditas; et fecit attentos, reddiditque confusos. Hinc est quod, posteaquam mandatum Dei aperta transgressione violarunt, scriptum est de illis, Et aperti sunt oculi amborum, et cognoverunt quia nudi erant, et consuerunt folia fici, et fecerunt sibi campestria. (Ibid. 7). Aperti sunt, inquit, oculi amborum, non ad videndum (nam et antea videbant); sed ad discernendum inter bonum quod amiserant, et malum quo ceciderant. Unde et ipsum lignum, eo quod istam faceret dignoscentiam, si ad vescendum contra vetitum tangeretur, ex ea re nomen accepit, ut appellaretur lignum sciendi boni et mali. Experta enim morbi molestia, evidentior fit etiam jucunditas sanitatis. Cognoverunt ergo quia nudi erant: nudati scilicet ea gratia, qua fiebat ut nuditas corporis nulla eos lege peccati menti eorum repugnante confunderet. Hoc itaque cognoverunt, quod felicius ignorarent, si Deo credentes et obedientes non committerent, quod eos cogeret experiri infidelitas et inobedientia quid nocerent. Proinde confusi inobedientia carnis suae, tanquam teste poena inobedientiae suae, consuerunt folia fici, et fecerunt sibi campestria, id est succinctoria genitalium. Nam quidam interpretes succinctoria posuerunt. Porro autem campestria latinum quidem verbum est, sed ex eo dictum, quod juvenes, qui nudi exercebantur in campo, pudenda operiebant: unde qui ita succincti sunt, campestratos vulgus appellat. Quod itaque adversus damnatam culpa inobedientiae voluntatem libido inobedienter movebat, verecundia pudenter tegebat.

Deservedly is there the greatest shame for this lust, deservedly also those members themselves, which it moves or does not move by a certain right of its own, as I might say, and not in every way at our arbitrament, are called shameful (pudenda), which they were not before the sin of man. For as it is written, "They were naked, and were not confounded" (Gen. 2:25): not that their nakedness was unknown to them, but base nakedness was not yet; because lust did not yet move those members beyond arbitrament, nor did the flesh yet bear testimony in some way by its own disobedience to redargue the disobedience of man. For neither were they created blind, as the unskilful vulgar suppose: since he even saw the animals to which he imposed names (Ib. 20); and of her it is read, "The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasing to the eyes to behold" (Ib. 3:6). Therefore their eyes were open, but to this they were not open, that is, not attentive, that they might know what was provided for them by the indument of grace, when their members knew not how to repugn the will. Which grace being removed, so that disobedience might be punished with a reciprocal penalty, there existed in the motion of the body a certain impudent novelty, whence there was indecent nakedness; and it made them attentive and rendered them confounded. Hence it is that, after they violated the command of God by open transgression, it is written of them: "And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked, and they sewed fig leaves, and made themselves campestria" (Ibid. 7). "Their eyes were opened," he says, "of both," not for seeing (for they saw before also); but for discerning between the good which they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. Whence also the tree itself, for the reason that it would cause that discernment if it were touched for eating against the prohibition, received its name from that fact, so that it was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. For the molest of disease being experienced, the pleasantness of health also becomes more evident. "They knew," therefore, "that they were naked": naked, to wit, of that grace by which it was brought about that no nakedness of the body confounded them with any law of sin repugning their mind. This, therefore, they knew, which they would more happily be ignorant of, if believing and obeying God they did not commit what would compel them to experience what harm infidelity and disobedience would do. Accordingly, confounded by the disobedience of their own flesh, as by a witness to the penalty of their own disobedience, "they sewed fig leaves, and made themselves campestria," that is, succinctoria (aprons) of the genitals. For some interpreters have put "succinctoria." Furthermore, "campestria" is indeed a Latin word, but so called from the fact that the youths, who exercised naked in the field (campus), covered their shameful parts: whence those who are thus succinct, the vulgar call "campestrati." That, therefore, which lust was inobediently moving against the will condemned for the fault of disobedience, modesty was shamefully covering.

Ex hoc omnes gentes, quoniam ab illa stirpe procreatae sunt, usque adeo tenent insitum pudenda velare, ut quidam barbari illas corporis partes nec in balneis nudas habeant, sed cum earum tegumentis lavent. Per opacas quoque Indiae solitudines, cum quidam nudi philosophentur, unde Gymnosophistae nominantur, adhibent tamen genitalibus tegmina, quibus per caetera membrorum carent.

Caput XVIII.

De pudore concubitus, non solum vulgari, sed etiam conjugali.

Opus vero ipsum quod libidine tali peragitur, non solum in quibusque stupris, ubi latebrae ad subterfugienda humana judicia requiruntur; verum etiam in usu scortorum, quam terrena civitas licitam turpitudinem fecit, quamvis id agatur, quod ejus civitatis nulla lex vindicat, devitat tamen publicum etiam permissa atque impunita libido conspectum; et verecundia naturali habent provisum lupanaria ipsa secretum, faciliusque potuit impudicitia non habere vincula prohibitionis, quam impudentia removere latibula illius foeditatis. Sed hanc etiam ipsi turpes turpitudinem vocant: cujus licet sint amatores, ostentatores esse non audent. Quid? concubitus conjugalis, qui secundum matrimonialium praescripta Tabularum procreandorum fit causa liberorum, nonne et ipse quanquam sit licitus et honestus, remotum ab arbitris cubile requirit? nonne omnes famulos, atque ipsos etiam paranymphos, et quoscumque ingredi quaelibet necessitudo permiserat, ante mittit foras, quam vel blandiri conjux conjugi incipiat? Et quoniam, sicut ait quidam, Romani maximus auctor eloquii, omnia recte facta in luce se collocari volunt, id est appetunt sciri: hoc recte factum sic appetit sciri, ut tamen erubescat videri. Quis enim nescit, ut filii procreentur. quid inter se conjuges agant? quandoquidem ut id agatur, tanta celebritate docuntur uxores: et tamen cum agitur unde filii nascantur, nec ipsi filii, si qui inde jam nati sunt, testes fieri permittuntur. Sic enim hoc recte factum ad sui notitiam lucem appetit animorum, ut tamen refugiat oculorum. Unde hoc, nisi quia sic geritur quod deceat ex natura, ut etiam quod pudeat comitetur ex poena?

Caput XIX.

Quod partes irae atque libidinis tam vitiose moventur, ut eas necesse sit frenis sapientiae cohiberi, quae in illa ante peccatum naturae sanitate non fuerunt.

From this all nations, since they have been procreated from that stock, hold so firmly the ingrained custom of veiling the shameful parts, that some barbarians do not have those parts of the body naked even in the baths, but wash with their coverings. Also through the opaque solitudes of India, when some philosophize naked, whence they are named Gymnosophists, they nevertheless apply coverings to the genitals, which they lack for the rest of their members.

Chapter XVIII.

Of the shame of intercourse, not only vulgar but even conjugal.

But that work itself which is performed by such lust, not only in any kind of debaucheries, where hiding-places are required to evade human judgments; but even in the use of harlots, which the earthly city has made a licit turpitude, although that is done which no law of that city punishes, yet even permitted and unpunished lust avoids public view; and by natural modesty the very brothels have provided secrecy, and it was more easily possible for unchastity not to have the bonds of prohibition than for impudence to remove the hiding-places of that foulness. But even the base themselves call this turpitude: of which, though they be lovers, they dare not be ostentators. What? Does not conjugal intercourse itself, which according to the precepts of the matrimonial tablets is done for the cause of procreating children, although it be licit and honest, require a bedchamber remote from witnesses? Does it not send out of doors all servants, and even the groomsmen themselves, and whomever any necessity had permitted to enter, before the spouse begins even to fondle the spouse? And since, as a certain most great author of Roman eloquence says, all things rightly done wish to be placed in the light, that is, they desire to be known: this rightly done thing so desires to be known that it nevertheless blushes to be seen. For who does not know what spouses do between themselves that children may be procreated? Since wives are taught with such celebration that this may be done: and yet when that is done whence children are born, not even the children themselves, if any have already been born thence, are permitted to be witnesses. For thus this rightly done thing desires for its knowledge the light of minds, so that nevertheless it flees from that of eyes. Whence is this, except because that is so carried on which may be becoming from nature, so that also that which may be shameful accompanies it from the penalty?

Chapter XIX.

That the parts of anger and lust are so viciously moved that it is necessary that they be restrained by the bridles of wisdom, which in that health of nature before sin were not there.

Hinc est quod et illi philosophi, qui veritati propius accesserunt, iram atque libidinem vitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide atque inordinate moverentur, ad ea etiam quae sapientia perpetrari non vetat; ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque ratione. Quam partem animi tertiam, velut in arce quadam ad istas regendas perhibent collocatam; ut illa imperante, istis servientibus, possit in homine justitia ex omni animi parte servari. Hae igitur partes, quas et in homine sapiente ac temperante fatentur esse vitiosas, ut eas ab his rebus ad quas injuste moventur, mens compescendo et cohibendo refrenet ac revocet, atque ad ea permittat, quae sapientiae lege concessa sunt; sicut iram ad exercendam justam coercitionem, sicut libidinem ad propagandae prolis officium: hae, inquam, partes in paradiso ante peccatum vitiosae non erant. Non enim contra rectam voluntatem ad aliquid movebantur, unde necesse esset eas rationis tanquam frenis regentibus abstinere. Nam quod nunc ita moventur, et ab eis qui temperanter et juste et pie vivunt, alias facilius, alias difficilius, tamen cohibendo et refrenando modificantur, non est utique sanitas ex natura, sed languor ex culpa. Quod autem irae opera aliarumque affectionum in quibusque dictis atque factis non sic abscondit verecundia, ut opera libidinis quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in caeteris membra corporis non ipsae affectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, voluntas movet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur? Nam quisquis verbum emittit iratus, vel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus jubente quodammodo voluntate moverentur: quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, moventur eadem voluntate. At vero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo juri quodammodo mancipavit, ut moveri non valeant, si ipsa defuerit, et nisi ipsa vel ultro vel excitata surrexerit. Hoc est quod pudet, hoc est quod intuentium oculos erubescendo devitat: magisque fert homo spectantium multitudinem, quando injuste irascitur homini, quam vel unius aspectum et quando juste miscetur uxori.

Caput XX.

De vanissima turpitudine Cynicorum.

Hoc illi canini philosophi, hoc est Cynici, non viderunt, proferentes contra humanam verecundiam, quid aliud quam caninam, hoc est immundam impudentemque sententiam? ut scilicet quoniam justum est quod fit in uxore, palam non pudeat id agere; nec in vico aut platea qualibet conjugalem concubitum devitare. Vicit tamen pudor naturalis opinionem hujus erroris.

Hence it is that even those philosophers who approached nearer to the truth confessed that anger and lust were vicious parts of the soul, for the reason that they were moved turbidly and inordinately even to those things which wisdom does not forbid to be perpetrated; and through this they have need of a moderating mind and reason. Which third part of the soul they maintain is placed as if in a certain citadel for the purpose of ruling these; so that, with it commanding and these serving, justice may be preserved in man from every part of the soul. These parts, therefore, which they confess to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind by checking and restraining may curb and recall them from those things to which they are unjustly moved, and permit them to those things which are granted by the law of wisdom; as anger for the exercise of just coercion, and lust for the office of propagating offspring: these parts, I say, were not vicious in paradise before sin. For they were not moved toward anything against the right will, whence it might be necessary to restrain them by reason as if by governing bridles. For that they are now so moved, and are modified by checking and curbing, sometimes more easily, sometimes with more difficulty, even by those who live temperately and justly and piously, is surely not health from nature, but languor from fault. But as to why modesty does not so hide the works of anger and other affections in any words and deeds as it hides the works of lust which are done by the genital members, what is the cause, unless because in the rest the will moves the members of the body, not the affections themselves, but when it has consented with them, which [will] dominates entirely in the use of them? For whoever emits a word being angry, or even strikes anyone, could not do this unless the tongue and the hand were moved, the will commanding in a certain way: which members are moved by the same will even when there is no anger. But truly lust has in a certain way so mancipated the genital parts of the body to its own right that they are not able to be moved if it be lacking, and unless it has arisen either of its own accord or being excited. This is what shames, this is what avoids the eyes of beholders by blushing: and man more easily bears a multitude of spectators when he is unjustly angry at a man, than the sight even of one when he is justly joined with his wife.

Chapter XX.

On the most vain turpitude of the Cynics.

Those canine philosophers, that is, the Cynics, did not see this, proffering against human modesty what else but a canine, that is, an unclean and impudent opinion? Namely, that since what is done with a wife is just, one should not be ashamed to do it openly; nor should one avoid conjugal intercourse in any street or square. Nevertheless, natural modesty overcame the opinion of this error.

Nam etsi perhibent hoc aliquando gloriabundum fecisse Diogenem, ita putantem sectam suam nobiliorem futuram, si in hominum memoria insignior ejus impudentia figeretur: postea tamen a Cynicis fieri cessatum est; plusque valuit pudor, ut erubescerent homines hominibus, quam error, ut homines canibus esse similes affectarent. Unde et illum vel illos, qui hoc fecisse referuntur, potius arbitror concumbentium motus dedisse oculis hominum nescientium quid sub pallio gereretur, quam humano premente conspectu potuisse illam peragi voluptatem. Ibi enim philosophi non erubescebant videri se velle concumbere, ubi libido ipsa erubesceret surgere. Et nunc videmus adhuc esse philosophos Cynicos; hi enim sunt, qui non solum amiciuntur pallio, verum etiam clavam ferunt: nemo tamen eorum audet hoc facere; quod si aliqui ausi essent, ut non dicam ictibus lapidantium, certe conspuentium salivis obruerentur. Pudet igitur hujus libidinis humanam sine ulla dubitatione naturam, et merito pudet. In ejus quippe inobedientia, quae genitalia corporis membra solis suis motibus subdidit, et potestati voluntatis eripuit, satis ostenditur quid sit hominis illi primae inobedientiae retributum: quod in ea maxime parte oportuit apparere, qua generatur ipsa natura, quae illo primo et magno in deterius est mutata peccato: a cujus nexu nullus eruitur, nisi id quod, cum omnes in uno essent, in communem perniciem perpetratum est, et Dei justitia vindicatum, Dei gratia in singulis expietur.

Caput XXI.

De benedictione multiplicandae fecunditatis humanae ante peccatum, quam praevaricatio non adimeret, et cui libidinis morbus accesserit.

Absit itaque, ut credamus illos conjuges in paradiso constitutos per hanc libidinem, de qua erubescendo eadem membra texerunt, impleturos fuisse quod in sua benedictione Deus dixit, Crescite, et multiplicamini, et implete terram (Gen. I, 28). Post peccatum quippe orta est haec libido; post peccatum eam natura non impudens, amissa potestate cui corpus ex omni parte serviebat, sensit, attendit, erubuit, operuit. Illa vero benedictio nuptiarum, ut conjugati crescerent, et multiplicarentur, et implerent terram, quamvis et in delinquentibus manserit; tamen antequam delinquerent, data est, ut cognosceretur procreationem filiorum ad gloriam connubii, non ad poenam pertinere peccati. Sed nunc homines, profecto illius quae in paradiso fuit felicitatis ignari, nisi per hoc quod experti sunt, id est per libidinem, de qua videmus ipsam etiam honestatem crubescere nuptiarum, non potuisse gigni filios opinantur:

For although they maintain that Diogenes sometimes did this boastfully, thinking thus that his sect would be more noble if his impudence were more signally fixed in the memory of men: yet afterwards the practice ceased to be done by the Cynics; and modesty prevailed more, so that men blushed before men, than error, so that men affected to be like dogs. Whence also I think that he, or those who are reported to have done this, rather gave to the eyes of men the movements of those lying together, while men were ignorant of what was being carried on under the cloak, than that that pleasure could have been performed while the human gaze was pressing upon them. For there the philosophers were not ashamed to seem to wish to lie together, where lust itself would be ashamed to arise. And now we see that there are still Cynic philosophers; for these are they who are not only clothed with the cloak, but also carry a club: yet no one of them dares to do this; because if any had dared, that I may not say by the blows of those stoning them, they would certainly be overwhelmed by the spittle of those spitting on them. Therefore human nature is ashamed of this lust without any doubt, and it is rightly ashamed. For in its disobedience, which has subjected the genital members of the body to its own movements alone, and has snatched them from the power of the will, it is sufficiently shown what was retributed to man for that first disobedience: which it was fitting should appear especially in that part by which nature itself is generated, which by that first and great sin was changed for the worse: from the bond of which no one is rescued, unless that which, when all were in one, was perpetrated to the common destruction, and avenged by the justice of God, be expiated by the grace of God in individuals.

Chapter XXI.

On the blessing of multiplying human fecundity before sin, which transgression would not take away, and to which the disease of lust has been added.

Far be it, therefore, that we should believe that those spouses established in paradise would have fulfilled, through this lust, by which they covered those same members in blushing, what God said in His blessing: "Increase, and multiply, and fill the earth" (Gen. I, 28). For after sin this lust arose; after sin nature, not [previously] impudent, having lost the power to which the body was in every part subject, perceived, attended to, blushed at, and covered it. That blessing of marriage indeed, that the married should increase and multiply and fill the earth, although it remained even in the delinquent; nevertheless, before they delinquented, it was given, that it might be known that the procreation of children pertained to the glory of marriage, not to the punishment of sin. But now men, surely ignorant of that happiness which was in paradise, do not think that children could have been begotten except through that which they have experienced, that is, through lust, concerning which we see that even the honesty of marriage blushes;

alii Scripturas divinas, ubi legitur post peccatum puduisse nuditatis, et pudenda esse contecta, prorsus non accipientes, sed infideliter irridentes; alii vero quamvis eas accipiant et honorent, illud tamen quod dictum est, Crescite, et multiplicamini, non secundum carnalem fecunditatem volunt intelligi; quia et secundum animam legitur tale aliquid dictum, Multiplicabis me in anima mea virtute tua (Psal. CXXXVII, 4): ut id quod in Genesi sequitur, Et implete terram, et dominamini ejus, terram intelligant carnem, quam praesentia sua implet anima, ejusque maxime dominatur, cum in virtute multiplicatur. Carnales autem fetus sine libidine, quae post peccatum exorta, inspecta, confusa, velata est, nec tunc nasci potuisse, sicut neque nunc possunt; nec in paradiso futuros fuisse, sed foris, sicut et factum est. Nam posteaquam inde dimissi sunt, ad gignendos filios coierunt, eosque genuerunt.

Caput XXII.

De copula conjugali a Deo primitus instituta, atque benedicta.

Nos autem nullo modo dubitamus secundum bene dictionem Dei crescere et multiplicari et implere terram, donum esse nuptiarum, quas Deus ante peccatum hominis ab initio constituit, creando masculum et feminam: qui sexus evidens utique in carne est. Huic quippe operi Dei etiam benedictio ipsa subjuncta est. Nam cum Scriptura dixisset, Masculum et feminam fecit eos; continuo subdidit, Et benedixit eos Deus, dicens: Crescite, et multiplicamini, et implete terram, et dominamini ejus (Gen. I, 27, 28), et caetera. Quae omnia quanquam non inconvenienter possint etiam ad intellectum spiritualem referri, masculum tamen et feminam, non sicut simile aliquid etiam in homine uno intelligi potest, quia videlicet in eo aliud est quod regit, aliud quod regitur: sed sicut evidentissime apparet in diversi sexus corporibus, masculum et feminam ita creatos, ut prolem generando crescerent, et multiplicarentur, et implerent terram, magnae absurditatis est reluctari. Neque enim de spiritu qui imperat, et carne quae obtemperat; aut de animo rationali qui regit, et irrationali cupiditate quae regitur; aut de virtute contemplativa quae excellit, et de activa quae subditur; aut de intellectu mentis, et sensu corporis: sed aperte de vinculo conjugali, quo invicem sibi uterque sexus obstringitur, Dominus interrogatus utrum liceret quacumque ex causa dimittere uxorem, quoniam propter duritiam cordis Israelitarum Moyses dari libellum repudii permisit, respondit atque ait:

some by no means accepting the Divine Scriptures, where it is read that after sin they were ashamed of their nakedness, and the shameful parts were covered, but unfaithfully mocking them; while others, although they accept and honor them, nevertheless do not wish that which was said, "Increase, and multiply," to be understood according to carnal fecundity; because something similar is read to have been said according to the soul, "Thou shalt multiply me in my soul by Thy virtue" (Psalm CXXXVII, 4): so that they understand what follows in Genesis, "And fill the earth, and subdue it," the earth to be the flesh, which the soul fills by its presence, and over which it especially dominates when it is multiplied in virtue. But they think that carnal offspring could not have been born then without lust, which after sin arose, was inspected, confused, and veiled, just as they cannot now; nor would they have been in paradise, but outside, as indeed it happened. For after they were dismissed from there, they came together to beget children, and begat them.

Chapter XXII.

On the conjugal union primordially instituted and blessed by God.

But we by no means doubt that to increase and multiply and fill the earth, according to the blessing of God, is the gift of marriage, which God instituted from the beginning before the sin of man, by creating male and female: which sex is certainly evident in the flesh. For to this work of God the blessing itself was also subjoined. For when Scripture had said, "He made them male and female," it immediately added, "And God blessed them, saying: Increase, and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it" (Gen. I, 27, 28), and the rest. Although all these things may not inconveniently be referred also to a spiritual understanding, yet it is of great absurdity to resist that male and female were created so that by generating offspring they might increase and multiply and fill the earth, as evidently appears in the bodies of different sex; not like something similar that can be understood even in one man, because forsooth in him there is one thing which rules, another which is ruled. For not concerning the spirit which commands and the flesh which obeys; or concerning the rational mind which rules and the irrational desire which is ruled; or concerning the contemplative virtue which excels and the active which is subjected; or concerning the intellect of the mind and the sense of the body: but openly concerning the conjugal bond, by which each sex is bound to the other in turn, the Lord, being asked whether it were lawful for any cause to dismiss a wife, because on account of the hardness of the heart of the Israelites Moses permitted a bill of divorcement to be given, answered and said:

Non legistis quia qui fecit ab initio, masculum et feminam fecit eos, et dixit: Propter hoc dimittet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una? Itaque jam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Quod ergo Deus conjunxit, homo non separet (Matth. XIX, 4-6). Certum est igitur, masculum et feminam ita primitus institutos, ut nunc homines duos diversi sexus videmus et novimus: unum autem dici, vel propter conjunctionem, vel propter originem feminae, quae de masculi latere creata est. Nam et Apostolus per hoc primum quod Deo instituente praecessit exemplum, singulos quosque admonet, ut viri uxores suas diligant (Ephes. V, 25 et Coloss. III, 19).

Caput XXIII.

An etiam in paradiso generandum fuisset, si nemo peccasset; vel utrum contra actum libidinis pugnatura illic fuisset traditio castitatis.

1. Quisquis autem dicit non fuisse coituros, nec generaturos, nisi peccassent, quid dicit, nisi propter numerositatem sanctorum necessarium hominis fuisse peccatum? Si enim non peccando soli remanerent, quia, sicut putant, nisi peccassent, generare non possent; profecto ut non soli duo justi homines possent esse, sed multi, necessarium peccatum fuit. Quod si credere absurdum est, illud potius est credendum, quod sanctorum numerus quantus complendae illi sufficit beatissimae civitati, tantus existeret, etsi nemo peccasset, quantus nunc per Dei gratiam de multitudine colligitur peccatorum, quousque filii hujus saeculi generant et generantur (Luc. XX, 34).

2. Et ideo illae nuptiae dignae felicitate paradisi, si peccatum non fuisset, et diligendam prolem gignerent, et pudendam libidinem non haberent. Sed quomodo id fieri posset, nunc non est quo demonstretur exemplo. Nec ideo tamen incredibile debet videri, etiam illud unum sine ista libidine voluntati potuisse servire cui tot membra nunc serviunt. An vero manus et pedes movemus, cum volumus, ad ea quae his membris agenda sunt, sine ullo renisu, tanta facilitate, quanta et in nobis et in aliis videmus, maxime in artificibus quorumque operum corporalium, ubi ad exercendam infirmiorem tardioremque naturam agilior accessit industria; et non credimus ad opus generationis filiorum, si libido non fuisset, quae peccato inobedientiae retributa est, obedienter hominibus ad voluntatis nutum similiter ut caetera potuisse illa membra servire?

Have ye not read that He who made them from the beginning, made them male and female, and said: For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh? Therefore they are no longer two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined, let not man separate" (Matt. XIX, 4-6). It is certain, therefore, that male and female were so primordially instituted as we now see and know two men of different sex: but that one is said, either on account of the union, or on account of the origin of the female, who was created from the male's side. For the Apostle also, through this first example which preceded by God's institution, admonishes each one that husbands should love their wives (Ephes. V, 25 and Coloss. III, 19).

Chapter XXIII.

Whether there would have been generation even in paradise if no one had sinned; or whether the tradition of chastity would have had to fight there against the act of lust.

1. But whoever says that they would not have had intercourse nor generated unless they had sinned, what else does he say but that the sin of man was necessary for the multitude of the saints? For if by not sinning they would have remained alone, because, as they think, they could not have generated unless they had sinned; certainly, in order that there might not be only two just men, but many, sin was necessary. But if it is absurd to believe this, that rather is to be believed: that as large a number of saints as suffices for completing that most blessed city would have existed even if no one had sinned, as large as is now collected through the grace of God from the multitude of sinners, so long as the children of this world generate and are generated (Luke XX, 34).

2. And therefore those marriages, worthy of the happiness of paradise if sin had not existed, would both beget desirable offspring and would not have shameful lust. But how that could be done, there is now no example by which it may be demonstrated. Nor yet on that account ought it to seem incredible that even that one [member] could have served the will without that lust, to which so many members now serve. Or do we indeed move hands and feet when we wish, for those things which are to be done by these members, without any resistance, with as much facility as we see both in ourselves and in others, especially in the artisans of any corporal works, where a more agile industry has been added to the exercise of a weaker and slower nature; and do we not believe that for the work of generating children, if there had not been lust, which was retributed to the sin of disobedience, those members could similarly have served men obediently at the nod of the will as the rest?

Nonne Cicero in libris de Republica, cum de imperiorum differentia disputaret, et hujus rei similitudinem ex natura hominis assumeret, ut filiis dixit imperari corporis membris propter obediendi facilitatem: vitiosas vero animi partes ut servos asperiore imperio coerceri? Et utique ordine naturali animus anteponitur corpori, et tamen ipse animus imperat corpori facilius quam sibi. Verumtamen haec libido, de qua nunc disserimus, eo magis erubescenda existit, quod animus in ea nec sibi efficaciter imperat, ut omnino non libeat; nec omnimodo corpori, ut pudenda membra voluntas potius quam libido commoveat: quod si ita essent, pudenda non essent. Nunc vero pudet animum resisti sibi a corpore, quod ei natura inferiore subjectum est. In aliis quippe affectionibus cum sibi resistit, ideo minus pudet, quia cum a se ipso vincitur, ipse se vincit; etsi inordinate atque vitiose, quia ex his partibus, quae rationi subjici debent; tamen a partibus suis, ac per hoc, ut dictum est, a se ipso vincitur. Nam cum ordinate se animus vincit, ut irrationales motus ejus menti rationique subdantur (si tamen et illa Deo subdita est), laudis atque virtutis est. Minus tamen pudet, cum sibi animus ex vitiosis suis partibus non obtemperat, quam cum ei corpus, quod alterum ab illo est, atque infra illum est, et cujus sine illo natura non vivit, volenti jubentique non cedit.

3. Sed cum alia membra retinentur voluntatis imperio, sine quibus illa quae contra voluntatem libidine concitantur, id quod appetunt, implere non possunt; pudicitia custoditur, non amissa, sed non permissa delectatione peccati. Hunc renisum, hanc repugnantiam, hanc voluntatis et libidinis rixam, vel certe ad voluntatis sufficientiam, libidinis indigentiam, procul dubio nisi culpabilis inobedientia poenali inobedientia plecteretur, in paradiso nuptiae non haberent, sed voluntati membra illa, ut caetera cuncta, servirent. Ita genitale arvum (Virgil. Georg. lib. 3, vers. 136) vas in hoc opus creatum seminaret, ut nunc terram manus. And quod modo de hac re nobis volentibus diligentius disputare, verecundia resistit, et compellit veniam honore praefato a pudicis auribus poscere, cur id fieret nulla causa esset: sed in omnia quae de hujusmodi membris sensum cogitantis attingerent, sine ullo timore obscenitatis liber sermo ferretur: nec ipsa verba essent, quae vocarentur obscena; sed quidquid inde diceretur, tam honestum esset, quam de aliis cum loquimur corporis partibus. Quisquis ergo ad has litteras impudicus accedit, culpam refugiat, non naturam; facta denotet suae turpitudinis, non verba nostrae necessitatis; in quibus mihi facillime pudicus et religiosus lector vel auditor ignoscit, donec infidelitatem refellam, non de fide rerum inexpertarum, sed de sensu expertarum argumentantem.

Does not Cicero, in his books on the Republic, when he disputed concerning the difference of empires, and assumed a likeness of this thing from the nature of man, say that the members of the body are commanded as if they were sons on account of the facility of obeying: but that the vicious parts of the soul are coerced as slaves by a harsher empire? And certainly by natural order the soul is set before the body, and yet the soul itself commands the body more easily than itself. Nevertheless, this lust, concerning which we now discourse, exists as the more to be blushed at, because the soul in it neither effectively commands itself so that it may not lust at all; nor in every way the body, so that the will rather than lust may move the shameful members: which if it were so, they would not be shameful. But now the soul is ashamed that it is resisted by the body, which is subject to it by a lower nature. For in other affections when it resists itself, it is therefore less ashamed, because when it is conquered by itself, it conquers itself; although inordinately and viciously, because it is from those parts which ought to be subject to reason; yet it is conquered by its own parts, and through this, as was said, by itself. For when the soul conquers itself ordinarily, so that its irrational movements are subjected to mind and reason (if however it is also subjected to God), it is of praise and virtue. Yet it is less ashamed when the soul does not obey itself from its vicious parts, than when the body, which is another from it and is below it, and whose nature does not live without it, does not yield to it when it is willing and commanding.

3. But since other members are retained by the command of the will, without which those which are excited by lust against the will cannot fulfill that which they desire; chastity is preserved, the delight of sin being not lost, but not permitted. This resistance, this repugnance, this quarrel of the will and lust, or certainly the deficiency of lust for the sufficiency of the will, without doubt the marriages in paradise would not have had, unless culpable disobedience had been punished by penal disobedience; but those members, like all the rest, would serve the will. Thus the genital field (Virgil, Georgics, Book III, line 136), a vessel created for this work, would sow as the hand now sows the earth. And whereas now modesty resists us when we wish to dispute more diligently concerning this matter, and compels us to ask pardon with the aforementioned honor from chaste ears, there would be no cause why that should be done: but into all things which might touch the sense of the thinker concerning members of this kind, free speech would be carried without any fear of obscenity: nor would there be any words themselves which would be called obscene; but whatever might be said thereof would be as honest as when we speak of other parts of the body. Whoever, therefore, approaches these writings impudently, let him flee the fault, not nature; let him denote the deeds of his own turpitude, not the words of our necessity; in which the chaste and religious reader or hearer most easily pardons me, until I refute infidelity, arguing not from the faith of things unexperienced, but from the sense of things experienced.

Legit enim haec sine offensione, qui non exhorret Apostolum horrenda feminarum flagitia reprehendentem, quae immutaverunt naturalem usum in eum usum qui est contra naturam (Rom. I, 26): praecipue quia nos non damnabilem obscenitatem nunc, sicut ille commemoramus atque reprehendimus, sed in explicandis, quantum possumus, humanae generationis effectibus, verba tamen, sicut ille, obscena vitamus.

CAPUT XXIV.---Quod insontes homines et merito obedientiae in paradiso permanentes, ita genitalibus membris fuissent usuri ad generationem prolis, sicut caeteris ad arbitrium voluntatis.

