

SAINT ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

ON THE HARMONY OF FORE-
KNOWLEDGE, PREDESTINATION,
AND GRACE WITH FREE WILL

De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis

SABBATISMUS

Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109)
De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis · On the Harmony of
Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace with Free Will

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Set in EB Garamond and Cinzel.
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TREATISE OF SAINT ANSELM ON THE HAR-
MONY OF FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDES-
TINATION, AND ALSO THE GRACE OF GOD
WITH FREE WILL.

Concerning those three questions, in which free will seems to be repugnant to the foreknowledge and predestination of God, as well as to His grace, I will take care to show in writing what God will deign to reveal to me, with His help.

QUAESTIO I.

*ON THE HARMONY OF THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF
GOD WITH FREE WILL.*

CHAPTER I.---The foreknowledge of God is not repugnant to the freedom of the will; because God foreknows that what is going to happen freely is not going to happen from necessity from another source.

Indeed, the foreknowledge of God and free will seem to conflict; since those things which God foreknows must necessarily come to pass, and those things which are done by free will do not occur by any necessity; but if they conflict, it is impossible for the foreknowledge of God, which foresees all things, to exist simultaneously with something happening through the freedom of the will. If this impossibility is understood to be absent, the conflict which seems to be present is entirely removed. Let us therefore posit that both exist at the same time: the foreknowledge of God, from which the necessity of future things seems to follow; and the freedom of the will,

by which many things are believed to be done without any necessity; and let us see whether it is impossible for these two to exist simultaneously. For if it is impossible, another impossibility arises from it: since it is impossible if, when it is posited, another impossibility follows. But if something is going to happen without necessity, God Himself foreknows this, who foreknows all future things; moreover, what God foreknows is going to happen of necessity, just as it is foreknown: therefore, it is necessary that something is going to happen without necessity. By no means, then, to one who rightly understands, do there seem to conflict here the foreknowledge from which necessity follows, and the freedom of the will from which necessity is removed: since it is both necessary that what God foreknows will be, and God foreknows that something will be without any necessity. But you will say to me: This nevertheless does not remove from me the necessity of sinning, or of not sinning; since God foreknows that I will sin, or that I will not sin: and therefore it is necessary for me to sin, if I sin; or not to sin, if I do not sin. To which I say: You ought not to say, God foreknows only that I will sin, or that I will not sin; but, God foreknows that I will sin without necessity, or won't sin without necessity: and so it follows that whether you sin or do not sin, either one will be without necessity; because God foreknows that that which will be, will be without necessity. You see therefore that it is not impossible for the foreknowledge of God, by which future things, which He foreknows, are

said to be from necessity, and the freedom of the will, by which many things are done without necessity, to exist simultaneously. For if it is impossible, something impossible follows, but no impossibility is born from this. Perhaps you say: You do not yet take away from my heart the force of necessity, when you say that it is necessary that I will sin, or will not sin without necessity, because God foreknows this: for necessity seems to sound like coercion or prohibition. Wherefore if it is necessary for me to sin by will, I understand that I am coerced by some hidden force to the will of sinning; and if I do not sin, I am prohibited from the will of sinning. Wherefore I seem to myself to sin by necessity, if I sin; or not to sin by necessity, if I do not sin.

CHAPTER II.---How it is necessary that a thing will be when God foreknows that it will be; and yet the will remains free: and concerning a twofold necessity.

Therefore it is to be known that we often say it is necessary for that to be which is coerced by no force, and it is not necessary for that to be which is removed by no prohibition. For we say, it is necessary for God to be immortal, and it is necessary for God not to be unjust; not that any force coerces Him to be immortal, or prohibits Him from being unjust, but since nothing can cause Him not to be immortal, or to be unjust. And so if I say, it is necessary that you will sin, or won't sin by will alone, just as God foreknows, it must not be understood that something prohibits the will which will not be, or coerces that will to be

which will be: for God Himself foreknows this, who foresees that something is going to happen from will alone, because the will is not coerced or prohibited by any other thing; and thus from freedom there happens what happens from the will. If therefore these things are diligently understood, I think that no incompatibility prohibits the foreknowledge of God and the freedom of the will from existing simultaneously. Finally, if anyone properly considers the meaning of the word, by the very fact that something is said to be foreknown, it is pronounced as going to be: for nothing is foreknown unless it is going to be, because knowledge is only of the truth. Wherefore when I say that if God foreknows something, 124 it is necessary that it will be; it is the same as if I were to say: If it will be, it will be by necessity; but this necessity does not coerce or prohibit anything to be or not to be. For it is said to be by necessity for this reason, because the thing is posited to be; or because it is posited not to be, it is affirmed not to be by necessity; not because necessity coerces or prohibits the thing to be, or not to be. For when I say: If it will be, it will be by necessity; here necessity follows the positing of the thing, and does not precede it. The same applies if it is pronounced thus: What will be, will be by necessity. For this necessity signifies nothing other than that what will be cannot at the same time not be. Moreover, it is equally true that something was, and is, and will be, not by necessity, and that it is necessary that everything that was, has been; and that what is, is; and that

what will be, is going to be. Of course, it is not the same for a thing to be past, and for a past thing to be past; or for a thing to be present, and for a present thing to be present; or for a thing to be future, and for a future thing to be future, just as it is not the same for a thing to be white, and for a white thing to be white. For wood is not always white by necessity, because sometimes before it was made white, it could have not been made white; and after it is white it can be made not white: but a white piece of wood must always necessarily be white; because neither before it is, nor after it is white, can it become true that white is simultaneously not white. Similarly, a thing is not present by necessity; since before it was present, it could have happened that it was not present; and after it is present, it can become not present. But a present thing must necessarily be present always; because neither before it is, nor after it is present, can what is present be simultaneously not present. In the same way, something, such as a certain action, is not going to be by necessity; because, before it is, it can happen that it is not going to be: but a future thing must necessarily be going to be; since the future cannot simultaneously be not future. Concerning the past, moreover, it is similarly true that something is not past by necessity; since, before it was, it could have happened that it was not: and that the past must always necessarily be past; since it cannot simultaneously not be past. But in a past thing there is something which is not in a present or future thing. For it can never happen

that a thing which is past, becomes not past: just as a certain thing which is present, can become not present; and some thing which is not going to be by necessity, can happen so as not to be going to be. And so, when future is predicated of a future thing, it is necessary that what is said is so; because the future is never not future: just as whenever we say the same thing of the same thing. For when we say that every man is a man, or if he is a man he is a man; or every white thing is white, and if it is white it is white: it is necessary that what is said is so, because something cannot at the same time both be and not be. Of course, if it is not necessary that every future thing is future; some future thing is not future: which is impossible. By necessity, therefore, every future thing is future; and if it is going to be, it is going to be, when the future is said of the future: but by a subsequent necessity, which coerces nothing to be.

CHAPTER III.---That freely future things are not necessary by a preceding necessity, but by a subsequent one.

But when future is predicated of a thing, the thing does not always exist by necessity, although it is future. For if I say: Tomorrow there is going to be a sedition among the people, nevertheless there will not be a sedition by necessity. For it can happen, before it is, that it does not happen, even if it is future. But sometimes it happens that a thing which is called future is by necessity, as if I say that tomorrow there is going to be a sunrise. If therefore I pronounce a future

thing with necessity in this way: a sedition is going to be tomorrow, it is going to be by necessity; or, a sunrise is going to be tomorrow, it is going to be by necessity: a sedition indeed, which will not be from necessity, is asserted to be future solely by a subsequent necessity; because future is said of a future thing: for if it is going to be tomorrow, it is going to be by necessity: but a sunrise is understood to be going to be by two necessities, namely both by a preceding one which causes the thing to be, for it will be on that account because it is necessary that it be; and by a subsequent one, which coerces nothing to be, since it is going to be by necessity on that account, because it is going to be. Wherefore, when we say that what God foreknows to be future, must necessarily be future, we do not assert that the thing is always going to be by necessity; but that the future thing, is going to be by necessity. For a future thing cannot simultaneously not be future. The sense is the same if it is stated thus: If God foreknows something, without adding 'future'; since 'future' is understood in 'to foreknow'. For to foreknow is nothing other than to know the future; and therefore if God foreknows something, it is necessary that it is going to be. Therefore it does not always follow the foreknowledge of God, that a thing is going to be by necessity; since, although He foreknows all future things, nevertheless He does not foreknow all future things by necessity, but He foreknows certain things that are to come from the free will of the rational creature. For it is to be noted that, just as it is not necessary for God

