

SAINT ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

MONOLOGION: ON THE ESSENCE OF THE DI-
VINITY

De Divinitatis Essentia Monologium

SABBATISMUS

Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109)
De Divinitatis Essentia Monologium · Monologion: On the Essence of the Divinity

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DE DIVINITATIS ESSENTIA MONOLOGIUM.

1-3 PRAEFATIO.

De Divinitatis essentia, per meditationis modum, non Scripturae auctoritate, sed rationum momentis hic disserit Anselmus. Nihil dixit quod SS. PP. et maxime beati Augustini scriptis non cohaereat. Cum dixit cap . 76 Trinitatem posse dici tres substantias, hoc est tres personas, cum Graecis locutus est.

Quidam fratres saepe me studioseque precati sunt ut quaedam quae illis de meditanda Divinitatis essentia, et quibusdam aliis huius meditationi cohaerentibus, usitato sermone colloquendo protuleram, sub quodam eius meditationis exemplo describerem. Cujus scilicet scribendae meditationis magis secundum suam voluntatem, quam secundum rei facilitatem aut meam possibilitatem, hanc mihi formam praestituerunt : quatenus auctoritate Scripturae penitus nihil in ea persuaderetur; sed quidquid per singulas investigationes finis assereret, id ita esse plano stylo et vulgaribus argumentis, simplicique disputatione, et rationis necessitas breviter cogeret, et veritatis claritas patenter ostenderet. Voluerunt etiam ut nec simplicibus peneque fatuis, objectionibus mihi occurrentibus obviare contemnerem. Quod quidem diu tentare recusavi, atque mecum reipsa comparans, multis me rationibus excusare tentavi: quanto enim id quod petebant usu sibi optabant facilius, tanto mihi illud actu injungebant difficilius. Tandem tamen victus, tum precum modesta importunitate, tum studii eorum non contemnenda honestate; invitus quidem propter rei difficultatem, et ingenii mei imbecillitatem, quod precabantur incoepi; sed libenter propter eorum charitatem, quantum potui secundum ipsorum diffinitionem effeci. Ad quod cum ea spe sim adductus, ut quidquid facerem illis solis a quibus exigebatur, esset notum, et paulo post idipsum ut vilem rem fastidientibus, contemptu esset obruendum: scio enim me in eo non tam precantibus satisfacere eisdem potuisse, quam precibus me prosequentibus finem posuisse. Nescio tamen quo pacto sic praeter spem evenit, ut non solum praedicti fratres, sed et plures alii Scripturam ipsam, quisque eam sibi transcribendo in longum memoriae condemnare satagerent: quam ego saepe retractans nihil potui invenire me in ea dixisse, quod non catholicorum Patrum, et maxime beati Augustini, scriptis cohaereat.

MONOLOGIUM ON THE ESSENCE OF DIVINITY.

1-3 PREFACE.

Anselm here discusses the essence of Divinity through the mode of meditation, not by the authority of Scripture, but by the weight of reasons. He said nothing that does not cohere with the writings of the Holy Fathers, and especially of the blessed Augustine. When he said in chapter 76 that the Trinity can be called three substances, that is, three persons, he spoke with the Greeks.

Some brothers have often and eagerly entreated me that I should write down, under a certain example of meditation for them, some things which I had brought forth to them concerning the meditating on the essence of Divinity, and some other things cohering to this meditation, conversing in everyday speech. And indeed for the writing of this meditation, they prescribed this form for me, more according to their own will than according to the ease of the matter or my own capability: that absolutely nothing in it should be persuaded by the authority of Scripture; but whatever the end of individual investigations might assert, the necessity of reason should briefly compel, and the clarity of truth should openly show, that it is so, in plain style and with common arguments, and simple disputation. They also wished that I should not disdain to meet even simple and almost foolish objections occurring to me. Which indeed I refused to attempt for a long time, and comparing it with myself in the matter itself, I tried to excuse myself with many reasons: for the more easily they desired for their own use what they were asking, the more difficultly they enjoined in act that upon me. Yet finally overcome, partly by the modest importunity of their prayers, partly by the non-contemptible honesty of their zeal; unwilling indeed because of the difficulty of the matter and the weakness of my intellect, I began what they were praying for; but willingly because of their charity, I effected as much as I could according to their definition. To which I was led with this hope, that whatever I did might be known to those alone by whom it was exacted, and shortly after that very thing should be overwhelmed with contempt, as a vile thing to those disdaining it: for I know that in it I could not so much satisfy those same entreating, as put an end to the prayers pursuing me. Yet I know not how it thus happened beyond hope, that not only the aforesaid brothers, but also many others strove to commit the Scripture itself to long memory, each one by transcribing it for himself: which I, frequently retracting, could find nothing that I have said in it, which does not cohere with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, and especially of the blessed Augustine.

Quapropter, si cui videbitur quod in eodem opusculo aliquid protulerim, quod aut nimis novum sit, aut a veritate dissentiat, rogo ne statim me aut praesumptorem novitatum, aut falsitatis assertorem exclamet; sed prius libros praefati doctoris Augustini de Trinitate diligenter perspiciat, deinde secundum eos opusculum meum dijudicet. Quod enim dixi summam Trinitatem posse dici tres substantias, Graecos secutus sum, qui confitentur tres substantias in una essentia, eadem fide, qua nos tres personas in una substantia. Nam hoc significant in Deo per substantiam, quod nos per personam. Quaecunque autem ibi dixi, sub persona secum sola cogitatione disputantis et investigantis ea, quae prius non animadvertisset, prolata sunt: sicut sciebam illos velle quorum petitioni obsequi intendebam. Precor autem et obsecro vehementer, si quis hoc opusculum voluerit transcribere, ut hanc praefationem in capite libelli ante ipsa capitula 4 studeat praeponere. Multum enim prodesse puto ad intelligenda ea quae legerit ibi, si quis prius, qua intentione, quove modo disputata sint, cognoverit. Puto etiam quod si quis hanc ipsam praefationem viderit prius, non temere iudicabit, si quid contra suam opinionem prolatum invenerit.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

Quod sit quiddam optimum et maximum et summum omnium quae sunt.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Unam summam naturam existere, sibi sufficientem, et a cujus omnipotenti bonitate omnia alia sint, pluraque alia quae de Deo credimus, sola ratio magna ex parte persuadere potest. Modus autem investigandi summam naturam promptissimus hic est. Non appetimus nisi quae bona putamus: et plurima bona esse ratione discernimus. Certissimum est autem quia quaecunque dicuntur aliquid, ita ut ad invicem magis aut minus aut aequaliter dicantur, per aliquid dicuntur quod non aliud et aliud, sed idem intelligitur in diversis quae in eo uno conveniunt. Ergo necesse est ut omnia sint bona per aliquid quod unum idem sit in diversis bonis. Ergo datur unum quid per quod cuncta sunt bona, et in quo bona diversa conveniunt. Quis autem dubitet illud ipsum, per quod cuncta sunt bona, esse magnum bonum, et esse bonum per seipsum? Ergo omnia alia bona sunt per aliud; et ipsum solum est per seipsum. At quod per aliud est, minus est eo quod per se est bonum. Ergo illud quod est per se bonum, est summe bonum, et summum omnium quae sunt: nam quod est summe bonum, est summe magnum. Est igitur unum aliquid summe magnum et summe bonum, id est summum omnium quae sunt.