1. Seminaret igitur prolem vir, susciperet femina genitalibus membris quando id opus esset, et quantum opus esset, voluntate motis, non libidine concitatis. Neque enim ea sola membra movemus ad nutum, quae compactis articulata sunt ossibus, sicut pedes et manus et digitos; verum etiam illa quae mollibus remissa sunt nervis, cum volumus, movemus agitando, et porrigendo producimus, et torquendo flectimus, et constringendo duramus; sicut ea sunt quae in ore ac facie, quantum potest, voluntas movet. Pulmones denique ipsi omnium, nisi medullarum, mollissimi viscerum, et ob hoc antro pectoris communiti, ad spiritum ducendum ac remitendum vocemque emittendam seu modificandam, sicut folles fabrorum vel organorum, flantis, respirantis, loquentis, clamantis, cantantis, serviunt voluntati. Omitto quod animalibus quibusdam naturaliter inditum est, ut tegmen quo corpus omne vestitur, si quid in quocumque loco ejus senserint abigendum, ibi tantum moveant, ubi sentiunt; nec solum insidentes muscas, verum etiam haerentes hastas cutis tremore discutiant. Numquid quia id non potest homo, ideo Creator quibus voluit animantibus donare non potuit? Sic ergo et ipse homo potuit obedientiam etiam inferiorum habere membrorum, quam sua inobedientia perdidit. Neque enim Deo difficile fuit sic illum condere, ut in ejus carne etiam illud nonnisi ejus voluntate moveretur, quod nunc nisi libidine non movetur.

2. Nam et hominum quorumdam naturas novimus multum caeteris dispares, et ipsa raritate mirabiles, nonnulla ut volunt de corpore facientium, quae alii nullo modo possunt, et audita vix credunt. Sunt enim qui et aures moveant vel singulas, vel ambas simul. Sunt qui totam caesariem capite immoto, quantum capilli occupant, deponunt ad frontem, revocantque cum volunt. Sunt qui eorum quae voraverint incredibiliter plurima et varia, paululum praecordiis contrectatis tanquam de sacculo quod placuerit integerrimum proferunt.

For he reads these things without offense who does not abhor the Apostle rebuking the horrendous shameful acts of women, who "changed the natural use into that use which is against nature" (Rom. I, 26): especially because we do not now commemorate and rebuke a damnable obscenity, as he does, but in explaining, as much as we can, the effects of human generation, we nevertheless avoid, as he does, obscene words.

CHAPTER XXIV. --- That innocent men, remaining in paradise by the merit of obedience, would have used their genital members for the generation of offspring just as they used the others at the choice of the will.

1. The man, therefore, would have sown the offspring, and the woman would have received it into her genital members when there was need, and as much as there was need, the members being moved by the will, not excited by lust. For we do not move at our beck only those members which are articulated with firm bones, such as the feet and hands and fingers; but we also move those which are relaxed with soft sinews, agitating them when we wish, and extending them by stretching, and bending them by twisting, and hardening them by contracting; such as are those in the mouth and face, which the will moves as much as it can. Finally, the lungs themselves, the softest of all the viscera except the marrow, and for this reason sheltered in the hollow of the chest, serve the will for drawing and releasing the breath and for emitting or modifying the voice, like the bellows of blacksmiths or organs, for one who blows, respires, speaks, shouts, or sings. I omit the fact that it is naturally implanted in certain animals to move the covering with which their whole body is clothed only in that place where they feel something to be driven away, if they feel it anywhere; and to shake off not only settling flies but even clinging spears by a tremor of the skin. Because man cannot do this, could not the Creator therefore have given it to such living things as He willed? Thus, then, man himself could have had the obedience even of the lower members, which he lost by his own disobedience. For it was not difficult for God to create him so that in his flesh even that which now is not moved except by lust should be moved only by his will.

2. For we also know the natures of certain men to be very different from others, and wonderful for their very rarity, doing some things with their body as they wish, which others can by no means do, and which are scarcely believed when heard. For there are some who can even move their ears, either singly or both together. There are those who, without moving the head, can bring their whole scalp down toward the forehead and move it back when they wish, as far as the hair covers it. There are those who, after swallowing incredibly many and various things, with a slight pressure on the stomach, bring forth whatever they please, perfectly intact, as if from a bag.

Quidam voces avium pecorumque et aliorum quorumlibet hominum sic imitantur atque exprimunt, ut nisi videantur, discerni omnino non possint. Nonnulli ab imo sine paedore ullo ita numerosos pro arbitrio sonitus edunt, ut ex illa etiam parte cantare videantur. Ipse sum expertus, sudare hominem solere cum vellet. Notum est, quosdam liberate cum volunt, atque ubertim lacrymas fundere. Jam illud multo est incredibilius quod plerique fratres memoria recentissima experti sunt. Presbyter fuit quidam nomine Restitutus in paroecia Calamensis Ecclesiae, qui quando ei placebat (rogabatur autem ut hoc faceret ab eis qui rem mirabilem coram scire cupiebant), id imitatas quasi lamentantis cujuslibet hominis votes, ita se auferebat a sensibus, et jacebat simillimus mortuo, ut non solum vellicantes atque pungentes minime sentiret, sed aliquando etiam igne ureretur admoto, sine ullo doloris sensu, nisi postmodum ex vulnere. Non autem obnitendo, sed non sentiendo non movere corpus, eo probabatur, quod tanquam in defuncto nullus inveniebatur anhelitus: hominum tamen voces, si clarius loquerentur, tanquam de longinquo se audire postea referebat. Cum itaque corpus etiam nunc quibusdam, licet in carne coruptibili hanc aerumnosam ducentibus vitam, ita in plerisque motionibus et affectionibus extra usitatum naturae modum mirabiliter serviat; quid causae est, ut non credamus ante inobedientiae peccatum corruptionisque supplicium, ad propagandam prolem sine ulla libidine servire voluntati humanae humana membra potuisse? Donatus est itaque homo sibi, quia deseruit Deum placendo sibi: et non obediens Deo, non potuit obedire nec sibi. Hinc evidentior miseria, qua homo non vivit ut vult, Nam si ut vellet viveret, beatum se putaret: sed nec sic tamen esset, si turpiter viveret.

Caput XXV.

De vera beatitudire, quam temporalis vita non obtinet.

Quanquam si diligentius attendamus, nisi beatus, non vivit ut vult: et nullus beatus, nisi justus. Sed etiam ipse justus non vivit ut vult, nisi eo pervenerit, ubi mori, falli, offendi omnino non possit; eique sit certum, ita semper futurum. Hoc enim natura expetit: nec plene atque perfecte beata erit, nisi adepta quod expetit. Nunc vero quis hominum potest ut vult vivere, quando ipsum vivere non est in potestate? Vivere enim vult, mori cogitur. Quomodo ergo vivit ut vult, qui non vivit quamdiu vult? Quod si mori voluerit, quomodo potest ut vult vivere, qui non vult vivere?

Some so imitate and express the voices of birds, cattle, and any other men, that unless they are seen, they can by no means be distinguished. Some produce from their lower parts, without any foul smell, so many musical sounds at will that they seem to sing even from that part. I myself have known a man who was accustomed to sweat when he wished. It is well known that some weep when they wish, and pour forth tears abundantly. But that is much more incredible which many brethren have experienced in very recent memory. There was a certain priest named Restitutus in the parish of the Church of Calama, who, when it pleased him (and he was asked to do this by those who desired to know the marvelous thing in person), would withdraw himself from his senses, imitating the voices as of someone lamenting, and would lie so much like a dead man that he not only felt very little when pinched and pricked, but sometimes even when fire was applied he was burned without any sensation of pain, except afterward from the wound. That he did not move his body not by resisting, but by not feeling, was proved by the fact that no breath was found in him, as if in a dead person; nevertheless, he later reported that he heard the voices of men, if they spoke more loudly, as if from a distance. Since, therefore, the body even now wonderfully serves some, although they lead this troublesome life in corruptible flesh, in many motions and affections beyond the usual mode of nature; what reason is there that we should not believe that before the sin of disobedience and the punishment of corruption, human members could have served the human will for the propagation of offspring without any lust? Man was thus given over to himself, because he deserted God by pleasing himself; and not obeying God, he could not obey himself either. Hence the more evident misery, in which man does not live as he wishes. For if he lived as he wished, he would think himself happy; but even so he would not be so, if he lived basely.

Chapter XXV.

Of true happiness, which temporal life does not obtain.

Although if we attend more diligently, no one lives as he wishes unless he is happy; and no one is happy unless he is just. But even the just man himself does not live as he wishes until he arrives where he can by no means die, be deceived, or be offended, and is certain that it will always be so. For this is what nature seeks; nor will it be fully and perfectly happy unless it has attained what it seeks. But now, what man can live as he wishes, when life itself is not in his power? For he wishes to live, but is compelled to die. How then does he live as he wishes, who does not live as long as he wishes? But if he should wish to die, how can he live as he wishes who does not wish to live?

Et si ideo mori velit, non quo nolit vivere, sed ut post mortem melius vivat: nondum ergo ut vult vivit, sed cum ad id quod vult, moriendo pervenerit. Verum ecce vivat ut vult, quoniam sibi extorsit sibique imperavit non velle quod non potest, atque hoc velle quod potest; sicut ait Terentius, Quoniam non potest id fieri quod vis, Id velis quod possit: num ideo beatus est, quia patienter miser est? Beata quippe vita si non amatur, non habetur. Porro si amatur et habetur, caeteris omnibus rebus excellentius necesse est ametur: quoniam propter hanc amandum est quidquid aliud amatur. Porro si tantum amatur, quantum amari digna est (non enim beatus est, a quo ipsa beata vita non amatur ut digna est), fieri non potest, ut eam qui sic amat, non aeternam velit. Tunc igitur beata erit quando aeterna erit.

Caput XXVI.

Quod felicitas in paradiso viventium sine erubescendo appetitu generandi officium credenda sit implere potuisse.

Vivebat itaque homo in paradiso sicut volebat, quamdiu hoc volebat quod Deus jusserat: vivebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus: vivebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper vivere habens in potestate. Cibus aderat, ne esuriret; potus, ne sitiret; lignum vitae, ne illum senecta dissolveret. Nihil corruptionis in corpore vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis ejus sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas. Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus aut frigus, ita in ejus habitatore nulla ex cupiditate vel timore accedebat bonae voluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum: gaudium verum perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat charitas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta (I Tim. I, 5): atque inter se conjugum fida ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque vigilia, et mandati sine labore custodia. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat invitum . In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum, absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo: sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra quo caetera, et sine ardoris illecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris (Aeneid. lib. 8, vers. 406).

And if he should wish to die, not because he does not wish to live, but that after death he may live better: he does not yet live as he wishes, but only when he reaches by dying that which he wishes. But behold, let him live as he wishes, since he has forced himself and commanded himself not to wish what he cannot do, and to wish what he can; as Terence says, "Since that which you wish cannot be done, wish that which can be done": is he therefore happy because he is patiently miserable? For a happy life is not possessed if it is not loved. Furthermore, if it is loved and possessed, it must necessarily be loved more excellently than all other things; since whatever else is loved must be loved for the sake of this. Furthermore, if it is loved as much as it is worthy of being loved (for he is not happy by whom the happy life itself is not loved as it is worthy), it cannot be that he who so loves it should not wish it to be eternal. Then, therefore, it will be happy when it is eternal.

Chapter XXVI.

That the happiness of those living in paradise could be believed to have been able to fulfill the duty of generating without a shameful appetite.

Man lived, therefore, in paradise as he wished, as long as he wished that which God had commanded: he lived enjoying God, from which good he was good: he lived without any want, having it in his power always to live so. Food was at hand, lest he should hunger; drink, lest he should thirst; the tree of life, lest old age should dissolve him. No corruption in the body or from the body inflicted any troubles on any of his senses. No inward disease, no outward blow was feared. There was supreme health in the flesh, and entire tranquility in the soul. As in paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense to the good will arose from desire or fear. Nothing at all was sad, nothing was vainly joyful: true joy was perpetuated from God, for whom charity glowed "from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned" (I Tim. I, 5): and between the spouses there was a faithful society of honest love, a harmonious watchfulness of mind and body, and the keeping of the commandment without labor. Weariness did not fatigue the idle, nor did sleep oppress the unwilling. In such facility of things and happiness of men, far be it from us to suspect that offspring could not have been sown without the disease of lust: but those members would have been moved by the same beck of the will as the others, and without the alluring stimulus of passion, with tranquility of mind and body, and with no corruption of integrity, the husband would have been poured into the womb of the wife.

Neque enim quia experientia probari non potest, ideo credendum non est; quando illas corporis partes non ageret turbidus calor, sed spontanea potestas, sicut opus esset, adhiberet; ita tunc potuisse utero conjugis salva integritate feminei genitalis virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest eadem integritate salva ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Eadem quippe via posset illud injici, qua hoc potest ejici. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret: sic ad fetandum et concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque conjungeret. De rebus loquimur nunc pudendis: et ideo quamvis, antequam earum puderet, quales esse potuissent conjiciamus ut possumus; tamen necesse est ut nostra disputatio magis frenetur ea quae nos revocat verecundia, quam eloquentia, quae nobis parum suppetit, adjuvetur. Nam cum id quod dico, nec ipsi experti fuerint qui experiri potuerunt (quoniam praeoccupante peccato exsilium de paradiso ante meruerunt, quam sibi in opere serendae propaginis tranquillo arbitrio convenirent), quomodo nunc cum ista commemorantur, sensibus occurrit humanis, nisi experientia libidinis turbidae, non conjectura placidae voluntatis? Hinc est quod impedit loquentem pudor, etsi non deficiat ratio cogitantem. Verumtamen omnipotenti Deo, summo ac summe bono creatori omnium naturarum, voluntatum autem bonarum adjutori et remuneratori, malarum autem relictori et damnatori, utrarumque ordinatori, non defuit utique consilium, quo certum numerum civium in sua sapientia praedestinatum etiam ex damnato genere humano suae civitatis impleret: non eos jam meritis, quandoquidem universa massa tanquam in vitiata radice damnata est, sed gratia discernens; et liberatis non solum de ipsis, verum etiam de non liberatis, quid eis largiatur, ostendens. Non enim debita, sed gratuita bonitate tunc se quisque agnoscit erutum malis, cum ab eorum hominum consortio fit immunis, cum quibus illi justa esset poena communis. Cur ergo non crearet Deus, quos peccaturos esse praescivit; quandoquidem in eis et ex eis, et quid eorum culpa mereretur, et quid sua gratia donaretur, posset ostendere, nec sub illo creatore ac dispositore perversa inordinatio delinquentium rectum perverteret ordinem rerum?

Caput XXVII.

De peccatoribus et angelis et hominibus, quorum perversitas non perturbat providentiam Dei.

For we should not refuse to believe simply because it cannot be proved by experience; since when those parts of the body were not driven by turbid heat, but a spontaneous power would employ them as there was need, then the male seed could have been injected into the womb of the spouse without violating the integrity of the female genital, just as now, while the same integrity is preserved, the flow of menstrual blood can be emitted from the womb of a virgin. For by the same way could the former be injected as the latter can be ejected. For as for giving birth, not the groans of pain, but the impulse of maturity would relax the female viscera: so for begetting and conceiving, not the appetite of lust, but a voluntary use would join both natures. We are speaking now of things that cause shame; and therefore, although we may conjecture as we can what they might have been like before there was shame of them, nevertheless it is necessary that our discussion be more reined in by that modesty which recalls us than be aided by eloquence, which is scantily supplied to us. For since those who could have experienced what I say did not themselves experience it (because, sin preoccupying them, they merited exile from paradise before they could come together in the work of sowing offspring with a tranquil will), how can these things now, when they are commemorated, occur to human senses, except by the experience of turbid lust, and not by the conjecture of a placid will? Hence it is that shame impedes the speaker, even if reason does not fail the thinker. Nevertheless, to the almighty God, the highest and supremely good Creator of all natures, the helper and rewarder of good wills, but the abandoner and condemner of bad ones, and the ordainer of both, there was certainly not lacking a counsel by which He might fulfill the certain number of citizens predestined in His wisdom even from the condemned human race for His city: discerning them not by merits, since the whole mass was condemned as if in a vitiated root, but by grace; and showing what He bestows upon them, not only from those who are liberated, but also from those who are not liberated. For not by a due but by a gratuitous goodness does each one then recognize himself rescued from evils, when he is made immune from the fellowship of those men with whom he would have had a common and just punishment. Why then should God not create those whom He foreknew would sin; since in them and from them He could show both what their fault merited and what His grace bestowed, nor would the perverse inordination of the delinquents pervert the right order of things under that Creator and Disposer?

Chapter XXVII.

Of sinners, both angels and men, whose perversity does not disturb the providence of God.

Proinde peccatores, et angeli. et homines nihil agunt, quo impediantur Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates ejus (Psal. CX, 2). Quoniam qui providenter atque omnipotenter sua cuique distribuit, non solum bonis, verum etiam malis bene uti novit. Ac per hoc propter meritum primae malae voluntatis ita damnato atque obdurato angelo malo, ut jam bonam voluntatem ulterius non haberet, bene utens Deus, cur non permitteret ut ab illo primus homo, qui rectus, hoc est bonae voluntatis, creatus fuerat, tentaretur? Quandoquidem sic erat institutus, ut, si de adjutorio Dei fideret bonus homo, malum angelum vinceret; si autem creatorem atque adjutorem Deum superbe sibi placendo desereret, vinceretur: meritum bonum habens in adjuta divinitus voluntate recta, malum vero in deserente Deum voluntate perversa. Quia et ipsum fidere de adjutorio Dei, non quidem posset sine adjutorio Dei: nec tamen ideo ab his divinae gratiae beneficiis sibi placendo recedere non habebat in potestate. Nam sicut in hac carne vivere sine adjumentis alimentorum in potestate non est, non autem in ea vivere in potestate est; quod faciunt qui se ipsos necant: ita bene vivere sine adjutorio Dei, etiam in paradiso, non erat in potestate; erat autem in potestate male vivere, sed beatitudine non permansura, et poena justissima secutura. Cum igitur hujus futuri casus humani Deus non esset ignarus, cur eum non sineret invidi angeli malignitate tentari? nullo modo quidem quod vinceretur incertus; sed nihilominus praescius quod ab ejus semine adjuto sua gratia idem ipse diabolus fuerat sanctorum gloria majore vincendus. Ita factum est ut nec Deum aliquid futurorum lateret, nec praesciendo quemquam peccare compelleret; et quid interesset inter propriam cujusque praesumptionem et suam tuitionem, angelicae et humanae rationali creaturae, consequenti experientia demonstraret. Quis enim audeat credere, aut dicere, ut neque angelus, neque homo caderet, in Dei potestate non fuisse? Sed hoc eorum potestati maluit non auferre; atque ita et quantum mali eorum superbia, et quantum boni sua gratia valeret, ostendere.

Caput XXVIII.

De qualitate duarum civitatum, terrenae atque coelestis.

Therefore, sinners, both angels and men, do nothing by which the "great works of the Lord, exquisite in all His wills" (Ps. CX, 2) are impeded. Since He who providently and omnipotently distributes to each his own, knows how to use well not only the good, but also the evil. And for this reason, using well the evil angel, who was so condemned and hardened by the merit of his first bad will that he no longer had a good will, why should God not permit the first man, who had been created upright, that is, of a good will, to be tempted by him? Since he was so instituted that if, trusting in the help of God, the good man should overcome the evil angel; but if he should proudly desert God his Creator and Helper by pleasing himself, he would be overcome: having good merit in a divinely aided upright will, but evil in a perverse will deserting God. Because even to trust in the help of God he could not indeed do without the help of God; and yet he was not for that reason without the power to withdraw from these benefits of divine grace by pleasing himself. For just as it is not in our power to live in this flesh without the aid of nourishment, but it is in our power not to live in it, as those do who kill themselves: so to live well without the help of God, even in paradise, was not in his power; but it was in his power to live ill, though with a happiness that would not remain, and a most just punishment following. Since, therefore, God was not ignorant of this future human fall, why should He not allow him to be tempted by the malignity of the envious angel? By no means being uncertain that he would be overcome; but nevertheless foreknowing that by his seed, aided by His grace, the same devil was to be overcome with greater glory for the saints. Thus it happened that nothing of the future was hidden from God, nor did He by foreknowing compel anyone to sin; and He demonstrated by consequent experience to the angelic and human rational creature what difference there was between each one's own presumption and His protection. For who would dare to believe or say that it was not in God's power that neither angel nor man should fall? But He preferred not to take this from their power; and thus to show both how much evil their pride could do, and how much good His grace could do.

Chapter XXVIII.

Of the quality of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly.

Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo; terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, coelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui . Denique illa in se ipsa, haec in Domino gloriatur. Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam: huic autem Deus conscientiae testis, maxima est gloria. Illa in gloria sua exaltat caput suum: haec dicit Deo suo, Gloria mea, et exaltans caput meum (Psal. III, 4). Illi in principibus ejus, vel in eis quas subjugat nationibus dominandi libido dominatur: in hac serviunt invicem in charitate, et praepositi consulendo, et subditi obtemperando. Illa in suis potentibus diligit virtutem suam: haec dicit Deo suo, Diligam te, Domine, virtus mea (Psal. XVII, 2). Ideoque in illa sapientes ejus secundum hominem viventes, aut corporis aut animi sui bona, aut utriusque sectati sunt; aut qui potuerunt cognoscere Deum, non ut Deum honoraverunt, vel gratias egerunt; sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum. Dicentes se esse sapientes, id est, dominante sibi superbia in sua sapientia sese extollentes, stulti facti sunt; et immutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum, et quadrupedum, et serpentium: ad hujuscemodi enim simulacra adoranda vel duces populorum, vel sectatores fuerunt. Et coluerunt atque servierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictus in saecula (Rom. I 21-25). In hac autem nulla est hominis sapientia, nisi pietas, qua recte colitur verus Deus, id exspectans praemium in societate sanctorum, non solum hominum, verum etiam Angelorum, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus (I Cor. XV, 28).

Accordingly, two loves have made two cities: the earthly by the love of self even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God even to the contempt of self. Finally, the former glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the former seeks glory from men; but to the latter, God, the witness of conscience, is the greatest glory. The former lifts up its head in its own glory; the latter says to its God, "My glory, and the lifter up of my head" (Ps. III, 4). In the former, the lust of rule dominates in its princes or in the nations it subdues; in the latter, they serve one another in charity, both the rulers by counseling and the subjects by obeying. The former loves its own strength in its potentates; the latter says to its God, "I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength" (Ps. XVII, 2). And therefore, in the former, its wise men living according to man have pursued the goods either of the body or of the mind, or of both; or those who were able to know God "did not honor Him as God, or give thanks; but they became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened." Saying that they were wise, that is, extolling themselves in their own wisdom while pride dominated them, they became fools; and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of serpents: for they were either leaders of the people or followers in adoring idols of this kind. And they worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever (Rom. I, 21-25). In the latter, however, there is no wisdom of man, but only piety, by which the true God is rightly worshipped, expecting that reward in the society of the saints, not only of men but also of angels, "that God may be all in all" (I Cor. XV, 28).

LIBER QUINTUS DECIMUS.

Postquam egit quatuor proxime antecedentibus libris de civitatum duarum, terrenae ac coelestis exortu, libros totidem de earumdem civitatum procursu subjungit Augustinus, idque argumentum ea ratione aggreditur, ut praecipua capita sacrae historiae eodem spectantia pertractet, primum scilicet quinto decimo hoc libro quae in Genesi leguntur a Cain et Abel usque ad diluvium.

Caput Primum.

De duobus ordinibus generationis humanae in diversos fines ab initio procurrentis.

1. De felicitate paradisi, vel de ipso paradiso, et de vita ibi primorum hominum, eorumque peccato atque supplicio, multi multa senserunt, multa dixerunt, multa litteris mandaverunt. Nos quoque secundum Scripturas sanctas, vel quod in eis legimus, vel quod ex eis intelligere potuimus, earum congruentes auctoritati, de his rebus in superioribus libris diximus. Enucleatius autem si ista quaerantur, multiplices atque multimodas pariunt disputationes, quae pluribus intexendae sunt voluminibus, quam hoc opus tempusque deposcit. Quod non ita largum habemus, ut in omnibus quae possunt requirere otiosi et scrupulosi, paratiores ad interrogandum, quam capaciores ad intelligendum, nos oporteat immorari. Arbitror tamen satis nos jam fecisse magnis et difficillimis quaestionibus de initio vel mundi , vel animae, vel ipsius generis humani: quod in duo genera distribuimus; unum eorum qui secundum hominem, alterum eorum qui secundum Deum vivunt. Quas etiam mystice appellamus civitates duas, hoc est duas societates hominum: quarum est una quae praedestinata est in aeternum regnare cum Deo; altera, aeternum supplicium subire cum diabolo. Sed iste finis est earum, de quo post loquendum est. Nunc autem quoniam de exortu earum, sive in Angelis, quorum numerus ignoratur a nobis, sive in duo bus primis hominibus, satis dictum est, jam mihi videtur earum aggrediendus excursus, ex quo illi duo generare coeperunt, donec homines generare cessabunt. Hoc enim universum tempus, sive saeculum, in quo cedunt morientes, succeduntque nascentes, istarum duarum civitatum, de quibus disputamus, excursus est.

BOOK FIFTEENTH.

After having treated in the four immediately preceding books the origin of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, Augustine adds as many books on the progress of the same cities, and approaches that argument in such a way as to treat the principal chapters of sacred history relating to the same subject, first of all in this fifteenth book those things which are read in Genesis from Cain and Abel up to the flood.

Chapter I.

Of the two orders of human generation running toward diverse ends from the beginning.

1. Concerning the happiness of paradise, or paradise itself, and the life of the first men there, and their sin and punishment, many have thought many things, said many things, and committed many things to writing. We also, according to the Holy Scriptures, either what we have read in them or what we have been able to understand from them, agreeing with their authority, have spoken of these things in the preceding books. But if these things are sought more minutely, they produce multiple and manifold disputes, which must be woven into more volumes than this work and time require. Which we do not have so large that we ought to linger in all things which idle and scrupulous men, more ready for questioning than capable of understanding, can require. Nevertheless, I think we have already done enough on the great and most difficult questions concerning the beginning either of the world, or of the soul, or of the human race itself: which we have distributed into two kinds; one of those who live according to man, the other of those who live according to God. These we also mystically call the two cities, that is, the two societies of men: of which one is predestined to reign eternally with God; the other, to undergo eternal punishment with the devil. But this is their end, of which we must speak later. Now, however, since enough has been said of their origin, whether in the angels, whose number is unknown to us, or in the two first men, it seems to me that their progress should be approached, from the time those two began to generate, until men shall cease to generate. For this whole time, or age, in which the dying give place and the nascent succeed, is the progress of those two cities of which we are disputing.

2. Natus est igitur prior Cain ex illis duobus generis humani parentibus, pertinens ad hominum civitatem; posterior Abel, ad civitatem Dei. Sicut enim in uno homine, quod dixit Apostolus, experimur quia non primum quod spirituale est, sed quod animale, postea spirituale (I Cor. XV, 46): unde unusquisque, quoniam ex damnata propagine exoritur, primo sit necesse est ex Adam malus atque carnalis. Quod si in Christum renascendo profecerit, post erit bonus et spiritualis: sic in universo genere humane cum primum duae istae coeperunt nascendo atque moriendo procurrere civitates, prior est natus civis hujus saeculi; posterior autem isto peregrinus in saeculo, et pertinens ad civitatem Dei, gratia praedestinatus, gratia electus, gratia peregrinus deorsum, gratia civis sursum. Nam quantum ad ipsum attinet, ex eadem massa oritur, quae originaliter est tota damnata: sed tanquam figulus Deus (hanc enim similitudinem non imprudenter, sed prudenter introducit Apostolus) ex eadem massa fecit aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam (Rom. IX, 21). Prius autem factum est vas in contumeliam, post vero alterum in honorem: quia et in ipso uno, sicut jam dixi, homine, prius est reprobum, unde necesse est incipiamus, et ubi non est necesse ut remaneamus; posterius vero probum, quo proficientes veniamus, et quo pervenientes maneamus. Proinde non quidem omnis homo malus erit bonus, nemo tamen erit bonus qui non erat malus: sed quanto quisque citius mutatur in melius, hoc in se facit nominari quod apprehendit celerius, et posteriore cooperit vocabulum prius. Scriptum est itaque de Cain, quod condiderit civitatem (Gen. IV, 17): Abel autem tanquam peregrinus non condidit. Superna est enim sanctorum civitas, quamvis hic pariat cives, in quibus peregrinatur, donec regni ejus tempus adveniat, cum congregatura est omnes in suis corporibus resurgentes, quando eis promissum dabitur regnum, ubi cum suo principe Rege saeculorum sine ullo temporis fine regnabunt.

Caput II.

De filiis carnis, et filiis promissionis.

Umbra sane quaedam civitatis hujus et imago prophetica ei significandae potius quam praesentandae servivit in terris, quo eam tempore demonstrari oportebat, et dicta est etiam ipsa civitas sancta merito significantis imaginis, non expressae, sicut futura est, veritatis. De hac imagine serviente, et de illa quam significat libera civitate, sic Apostolus ad Galatas loquitur: Dicite mihi, inquit, sub lege volentes esse, legem non audistis ? Scriptum est enim quod Abraham duos filios habuit, unum de ancilla, et unum de libera.

2. Cain, therefore, was born first of those two parents of the human race, belonging to the city of men; after him Abel, belonging to the city of God. For as we experience in one man what the Apostle says, that "not that which is spiritual is first, but that which is animal, and afterward that which is spiritual" (I Cor. XV, 46): whence each one, since he arises from a condemned stock, is necessarily first evil and carnal from Adam. But if by being reborn in Christ he makes progress, he will afterward be good and spiritual: so in the whole human race, when those two cities first began to run their course by being born and dying, the first born was a citizen of this world; but the later was a pilgrim in the world, and belonging to the city of God, predestined by grace, elected by grace, a pilgrim below by grace, a citizen above by grace. For as far as he himself is concerned, he arises from the same mass which was originally all condemned; but like a potter, God (for this similitude the Apostle introduces not imprudently, but prudently) from the same mass "made one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor" (Rom. IX, 21). But first the vessel unto dishonor was made, and afterward the other unto honor: because also in the one man, as I have already said, that which is reprobate is first, whence we must necessarily begin, and where it is not necessary that we should remain; but afterward that which is approved, toward which we come by making progress, and in which we remain when we have arrived. Accordingly, not indeed every evil man will be good, yet no one will be good who was not evil: but the more quickly each one is changed for the better, the more he makes that which he more quickly apprehends to be named in him, and covers the former name with the later. It is written, therefore, of Cain, that he built a city (Gen. IV, 17): but Abel, like a pilgrim, did not build one. For the city of the saints is above, although it brings forth citizens here, in whom it sojourns as a pilgrim until the time of its kingdom comes, when it will gather all rising in their bodies, when the promised kingdom shall be given to them, where they shall reign with their Prince, the King of ages, without any end of time.

Chapter II.

Of the sons of the flesh, and the sons of the promise.

A certain shadow of this city and a prophetic image served to signify it rather than to present it on earth, at the time when it was appropriate for it to be demonstrated; and it was even called the holy city by the merit of its signifying image, not of the expressed truth, such as it is to be. Concerning this serving image, and concerning that free city which it signifies, the Apostle thus speaks to the Galatians: "Tell me," he says, "you who wish to be under the law, have you not heard the law? For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by a bondmaid, and one by a free woman.