to will what He wills; so it is necessary in many things for man to will what he wills; and, just as it is necessary that whatever God wills, is; so it is necessary for what man wills to be, in those things which God so subjects to human will, that if he wills, they happen, if he does not will, they do not happen. For since what God wills cannot not be; when He wills the will of man to be coerced or prohibited by no necessity to willingly act; or to not willingly act, and wills the effect to follow the will; then it is necessary that the will is free, and that what it wills, is. In such matters, therefore, it is true that by necessity there is the work of a sin, which a man wills to do; although he does not will it by necessity. But if it is asked about the sin of the will itself, when it sins by willing, whether it is by necessity, it must be answered that just as it does not will by necessity, so the sin of the will is not by necessity. Nor does the same will operate by necessity; because if it did not will spontaneously, it would not operate, although what it does, must necessarily be done, as I said above. For, since to sin there is nothing other than to will what one ought not; so the sin of the will is not necessary, just as willing is not necessary: nevertheless it is true that if a man wills to sin, it is necessary for him to sin; but by that necessity which I mentioned above (chap. 2) which coerces or prohibits nothing. Therefore what the free will wills, it both can and cannot not will, and it is necessary for it to will. For it can not will before it wills, because it is free; and when it already wills, it cannot not will, but it is

necessary for it to will; since it is impossible for it simultaneously both to will and not to will the exact same thing. But the work of the will, to which it is given that what it wills is, and what it does not will is not, is voluntary or spontaneous; since it is done by a spontaneous will: and it is twofold necessary, because it is both coerced to be done by the will, and what is done cannot simultaneously not be done. But the freedom of the will makes these necessities, which, before they are, it can caution against. All these things God, who knows all truth and nothing but the truth, sees just as they are spontaneous or necessary, and just as He sees them, so they are. By this consideration, therefore, it is clear that without any contradiction, both God foreknows all things, and many things happen from free will, which, before they are, it could happen that they never be; and yet in a certain way they are by necessity: which necessity, as I said, descends from free will.

CHAPTER IV.---If the foreknowledge of God imposes necessity upon the things which He foreknows; He Himself does nothing from freedom, but all things from necessity.

It can also be known that not all things which God foreknows exist from necessity, but certain things happen from freedom of will; because, when God wills or does something, whether it is spoken according to the immutable presence of eternity, in which nothing is past or 125 future, but all things exist simultaneously without any motion; as, if we say that He did not will or will will, nor did or will do something, but only wills

and does; or whether according to time, as when we state that He will will or will do what we know has not yet been done: it cannot be denied that He knows what He wills and does, and foreknows what He will will and will do. Wherefore if the knowing and foreknowing of God imposes necessity on all things which He knows or foreknows; He Himself, according to eternity or according to any time, wills or will do nothing from freedom, but all things from necessity: but if it is absurd even to suppose this, not everything that God knows or foreknows to be or not to be, is or is not by necessity. Therefore nothing prohibits something from being known or foreknown by Him to occur in our wills and actions, or to be future through free will: so that, although it is necessary for what He knows or foreknows to be, nevertheless many things happen by no necessity, but by free will, just as I showed above (chap. 1). Indeed what wonder is it, if in this way something exists from freedom and from necessity, since there are many things which receive opposites by a different reasoning? For what things are more opposite than to approach and to depart? We see however, when someone crosses from place to place, that the same going is to approach and to depart. For he departs from a place, and he approaches a place. Likewise: if we consider the sun under some part of the heaven, since in traversing the heaven it always hastens to the same part, we see that it is the same place from which it recedes and to which it accedes, and it unceasingly approaches at the same time that from which it

is lengthened away. It is also clear to those who are not ignorant of its course, that if we consider the heaven, it always transits from the western part to the eastern. But if we attend to the earth, never except from the eastern to the western, and thus it always goes against the firmament, and although slower, with the firmament: which is itself discerned in all planets. Thus therefore no contradiction arises, if according to the aforesaid reasons we assert the same thing to be going to occur by necessity, because it is going to occur; and to be coerced to be future by no necessity, except by that necessity which I said above (chap. 3) is made by free will.

CHAPTER V.---That many things in the Scriptures are said to be necessary and immutable, by comparison to eternity; which in time are free, and could not be.

But if by this, what Job says of man to God: You have appointed his bounds, which cannot be passed (Job XIV, 5), someone wishes to show that no one could hasten or defer the day on which he dies, although sometimes it seems to us that someone does from free will whence he dies, it is not what is objected against what we have said above. For, since God is not deceived, nor does He see except the truth whether it happens from freedom or from necessity, He is said to have established immutably with Himself what with man before it happens can be changed. Such also is what Paul the apostle says concerning those who are called saints according to his purpose: Whom He foreknew and predestinated

to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren. And whom He predestinated, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified (Rom. VIII, 28-30). This purpose indeed, according to which the saints are called, in eternity, in which there is no past or future, but only present, is immutable; but in the men themselves from the freedom of the will it is sometimes mutable. For just as although in eternity there has not been or will be anything, but only there is, and yet in time there has been and will be something without contradiction; so what in eternity cannot be changed, in time sometimes through free will before it is, is proven to be mutable without inconvenience: although however there is nothing there except the present, nevertheless that present is not temporal, like ours; but eternal, in which all times are contained. If indeed, just as the present time contains every place and the things which are in any place; so in the eternal present there is simultaneously enclosed every time and the things which are in any time. Therefore when the Apostle says that God foreknew His saints, predestinated, called, justified, glorified them, nothing of these is earlier or later with God; but all things are to be understood simultaneously in the eternal present. For eternity has its own 'simultaneously', in which there are all things which are simultaneously in place or time, and which are in diverse places or times. But that the same Apostle might show

that he did not state those words for a temporal signification; he pronounced even those things which are future, by a verb of past time. For not yet has He temporally called, justified, glorified those whom He foreknew as yet to be born. Whence it can be known that he, because of the lack of a verb signifying the eternal present, used words of past signification; since those things which are past in time, in the likeness of the eternal present are altogether immutable. If indeed in these things temporally past are more like the eternal present than present things; since those things which are there, can never not be present, just as things past in time can never not be past: but concerning things present in time all things which pass away, become not present. In this way therefore whatever concerning these things which are done by free will, sacred Scripture pronounces as if necessary; it speaks according to eternity, in which every truth and nothing but the truth is present, immutably, not according to time, in which our wills and actions are not always: and, just as while they are not, it is not necessary for them to be; so often it is not necessary that they be sometime. For, I do not always write or will to write: and, just as, while I do not write or do not will to write, it is not necessary for me to write or to will to write; so it is not necessary that I sometime write, or will to write. But when a thing is known to be so otherwise in time than in eternity: that sometimes the truth is since something is not in time, which is in eternity; and what was in time, since it was not

there; and will be temporally, since it will not be there: by no reason does it seem to be able to be denied similarly that something is mutable in time, which there is immutable. Indeed mutable in time, and immutable in eternity, are not more opposite; than not to be in some time, and always to be in eternity: and to have been, or to be future according to time, and not to have been, or not to be future in eternity. If indeed I do not say something is never in time, which always is in eternity; but only in some time it is not. For I do not say my tomorrow's action is at no time; but today only I deny that it is, which nevertheless always is in eternity. And when we deny that something has been or will be there, which was or will be in time, we do not assert that what was or will be is in no way there; but only in a past or future mode we say it is not there, which there unceasingly is, in its own present mode: but in these no contrariety seems to oppose. Thus indeed without any contradiction it is said that something is mutable in time before it is, which remains immutably in eternity, not before it is, or after it is; but unceasingly, because nothing is there according to time. For this itself is there eternally, because temporally something both is, and, before it is, it can not be, as I have already said. Sufficiently from these things which have been said, I think it is clear that the foreknowledge of God and free will by no means contradict each other: which is caused by the force of eternity, which encloses every time and the things which are in any time.