Wherefore, if it shall seem to anyone that in the same little work I have brought forth anything which is either too new, or dissents from the truth, I ask that he not immediately exclaim me to be either a presumer of novelties, or an assertor of falsity; but first let him diligently examine the books of the aforesaid doctor Augustine on the Trinity, and then according to them let him judge my little work. For in that I said the supreme Trinity can be called three substances, I followed the Greeks, who confess three substances in one essence, by the same faith by which we confess three persons in one substance. For they signify that in God by substance, which we do by person. But whatever things I have said there, are brought forth under the person of one disputing and investigating by himself with alone cogitation those things which he had not well considered before: as I knew those wished whose petition I intended to obey. But I pray and vehemently beseech, if anyone shall wish to transcribe this little work, that he take care to prefix this preface at the head of the little book before the chapters themselves. For I think it to be of much profit for understanding those things which he shall read there, if anyone shall first know with what intention, or in what mode they have been disputed. I also think that if anyone shall see this very preface first, he will not rashly judge, if he shall find anything brought forth against his own opinion.

CHAPTER I.

That there is a certain best and greatest and supreme of all things that are.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---That one supreme nature exists, sufficient unto itself, and from whose omnipotent goodness all other things are, and many other things which we believe concerning God, reason alone can in great part persuade. But the most prompt mode of investigating the supreme nature is this. We do not appetite except those things which we think good: and we discern by reason that there are very many good things. But it is most certain that whatever things are called something, so that they are called to one another more or less or equally, are called through something which is not understood as one thing and another, but the same in the diverse things which convene in that one. Therefore it is necessary that all things be good through something which is one and the same in diverse goods. Therefore there is given a certain one thing through which all things are good, and in which diverse goods convene. But who would doubt that that very thing, through which all things are good, is a great good, and is good through itself? Therefore all other goods are through another; and it alone is through itself. But what is through another, is less than that which is good through itself. Therefore that which is good through itself, is supremely good, and the supreme of all things that are: for what is supremely good, is supremely great. There is therefore a certain one thing supremely great and supremely good, that is, the supreme of all things that are.

Si quis unam naturam summam omnium quae sunt, solam sibi in aeterna beatitudine sua sufficientem omnibusque rebus aliis hoc ipsum quod aliquid sunt, aut quod aliquo modo bene sunt, per omnipotentem bonitatem suam dantem et facientem, aliaque perplura, quae de Deo, sive de ejus creatura necessario credimus, aut non audiendo, aut non credendo ignorat, putat quia ea ipsa ex magna parte, si vel mediocris ingenii est, potest ipse sibi saltem sola ratione persuadere. Quod cum multis modis facere possit, unum ponam, quem illi aestimo esse promptissimum. Etenim cum omnes frui solis his appetant, quae bona putant; in promptu est, ut aliquando mentis oculum convertat ad investigandum illud, unde sunt bona ea ipsa, quae non appetit, nisi quia judicat esse bona, ut deinde ratione ducente et illa prosequente ad ea, quae irrationabiliter ignorat, rationabiliter proficiat. In quo tamen si quid dixerō, quod major non monstret auctoritas, sic volo accipi: ut quamvis ex rationibus, quae mihi videbuntur, quasi necessarium concludatur, non ob hoc tamen omnino necessarium, sed tantum sic interim videri posse dicatur. Facile est igitur ut aliquis sic secum tacitus dicat: Cum tam innumerabilia bona sint, quorum tam multam diversitatem et sensibus corporeis experimur, et ratione mentis discernimus, estne credendum esse unum aliquid, per quod unum sint bona quaecunque bona sunt; an sunt bona alia per aliud. Certissimum quidem et omnibus est volentibus advertere perspicuum quia quaecunque dicuntur aliquid, ita ut ad invicem magis aut minus aut aequaliter dicantur per aliquid dicuntur, quod non aliud et aliud, sed idem intelligitur in diversis, sive in illis aequaliter sive inaequaliter consideretur. Nam quaecunque justa dicuntur ad invicem, sive pariter sive magis vel minus, non possunt intelligi justa nisi per justitiam, quae non est aliud et aliud in diversis. Ergo cum certum sit quod omnia bona, si ad invicem conferantur, aut aequaliter, aut inaequaliter sint bona, necesse est ut omnia sint per aliquid bona, quod intelligitur idem in diversis bonis, licet aliquando videantur bona dici alia per aliud. Per aliud enim videtur dici bonus equus, quia fortis est; et per aliud bonus equus, quia velox est.

If anyone ignores, either by not hearing or by not believing, that there is one nature supreme of all things that are, alone sufficient unto itself in its eternal beatitude, and giving and making to all other things through its own omnipotent goodness this very thing that they are something, or that they are well in some mode, and very many other things, which we necessarily believe concerning God, or concerning his creature, I think that he himself can at least by reason alone persuade himself of those very things in great part, if he be of even mediocre intellect. Which since he can do in many modes, I shall posit one, which I esteem to be the most prompt for him. For since all appetite to enjoy only those things which they think good; it is in readiness, that at some time he may turn the eye of the mind to investigating that, whence are good those very things, which he does not appetite, except because he judges them to be good, so that then with reason leading and following those things, he may rationally advance to those things which he irrationally ignores. In which, however, if I shall say anything which a greater authority does not show, I wish it to be accepted thus: that although it be concluded as if necessary from the reasons which shall seem to me, yet it be not said to be absolutely necessary on this account, but only that it can seem so in the meantime. It is easy therefore that anyone thus speak tacitly with himself: Since there are so innumerable goods, the great diversity of which we both experience with bodily senses, and discern with the reason of the mind, is it to be believed that there is one somewhat, through which all things are good whatever are good; or are some good through another. Indeed it is most certain and perspicuous to all wishing to advert, that whatever things are called something, so that they are called to one another more or less or equally, are called through something, which is not understood as one thing and another, but the same in the diverse things, whether it be considered in them equally or unequally. For whatever things are called just to one another, whether equally or more or less, cannot be understood as just except through justice, which is not one thing and another in diverse things. Therefore since it is certain that all goods, if they be collated to one another, are good either equally, or unequally, it is necessary that all be made good through something, which is understood the same in diverse goods, although sometimes they seem to be called good some through another. For a horse seems to be called good through one thing, because it is strong; and a horse good through another thing, because it is swift.