Sed ille quidem qui de ancilla, secundum carnem natus est; qui autem de libera, per repromissionem: quae sunt in allegoria . Haec enim sunt duo testamenta; unum quidem a monte Sina in servitutem generans, quod est Agar . Sina enim est mons in Arabia, qui conjunctus est huic quae nunc est Jerusalem: servit enim cum filiis suis. Quae autem sursum est Jerusalem, libera est, quae est mater omnium nostrum . Scriptum est enim, Laetare, sterilis, quae non paris; erumpe et clama, quae non parturis: quoniam multi filii desertae, magis quam ejus quae habet virum. Nos autem, fratres, secundum Isaac promissionis filii sumus. Sed sicut tunc qui secundum carnem natus fuerat, persequebatur eum qui secundum spiritum; ita et nunc. Sed quid dicit Scriptura? Ejice ancillam et filium ejus: non enim haeres erit filius ancillae cum filio liberae. Nos autem, fratres, non sumus ancillae filii, sed liberae, qua libertate Christus nos liberavit (Galat. IV, 21-31). Haec forma intelligendi de apostolica auctoritate descendens locum nobis aperit, quemadmodum Scripturas duorum Testamentorum, Veteris et Novi accipere debeamus. Pars enim quaedam terrenae civitatis imago coelestis civitatis effecta est, non se significando, sed alteram; et ideo serviens. Non enim propter se ipsam, sed propter aliam significandam est instituta; et praecedente alia significatione et ipsa praefigurans praefigurata est. Namque Agar ancilla Sarrae, ejusque filius, imago quadam hujus imaginis fuit.

Et quoniam transiturae erant umbrae luce veniente, ideo dixit libera Sarra, quae significabat liberam civitatem, cui rursus alio modo significandae etiam illa umbra serviebat: Ejice ancillam, et filium ejus; non enim haeres erit filius ancillae cum filio meo Isaac, quod ait Apostolus, cum filio liberae. Invenimus ergo in terrena civitate duas formas; unam suam praesentiam demonstrantem, alteram coelesti civitati significandae sua praesentia servientem. Parit autem cives terrenae civitatis peccato vitiata natura; coelestis vero civitatis cives parit a peccato naturam liberans gratia: unde illa vocantur vasa irae; ista, vasa misericordiae (Rom. IX, 22, 23). Significatum est hoc etiam in duobus filiis Abrahae, quod unus de ancilla, quae dicebatur Agar, secundum carnem natus est Ismael, alter autem de Sarra libera secundum repromissionem natus Isaac. Uterque quidem de semine Abrahae: sed illum genuit demonstrans consuetudo naturam, istum vero dedit promissio significans gratiam. Ibi humanus usus ostenditur, hic divinum beneficium commendatur.

Caput III.

De sterilitate Sarrae, quam Dei gratia fecundavit.

But he who was of the bondmaid was born according to the flesh; but he of the free woman, through promise: which things are an allegory. For these are two testaments; one indeed from Mount Sinai, generating unto servitude, which is Hagar. For Sinai is a mountain in Arabia, which is joined to this Jerusalem which now is: for she is in servitude with her children. But that Jerusalem which is above is free, which is the mother of us all. For it is written, Rejoice, thou barren that bearest not; break forth and cry, thou that travailest not: for many are the children of the desolate, more than of her who hath a husband. Now we, brethren, according to Isaac, are the children of promise. But as then he who was born according to the flesh persecuted him who was according to the spirit; so also now. But what saith the Scripture? Cast out the bondmaid and her son: for the son of the bondmaid shall not be heir with the son of the free woman. We then, brethren, are not children of the bondmaid, but of the free, with that liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free" (Galat. IV, 21-31). This form of understanding, descending from apostolic authority, opens a place for us as to how we ought to receive the Scriptures of the two Testaments, the Old and the New. For a certain part of the earthly city was made an image of the heavenly city, not signifying itself, but the other; and therefore serving. For it was instituted not for its own sake, but for the sake of signifying another; and, another signification preceding, it was itself prefigured while prefiguring. For Hagar, the bondmaid of Sarah, and her son, were a certain image of this image.

And because the shadows were to pass away when the light came, therefore the free Sarah said, who signified the free city, to which also that shadow served for the purpose of signifying in another way: "Cast out the bondmaid and her son; for the son of the bondmaid shall not be heir with my son Isaac," which, as the Apostle says, means "with the son of the free woman." We find, therefore, in the earthly city two forms: one demonstrating its own presence, the other serving by its presence to signify the heavenly city. Now nature vitiated by sin brings forth the citizens of the earthly city; but grace liberating nature from sin brings forth the citizens of the heavenly city: whence the former are called vessels of wrath, the latter vessels of mercy (Rom. IX, 22, 23). This was signified also in the two sons of Abraham, that one, Ishmael, was born according to the flesh of the bondmaid who was called Hagar, but the other, Isaac, was born according to the promise of the free Sarah. Both indeed were of the seed of Abraham: but the one was begotten by nature demonstrating custom, but the other was given by promise signifying grace. There human use is shown, here divine benefit is commended.

Chapter III.

Of the sterility of Sarah, whom the grace of God made fruitful.

Sarra quippe sterilis erat, et desperatione prolis, saltem de ancilla sua concupiscens habere, quod de se ipsa non se posse cernebat, dedit eam fetandam viro, de quo parere voluerat, nec potuerat. Exegit itaque etiam sic debitum de marito, utens jure suo in utero alieno. Natus est ergo Ismael, sicut nascuntur homines, permixtione sexus utriusque, usitata lege naturae. Ideo dictum est secundum carnem: non quod ista beneficia Dei non sint, aut non illa operetur Deus, cujus opifex sapientia attingit, sicut scriptum est, a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter (Sap. VIII, 1): sed ubi significandum fuerat Dei donum, quod indebitum hominibus gratis gratia largiretur, sic oportuit dari filium, quemadmodum naturae non debebatur excursibus. Negat enim natura jam filios tali commixtioni maris et feminae, qualis esse poterat Abrahae et Sarrae in illa jam aetate, etiam mulieris accedente sterilitate, quae nec tunc parere potuit, quando non aetas fecunditati, sed aetati fecunditas defuit. Quod ergo naturae sic affectae fructus posteritatis non de bebatur, significat quod natura generis humani peccato vitiata, ac per hoc jure damnata, nihil verae felicitatis in posterum merebatur. Recte igitur significat Isaac per repromissionem natus filios gratiae, cives civitatis liberae, socios pacis aeternae, ubi sit non amor propriae ac privatae quodammodo voluntatis, sed communi eodemque immutabili bono gaudens, atque ex multis unum cor faciens, id est perfecte concors , obedientia charitatis.

Caput IV.

De terrenae civitatis vel concertatione, vel pace.

Terrena porro civitas, quae sempiterna non erit (neque enim cum in extremo supplicio damnata fuerit, jam civitas erit), hic habet bonum suum, cujus societate laetatur, qualis esse de talibus rebus laetitia potest. Et quoniam non est tale bonum, ut nullas angustias faciat amatoribus suis, ideo civitas ista adversus se ipsam plerumque dividitur litigando, bellando, atque pugnando, et aut mortiferas, aut certe mortales victorias requirendo. Nam ex quacumque sui parte adversus alteram sui partem bellando surrexerit, quaerit esse victrix gentium, cum sit captiva vitiorum. Et si quidem cum vicerit, superbius extollitur, etiam mortifera ; si vero conditionem cogitans casusque communes, magisque accidere possunt adversis angitur, quam eis quae provenerint secundis rebus inflatur, tantummodo mortalis est ista victoria. Neque enim semper dominari poterit permanendo eis quos potuerit subjugare vincendo.

For Sarah was sterile, and in despair of offspring, desiring to have at least from her bondmaid what she saw she could not have from herself, she gave her to be impregnated by the man by whom she had wished to bear but could not. She therefore exacted even thus the debt from her husband, using her own right in the womb of another. Ishmael was therefore born, as men are born, by the commingling of both sexes, by the usual law of nature. Therefore it was said "according to the flesh": not that these are not the benefits of God, or that God does not work them, whose "artificer wisdom reacheth," as it is written, "from one end to the other mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wisd. VIII, 1): but where the gift of God was to be signified, which grace would bestow freely upon men who did not deserve it, it was appropriate that a son should be given in such a way as was not due to the course of nature. For nature now denies children to such a commingling of male and female as could be that of Abraham and Sarah in that age, the sterility of the woman also being added, who could not bear even then when it was not age that was lacking to fecundity, but fecundity to age. That therefore the fruit of posterity was not due to nature so affected, signifies that the nature of the human race, vitiated by sin, and therefore justly condemned, merited nothing of true happiness in the future. Rightly, therefore, does Isaac, born through promise, signify the sons of grace, the citizens of the free city, the partners of eternal peace, where there is not the love of a proper and, as it were, private will, but rejoicing in a common and the same unchangeable good, and making one heart out of many, that is, a perfectly harmonious heart, by the obedience of charity.

Chapter IV.

Of the conflict or peace of the earthly city.

Furthermore, the earthly city, which will not be everlasting (for when it shall have been condemned in the final punishment, it will no longer be a city), has here its own good, in the society of which it rejoices, such as the joy from such things can be. And since it is not such a good as to cause no distresses to its lovers, therefore this city is for the most part divided against itself by litigating, warring, and fighting, and by seeking either deadly or certainly mortal victories. For from whatever part of itself it has risen up warring against another part of itself, it seeks to be the victor of nations, although it is a captive of vices. And if indeed when it has conquered, it is more proudly extolled, it is even deadly; but if, considering its condition and the common accidents, it is more distressed by the things that can happen to the adverse side than inflated by those which have turned out favorably, that victory is only mortal. For it will not always be able to dominate by remaining over those whom it was able to subdue by conquering.

Caput V.

De primo terrenae civitatis auctore fratricida, cujus impietati Romanae urbis conditor germani caede responderit.

Primus itaque fuit terrenae civitatis conditor fratricida: nam suum fratrem civem civitatis aeternae in hac terra peregrinantem invidentia victus occidit. Unde mirandum non est, quod tanto post in ea civitate condenda, quae fuerat hujus terrenae civitatis, de qua loquimur, caput futura, et tam multis gentibus regnatura, huic primo exemplo et, ut Graeci appellant, á¼€ÏÏ‡ÎµÏ„á½»Ï€á¿[3] quaedam sui generis imago respondit. Nam et illic, sicut ipsum facinus quidam poeta commemoravit illorum, Fraterno primi maduerunt sanguine muri. (Lucan. lib. 1 Pharsal., v. 95.) Sic enim condita est Roma, quando occisum Remum a fratre Romulo Romana testatur historia: nisi quod isti terrenae civitatis ambo cives erant. Ambo gloriam de Romanae reipublicae institutione quaerebant: sed ambo eam tantam, quantam, si unus esset, habere non poterant. Qui enim volebat dominando gloriari, minus utique dominaretur, si ejus potestas vivo consorte minueretur. Ut ergo totam dominationem haberet unus, ablatus est socius: et scelere crevit in pejus, quod innocentia minus esset et melius. Hi autem fratres Cain et Abel non habebant ambo inter se similem rerum terrenarum cupiditatem; nec in hoc alter alteri invidit, quod ejus dominatus fieret angustior, qui alterum occidit, si ambo dominarentur (Abel quippe non quaerebat dominationem in ea civitate, quae condebatur a fratre): sed invidentia illa diabolica, qua invident bonis mali, nulla alia causa , nisi quia illi boni sunt, illi mali. Nullo enim modo fit minor accedente seu permanente consorte possessio bonitatis; imo possessio bonitas, quam tanto latius, quanto concordius individua sociorum possidet charitas . Non habebit denique istam possessionem, qui eam noluerit habere communem; et tanto eam reperiet ampliorem, quanto amplius ibi potuerit amare consortem. Illud igitur quod inter Remum et Romulum exortum est, quemadmodum adversus se ipsam terrena civitas dividatur, ostendit: quod autem inter Cain et Abel, inter duas ipsas civitates, Dei et hominum, inimicitias demonstravit. Pugnant ergo inter se mali et mali: item pugnant inter se boni et mali. Boni vero et boni, si perfecti sunt, inter se pugnare non possunt: proficientes autem nondumque perfecti ita possunt, ut bonus quisque ex ea parte pugnet contra alterum, qua etiam contra semetipsum. Et in uno quippe homine caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem (Galat. V, 17).

Chapter V.

Of the first author of the earthly city, the fratricide, to whose impiety the founder of the Roman city responded by the slaughter of his brother.

The first founder of the earthly city was therefore a fratricide: for, overcome by envy, he slew his brother, a citizen of the eternal city, a pilgrim on this earth. Wherefore it is not to be wondered at that, so long after, in the founding of that city which was to be the head of this earthly city of which we speak, and to reign over so many nations, a certain image of its own kind responded to this first example and, as the Greeks call it, archetype. For there also, as a certain poet of theirs has commemorated the crime itself, "The first walls were moistened with fraternal blood" (Lucan, Pharsalia, Book I, v. 95). For thus was Rome founded, when Roman history testifies that Remus was slain by his brother Romulus: except that both of these were citizens of the earthly city. Both sought glory from the institution of the Roman republic: but both could not have it as great as if there were only one. For he who wished to glory in dominating would certainly dominate less if his power were diminished by a living consort. Therefore, that one might have the whole domination, the associate was removed: and it grew for the worse by crime, that which was less and better by innocence. But these brothers Cain and Abel did not both have a similar desire for earthly things; nor in this did the one envy the other, because his dominion would become narrower, who slew the other, if both were to dominate (for Abel did not seek dominion in that city which was being founded by his brother): but that diabolical envy, by which the evil envy the good, for no other cause than because they are good and those are evil. For in no way does the possession of goodness become less by the accession or remaining of a consort; rather, goodness is a possession which the individual charity of associates possesses the more widely the more harmoniously. Finally, he will not have this possession who shall be unwilling to have it in common; and he will find it the more ample the more he can love his associate there. That, therefore, which arose between Remus and Romulus, showed how the earthly city is divided against itself; but what arose between Cain and Abel showed the enmities between the two cities themselves, of God and of men. Therefore the evil and the evil fight among themselves: likewise the good and the evil fight among themselves. But the good and the good, if they are perfect, cannot fight among themselves: but those who are progressing and are not yet perfect can so fight that each good man fights against the other from that part in which he also fights against himself. For even in one man "the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh" (Galat. V, 17).

Concupiscentia ergo spiritualis contra alterius potest pugnare carnalem, vel concupiscentia carnalis contra alterius spiritualem, sicut inter se pugnant boni et mali: vel certe ipsae concupiscentiae carnales inter se duorum bonorum, nondum utique perfectorum, sicut inter se pugnant mali et mali, donec eorum qui curantur ad ultimam victoriam sanitas perducatur.

Caput VI.

De languoribus, quos ex poena peccati etiam cives civitatis Dei in hujus vitae peregrinatione patiuntur, et a quibus Deo medente sanantur.

Languor est quippe iste, id est illa inobedientia, de qua in libro quartodecimo diseruimus (Capp. 1, 11 et alibi), primae inobedientiae supplicium; et ideo non natura, sed vitium: propter quod dicitur proficientibus bonis, et ex fide in hac peregrinatione viventibus, Invicem onera vestra portate, et sic adimplebitis legem Christi (Galat. VI, 2) . Item alibi dicitur: Corripite inquietos, consolamini pussillanimes, suscipite infirmos, patientes estote ad omnes. Videte ne quis malum pro malo alicui reddat (I Thess. V, 14 et 15). Item alio loco: Si praeoccupatus fuerit homo in aliquo delicto, vos qui spirituales estis, instruite hujusmodi in spiritu mansuetudinis, intendens te ipsum, ne et tu tenteris (Galat. VI, 1). Et alibi: Sol non occidat super iracundiam vestram (Ephes. IV, 26). Et in Evangelio: Si peccaverit in te frater tuus, corripe eum inter te et ipsum solum (Matth. XVIII, 15). Item de peccatis, in quibus multorum cavetur offensio, Apostolus dicit: Peccantes coram omnibus argue, ut et caeteri timorem habeant (I Tim. V, 20). Propter hoc et de venia invicem danda, multa praecipiuntur, et magna cura, propter tenendam pacem, sine qua nemo poterit videre Deum (Hebr. XII, 14): ubi ille terror est, quando jubetur servus decem millium talentorum reddere debita, quae illi fuerant relaxata, quoniam debitum denariorum centum conservo suo non relaxavit. Qua similitudine proposita, Dominus Jesus adjecit, atque ait, Sic et vobis faciet Pater vester coelestis, si non dimiseritis unusquisque fratri suo de cordibus vestris (Matth. XVIII, 35). Hoc modo curantur cives civitatis Dei in hac terra peregrinantes, et paci supernae patriae suspirantes. Spiritus autem sanctus operatur intrinsecus, ut valeat aliquid medicina, quae adhibetur extrinsecus. Alioquin etiamsi Deus ipse utens creatura sibi subdita in aliqua specie humana sensus alloquatur humanos, sive istos corporis, sive illos quos istis simillimos habemus in somnis, nec interiore gratia mentem regat atque agat, nihil prodest homini omnis praedicatio veritatis. Facit autem hoc Deus a vasis misericordiae irae vasa discernens, dispensatione qua ipse novit multum occulta, sed tamen justa.

Spiritual concupiscence therefore can fight against the carnal concupiscence of another, or carnal concupiscence against the spiritual concupiscence of another, just as the good and the evil fight among themselves: or certainly the carnal concupiscences of two good men themselves, not yet indeed perfect, fight among themselves, just as the evil and the evil fight among themselves, until the health of those who are being cared for is led to the ultimate victory.

Chapter VI.

Of the languors which even the citizens of the city of God suffer in the pilgrimage of this life from the punishment of sin, and from which they are healed by God the physician.

For this is that languor, that is, that disobedience of which we discussed in the fourteenth book, the punishment of the first disobedience; and therefore it is not nature, but a vice: on account of which it is said to the good who are making progress, and living from faith in this pilgrimage, "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so shall ye fulfill the law of Christ" (Galat. VI, 2). Likewise it is said elsewhere: "Correct the restless, comfort the faint-hearted, support the weak, be patient towards all." See that no one render evil for evil to any one" (I Thess. V, 14 and 15). Likewise in another place: "If a man be overtaken in any fault, ye who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness, considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted" (Galat. VI, 1). And elsewhere: "Let not the sun go down upon your wrath" (Ephes. IV, 26). And in the Gospel: "If thy brother shall sin against thee, correct him between thee and him alone" (Matth. XVIII, 15). Likewise concerning sins in which the offense of many is guarded against, the Apostle says: "Those that sin rebuke before all, that others also may have fear" (I Tim. V, 20). On account of this also many things are commanded concerning the forgiveness to be given mutually, and with great care, for the sake of holding peace, without which no one will be able to see God (Hebr. XII, 14): where that terror is, when the servant of ten thousand talents is commanded to pay the debts which had been released to him, because he did not release the debt of a hundred pence to his fellow-servant. Which similitude having been proposed, the Lord Jesus added, and said, "So also will your heavenly Father do to you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother" (Matth. XVIII, 35). In this way are the citizens of the city of God healed while peregrinating in this earth, and sighing for the peace of the heavenly country. But the Holy Spirit works internally, so that the medicine which is applied externally may avail something. Otherwise, even if God Himself, using a creature subject to Him, should address human senses in some human form, whether these of the body, or those which we have very like to these in dreams, and should not rule and move the mind by internal grace, all preaching of the truth profits a man nothing. But God does this, discerning the vessels of mercy from the vessels of wrath, by a dispensation which He Himself knows to be very hidden, but yet just.

Ipso quippe adjuvante mirabilibus et latentibus modis, cum peccatum, quod habitat in membris nostris, quae potius jam poena peccati est, sicut Apostolus praecipit, non regnat in nostro mortali corpore ad obediendum desideriis ejus, nec ei membra nostra velut iniquitatis arma exhibemus (Rom. VI, 12, 13), convertitur ad mentem non sibi ad mala, Deo regente, consentientem; et eam regentem tranquillius nunc habebit, postea sanitate perfecta atque immortalitate percepta homo sine ullo peccato in aeterna pace regnabit.

Caput VII.

De causa et pertinacia sceleris Cain, quem a facinore concepto nec Dei sermo revocavit.

1. Sed hoc ipsum, quod sicut potuimus exposuimus, cum Deus locutus esset ad Cain eo more , quo cum primis hominibus per creaturam subjectam velut eorum socius forma congrua loquebatur , quid ei profuit? nonne conceptum scelus in necando fratre etiam post verbum divinae admonitionis implevit? Nam cum sacrificia discrevisset amborum, in illius respiciens, hujus despiciens, quod non dubitandum est potuisse cognosci signo aliquo attestante visibili; et hoc ideo fecisset Deus, quia mala erant opera hujus, fratris vero ejus bona: contristatus est Cain valde, et concidit facies ejus. Sic enim scriptum est: Et dixit Dominus ad Cain, Quare tristis factus es, et quare concidit facies tua? Nonne si recte offeras, recte autem non dividas, peccasti? Quiesce: ad te enim conversio ejus, et tu dominaberis illius (Gen. IV, 6, 7, sec. LXX). In hac admonitione quam Deus protulit ad Cain, illud quidem quod dictum est, Nonne si recte offeras, recte autem non dividas, peccasti? quia non elucet cur vel unde sit dictum, multos sensus peperit ejus obscuritas, cum divinarum Scripturarum quisque tractator secundum fidei regulam id conatur exponere. Recte quippe offertur sacrificium, cum offertur Deo vero, cui uni tantummodo sacrificandum est. Non autem recte dividitur, dum non discernuntur recte vel loca, vel tempora, vel res ipsae quae offeruntur, vel qui offert, et cui offertur, vel hi quibus ad vescendum distribuitur quod oblatum est: ut divisionem hic discretionem intelligamus; sive cum offertur, ubi non oportet, aut quod non ibi, sed alibi oportet; sive cum offertur, quando non oportet, aut quod non tunc, sed alias oportet; sive cum id offertur, quod nusquam et nunquam penitus debuit; sive cum electiora sibi ejusdem generis rerum tenet homo, quam sunt ea quae offert Deo; sive cum ejus rei quae oblata est, fit particeps profanus, aut quilibet quem fas non est fieri. In quo autem horum Deo displicuerit Cain, facile non potest inveniri.

For by His own help in wonderful and latent ways, when sin, which dwells in our members, which rather is now the punishment of sin, as the Apostle commands, does not reign in our mortal body to obey its desires, nor do we present our members to it as weapons of iniquity (Rom. VI, 12, 13), it is turned to a mind not consenting to itself for evil, God ruling; and he will have it ruling more tranquilly now, afterwards, perfect health and immortality having been perceived, man without any sin will reign in eternal peace.

Chapter VII.

Of the cause and pertunacity of the crime of Cain, whom not even the word of God recalled from the conceived wickedness.

1. But this very thing which we have explained as we were able, when God had spoken to Cain in that manner in which He spoke with the first men through a subject creature, as if their associate, in a suitable form, what did it profit him? did he not fulfill the conceived wickedness in slaying his brother even after the word of divine admonition? For when He had discerned the sacrifices of both, looking upon his brother's and looking down upon his, which it is not to be doubted could have been known by some attesting visible sign; and God had done this because his works were evil, but those of his brother good: Cain was very sorrowful, and his countenance fell. For thus it is written: "And the Lord said to Cain, Why art thou become sorrowful, and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou offerest rightly, but dividest not rightly, hast thou not sinned? Be quiet: for to thee is his turning, and thou shalt rule over him" (Gen. IV, 6, 7, sec. LXX). In this admonition which God brought forth to Cain, that indeed which was said, "If thou offerest rightly, but dividest not rightly, hast thou not sinned?" because it does not appear clearly why or whence it was said, its obscurity has given birth to many senses, since each tracker of the divine Scriptures tries to explain it according to the rule of faith. For a sacrifice is rightly offered when it is offered to the true God, to whom alone only one must sacrifice. But it is not rightly divided, while places or times, or the things themselves which are offered, or he who offers, and he to whom it is offered, or those to whom that which was offered is distributed for eating, are not rightly discerned: that we may understand division here as discretion; whether when it is offered where it is not appropriate, or that which is not appropriate there, but elsewhere; whether when it is offered when it is not appropriate, or that which is not appropriate then, but at another time; whether when that is offered which ought to have been offered nowhere and never at all; whether when a man keeps for himself more select things of the same kind of things than are those which he offers to God; or whether he who is profane, or whoever it is not lawful to become so, becomes a participant of that thing which was offered. In which of these things Cain displeased God, cannot easily be found.

Sed quoniam Joannes apostolus, cum de his fratribus loqueretur, Non sicut Cain, inquit, qui ex maligno erat, et occidit fratrem suum: et cujus rei gratia occidit eum? Quia opera illius maligna fuerunt fratris autem illius justa (I Joan. III, 12): datur intelligi propterea Deum non respexisse in munus ejus, quia hoc ipso male dividebat, dans Deo aliquid suum, sibi autem se ipsum. Quod omnes faciunt qui non Dei, sed suam sectantes voluntatem, id est, non recto, sed perverso corde viventes, offerunt tamen Deo munus, quo putant eum redimi, ut eorum non opituletur sanandis pravis cupiditatibus, sed explendis. Et hoc est proprium terrenae civitatis, Deum vel deos colere, quibus adjuvantibus regnet in victoriis et pace terrena, non charitate consulendi, sed dominandi cupiditate. Boni quippe ad hoc utuntur mundo, ut fruantur Deo: mali autem contra, ut fruantur mundo, uti volunt Deo; qui tamen eum vel esse, vel res humanas curare jam credunt. Sunt enim multo deteriores, qui nec hoc quidem credunt. Cognito itaque Cain quod super ejus germani sacrificium, nec super suum respexerat Deus, utique fratrem bonum mutatus imitari, non elatus debuit aemulari. Sed contristatus est, et concidit facies ejus. Hoc peccatum maxime arguit Deus, tristitiam de alterius bonitate, et hoc fratris. Hoc quippe arguendo interrogavit dicens, Quare contristatus es, et quare concidit facies tua? Quia enim fratri invidebat, Deus videbat, et hoc arguebat. Nam hominibus, quibus absconditum est cor alterius, esse posset ambiguum, et prorsus incertum, utrum illa tristitia malignitatem suam, in qua se Deo displicuisse didicerat, an fratris doluerit bonitatem, quae Deo placuit, cum in sacrificium ejus aspexit. Sed rationem Deus reddens, cur ejus oblationem accipere noluerit, ut sibi ipse potius merito, quam ei frater immerito displiceret , cum esset injustus non recte dividendo, hoc est non recte vivendo, et indignus cujus approbaretur oblatio, quam esset injustior, quod fratrem justum gratis odisset, ostendit.

2. Non tamen eum dimittens sine mandato sancto, justo et bono, Quiesce, inquit; ad te enim conversio ejus, et tu dominaberis illius. Numquid fratris? Absit. Cujus igitur, nisi peccati? Dixerat enim, Peccasti: tum deinde addidit, Quiesce; ad te enim conversio ejus, et tu dominaberis illius. Potest quidem ita intelligi ad ipsum hominem conversionem esse debere peccati, ut nulli alii quam sibi sciat tribuere debere quod peccat.

But since John the Apostle, when he spoke of these brothers, says, "Not as Cain, who was of the malignant one, and slew his brother: and for the sake of what thing did he slay him? Because his works were malignant, but those of his brother just" (I John III, 12): it is given to be understood that God did not look upon his gift for this reason, because by this very thing he divided badly, giving to God something of his own, but to himself, himself. Which all do who, following not God's will but their own, that is, living with a heart not upright but perverted, yet offer a gift to God, by which they think He is redeemed, so that He may help not in healing their depraved desires, but in fulfilling them. And this is proper to the earthly city, to worship God or gods, by whose help it may reign in earthly victories and peace, not with the charity of consulting, but with the desire of dominating. For the good use the world for this, that they may enjoy God: but the evil, on the contrary, wish to use God that they may enjoy the world; those, however, who already believe Him either to be, or to care for human affairs. For there are some much worse, who do not even believe this. Cain, therefore, having known that God had looked upon the sacrifice of his brother, and not upon his own, certainly having been changed, ought to have imitated his good brother, not, having been puffed up, ought to have emulated him. But he was sorrowful, and his countenance fell. This sin God especially rebukes, sorrow for another's goodness, and this of a brother. For He interrogated him by rebuking him, saying, "Why art thou become sorrowful, and why is thy countenance fallen?" For that he envied his brother, God saw, and this He rebuked. For to men, to whom the heart of another is hidden, it could be ambiguous and altogether uncertain, whether he grieved for that sorrow his own malignancy, in which he had learned that he had displeased God, or the goodness of his brother, which pleased God when He looked upon his sacrifice. But God, rendering the reason why He was unwilling to accept his oblation, so that he should rather deservedly displease himself, than his brother should undeservedly displease him, when he was unjust by not dividing rightly, that is, by not living rightly, and unworthy whose oblation should be approved, showed how much more unjust he was because he had hated his just brother without cause.

2. However, not dismissing him without a holy, just, and good mandate, He said, "Be quiet; for to thee is his turning, and thou shalt rule over him." Was it of his brother? Far from it. Of what, then, unless of sin? For He had said, "Thou hast sinned": then He added, "Be quiet; for to thee is his turning, and thou shalt rule over him." It can indeed be understood that the turning of sin ought to be toward the man himself, so that he should know that he ought to attribute what he sins to none other than himself.

Haec est enim salubris poenitentiae medicina, et veniae petitio non incongrua, ut ubi ait, Ad te enim conversio ejus, non subaudiatur, Erit; sed, Sit; praecipientis videlicet, non praedicentis modo. Tunc enim dominabitur quisque peccato, si id sibi non defendendo praeposuerit, sed poenitendo subjecerit: alioquin et illi serviet dominanti, si patrocinium adhibuerit accidenti. Sed ut peccatum intelligatur concupiscentia ipsa carnalis, de qua dicit Apostolus, Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum (Galat. V, 17); in cujus carnis fructibus et invidiam commemorat, qua utique Cain stimulabatur, et accendebatur in fratris exitium: bene subauditur, Erit, id est, Ad te enim conversio ejus erit, et tu dominaberis illius. Cum enim commota fuerit pars ipsa carnalis, quam peccatum appellat Apostolus, ubi dicit, Non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum (Rom. VII, 17): quam partem animi etiam philosophi dicunt esse vitiosam, non quae mentem debeat trahere, sed cui mens debeat imperare, eamque ab illicitis operibus ratione cohibere: cum ergo commota fuerit ad aliquid perperam committendum, si quiescatur et obtemperetur dicenti Apostolo, Nec exhibueritis membra vestra arma iniquitatis peccato (Id. VI, 13); ad mentem domita et victa convertitur, ut subditae ratio dominetur. Hoc praecepit Deus huic, qui facibus invidiae inflammabatur in fratrem, et quem debuerat imitari, cupiebat auferri. Quiesce, inquit: manus ab scelere contine; non regnet peccatum in tuo mortali corpore ad obediendum desideriis ejus, nec exhibeas membra tua iniquitatis arma peccato. Ad te enim conversio ejus: dum non adjuvatur relaxando, sed quiescendo frenatur. Et tu dominaberis illius: ut cum forinsecus non permittitur operari, sub potestate mentis regentis et benevolentis assuescat etiam intrinsecus non moveri. Dictum est tale aliquid in eodem divino libro et de muliere, quando post peccatum Deo interrogante atque judicante damnationis sententias acceperunt, in serpente diabolus, et in se ipsis illa et maritus. Cum enim dixisset ei, Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas et gemitum tuum, et in tristitiis paries filios: deinde addidit, Et ad virum tuum conversio tua, et ipse dominabitur tui (Gen. III, 16). Quod dictum est ad Cain de peccato, vel de vitiosa carnis concupiscentia, hoc isto loco de peccatrice femina: ubi intelligendum est virum ad regendam uxorem, animo carnem regenti similem esse oportere. Propter quod dicit Apostolus: Qui diligit uxorem suam, se ipsum diligit: nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit (Ephes. V, 28 et 29). Sananda sunt enim haec, sicut nostra; non sicut aliena, damnanda. Sed illud Dei praeceptum Cain sicut praevaricator accepit. Invalescente quippe invidentiae vitio, fratrem insidiatus occidit. Talis erat terrenae conditor civitatis.