126 CHAPTER VI.---Concerning freedom for those things which are of salvation it is here asked where, and what it is.

But since we do not have free will in all things, it must be seen where, and what is that freedom of the will which man is always believed to have, and what that will is. For will and the freedom by which it is called free are not the same. In many things freedom and will are said; as when we say someone has the freedom of speaking, or of keeping silent, and it is in his will which of these he wishes. In many other things likewise freedom and will are said, which are not always present, or are necessary to us for the salvation of the soul. But only for that will, and for that freedom is this question aired; without which man cannot be saved, after he is able to use them. For many therefore complain because they think free will avails nothing for salvation or damnation; but only necessity on account of God's foreknowledge. Since therefore man is not saved, after he comes to an intelligible age, without his own justice: there this will must be investigated, and this freedom whence it is treated, where the seat also of justice is. First therefore justice must be shown; then that freedom and that will. Indeed any justice whatever, great or small, is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake. But that freedom is the power of preserving rectitude of will for the sake of the rectitude itself. Which definitions I think I have shown by clear reasons: the former indeed in the treatise (chap. 12) which I made concerning truth; but the other in that

which I published (chap. 3, 13) concerning this freedom itself; in which it was also shown (chap. 5) how this freedom is naturally and inseparably in man, although he does not always use it; and (chap. 6, 7, 8) that it is so strong, that no thing is able to take away from man the aforesaid rectitude, that is justice, which he has, as long as he wishes to use this freedom. But justice is not natural, but was separable in the beginning both in angels in heaven, and in men in paradise, and is still in this life; not however by necessity, but by the proper will of those having it. But since it is evident that the justice by which someone is just is rectitude of will, which I mentioned: which rectitude is then only in someone, when he himself wills what God wills him to will: it is clear that God cannot take away the same rectitude from an unwilling person; since He cannot will this. But neither can He will that the one having it, unwillingly by any necessity forsakes it, for He would will him not to will what He wills him to will: which cannot be. It follows therefore that God wills the will which is right in this way to be free for willing rightly and for preserving the same rectitude; which when it is able to do what it wills, freely does what it does. Whence also it can be most clearly known that there is some free will with its action, not contradictory to God's foreknowledge, just as was shown above. Let us now posite some example, in which there appears both a right, that is just will, and freedom of the will, and the will itself; and how a right will is attacked, so that it may forsake rectitude, and

how it preserves it by free will. Someone has it in his heart to hold to the truth, because he understands it is right to love the truth. Here indeed he already has a right will and rectitude of will. But the will is one thing; and the rectitude by which it is right, another. Another person approaches; and, unless he lies, threatens him with death. We see now that it is in his will whether he forsakes life for the sake of the rectitude of the will; or rectitude, for the sake of life. This will, which can also be called judgment, is free; since reason, by which rectitude is understood, teaches that that rectitude must always be preserved for the love of the same rectitude; and whatever is offered so that it is forsaken must be despised; and it belongs to the will that it itself also reprobates and elects, just as the understanding of reason shows: for mostly to this end were will and reason given to the rational creature. Wherefore the same arbitrium of the will, to forsake the same rectitude, is coerced by no necessity, although it is attacked by the difficulty of death. For although it is necessary to relinquish either life or rectitude, nevertheless no necessity determines which he preserves or forsakes. Indeed only the will determines there what he holds, nor does the force of necessity do anything, where only the choice of the will operates. But for him to whom there is no necessity of forsaking the rectitude of the will which he has; it is clear that the power or freedom of preserving it is not lacking. For this power is always free. For this is freedom, which I said is (Dial. on free will c. 3, 13) the power of preserving

rectitude of will, for the sake of the rectitude itself. By this same freedom of rational nature, it is called both free arbitrium and free will.

CHAPTER VII.---Whether God's foreknowledge is from things: and whether things are from His knowledge. And how evil things are from God.

It remains now for us to consider, since God is believed to foreknow or know all things, whether His knowledge is from things, or things have their being from His knowledge. For, if God has knowledge from things, it follows that they are prior to His knowledge, and thus they are not from God, from whom they cannot be except through His knowledge. But if whatever things are, assume their essence from the knowledge of God: God is the maker and author of evil works, and therefore He does not justly punish the wicked: which we do not accept. But this question can easily be solved, if first it is known that the good, which is justice, is truly something; but evil, which is injustice, lacks all existence. Which in the treatise (chap. 9, 10, 15, 16) concerning the fall of the devil, and in the little book which I entitled concerning virginal conception and original sin, I have most clearly shown. For injustice is not a quality, or an action, or any essence, but only the absence of due justice; nor is it except in the will, where justice ought to be. Through which just or unjust will every rational nature is called, and every action of it just or unjust. For every quality, and every action, and whatever has any essence, is from God, from whom is all justice

and no injustice: God therefore makes all things which are done by a just or unjust will, that is good and evil works. In good things indeed He makes that they are, and that they are good; but in evil things He makes that they are, but not that they are evil. For for any thing to be just or good, is to be something; but for no thing is it to be something, to be unjust or evil. If indeed to be good or just, is to have justice: which is something. But to be evil or unjust, is not to have the justice which it ought to have: which is not something. For justice is something; but injustice nothing, as I said. Moreover there is another good, which is called advantageous, the contrary of which is evil, which is disadvantageous. This evil sometimes is nothing, like blindness; sometimes it is something, like pain. But this evil, when it is something, we do not deny that God makes; because He Himself is, as is read, making peace and creating evil (Isa. XLV, 7). For He Himself creates disadvantages, by which He exercises and purges the just, and punishes the unjust. And so concerning only that evil, which is injustice, through which it is called unjust, it is certain that it is never something; nor to any thing is it to be something, to be unjust. And, just as God does not make injustice, so He does not make anything to be unjust: who nevertheless makes all actions and all motions, because He Himself makes the things by which, and from which, and through which, and in which they are done; and no thing has any power of willing or doing, unless He gives it. Will itself also, which is sometimes just, some-

times unjust, nor is it other than to use the power of willing and the will, which God gives, insofar as it is, 127 is good, and is from God. Which then indeed when it is right, is good and just; but when not right, by this alone because it is not right, is evil and unjust. Moreover it is something to be right, and this is from God; but not to be right, is not something, nor is it from God. For, just as when someone uses a sword, or tongue, or the power of speaking, the sword is not one thing, or the tongue, or the power when their use is right, and another, when it is not right; so the will which we use for willing, just as we use reason for reasoning, is not one thing when someone uses it rightly, and another when not rightly; nor is it more or less this which it is essentially, when the will is just, than when it is unjust, by which it is called either a just or unjust substance or action. Thus, therefore God makes in all wills and good works, both that they are essentially, and that they are good; but in evil things not that they are evil, but only that they are through essence. For just as the essence of things is not, except from God; so neither is rectitude, except from Him. But the absence of this rectitude of which I speak, which is injustice, is not except in the will of the rational creature, which always ought to have justice. But why it does not have, what it always ought to have: and how God makes good things, by His goodness alone, and evil things by the sole fault of man or devil; and how man makes good things through free will, with grace presiding, and evil with his own proper will alone operating;

and what God has in evil things, without His fault, and man in good things, with his praise; so that nevertheless the good things of man seem clearly to be imputed to God, and the evil things to man: when we shall treat of grace and free will, as I think with God granting, it will be more openly clear. But now I only say that the evil angel therefore does not have justice, because he forsook it, nor did he afterwards receive it; but man lacks it on that account, because in the first parents he cast it away, afterwards either he did not receive it, or having received it he rejected it. I think that, with the grace of God helping, we have shown that the foreknowledge of God and free will existing simultaneously, if those things which we said are diligently considered, is not impossible, nor can anything be objected which is not soluble.

QUESTION II.

ON THE HARMONY OF PREDESTINATION WITH FREE WILL.

Now therefore hoping in Him, who has led us thus far, let us attempt to dissolve the discord which seems to be between predestination and free will. To which through those things which we have discussed above, as will be clear in the following, we have profited not a little.

CHAPTER I [al. VIII].---Reason for doubting concerning the harmony of freedom and predestination.

Predestination seems to be the same as pre-ordination, or pre-establishment: and therefore what God is said to predestinate, is understood to preordain: which is to establish that it will be. But what God establishes to be future, seems to be future by necessity; wherefore whatever God predestinates, it is necessary to be future. If therefore God predestinates the good and evil things which are done, nothing is done through free will; but all things from necessity. But, if He predestinates only good things, only good things are from necessity, nor is there free will except for evil things: which is too absurd. Therefore God does not predestinate only good things. But if free will does certain good works, by which they are made just apart from predestination, God does not predestinate all good works, which make men just, wherefore neither those just ones, who are through the works of free will. Therefore God did not foreknow them; because whom He foreknew He also predestinated (Rom. VIII, 29). But it is false that God does not foreknow some good works, or some just men. Therefore certain good works of free will alone do not justify, but only those which God predestinates. If therefore God predestinates all things, and predestinated things are from necessity, since nothing happens through free will by necessity, it seems to follow that free will is nothing, while predestination remains; or if we establish free will in some things, predestination perishes in those.

CHAPTER II [al. IX].---Predestination is not only of good things, but can also be said of evil things.