Cum enim videatur dici bonus per fortitudinem, et bonus per velocitatem, non tamen idem videtur esse velocitas et fortitudo. Verum si equus, quia est fortis et velox, idcirco bonus est; quomodo fortis et velox latro malus est? Potius igitur quemadmodum fortis et velox latro ideo malus est quia noxius est; ita fortis et velox equus idcirco bonus est, quia utilis est. Et quidem nihil solet putari bonum, nisi aut propter utilitatem aliquam, ut bona dicitur salus, et quae saluti prosunt; aut propter quamlibet honestatem, sicut pulchritudo aestimatur bona, et quae pulchritudinem juvant. Sed quoniam jam perspecta ratio nullo potest dissolvi pacto, necesse est omne quoque utile vel honestum, si vere bona sunt, per idipsum esse bona per quod necesse est cuncta esse bona, quidquid illud sit. Quis autem dubitet illud ipsum, per quod cuncta sunt bona esse magnum bonum? Illud igitur est bonum per seipsum; quoniam omne bonum est per ipsum. Ergo consequitur ut omnia alia bona sint per aliud quam quod ipsa sunt et ipsum solum per seipsum. At nullum bonum quod per aliud est, est aequale aut majus eo bono quod per se est bonum. Illud itaque solum est summe bonum, quod solum est per se bonum. Id enim summum est, quod sic supereminet aliis, ut nec par habeat, nec praestantius. Sed quod est summe bonum, est etiam summe magnum. Est igitur unum aliquid summe magnum, et summe bonum, id est summum omnium quae sunt.

CAPUT II.

De eadem re.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Sicut est unum aliquid summe bonum, quia cuncta bona per unum aliquid sunt, quod est bonum per se; ita existit unum aliquid summe magnum; quia quaecunque magna sunt, per unum aliquid magna sunt, quod magnum est per seipsum. Magnum intelligo, non spatio, ut est corpus, sed sapientia; quod melius et dignius est.

Quemadmodum autem inventum est aliquid esse summe bonum, quoniam cuncta bona per unum aliquid sunt bona, quod est bonum per seipsum; sic ex necessitate colligitur aliquid esse summe magnum, quoniam quaecunque magna sunt, per unum aliquid magna sunt, quod magnum est per seipsum. Dico autem non magnum spatio, ut est corpus aliquod; sed quod quanto majus, tanto melius est aut dignius, ut est sapientia. Et quoniam non potest esse summe magnum, nisi id quod est summe bonum, necesse est aliquid esse maximum et optimum, id est summum omnium quae sunt.

For although it seems to be called good through strength, and good through swiftness, yet swiftness and strength do not seem to be the same. But if a horse, because it is strong and swift, is therefore good; how is a strong and swift robber evil? Rather therefore as a strong and swift robber is therefore evil because he is noxious; so a strong and swift horse is therefore good, because it is useful. And indeed nothing is wont to be thought good, except either on account of some utility, as health is called good, and those things which profit health; or on account of some honesty whatever, just as beauty is esteemed good, and those things which assist beauty. But since the reason already inspected can be dissolved by no pact, it is necessary that every useful or honest thing also, if they are truly good, be good through that very thing through which it is necessary that all things be good, whatever that is. But who would doubt that that very thing, through which all things are good, is a great good? That therefore is good through itself; since every good is through it. Therefore it follows that all other goods are through another than what they themselves are, and it alone through itself. But no good which is through another, is equal or greater than that good which is good through itself. Therefore that alone is supremely good, which alone is good through itself. For that is supreme, which so supereminently excels others, that it has neither an equal, nor a more excellent. But what is supremely good, is also supremely great. There is therefore a certain one thing supremely great, and supremely good, that is the supreme of all things that are.

CHAPTER II.

On the same matter.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---As there is a certain one thing supremely good, because all goods are through a certain one thing, which is good through itself; so there exists a certain one thing supremely great; because whatever things are great, are great through a certain one thing, which is great through itself. I understand great, not by space, as a body is, but by wisdom; which is better and more worthy.

But as it has been discovered that there is something supremely good, since all goods are good through a certain one thing, which is good through itself; so from necessity it is collected that there is something supremely great, since whatever things are great, are great through a certain one thing, which is great through itself. But I say great not by space, as some body is; but that which the greater it is, the better or more worthy it is, as is wisdom. And since nothing can be supremely great, except that which is supremely good, it is necessary that something be greatest and best, that is, the supreme of all things that are.

CAPUT III.

Quod sit quaedam natura per quam est quidquid est, et quae per se est, et est summum omnium quae sunt.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Omne quod est, aut per aliquid, aut per nihil. Non per nihil; ergo per aliquid est. Illud autem per quod cuncta sunt, aut est unum, aut plura: si plura, haec plura sunt singula per se: et ita est una ratio seu vis qua plura haec habent ut sint per se. Ergo est unum aliquid per quod sunt quaecunque sunt: et illud solum est per se. Nulla enim, neque ea qua referuntur, neque ipsae relationes, sunt per invicem. At quod per aliud est, minus est eo quod per se est. Est igitur unum aliquid quod solum maxime 5 et summe omnium est, summeque bonum et summe magnum existit; utpote per quod est, quidquid bonum et magnum et aliquid est.

Denique non solum omnia bona per idem aliquid sunt bona, et omnia magna per idem aliquid sunt magna; sed quidquid est, per unum aliquid videtur esse. Omne namque quod est, aut est per aliquid, aut per nihil; sed nihil est per nihil. Non enim vel cogitari potest ut sit aliquid non per aliquid. Quidquid igitur est, non nisi per aliquid est. Quod cum ita sit, aut est unum, aut sunt plura, per quae sunt cuncta quae sunt. Sed si sunt plura, aut ipsa referuntur ad unum aliquid, per quod sunt; aut eadem plura singula sunt per se; aut ipsa per se invicem sunt. At si plura ipsa sunt per unum, jam non sunt omnia per plura; sed potius per illud unum, per quod haec plura sunt. Si vero ipsa plura singula sunt per se, utique est una aliqua vis vel natura existendi per se, qua habent ut per se sint. Non est autem dubium quod per idipsum unum sint, per quod habent ut sint per se. Verius ergo per ipsum unum cuncta sunt, quam per plura, quae sine eo uno esse non possunt: ut vero plura per se invicem sint, nulla patitur ratio; quoniam irrationalis cogitatio est ut aliqua res sit per illud cui dat esse: nam nec ipsa relativa sic sunt per se invicem.