For this is the medicine of salutary penitence, and a not unsuitable petition for pardon, so that where He says, "For to thee is his turning," "let it be" is understood, not "it will be"; namely, as one commanding, not merely as one predicting. For then each one shall rule over sin, if he has not preferred it to himself by defending it, but has subjected it to himself by repenting: otherwise he will also serve it as it rules, if he has applied patronage to it as it happens. But so that sin may be understood as that carnal concupiscence itself, of which the Apostle says, "The flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Galat. V, 17); in the fruits of which flesh he also commemorates envy, by which certainly Cain was stimulated and inflamed for the destruction of his brother: "it will be" is well understood, that is, "For to thee shall be its turning, and thou shalt rule over it." For when that carnal part itself has been moved, which the Apostle calls sin where he says, "It is not I that work it, but sin that dwelleth in me" (Rom. VII, 17): which part of the soul even the philosophers say is vicious, not that which ought to draw the mind, but over which the mind ought to command, and restrain it by reason from illicit works: when therefore it has been moved to commit something wrongly, if one is quiet and obeys the Apostle saying, "Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin" (Id. VI, 13); it is turned to the mind, tamed and conquered, so that reason may rule over it as subject. This God commanded to him who was inflamed with the torches of envy against his brother, and desired that he whom he ought to have imitated should be taken away. "Be quiet," He said: restrain thy hands from crime; let not sin reign in thy mortal body to obey its desires, nor yield thy members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin. "For to thee is its turning": while it is not helped by relaxing, but is bridled by being quiet. "And thou shalt rule over it": so that when it is not permitted to work from without, it may become accustomed, under the power of a ruling and benevolent mind, not even to be moved within. Something of this kind was said in the same divine book also concerning the woman, when, after sin, upon God's interrogation and judgment, they received sentences of condemnation, the devil in the serpent, and she and her husband in themselves. For when He had said to her, "Multiplying I will multiply thy sorrows and thy groaning, and in sorrows thou shalt bring forth children": then He added, "And to thy husband shall be thy turning, and he shall rule over thee" (Gen. III, 16). What was said to Cain concerning sin, or concerning the vicious concupiscence of the flesh, is said in this place concerning the sinning woman: where it is to be understood that the husband ought to be similar to the mind ruling the flesh, for the purpose of ruling the wife. For which reason the Apostle says: "He that loveth his wife, loveth himself: for no man ever hated his own flesh" (Ephes. V, 28 and 29). For these things are to be healed as our own; not as alien things, to be condemned. But Cain received that precept of God as a transgressor. For the vice of envy prevailing, he slew his brother after lying in wait for him. Such was the founder of the earthly city.

Quomodo autem significaverit etiam Judaeos, a quibus Christus occisus est pastor ovium hominum, quem pastor ovium pecorum praefigurabat Abel, quia in allegoria prophetica res est, parco nunc dicere, et quaedam hinc adversus Faustum Manichaeum dixisse me recolo .

Caput VIII.

Quae ratio fuerit, ut Cain inter principia generis humani conderet civitatem.

1. Nunc autem defendenda mihi videtur historia, ne sit Scriptura incredibilis, quae dicit aedificatam ab uno homine civitatem eo tempore, quo non plus quam viri quatuor, vel potius tres, posteaquam fratrem frater occidit, fuisse videntur in terra; id est, primus homo pater omnium, et ipse Cain, et ejus filius Enoch, ex cujus nomine ipsa civitas nuncupata est. Sed hoc quos movet, parum considerant, non omnes homines, qui tunc esse potuerunt, scriptorem sacrae hujus historiae necesse habuisse nominare; sed eos solos, quos operis suscepti ratio postulabat. Propositum quippe scriptoris illius fuit, per quem Spiritus sanctus id agebat, per successiones certarum generationum ex uno homine propagatarum pervenire ad Abraham, ac deinde ex ejus semine ad populum Dei: in quo distincto a caeteris gentibus praefigurarentur et praenuntiarentur omnia quae de civitate, cujus aeternum erit regnum, et de Rege ejus eodemque conditore Christo in Spiritu praevidebantur esse ventura; ita ut nec de altera societate hominum taceretur, quam terrenam dicimus civitatem, quantum ei commemorandae satis esset, ut civitas Dei etiam suae adversariae comparatione clarescat. Cum igitur Scriptura divina, ubi et numerum annorum, quos illi homines vixerunt, commemorat, ita concludat, ut dicat de illo de quo loquebatur, Et genuit filios et filias, et fuerunt omnes dies illius, vel illius, quos vixit, anni tot, et mortuus est (Gen. V, 4, 5, et alibi): numquid quia eosdem filios et filias non nominat, ideo intelligere non debemus per tam multos annos, quibus tunc in saeculi hujus prima aetate vivebant, nasci potuisse plurimos homines, quorum coetibus condi possent etiam plurimae civitates? sed pertinuit ad Deum, quo ista inspirante conscripta sunt, has duas societates suis diversis generationibus primitus digerere atque distinguere: ut seorsum hominum, hoc est secundum hominem viventium, seorsum autem filiorum Dei, id est hominum secundum Deum viventium, generationes contexerentur usque ad diluvium, ubi ambarum societatum discretio concretioque narratur: discretio quidem, quod ambarum separatim generationes commemorantur, unius fratricidae Cain, alterius autem qui vocabatur Seth; natus quippe fuerat et ipse de Adam, pro illo quem frater occidit:

But how he may have signified also the Jews, by whom Christ was slain, the shepherd of the sheep of men, whom Abel, the shepherd of the sheep of the flock, prefigured, because the matter is in a prophetic allegory, I spare to say now, and I remember that I have said some things here against Faustus the Manichaean.

Chapter VIII.

What was the reason that Cain, among the beginnings of the human race, founded a city.

1. But now it seems to me that the history must be defended, lest the Scripture be incredible, which says that a city was built by one man at that time in which no more than four men, or rather three, after brother slew brother, seem to have been on the earth; that is, the first man, the father of all, and Cain himself, and his son Enoch, from whose name the city itself was called. But those whom this moves, consider too little that it was not necessary for the writer of this sacred history to name all the men who could then be; but those only whom the reason of the work undertaken required. For the purpose of that writer was, through whom the Holy Spirit was doing this, to arrive through successions of certain generations propagated from one man to Abraham, and then from his seed to the people of God: in which, distinct from the other nations, all things might be prefigured and foretold which were foreseen in the Spirit as coming concerning the city whose kingdom shall be eternal, and concerning its King and the same founder, Christ; so that neither should silence be kept concerning the other society of men, which we call the earthly city, as much as might be sufficient for its commemoration, so that the city of God may shine forth even by comparison with its adversary. Since therefore the divine Scripture, where it also commemorates the number of years which those men lived, concludes in such a way that it says concerning him of whom it was speaking, "And he begat sons and daughters, and all the days of him were," or of that one, "which he lived, so many years, and he died" (Gen. V, 4, 5, and elsewhere): because it does not name the same sons and daughters, ought we not therefore to understand that through so many years in which they then lived in this first age of the world, very many men could have been born, by whose gatherings even very many cities could be founded? but it pertained to God, by whose inspiration these things were written, to first arrange and distinguish these two societies by their diverse generations: so that the generations of men, that is, of those living according to man, and on the other hand, the generations of the sons of God, that is, of men living according to God, might be woven together until the flood, where the discretion and concretion of both societies are narrated: discretion indeed, because the generations of both are commemorated separately, of the one fratricide Cain, and of the other who was called Seth; for he also had been born of Adam in place of him whom his brother slew:

concretio autem, quia, bonis in deterius declinantibus, tales universi facti fuerant, ut diluvio delerentur, excepto uno justo, cui nomen erat Noe, et ejus conjuge, et tribus filiis, totidemque nuribus, qui homines octo ex illa omnium vastatione mortalium per arcam evadere meruerunt.

2. Quod igitur scriptum est, Et cognovit Cain uxorem suam, et concipiens peperit Enoch; et erat aedificans civitatem in nomine filii sui Enoch: non est quidem consequens, ut istum primum filium genuisse credatur. Neque enim hoc ex eo putandum est, quia dictus est cognovisse uxorem suam, quasi tunc se illi primitus concumbendo miscuisset. Nam et de ipso patre omnium Adam non tunc solum hoc dictum est, quando conceptus est Cain, quem primogentium videtur habuisse: verum etiam posterius eadem Scriptura, Cognovit, inquit, Adam uxorem suam Evam, et concepit, et peperit filium, et nominavit nomen illius Seth (Id. IV, 17, 25). Unde intelligitur ita solere illam Scripturam loqui, quamvis non semper cum in ea legitur factos hominum fuisse conceptus, non tamen solum cum primum sibi sexus uterque miscetur. Nec illud necessario est argumento, ut primogenitum patri existimemus Enoch, quod ejus nomine civitas illa nuncupata est. Non enim ab re est, ut propter aliquam causa, cum et alios haberet, diligeret eum pater caeteris amplius. Neque enim et Judas primogenitus fuit, a quo Judaea cognominata est, et Judaei. Sed etiamsi conditori civitatis illius iste filius primus est natus, non ideo putandum est tunc a patre conditae civitati nomen ejus impositum, quando natus est; quia nec constitui tunc ab uno poterat civitas, quae nihil aliud est quam hominum multitudo aliquo societatis vinculo colligata: sed cum illius hominis familia tanta numeriositate cresceret, ut haberet jam populi quantitatem, tunc potuit utique fieri, ut et constitueret, et nomen primogeniti sui constitutae imponeret civitati. Tam longa quippe vita illorum hominum fuit, ut illic memoratorum, quorum et anni taciti non sunt, qui minimum vixit ante diluvium, ad septingentos quinquagita tres perveniret . Nam plures nongentos annos etiam transierunt, quamvis nemo ad mille pervenerit. Quis itaque dubitaverit per unius hominis aetatem tantum multiplicari potuisse genus humanum, ut esset unde constitueretur non una, sed plurimae civitates ? Quod ex hoc conjici facillime potest, quia ex uno Abraham non multo amplius quadringentis annis numerositas Hebraeae gentis tanta procreata est, ut in exitu ejusdem populi ex Aegypto sexcenta millia hominum fuisse referantur bellicae juventutis (Exod. XII, 37), ut omittamus gentem Idumaeorum non pertinentem ad populum Israel, quam genuit frater ejus Esau, nepos Abrahae, et alias natas ex semine ipsius Abrahae, non per Sarram conjugem procreatas.

but concretion, because, the good declining into worse, all had become such that they were destroyed by the flood, except one just man, whose name was Noah, and his wife, and three sons, and as many daughters-in-law, which eight persons deserved to escape from that devastation of all mortals through the ark.

2. What therefore is written, "And Cain knew his wife, and she conceiving bore Enoch; and he was building a city in the name of his son Enoch": it is not indeed a consequence that he should be believed to have begotten this first son. For this is not to be thought of from this, that he is said to have known his wife, as if he had then first mixed with her by lying together. For even concerning the father of all himself, Adam, this was not said only then when Cain was conceived, whom he seems to have had as his first-born: but also later the same Scripture says, "Adam knew his wife Eve, and she conceived, and bore a son, and named his name Seth" (Id. IV, 17, 25). From which it is understood that that Scripture is accustomed so to speak, although not always when in it it is read that the conceptions of men were made, yet not only when first each sex is mixed together. Nor is that necessarily an argument, that we should think Enoch the first-born to his father, that that city was called by his name. For it is not beside the point that for some reason, although he had others, the father loved him more than the rest. For neither was Judah the first-born, from whom Judea was named, and the Jews. But even if this son was born first to that founder of a city, it is not therefore to be thought that his name was imposed on the city founded by his father then when he was born; because a city, which is nothing else than a multitude of men bound together by some bond of society, could not then be established by one man: but when the family of that man grew to such a numerosity that it already had the quantity of a people, then it could certainly happen that he both established and imposed the name of his first-born on the established city. For the life of those men was so long, that of those there commemorated, whose years are not silent, he who lived the least before the flood reached seven hundred and fifty-three years. For many also passed nine hundred years, although no one reached a thousand. Who therefore would doubt that through the age of one man the human race could have been so multiplied that there was that from which was established not one, but very many cities? Which can be very easily conjectured from this, because from one Abraham in not much more than four hundred years so great a numerosity of the Hebrew nation was procreated, that in the exit of the same people from Egypt six hundred thousand men are reported to have been of military youth (Exod. XII, 37), that we may omit the nation of the Edomites not pertaining to the people of Israel, whom his brother Esau, the grandson of Abraham, begat, and others born from the seed of Abraham himself, not procreated through Sarah his wife.

Caput IX.

De longa vita hominum, quae fuit ante diluvium, et de ampliore humanorum corporum forma.

Quamobrem nullus prudens rerum existimator dubitaverit, Cain, non solum aliquam, verum etiam magnam potuisse condere civitatem, quando in tam longum tempus protendebatur vita mortalium : nisi forte infidelium quispiam ex ipsa numerositate annorum nobis ingerat quaestionem, qua vixisse tunc homines scriptum est in auctoribus nostris ; et hoc neget esse credendum. Ita quippe non credunt etiam magnitudines corporum longe ampliores tunc fuisse quam nunc sunt. Unde et nobilissimus eorum poeta Virgilius, de ingenti lapide, quem in agrorum limite infixum vir fortis illorum temporum pugnans et rapuit, et cucurrit, et intorsit, et misit, Vix illum (inquit) lecti bis sex cervice subirent, Qualia nunc hominum producit corpora tellus: (Aeneid. lib. 12, v. 899-900.) significans majora tunc corpora producere solere tellurem. Quanto magis igitur temporibus recentioribus mundi, ante illud nobile diffamatumque diluvium? Sed de corporum magnitudine plerumque incredulos nudata per vetustatem sive per vim fluminum variosque casus sepulcra convincunt, ubi apparuerunt, vel unde ceciderunt incredibilis magnitudinis ossa mortuorum. Vidi ipse non solus, sed aliquot mecum in Uticensi littore molarem hominis dentem tam ingentem, ut si in nostrorum dentium modulos minutatim concideretur, centum nobis videretur facere potuisse. Sed illum gigantis alicujus fuisse crediderim. Nam praeter quod erant omnium multo majora, quam nostra, tunc corpora, gigantes longe caeteris anteibant. Sicut aliis deinde nostrisque temporibus rara quidem, sed nunquam ferme defuerunt, quae modum aliorum plurimum excederent. Plinius Secundus, doctissimus homo, quanto magis magisque praeterit saeculi excursus, minora corpora naturam ferre testatur. Quod etiam Homerum commemorat saepe carmine fuisse conquestum, non haec velut poetica figmenta deridens, sed in historicam fidem tanquam miraculorum naturalium scriptor assumens (Hist. natur. lib. 7, cap. 16). Verum, ut dixi, antiquorum magnitudines corporum inventa plerumque ossa, quoniam diuturna sunt, etiam multo posterioribus saeculis produnt.

Chapter IX.

On the long life of men which was before the flood, and on the larger form of human bodies.

Wherefore no prudent estimator of things would doubt that Cain could have founded not only some city, but even a great one, when the life of mortals was extended for so long a time: unless perhaps some one of the unfaithful should bring up a question to us from that numerosity of years in which it is written in our authors that men then lived; and should deny that this is to be believed. Thus indeed they do not believe even that the magnitudes of bodies were far larger then than they are now. Whence also their most noble poet Virgil, concerning a huge stone which, fixed in the boundary of the fields, a brave man of those times snatching up while fighting, both ran and twisted and sent it, says: "Hardly twelve chosen men could support it on their neck, such bodies of men as the earth now produces" (Aeneid. lib. 12, v. 899-900); signifying that the earth was then accustomed to produce larger bodies. How much more, therefore, in the more recent times of the world, before that noble and celebrated flood? But concerning the magnitude of bodies, for the most part, sepulchers laid bare by age or by the force of rivers and various accidents convince the incredulous, where bones of dead men of incredible magnitude have appeared, or whence they have fallen. I myself have seen, not alone, but some with me, on the Utican shore, a molar tooth of a man so huge, that if it were cut into small pieces after the manner of our teeth, it seemed to us to have been able to make a hundred. But I should have believed that to have been of some giant. For besides that the bodies then were much larger than ours, the giants far surpassed the rest. Just as in other and in our times, rare indeed, but they have almost never been lacking, those who would greatly exceed the measure of others. Pliny the Second, a most learned man, testifies that as the progress of the age passes more and more, nature bears smaller bodies. Which he also commemorates that Homer often lamented in his song, not mocking these as if they were poetical fictions, but assuming them for historical faith as a writer of natural miracles (Hist. natur. lib. 7, cap. 16). But, as I said, the magnitudes of the bodies of the ancients, the bones for the most part found, because they are long-lasting, betray even to much later ages.

Annorum autem numerositas cujusque hominis qui temporibus illis fuit, nullis nunc talibus documentis venire in experimentum potest. Nec tamen ideo fides sacrae huic historiae deroganda est, cujus tanto impudentius narrata non credimus, quanto impleri certius praenuntiata conspicimus. Dicit tamen etiam idem Plinius , esse adhuc gentem, ubi ducentos annos vivitur. Si ergo humanarum vitarum diuturnitates, quas experti non sumus, hodie habere creduntur incognita nobis loca, cur non habuisse credantur et tempera? An vero est credibile alicubi esse quod hic non est, et incredibile est aliquando fuisse quod nunc non est?

Caput X.

De differentia qua inter hebraeos et nostros codices videntur annorum numeri dissonare.

Quocirca etsi inter hebraeos et nostros codices de ipso numero annorum nonnulla videtur esse distantia, quod ignoro qua ratione sit factum: non tamen tanta est, ut illos homines tam longaevos fuisse dissentiant. Nam ipse homo primus Adam, antequam gigneret filium qui appellatus est Seth, ducentos triginta annos vixisse reperitur in codicibus nostris, in hebraeis autem centum triginta perhibetur (Gen. V, 3). Sed posteaquam eum genuit, septingentos vixisse legitur in nostris, octingentos vero in illis (Ibid., 4). Atque ita in utrisque universatis summa concordat. Ac deinde per consequentes generationes antequam gignatur qui gigni commemoratur, minus vixisse apud hebraeos pater ejus invenitur centum annos: sed posteaquam est genitus idem ipse, centum minus quam in hebraeis inveniuntur in nostris. Atque ita hinc et inde numeri universitas consonat. In sexta autem generatione nusquam utrique codices discrepant. In septima vero, ubi ille qui natus est Enoch, non mortuus, sed quod Deo placuerit translatus esse narratur, eadem dissonantia est, quae in superioribus quinque de centum annis antequam gigneret eum qui ibi commemoratus est filium: atque ita in summa similis consonantia. Vixit enim annos, antequam transferretur, secundum utrosque codices, trecentos sexaginta et quinque (Ibid., 21-23). Octava generatio habet quidem nonullam diversitatem, sed minorem, ac dissimilem caeteris. Mathusalem quippe, quem genuit Enoch, antequam gigneret eum qui in ipso ordine sequitur, secundum hebraeos non centum minus, sed viginti amplius vixit annos: qui rursus in nostris posteaquam eum genuit, reperiuntur additi, et in utrisque sibi summa universi numeri occurrit (Ibid. 25-27). In sola nona generatione, id est in annis Lamech filii Mathusalem, patris autem Noe, summa universitatis discrepat, sed non plurimum. Viginti enim et quatuor annos plus vixisse in hebraeis, quam in nostris codicibus invenitur.

But the numerosity of the years of each man who was in those times, can now come into experiment by no such documents. Nor, however, is faith to be derogated from this sacred history for that reason, whose narrated things we do not believe so much more impudently, as we behold more certainly the foretold things being fulfilled. Yet the same Pliny also says that there is still a nation where they live two hundred years. If therefore the long durations of human lives, which we have not experienced, are believed to be today in places unknown to us, why should they not be believed to have been also in those times? Or is it indeed credible that there is somewhere what is not here, and incredible that there was sometime what is not now?

Chapter X.

On the difference by which the numbers of years seem to disagree between the Hebrew and our codices.

Wherefore, even if between the Hebrew and our codices there seems to be some distance concerning the number of years itself, which I know not for what reason it has been made: yet it is not so great that they should disagree that those men were so long-lived. For the first man, Adam himself, before he begat the son who was called Seth, is found in our codices to have lived two hundred and thirty years, but in the Hebrew he is asserted to have lived a hundred and thirty (Gen. V, 3). But after he begat him, he is read in ours to have lived seven hundred, but in those, eight hundred (Ibid., 4). And thus in both the sum of the whole agrees. And then through the following generations, before he who is commemorated as being born is born, his father is found among the Hebrews to have lived a hundred years less: but after the same one was born, a hundred less are found in ours than in the Hebrew. And thus from here and there the universality of the number agrees. But in the sixth generation the codices nowhere differ. But in the seventh, where he who was born is Enoch, not dead, but narrated to have been translated because he pleased God, there is the same dissonance which was in the five superior generations concerning the hundred years before he begat the son who is there commemorated; and thus in the sum there is a similar consonance. For he lived three hundred and sixty-five years before he was translated, according to both codices (Ibid., 21-23). The eighth generation has indeed some diversity, but less, and unlike the rest. For Methuselah, whom Enoch begat, lived not a hundred years less, but twenty years more, before he begat him who follows in the same order, according to the Hebrews: who again in ours, after he begat him, are found added, and in both the sum of the whole number meets itself (Ibid. 25-27). In the ninth generation alone, that is, in the years of Lamech the son of Methuselah, but the father of Noah, the sum of the whole disagrees, but not very much. For he is found to have lived twenty-four years more in the Hebrew than in our codices.

Nam antequam gigneret filium, qui vocatus est Noe, sex minus habet in hebraeis quam in nostris: postea vero quam eum genuit, triginta amplius in eisdem quam in nostris (Ibid. 28-31). Unde sex illis detractis, restant viginti et quatuor, ut dictum est.

Caput XI.

De annis Mathusalem, cujus aetas quatuordecim annis diluvium videtur excedere.

Per hanc autem discrepantiam hebraeorum codicum atque nostrorum, exoritur illa famosissima quaestio, ubi Mathusalem quatuordecim annos vixisse post diluvium computatur , cum Scriptura ex omnibus qui in terra tunc fuerant, solos octo homines in arca exitium commemoret evasisse diluvii (I Petr. III, 20), in quibus Mathusalem non fuit. Secundum codices enim nostros Mathusalem, priusquam gigneret illum quem vocavit Lamech, vixit annos centum sexaginta septem: deinde ipse Lamech, antequam ex illo natus esset Noe, vixit annos centum octoginta octo, qui simul fiunt trecenti quinquaginta quinque. His adduntur sexcenti Noe, quoto ejus anno diluvium factum est (Gen. VII, 6): qui fiunt nongenti quinquaginta quinque, ex quo Mathusalem natus est usque ad annum diluvii. Omnes autem anni vitae Mathusalem nongenti sexaginta novem computantur: quia cum vixisset annos centum sexaginta septem, et genuisset filium, qui est appellatus Lamech, post eum genitum vixit annos octingintos duos; qui omnes, ut diximus, nongenti sexaginta novem fiunt (Gen. V, 25-27). Unde detractis nongentis quinquaginta quinque ab ortu Mathusalem usque ad diluvium, remanent quatuordecim, quibus vixisse creditur post diluvium. Propter quod eum nonnulli, etsi non in terra, ubi omnem carnem, quam vivere in aquis natura non sinit, constat fuisse deletam, cum patre suo qui translatus fuerat aliquantum fuisse, atque ibi donec diluvium praeteriret, vixisse arbitrantur; nolentes derogare fidem codicibus, quos in auctoritatem celebriorem suscepit Ecclesia, et credentes Judaeorum potius quam istos non habere quod verum est. Non enim admittunt, quod magis hic esse potuerit error interpretum, quam in ea lingua esse falsum, unde in nostram per graecam Scriptura ipsa translata est. Sed inquiunt, non esse credibile Septuaginta interpretes, qui uno simul tempore unoque sensu interpretati sunt, errare potuisse, aut ubi nihil eorum intererat, voluisse mentiri; Judaeos vero, dum nobis invident, quod Lex et Prophetae ad nos interpretando transierint, mutasse quidam in cordibus suis, ut nostris minueretur auctoritas.

For before he begat the son who was called Noah, he has six less in the Hebrew than in ours: but after he begat him, thirty more in the same than in ours (Ibid. 28-31). Whence those six having been subtracted, twenty-four remain, as has been said.

Chapter XI.

On the years of Methuselah, whose age seems to exceed the flood by fourteen years.

But through this discrepancy of the Hebrew codices and ours, that most famous question arises, where Methuselah is calculated to have lived fourteen years after the flood, although Scripture commemorates only eight persons from all who had been on the earth then to have escaped the destruction of the flood in the ark (I Pet. III, 20), among whom Methuselah was not. For according to our codices Methuselah, before he begat him whom he called Lamech, lived a hundred and sixty-seven years: then Lamech himself, before Noah was born from him, lived a hundred and eighty-eight years, which together make three hundred and fifty-five. To these are added the six hundred of Noah, in which year of his the flood was made (Gen. VII, 6): which make nine hundred and fifty-five, from which Methuselah was born until the year of the flood. But all the years of the life of Methuselah are calculated as nine hundred and sixty-nine: because when he had lived a hundred and sixty-seven years, and had begotten a son who is called Lamech, after he was begotten he lived eight hundred and two years; all of which, as we said, become nine hundred and sixty-nine (Gen. V, 25-27). Whence nine hundred and fifty-five having been subtracted from the birth of Methuselah until the flood, fourteen remain, by which he is believed to have lived after the flood. For which reason some, even if not on the earth, where it is certain that all flesh which nature does not permit to live in the waters was destroyed, think that he was for some time with his father who had been translated, and lived there until the flood should pass; being unwilling to derogate faith from the codices which the Church has received into more celebrated authority, and believing the Jews rather than these to not have what is true. For they do not admit that there could rather be an error of the interpreters here, than that there should be a falsehood in that language whence into ours through the Greek the Scripture itself was translated. But they say that it is not credible that the Seventy interpreters, who interpreted at one time together and with one sense, could have erred, or where nothing of theirs was at stake, have wished to lie; but that the Jews, while they envy us because the Law and the Prophets have passed to us by interpreting, have changed some things in their hearts, that authority might be diminished for ours.

Hanc opinionem vel suspicionem accipiat quisque ut putaverit: certum est tamen, non vixisse Mathusalem post diluvium, sed eodem anno fuisse defunctum, si verum est quod de numero annorum in hebraeis codicibus invenitur. De illis autem Septuaginta interpretibus quid mihi videatur, suo loco diligentius inserendum est, cum ad ipsa tempora, quantum necessitas hujus operis postulat, commemoranda, adjuvante Domino, venerimus . Praesenti enim sufficit quaestioni secundum utrosque codices tam longas habuisse vitas illius aevi homines, ut posset aetate unus, qui de duobus, quos solos terra tunc habuit parentibus primus est natus, ad constituendam etiam civitatem multiplicari genus humanum.

Caput XII.

De opinione eorum, qui primorum temporum homines tam longaevos, quam scribitur, fuisse non credunt.

1. Neque enim ullo modo audiendi sunt, qui putant aliter annos illis temporibus computatos, id est tantae brevitatis, ut unus annus noster decem illos habuisse credatur. Quapropter, inquiunt, cum audierit quisque vel legerit nongentos annos quemquam vixisse, debet intelligere nonaginta: decem quippe illi anni unus est noster; et decem nostri, centum illi fuerunt. Ac per hoc, ut putant, viginti trium annorum fuit Adam, quando genuit Seth; et ipse Seth viginti habebat et sex menses, quando ex illo natus est Enos, quos appellat Scriptura ducentos et quinque annos. Quoniam, sicut isti suspicantur quorum exponimus opinionem, unum annum qualem nunc habemus, in decem partes illi dividebant, et easdem partes annos vocabant. Quarum partium habet una quadratum senarium, eo quod Deus sex diebus perfecerit opera sua, ut in septimo requiesceret. De qua re in libro undecimo (Cap. 8), sicut potui, disputavi. Sexies autem seni, qui numerus quadratum senarium facit, triginta sex dies fiunt: qui multiplicati decies, ad trecentos sexaginta perveniunt, id est duodecim menses lunares. Propter quinque dies enim reliquos, quibus solaris annus impletur, et diei quadrantem, propter quem quater ductum eo anno, quo bissextum vocant, unus dies adjicitur, addebantur a veteribus postea dies, ut occurreret numerus annorum, quos dies Romani intercalares vocabant. Proinde etiam Enos, quem genuit Seth, decem et novem agebat annos, quando ex illo natus est filius ejus Cainan, quos annos dicit Scriptura centum nonaginta (Gen. V, 9, sec. LXX).

Let each one take this opinion or suspicion as he shall think: it is certain, however, that Methuselah did not live after the flood, but died in the same year, if what is found in the Hebrew codices concerning the number of years is true. But what I think of those Seventy interpreters must be inserted more diligently in its own place, when we shall come, the Lord helping, to the commemoration of those times, as much as the necessity of this work requires. For it suffices for the present question that according to both codices the men of that age had such long lives, that one, who was born first from the two parents whom alone the earth then had, could by his age multiply the human race for the establishment even of a city.

Chapter XII.

On the opinion of those who do not believe that the men of the first times were as long-lived as is written.

1. For in no way are they to be heard who think that years were computed differently in those times, that is, of such brevity that one year of ours is believed to have had ten of those. Wherefore, they say, when anyone hears or reads that someone lived nine hundred years, he ought to understand ninety: for those ten years are one of ours; and ten of ours were a hundred of those. And by this, as they think, Adam was twenty-three years old when he begat Seth; and Seth himself had twenty years and six months when Enos was born from him, whom Scripture calls two hundred and five years. Since, as these suspect whose opinion we are explaining, they divided one year such as we now have into ten parts, and called those same parts years. One of which parts has a square of six, because God perfected His works in six days, so that He might rest on the seventh. Concerning which matter I disputed in the eleventh book (Cap. 8), as I was able. But six times six, which number makes a square of six, become thirty-six days: which multiplied ten times, reach to three hundred and sixty, that is, twelve lunar months. For on account of the five remaining days, by which the solar year is filled, and the quadrant of a day, on account of which being taken four times in that year which they call bissextile, one day is added, days were added by the ancients afterwards, so that the number of years should meet, which days the Romans called intercalary. Accordingly also Enos, whom Seth begat, was nineteen years old when his son Cainan was born from him, which years the Scripture says are a hundred and ninety (Gen. V, 9, sec. LXX).

Et deinceps per omnes generationes, in quibus hominum anni commemorantur ante diluvium, nullus fere in nostris codicibus invenitur, qui cum esset centum annorum vel infra, vel etiam centum viginti, aut non multo amplius, genuerit filium; sed qui minima aetate genuerunt, centum sexaginta, et quod excurrit, fuisse referuntur: quia nemo, inquiunt, decem annorum homo potest gignere filios, qui numerus centum appellabantur anni ab illis hominibus; sed in annis sexdecim est matura pubertas, et proli jam idonea procreandae, quos centum et sexaginta annos illa tempora nuncupabant. Ut autem aliter annum tunc fuisse computatum non sit incredibile, adjiciunt quod apud plerosque scriptores historiae reperitur, Aegyptios habuisse annum quatuor mensium , Acarnanas sex mensium, Lavinios tredecim mensium. Plinius Secundus cum commemorasset, relatum fuisse in litteras, quemdam vixisse centum quinquaginta duos annos, alium decem amplius, alios ducentorum annorum habuisse vitam, alios trecentorum, quosdam ad quingentos, alios ad sexcentos, nonnullos ad octingentos etiam pervenisse, haec omnia propter inscientiam temporum accidisse arbitratus est. Alii quippe, inquit, aestate unum determinabant annum, et alterum hieme; alii quadripertitis temporibus, sicut Arcades, inquit, quorum anni trimestres fuere. Adjecit etiam, aliquando Aegyptios, quorum parvos annos quaternorum mensium fuisse supra diximus, lunae fine limitasse annum. Itaque apud eos, inquit, et singula millia annorum vixisse produntur .