First of all therefore before the response to the question, it must be seen that predestination is not only of good things, but can also be said of evil things: just as God is said to do the evils which He does not do, because He permits them. For, He is said to harden a man when He does not soften him, and to lead into temptation when He does not liberate. It is not therefore incongruous if in this way we say God predestinates the wicked, and their evil works, when He does not correct them and their evil works. But He is said more especially to foreknow and predestinate good things, because in them He makes that they are, and that they are good; but in evil things only that they are essentially, not that they are evil; as was said above (question I, chap. 7). It must also be known that just as foreknowledge is not properly said in God; so neither predestination, because to Him there is neither 'before' nor 'after' anything, but all things are to Him simultaneously present.

CHAPTER III. [al. X].---Predestination is conciliated with freedom in the same way as foreknowledge.

Let us now consider whether any things can be predestinated, to be future through free will. It ought certainly not to be doubted that His predestination, and foreknowledge do not discord; but just as He foreknows, so also He predestinates. In the question concerning foreknowledge we knew openly that some future things are

foreknown through free will, without any contradiction. Whence also evident truth, and reason teach that similarly certain future things are predestinated through free will, without any inconvenience. For neither does God foreknow, nor does He predestinate anyone to be just from necessity. For he does not have justice, who does not preserve it by free will. Equally therefore, although it is necessary that those things which are foreknown and which are predestinated happen, nevertheless certain things foreknown and predestinated do not occur by that necessity which precedes the thing and causes it, but by that which follows the thing, as we said above. For God, although He predestinates them, does not make the will by coercing it or by resisting the will, but by leaving it in its own power. Although nevertheless His will uses power, nevertheless it does nothing which God does not make in good things by His grace, in evil things not by His, but by the fault of the same will; which, as we promised, will appear more clearly when we speak of grace. And, just as foreknowledge which is not deceived, does not foreknow except the truth as it will be, either necessary, or spontaneous; so predestination which is not changed, does not predestinate except as it is in foreknowledge. And, just as what is foreknown, although in eternity it is immutable, nevertheless in time sometimes before it is, it can be changed; so it is through all things concerning predestination. It is clear therefore from these things which have been said, if they are considered well, that

neither does predestination exclude free will, nor does free will oppose predestination. If indeed all those things, by which we showed above that free will is not repugnant to foreknowledge, equally show that it concords with predestination. Therefore not reasonably, 128 as often as something happens, with spontaneous will operating, as when a man does injury to a man from which he is killed by him, do certain men cry out saying: Thus it was foreknown and predestinated by God; and therefore it was done by necessity, nor could it happen otherwise. Indeed neither he who irritated another with injury, nor he who avenged himself, did this by necessity, but by will alone; because if he had not willed it spontaneously, neither would have done what he did.

QUESTION III.

ON THE HARMONY OF GRACE AND FREE WILL.

It remains now that we consider concerning grace and the same free will, with the same grace helping.

CHAPTER I [al. XI].---A difficulty is proposed from the Scriptures concerning the harmony of grace and freedom.

That question arises from this, because divine Scripture speaks in such a way sometimes that free will seems to profit nothing for salvation, but only grace; but sometimes in such a way, as if our whole salvation consisted in our free will. For concerning grace the Lord says: Without me you can do nothing (John XV, 5); and: And no

one comes to me, unless my Father draws him (John VI, 44). And the apostle Paul: But what do you have that you have not received? (I Cor. IV, 7.) And concerning God: He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens (Rom. IX, 18); and: It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God who shows mercy (Ibid., 16). Many other things are also read, which seem to attribute our good works and our salvation to grace alone without free will. Likewise many assert they prove by experience that man is by no means supported by any free will; since they feel countless many, strive with immense effort of mind and body: who aggravated by a certain difficulty, nay impossibility, profit nothing, or after great profit suddenly and irreparably fail. But the same Scripture shows that we have free will in this way. God says through Isaiah: If you will, and will hear me, you shall eat the good things of the earth (Isa. I, 19). And David: Who is the man, who wills life; loves to see good days? Keep your tongue from evil, and your lips that they speak no guile. Turn away from evil, and do good (Psal. XXXIII, 13, 14, 15). And the Lord in the Gospel: Come to me, all you who labor, and are burdened, and I will refresh you. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me because I am meek and humble of heart, and you shall find rest for your souls (Matt. XI, 28, 29). There are also many other and innumerable things, which seem to excite free will to work well; and because he despises admonitions, to reproach: which divine authority would by no means do, if it recognized no freedom of will in

man. But neither would there in any way be a reason why God would justly repay the good or the evil according to the merits of each, if no one did good or evil through free will. Since therefore in sacred Scripture we find certain things, which seem to favor grace alone; and certain things, which are thought to establish free will alone without grace, there were some proud men, who thought the whole efficacy of virtues consisted in the freedom of the will alone: and there are in our time many, who entirely despair that free will is anything. In this question therefore this will be our intention, that we show free will exists simultaneously with grace, and works with it in many things: just as we found it concords with foreknowledge and predestination.

CHAPTER II [al. XII].---Concerning freedom of will, without which no one merits salvation; and concerning grace, without which no man is saved, this is treated here.

It must be known that just as this question, as I said above, is not made concerning any other free will except concerning that without which no one merits salvation, after he has an intelligible age; so it is not concerning any other grace than concerning that without which no man is saved. For every creature exists by grace, because it is made freely; and God gives many good things through grace in this life, without which man can be saved. Indeed in infants, who die baptized before they are able to use their free will, the harmony which we seek does not appear; since in them grace alone works salvation, without their

free will. For this also is grace that the will is given to others that they may subvene them with their faith. And so in those having an intelligible age what we investigate must be shown; because concerning these alone is this question engaged. But whoever of these are saved, it is not doubtful that they are saved through justice. For eternal life is promised to the just; because the just shall live forever, and their reward is with the Lord (Wis. V, 16). But that justice is rectitude of will, sacred authority often shows. Concerning which matter it suffices to propose one example: for when David had said (Psal. XCIII, 14, 15): The Lord will not repel His people, and His inheritance He will not forsake, until justice is turned into judgment, so that he might teach us what justice was, asking he said: And who are near it? To which he himself responding to himself said: All who are right in heart, that is, who are right in will. For although we believe and understand with the heart, just as we will with the heart, nevertheless the Holy Spirit does not judge him to have a right heart who rightly believes and understands, and does not rightly will; because he does not use the rectitude of faith and understanding for willing rightly, on account of which it was given to the rational creature to believe and understand rightly. For neither is he to be said to have a right understanding, who does not will rightly according to it; nor is he said to make faith, except a dead one, who according to faith does not will to work rightly; on account of which it is called faith, and is given. Rightly therefore we understand David

to have said right in heart, right in will. But, lest anyone think by divine authority that one is said to be just or right, who except on account of another thing holds the rectitude of the will, we say justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake: for he who only on account of another thing preserves it, does not love it; but that on account of which he preserves it; and therefore he is not to be called just, nor is such rectitude to be named justice. When we were treating of foreknowledge and free will (Question 1, chap. 6), we showed by a certain example that this rectitude, which I call justice, and free will can be simultaneous: through which it is plain to understand that it is similarly in many others. If therefore we can show that no creature can obtain this rectitude except through grace, the harmony between grace and free will, for saving man, which we seek will be manifest.

CHAPTER III [al. XIII].---Rectitude, by which we attain salvation, is not obtained except through grace.

It is certainly not doubtful that the will does not will rightly, except because it is right. For just as sight is not sharp because it sees sharply, but therefore sees sharply because it is sharp: so the will is not right because it wills rightly; but it wills rightly because it is right. But when it wills this rectitude, without doubt it wills rightly; therefore it does not will rectitude, except because it is right: but it is the same thing for the will to be right, and to have rectitude. It is plain therefore that it does not will rectitude, except because it

has rectitude. I do not deny that a right will wills the rectitude which it does not yet have, when it wills a greater one than it may have; but I say that none can will rectitude, if it does not have the rectitude by which it may will it. Let us consider now whether anyone not having this rectitude, is able in any way to have it from himself. He certainly cannot have it from himself, except either by willing or by not willing. By willing indeed no one is able to obtain it through himself; because he cannot will it, unless he has it. But that someone not having rectitude of will, is able through himself by not willing to obtain it, no one's mind accepts. In no way therefore can a creature have it from itself. But neither is a creature able to have it from another creature. For just as a creature cannot save a creature; so it cannot give to it that through which it ought to be saved. It follows therefore that no creature has the rectitude, which I called of the will, except through grace. But we have shown that this rectitude can be preserved through free will, as I said above. With God therefore granting, we have found His grace concords with free will, for saving man; so that grace alone is able to save man, with nothing of his free will acting (as happens in infants), and in non-intelligent beings it always helps natural free will, which without it avails nothing for salvation, by giving to the will the rectitude which it preserves through free will. And although He does not give to all, since He has mercy on whom He wills and whom He wills He hardens (Rom. IX, 18); nevertheless He gives to none for any

preceding merit, since who has first given to God, and recompense shall be made him? (Rom. XI, 35.) But if the will, by preserving through free will what it received, merits either an increase of the received justice, or even power for the good will, or any reward: all these are fruits of the first grace, and grace for grace; and therefore the whole is to be imputed to grace, because it is neither of him that wills, what he wills, nor of him that runs, what he runs; but of God who shows mercy (Rom. IX, 16). For to all, except God alone, it is said: What do you have that you have not received? But if you have received, why do you glory, as if you had not received? (I Cor. IV, 7.)