CHAPTER III.

That there is a certain nature through which is whatever is, and which is through itself, and is the supreme of all things that are.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Every thing that is, is either through something, or through nothing. Not through nothing; therefore it is through something. But that through which all things are, is either one, or many: if many, these many are individual through themselves: and thus there is one reason or power by which these many have it that they are through themselves. Therefore there is a certain one thing through which are whatever things are: and that alone is through itself. For none, neither those by which they are related, nor the relations themselves, are through each other. But what is through another, is less than that which is through itself. There is therefore a certain one thing which alone is maximally and supremely of all things, and exists supremely good and supremely great; inasmuch as through it is whatever is good and great and something.

Finally not only are all good things good through the same certain thing, and all great things great through the same certain thing; but whatever is, seems to be through a certain one thing. For everything that is, is either through something, or through nothing; but nothing is through nothing. For it cannot even be cogitated that something is not through something. Whatever therefore is, is not except through something. Which since it is so, either there is one, or there are many, through which are all things that are. But if there are many, either they themselves refer to a certain one thing, through which they are; or those same many individual things are through themselves; or they themselves are through each other. But if the many themselves are through one, already all things are not through many; but rather through that one, through which these many are. But if those many individual things themselves are through themselves, assuredly there is some one power or nature of existing through oneself, by which they have it that they are through themselves. But there is no doubt that through that very one thing they are, through which they have it that they are through themselves. More truly therefore through that one thing itself are all things, than through many, which without that one cannot be: but that many should be through each other, no reason suffers; since it is an irrational cogitation that any thing should be through that to which it gives being: for not even those relative things themselves are thus through each other.

Nam cum dominus et servus referantur ad invicem, et ipsi homines qui referuntur, omnino non sunt per invicem; et ipsae relationes quibus referuntur, non omnino sunt per se invicem, quia eadem sunt per subjecta. Cum itaque veritas omnimodo excludat plura esse, per quae cuncta sunt, necesse est unum illud esse, per quod sunt cuncta quae sunt. Quoniam ergo cuncta quae sunt, sunt per ipsum unum; procul dubio et ipsum unum est per seipsum. Quaecunque igitur alia sunt, sunt per aliud et ipsum solum per seipsum. At quidquid est per aliud, minus est quam illud per quod cuncta sunt alia, et quod solum est per se. Quare illud quod est per se, maxime omnium est. Est igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est: quod autem maxime omnium est, et per quod est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, et omnino quidquid aliquid est, id necesse est esse summe bonum, et summe magnum, et summum omnium quae sunt. Quare est aliquid quod sive essentia, sive substantia, sive natura dicatur, optimum et maximum est, et summum omnium quae sunt.

CAPUT IV.

De eadem re.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Non omnes naturae sunt pares dignitate; sed aliae aliis sunt meliores. Ergo una datur quae caeteris sic supereminet, ut non habeat se superiorem: alioquin naturarum multitudo nullo fine clauderetur, quod est absurdum. Superior autem natura aut est sola, aut plures sunt aequales. Si plures, aequales non sunt, nisi per aliquid idem quod ipsa sit earum essentia: si enim per aliud essent aequales, essent illo minores; nec proinde summa essent ac caeteris superiores. Est igitur una quaedam natura seu essentia, quae est summum omnium quae sunt; quae per se bona et magna; quae per se est id quod ipsa est, et per quam est quidquid aut bonum aut magnum aut aliquid est.

Amplius : Si quis intendat rerum naturas, velit, nolit, sentit non eas omnes contineri una dignitatis paritate; sed quasdam earum distingui graduum imparitate. Qui enim dubitat quod in natura sua ligno melior sic equus, et equo praestantior homo, is profecto non est dicendus homo. Cum igitur naturarum aliae aliis negari non possint meliores, nihilominus persuadet ratio aliquam in eis sic supereminere, ut non habeat se superiorem.

For since master and servant refer to each other, both the men themselves who refer, are absolutely not through each other; and the relations themselves by which they refer, are not absolutely through each other, because those same are through subjects. Since therefore truth in every way excludes there being many, through which all things are, it is necessary that there be that one, through which are all things that are. Since therefore all things that are, are through that one itself; without doubt that one itself also is through itself. Whatever other things therefore are, are through another and it alone through itself. But whatever is through another, is less than that through which all other things are, and which alone is through itself. Wherefore that which is through itself, is maximally of all things. There is therefore a certain one thing, which alone is maximally and supremely of all things: but what is maximally of all things, and through which is whatever is good or great, and absolutely whatever is something, that is necessary to be supremely good, and supremely great, and the supreme of all things that are. Wherefore there is something which whether it be called essence, or substance, or nature, is best and greatest, and the supreme of all things that are.

CHAPTER IV.

On the same matter.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Not all natures are equal in dignity; but some are better than others. Therefore one is given which so supereminently excels the rest, that it does not have a superior to itself: otherwise the multitude of natures would be closed by no end, which is absurd. But the superior nature is either alone, or many are equal. If many, they are not equal, except through some same thing which is their essence: for if they were equal through another, they would be less than it; nor accordingly would they be supreme and superior to the rest. There is therefore a certain one nature or essence, which is the supreme of all things that are; which through itself is good and great; which through itself is that which it itself is, and through which is whatever is either good or great or something.

More largely: If anyone intends the natures of things, whether he wills or nills, he senses them not all to be contained in one parity of dignity; but certain of them to be distinguished by an imparity of degrees. For he who doubts that in its nature a horse is thus better than a wood, and a man more excellent than a horse, he surely is not to be called a man. Since therefore it cannot be denied that of natures some are better than others, reason nonetheless persuades that some one among them so supereminently excels, that it does not have a superior to itself.