2. His velut probabilibus argumentis quidam non destruentes fidem sacrae hujus historiae, sed astruere nitentes, ne sit incredibile quod tam multos annos vixisse referuntur antiqui, persuaserunt sibi, nec se suadere imprudenter existimant, tam exiguum spatium temporis tunc annum vocatum, ut illi decem sint unus noster, et decem nostri centum illorum. Hoc autem falsissimum esse documento evidentissimo ostenditur. Quod antequam faciam, non mihi tacendum videtur, quae credibilior possit esse suspicio. Poteramus certe hanc asseverationem ex hebraeis codicibus redarguere atque convincere, ubi Adam non ducentorum triginta, sed centum triginta annorum fuisse reperitur, quando tertium genuit filium (Gen. V, 3): qui anni si tredecim nostri sunt, procul dubio primum genuit, quando undecim vel non multo amplius annorum fuit. Quis potest hac aetate generare usitata ista nobisque notissima lege naturae? Sed hunc omittamus, qui fortasse etiam quando creatus est, potuit. Non enim eum tam parvum, quam infantes nostri sunt, factum fuisse, credibile est. Sed filius ejus non ducentorum quinque, sicut nos legimus, sed centum quinque fuit, quando genuit Enos (Ibid., 6): ac per hoc, secundum istos, nondum habebat undecim annos aetatis. Quid dicam de Cainan ejus filio, qui cum apud nos centum septuaginta reperiatur, apud Hebraeos septuaginta legitur fuisse, quando genuit Malalehel (Ibid., 12)? Quis generat homo septennis, si tunc anni septuaginta nuncupabantur qui septem fuerunt?

And henceforth through all generations, in which the years of men are commemorated before the flood, almost no one is found in our codices who, when he was a hundred years old or below, or even a hundred and twenty, or not much more, begat a son; but those who begat at the smallest age are reported to have been a hundred and sixty and what exceeds: because no man of ten years, they say, can beget sons, which number were called a hundred years by those men; but in sixteen years is mature puberty, and already fit for procreating offspring, which those times called a hundred and sixty years. But so that it should not be incredible that the year was then computed otherwise, they add what is found among most writers of history, that the Egyptians had a year of four months, the Acarnanians of six months, the Lavinians of thirteen months. Pliny the Second, when he had commemorated that it had been related in letters that a certain person had lived a hundred and fifty-two years, another ten more, others to have had a life of two hundred years, others of three hundred, some to have reached to five hundred, others to six hundred, some even to eight hundred, thought that all these things had happened on account of ignorance of times. "For some," he says, "determined one year by summer, and another by winter; others by four-parted times, just as the Arcadians, whose years were of three months." He added also that sometimes the Egyptians, whose small years of four months each we said above, limited the year by the end of the moon. "And so among them," he says, "they are reported to have lived even single thousands of years."

2. By these as if probable arguments, some, not destroying the faith of this sacred history, but striving to build it up, lest it be incredible that the ancients are reported to have lived so many years, persuaded themselves, and do not think they persuade imprudently, that so small a space of time was then called a year, that those ten are one of ours, and ten of ours are a hundred of theirs. But that this is most false is shown by a most evident document. Before I do which, it seems to me that I must not keep silent what could be a more credible suspicion. We could certainly refute and convince this assertion from the Hebrew codices, where Adam is found to have been not two hundred and thirty, but a hundred and thirty years old, when he begat his third son (Gen. V, 3): which years, if they are thirteen of ours, he without doubt begat the first when he was eleven or not much more years old. Who can generate at this age by that customary and most known law of nature to us? But let us omit this one, who perhaps even when he was created, was able. For it is not credible that he was made as small as our infants are. But his son was not two hundred and five, as we read, but a hundred and five, when he begat Enos (Ibid., 6): and through this, according to those, he did not yet have eleven years of age. What shall I say of Cainan his son, who while among us he is found to be a hundred and seventy, is read among the Hebrews to have been seventy, when he begat Mahalaleel (Ibid., 12)? What man generates at seven years old, if those seventy years were called years which were seven?

Caput XIII.

An in dinumeratione annorum, Hebraeorum magis quam Septuaginta interpretum sit sequenda auctoritas.

1. Sed cum hoc dixero, continuo referetur illud Judaeorum esse mendacium; de quo superius satis actum est: nam Septuaginta interpretes laudabiliter celebratos viros non potuisse mentiri. Ubi si quaeram, quid sit credibilius, Judaeorum gentem, tam longe lateque diffusam, in hoc conscribendum mendacium uno consilio conspirare potuisse, et dum aliis invident auctoritatem, sibi abstulisse veritatem; an septuaginta homines, qui etiam ipsi Judaei erant, in uno loco positos, quoniam rex Aegypti Ptolemaeus eos ad hoc opus asciverat, ipsam veritatem gentibus alienigenis invidisse, et communicato istud fecisse consilio: quis non videat quid proclivius faciliusque credatur? Sed absit ut prudens quispiam, vel Judaeos cujuslibet perversitatis atque malitiae tantum potuisse credat in codicibus tam multis et tam longe lateque dispersis; vel Septuaginta illos memorabiles viros hoc de invidenda gentibus veritate unum communicasse consilium. Credibilior ergo quis dixerit, cum primum de bibliotheca Ptolemaei describi ista coeperunt, tunc aliquid tale fieri potuisse in codice uno, scilicet primitus inde descripto, unde jam latius emanaret, ubi potuit quidem accidere etiam scriptoris error. Sed hoc in illa quaestione de vita Mathusalem non absurdum est suspicari; et in illo alio, ubi superantibus viginti et quatuor annis summa non convenit. In his autem in quibus continuatur ipsius mendositatis similitudo, ita ut ante genitum filium, qui ordini inseritur, alibi supersint centum anni, alibi desint; post genitum autem ubi deerant, supersint; ubi supererant, desint, ut summa conveniat; et hoc in prima, secunda, tertia, quarta, quinta, septima generatione invenitur: videtur habere quamdam, si dici potest, error ipse constantiam; nec casum redolet, sed industriam.

2. Itaque illa diversitas numerorum aliter se habentium in codicibus graecis et latinis, aliter in hebraeis, ubi non est ista de centum annis prius additis et postea detractis per tot generationes continuata parilitas, nec malitiae Judaeorum, nec diligentiae vel prudence Septuaginta interpretum, sed scriptoris tribuatur errori, qui de bibliotheca supradicti regis codicem describendum primus accepit. Nam etiam nunc, ubi numeri non faciunt intentum ad aliquid quod facile possit intelligi, vel quod appareat utiliter disci, et negligenter describuntur, et negligentius emendantur.

Chapter XIII.

Whether in the enumeration of years, the authority of the Hebrews more than that of the Seventy interpreters is to be followed.

1. But when I shall have said this, that lie of the Jews will immediately be referred to; concerning which it has been sufficiently acted above: for that the Seventy interpreters, men laudably celebrated, could not have lied. Where if I should ask, what is more credible, that the nation of the Jews, so far and wide diffused, could have conspired with one counsel to write this lie, and while they envy authority to others, have taken truth from themselves; or that seventy men, who were also themselves Jews, placed in one place, since Ptolemy king of Egypt had summoned them for this work, envied the truth itself to alien nations, and did that with a communicated counsel: who does not see what is more prone and easier to be believed? But far be it that any prudent person should either believe that the Jews of any perversity and malice were able to do so much in so many and so far and wide dispersed codices; or that those seventy memorable men communicated one counsel concerning envying the truth to the nations. More credibly, therefore, would someone say, when first these things began to be described from the library of Ptolemy, then some such thing could have been done in one codex, namely, first described from there, whence it should now emanate more widely, where indeed even an error of the writer could have happened. But this is not absurd to suspect in that question concerning the life of Methuselah; and in that other, where the sum does not agree by twenty-four years surpassing. But in these things in which the similarity of the falsehood itself is continued, so that before the son is born, who is inserted into the order, in one place a hundred years are over, in another they are lacking; but after the son is born, where they were lacking, they are over; where they were over, they are lacking, so that the sum should agree; and this is found in the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh generation: the error itself seems to have a certain, if it can be said, constancy; nor does it smell of chance, but of industry.

2. Therefore let that diversity of numbers having themselves otherwise in the Greek and Latin codices, otherwise in the Hebrew, where there is not that continued parity concerning the hundred years added before and afterwards subtracted through so many generations, be attributed neither to the malice of the Jews, nor to the diligence or prudence of the Seventy interpreters, but to the error of the writer who first received the codex to be described from the library of the aforesaid king. For even now, where numbers do not make the intent toward something which can easily be understood, or which appears usefully to be learned, they are both negligently described and more negligently emended.

Quis enim existimet sibi esse discendum, quot millia hominum tribus Israel sigillatim habere potuerunt? quoniam prodesse aliquid non putatur: et quotus quisque hominum est, cui profunditas utilitatis hujus appareat? Hic vero ubi per tot contextas generationes centum anni alibi adsunt, alibi desunt; et post natum, qui commemorandus fuerat, filium, desunt ubi adfuerunt, adsunt ubi defuerunt, ut summa concordet: nimirum cum vellet persuadere, qui hoc fecit, ideo numerosissimos annos vixisse antiquos, quod eos brevissimos nuncupabant; et hoc de maturitate pubertatis, qua idonea filii gignerentur, conaretur ostendere; atque ideo in illis centum annis decem nostros insinuandos putaret incredulis, ne homines tam diu vixisse recipere in fidem nollent; addidit centum, ubi gignendis filiis habilem non invenit aetatem; eosdemque, post genitos filios, ut congrueret summa, detraxit. Sic quippe voluit credibiles facere idonearum generandae proli convenientias aetatum, ut tamen numero non fraudaret universas aetates viventium singulorum. Quod autem in sexta generatione id non fecit, hoc ipsum est quod magis movet, illum ideo fecisse, cum res quam dicimus postulavit, quia non fecit ubi non postulavit. Invenit namque in eadem generatione apud hebraeos vixisse Jareth, antequam genuisset Enoch, centum sexaginta duos annos (Gen. V, 18), qui secundum illam rationem brevium annorum fiunt anni sexdecim, et aliquid minus quam menses duo; quae jam aetas apta est ad gignendum: et ideo addere centum annos breves, ut nostri viginti sex fierint, necesse non fuit; nec post natum Enoch eos detrahere, quos non addiderat ante natum. Sic factum est ut hic nulla esset inter codices utrosque varietas.

3. Sed rursus movet, cur in octava generatione, antequam de Mathusalem nasceretur Lamech, cum apud hebraeos legantur centum octoginta duo anni, viginti minus inveniuntur in codicibus nostris, ubi potius addi centum solent; et post genitum Lamech complendam restituuntur ad summam, quae in codicibus utrisque non discrepat. Si enim centum septuaginta annos propter pubertatis maturitatem, decem et septem volebat intelligi, sicut nihil addere, ita nihil detrahere jam debebat: quia invenerat aetatem idoneam generationi filiorum, propter quam in aliis centum illos annos, ubi eam non inveniebat, addebat. Hoc autem de viginti annis merito putaremus casu mendositatis accidere potuisse, nisi eos sicut prius detraxerat, restituere postea curaret, ut summae conveniret integritas.

For who would think that he must learn how many thousands of men the tribes of Israel were able to have individually? since it is not thought to profit anything: and how few men are there to whom the depth of this utility appears? But here where through so many woven generations a hundred years are in one place present, in another absent; and after the son was born who was to be commemorated, they are absent where they were present, present where they were absent, so that the sum should agree: doubtless since he who did this wished to persuade that the ancients lived very numerous years for this reason, that they called them very short; and should try to show this concerning the maturity of puberty, by which children might fitly be begotten; and therefore should think that ten of ours must be insinuated to the incredulous in those hundred years, lest they should be unwilling to receive into faith that men lived so long; he added a hundred where he did not find an age fit for begetting children; and subtracted the same, after the children were born, so that the sum should agree. For thus he wished to make credible the conveniences of ages fit for generating offspring, so that however he should not defraud the total ages of each of the living in number. But that he did not do this in the sixth generation, this very thing is what more moves, that he therefore did it, since the matter which we say required it, because he did it not where it did not require it. For he found in the same generation among the Hebrews that Jared had lived, before he begat Enoch, a hundred and sixty-two years (Gen. V, 18), which according to that reason of short years become sixteen years and something less than two months; which age is already fit for begetting: and therefore to add a hundred short years, so that twenty-six of ours should be made, was not necessary; nor to subtract them after Enoch was born, which he had not added before he was born. Thus it was made that here there was no variety between both codices.

3. But again it moves, why in the eighth generation, before Lamech was born of Methuselah, when a hundred and eighty-two years are read among the Hebrews, twenty less are found in our codices, where rather a hundred are accustomed to be added; and after Lamech was begotten they are restored to the sum to be completed, which does not disagree in both codices. For if he wished a hundred and seventy years to be understood as seventeen on account of the maturity of puberty, as he ought to add nothing, so he ought to subtract nothing now: because he had found an age fit for the generation of children, on account of which he was adding those hundred years in others where he was not finding it. But we should deservedly think this concerning the twenty years could have happened by chance of falsehood, unless he took care to restore them afterwards as he had first subtracted them, so that the integrity of the sum should agree.

An forte astutius factum existimandum est, ut illa, qua centum anni prius solent adjici et postea detrahi, occultaretur industria, cum et illic ubi necesse non fuerat, non quidem de centum annis, verumtamen de quantulocumque numero prius detracto, post reddito, tale aliquid fieret? Sed quomodolibet istud accipiatur, sive credatur ita esse factum, sive non credatur; sive postremo ita, sive non ita sit: recte fieri nullo modo dubitaverim, ut cum diversum aliquid in utrisque codicibus invenitur, quandoquidem ad fidem rerum gestarum utrumque esse non potest verum, ei linguae potius credatur, unde est in aliam per interpretes facta translatio. Nam in quibusdam etiam codicibus graecis tribus, et uno latino, et uno etiam syro inter se consentientibus, inventus est Mathusalem sex annis ante diluvium fuisse defunctus .

Caput XIV.

De parilitate annorum, qui iisdem quibus nunc spatiis et in prioribus saeculis cucurrerunt.

1. Nunc jam videamus quonam modo evidenter possit ostendi, non tam breves, ut illi decem unus esset noster, sed tantae prolixitatis annos quantae nunc habemus (quos utique circuitus conficit solis), in illorum hominum vita prolixissima computatos. Sexcentesimo nempe anno vitae Noe scriptum est factum esse diluvium. Cur ergo ibi legitur, Et aqua diluvii facta est super terram sexcentesimo anno in vita Noe, secundi mensis, septima et vicesima mensis (Gen. VII, 10, 11 sec. LXX); si annus ille minimus, quales decem faciunt unum nostrum, triginta sex dies habebat? Tantillus quippe annus, si antiquo more hoc nomen accepit, aut non habet menses, aut mensis ejus est triduum, ut habeat duodecim menses. Quomodo igitur hic dictum est, Sexcentesimo anno, secundi mensis, septima et vicesima die mensis; nisi quia tales quales nunc sunt, etiam tunc erant menses? Nam quo pacto aliter vicesimo et septimo die secundi mensis diceretur coeptum esse diluvium? Deinde postea in fine diluvii ita legitur: Et sedit arca in mense septimo, septima et vicesima die mensis, super montes Ararat. Aqua autem minuebatur usque ad undecimum mensem: in undecimo autem mense, prima die mensis, paruerunt capita montium (Id. VIII, 4, 5). Si igitur tales menses erant, tales profecto et anni erant, quales nunc habemus. Menses quippe illi triduani, viginti et septem dies habere non poterant. Aut si pars tricesima tridui tunc appellabatur dies, ut omnia proportione minuantur; ergo nec toto quatriduo nostro factum est illud tam grande diluvium, quod memoratur factum quadraginta diebus et noctibus. Quis hanc absurditatem et vanitatem ferat?

Or perhaps it is to be thought done more astutely, so that that industry by which a hundred years are accustomed to be first added and afterwards subtracted, should be hidden, since even there where it had not been necessary, not indeed concerning a hundred years, but yet concerning whatever small number first subtracted, afterwards restored, some such thing was made? But however that may be taken, whether it be believed to have been so made, or be not believed; whether finally it be so, or be not so: I should in no way doubt that it is rightly done, that when some diverse thing is found in both codices, since to the faith of things done both cannot be true, that language should rather be believed from which the translation into another was made by interpreters. For in certain even three Greek codices, and one Latin, and also one Syrian agreeing among themselves, Methuselah was found to have died six years before the flood.

Chapter XIV.

Of the parity of years, which ran in the same spaces as now even in the prior ages.

1. Now let us see in what way it can be evidently shown, that not so short years, as if ten of those were one of ours, but years of such great length as we now have (which the circuits of the sun certainly complete), were computed in the very long life of those men. For in the six hundredth year of the life of Noah it is written that the flood occurred. Why therefore is it read there, And the water of the flood was made upon the earth in the six hundredth year in the life of Noah, of the second month, on the twenty-seventh of the month (Gen. VII, 10, 11 according to LXX); if that very small year, such as ten make one of ours, had thirty-six days? For so small a year, if it received this name according to the ancient custom, either has no months, or its month is three days, so that it may have twelve months. How therefore was it said here, In the six hundredth year, of the second month, on the twenty-seventh day of the month; unless because such months as they are now, were even then months? For in what way otherwise would the flood be said to have begun on the twenty-seventh day of the second month? Then afterwards at the end of the flood it is read thus: And the ark sat in the seventh month, on the twenty-seventh day of the month, upon the mountains of Ararat. But the water was diminished until the eleventh month: but in the eleventh month, on the first day of the month, the heads of the mountains appeared (Id. VIII, 4, 5). If therefore such were the months, such surely were the years, such as we now have. For those three-day months could not have twenty-seven days. Or if the thirtieth part of three days was then called a day, so that all things are diminished in proportion; therefore not even in four of our whole days was that so great flood made, which is remembered to have been made in forty days and nights. Who would bear this absurdity and vanity?

Proinde removeatur hic error, qui conjectura falsa ita vult astruere Scripturarum nostrarum fidem, ut alibi destruat. Prorsus tantus etiam tunc dies fuit, quantus et nunc est, quem viginti et quatuor horae diurno curriculo nocturnoque determinant: tantus mensis, quantus et nunc est, quem luna coepta et finita concludit: tantus annus, quantus et nunc est, quem duodecim menses lunares, additis propter cursum solarem quinque diebus et quadrante, consummant: quanti anni sexcentesimi vitae Noe secundus erat mensis ejusque mensis vicesimus et septimus dies, quando coepit esse diluvium; in quo dies quadraginta continuatae ingentes pluviae memorantur (Gen. VII, 12), qui dies non binas ac paulo amplius horas habebant, sed vicenas et quaternas die noctuque transactas. Ac per hoc tam magnos annos vixerunt illi antiqui usque amplius quam nongentos, quantos postea vixit Abraham centum septuaginta quinque (Id. XXV, 7), et post eum filius ejus Isaac centum octoginta (Id. XXXV, 28), et filius ejus Jacob prope centum quinquaginta (Id. XXVII, 28), et quantos interposita aliquanta aetate Moyses centum viginti (Deut. XXXIV, 7), et quantos etiam nunc vivunt homines septuaginta vel octoginta, vel non multo amplius, de quibus dictum est: Et amplius eis labor et dolor (Psal. LXXXIX, 10).

2. Illa vero numerorum varietas, quae inter codices hebraeos invenitur et nostros, neque de hac antiquorum longaevitate dissentit, et si quid habet ita diversum, ut verum esse utrumque non possit, rerum gestarum fides ab ea lingua repetenda est, ex qua interpretatum est quod habemus. Quae facultas cum volentibus ubique gentium praesto sit; non tamen vacat, quod Septuaginta interpretes, in plurimis quae diversa dicere videntur, ex haebreis codicibus emendare ausus est nemo. Non enim est illa diversitas putata mendositas; nec ego ullo modo putandam existimo. Sed ubi non est scriptoris error, aliquid eos divino Spiritu, ubi sensus esset consentaneus veritati, et praedicans veritatem, non interpretantium more, sed prophetantium libertate aliter dicere voluisse credendum est. Unde merito, non solum hebraeis, verum etiam ipsis, cum adhibet testimonia de Scripturis, uti apostolica invenitur auctoritas. Sed hinc me opportuniore loco, si Deus adjuverit, promisi diligentius locuturum: nunc quod instat expediam. Non enim ambigendum est ab homine, qui ex primo homine primus est natus, quando tam diu vivebant, potuisse constitui civitatem, sane terrenam, non illam quae dicitur civitas Dei: de qua ut scriberemus, laborem tanti hujus operis in manus sumpsimus.

Caput XV.

An credibile sit, primi saeculi viros usque ad eam aetatem, qua filios generasse referuntur, a concubitu continuisse.

Therefore let this error be removed, which by a false conjecture thus wishes to build up the faith of our Scriptures, that it may destroy it elsewhere. Certainly even then the day was as great as it is now, which twenty-four hours determine by their diurnal and nocturnal course: the month as great as it is now, which the moon begun and finished concludes: the year as great as it is now, which twelve lunar months, with five days and a quadrant added on account of the solar course, consummate: of which years the second was the month and the twenty-seventh day of that month of the six hundredth of the life of Noah, when the flood began to be; in which are remembered forty days of continued huge rains (Gen. VII, 12), which days did not have two and a little more hours, but twenty-four passed day and night. And through this those ancient men lived so great years even for more than nine hundred, as many as afterwards Abraham lived a hundred and seventy-five (Id. XXV, 7), and after him his son Isaac a hundred and eighty (Id. XXXV, 28), and his son Jacob nearly a hundred and fifty (Id. XXVII, 28), and as many as after some age had intervened Moses lived a hundred and twenty (Deut. XXXIV, 7), and as many as even now men live seventy or eighty, or not much more, concerning whom it was said: And more to them is labor and sorrow (Psal. LXXXIX, 10).

2. But that variety of numbers, which is found between the Hebrew codices and ours, does not disagree concerning this longevity of the ancients, and if it has anything so diverse that both cannot be true, the faith of things done must be sought from that language from which what we have was translated. Which faculty although it may be at hand for those wishing it everywhere among the nations; yet it is not empty, that no one has dared to emend from the Hebrew codices the Seventy interpreters in the very many things which they seem to say differently. For that diversity was not thought a falsehood; nor do I think it must be so thought in any way. But where it is not an error of the writer, it must be believed that they, by some divine Spirit, where the sense would be consistent with the truth, and preaching the truth, wished to say otherwise not in the manner of those interpreting, but with the liberty of those prophesying. Whence deservedly, apostolic authority is found to use not only the Hebrew, but even them, when it applies testimonies from the Scriptures. But concerning this in a more opportune place, if God shall have helped, I have promised to speak more diligently: now I shall expedite what is at hand. For it must not be doubted by a man, that by the man who was first born from the first man, when they lived so long, a city could be established, certainly an earthly one, not that which is called the city of God: concerning which that we might write, we have taken the labor of this so great work into our hands.

Chapter XV.

Whether it is credible that the men of the first age refrained from intercourse until that age at which they are reported to have begotten sons.

Hunc secutus Abel, quem major frater occidit, praefiguratione quadam peregrinantis civitatis Dei, quod ab impiis, et quodammodo terrigenis, id est terrenam originem diligentibus, et terrenae civitatis terrena felicitate gaudentibus, persecutiones iniquas passura fuerat, primus ostendit. 1. Dicet ergo aliquis: Itane credendum est, hominem filios generaturum, nec habentem propositum continentiae, centum et amplius, vel secundum Hebraeos non multo minus, id est octoginta, septuaginta, sexaginta annos a concumbendi opere vacavisse; aut si non vacaret, nihil prolis gignere potuisse? Haec quaestio duobus modis solvitur. Aut enim tanto serior fuit proportione pubertas, quanto vitae totius major annositas: aut, quod magis video esse credibile, non hic primogeniti filii commemorati sunt, sed quos successionis ordo poscebat, ut perveniretur ad Noe, a quo rursus ad Abraham videmus esse perventum; ac deinde usque ad certum articulum temporis, quantum oportebat signari etiam generationibus commemoratis cursum gloriosissimae civitatis in hoc mundo peregrinantis, et supernam patriam requirentis. Quod enim negari non potest, prior omnibus Cain ex conjunctione maris et feminae natus est. Neque enim illo nato dixisset Adam, quod dixisse legitur, Acquisivi hominem per Deum; nisi illis duobus ipse fuisset homo nascendo additus primus. Sed quot annorum erat Adam, cum eos genuit, non apparet. Exinde digeruntur generationes aliae de Cain, aliae de illo quem genuit Adam in ejus successionem, quem frater occidit, et appellavit nomen illius Seth, dicens ut scriptum est, Suscitavit enim mihi Deus semen aliud pro Abel, quem occidit Cain (Gen. IV, 1, 25). Cum itaque istae duae series generationum, una de Seth, altera de Cain, has duas de quibus agimus, distinctis ordinibus insinuent civitates, unam coelestem in terris peregrinantem, alteram terrenam terrenis tanquam sola sint gaudiis inhiantem vel inhaerentem; nullus de progenie Cain, cum dinumerata sit connumerato Adam usque ad octavam generationem, quot annorum fuisset expressus est, quando genuit eum qui commemoratur post eum. Noluit enim Spiritus Dei in terrenae civitatis generationibus tempora notare ante diluvium, sed in coelestis maluit, tanquam essent memoria digniores. Porro autem Seth quando natus est, non quidem taciti sunt anni patris ejus, sed jam genuerat alios: et utrum solos Cain et Abel, affirmare quis audeat? Non enim quia soli nominati sunt propter ordines generationum, quas commemorari oportebat, ideo consequens videri debet solos fuisse tunc generatos ex Adam. Cum enim silentio coopertis omnium nominibus caeterorum, legatur eum genuisse filios et filias, quota fuerit ista proles ejus, quis praesumat asserere, si culpam temeritatis evitat?

Following him was Abel, whom the elder brother killed, who first showed by a certain prefiguration of the sojourning city of God, that it was about to suffer unjust persecutions from the impious, and in a certain way the earth-born, that is, those loving an earthly origin, and rejoicing in the earthly happiness of the earthly city. 1. Someone will therefore say: Is it thus to be believed, that a man about to beget sons, and not having a purpose of continence, should have vacated from the work of lying together for a hundred and more, or according to the Hebrews not much less, that is eighty, seventy, sixty years; or if he did not vacate, he was able to beget no offspring? This question is solved in two ways. For either puberty was later in proportion as the years of the whole life were greater: or, what I see to be more credible, not the first-born sons are commemorated here, but those whom the order of succession required, so that it might reach to Noah, from whom again we see it reached to Abraham; and thereafter even to a certain article of time, as much as it was behooveful that the course of the most glorious city sojourning in this world and seeking the supernal country should be marked even by the commemorated generations. For what cannot be denied, Cain was born first of all from the conjunction of male and female. Nor when he was born would Adam have said, what he is read to have said, Acquired a man through God; unless he himself by being born had been the first man added to those two. But of how many years Adam was when he begat them, does not appear. From then on other generations are digested from Cain, others from him whom Adam begat in his succession, whom the brother killed, and he called his name Seth, saying as it is written, For God has raised up for me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain killed (Gen. IV, 1, 25). Since therefore these two series of generations, one from Seth, the other from Cain, insinuate these two cities of which we treat in distinct orders, one celestial sojourning on earth, the other earthly gaping for or adhering to earthly things as if they were the only joys; no one from the progeny of Cain, when he was numbered with Adam connumerated even to the eighth generation, has been expressed of how many years he was when he begat him who is commemorated after him. For the Spirit of God did not wish to mark the times in the generations of the earthly city before the flood, but preferred to in those of the celestial, as if they were more worthy of memory. Furthermore, when Seth was born, the years of his father were indeed not silent, but he had already begotten others: and whether only Cain and Abel, who would dare to affirm? For not because they alone were named on account of the orders of the generations which it was behooveful to be commemorated, therefore it ought to seem a consequence that they alone were then begotten from Adam. For since, with the names of all the others covered in silence, it is read that he begat sons and daughters, who would presume to assert how great that offspring of his was, if he avoids the fault of temerity?

Potuit quippe Adam divinitus admonitus dicere, posteaquam Seth natus est, Suscitavit enim mihi Deus semen aliud pro Abel; quoniam talis erat futurus, qui impleret illius sanctitatem, non quod ipse prior post eum temporis ordine nasceretur. Deinde quod scriptum est, Vixit autem Seth quinque et ducentos annos, vel secundum Hebraeos, quinque et centum annos, et genuit Enos: quis possit nisi inconsideratus asseverare, hunc ejus primogenitum fuisse? Ut admirantes merito requiramus, quomodo per tot annos immunis fuerit a connubio sine ullo proposito continentiae, vel non genuerit conjugatus; quandoquidem etiam de ipso legitur, Et genuit filios et filias, et fuerunt omnes dies Seth duodecim et nongenti anni, et mortuus est (Gen. V, 4-8). Atque ita deinceps quorum anni commemorantur, nec filios filiasque genuisse reticentur. Ac per hoc non apparet omnino, utrum qui nominatur genitus, ipse fuerit primogenitus: imo vero, quoniam credibile non est, patres illos aetate tam longa aut impuberes fuisse, aut conjugibus caruisse vel fetibus; nec illos eorum filios primos eis natos fuisse credibile est. Sed cum sacrae scriptor historiae ad ortum vitamque Noe, cujus tempore diluvium factum est, per successiones generationum notatis temporibus intenderet pervenire, eas utique commemoravit, non quae primae suis parentibus fuerint, sed quae in propagationis ordinem venerint.

2. Exempli gratia, quo id fiat apertius, aliquid interponam, unde nullus ambigat fieri potuisse quod dico. Evangelista Matthaeus generationem Dominicae carnis per seriem parentum volens commendare memoriae, ordiens a patre Abraham, atque ad David primitus ut perveniret intendens, Abraham, inquit, genuit Isaac: cur non dixit, Ismael, quem primitus genuit? Isaac autem, inquit, genuit Jacob: cur non dixit, Esau, qui ejus primogenitus fuit? Quia scilicet per illos ad David pervenire non posset. Deinde sequitur, Jacob autem genuit Judam, et fratres ejus: numquid Judas primogenitus fuit? Judas, inquit, genuit Phares et Zaram (Matth. I, 2, 3): nec istorum geminorum aliquis fuit primogenitus Judae, sed ante illos jam tres genuerat. Eos itaque tenuit in ordine generationum, per quos ad David, atque inde quo intenderat, perveniret. Ex quo intelligi potest, veteres quoque homines ante diluvium non primogenitos, sed eos fuisse commemoratos, per quos succedentium ordo generationum ad Noe patriarcham duceretur, ne serae pubertatis illorum obscura et non necessaria quaestio nos fatiget.

Caput XVI.

De jure conjugiorum, quod dissimile a subsequentibus matrimoniis habuerint prima connubia.

For Adam, divinely admonished, was able to say after Seth was born, For God has raised up for me another seed instead of Abel; because he was to be such a one who would fulfill his sanctity, not that he himself was born first after him in the order of time. Then what is written, But Seth lived two hundred and five years, or according to the Hebrews, a hundred and five years, and begat Enos: who except the inconsiderate could assert that this was his first-born? So that we, deservedly wondering, should seek how through so many years he was immune from wedlock without any purpose of continence, or being married did not beget; since even of him it is read, And he begat sons and daughters, and all the days of Seth were nine hundred and twelve years, and he died (Gen. V, 4-8). And so thereafter of those whose years are commemorated, they are not kept silent from having begotten sons and daughters. And through this it does not appear at all whether he who is named begotten was himself the first-born: nay indeed, since it is not credible that those fathers were either impuberal at so long an age, or lacked wives or offspring; nor is it credible that those sons of theirs were the first born to them. But since the writer of the sacred history intended to reach by successions of generations with times marked to the birth and life of Noah, in whose time the flood occurred, he certainly commemorated those, not which were first to their parents, but which came into the order of propagation.