CHAPTER IV [al. XIV].---The same rectitude is not preserved except through grace.

How the freedom of the will that holds the received rectitude is not conquered by any necessity to desert it, but is attacked by difficulty, and does not yield to that same difficulty unwillingly but willingly, I think I have shown in the Treatise on Freedom of Choice (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). But in what ways, after the same rectitude has been received, grace helps free choice to preserve what it received: although I am not able to enumerate them all, for it does this in many ways; nevertheless it will not be useless to say something about it. Certainly no one preserves this received rectitude except by willing; but no one is able to will it except by having it: and he is in no way able to have it except through grace. Therefore, just as no one receives it except by prevenient grace; so no one preserves it except by

the same subsequent grace. For indeed, although it is preserved through free choice, nevertheless it is not to be imputed as much to free choice as to grace when this rectitude is preserved; since free choice does not have and preserve it except through prevenient and subsequent grace. Moreover, grace so follows its own gift that, whether it be small or great, it never fails to give it, unless free choice, by willing something else, deserts the rectitude which it received. For this rectitude is never separated from the will, except when it wills something else that does not concord with this rectitude; as when someone receives the rectitude of willing sobriety and rejects it by willing the immoderate pleasure of drinking. Which when he does by his own will, he therefore by his own fault loses the grace which he received. Grace also helps free choice when it is attacked so as to desert the received rectitude, by mitigating or entirely removing the force of the attacking temptation, or by increasing the affection for the same rectitude. Finally, since all things are subject to the disposition of God, whatever happens to man that helps free choice to receive or to preserve this rectitude of which I speak, is to be imputed entirely to grace. I have said that all justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake. From which it follows that everyone having this rectitude has justice and is just; since everyone having justice is just. Nevertheless, I do not feel that perpetual life is promised to all the just, but only to those who are just without any injustice. For those are properly and absolutely called just

and upright in heart. For someone is just according to something and unjust according to something, as one who is chaste and envious. To such as these the beatitude of the just is not promised; since, just as true beatitude is without any lack, so it is given to none except to the just without any injustice. For since the beatitude which is promised to the just will be the likeness of the angels of God: just as in the good angels there is no injustice, so no one would be associated with them with any injustice. But how a man may become without any injustice is not our purpose to show here. We know, however, that this is possible through Christian holy studies and through the grace of God.

CHAPTER V [al. XV].---The Scriptures are elucidated which seem to attribute salvation to grace alone, and those which seem to attribute it to freedom alone.

If those things which have been said are well considered, it is clearly known that when sacred Scripture says something for grace, it does not entirely remove free choice; nor when it speaks for free choice, does it exclude grace: as if grace alone, or free choice alone, were sufficient for saving man, as it seems to those who make this question. For indeed, the divine sayings are to be understood in this way; that, with the exception of what I said about infants, neither grace alone nor free choice alone effects the salvation of man. For when the Lord says: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5), He does not say: Your free choice avails you nothing; but it can do

nothing without my grace. And when it is read: It is neither of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God who shows mercy (Rom. 9:16): it is not denied that in him who wills and in him who runs free choice profits something; but it is signified that it is not to be imputed to free choice what he wills and what he runs, but to grace. For when He says: It is neither of him that wills, nor of him that runs, it is to be understood, what he wills and what he runs: as when someone gives a garment to a naked person, to whom he owes nothing, and who can have no clothing from himself; nevertheless, although he himself has the power of using and not using the received garment, if he uses it, it is not to be imputed to the one clothed because he is clothed, but to the giver of the garment. Wherefore it can be said thus: It is not of the clothed that he is clothed, but of the merciful; that is, of the giver of the garment. But much more would this be said, if he who gave the garment had also given the power of preserving it and using it: as God to man, when He gives the oft-mentioned rectitude, He also gives the power of preserving and using it; because He first gave free choice for preserving it and using it. But if to a naked person to whom nothing was owed, a garment were not given; or if he himself should cast away the received one, his nakedness would be imputed to none but himself. So, when God gives to someone conceived and born in sin, to whom He owes nothing but punishment, to will and to run; it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God who shows mercy: and he

who does not receive the same grace or rejects it when received, it is of him, not of God, that he remains in his own hardness and iniquity. The same understanding is to be had in other things in which Scripture speaks for grace, 130 so that clearly free choice is not excluded. Similarly when the divine sayings so speak that they seem to attribute the salvation of man to free choice alone, by no understanding is grace to be separated. Therefore, just as natural use does not procreate offspring without a father, nor except through a mother, yet no understanding removes either the father or the mother from the generation of offspring; so grace and free choice do not discord, but concur for justifying and saving man.

CHAPTER VI [al. XVI].---How it is not superfluous to invite men to faith, and to those things which faith requires.

In these things, however, in which Scripture seems to invite free choice to will and to work rightly, there is a difficulty. It is asked why it invites man to will rightly, and why it rebukes the non-obedient, since no one can have or receive that rectitude itself unless grace gives it? It should be known that, just as the earth brings forth innumerable herbs and trees, without which human nature is nourished, or even by which it is destroyed, without any care of man; those, however, which are most necessary to us for nourishing life, it does not bring forth without great labor and a cultivator, nor without seeds: so human hearts without doctrine or study spontaneously, as it were, germinate thoughts

and wills not at all useful for salvation, or even harmful; those, however, without which we do not progress to the salvation of the soul, they by no means conceive and germinate without the seed of their own kind and laborious cultivation. Whence the Apostle calls those men to whom such cultivation is expended, the agriculture of God (1 Cor. 3:9). Moreover, the seed of this agriculture is the word of God; rather not the word, but the sense which is perceived through the word: for the voice without sense establishes nothing in the heart. And not only the sense of the word, but every sense or understanding of rectitude, which the human mind conceives either through hearing, or through reading, or through reason, or in any other way, is the seed of willing rightly. For no one can will what he does not first conceive in the heart; moreover, to will to believe what is to be believed is to will rightly. No one therefore can will this if he does not know what is to be believed. For when the Apostle had first said: Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved (Rom. 10:13), he added: How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? Or how shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent? (ibid., 14). And a little after: So then faith is from hearing; but hearing through the word of Christ (ibid., 17). But that he says faith is from hearing is to be understood because faith is from this, that the mind conceives through hearing; not so that the

mere conception of the mind makes faith in man, but because faith cannot be without conception. For when rectitude of willing is added to the conception through grace, faith is made; because he believes what he hears. But hearing is through the word of Christ, that is, through the word of those preaching Christ. But they do not preach unless they be sent; but that they are sent is grace. Wherefore also the preaching is grace; because it is grace which descends from grace, and the hearing is grace, and the understanding from hearing is grace, and the rectitude of willing is grace. Truly mission, preaching, hearing, understanding are nothing, unless the will wills what the mind understands: which the will cannot do unless rectitude is received: for it wills rightly when it wills what it ought. So what the mind conceives from the hearing of the word is the seed of the preacher; and rectitude is the increase which God gives, without which neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything; but God who gives the increase (1 Cor. 3:7). Just as therefore God in the beginning through a miracle made corn and other things growing from the earth for the nourishment of men without a cultivator and seeds; so without human doctrine He wonderfully made the hearts of the prophets, and of the apostles, and also of the evangelists, fruitful with saving seeds: whence we receive whatever we sow wholesomely in the agriculture of God for the nourishment of souls; just as we have only from the first seeds of the earth what we propagate for the nourishment of bodies.