Si enim hujusmodi graduum distinctio sic est infinita, ut nullus sit ibi gradus superior, quo superior alius non inveniatur; ad hoc ratio deducitur, ut ipsarum multitudo naturarum nullo fine claudatur. Hoc autem nemo non putat absurdum, nisi qui nimis est absurdus. Est igitur ex necessitate aliqua natura, quae sic est alicui vel aliquibus superior, ut nulla sit cui ordinetur inferior. Haec vero natura quae talis est, aut sola est, aut plures hujusmodi et aequales sunt: verum si plures sunt et aequales, cum aequales esse non possint, per diversa quaedam, sed per idem aliquid, illud unum, per quod aequaliter tam magnae sunt, aut est id ipsum quod ipsae sunt, id est, ipsa rerum essentia, aut aliud quam quod ipsae sunt. Sed si nihil est aliud quam ipsa earum essentia, sicut earum essentiae non sunt plures, sed una; ita et naturae non sunt plures, sed una. Idem namque naturam hic intelligo, quod essentiam. Si vero id, per quod plures ipsae naturae tam magnae sunt, aliud est quam quod ipsae sunt, pro certo minores sunt, quam id per quod magnae sunt. Quidquid enim per aliud est magnum, minus est quam id per quod est magnum. Quare non sunt sic magnae, ut illis nihil aliud sit majus. Quod si nec per hoc quod sunt, nec per aliud possibile est tales esse plures naturas, quibus nihil sit praestantius; nullo modo possunt esse naturae plures hujusmodi. Restat igitur unam et solam naturam aliquam esse, quae sic est aliis superior, ut nulli sit inferior; sed quod tale est, maximum et optimum est omnium quae sunt. Est igitur quaedam natura, quae est summum omnium quae sunt. Hoc autem esse non potest, nisi ipsa sit per se id quod est; et cuncta quae sunt, sint per ipsam id quod sunt. Nam cum paulo ante ratio docuerit id quod per se est, et per quod alia cuncta sunt, esse summum omnium existentium; aut e converso id quod est summum, est per se, et cuncta alia per illud; aut erunt plura summa. Sed plura summa non esse manifestum est. Quare est quaedam natura, vel substantia, vel essentia, quae est per se bona et magna, et per se est id quod est, et per quam est quidquid vere aut bonum, aut magnum, aut aliquid est, et quae est summum bonum, summum magnum, summum eus sive subsistens, id est, summum omnium quae sunt.

CAPUT V.

Quod sicut illa est per se, et alia per illam; ita illa sit ex se, et alia ex illa.

For if a distinction of degrees of this sort is so infinite, that there is no superior degree there, than which another superior is not found; reason is deduced to this, that the multitude of those very natures is closed by no end. But no one except one who is too absurd does not think this absurd. Therefore there is from necessity some nature, which is so superior to some one or some many, that there is none to which it is ordered as inferior. But this nature which is such, is either alone, or there are many of this sort and equal: but if there are many and equal, since they cannot be equal through certain diverse things, but through some same thing, that one, through which they are equally so great, is either that very thing which they themselves are, that is, the very essence of the things, or another than what they themselves are. But if it is nothing else than their very essence, just as their essences are not many, but one; so also the natures are not many, but one. For here I understand nature to be the same as essence. But if that, through which the many natures themselves are so great, is another than what they themselves are, it is for certain they are less than that through which they are great. For whatever is great through another, is less than that through which it is great. Wherefore they are not so great, that nothing else is greater than them. But if neither through this that they are, nor through another is it possible that there be many such natures, than which nothing is more excellent; in no mode can there be many natures of this sort. It remains therefore that there is one and alone some nature, which is so superior to others, that it is inferior to none; but what is such, is greatest and best of all things that are. There is therefore a certain nature, which is the supreme of all things that are. But this cannot be, unless it itself be through itself that which it is; and all things which are, be through it that which they are. For since reason has taught a little before that that which is through itself, and through which all other things are, is the supreme of all existing things; either conversely that which is supreme, is through itself, and all other things through it; or there will be many supremes. But it is manifest that there are not many supremes. Wherefore there is a certain nature, or substance, or essence, which is through itself good and great, and through itself is that which it is, and through which is whatever is truly either good, or great, or something, and which is the supreme good, the supreme great, the supreme being or subsistent, that is, the supreme of all things that are.

CHAPTER V.

That just as that [nature] is through itself, and other things through it; so it is from itself, and other things from it.

Quoniam itaque placet quod inventum est, juvat indagare utrum haec ipsa natura et cuncta quae aliquid sunt, non sint nisi ex ipsa, quemadmodum non sunt nisi per ipsam. Sed liquet posse dici quia quod est ex aliquo, est etiam per id ipsum; et quod est per aliquid, est etiam ex eo ipso: quemadmodum quod est ex materia et per artificem, potest etiam dici esse per materiam et ex artifice; quoniam per utrumque, et ex utroque, id est ab utroque habet ut sit, quamvis aliter sit per materiam et ex materia, quam per artificem et ex artifice. Consequitur ergo ut quomodo cuncta quae sunt, per summam naturam sunt id quod sunt; et ideo illa est per se ipsam, alia vero per aliud; ita omnia quae sunt, sint ex eadem summa natura: et idcirco illa sit ex seipsa, alia autem ex illa.

CAPUT VI

[al., V]. Quod illa non sit ulla juvante causa ducta ad esse; nec tamen sit per nihil aut ex nihilo; et quomodo intelligi possit esse per se, et ex se.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Quomodo summa natura per se esse dicenda est? Quidquid enim per aliquid est, aut per efficiens, aut per materiam, aut per instrumentum esse videtur. Quod autem aliquo ex his modis est, per aliud est, et proinde minus eo per quod habet ut sit; summa vero natura nec per aliud est, nec minor aut posterior seipsa, aut aliqua re. Ergo summa natura nec a se nec ab alio fieri potest; nec ipsa sibi aut aliquid aliud materia fuit, unde fieret; aut aliqua res ipsam, ut esset, adjuvit. Sed nec intelligi potest ut quod aliquid est, sit per nihil. Si igitur summa natura est ex nihilo, aut per se, aut per aliud est ex nihilo. Non per se, alioquin ipsa esset seipsa prior: non per aliud, alioquin ipsa non esset summa, sed inferior eo per quod est. Deinde, si summa natura per aliquid est nihilo, id quod causa tanti boni fuit, magnum bonum est. Nullum autem bonum intelligi potest ante illud bonum sine quo nihil est bonum, hoc est, ante summam naturam. Ergo nec intelligi potest res ulla praecedere, per quam summa natura sit ex nihilo. Item: Si haec est aliquid ex nihilo, aut per nihil, vel ipsa non est ex se et per se 6, vel ipsa est nihil. Ergo ipsa nullatenus est per nihil, aut ex nihilo, sed ipsa per se et ex seipsa est; eo modo quo lux lucere et lucens esse per seipsam et ex seipsa intelligitur.

Since, therefore, what has been found is pleasing, it is helpful to investigate whether this same nature and all things that are something are only from it, just as they are only through it. But it is clear that it can be said that what is from something is also through that same thing, and what is through something is also from that same thing: just as what is from matter and through a craftsman can also be said to be through matter and from a craftsman, since through both and from both—that is, from both it has its being—although it is through matter and from matter in one way, and through a craftsman and from a craftsman in another. It follows, therefore, that just as all things that are, are what they are through the supreme nature—and therefore that nature is through itself, while other things are through another—so all things that are, are from that same supreme nature, and for that reason it is from itself, while other things are from it.

CHAPTER VI

[or V]. That it was not brought into being by any assisting cause; and yet is not through nothing or from nothing; and how it can be understood to be through itself and from itself.