2. For example's sake, that it may be made more open, I shall interpose something from which no one may doubt it could have been made as I say. The Evangelist Matthew, wishing to commend to memory the generation of the Lord's flesh through a series of parents, starting from father Abraham, and intending first to reach to David, says: Abraham begat Isaac: why did he not say Ishmael, whom he begat first? Isaac, he says, begat Jacob: why did he not say Esau, who was his first-born? Because, forsooth, he would not be able through those to reach to David. Then follows: But Jacob begat Judah, and his brothers: was Judah the first-born? Judah, he says, begat Pharez and Zara (Matth. I, 2, 3): nor was either of those twins the first-born of Judah, but before those he had already begotten three. He held them, therefore, in the order of generations, through whom he might reach to David, and thence to where he had intended. From which it can be understood, that the ancient men also before the flood were not first-born, but those were commemorated through whom the order of succeeding generations might be led to the patriarch Noah, lest the obscure and unnecessary question of their late puberty should weary us.

Chapter XVI.

Of the right of marriages, which the first unions had different from subsequent marriages.

1. Cum igitur genus humanum post primam copulam viri facti ex pulvere, et conjugis ejus ex viri latere, marium feminarumque conjunctione opus haberet, ut gignendo multiplicaretur; nec essent ulli homines, nisi qui ex illis duobus nati fuissent; viri sorores suas conjuges acceperunt: quod profecto quanto est antiquius compellente necessitate, tanto postea factum est damnabilius religione prohibente. Habita est enim ratio rectissima charitatis, ut homines quibus esset utiles atque honesta concordia, diversarum necessitudinum vinculis necterentur; nec unus in uno multas haberet, sed singulae spargerentur in singulos; ac sic ad socialem vitam diligentius colligandam plurimae plurimos obtinerent. Pater quippe et socer duarum sunt necessitudinum nomina. Ut ergo alium quisque habeat patrem, alium socerum, numerosius se charitas porrigit. Utrumque autem unus Adam esse cogebatur et filiis et filiabus suis, quando fratres sororesque connubio jungebantur. Sic et Eva, uxor ejus, utrique sexui filiorum fuit et socrus et mater: quae si duae feminae fuissent, mater altera, et socrus altera, copiosius se socialis dilectio colligaret. Ipsa denique jam soror, quod etiam uxor fiebat, duas tenebat una necessitudines: quibus per singulas distributis, ut altera esset soror, altera uxor, hominum numero socialis propinquitas augeretur. Sed hoc unde fieret tunc non erat, quando nisi fratres et sorores ex illis duobus primis nulli homines erant. Fieri ergo debuit quando potuit, ut existente copia inde ducerentur uxores, quae non erant jam sorores; et non solum istud ut fieret, nulla necessitas esset, verum etiam si fieret, nefas esset. Nam si et nepotes primorum hominum, qui jam consobrinas poterant accipere conjuges, sororibus matrimonio jungerentur; non jam duae, sed tres in homine uno necessitudines fierent, quae propter charitatem numerosiore propinquitate nectendam, disseminari per singulos singulae debuerunt. Esset enim unus homo filiis suis, fratri scilicet sororique conjugibus, et pater et socer et avunculus: ita et uxor ejus iisdem communibus filiis et mater et amita et socrus: iidemque inter se filii eorum, non solum essent fratres atque conjuges, verum etiam consobrini; quia et fratrum filii. Omnes autem istae necessitudines, quae uni homini tres homines connectebant, novem connecterent, si essent in singulis singulae, ut unus homo haberet alteram sororem, alteram uxorem, alteram consobrinam, alterum patrem, alterum avunculum, alterum socerum, alteram matrem, alteram amitam, alteram socrum: atque ita se non in paucitate coarctatum, sed latius atque numerosius propinquitatibus crebris vinculum sociale diffunderet.

1. Since therefore the human race, after the first copulation of the man made from the dust and his spouse from the man's side, had need of the conjunction of males and females so that it might be multiplied by begetting; nor were there any men, except those who had been born from those two; men took their own sisters as wives: which certainly, by as much as it is more ancient with necessity compelling, by so much afterwards it was made more damnable with religion prohibiting. For a most right reason of charity was held, that men for whom a useful and honest concord would be, should be bound together by the bonds of diverse relationships; nor should one have many things in one, but single things should be scattered into single persons; and thus for the sake of more diligently binding together social life, very many should obtain very many. For father and father-in-law are the names of two relationships. That therefore each one should have one as father, another as father-in-law, charity stretches itself out more numerously. But one Adam was compelled to be both for his sons and for his daughters, when brothers and sisters were joined in wedlock. So also Eve, his wife, was both mother-in-law and mother for both sexes of children: who if they had been two women, the mother one, and the mother-in-law the other, social affection would bind itself together more copiously. Finally, that sister herself, because she was also made a wife, held two relationships in one: which, being distributed through single ones, so that the sister was one and the wife another, social proximity would be increased by the number of men. But there was not whence this should be made then, when none were men except brothers and sisters from those two first ones. It ought therefore to have been made when it was able, that with a copy existing, wives should be led from thence who were not now sisters; and not only that there should be no necessity that this should be made, but even if it were made, it would be a nefas. For if also the grandsons of the first men, who now were able to take cousins as wives, were joined in marriage to sisters; not now two, but three relationships would be made in one man, which for the sake of binding a more numerous proximity of charity, ought to have been disseminated through single ones. For one man would be for his children, namely the brother and sister being spouses, both father and father-in-law and uncle: thus also his wife for the same common children both mother and aunt and mother-in-law: and the same children of theirs among themselves would not only be brothers and spouses, but also cousins; because also the children of brothers. But all those relationships, which were connecting three men to one man, would connect nine, if they were single in each one, so that one man would have the sister as one, the wife as another, the cousin as another, the father as one, the uncle as another, the father-in-law as another, the mother as one, the aunt as another, the mother-in-law as another: and thus the social bond would diffuse itself not coarcted in paucity, but more widely and numerously by frequent proximities.

2. Quod humano genere crescente et multiplicato, etiam inter impios deorum multorum falsorumque cultores sic observari cernimus, ut etiamsi perversis legibus permittantur fraterna conjugia, melior tamen consuetudo ipsam malit exhorrere licentiam; et cum sorores accipere in matrimonium primis humani generis temporibus omnino licuerit, sic aversetur, quasi nunquam licere potuerit. Ad humanum enim sensum vel alliciendum, vel offendendum mos valet plurimum. Qui cum in hac causa immoderationem concupiscentiae coerceat, eum dissignari atque corrumpi merito esse nefarium judicatur. Si enim iniquum est, aviditate possidendi transgredi limitem agrorum, quanto est iniquius libidine concumbendi subvertere limitem morum? Experti autem sumus in connubiis consobrinarum etiam nostris temporibus propter gradum propinquitatis fraterno gradui proximum, quam raro per mores fiebat, quod fieri per leges licebat; quia id nec divina prohibuit, et nondum prohibuerat lex humana. Verumtamen factum etiam licitum propter vicinitatem horrebatur illiciti; et quod fiebat cum consobrina, pene cum sorore fieri videbatur: quia et ipsi inter se propter tam propinquam consanguinitatem fratres vocantur, et pene germani sunt. Fuit autem antiquis patribus religiosae curae, ne ipsa propinquitas se paulatim propaginum ordinibus dirimens longius abiret et propinquitas esse desisteret, eam nondum longe positam rursus matrimonii vinculo colligare, et quodammodo revocare fugientem. Unde jam pleno hominibus orbe terrarum, non quidem sorores ex patre vel matre, vel ex ambobus suis parentibus natas, sed tamen amabant de suo genere ducere uxores. Verum quis dubitet honestius hoc tempore etiam consobrinorum prohibita esse conjugia? non solum secundum ea quae disputavimus, propter multiplicandas affinitates, ne habeat duas necessitudines una persona, cum duae possint eas habere, et numerus propinquitatis augeri; sed etiam quia nescio quomodo inest humanae verecundiae quiddam naturale atque laudabile, ut cui debet causa propinquitatis reverendum honorem, ab ea contineat, quamvis generatricem, tamen libidinem, de qua erubescere videmus et ipsam pudicitiam conjugalem.

3. Copulatio igitur maris et feminae, quantum attinet ad genus mortalium, quoddam seminarium est civitatis: sed terrena civitas generatione tantummodo, coelestis autem etiam regeneratione opus habet, ut noxam generationis evadat. Utrum autem aliquod fuerit, vel si fuit, quale fuerit corporale atque visibile regenerationis signum ante diluvium, sicut Abrahae circumcisio postea est imperata (Gen. XVII, 10, 11), sacra historia tacet.

2. Which we see observed even among the impious worshippers of many and false gods, as the human race grew and was multiplied, so that even if fraternal marriages should be permitted by perverse laws, yet the better custom should prefer to abhor that license itself; and although it had been altogether allowed to take sisters in marriage in the first times of the human race, it should so be turned away from, as if it could never have been allowed. For custom avails very much either for enticing or for offending the human sense. Which since in this cause it coerces the immoderation of concupiscence, it is deservedly judged to be nefarious for it to be broken through and corrupted. For if it is iniquitous to transgress the limit of fields by the greed of possessing, how much more iniquitous is it to subvert the limit of morals by the lust of lying together? But we have experienced even in our times in the marriages of cousins, on account of the degree of proximity being next to the fraternal degree, how rarely it was done by morals, what was allowed to be done by laws; because neither did the divine law prohibit it, and human law had not yet prohibited it. Nevertheless, a thing even allowed was abhorred on account of the vicinity of the illicit; and what was done with a cousin, seemed almost to be done with a sister: because they themselves are called brothers and sisters among themselves on account of so near a consanguinity, and are almost germane. But it was of religious care to the ancient fathers, lest that proximity, gradually severing itself by the orders of the offspring, should go further away and cease to be proximity, to bind it together again by the bond of marriage while not yet placed far away, and in a certain way to recall it as it was fleeing. Whence now with the world full of men, they loved to lead wives from their own kind, not indeed sisters born from father or mother, or from both their parents. But who would doubt that even the marriages of cousins are more honestly prohibited in this time? not only according to those things which we have disputed, for the sake of multiplying affinities, lest one person should have two relationships when two are able to have them, and the number of proximity be increased; but also because I know not how there is in human shame something natural and laudable, so that it should restrain from her to whom it owes a reverend honor on account of the cause of proximity, although generative, yet the lust, concerning which we see even conjugal modesty itself to blush.

3. The copulation therefore of male and female, as much as pertains to the kind of mortals, is a certain seminary of the city: but the earthly city has need only of generation, but the celestial also of regeneration, so that it may evade the harm of generation. But whether there was any, or if there was, what kind of corporal and visible sign of regeneration there was before the flood, as the circumcision of Abraham was afterwards commanded (Gen. XVII, 10, 11), sacred history is silent.

Sacrificasse tamen Deo etiam illos antiquissimos homines non tacet: quod et in duobus primis fratribus claruit; et Noe post diluvium, cum de arca fuisset egressus, hostias Deo legitur immolasse (Id. VIII, 20). De qua re in praecedentibus libris jam diximus, non ob aliud daemones arrogantes sibi divinitatem deosque se credi cupientes sibi expetere sacrificium, et gaudere hujusmodi honoribus, nisi quia verum sacrificium vero Deo deberi sciunt.

Caput XVII.

De duobus ex uno genitore procreatis patribus atque principibus.

Cum ergo esset Adam utriusque generis pater, id est, et cujus series ad terrenam, et cujus series ad coelestem pertinet civitatem; occiso Abel, atque in ejus interfectione commendato mirabili sacramento, facti sunt duo patres singulorum generum, Cain et Seth: in quorum filiis, quos commemorari oportebat, duarum istarum civitatum in genere mortalium evidentius indicia clarere coeperunt. Cain quippe genuit Enoch, in cujus nomine condidit civitatem, terrenam scilicet, non peregrinantem in hoc mundo, sed in ejus temporali pace ac felicitate quiescentem. Cain autem interpretatur Possessio: unde dictum est quando natus est, sive a patre, sive a matre ejus, Acquisivi hominem per Deum (Gen. IV, 1). Enoch vero, Dedicatio: hic enim dedicatur terrena civitas, ubi conditur; quoniam hic habet eum, quem intendit et appetit finem. Porro ille Seth Resurrectio interpretatur, et Enos filius ejus interpretatur Homo: non sicut Adam (et ipsum enim nomen interpretatur Homo), sed commune perhibetur esse in illa lingua, id est hebraea, masculo et feminae. Nam sic de illo scriptum est: Masculum et feminam fecit illos, et benedixit illos, et cognominavit nomen eorum Adam (Id. V, 2). Unde non ambigitur, sic appellatam fuisse feminam Evam proprio nomine, ut tamen Adam, quod intepretatur Homo, nomen esset amborum. Enos autem sic interpretatur Homo, ut hoc non posse feminam nuncupari periti linguae illius asseverent, tanquam filius resurrectionis, ubi non nubent, neque uxores ducent (Luc. XX, 35). Non enim erit ibi generatio, cum illuc perduxerit regeneratio. Quare et hoc non incassum notandum arbitror, quod in eis generationibus quae propagantur ex illo qui est appellatus Seth, cum genuisse filios filiasque dicantur, nulla ibi genita nominatim femina expressa est: in his autem quae propagantur ex Cain, in ipso fine quousque protenduntur, novissima femina genita nominatur. Sic enim legitur: Mathusael genuit Lamech: et sumpsit sibi Lamech duas uxores, nomen uni Ada, et nomen secundae Sella; et peperit Ada Jobel: hic erat pater habitantium in tabernaculis pecuariorum. Et nomen fratris ejus Jubal: hic fuit qui ostendit psalterium et citharam.

Yet it is not silent that those most ancient men also sacrificed to God: which both was clear in the two first brothers; and Noah after the flood, when he had gone out of the ark, is read to have immolated hosts to God (Id. VIII, 20). Concerning which matter we have already said in the preceding books, that the arrogant demons, arrogating divinity to themselves and wishing themselves to be believed gods, do not for any other reason seek sacrifice for themselves, and rejoice in honors of this kind, except because they know that true sacrifice is owed to the true God.

Chapter XVII.

Of the two fathers and princes procreated from one parent.

Since therefore Adam was the father of both kinds, that is, both of the series which pertains to the earthly and of the series which pertains to the celestial city; Abel being killed, and a wonderful sacrament being commended in his slaying, two fathers of single kinds were made, Cain and Seth: in whose sons, who it was behooveful should be commemorated, the indications of those two cities in the kind of mortals began to appear more evidently. For Cain begat Enoch, in whose name he founded a city, an earthly one forsooth, not sojourning in this world, but resting in its temporal peace and happiness. But Cain is interpreted Possession: whence it was said when he was born, either by his father or by his mother, I have acquired a man through God (Gen. IV, 1). But Enoch, Dedication: for here the earthly city is dedicated, where it is founded; since here it has him whom it intends and desires as end. Furthermore that Seth is interpreted Resurrection, and Enos his son is interpreted Man: not as Adam (for even that name is interpreted Man), but it is said to be common in that language, that is the Hebrew, to male and female. For so it is written of him: Male and female He made them, and blessed them, and called their name Adam (Id. V, 2). Whence it is not doubted that the female was so called Eve by her proper name, that yet Adam, which is interpreted Man, was the name of both. But Enos is so interpreted Man, that the experts of that language assert that a female cannot be called this, as if a son of resurrection, where they shall not marry, nor lead wives (Luke XX, 35). For there will not be generation there, when regeneration shall have led thither. Wherefore also I think this not to be noted in vain, that in those generations which are propagated from him who is called Seth, although they are said to have begotten sons and daughters, no female begotten there is expressed by name: but in these which are propagated from Cain, in the very end as far as they are extended, the last female begotten is named. For so it is read: Methushael begat Lamech: and Lamech took to himself two wives, the name of one Adah, and the name of the second Zillah; and Adah bore Jabal: he was the father of those dwelling in tents of cattle-breeders. And his brother's name Jubal: he was he who showed the psaltery and the harp.

Sella autem peperit et ipsa Thobel, et erat aerarius et malleator aeramenti et ferri. Soror autem Thobel Noema (Gen. IV, 18-22). Huc usque porrectae sunt generationes ex Cain, quae sunt omnes ab Adam octo, annumerato ipso Adam, septem scilicet usque ad Lamech, qui duarum maritus uxorum fuit: et octava est generatio in filiis ejus, in quibus commemoratur et femina. Ubi eleganter significatum est, terrenam civitatem usque in sui finem carnales habituram generationes, quae marium feminarumque conjunctione proveniunt. Unde et ipsae, quod praeter Evam nusquam reperitur ante diluvium, nominibus propriis exprimuntur uxores illius hominis, qui nominatur hic novissimus pater. Sicut autem Cain, quod interpretatur Possessio, terrenae conditor civitatis, et filius ejus, in cujus nomine condita est, Enoch, quod interpretatur Dedicatio, indicat istam civitatem et initium et finem habere terrenum; ubi nihil speratur amplius, quam in hoc saeculo cerni potest: ita Seth, quod interpretatur Resurrectio, cum sit generationum seorsum commemoratarum pater, quid de filio ejus sacra haec historia dicat, intuendum est.

Caput XVIII.

Quid significatum sit in Abel, et Seth, et Enos, quod appareat ad Christum et corpus ejus, id est Ecclesiam, pertinere.

Et Seth, inquit, natus est filius, et nominavit nomen ejus Enos: hic speravit invocare nomen Domini Dei (Gen. IV, 26). Nempe clamat attestatio veritatis. In spe igitur vivit homo filius resurrectionis; in spe vivit, quamdiu peregrinatur hic civitas Dei, quae gignitur ex fide resurrectionis Christi. Ex duobus namque illis hominibus, Abel, quod interpretatur Luctus, et ejus fratre Seth, quod interpretatur Resurrectio, mors Christi et vita ejus ex mortuis figuratur. Ex qua fide gignitur hic civitas Dei, id est homo, qui speravit invocare nomen Domini Dei. Spe enim salvi facti sumus, ait Apostolus. Spes autem quae videtur, non est spes: quod enim videt quis, quid sperat? Si autem quod non videmus, speramus, per patientiam exspectamus (Rom. VIII, 24, 25). Nam quis vacare hoc existimet ab altitudine sacramenti? Numquid enim Abel non speravit invocare nomen Domini Dei, cujus sacrificium Scriptura tam acceptum Deo fuisse commemorat? numquid ipse Seth non speravit invocare nomen Domini Dei, de quo dictum est, Suscitavit enim mihi Deus semen aliud pro Abel (Gen. IV, 25)?

But Zillah herself also bore Tubal, and he was a smith and hammerer of brass and iron. But the sister of Tubal was Naamah (Gen. IV, 18-22). To this point are the generations from Cain extended, which are all eight from Adam, with Adam himself numbered, seven forsooth up to Lamech, who was the husband of two wives: and the eighth is the generation in his sons, in whom also a female is commemorated. Where it is elegantly signified, that the earthly city even unto its end will have carnal generations, which proceed from the conjunction of males and females. Whence also they themselves, which except for Eve is nowhere found before the flood, are expressed by proper names as wives of that man who is named here as the last father. But just as Cain, which is interpreted Possession, the founder of the earthly city, and his son, in whose name it was founded, Enoch, which is interpreted Dedication, indicates that this city has both a beginning and an end that is earthly; where nothing more is hoped for, than can be discerned in this world: so Seth, which is interpreted Resurrection, since he is the father of the generations commemorated separately, it must be looked into what this sacred history says of his son.

Chapter XVIII.

What was signified in Abel, and Seth, and Enos, which appears to pertain to Christ and His body, that is the Church.

And to Seth, he says, a son was born, and he called his name Enos: he hoped to invoke the name of the Lord God (Gen. IV, 26). Surely the attestation of truth cries out. In hope therefore the man, the son of resurrection, lives; in hope he lives, as long as the city of God sojourns here, which is begotten from the faith of the resurrection of Christ. For from those two men, Abel, which is interpreted Mourning, and his brother Seth, which is interpreted Resurrection, the death of Christ and His life from the dead are figured. From which faith the city of God is begotten here, that is the man, who hoped to invoke the name of the Lord God. For in hope we are saved, says the Apostle. But hope which is seen, is not hope: for what anyone sees, why does he hope? But if what we do not see, we hope, through patience we expect it (Rom. VIII, 24, 25). For who would think this to be empty from the height of the sacrament? For did not Abel hope to invoke the name of the Lord God, whose sacrifice Scripture commemorates to have been so accepted by God? did not Seth himself hope to invoke the name of the Lord God, of whom it was said, For God has raised up for me another seed instead of Abel (Gen. IV, 25)?

Cur ergo huic proprie tribuitur quod piorum omnium intelligitur esse commune, nisi quia oportebat in eo qui de patre generationum in meliorem partem, hoc est supernae civitatis separatarum, primus commemoratur exortus, praefigurari hominem, id est hominum societatem, quae non secundum hominem in re felicitatis terrenae, sed secundum Deum vivit in spe felicitatis aeternae? Nec dictum est, Hic speravit in Dominum Deum; aut, Hic invocavit nomen Domini Dei: sed, Hic speravit, inquit, invocare nomen Domini Dei. Quid sibi hoc vult, Speravit invocare, nisi quia prophetia est, exorturum populum, qui secundum electionem gratiae invocaret nomen Domini Dei? Hoc est, quod per alium prophetam dictum, Apostolus de hoc populo intelligit ad Dei gratiam pertinente: Et erit, omnis quicumque invocaverit nomen Domini, salvus erit (Rom. X, 13; Joel II, 32). Hoc enim ipsum quod dicitur, Et nominavit nomen ejus Enos, quod interpretatur Homo; ac deinde additur, Hic speravit invocare nomen Domini Dei: satis ostenditur, quod non in se ipso spem ponere debeat homo. Maledictus enim omnis, sicut alibi legitur, qui spem suam ponit in homine (Jerem. XVII, 5): ac per hoc, nec in se, ut sit civis alterius civitatis, quae non secundum filium Cain dedicatur hoc tempore, id est mortalis hujus saeculi labente transcursu, sed in illa immortalitate beatitudinis sempiternae.

Caput XIX.

De significatione quae in Enoch translatione monstratur.

Nam et ista propago, cujus est pater Seth, in ea generatione habet dedicationis nomen, quae septima est ab Adam, annumerato Adam. Septimus enim ab illo natus est Enoch, quod interpretatur Dedicatio. Sed ipse est ille translatus, quoniam placuit Deo, et insigni numero in ordine generationum, quo sabbatum consecratum est, septimo scilicet ab Adam. Ab ipso autem patre istarum generationum, quae discernuntur a propagine Cain, id est a Seth, sextus est: quoto die factus est homo, et consummavit Deus omnia opera sua. Sed hujus Enoch translatio nostrae dedicationis est praefigurata dilatio. Quae quidem jam facta est in Christo capite nostro, qui sic resurrexit, ut non moriatur ulterius, sed etiam ipse translatus est: restat autem altera dedicatio universae domus, cujus ipse Christus est fundamentum, quae differtur in finem, quando erit omnium resurrectio, non morturorum amplius. Sive autem domus Dei dicatur, sive templum Dei, sive civitas Dei, idipsum est, nec abhorret a latin. eloquii consuetudine.

Why therefore is that properly attributed to him which is understood to be common to all the pious, unless because it was behooveful that in him who is commemorated as the first arisen from the father of generations in the better part, that is of the separated supernal city, there should be prefigured the man, that is the society of men, which lives not according to man in the reality of earthly happiness, but according to God in the hope of eternal happiness? Nor was it said, He hoped in the Lord God; or, He invoked the name of the Lord God: but, He hoped, he says, to invoke the name of the Lord God. What does this mean for itself, He hoped to invoke, unless because it is a prophecy, that a people was about to arise, who according to the election of grace would invoke the name of the Lord God? This is what, said through another prophet, the Apostle understands concerning this people pertaining to the grace of God: And it shall be, every one whosoever shall have invoked the name of the Lord, shall be saved (Rom. X, 13; Joel II, 32). For this very thing which is said, And he called his name Enos, which is interpreted Man; and thereafter is added, He hoped to invoke the name of the Lord God: it is sufficiently shown, that a man ought not to place hope in himself. For cursed is every one, as is read elsewhere, who puts his hope in man (Jerem. XVII, 5): and through this, neither in himself, that he may be a citizen of the other city, which is not dedicated at this time according to the son of Cain, that is in the gliding transit of this mortal world, but in that immortality of sempiternal bliss.

Chapter XIX.

Of the significance which is shown in the translation of Enoch.

For also that offspring, whose father is Seth, has in that generation the name of dedication, which is the seventh from Adam, with Adam numbered. For seventh from him was born Enoch, which is interpreted Dedication. But he himself is that one translated, because he pleased God, and in a remarkable number in the order of generations, by which the sabbath was consecrated, seventh forsooth from Adam. But from the father himself of those generations, which are discerned from the progeny of Cain, that is from Seth, he is the sixth: on which day man was made, and God consummated all His works. But the translation of this Enoch is the prefigured delay of our dedication. Which indeed has already been made in Christ our head, who so rose again, that He dies no more, but also He Himself was translated: but there remains another dedication of the universal house, of which Christ Himself is the foundation, which is deferred unto the end, when there will be the resurrection of all, about not to die anymore. But whether it be called the house of God, or the temple of God, or the city of God, it is the same thing, nor does it abhor from the custom of Latin eloquence.

Nam et Virgilius imperiosissimam civitatem domum appellat Assaraci, Romanos volens intelligi, qui de Assaraco per Trojanos originem ducunt; et domum Aeneae eosdem ipsos (Aeneid. lib. 1, vers. 284; lib. 3, vers. 97), quia eo duce Trojani cum Italiam venissent, ab eis condita est Roma. Imitatus namque est poeta ille sacras Litteras, in quibus dicitur domus Jacob tam ingens populus Hebraeorum.

Caput XX.

De eo quod Cain successio in octo ab Adam generationes clauditur, et in posteris ab eodem patre Adam Noe decimus invenitur.

Dicet aliquis: Si hoc intendebat scriptor hujus historiae in commemorandis generationibus ex Adam per filium ejus Seth, ut per illas perveniret ad Noe, sub quo factum est diluvium, a quo rursus contexeretur ordo nascentium, quo perveniret ad Abraham, a quo Matthaeus evangelista incipit generationes, quibus ad Christum pervenit aeternum Regem civitatis Dei; quid intendebat in generationibus ex Cain, et quo eas perducere volebat? Respondetur: Usque ad diluvium, quo totum illul genus terrenae civitatis absumptum est, sed reparatum ex filiis Noe. Neque enim deesse poterit haec terrena civitas societasque hominum secundum hominem viventium usque ad hujus saeculi finem, de quo Dominus ait, Filii hujus saeculi generant, et generantur (Luc. XX, 34). Civitatem vero Dei peregrinantem in hoc saeculo regeneratio perducit ad alterum saeculum, cujus filii nec generant, nec generantur. Hic ergo generari et generare civitati utrique commune est: quamvis Dei civitas habeat etiam hic multa civium millia, quae ab opere generandi se abstinent; sed habet etiam illa ex imitatione quadam, licet errantium. Ad eam namque pertinent etiam, qui deviantes ab hujus fide diversas haereses condiderunt: secundum hominem quippe vivunt, non secundum Deum. Et Indorum Gymnosophistae, qui nudi perhibentur philosophari in solitudinibus Indiae, cives ejus sunt, et a generando se cohibent. Non enim est hoc bonum, nisi cum fit secundum fidem summi boni, qui est Deus. Hoc tamen nemo fecisse ante diluvium reperitur: quandoquidem etiam ipse Enoch septimus ab Adam, qui translatus refertur esse, non mortuus, genuit filios et filias antequam transferretur; in quibus fuit Mathusalem, per quem generationum memorandarum ordo transcurrit.

Cur ergo tanta paucitas successionum commemoratur in generationibus ex Cain, si eas usque ad diluvium perduci oportebat, nec erat diuturna aetas praeveniens pubertatem, quae centum vel amplius annos vacaret a fetibus?

For Virgil also calls a most imperious city the house of Assaracus, wishing the Romans to be understood, who through the Trojans lead their origin from Assaracus; and the house of Aeneas the same ones (Aeneid. lib. 1, vers. 284; lib. 3, vers. 97), because with him as leader when the Trojans had come to Italy, Rome was founded by them. For that poet imitated the sacred Letters, in which the house of Jacob is called so great a people of the Hebrews.

Chapter XX.

Of the fact that the succession of Cain is closed in eight generations from Adam, and in the descendants from the same father Adam, Noah is found to be the tenth.

Someone will say: If the writer of this history intended, in recording the generations from Adam through his son Seth, to reach Noah, under whom the flood occurred, from whom again the order of those being born would be woven together, which would reach Abraham, from whom the evangelist Matthew begins the generations by which he reaches Christ the eternal King of the city of God; what did he intend in the generations from Cain, and where did he wish to lead them? The answer is: Even to the flood, by which that whole race of the earthly city was consumed, but repaired from the sons of Noah. For this earthly city and society of men living according to man will not be able to be lacking until the end of this world, of which the Lord says, "The children of this world beget, and are begotten" (Luke XX, 34). But regeneration leads the city of God, which is a pilgrim in this world, to another world, whose children neither beget nor are begotten. Here, therefore, to be begotten and to beget is common to both cities: although the city of God also has many thousands of citizens here who abstain from the work of begetting; but that city also has them from a certain imitation, although of those who err. For those also belong to it, who, deviating from this faith, have founded various heresies: for they live according to man, not according to God. And the Gymnosophists of the Indians, who are reported to philosophize naked in the solitudes of India, are its citizens, and restrain themselves from begetting. For this is not good, except when it is done according to the faith of the highest good, which is God. No one, however, is found to have done this before the flood: since even Enoch himself, the seventh from Adam, who is reported to have been translated, not dead, begot sons and daughters before he was translated; among whom was Methuselah, through whom the order of the generations to be recorded runs.

Why, therefore, is so small a number of successions recorded in the generations from Cain, if it was necessary for them to be led up to the flood, and there was not a long age preceding puberty, which would be free from offspring for a hundred or more years?

Nam si non intendebat auctor libri hujus aliquem, ad quem necessario perduceret seriem generationum, sicut in illis quae veniunt de semine Seth intendebat pervenire ad Noe, a quo rursus ordo necessarius sequeretur; quid opus erat praetermittere primogenitos filios, ut perveniretur ad Lamech, in cujus filiis finitur illa contextio, octava generatione scilicet ex Adam, septima ex Cain, quasi esset inde aliquid deinceps connectendum, unde perveniretur vel ad Israeliticum populum, in quo coelesti civitati etiam terrena Jerusalem figuram propheticam praebuit, vel ad Christum secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula (Rom. IX, 5), supernae Jerusalem fabricator atque regnator; cum tota progenies Cain diluvio sit deleta? Unde videri potest, in eodem ordine generationum primogenitos fuisse commemoratos. Cur ergo tam pauci sunt? Non enim usque ad diluvium tot esse potuerunt, non vacantibus usque ad centenariam pubertatem patribus ab officio generandi, si non erat tunc proportione longaevitatis illius etiam sera pubertas. Ut enim peraeque triginta annorum fuerint, cum filios generare coeperunt, octies triceni (quoniam octo sunt generationes cum Adam et cum eis quos genuit Lamech), ducenti et quadraginta sunt anni: num itaque toto deinde tempore usque ad diluvium non generaverunt? Qua tandem causa, qui haec scripsit, generationes commemorare noluit quae sequuntur? Nam ex Adam usque ad diluvium computantur anni, secundum codices nostros, duo millia ducenti sexaginta duo: secundum hebraeos autem, mille sexcenti quinquaginta sex. Ut ergo istum numerum minorem credamus esse veriorem, de mille sexcentis quinquaginta sex annis ducenti quadraginta detrahantur: numquid credibile est per mille quadringentos, et quod excurrit, annos, qui restant usque ad diluvium, progeniem Cain a generationibus vacare potuisse?

Sed qui ex hoc movetur, meminerit, cum quaererem quomodo credendum sit, antiquos illos homines per tam multos annos a gignendis filiis cessare potuisse, duobus modis istam solutam esse quaestionem; aut de sera pubertate, proportione tam longae vitae; aut de filiis qui commemorantur in generationibus, quod non fuerint primogeniti; sed hi per quos ad eum, quem intendebat auctor libri, poterat pervenire, sicut ad Noe in generationibus Seth. Proinde in generationibus Cain, si non occurrit qui deberet intendi, ad quem praetermissis primogenitis, per eos qui commemorati sunt, perveniri oportebat, sera pubertas intelligenda restabit; ut aliquanto post centum annos, puberes habilesque ad gignendum facti fuerint, ut ordo generationum per primogenitos curreret, et usque ad diluvium ad numerum annorum tantae quantitatis occurreret.