Indeed we preach nothing useful for spiritual salvation which sacred Scripture, made fruitful by the miracle of the Holy Spirit, has not brought forth, or does not contain within itself. For if we say anything by reason at some time which we are unable openly to show in its sayings or to prove from them, in this way we know through it whether it is to be received or rejected. For if it is gathered by open reason, and it in no part contradicts it; since just as it is adverse to no truth, so it favors no falsehood: by this very fact that it does not deny what is said by reason, it is received by its authority. But if it indubitably repugns our sense; although our reason seems to us invincible, it is to be believed to be supported by no truth. Thus therefore sacred Scripture contains the authority of all truth which reason gathers, since it either openly affirms it or in no way denies it. Let us see now in examples how the word is a seed. When those hear to whom it is said: If you will and hear me (Isa. 1:19), they understand and think what is said to will and to hear, that is to obey: for he who hears and does not obey is said not to hear. But they cannot obey unless they will; moreover, to will to obey is to will rightly: but no one can will rightly unless he has rectitude of will, which no man has except through grace. Truly the rectitude of willing something is given to none except to one understanding to will and what he ought to will. We see therefore that what was said: If you will and hear me, is a seed by no means germinating through itself to any fruit without the addition of rectitude; nor is

rectitude itself given except with seeds. Similarly when God says: Be converted to me (Isa. 45:22; Joel 2:12; Zech. 1:3), it is a seed without a germ, as long as God does not convert the will of man to will the conversion which he thinks when he hears be converted, without which seed no one can will to be converted. Is it also said to the converted, be converted? either that they may be more converted, or that they may preserve what they are converted to. But those who say: Convert us, O God (Ps. 84:5), are already in some measure converted; because they have a right will when they will to be converted; but they pray through this which they have already received, that their conversion may be increased, like those who believing said: Increase our faith (Luke 17:5). As if both those and these should say: Increase in us what You have given; perfect what You have begun. What I have shown concerning these is to be understood also in similar things. Therefore, just as the earth does not naturally germinate those things which are most necessary for the salvation of our body without seeds, and although God does not give increase to every seed, nevertheless our farmers do not cease to sow in the hope of some little harvest; so the earth of the human heart does not bring forth the fruit of faith and justice without congruent seeds: and although God does not make all such seeds to germinate, nevertheless He commands His farmers to sow His word most instantly in hope. We have shown, as I think, how it is not superfluous to invite men to the faith of Christ, and to those things which

this faith requires, although not all receive this invitation.

CHAPTER VII [al. XVII].---That those are justly rebuked who being invited are reluctant; although they are not able to follow the invitation without grace.

I said also that it can be asked why those are rebuked who do not receive the word of God, since they are unable to do this unless grace directs their wills. For the Lord says of the Holy Spirit: He shall rebuke the world of sin, because they have not believed in me (John 16:8). To which although it may perhaps be difficult to answer; nevertheless what I can by God's granting, I ought not to keep silent. It is to be noted that the impotence which descends from fault does not excuse the impotent one, as long as the fault remains. Whence in infants, in whom God requires from human nature the justice which it received in our first parents with the power of preserving it in all its offspring, the impotence of having justice does not excuse it; since on account of fault it fell into this impotence: for this very thing, because it does not have what it cannot resume through itself, is for it the impotence of having; into which it therefore fell, because it spontaneously deserted what it could have preserved. Since therefore by sinning it deserted justice, to sin is imputed the impotence which it made for itself by sinning. Nor only the impotence of having justice, but also the impotence of understanding it, is similarly imputed to sin in the non-baptized; since it likewise descends from sin.

We can also reasonably assert that because from the first dignity of the human condition, and its strength, and beauty, it was lessened and corrupted, that is imputed to it as fault. For by this it lessened, as much as was in it, the honor and praise of God. Indeed according to the dignity of the work is the wisdom of the craftsman praised and preached. Therefore by as much as human nature lessened and defiled in itself the precious work of God, from which He was to be glorified; by so much by its own fault it dishonored God. Which is established for it as such a sin, that it is not deleted except through the death of God. Since sacred authority sufficiently shows that the movements themselves, or appetites, to which on account of the sin of Adam we are subject like brute animals (which the Apostle calls flesh and concupiscence, which he manifests that he tolerates unwillingly when he says: That which I hate, that I do [Rom. 7:15], that is, I concupisce unwillingly), are imputed to sin. For indeed, concerning the mere movement of anger, without work or voice, the Lord says: He who is angry with his brother shall be guilty in the judgment (Matth. 5:22): He openly shows the fault is not light, which so grave a condemnation, namely of death, follows. As if He should say: He who does what a man ought not to do, and would not do if he had not sinned, ought to be taken away from among men. And when Paul says of those who feel the flesh, that is, concupiscences, unwillingly: There is no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh (Rom.

8:1), that is, they do not consent with the will: without doubt he signifies that those who are not in Christ follow condemnation as often as they feel the flesh, even if they do not walk according to it. Since man was so made that he ought not to feel it, as I said concerning anger. If anyone therefore diligently considers what I have said, he in no way doubts that those who on account of their own fault are unable to receive the word of God, are rightly to be rebuked.

CHAPTER VIII [al. XVIII].---That all fault and culpable impotence in those reborn are deleted through baptism.

But to those to whom the grace of Christian faith is given, just as original injustice, with which they are born, is remitted to them in baptism: so all fault of impotence and of all corruption, which on account of the sin of the first parent they incurred, and through which God is dishonored, is forgiven. For concerning no fault which was in them before baptism are they rebuked after baptism; although the corruption itself and the appetites, which are the punishment of sin, are not immediately deleted in baptism: nor is any transgression imputed to them after baptism, except what they have done by their own will. Whence it appears that corruption, and the evils which were the punishment of sin, and remain after baptism, are not per se sins. For only injustice is per se sin; and those things which follow injustice are judged sins on account of their cause, until it itself is remitted. For if they were sins, they would be deleted in

baptism, in which all sins are washed by the blood of Christ. Item: if they were properly called sins, there would be sins in brute animals, after whose likeness nature sustains those things on account of our sins. There is also another thing which is greatly to be feared, which can be known in the first sin of human nature. For since man is a spirit going and not returning (Ps. 77:39); after he spontaneously falls (that I may speak now only of voluntary sins), in no way can he rise again unless he is raised by grace; but by his own merit he is submerged from sin into sin, even into the abyss of sins without a bottom, that is, profound without estimation, unless he is restrained by mercy; so that even the good is turned into hatred for him, and is to him unto death. Whence the Lord says to the apostles: If the world hate you, know that it hated me before you (John 15:18). And the Apostle: We are a good odor to God, to some indeed the odor of death unto death, but to others the odor of life unto life (2 Cor. 2:15-16), on account of which it is said of God, that He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens (Rom. 9:18). But of those on whom He has mercy, He does not have mercy on all equally; nor does He harden all equally whom He hardens.

CHAPTER IX [al. XIX].---Why sin being deleted, its effect remains: and why the baptized, and martyrs, do not immediately become incorruptible..

But why the punishment of sin should persevere in us in this life, sin having been deleted, is another question. Concerning which, although

we have not proposed to treat it now, nevertheless I say briefly that if the faithful were immediately changed into incorruption in baptism or in martyrdom, merit would perish, and men, except those who first believed without an example, would be saved by no merit. For indeed faith and hope would fail, without which no man having understanding can merit the kingdom of God: for faith and hope are of those things which are not seen. For when men saw those who were converted to Christ immediately pass to incorruptibility: there would be no one who could at least not will to withdraw himself from such great beatitude which he saw. Therefore, that we may more gloriously obtain the beatitude which we desire through the merit of faith and of hope: we remain, as long as we are in this life, in that which is now not imputed to sin, although it happened on account of sin. Finally, beatitude is not promised to us through baptism and Christian faith such as Adam had before sin in paradise, but such as he was going to have when the number of men should be completed who were to be assumed for perfecting the heavenly city, which is to be completed both from angels and from men: where men shall not procreate, as they would have done in paradise. If therefore those converted to Christ soon passed into that incorruptibility, there would not be men from whom that number could be gathered: since to the beatitude which they saw, no one could not hasten. This I think is what the Apostle says of them: Who through faith worked justice, and all these, he

says, approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise, God providing some better thing for us, lest they should be consummated without us (Heb. 11:33, 39, 40). For if it is asked what better thing He provided for us from this, because they did not receive the promise, I see that nothing more convenient can be answered than what I said above: because, clearly, if for them being approved the beatitude promised to the just were not deferred, merit would perish in those who would know this not through faith but through experience: also the propagation of men, from which we are born, would fail; since all would run to the incorruptibility which they saw present. Therefore God provided a great good for us, when for the saints approved by the testimony of faith He deferred the acceptance of the promise; so that we also might be propagated, and faith might remain, through which with them we might merit the promise; and together with them we might be consummated. There is also another reason why the baptized, and martyrs, do not immediately become incorruptible. For indeed if someone should severely beat his servant, whom he had proposed to enrich some time with great honors, for a fault for which he could in no way satisfy through himself, being about to thrust him after this beating at a set time into a horrendous prison, where he should be tortured with most grave punishments; and there be someone powerful with the lord, who satisfying for him should reconcile him: certainly the stripes which the guilty one deservedly received

before satisfaction, while he was in fault, are not deleted; but the greater torments, into which he had not yet been thrust, are averted by the intervening reconciliation; the honors also, which he was to receive in his own time if he had not sinned, and of which he was to be devoid after fault if he is not reconciled, are handed over on account of the perfect satisfaction, just as had been first ordained, without any change. For if before reconciliation he had been disinherited of those honors, just as he was to be disinherited after fault irrecoverably if he were not reconciled; no reconciliation would have place for helping. But since he could not be disinherited of an honor which he did not yet have, nor ought to have, reconciliation can prevent this disinheriting and avert it. If however that servant, while he lies in the sickness of the beating until it itself passes, vows and pays to his lord fidelity and correction with heart and mouth: so it is between God and man. For when human nature first sinned, it was scourged with this punishment, that it should never procreate offspring naturally except such as we see infants to be born; and after this life in hell, it should be forever exiled from the kingdom of God, to which it had been made, unless someone should reconcile it, which it alone could not do through itself. But by whom it may be reconciled is none but Christ. In all infants therefore born naturally, it is born with sin and scourged: which when it approaches reconciliation, the scourging deservedly remains which it received before reconciliation. But the torments which it

was going to suffer in hell are remitted in those whom Christ redeemed; and the kingdom of God, which after the conversation of the earthly paradise it was to receive in its own time, is given: if however they persevere until the end in the faith which they promise in baptism.

CHAPTER X [al. XX].---That if any striving do not profit or fail, this is not done from impossibility.

But that some think it is proved by experience that free choice avails nothing, because many strive with immense effort that they may live well, and some, as they say, impossibility standing in the way, they profit nothing, or after profit they irreparably fail: does not destroy what has been rationally shown, namely that free choice with grace avails. But that those striving do not profit, or after profit fail; I think it is done not by impossibility, but sometimes by grave, sometimes by easily surmountable difficulty. For very often we are accustomed to assert that it is impossible for us, what we are not able to perfect without difficulty. For if each one should diligently consider the movements of his own will, he will understand that he never deserts the rectitude of the will received through grace, except by willing something else which he cannot will at the same time. Which certainly he does not do by the power of preserving that same rectitude failing, which power is freedom of choice itself: but the will to preserve failing, which through itself does not fail, but another will, as I said, expelling it.

CHAPTER XI [al. XXI].---In what sense the will of living rightly is in a just or unjust man.

Since, however, that consideration is mostly concerned with the will, I think something deeper should be said about the will, which, as I think, will not be useless. Just as we have members in the body, and five senses, each adapted to its own uses, which we use as if they were instruments; as the hands are adapted for grasping, the feet for walking, the tongue for speaking, the sight for seeing: so also the soul has in itself certain powers, which it uses like instruments for congruent uses. For there is reason in the soul, which it uses as its instrument for reasoning: and the will, which it uses for willing. For neither reason nor the will is the whole soul; but each is something in the soul. Since therefore individual instruments have both that which they are and their aptitudes, and their uses: let us discern in the will (on account of which we say these things) the instrument, and its aptitudes, and its use: which aptitudes in the will we can name affections. For the instrument of willing is affected by its own aptitudes. Whence the soul of a man is said, when it vehemently wills something, to be affected for willing that, or to will affectionately. Will, therefore, seems to be said equivocally in three ways. For one thing is the instrument of willing, another the affection of the instrument, another the use of the same instrument. The instrument of willing is that power of the soul which we use for willing: just as reason is the instrument of reasoning which we use when we

reason; and sight is the instrument of seeing which we use when we see. The affection of this instrument is that by which the instrument itself is so affected for willing something, even when it does not think of that which it wills: so that if it should come into memory, it may will it either immediately or in its own time. For thus the instrument of willing is affected for willing health, even when it does not think of it; so that as soon as it should come into memory, it immediately wills it: and thus it is affected for willing sleep, even when it does not think of it; so that when it comes into the mind, it may will it in its own time. For it is never so affected that it should at some time will sickness, or that it should will never to sleep. Similarly in a just man the same instrument is affected for willing justice, even when he sleeps; so that, when he thinks of it, he immediately wills it. But the use of the same instrument is what we do not have except when we think of the thing which we will. Moreover, will is said of both the instrument of willing, and its affection, and its use. We call the instrument "will" indeed, when we say that we turn the will to diverse things, now clearly to willing to walk, now to willing to sit, now to willing another and another thing. This instrument a man always has, although he does not always use it: as he has sight, which is the instrument of seeing, even when he does not use it, as when he sleeps; and when he uses it, he turns it now to seeing the heaven, now to seeing the earth, now to seeing something else. And thus we always have the

instrument of reasoning, that is reason, which we do not always use, and which by reasoning we turn to diverse things. But the affection of the instrument of willing is called "will" when we say that a man always has the will that it may be well with him: for we call "will" here that affection of the same instrument by which a man wills it to be well with him. In the same way a holy man is asserted, even when he should sleep and does not think, to have incessantly the will of living justly. And when we assert this will to be greater in one than in another; we say the will is nothing else than that affection of the instrument itself by which he wills to live justly. For the instrument is not greater in one and less in another. But the use of this instrument is named "will": as when someone says: Now I have the will of reading, that is, Now I will to read; or, Now I have the will of writing, that is, Now I will to write. For just as to see is to use sight, which is the instrument of seeing; and its use is vision, or sight, when "sight" signifies the same as vision (for "sight" also signifies the instrument itself): so to will is to use the will, which is the instrument of willing, and its use is the will, which is not except when we think what we will. Therefore the will which is the instrument is only one, that is, the instrument of willing is only one in man; just as reason is only one, that is, only one instrument of reasoning. But the will by which that instrument is affected is twofold. For just as sight has several aptitudes; clearly, for seeing light, and through light for seeing figures, for seeing colors; so the instru-

ment of willing has two aptitudes, which I call affections: of which one is for willing advantage (*commoditas*); the other for willing rectitude. For indeed the will which is the instrument wills nothing except either advantage or rectitude. For whatever else it wills, it wills either on account of advantage or on account of rectitude; and to these, even if it be deceived, it thinks itself to refer what it wills. Through the affection indeed which is for willing advantage, a man always wills beatitude and to be happy: but through that which is for willing rectitude, he wills rectitude, and to be right, that is just. Moreover on account of advantage he wills something: as when he wills to plow or to labor, that he may have whence he may protect life and health, which things he judges to be advantageous. But on account of rectitude: as when he wills to learn with labor, that he may know how to live rightly, that is justly. But the will which is the use of the oft-mentioned instrument is not except when someone thinks what he wills, as has been said. Of this will there is a manifold division: concerning which not now, but perhaps at another time we shall speak. Moreover "to will" is equivocal, just as "to see": for just as he is said to see who uses sight; and he who does not use it, but who has the aptitude of seeing: so it is asserted to will both he who uses the instrument of willing by thinking what he wills; and he who does not use it, since he has the affection, that is the aptitude, of willing. By this also it can be known that the will which is the instrument of willing is one thing, its affection

another, its use of the same instrument another: because if a just man is said, even when he sleeps and thinks nothing, to have the will of living justly; and an unjust man is denied to have, when he sleeps, the will of living rightly: the same will is denied of the unjust which is asserted of the just. But it is plain that when we say there is not in the sleeping unjust man the will of living justly, it is not denied that in him is the will which I called the instrument: since every man, sleeping and waking, always has it. Wherefore since no other will is pronounced to be in the good man in this way than that which is removed from the evil man: it is not signified that the will which is the instrument is in the good man; but that by which the instrument is affected. Moreover there is no doubt that in the sleeping man, unless he dreams, there is not the will which is the use: wherefore, when the will of living justly is said to be in the sleeping just man, the will of use is not understood there. Therefore the will of affection is not the will of instrument, or the will of use; also no one is ignorant that the will of instrument is not the will of use; since when I say that I do not have the will of writing, no one understands that I do not have the instrument of willing. Therefore the will of instrument is one thing, the will of affection another, the will of use another. The will of instrument indeed moves all other instruments which we use spontaneously, and which are in us, as the hands, the tongue, the sight; and which are outside of us, as the pen and the axe; and it makes all voluntary movements: but it moves itself by

its own affections: whence it can be called an instrument moving itself. I say the will of instrument makes all voluntary movements: but if we consider diligently, he is more truly said to make all that nature or the will makes, who makes nature and the instrument of willing with its own affections, without which the same instrument does nothing.