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.---How is the supreme nature to be said to be through itself? For whatever is through something seems to be either through an efficient cause, or through matter, or through an instrument. But that which is in any of these ways is through another, and therefore less than that through which it has its being; but the supreme nature is neither through another, nor less than or posterior to itself or any other thing. Therefore, the supreme nature can be made neither by itself nor by another; nor was it itself or anything else matter for itself, from which it might be made; nor did any thing assist it to be. But neither can it be understood that what is something, is through nothing. If, therefore, the supreme nature is from nothing, it is from nothing either through itself or through another. Not through itself, otherwise it would be prior to itself; not through another, otherwise it would not be supreme, but inferior to that through which it is. Furthermore, if the supreme nature is from nothing through something, that which was the cause of so great a good is a great good. But no good can be understood before that good without which nothing is good, that is, before the supreme nature. Therefore, neither can any thing be understood to precede, through which the supreme nature would be from nothing. Likewise: If this is something from nothing, or through nothing, either it is not from itself and through itself, or it is itself nothing. Therefore, it is in no way through nothing or from nothing, but it is through itself and from itself; in the same way that light is understood to shine and to be shining through itself and from itself.

Quoniam igitur non semper habet eundem sensum quod dicitur esse per aliquid, aut esse ex aliquo, quaerendum est diligentius quomodo per summam naturam, vel ex ipsa sint omnia quae sunt: et quoniam id quod est per seipsum, et id quod est per aliud, non eandem suscipiunt existendi rationem.

Prius separatim videamus de ipsa summa natura quae per se est; postea de his, quae per aliud sunt. Cum igitur constet quia illa est per seipsam quidquid est, et omnia alia sunt per illam id quod sunt, quomodo ipsa est per se? Quod enim dicitur esse per aliquid videtur esse aut per efficiens, aut per materiam, aut per aliquod aliud adjumentum velut per instrumentum. Sed quidquid aliquo ex his tribus modis est, per aliud est; et posterius, et aliquo modo minus est eo, per quod habet ut sit: at summa natura nullatenus est per aliud; nec est posterior, aut minor seipsa, aut aliqua alia re. Quare summa natura nec a se, nec ab alio fieri potuit; nec ipsa sibi, nec aliquid aliud illi materia, unde fieret, fuit; nec ipsa se aliquo modo, aut aliqua res ipsam, ut esset quod non erat, adjuvit.

Quid igitur? Quod enim non est a quo faciente, aut ex qua materia, aut quibus adjumentis ad esse pervenerit, id videtur aut esse nihil; aut, si aliquid est, per nihil esse, et ex nihilo. Quae licet ex iis, quae rationis luce de summa jam animadverti substantia, putem nullatenus in illam posse cadere; non tamen negligam hujus rei probationem contexere. Quoniam namque ad magnum et delectabile quidam me subito perduxit haec mea meditatio, nullam vel simplicem peneque fatuam objectionem mihi disputanti occurrentem, negligendo, volo praeterire: quatenus et ego nihil ambiguum in praecedentibus relinquens, certior valeam ad sequentia procedere; et si forte cui, quod speculor, persuadere voluero, omni, vel modico, remoto obstaculo quilibet tardus intellectus ad audita facile possit accedere.

Quod igitur illa natura, sine qua nulla est natura, sit nihil, tam falsum est; quam absurdum erit si dicatur quidquid est nihil esse: per nihil vero non est, quia nullo modo intelligi potest, ut quod aliquid est sit per nihil. At si quo modo est ex nihilo, aut per se, aut per aliud, aut per nihil est ex nihilo; sed constat quia nullo modo aliquid est per nihil. Si igitur est aliquo modo ex nihilo; aut per se, aut per aliud est ex nihilo. Per se autem nihil potest esse ex nihilo; quia si quid est ex nihilo per aliquid necesse est ut id, per quod est, prius sit.

Since, therefore, what is said to be "through something" or "from something" does not always have the same meaning, it must be inquired more diligently how all things that are, are through the supreme nature, or from it; and since that which is through itself and that which is through another do not admit the same mode of existing.

First let us consider separately the supreme nature itself, which is through itself; afterwards, those things which are through another. Since, therefore, it is established that it is through itself whatever it is, and all other things are through it what they are, how is it through itself? For what is said to be through something seems to be either through an efficient cause, or through matter, or through some other aid, as for instance through an instrument. But whatever exists in any of these three ways is through another; and it is posterior to, and in some way less than, that through which it has its being. But the supreme nature is in no way through another; nor is it posterior to, or less than, itself or any other thing. Wherefore, the supreme nature could be made neither by itself nor by another; nor was it itself, nor was anything else, matter for it from which it might be made; nor did it itself in any way, nor did any other thing, assist it to be what it was not.

What then? For that which has not come into being from some maker, or from some matter, or by some aids, seems either to be nothing, or, if it is something, to be through nothing and from nothing. Although, from those things which I have already observed by the light of reason concerning the supreme substance, I think these possibilities can in no way apply to it, I will not, however, neglect to construct a proof of this matter. For since this meditation of mine has suddenly led me to something great and delightful, I do not wish to pass over by neglect any objection, even a simple and almost foolish one, that occurs to me in my argument, so that, leaving nothing ambiguous in the preceding points, I may be able to proceed with more certainty to what follows; and so that if, perchance, I should wish to persuade anyone of what I am contemplating, with every obstacle, however small, removed, any intellect, however slow, may easily be able to approach what it hears.

That this nature, therefore, without which no nature exists, should be nothing, is as false as it would be absurd to say that whatever is, is nothing; and it is not through nothing, because it can in no way be understood that what is something is through nothing. But if it is in some way from nothing, it is from nothing either through itself, or through another, or through nothing; but it is established that in no way is anything through nothing. If, therefore, it is in some way from nothing, it is from nothing either through itself or through another. But through itself, nothing can be from nothing; because if anything is from nothing through something, it is necessary that that through which it is, be prior.

Quoniam igitur haec essentia prior seipsa non est, nullo modo est ex nihilo per se. At si dicitur per aliquam naturam aliam exstitisse ex nihilo, non est summa omnium, sed aliqua inferior; nec est per se hoc quod est, sed per aliud. Item: Si per aliquid est ipsa ex nihilo; id, per quod est, magnum bonum fuit, cum causa boni fuit. At nullum bonum potest intelligi ante illud bonum, sine quo nihil est bonum: hoc autem bonum, sine quo nullum est bonum, satis liquet hanc esse summam naturam, de qua agitur. Quare res nulla vel intellectu praecessit, per quam ista ex nihilo esset. Denique si haec ipsa natura est aliquid aut per nihil, aut ex nihilo, procul dubio aut ipsa non est per se et ex se quidquid est; aut dicitur ipsa nihil: quod utrumque superfluum est exponere quam falsum sit. Licet igitur summa substantia non sit per aliquid efficiens, aut ex aliqua materia, nec aliquibus adjuta sit causis, ut ad esse perduceretur: nullatenus tamen est per nihil, aut ex nihilo; quia per seipsam, et ex seipsa est quidquid est.