For if the author of this book did not intend someone to whom he must necessarily lead the series of generations, just as in those who come from the seed of Seth he intended to reach Noah, from whom again a necessary order would follow; what need was there to pass over the firstborn sons, so that he might reach Lamech, in whose sons that weaving together is finished, namely in the eighth generation from Adam, the seventh from Cain, as if there were something to be connected from there thereafter, from which one might reach either the Israelite people, in whom the earthly Jerusalem also provided a prophetic figure for the heavenly city, or Christ according to the flesh, who is God blessed over all things for ever (Rom. IX, 5), the builder and ruler of the supernal Jerusalem; since the whole progeny of Cain was destroyed by the flood? Whence it can be seen that in the same order of generations the firstborn were recorded. Why, then, are they so few? For they could not be so many up to the flood, the fathers not being free from the duty of begetting until a hundred-year puberty, if there was not then also a late puberty in proportion to that longevity. For even if they were on average thirty years old when they began to beget sons, eight times thirty (since there are eight generations with Adam and with those whom Lamech begot) are two hundred and forty years: did they then not beget for the whole time thereafter up to the flood? For what cause, finally, did he who wrote this refuse to record the generations that follow? For from Adam to the flood the years are computed, according to our codices, two thousand two hundred and sixty-two: but according to the Hebrews, one thousand six hundred and fifty-six. That we may believe this smaller number to be the truer one, let two hundred and forty be subtracted from one thousand six hundred and fifty-six years: is it credible that through the one thousand four hundred and some odd years which remain until the flood, the progeny of Cain could have been free from generations?

But let him who is moved by this remember that when I was seeking how it is to be believed that those ancient men could cease from begetting sons for so many years, that question was solved in two ways: either concerning late puberty, in proportion to so long a life; or concerning the sons who are recorded in the generations, that they were not the firstborn, but those through whom the author of the book intended to reach the one he intended, as to Noah in the generations of Seth. Accordingly, in the generations of Cain, if no one occurs who ought to have been intended, to whom, after passing over the firstborn, it was necessary to reach through those who have been recorded, late puberty will remain to be understood; so that somewhat after a hundred years they became pubescent and fit for begetting, so that the order of generations might run through the firstborn, and up to the flood might occur for a number of years of such great quantity.

Quamvis fieri possit, ut propter aliquam secretiorem causam, quae me latet, usque ad Lamech et ejus filios generationum perveniente contextu, commendaretur haec civitas, quam dicimus esse terrenam; ac deinde cessaret scriptor libri commemorare caeteras, quae usque ad diluvium esse potuerunt. Potest et illa esse causa, cur non ordo generationum per primogenitos duceretur, ut necesse non sit in illis hominibus tam seram credere pubertatem, quod scilicet eadem civitas, quam Cain in nomine Enoch filii sui condidit, longe lateque regnare potuerit, et reges habere non simul plures, sed suis aetatibus singulos, quos genuissent sibi successuros quicumque regnassent. Horum regum primus esse potuit ipse Cain, secundus filius ejus Enoch, in cujus nomine ubi regnaretur, condita est civitas: tertius Gaidad, quem genuit Enoch: quartus Manihel, quem genuit Gaidad: quintus Mathusael, quem genuit Manihel: sextus Lamech, quem genuit Mathusael, qui septimus est ab Adam per Cain. Non autem erat consequens, ut primogeniti regum regnantibus succederent patribus, sed quos regnandi meritum propter virtutem terrenae utilem civitati, vel sors aliqua reperiret, vel ille potissimum succederet patri haereditario quodam jure regnandi, quem prae caeteris filiis dilexisset. Potuit autem vivente adhuc Lamech atque regnante fieri diluvium, ut ipsum cum aliis omnibus hominibus, exceptis qui in arca fuerunt, quem perderet, inveniret. Neque enim mirandum est, si varia quantitate numerositatis annorum interposita, per tam longam aetatem ab Adam usque ad diluvium non aequalis numeri generationes habuit utraque progenies, sed per Cain septem, per Seth autem decem: septimus est enim, ut jam dixi, ab Adam Lamech, decimus Noe: et ideo non unus filius Lamech, sicut in caeteris superius, sed plures commemorati sunt; quia incertum erat quis ei fuisset mortuo successurus, si regnandi tempus inter ipsum et diluvium remansisset.

Sed quoquo modo se habeat, sive per primogenitos, sive per reges, ex Cain generationum ordo decurrens, illud mihi nullo pacto praetereundum silentio videtur, quod cum Lamech septimus ab Adam fuisset inventus, tot ejus annumerati sunt filii, donec undenarius numerus impleretur, quo significatur peccatum. Adduntur enim tres filii, et una filia. Uxores autem aliud possunt significare, non hoc quod nunc commendandum videtur. Nunc enim de generationibus loquimur: illae vero unde sint genitae, tacitum est.

Although it is possible that for some more secret cause, which is hidden from me, the weaving together of the generations reaching up to Lamech and his sons, this city which we call earthly might be commended; and then the writer of the book might cease to record the others which could have been up to the flood. That could also be a cause why the order of generations was not led through the firstborn, so that it is not necessary to believe in so late a puberty in those men, because namely the same city which Cain founded in the name of his son Enoch could have reigned far and wide, and have had kings not many at the same time, but single ones in their own ages, whom they had begotten to succeed them, whoever had reigned. The first of these kings could have been Cain himself, the second his son Enoch, in whose name, where the reign was, the city was founded; the third Gaidad, whom Enoch begot; the fourth Mahujael, whom Gaidad begot; the fifth Methusael, whom Mahujael begot; the sixth Lamech, whom Methusael begot, who is the seventh from Adam through Cain. It was not, however, a consequence that the firstborn of the kings should succeed their reigning fathers, but those whom the merit of reigning because of a virtue useful to the earthly city, or some lot might find, or he most of all should succeed the father by some hereditary right of reigning, whom he had loved more than the other sons. It could, moreover, have happened while Lamech was still living and reigning that the flood occurred, so that it might find him with all other men, except those who were in the ark, whom it should destroy. For it is not to be wondered at if, with a varied quantity of the number of years interposed, through so long an age from Adam to the flood, each progeny did not have an equal number of generations, but through Cain seven, and through Seth ten; for Lamech is the seventh from Adam, as I have already said, and Noah the tenth: and therefore not one son of Lamech, as in the others above, but several are recorded; because it was uncertain who would have succeeded him when dead, if the time of reigning between himself and the flood had remained.

But in whatever way it may be, whether through the firstborn or through kings, the order of generations running from Cain, that seems to me by no means to be passed over in silence, that when Lamech had been found the seventh from Adam, so many of his sons were numbered until the number eleven was filled, by which sin is signified. For three sons are added, and one daughter. But the wives can signify something else, not this which now seems to be commended. For now we speak of generations: but whence they were begotten is kept silent.

Quoniam ergo Lex denario numero praedicatur, unde est memorabilis ille Decalogus; profecto numerus undenarius, quoniam transgreditur denarium, transgressionem legis, ac per hoc peccatum significat. Hinc est quod in tabernaculo testimonii, quod erat in itinere populi Dei velut templum ambulatorium, undecim vela cilicina fieri praecepta sunt (Exod. XXVI, 7). In cilicio quippe recordatio est peccatorum, propter haedos ad sinistram futuros: quod confitentes in cilicio prosternimur, tanquam dicentes quod in Psalmo scriptum est, Et peccatum meum ante me est semper (Psal. L, 5). Progenies ergo ex Adam per Cain sceleratum undenario numero finitur, quo peccatum significatur: et ipse numerus femina clauditur, a quo sexu initium factum est peccati, per quod omnes morimur. Commissum est autem, ut et voluptas carnis, quae spiritui resisteret, sequeretur. Nam et ipsa filia Lamech Noema Voluptas interpretatur. Per Seth autem ab Adam usque ad Noe denarius insinuatur legitimus numerus. Cui Noe tres adjiciuntur filii: unde uno lapso duo benedicuntur a patre, ut remoto reprobo et probatis filiis ad numerum additis etiam duodenarius numerus intimetur, qui et in Patriarcharum et in Apostolorum numero insignis est, propter septenarii partes, alteram per alteram multiplicatas. Nam ter quaterni, vel quater terni ipsum faciunt. His ita se habentibus, video considerandum et commemorandum, ista utraque progenies, quae distinctis generationibus duas insinuat civitates, unam terrigenarum, alteram regeneratorum, quomodo postea sic commixta fuerit atque confusa, ut universum genus humanum, exceptis octo hominibus, perire mereretur diluvio.

CAPUT XXI.---Qua ratione commemorato Enoch, qui fuit filius Cain, totius generationis ejus usque ad diluvium sit continuata narratio; commemorato autem Enos, qui fuit filius Seth, ad conditionis humanae principium sit reditum.

Primo autem intuendum est, quemadmodum cum ex Cain generationes enumerarentur, commemorato ante caeteros posteros ejus illo in cujus nominecondita est civitas, id est Enoch, contexti sunt caeteri usque ad illum finem, de quo locutus sum, donec illud genus atque universa propago diluvio deleretur: cum vero filius Seth unus commemoratus fuisset Enos, nondum usque ad diluvium additis caeteris, articulus quidam interponitur et dicitur, Hic liber nativitatis hominum, qua die fecit Deus Adam, ad imaginem Dei fecit illum. Masculum et feminam fecit illos, et benedixit illos, et cognominavit nomen eorum Adam, qua die fecit illos (Gen. V, 1, 2). Quod mihi videtur ad hoc interpositum, ut hinc rursus inciperet ab ipso Adam dinumeratio temporum, quam noluit facere qui haec scripsit in civitate terrena: tanquam eam Deus sic commemoraret, ut non computaret.

Since, therefore, the Law is preached by the number ten, whence is that memorable Decalogue; surely the number eleven, since it transgresses the ten, signifies the transgression of the law, and through this, sin. Hence it is that in the tabernacle of the testimony, which was on the journey of the people of God like an ambulatory temple, eleven curtains of haircloth were commanded to be made (Exod. XXVI, 7). For in haircloth there is the remembrance of sins, because of the goats to be on the left hand: because confessing in haircloth we are prostrated, as if saying what is written in the Psalm, "And my sin is ever before me" (Psalm L, 5). The progeny, therefore, from Adam through the wicked Cain is finished in the number eleven, by which sin is signified: and the number itself is closed by a woman, from which sex the beginning of sin was made, through which we all die. Moreover, it was committed so that also the pleasure of the flesh, which would resist the spirit, should follow. For also the daughter of Lamech herself, Naamah, is interpreted as Pleasure. But through Seth from Adam to Noah the legitimate number ten is hinted at. To which Noah three sons are added: whence one having fallen, two are blessed by the father, so that the reprobate being removed and the approved sons being added to the number, even the number twelve is intimated, which is distinguished both in the number of the Patriarchs and of the Apostles, because of the parts of the seven, one multiplied by the other. For three times four, or four times three, make it. These things being so, I see that it must be considered and recorded how both these progenies, which in distinct generations hint at two cities, one of the earth-born, the other of the regenerated, were afterwards so mixed together and confused, that the whole human race, except eight persons, deserved to perish in the flood.

CHAPTER XXI.---For what reason, after recording Enoch, who was the son of Cain, the narration of his whole generation was continued up to the flood; but after recording Enos, who was the son of Seth, there was a return to the beginning of the human condition.

First, it must be observed how, when the generations from Cain were being enumerated, after recording before his other descendants the one in whose name the city was founded, that is Enoch, the others were woven together up to that end of which I have spoken, until that race and the whole progeny should be destroyed by the flood: but when one son of Seth, Enos, had been recorded, the others not yet being added up to the flood, a certain point is interposed and it is said, "This is the book of the birth of men, in the day that God made Adam, in the image of God he made him." Male and female he made them, and blessed them, and called their name Adam, in the day that he made them" (Gen. V, 1, 2). This seems to me to be interposed for this purpose, that from here the numbering of times might begin again from Adam himself, which he who wrote this did not wish to do in the earthly city: as if God recorded it in such a way that he did not compute it.

Sed quare hinc reditur ad istam recapitulationem, posteaquam commemoratus est filius Seth, homo qui speravit invocare nomen Domini Dei; nisi quia sic oportebat istas duas proponere civitates, unam per homicidam usque ad homicidam; nam et Lamech duabus uxoribus suis se perpetrasse homicidium confitetur (Gen. IV, 23): alteram per eum qui speravit invocare nomen Domini Dei? Hoc est quippe in hoc mundo peregrinantis civitatis Dei totum atque summum in hac mortalitate negotium, quod per unum hominem, quem sane occisi resurrectio genuit, commendandum fuit. Homo quippe ille unus totius supernae civitatis est unitas; nondum quidem completa, sed praemissa ista prophetica praefiguratione complenda. Filius ergo Cain, hoc est filius possessionis (cujus, nisi terrenae?) habeat nomen in civitate terrena, quae in ejus nomine condita est. De his est enim de quibus cantatur in Psalmo, Invocabunt nomina eorum in terris ipsorum (Psal. XLVIII, 12). Propter quod sequitur eos quod in alio Psalmo scriptum est, Domine, in civitate tua imaginem ipsorum ad nihilum rediges (Psal. LXXII, 20). Filius autem Seth, hoc est filius resurrectionis, speret invocare nomen Domini Dei. Eam quippe societatem hominum praefigurat quae dicit, Ego autem, sicut oliva fructifera in domo Dei speravi, in misericordia Dei (Psal. LI, 10). Vanas autem glorias famosi in terra nominis non requirat: Beatus enim vir, cujus est nomen Domini spes ejus, et non respexit in vanitates, et insanias mendaces (Psal. XXXIX, 5). Propositis itaque duabus civitatibus, una in re hujus saeculi, altera in spe Dei, tanquam ex communi, quae aperta est in Adam, janua mortalitatis egressis, ut procurrant et excurrant ad discretos proprios ac debitos fines, incipit dinumeratio temporum: in qua et aliae generationes adjiciuntur, facta recapitulatione ex Adam, ex cujus origine damnata, veluti massa una meritae damnationi tradita, fecit Deus alia in contumeliam vasa irae, alia in honorem vasa misericordiae (Rom. IX, 23); illis reddens quod debetur in poena, istis donans quod non debetur in gratia: ut ex ipsa etiam comparatione vasorum irae, superna civitas discat, quae peregrinatur in terris, non fidere libertate arbitrii sui, sed speret invocare nomen Domini Dei. Quoniam voluntas, in natura quae facta est bona a Deo bono, sed mutabilis ab immutabili, quia ex nihilo, et a bono potest declinare, ut faciat malum, quod fit libero arbitrio; et a malo, ut faciat bonum, quod non fit sine divino adjutorio.

Caput XXII.

De lapsu filiorum Dei alienigenarum mulierum amore captorum, unde et omnes, exceptis octo hominibus, diluvio perire meruerunt.

But why is there a return to this recapitulation from here, after the son of Seth was recorded, the man who hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God; unless because it was necessary thus to propose these two cities, one through a murderer even to a murderer; for Lamech also confesses to his two wives that he has perpetrated a murder (Gen. IV, 23): the other through him who hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God? For this is the whole and highest business of the city of God, which is a pilgrim in this world during this mortality, which had to be commended through one man, whom indeed the resurrection of the slain begot. For that one man is the unity of the whole supernal city; not yet indeed completed, but sent ahead to be completed by this prophetic prefiguration. Let the son of Cain, therefore, that is the son of possession (of whose, except of the earthly?), have a name in the earthly city, which was founded in his name. For it is of these of whom it is sung in the Psalm, "They shall call their names in their own lands" (Psalm XLVIII, 12). Because of which there follows for them what is written in another Psalm, "Lord, in thy city thou shalt bring their image to nothing" (Psalm LXXII, 20). But let the son of Seth, that is the son of resurrection, hope to call upon the name of the Lord God. For he prefigures that society of men which says, "But I, like a fruitful olive tree in the house of God, have hoped in the mercy of God" (Psalm LI, 10). But let him not seek the vain glories of a name famous on earth: for "Blessed is the man whose hope is the name of the Lord, and he has not regarded vanities and lying insanities" (Psalm XXXIX, 5). The two cities having been proposed, therefore, one in the reality of this world, the other in the hope of God, as if having gone out from the common door of mortality which was opened in Adam, that they might run forward and run out to their own distinct and due ends, the numbering of times begins: in which also other generations are added, a recapitulation being made from Adam, from whose condemned origin, as if one mass delivered to deserved condemnation, God made some vessels of wrath unto dishonor, others vessels of mercy unto honor (Rom. IX, 23); rendering to those what is due in punishment, giving to these what is not due in grace: that from that very comparison of the vessels of wrath, the supernal city, which is a pilgrim on earth, may learn not to trust in the freedom of its own will, but hope to call upon the name of the Lord God. Since the will, in a nature which was made good by a good God, but mutable by the immutable because it is from nothing, can decline both from the good, so that it may do evil, which is done by free will; and from the evil, so that it may do good, which is not done without divine help.

Chapter XXII.

Of the fall of the sons of God captured by the love of strange women, whence also all, except eight persons, deserved to perish in the flood.

Hoc itaque libero voluntatis arbitrio genere humano progrediente atque crescente, facta est permixtio, et iniquitate participata quaedam utriusque confusio civitatis. Quod malum a sexu femineo causam rursus invenit: non quidem illo modo quo ab initio; non enim cujusquam etiam tunc fallacia seductae illae feminae persuaserunt peccatum viris: sed ab initio quae pravis moribus fuerant in terrena civitate, id est in terrigenarum societate, amatae sunt a filiis Dei, civibus scilicet peregrinantis in hoc saeculo alterius civitatis, propter pulchritudinem corporis (Gen. VI, 1 sqq.). Quod bonum Dei quidem donum est: sed propterea id largitur etiam malis, ne magnum bonum videatur bonis. Deserto itaque magno bono et bonorum proprio, lapsus est factus ad bonum minimum, non bonis proprium, sed bonis malisque commune: ac sic filii Dei filiarum hominum amore sunt capti, atque ut eis conjugibus fruerentur, in mores societatis terrigenae defluxerunt, deserta pietate quam in sancta societate servabant. Sic enim corporis pulchritudo, a Deo quidem factum, sed temporale, carnale, infimum bonum, male amatur postposito Deo, aeterno, interno, sempiterno bono: quemadmodum justitia deserta et aurum amatur ab avaris, nullo peccato auri, sed hominis. Ita se habet omnis creatura. Cum enim bona sit, et bene potest amari, et male: bene, scilicet ordine custodito; male, ordine perturbato. Quod in laude quadam Cerei breviter versibus dixi : Haec tua sunt, bona sunt, quia tu bonus ista creasti. Nil nostrum est in eis, nisi quod peccamus amantes, Ordine neglecto, pro te, quod conditur abs te. Creator autem si veraciter ametur, hoc est, si ipse, non aliud pro illo quod non est ipse, ametur, male amari non potest. Nam et amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene amatur quod amandum est, ut sit in nobis virtus qua vivitur bene. Unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis, Ordo est amoris: propter quod in sancto Cantico canticorum cantat sponsa Christi, civitas Dei, Ordinate in me charitatem (Cantic. II, 4). Hujus igitur charitatis, hoc est, dilectionis et amoris ordine perturbato, Deum filii Dei neglexerunt, et filias hominum dilexerunt. Quibus duobus nominibus satis civitas utraque discernitur. Neque enim et illi non erant filii hominum per naturam: sed aliud nomen coeperant habere per gratiam. Nam in eadem Scriptura, ubi dicti sunt dilexisse filias hominum filii Dei, iidem dicti sunt etiam angeli Dei. Unde illi multi putant non homines fuisse, sed angelos.

As this human race progressed and grew by this free will of the choice, a mixing was made, and by participated iniquity a certain confusion of both cities. Which evil again found its cause from the female sex: not indeed in that way as from the beginning; for not then also, seduced by anyone's deceit, did those women persuade the men to sin: but those who from the beginning had been of perverse morals in the earthly city, that is, in the society of the earth-born, were loved by the sons of God, citizens namely of that other city which is a pilgrim in this world, because of the beauty of the body (Gen. VI, 1 ff.). Which good is indeed a gift of God: but for this reason he bestows it even on the evil, lest it should seem a great good to the good. A great good, therefore, and one proper to the good having been deserted, a fall was made to a minimal good, not proper to the good, but common to the good and the evil: and thus the sons of God were captured by the love of the daughters of men, and that they might enjoy them as wives, they flowed down into the morals of the earth-born society, having deserted the piety which they were keeping in the holy society. For thus the beauty of the body, a thing made by God indeed, but a temporal, carnal, lowest good, is evilly loved after God, the eternal, internal, everlasting good, has been postponed: just as, justice having been deserted, gold is also loved by the avaricious, by no sin of the gold, but of the man. So it is with every creature. For since it is good, it can be loved both well and evilly: well, namely with the order being guarded; evilly, with the order being disturbed. Which I have said briefly in some verses in praise of the Wax Taper: "These things are thine, they are good, because thou, good, hast created these. Nothing of ours is in them, except that we sin in loving, with the order neglected, instead of thee, what is founded by thee." But if the Creator be truly loved, that is, if he himself, and not another thing instead of him which is not himself, be loved, he cannot be evilly loved. For even love itself is to be loved ordinately, by which that is well loved which is to be loved, so that there may be in us the virtue by which one lives well. Whence it seems to me that a brief and true definition of virtue is the Order of Love: because of which in the holy Song of Songs the bride of Christ, the city of God, sings, "Order charity in me" (Cant. II, 4). The order, therefore, of this charity, that is, of dilection and love, having been disturbed, the sons of God neglected God, and loved the daughters of men. By which two names both cities are sufficiently discerned. For not even those were not sons of men by nature: but they had begun to have another name through grace. For in the same Scripture where the sons of God were said to have loved the daughters of men, the same ones were also called the angels of God. Whence many think that they were not men, but angels.

Caput XXIII.

An credendum sit angelos substantiae spiritualis, amore speciosarum mulierum captos, earumdem iniisse conjugia, ex quibus gigantes sint creati.

1. Quam quaestionem nos transeunter commemoratam in tertio hujus operis libro (cap. 5) reliquimus insolutam, Utrum possint angeli, cum spiritus sint, corporaliter coire cum feminis. Scriptum est enim, Qui facit angelos suos spiritus: id est, eos qui natura spiritus sunt, facit esse angelos suos, injungendo eis officium nuntiandi. Qui enim graece dicitur ἄγγελος, quod nomen latina declinatione angelus perhibetur, latina lingua nuntius interpretatur. Sed utrum eorum corpora consequenter adjunxerit, dicendo, Et ministros suos ignem ardentem (Psal. CIII, 5): an quod charitate tanquam igne spirituali fervere debeant ministri ejus, ambiguum est. Apparuisse tamen hominibus angelos in talibus corporibus, ut non solum videri, verum etiam tangi possent, eadem verissima Scriptura testatur. Et quoniam creberrima fama est, multique se expertos, vel ab eis qui experti essent, de quorum fide dubitandum non est, audisse confirmant, Silvanos, et Faunos, quos vulgo incubos vocant, improbos saepe exstitisse mulieribus, et earum appetisse ac peregisse concubitum ; et quosdam daemones, quos Dusios Galli nuncupant, hanc assidue immunditiam et tentare et efficere, plures talesque asseverant, ut hoc negare impudentiae videatur: non hinc aliquid audeo definire, utrum aliqui spiritus elemento aerio corporati (nam hoc elementum etiam cum agitatur flabello, sensu corporis tactuque sentitur), possint etiam hanc pati libidinem, ut quomodo possunt, sentientibus feminis misceantur. Dei tamen Angelos sanctos nullo modo illo tempore sic labi potuisse crediderim: nec de his dixisse apostolum Petrum, Si enim Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercit, sed carceribus caliginis inferi retrudens tradidit in judicio puniendos reservari (II Petr. II, 4); sed potius de illis qui primum apostatantes a Deo cum diabolo principe suo ceciderunt, qui primum hominem per invidiam serpentina fraude dejecit. Angelos autem fuisse etiam Dei homines nuncupatos, eadem Scriptura sancta locupletissima testis est . Nam et de Joanne scriptum est, Ecce mitto angelum meum ante faciem tuam, qui praeparabit viam tuam (Marc. I, 2). Et Malachias propheta propria quadam, id est sibi proprie impertita, gratia dictus est angelus (Malach. II, 7).

Chapter XXIII.

Whether it is to be believed that angels of a spiritual substance, captured by the love of beautiful women, entered into marriages with them, from which giants were created.

1. Which question we left unsolved, after having mentioned it in passing in the third book of this work (chap. 5), whether angels, since they are spirits, can corporally cohabit with women. For it is written, "Who maketh his angels spirits" (Psalm CIII, 5): that is, those who are spirits by nature, he makes to be his angels, by enjoining upon them the office of announcing. For he who in Greek is called ἄγγελος, which name is presented in Latin declension as *angelus*, is interpreted in the Latin language as *nuntius* (messenger). But whether he consequently added their bodies, by saying, "And his ministers a burning fire": or because his ministers ought to burn with charity as with a spiritual fire, is ambiguous. That angels, however, have appeared to men in such bodies that they could not only be seen, but even touched, the same most true Scripture testifies. And since it is a most frequent report, and many confirm that they have experienced it, or have heard it from those who had experienced it, of whose faith there is no doubt, that Silvans and Fauns, whom the common people call incubi, have often existed as wicked to women, and have sought and completed cohabitation with them; and that certain demons, whom the Gauls call Dusii, assiduously both attempt and effect this uncleanness, so many and such persons assert it, that to deny this seems a matter of impudence: I do not dare to define anything from here, whether some spirits embodied in an aerial element (for this element even when it is moved by a fan, is felt by the sense of the body and by touch), can also suffer this lust, so that in whatever way they can, they may be mixed with perceiving women. I should, however, by no means believe that the holy Angels of God could have fallen in that way at that time: nor that the apostle Peter said of these, "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivering them to the prisons of the darkness of hell, delivered them to be reserved to be punished in the judgment" (II Peter II, 4); but rather of those who first apostatizing from God fell with their prince the devil, who first cast down the first man through envy by a serpentine fraud. But that men were also called angels of God, the same holy Scripture is a most wealthy witness. For it is written also of John, "Behold, I send my angel before thy face, who shall prepare thy way" (Mark I, 2). And the prophet Malachi, by a certain grace, that is, one properly imparted to him, was called an angel (Malach. II, 7).

2. Verum hoc movet quosdam, quod ex illis qui dicti sunt angeli Dei, et ex mulieribus quas amaverunt, non quasi homines generis nostri, sed gigantes legimus esse natos. Quasi vero corpora hominum modum nostrum longe excedentia, quod etiam supra commemoravi (cap. 9), non etiam nostris temporibus nata sunt. Nonne ante paucos annos, cum Romanae urbis, quod a Gothis factum est, appropinquaret excidium, Romae fuit femina cum suo patre et sua matre, quae corpore quodammodo giganteo longe caeteris praeemineret? Ad quam visendam mirabilis fiebat usquequaque concursus. Et hoc erat maxime admirationi, quod ambo parentes ejus nec saltem tam longi homines erant, quam longissimos videre consuevimus. Potuerunt ergo gigantes nasci et prius quam filii Dei, qui et angeli Dei dicti sunt, filiabus hominum, hoc est secundum hominem viventium, miscerentur; filii scilicet Seth filiabus Cain. Nam et canonica Scriptura sic loquitur, in quo libro haec legimus, cujus verba ista sunt: Et factum est, postquam coeperunt homines multi fieri super terram, et filiae natae sunt illis: videntes autem angeli Dei filias hominum, quia bonae sunt, sumpserunt sibi uxores ex omnibus quas elegerant. Et dixit Dominus Deus: Non permanebit spiritus meus in hominibus his in aeternum, propter quod caro sunt. Erunt autem dies eorum centum viginti anni. Gigantes autem erant super terram in diebus illis: et post illud cum intrarent filii Dei ad filias hominum, et generabant sibi, illi erant gigantes, a saeculo homines nominati (Gen. VI, 1-4). Haec libri verba divini satis indicant, jam illis diebus fuisse gigantes super terram, quando filii Dei acceperunt uxores filias hominum, cum eas amarent bonas, id est pulchras. Consuetudo quippe Scripturae hujus est, etiam speciosos corpore, bonos vocare. Sed et postquam hoc factum est, nati sunt gigantes. Sic enim ait: Gigantes autem erant super terram in diebus illis: et post illud, cum intrarent filii Dei ad filias hominum. Ergo et ante in illis diebus, et post illud. Quod autem ait, Et generabant sibi, satis ostendit quod prius, antequam sic caderent filii Dei, Deo generabant, non sibi, id est, non dominante libidine coeundi, sed serviente officio propagandi; non familiam fastus sui, sed cives civitatis Dei: quibus annuntiarent tanquam angeli Dei, ut ponerent in Deo spem suam (Psal. LXXVII, 7), similes illius qui natus est de Seth, filius resurrectionis, et speravit invocare nomen Domini Dei: in qua spe essent cum suis posteris cohaeredes aeternorum bonorum, et sub Deo patre fratres filiorum.

2. But this moves some, that from those who were called angels of God, and from the women whom they loved, we read that not as it were men of our kind, but giants were born. As if indeed bodies of men far exceeding our measure, which I also mentioned above (chap. 9), were not also born in our times. Was there not a few years ago, when the destruction of the Roman city, which was done by the Goths, was approaching, a woman in Rome with her father and her mother, who by a certain giant body far excelled the others? To see whom a marvelous concourse was made everywhere. And this was especially for admiration, that both her parents were not even so tall men as the tallest we have been accustomed to see. Giants could, therefore, have been born even before the sons of God, who were also called angels of God, were mixed with the daughters of men, that is, those living according to man; namely the sons of Seth with the daughters of Cain. For also the canonical Scripture speaks thus, in which book we read these things, whose words are these: "And it came to pass, after men began to be multiplied upon the earth, and daughters were born to them: that the angels of God seeing the daughters of men, that they were good, took to themselves wives of all which they had chosen. And the Lord God said: My spirit shall not remain in these men for ever, because they are flesh. Their days shall be a hundred and twenty years. But there were giants upon the earth in those days: and after that when the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth to themselves, these were giants, men named from the world" (Gen. VI, 1-4). These words of the divine book sufficiently indicate that already in those days there were giants upon the earth, when the sons of God took as wives the daughters of men, since they loved them as good, that is, beautiful. For it is the custom of this Scripture to call even those handsome in body, good. But also after this was done, giants were born. For thus it says: "But there were giants upon the earth in those days: and after that, when the sons of God went in to the daughters of men." Therefore both before in those days, and after that. But what it says, "And they brought forth to themselves," sufficiently shows that before, before the sons of God thus fell, they were bringing forth to God, not to themselves, that is, not with the lust of cohabiting dominating, but with the office of propagating serving; not a family of their own pride, but citizens of the city of God: to whom they should announce as angels of God, that they should put their hope in God (Psalm LXXVII, 7), similar to him who was born of Seth, the son of resurrection, and hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God: in which hope they should be with their descendants co-heirs of eternal goods, and under God the father brothers of the sons.