CHAPTER XII [al. XXII].--- That from the will of rectitude or of advantage proceeds all merit of man, whether unto salvation or unto damnation.

From these two affections, which we also call wills, descends all merit of man, whether good or evil. Which two wills also differ in this, that that which is for willing advantage is inseparable; but that which is for willing rectitude was separable, as I said above (Dialogue on Free Choice, c. 14), in the beginning in the angels, and in our first parents; and it is still in those remaining in this life. In this also they differ, that that which is for willing advantage is not that which it itself wills: but that which is for willing rectitude, is rectitude. For indeed no one wills rectitude except having rectitude: nor can anyone will rectitude, except by rectitude. But it is plain that this is the rectitude of that will which is the instrument. This we pronounce, when by justice is designated rectitude of will preserved for its own sake. This is also that truth of the will in which the devil is rebuked by the Lord for not having stood: which I said (chap. 4) in the Treatise on Truth. Now it is to be considered how from these two wills, which I call aptitudes or affections, proceed, as I

said, the merits of men, whether unto salvation or unto damnation. Rectitude indeed, as far as is in itself, is the cause of no evil, and is the mother of all good merit, for this favors the spirit lusting against the flesh (Gal. 5:17) and delights in the law of God according to the interior man (Rom. 7:22), that is according to the same spirit. But if evil is sometimes seen to follow from it, it is not from itself, but from something else. For indeed by rectitude the apostles were a good odor to God (2 Cor. 2:15): but that to some they were the odor of death unto death (*ibid.*), did not proceed from the justice of the apostles, but from the iniquity of the malevolent. But that will which is for willing advantage is not always evil; but when it consents to the flesh lusting against the spirit.

CHAPTER XIII [al. XXIII].---Whence is the will so vicious and so prone to evil.

But that this may be more clearly understood, it must be investigated whence that will is so vicious and so prone to evil. For it is not to be believed that God made it such in our first parents. For when I stated that human nature on account of sin incurred corruption and appetites after the likeness of brute animals, I did not say how such a will arose in man. For vicious appetites are one thing: a vicious will consenting to the appetites is another. Concerning such a will, therefore, I think it should be asked whence it happened to man. But if we consider the first condition of rational nature, the cause of such a will will easily be open to us. For the intention of God was that He might make rational nature

just and happy for enjoying Himself: but it could be neither just nor happy without the will of justice and of beatitude. The will of justice indeed is justice itself; but the will of beatitude is not beatitude: because not everyone has beatitude who has the will for it. Moreover in beatitude, according to the sense of all, is the sufficient competence of advantages without any lack: whether angelic beatitude be understood, or that which Adam had in paradise. For although the beatitude of the angels was greater than that which was of man in paradise, nevertheless it cannot therefore be denied that Adam had beatitude. For just as a great heat is without any cold, and yet there can be another greater heat: and just as cold is without any heat, when yet a greater cold can be; so nothing prohibits Adam from having been happy in paradise without any lack, although angelic beatitude were greater. For indeed to have something less than another is not always to lack; but to be devoid of something, when it ought to be had (which was not in Adam), is to lack. But where there is lack, there is misery: moreover God did not make, without preceding fault, rational nature miserable, which He created for understanding and loving Himself: God therefore made man happy without any lack. Together therefore rational nature received both the will of beatitude, and beatitude, and the will of justice, that is rectitude, which is justice itself, and free choice, without which it could not preserve justice. Moreover God so ordained these two wills, or affections; that the will which is

the instrument should use that which is justice for command and governance, the spirit which is also called mind and reason teaching; and should use the other for obeying, without any inconvenience. Beatitude indeed He gave to man (to say nothing of the angels) for his advantage; but justice for His own honor: but justice so that he could desert it; so that when he should not desert it but preserve it perseveringly, he might merit to be promoted to the fellowship of angels: but if he should desert it, he could in no way resume it through himself thereafter; and he would not obtain the beatitude of the angels, and would be deprived of that which he had, and falling into the likeness of brute animals, would be subject with them to corruption and the oft-mentioned appetites; yet the will of beatitude would remain: so that through the lack of the goods which he had lost, he should be justly punished with grave misery. Since therefore he deserted justice, he lost beatitude; and the will which he received good and for his good, fervent with the desire of advantages which it cannot not will, because it is not able to have the true advantages convenient to rational nature which it lost, it turns itself to false advantages and those of brute animals which beastly appetites suggest: and so when it wills them inordinately, it repels rectitude lest it be received when offered, or expels it when received: but when it wills them licitly, it does not do this. In this way therefore the will which is the instrument, created good in as much as it has being, and just and strong for preserving the

received justice; through free choice was made evil, not in as much as it is, but in as much as it was made unjust through the absence of the spontaneously deserted justice which it ought always to have. It was also made weak in a way for willing the deserted justice: for it cannot so will it through free choice when it does not have it, as it is able to preserve it when it has it. Also the will of advantage, founded good in as much as it is something; was made evil, that is unjust, because it is not subject to justice, without which it ought to will nothing. Therefore the will which is the instrument, since it was spontaneously made unjust, after deserting justice it remains, as far as is in itself, unjust by necessity, and the handmaid of injustice: because it cannot return through itself to justice, without which it is never free, because the natural freedom of choice without it is idle. It was also made the handmaid of its own affection which is for advantage: because, justice being removed, it can will nothing except what that wills. Moreover I say both the instrument and its affection will: because both the instrument is will, and the affection is will. Nor is it incongruously said that each will wills: because that one wills which it wills by its affection; and the affection wills, through which that one wills: just as both a man is said to see, who sees by sight, and the sight itself by which he sees. Whence not absurdly can we say the affections of that will, which I called the instrument of the soul, are as it were instruments of the same instrument: because it works nothing except by

these. Therefore the instrument of willing justice, that is rectitude, being lost; in no way, unless it be restored through grace, can the will which is the instrument will justice. Wherefore since it ought to will nothing except justly: whatever it wills without rectitude, it wills unjustly. But the appetites, all of which the Apostle calls flesh and concupiscence, in as much as they are, are not evil or unjust; but because they are in a rational creature where they ought not to be, they are called unjust. Since indeed in brute animals they are not evil or unjust, because they ought to be there.

CHAPTER XIV [al. XXIV].---How man has free choice, although he can will nothing except unjustly.

CHAPTER XIV [al. XXIV].---Recapitulation, and conclusion of the work.

Now from these things which have been said, it can be known that man for this reason does not always have justice, which he ought to have without intermission; because in no way can he attain or recover it by himself. It is also clear that God does His good works by His goodness alone: since He himself creates the will with free choice, and gives to it the justice through which it works. But evil things He does by the fault of men alone; because He would not do them if man did not want to do them: nevertheless He makes that which they are; since He established in man the will, which he uses without justice: and therefore by the fault of man alone are the evil things which he works.

For it is not the fault of God, who created in him the will with freedom of choice, and conferred on him justice, so that he might will nothing except justly; but the fault of man, who deserted the justice which he could have kept. God, therefore, has in good things indeed, that they are good by essence; and that they are good by justice: but in evil things only that they are good by essence; not that they are evil by the absence of due justice, which is not something. Man, however, has in good things, that they are not evil; because when he could have deserted justice and done evil, he did not desert it; but kept it through free choice, with grace giving and following; but in evil things this alone, that they are evil: because he does them by his own, that is, unjust will alone.

I think I can now fittingly put an end to the treatise on the three difficult questions, which I began in the hope of the help of God, in which if I have said anything that ought to suffice for anyone seeking, I do not impute it to myself; because not I, but the grace of God with me. Moreover, I say this because if anyone, when my mind was fluctuating by seeking reason in those same questions, had responded to me seeking concerning them what I have written, I would have given thanks because he would have satisfied me. Since therefore what I have known from there, God manifesting it, has greatly pleased me; understanding that it would likewise please some if I should write this: what I have received

freely, I have wished freely to bestow on those asking.