Quomodo ergo tandem esse intelligenda est per se et ex se; sic nec ipsa se fecit, nec ipsa sibi materia exstitit, nec ipsa se quolibet modo, ut quod non erat esset, adjuvit, nisi forte eo modo intelligendum videtur, quo dicitur quia lux lucet, vel lucens est per seipsam, et ex seipsa. Quemadmodum enim sese habent ad invicem lux, et lucere, et lucens; sic sunt ad se invicem essentia, esse, et ens, hoc est existens, sive subsistens. Ergo summa essentia, et summe esse, et summe ens, id est summe existens, sive summe subsistens non dissimiliter sibi convenient, quam lux, et lucere, et lucens.

CAPUT VII

[al., VI]. Quomodo alia omnia sint per illam, et ex illa.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---

Utrum cuncta sint per summam illam naturam, ut causam efficientem, vel ex illa, tanquam ex materia, sic inquiritur: Quatuor elementa sine suis formis, quas conspiciamus in rebus formatis, intelligi possunt. Haec informis seu confusa eorum natura unde est? 1. Si ex aliqua materia est, vel est ex summa natura, vel ex seipsa, vel ex aliqua tertia essentia, quae nulla est.

Since, therefore, this essence is not prior to itself, it is in no way from nothing through itself. But if it is said to have come into existence from nothing through some other nature, it is not the supreme of all things, but something inferior; nor is it through itself what it is, but through another. Likewise: If it is from nothing through something, that through which it is was a great good, since it was the cause of a good. But no good can be understood before that good without which nothing is good; and this good, without which no good exists, is clearly this supreme nature of which we are treating. Wherefore, no thing, even in thought, preceded it, through which it could be from nothing. Finally, if this nature itself is something either through nothing or from nothing, without a doubt either it is not through itself and from itself whatever it is, or it is said to be nothing itself: to explain how false both of these are is superfluous. Although, therefore, the supreme substance is not through any efficient cause, or from any matter, nor was it aided by any causes to be brought into being, it is nevertheless in no way through nothing or from nothing, because it is through itself and from itself whatever it is.

How, then, is it finally to be understood as being through itself and from itself, since it neither made itself, nor was matter for itself, nor did it in any way assist itself to be what it was not, unless, perhaps, it is to be understood in the way that light is said to shine, or to be shining, through itself and from itself? For just as light, to shine, and shining are related to one another, so are essence, to be, and being—that is, existing or subsisting—related to one another. Therefore, the supreme essence, and supremely to be, and the supreme being—that is, supremely existing or supremely subsisting—will correspond to one another not unlike light, to shine, and shining.

CHAPTER VII

[or VI]. How all other things are through it, and from it.

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.

Whether all things are through that highest nature, as an efficient cause, or from it, as from matter, is investigated as follows: The four elements can be understood without their forms, which we perceive in formed things. Whence is this formless or confused nature of theirs? 1. If it is from some matter, it is either from the highest nature, or from itself, or from some third essence, which is nothing.

Non ex se; tum quia haec non per se sed per aliud est, tum quia cum nihil sit posterius seipso, nihil est materialiter ex seipso: non ex materia summa naturae; alioquin ex ipsa aliquid minus ipsa fieret, et proinde ipsa mutaretur et corrumpereetur: quod nefas est dicere. 2. Non est bonum, per quod mutatur vel corrumpitur summum bonum. At quidquid est, per summam essentiam est. Ergo si quid est ex summi boni materia, summam essentiam corrumpitur et mutatur summum bonum. Et ita summum bonum, nullatenus est bonum: quod est inconueniens. Ergo nulla minor natura est materialiter ex summa natura. Ergo elementorum essentia ex nulla materia est. Ergo summa essentia tantam rerum molem sola per seipsam produxit ex nihilo.

Restat nunc de rerum earum universitate, quae per aliud sunt, discutere quomodo sint per summam substantiam, utrum quia ipsa fecit universa, aut quia materia fuit universorum. Non enim opus est quaerere utrum ideo sint universa per ipsam; quia alio faciente, aut alia materia existente, illa tantum quolibet modo, ut res omnes essent, adjuverit cum repugnet his quae jam supra patuerunt, si secundo loco et non principaliter sint per ipsam, quaecunque sunt. Primum itaque mihi quaerendum esse puto utrum universitas rerum, quae per aliud sunt, sit ex aliqua materia. Non autem dubito omnem hanc mundi molem, cum partibus suis, sicut videmus, formatam constare ex terra et aqua, et aere et igne: quae, scilicet, quatuor elementa, aliquo modo intelligi possunt sine his formis quas conspiciamus in rebus formatis, ut eorum informis aut etiam confusa natura videatur esse materia omnium corporum suis formis discretorum; non inquam, hoc dubito; sed quaero, unde haec ipsa, quam dixi, mundanae molis materia sit. Nam si hujus materiae est aliqua materia, illa verius est corporeae universitatis materia. Si igitur universitas rerum, seu visibilium, seu invisibilium est ex aliqua materia, profecto non solum non potest esse, sed nec dici potest esse ex alia materia, quam ex summa natura, aut ex se ipsa, aut ex aliqua tertia essentia; quae utique nulla est. Quippe nihil omnino vel cogitari potest esse praeter illud summum omnium, quod est per seipsum; et universitatem eorum quae non per se, sed per idem summum sunt: quare quod nullo modo aliquid est, nullius rei materia est.

Not from itself; both because this nature is not through itself but through another, and because since nothing is posterior to itself, nothing is materially from itself. Not from the matter of the highest nature; otherwise, from it something less than itself would be made, and consequently it would be changed and corrupted: which is impious to say. 2. That through which the highest good is changed or corrupted is not good. But whatever is, is through the highest essence. Therefore, if anything is from the matter of the highest good, the highest good is changed and corrupted as to the highest essence. And so the highest good is in no way good: which is absurd. Therefore, no lesser nature is materially from the highest nature. Therefore, the essence of the elements is from no matter. Therefore, the highest essence alone, through itself, produced so great a mass of things from nothing.