3. Non autem illos ita fuisse angelos Dei, ut homines non essent, sicut quidam putant, sed homines procul dubio fuisse, Scriptura ipsa sine ulla ambiguitate declarat. Cum enim praemissum esset, quod videntes angeli Dei filias hominum, quia bonae sunt, sumpserunt sibi uxores ex omnibus quas elegerant; mox adjunctum est, Et dixit Dominus Deus: Non permanebit spiritus meus in hominibus his in aeternum, propter quod caro sunt. Spiritu quippe Dei fuerant facti angeli Dei et filii Dei: sed declinando ad inferiora, homines dicuntur nomine naturae, non gratiae; dicuntur et caro, desertores spiritus et deserendo deserti. Et Septuaginta quidem interpretes et angelos Dei dixerunt istos, et filios Dei: quod quidem non omnes codices habent; nam quidam nisi filios Dei non habent. Aquila autem, quem interpretem Judaei caeteris anteponunt, non angelos Dei, nec filios Dei, sed filios deorum interpretatus est . Utrumque autem verum est. Nam et filii Dei erant, sub quo patre suorum patrum etiam fratres erant; et filii deorum, quoniam a diis geniti erant, cum quibus et ipsi dii erant, juxta illud Psalmi: Ego dixi, Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes (Psal. LXXXI, 6). Merito enim creduntur Septuaginta interpretes accepisse propheticum spiritum, ut si quid ejus auctoritate mutarent, atque aliter quam erat quod interpretabantur dicerent, neque hoc divinitus esse dictum dubitaretur. Quamvis hoc in hebraeo esse perhibeatur ambiguum, ut et filii Dei, et filii deorum, posset interpretari.

4. Omittamus igitur earum scripturarum fabulas, quae apocryphae nuncupantur, eo quod earum occulta origo non claruit patribus, a quibus usque ad nos auctoritas veracium Scripturarum certissima et notissima successione pervenit. In his autem apocryphis etsi invenitur aliqua veritas, tamen propter multa falsa nulla est canonica auctoritas. Scripsisse quidem nonnulla divina Enoch, illum septimum ab Adam, negare non possumus, cum hoc in Epistola canonica Judas apostolus dicat (Judae 14). Sed non frustra non sunt in eo canone Scripturarum, qui servabatur in templo Hebraei populi succedentium diligentia sacerdotum, nisi quia ob antiquitatem suspectae fidei judicata sunt, nec utrum haec essent quae ille scripsisset , poterat inveniri, non talibus proferentibus, qui ea per seriem successionis reperirentur rite servasse. Unde illa quae sub ejus nomine proferuntur, et continent istas de gigantibus fabulas, quod non habuerint homines patres, recte a prudentibus judicantur non ipsius esse credenda; sicut multa sub nominibus et aliorum Prophetarum, et recentiora sub nominibus Apostolorum ab haereticis proferuntur, quae omnia nomine apocryphorum ab auctoritate canonica diligenti examinatione remota sunt.

3. But that those were so the angels of God that they were not men, as some think, the Scripture itself declares without any ambiguity. For when it had been sent ahead, that "the angels of God seeing the daughters of men, that they were good, took to themselves wives of all which they had chosen"; it was soon added, "And the Lord God said: My spirit shall not remain in these men for ever, because they are flesh." For by the spirit of God they had been made angels of God and sons of God: but by declining to inferior things, they are called men by the name of nature, not of grace; they are called also flesh, deserters of the spirit and deserted by deserting. And the Seventy interpreters indeed called these both angels of God and sons of God: which indeed not all codices have; for some have nothing but sons of God. But Aquila, whom the Jews prefer to the other interpreters, interpreted not as angels of God, nor as sons of God, but as the sons of gods. But each is true. For they were both sons of God, under which father they were also brothers of their own fathers; and sons of gods, because they had been begotten by gods, with whom they themselves also were gods, according to that of the Psalm: "I have said, Ye are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High" (Psalm LXXXI, 6). For the Seventy interpreters are deservedly believed to have received the prophetic spirit, so that if they changed anything by his authority, and said it otherwise than it was which they were interpreting, it would not be doubted that this had been divinely said. Although this is reported to be ambiguous in the Hebrew, so that it could be interpreted both as sons of God and as sons of gods.

4. Let us, therefore, omit the fables of those scriptures which are called apocryphal, for the reason that their occult origin did not become clear to the fathers, from whom the authority of the true Scriptures has come down to us by a most certain and most known succession. In these apocryphal works, although some truth is found, yet because of many false things there is no canonical authority. That Enoch, that seventh from Adam, wrote some divine things, we cannot deny, since the apostle Jude says this in his canonical Epistle (Jude 14). But it is not in vain that they are not in that canon of Scriptures which was kept in the temple of the Hebrew people by the diligence of successive priests, except because they were judged of suspected faith on account of their antiquity, nor could it be found whether these were the things which he had written, with such persons not bringing them forward who were found to have kept them rightly through a series of succession. Whence those things which are brought forward under his name, and contain those fables about giants, that they did not have men as fathers, are rightly judged by the prudent not to be believed as his; just as many things under the names of other Prophets, and more recent things under the names of Apostles are brought forward by heretics, all of which have been removed from canonical authority by diligent examination under the name of apocrypha.

Igitur secundum Scripturas canonicas hebraeas atque christianas, multos gigantes ante diluvium fuisse, non dubium est, et hos fuisse cives terrigenae societatis hominum; Dei autem filios, qui secundum carnem de Seth propagati sunt, in hanc societatem deserta justitia declinasse. Nec mirandum est, quod etiam de ipsis gigantes nasci potuerunt. Neque enim omnes gigantes, sed magis multi utique tunc fuerunt, quam post diluvium temporibus caeteris. Quos propterea creare placuit Creatori, ut etiam hinc ostenderetur non solum pulchritudines, verum etiam et magnitudines et fortitudines corporum non magnipendendas esse sapienti, qui spiritualibus atque immortalibus longe melioribus atque firmioribus et bonorum propriis, non bonorum malorumque communibus beatificatur bonis. Quam rem alius propheta commendans ait: Ibi fuerunt gigantes illi nominati, qui ab initio fuerunt staturosi, scientes praelium. Non hos elegit Dominus, nec viam scientiae dedit illis: et interierunt, quia non habuerunt sapientiam, perierunt propter inconsiderantiam (Baruch III, 26-28).

Caput XXIV.

Quomodo intelligendum sit, quod de eis qui diluvio perdendi erant, Dominus dixit, Erunt dies eorum centum viginti anni.

Quod autem dixit Deus, Erunt dies eorum centum viginti anni (Gen. VI, 3), non sic accipiendum est, quasi praenuntiatum sit, post haec homines centum viginti annos vivendo non transgredi, cum et post diluvium etiam quingentos excessisse inveniamus. Sed intelligendum est hoc Deum dixisse, cum circa finem quingentorum annorum esset Noe, id est, quadringentos octoginta vitae annos ageret, quos more suo Scriptura quingentos vocat, nomine totius maximam partem plerumque significans: sexcentesimo quippe anno vitae Noe, secundo mense factum est diluvium (Id. VII, 11); ac sic centum viginti anni praedicti sunt futuri vitae hominum periturorum, quibus transactis diluvio delerentur. Nec frustra creditur sic factum esse diluvium, jam non inventis in terra qui non erant digni tali morte defungi, qua in impios vindicatum est: non quo hic quidquam bonis quandoque morituris tale genus mortis faciat aliquid quod eis possit obesse post mortem. Verumtamen nullus eorum diluvio mortuus est, quos de semine Seth propagatos sancta Scriptura commemorat.

Therefore, according to the canonical Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, it is not doubtful that many giants were before the flood, and that these were citizens of the earth-born society of men; but that the sons of God, who were propagated according to the flesh from Seth, declined into this society after deserting justice. Nor is it to be wondered at that giants could be born even of them. For not all were giants, but more were certainly many then than in the other times after the flood. Whom it pleased the Creator to create for this reason, that also from here it might be shown that not only beauties, but even also magnitudes and strengths of bodies are not to be highly valued by the wise man, who is beatified by spiritual and immortal goods, far better and firmer and proper to the good, not common to the good and the evil. Which thing another prophet commending says: "There were those named giants, who from the beginning were of great stature, knowing war. These the Lord did not choose, nor did he give them the way of science: and they perished, because they had not wisdom, they perished because of inconsiderateness" (Baruch III, 26-28).

Chapter XXIV.

How it is to be understood, that concerning those who were to be destroyed by the flood, the Lord said: "Their days shall be a hundred and twenty years."

But what God said, "Their days shall be a hundred and twenty years" (Gen. VI, 3), is not so to be taken as if it were foretold that after these things men would not exceed a hundred and twenty years in living, since even after the flood we find some to have exceeded five hundred. But it is to be understood that God said this when Noah was around the end of five hundred years, that is, when he was spending four hundred and eighty years of life, which according to its custom the Scripture calls five hundred, mostly signifying the greatest part by the name of the whole: for indeed in the six hundredth year of the life of Noah, in the second month, the flood occurred (Id. VII, 11); and thus a hundred and twenty years were predicted as future for the life of the men who were to perish, which having passed, they would be destroyed by the flood. Nor is it believed in vain that the flood happened thus, when those were no longer found on the earth who were not worthy to die by such a death, by which vengeance was taken upon the impious: not that here anything of such a kind of death does to the good who are some time to die, anything which can be against them after death. Nevertheless, none of those died in the flood whom holy Scripture records as having been propagated from the seed of Seth.

Sic autem divinitus diluvii causa narratur: Videns, inquit, Dominus Deus, quia multiplicatae sunt malitiae hominum super terram, et omnis quisque cogitat in corde suo diligenter super maligna omnes dies: et cogitavit Deus quia fecit hominem super terram, et recogitavit, et dixit Deus, Delebo hominem quem feci a facie terrae, ab homine usque ad pecus, et a reptilibus usque ad volatilia coeli, quia iratus sum, quoniam feci eos (Id. VI, 5-7).

Caput XXV.

De ira Dei, quae incommutabilem tranquillitatem nulla inflammatione perturbat.

Ira Dei non perturbatio animi ejus est, sed judicium quo irrogatur poena peccato. Cogitatio vero ejus et recogitatio, mutandarum rerum est immutabilis ratio. Neque enim sicut hominem, ita Deum cujusquam facti sui poenitet, cujus est de omnibus omnino rebus tam fixa sententia, quam certa praescientia. Sed si non utatur Scriptura talibus verbis, non se quodammodo familiarius insinuabit omni generi hominum, quibus vult esse consultum, ut et perterreat superbientes, et excitet negligentes, et exerceat quaerentes, et alat intelligentes: quod non faceret, si non se prius inclinaret, et quodammodo descenderet ad jacentes. Quod autem etiam interitum omnium animalium terrenorum volatiliumque denuntiat, magnitudinem futurae cladis effatur; non animantibus rationis expertibus, tanquam et ipsa peccaverint, minatur exitium.

Caput XXVI.

Quod arca quam Noe jussus est facere, in omnibus Christum Ecclesiamque significet

Jam vero quod Noe homini justo, et sicut de illo Scriptura veridica loquitur, in sua generatione perfecto (Gen. VI, 9) (non utique sicut perficiendi sunt cives civitatis Dei in illa immortalitate, qua aequabuntur Angelis Dei, sed sicut esse possunt in hac peregrinatione perfecti), imperat Deus, ut arcam faciat, in qua cum suis, id est, uxore, filiis, et nuribus, et cum animalibus, quae ad illum ex Dei praecepto in arcam ingressa sunt, liberaretur a diluvii vastitate; procul dubio figura est peregrinantis in hoc saeculo civitatis Dei, hoc est Ecclesiae, quae fit salva per lignum, in quo pependit Mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus (I Tim. II, 5). Nam et mensurae ipsae longitudinis, altitudinis, latitudinisque ejus, significant corpus humanum, in cujus veritate ad homines praenuntiatus est venturus, et venit.

But the cause of the flood is thus narrated divinely: "The Lord God seeing," it says, "that the wickednesses of men were multiplied upon the earth, and every one thinks in his heart diligently upon evil things all days: and God thought that he had made man upon the earth, and he thought again, and God said: I will destroy man whom I have made from the face of the earth, from man even to beast, and from reptiles even to the fowls of the air, for I am angry that I have made them" (Id. VI, 5-7).

Chapter XXV.

Of the wrath of God, which perturbs his incommutable tranquility with no inflammation.

The wrath of God is not a perturbation of his mind, but the judgment by which punishment is imposed upon sin. But his thought and re-thought is the immutable reason for changing things. For not as a man, so does God repent of any deed of his, whose sentence is as fixed as his prescience is certain about all things whatsoever. But if the Scripture were not to use such words, it would not in a certain more familiar way hint itself to every kind of men, whom it wishes to be consulted, so that it may both terrify the proud, and excite the negligent, and exercise those seeking, and nourish those understanding: which it would not do, if it did not first incline itself, and in a certain way descend to those lying down. But because it also denounces the destruction of all terrestrial and volatile animals, it speaks of the magnitude of the future slaughter; it does not threaten exit to animals expert in no reason, as if they themselves also had sinned.

Chapter XXVI.

That the ark which Noah was commanded to make, signifies Christ and the Church in all things

Now indeed, that to Noah, a just man, and as the truthful Scripture speaks of him, perfect in his generation (Gen. VI, 9) (not certainly as the citizens of the city of God are to be perfected in that immortality, by which they will be equal to the Angels of God, but as they can be perfect in this pilgrimage), God commands that he make an ark, in which with his own, that is, wife, sons, and daughters-in-law, and with the animals, which by God's precept entered into the ark to him, he might be liberated from the vastness of the flood; without doubt it is a figure of the city of God pilgrimaging in this world, that is the Church, which is made safe through the wood, on which hung the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus (I Tim. II, 5). For also those very measures of its length, height, and width, signify the human body, in whose truth he was foretold to come to men, and came.

Humani quippe corporis longitudo a vertice usque ad vestigia sexies tantum habet, quam latitudo, quae est ab uno latere ad alterum latus; et decies tantum, quam altitudo, cujus altitudinis mensura est in latere a dorso ad ventrem: velut si jacentem hominem metiaris supinum, seu pronum, sexies tantum longus est a capite ad pedes, quam latus a dextra ad sinistram, vel a sinistra in dexteram; et decies, quam altus a terra. Unde facta est arca trecentorum in longitudine cubitorum, et quinquaginta in latitudine, et triginta in altitudine. Et quod ostium in latere accepit, profecto illud est vulnus, quando latus crucifixi lancea perforatum est (Joan. XIX, 34): hac quippe ad illum venientes ingrediuntur; quia inde Sacramenta manarunt, quibus credentes initiantur. Et quod de lignis quadratis fieri jubetur, undique stabilem vitam sanctorum significat: quacumque enim verteris quadratum, stabit. Et caetera quae in ejusdem arcae constructione dicuntur, ecclesiasticarum signa sunt rerum.

Sed ea nunc persequi longum est: et hoc jam fecimus in opere quod adversus Faustum Manichaeum scripsimus (lib. 12, cap. 14), negantem in libris Hebraeorum aliquid de Christo esse prophetatum. Et fieri quidem potest, ut et nobis quispiam, et alius alio exponat haec aptius: dum tamen ea quae dicuntur, ad hanc de qua loquimur Dei civitatem, in hoc saeculo maligno tanquam in diluvio peregrinantem, omnia referantur; si ab ejus sensu qui ista conscrisit, non vult longe aberrare qui exponit. Exempli gratia, velut si quispiam quod hic scriptum est, Inferiora bicamerata et tricamerata facies eam (Gen. VI, 16); non quod ego in illo opere dixi (lib. 4, cap. 16), velit intelligi; quia ex omnibus gentibus Ecclesia congregatur, bicameratam dictam, propter duo genera hominum, circumcisionem scilicet et praeputium, quos Apostolus et alio modo dicit Judaeos et Graecos (Rom. III, 9); tricameratam vero, eo quod omnes gentes de tribus filiis Noe post diluvium reparatae sunt: sed aliud dicat aliquid, quod a fidei regula non sit alienum. Nam quoniam non solas in inferioribus mansiones habere arcam voluit, verum etiam in superioribus, et haec dixit bicamerata; et in superioribus superiorum, et haec appellavit tricamerata: ut ab imo sursum versus tertia consurgeret habitatio. Possunt hic intelligi et illa tria quae commendat Apostolus, fides, spes, charitas (I Cor. XIII, 13).

For the length of the human body from the crown even to the footsteps has six times as much as the width, which is from one side to the other side; and ten times as much as the height, of which height the measure is in the side from the back to the belly: as if you were to measure a man lying supine, or prone, he is six times as long from the head to the feet, as he is wide from the right to the left, or from the left to the right; and ten times, as he is high from the ground. Whence the ark was made of three hundred cubits in length, and fifty in width, and thirty in height. And that it received a door in the side, surely that is the wound, when the side of the crucified was perforated by a lance (John XIX, 34): by this indeed those coming to him enter; because from there the Sacraments flowed, by which believers are initiated. And that it is commanded to be made of squared timbers, signifies the stable life of the saints on every side: for whichever way you turn a square, it will stand. And the other things which are said in the construction of the same ark, are signs of ecclesiastical things.

But to pursue those things now is long: and this we have already done in the work which we wrote against Faustus the Manichaean (book 12, cap. 14), who denied that anything was prophesied about Christ in the books of the Hebrews. And it can indeed happen, that both to us someone, and another more aptly than another may explain these things: provided however that those things which are said, be all referred to this city of God of which we speak, pilgrimaging in this malignant world as if in a flood; if he who explains does not wish to wander far from his sense who composed these things. For example, as if someone should wish that which is written here, "Lower rooms of two stories and three stories you shall make it" (Gen. VI, 16), to be understood not as I said in that work (book 4, cap. 16); because from all nations the Church is gathered, called two-storied, because of two kinds of men, namely the circumcision and the uncircumcision, whom the Apostle also in another way calls Jews and Greeks (Rom. III, 9); but three-storied, for that reason that all nations were repaired from the three sons of Noah after the flood: but should say something else, which is not alien to the rule of faith. For since he wished the ark to have mansions not only in the lower parts, but also in the higher, and called these two-storied; and in the higher of the higher, and called these three-storied: so that from the bottom upwards the third habitation should rise. Here those three things which the Apostle commends, faith, hope, charity (I Cor. XIII, 13), can be understood.

Possunt etiam multo convenientius tres illae ubertates evangelicae, tricena, sexagena, centena (Matth. XIII, 8); ut in infimo habitet pudicitia conjugalis, supra vidualis, atque hac superior virginalis: et si quid melius secundum fidem civitatis hujus intelligi et dici potest. Hoc etiam de caeteris quae hic exponenda sunt, dixerim, quia etsi non uno disseruntur modo, ad unam tamen catholicae fidei concordiam revocanda sunt.

CAPUT XXVII.---De arca atque diluvio, nec illis esse consentiendum, qui solam historiam recipiunt sine allegorica significatione; nec illis qui solas figuras defendunt repudiata historica veritate.

Non tamen quisquam putare debet, aut frustra haec esse conscripta, aut tantummodo rerum gestarum veritatem sine ullis allegoricis significationibus hic esse quaerendam; aut e contrario haec omnino gesta non esse, sed solas esse verborum figuras; aut quidquid illud est, nequaquam ad prophetiam Ecclesiae pertinere. Quis enim nisi mente perversus, inaniter scriptos esse contendat libros per annorum millia tanta religione et tam ordinatae successionis observantia custoditos; aut solas res gestas illic intuendas, ubi certe, ut alia omittam, si numerositas animalium cogebat arcae tantam fieri magnitudinem, immunda bina et munda septena intromitti animalia (Gen. VII, 2) quid cogebat, cum aequalis numeri possent utraque servari ? Aut vero Deus, qui propter reparandum genus servanda praecepit, eo modo illa quo instituerat, restituere non valebat?

Qui vero non esse gesta, sed solas rerum significandarum figuras esse contendunt, primum opinantur tam magnum fieri non potuisse diluvium, ut altissimos montes quindecim cubitis aqua crescendo transcenderet; propter Olympi verticem montis, supra quem perhibentur nubes non posse concrescere , quod tam sublimis quam coelum sit, ut non ibi sit aer iste crassior, ubi venti, nebulae imbresque gignuntur : nec attendunt omnium elementorum crassissimam terram ibi esse potuisse. An forte negant esse terram verticem montis? Cur igitur usque ad illa coeli spatia terris exaltari licuisse, et aquis exaltari non licuisse contendunt, cum isti mensores et pensores elementorum, aquas terris perhibeant superiores atque leviores? Quid itaque rationis afferunt, quare terra gravior et inferior locum coeli tranquillioris invaserit per volumina tot annorum, et aqua levior ac superior permissa non sit hoc facere saltem ad tempus exiguum?

Also those three evangelical fruitfulnesses, thirtyfold, sixtyfold, an hundredfold (Matth. XIII, 8), can much more conveniently be understood; so that in the lowest part conjugal chastity may dwell, above it vidual, and higher than this virginal: and if anything better according to the faith of this city can be understood and said. This also I would say about the other things which are to be explained here, because even if they are discussed in more than one way, they are yet to be recalled to the one concord of the catholic faith.

CHAPTER XXVII.---Of the ark and the flood, that neither are those to be consented to who receive only the history without allegorical signification; nor those who defend only the figures having repudiated the historical truth.

Yet no one ought to think, either that these things were written in vain, or that only the truth of the things done without any allegorical significations is to be sought here; or on the contrary that these things were not done at all, but are only figures of words; or whatever that is, that it pertains in no way to the prophecy of the Church. For who, unless perverse in mind, would contend that books written in vain were guarded through so many thousands of years with so much religion and with the observance of so ordered a succession; or that only the things done are to be looked at there, where certainly, to omit other things, if the multiplicity of animals compelled so great a magnitude of the ark to be made, what compelled that unclean animals be let in by twos and clean ones by sevens (Gen. VII, 2), when both could be preserved by an equal number? Or indeed was God, who commanded them to be preserved for the sake of repairing the race, not able to restore them in that way in which he had instituted them?

But those who contend that these were not things done, but are only figures of things to be signified, first think that so great a flood could not have happened, that the water by growing should transcend the highest mountains by fifteen cubits; because of the vertex of Mount Olympus, above which it is perhibited that clouds cannot congeal, because it is as sublime as heaven, so that there is not there that thicker air, where winds, mists, and rains are produced: nor do they attend that the earth, the thickest of all elements, could be there. Or do they perhaps deny that the vertex of the mountain is earth? Why therefore do they contend that it was permitted for the lands to be exalted even to those spaces of heaven, and not permitted for the waters to be exalted, when these measurers and weighers of elements assert that waters are higher and lighter than lands? What reason therefore do they bring, why the heavier and lower earth invaded the place of the more tranquil heaven through the volumes of so many years, and the lighter and higher water was not permitted to do this at least for a small time?

Dicunt etiam non potuisse capere arcae illius quantitatem animalium genera tam multa in utroque sexu, bina de immundis, septena de mundis. Qui mihi videntur non computare nisi trecenta cubita longitudinis, et latitudinis quinquaginta , nec cogitare aliud tantum esse in superioribus, itemque aliud tantum in superioribus superiorum, ac per hoc ter ducta illa cubita fieri nongenta centum quinquaginta. Si autem cogitemus quod Origenes non ineleganter astruxit (Homilia 2 in Genesim), Moysen scilicet hominem Dei eruditum, sicut scriptum est, omni sapientia Aegyptiorum (Act. VII, 22), qui geometricam dilexerunt, geometrica cubita significare potuisse, ubi unum quantum sex nostra valere asseverant; quis non videat quantum rerum capere potuit illa magnitudo? Nam illud quod disputant tantae magnitudinis arcam non potuisse compingi, ineptissime calumniantur, cum sciant immensas urbes fuisse constructas, nec attendunt centum annos quibus arca illa est fabricata: nisi forte lapis lapidi adhaerere potest sola ealce conjunctus, ut murus per tot millia circumagatur, et lignum ligno per subscudines, epiros , clavos, gluten bituminis non potest adhaerere, ut fabricetur arca, non curvis, sed rectis lineis longe lateque porrecta, quam nullus in mare mittat conatus hominum, sed levet unda, cum venerit, naturali ordine ponderum, magisque divina providentia, quam humana prudentia natantem gubernet, ne incurrat ubicumque naufragium.

Quod autem scrupulosissime quaeri solet de minutissimis bestiolis, non solum quales sunt mures et stelliones, verum etiam quales locustae, scarabaei, muscae denique et pulices, utrum non amplioris numeri in arca illa fuerint, quam qui est definitus, cum hoc imperaret Deus: prius admonendi sunt quos haec movent, sic accipiendum esse quod dictum est, Quae repunt super terram; ut necesse non fuerit conservari in arca, quae possunt in aquis vivere, non solum mersa, sicut pisces; verum etiam supernatantia, sicut multae alites. Deinde cum dicitur, Masculus et femina erunt: profecto intelligitur ad reparandum genus dici: ac per hoc nec illa necesse fuerat ibi esse, quae possunt sine concubitu de quibusque rebus vel rerum corruptionibus nasci: vel si fuerunt, sicut in domibus esse consueverunt, sine ullo numero definito esse potuisse: aut si mysterium sacratissimum quod agebatur, et tantae rei figura etiam in veritate facti aliter non posset impleri, nisi ut omnia ibi certo illo numero essent, quae vivere in aquis natura prohibente non possent, non fuit ista cura illius hominis, vel illorum hominum, sed divina.

They also say that the quantity of so many kinds of animals in both sexes, twos of the unclean, sevens of the clean, could not be contained in that ark. Who seem to me not to compute except three hundred cubits of length, and fifty of width, nor to think that there is just as much in the higher parts, and likewise just as much in the higher of the higher, and through this those cubits taken thrice become nine hundred and one hundred fifty. But if we think what Origen elegantly asserted (Homily 2 on Genesis), namely that Moses, the man of God erudite, as it is written, in all the wisdom of the Egyptians (Acts VII, 22), who loved geometry, could have signified geometrical cubits, where they assert that one is worth as much as six of ours; who would not see how much of things that magnitude could contain? For that which they dispute, that an ark of so great magnitude could not be put together, they most ineptly calumniate, when they know that immense cities have been constructed, nor do they attend to the hundred years in which that ark was fabricated: unless perhaps stone can adhere to stone joined by lime alone, so that a wall may be driven around through so many thousands, and wood cannot adhere to wood through tenons, treenails, nails, and the glue of bitumen, so that an ark may be fabricated, extended far and wide by straight lines, not curved, which no effort of men might send into the sea, but the wave, when it came, might lift by the natural order of weights, and more by divine providence than by human prudence might govern it swimming, lest it run into shipwreck anywhere.

But as for what is usually sought most scrupulously about the smallest little beasts, not only such as are mice and lizards, but also such as locusts, beetles, finally flies and fleas, whether there were not a greater number in that ark than what was defined, when God commanded this: first those whom these things move are to be admonished, that what was said, "Which creep upon the earth," is to be so accepted; so that it was not necessary that those be preserved in the ark which can live in the waters, not only submerged, such as fishes, but also floating, such as many birds. Then when it is said, "They shall be male and female," surely it is understood to be said for the sake of repairing the race: and through this it was not necessary that those be there which can be born without concubinage from whatever things or corruptions of things: or if they were, as they are accustomed to be in houses, they could have been there without any defined number: or if the most sacred mystery which was being acted, and the figure of so great a thing even in the truth of the fact could not otherwise be fulfilled, unless all things were there in that certain number, which could not live in the waters, nature prohibiting, this was not the care of that man, or of those men, but divine.

Non enim ea Noe capta intromittebat, sed venientia et intrantia permittebat. Ad hoc enim valet quod dictum est, Intrabunt ad te (Gen. VI, 19, 20): non scilicet hominis actu, sed Dei nutu: ita sane, ut non illic fuisse credenda sint, quae sexu carent. Praescriptum est enim, atque definitum, Masculus et femina erunt. Alia sunt quippe quae de quibusque rebus sine concubitu ita nascuntur, ut postea concumbant et generent, sicut muscae: alia vero in quibus nihil sit maris, et feminae, sicut apes. Ea porro quae sic habent sexum, ut non habeant fetum, sicut muli et mulae, mirum si ibi fuerunt, ac non potius parentes eorum ibi fuisse suffecerit, equinum videlicet atque asininum genus: et si qua alia sunt, quae commixtione diversi generis genus aliquod gignunt. Sed si et hoc ad mysterium pertinebat, ibi erant. Habet enim et hoc genus masculum et feminam.

Solet etiam movere nonnullos, genera escarum quae illic habere poterant animalia, quae nonnisi carne vesci putantur, utrum praeter numerum ibi fuerint sine transgressione mandati, quae aliorum alendorum necessitas illic coegisset includi: an vero, quod potius est credendum, praeter carnes, aliqua alimenta esse potuerint, quae omnibus convenirent . Novimus enim quam multa animalia, quibus caro cibus est, frugibus pomisque vescantur, et maxime fico atque castaneis. Quid ergo mirum, si vir ille sapiens et justus, etiam divinitus admonitus, quid cuique congrueret, sine carnibus aptam cuique generi alimoniam praeparavit et recondidit? Quid est autem, quo vesci non cogeret fames? aut quid non suave ac salubre facere posset Deus, qui etiam, ut sine cibo viverent, divina facilitate donaret, nisi ut pascerentur etiam hoc implendae figurae tanti mysterii conveniret? Non autem ad praefigurandam Ecclesiam pertinere tam multiplicia rerum signa gestarum, nisi fuerit contentiosus, nemo permittitur opinari. Jam enim gentes ita Ecclesiam repleverunt, mundique et immundi, donec certum veniatur ad finem, ita ejus unitatis quadam compagine continentur, ut ex hoc uno manifestissimo, etiam de caeteris, quae obscurius aliquando dicta sunt, et difficilius agnosci queunt, dubitari fas non sit. Quae cum ita sint, si nec inaniter ista conscripta esse putare quisquam vel durus audebit, nec nihil significare cum gesta sint, nec sola dicta esse significative, non facta, nec aliena esse ab Ecclesia significanda probabiliter dici potest: sed magis credendum est, et sapienter esse memoriae litterisque mandata, et gesta esse, et significare aliquid et ipsum aliquid ad praefigurandam Ecclesiam pertinere. Jam usque ad hunc articulum perductus liber iste claudendus est, ut ambarum civitatum cursus, terrenae scilicet secundum hominem viventis, et coelestis secundum Deum, post diluvium et deinceps in rebus consequentibus requiratur.

For Noah did not introduce them captured, but permitted them coming and entering. For to this avails what was said, "They shall enter to you" (Gen. VI, 19, 20): not namely by the act of man, but by the nod of God: so indeed, that those are not to be believed to have been there which lack sex. For it was prescribed and defined, "They shall be male and female." For there are some things which are so born from whatever things without concubinage from whatever things, that afterwards they couple and generate, such as flies: but others in which there is nothing of male and female, such as bees. Furthermore those which have sex in such a way that they do not have offspring, such as mules, it would be strange if they were there, and rather it might have sufficed that their parents were there, namely the equine and asinine race: and if there are any other things which by the commixture of a diverse genus beget some genus. But if even this pertained to the mystery, they were there. For this genus also has male and female.

It also usually moves some, as to the kinds of foods which the animals could have there, which are thought to feed only on meat, whether they were there beyond the number without transgression of the mandate, which the necessity of nourishing others would have compelled to be included there: or whether, which is rather to be believed, there could have been some nourishments besides meats, which might be convenient for all. For we know how many animals, for which meat is food, feed on fruits and pomes, and especially on the fig and chestnuts. What wonder therefore, if that wise and just man, even divinely admonished as to what was congruent for each, prepared and stored up nourishment apt for each genus without meats? But what is there, which hunger would not compel to eat? or what could God not make sweet and healthful, who also, that they might live without food, would grant by divine facility, unless it also were convenient for the figure of so great a mystery to be fulfilled that they should be fed? But that such manifold signs of things done do not pertain to the prefiguring of the Church, no one, unless he be contentious, is permitted to think. For already the nations have so filled the Church, and the clean and the unclean, until the certain end be come, are so contained in a certain compages of its unity, that from this one most manifest thing, it is not lawful to doubt even about the others, which sometimes were said more obscurely, and can be recognized more difficultly. Since these things are so, if no one even hard will dare to think either that those things were written in vain, or that they signify nothing since they were done, nor can it probably be said that only the words were significative, not the facts, nor that they are alien to the Church to be signified: but it is rather to be believed, that they were both wisely committed to memory and letters, and were done, and signify something, and that something itself pertains to the prefiguring of the Church. This book, having been brought even to this article, is to be closed, so that the course of both cities, namely the earthly living according to man, and the heavenly according to God, may be sought after the flood and henceforth in the consequent things.