It now remains to discuss, concerning the universe of those things which exist through another, how they exist through the highest substance: whether because it made all things, or because it was the matter of all things. For there is no need to ask whether all things exist through it for this reason: that with another making them, or another matter existing, it merely assisted in some way so that all things might exist; since it would be contrary to what has already been shown above, if whatever things exist were to exist through it in a secondary and not a principal way. Therefore, I think I must first inquire whether the universe of things, which exist through another, is from some matter. I do not, however, doubt that this whole mass of the world, with its parts, as we see it formed, consists of earth and water, and air and fire: which four elements, that is, can in some way be understood without these forms which we perceive in formed things, so that their formless or even confused nature may seem to be the matter of all bodies distinguished by their forms. I say, I do not doubt this; but I ask, whence is this very matter of the worldly mass, which I have mentioned. For if this matter has some matter, that latter is more truly the matter of the corporeal universe. If, therefore, the universe of things, whether visible or invisible, is from some matter, it certainly not only cannot be, but cannot even be said to be from any other matter than from the highest nature, or from itself, or from some third essence, which is indeed nothing. For indeed nothing at all can even be thought to exist besides that highest of all things, which exists through itself, and the universe of those things which exist not through themselves, but through the same highest being. Therefore, that which is in no way anything, is the matter of no thing.

Ex sua vero natura rerum universitas, quae per se non est, esse non potest; quoniam si hoc esset, aliquo modo esset per se et per aliud, quam per id per quod sunt cuncta, et non esset solum id per quod cuncta sunt: quae omnia sunt falsa . Item, omne quod ex materia est, ex alio est , et posterius est eo; quoniam igitur nihil est aliud a seipso, vel posterius seipso, consequitur ut nihil sit materialiter ex seipso. At si ex summae naturae materia potest esse aliquid minus ipsa, summum bonum mutari et corrumpi potest: quod nefas est dicere. Quapropter, quoniam omne quod aliud est quam ipsa, minus est ipsa; impossibile est aliquid aliud hoc modo esse ex ipsa . Amplius: Dubium non est quia nullatenus est bonum, per quod mutatur vel corrumpitur summum bonum. Quod si qua minor natura est ex summi boni materia, cum nihil sit undecunque nisi per summam essentiam, mutatur et corrumpitur summum bonum per ipsam: quare summa essentia, 7 quae est ipsum summum bonum, nullatenus est bonum; quod est inconueniens. Nulla igitur minor natura materialiter est ex summa natura. Cum igitur eorum essentiam, quae per aliud sunt, constet non esse velut ex materia, ex summa essentia, nec ex se, nec ex alio , manifestum est quia ex nulla materia est. Quare, quoniam quidquid est per summam essentiam est, nec per ipsam aliquid aliud esse potest nisi ea aut faciente aut materia existente, consequitur de necessitate, ut praeter eam nihil sit, nisi ea faciente, et quoniam nihil aliud est vel fuit, nisi illa, et quae facta sunt ab illa, nihil omnino facere potuit per aliud, vel instrumentum, vel adjumentum, quam per seipsam. At omne quod fecit, sine dubio aut fecit ex aliquo, velut ex materia; aut ex nihilo. Quoniam igitur certissime patet quia essentia omnium, quae praeter summam essentiam sunt, ab eadem summa essentia facta est, et quia ex nulla materia est; procul dubio nihil apertius quam quia illa summa essentia tamen rerum molem, tam numerosam multitudinem, tam formose formatam, tam ordinate variatam, tam conuenienter diversam, sola per seipsam produxit ex nihilo.

CAPUT VIII

[al., VII]. Quomodo intelligendum sit quod omnia fecit ex nihilo.

But the universe of things, which does not exist through itself, cannot exist from its own nature; for if this were so, it would in some way exist through itself and through something other than that through which all things exist, and that through which all things exist would not be alone: all of which is false. Likewise, everything that is from matter is from another, and is posterior to it; since, therefore, nothing is other than itself, or posterior to itself, it follows that nothing is materially from itself. But if from the matter of the highest nature something less than it can exist, the highest good can be changed and corrupted: which is impious to say. Wherefore, since everything that is other than it is less than it, it is impossible for anything else to exist from it in this way. Furthermore: there is no doubt that that by which the highest good is changed or corrupted is in no way good. But if some lesser nature is from the matter of the highest good, since nothing exists from any source whatsoever except through the highest essence, the highest good is changed and corrupted through that very essence: wherefore the highest essence, which is the highest good itself, is in no way good; which is absurd. Therefore, no lesser nature is materially from the highest nature. Since, therefore, it is established that the essence of those things which exist through another is not, as it were from matter, from the highest essence, nor from itself, nor from another, it is manifest that it is from no matter. Wherefore, since whatever exists, exists through the highest essence, and nothing else can exist through it except either by its making it or by its being the matter of it, it follows of necessity that, besides it, nothing exists except by its making; and since nothing else is or was, except it and what has been made by it, it could in no way make anything through another, whether as an instrument or as an aid, but only through itself. But everything that it made, it undoubtedly made either from something, as from matter, or from nothing. Since, therefore, it is most certainly clear that the essence of all things that are besides the highest essence was made by the same highest essence, and that it is from no matter, without a doubt nothing is more clear than that the highest essence alone, through itself, produced so great a mass of things, so numerous a multitude, so beautifully formed, so orderly varied, so fittingly diverse, from nothing.

CHAPTER VIII

[or, VII]. How it is to be understood that He made all things from nothing.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Ipsum nihil non potest esse causa alicujus quod est: et vox omnium est, nihil de nihilo. Unde videtur quod quidquid fit, fiat ex aliquo. Quod si verum est, corruunt omnia quae supra posita sunt de summa essentia, quae omnia fecit ex nihilo. Tribus quidem modis substantia dici potest facta ex nihilo: 1. ita ut penitus non facta intelligatur: sic de tacente dicitur, de nihilo loquitur. 2. Cum sic facta ex nihilo, quasi ex aliquo significatur: et haec significatio semper est falsa. 3. Cum sic facta ex nihilo dicitur, ut facta non ex aliquo intelligatur. Eo sensu cuncta, praeter summam essentiam, facta ex nihilo dicuntur: hoc est, quae prius nihil erant, nunc sunt aliquid: sicut quis dicitur dives fieri ex paupere, sanus ex infirmitate. Et hic est sensus, qui pauper vel aeger erat, nunc est dives vel sanus.

Sed occurrit quaedam dubitatio de nihilo . Nam ex quocunque fit aliquid, id causa est ejus quod ex se fit , et omnis causa necesse est aliquod ad essentiam effecti praebeat adjumentum. Quod sic omnes tenent experimento, ut etiam nulli rapiatur contendendo, et vix ulli subripiatur decipiendo. Si ergo factum est ex nihilo aliquid, ipsum nihil fuit causa ejus, quod ex ipso factum est. Sed quomodo id quod nullum habebat esse, adjuvit aliquid ut perveniret ad esse? Si autem nullum adjumentum de nihilo provenit ad aliquid, cui aut qualiter persuadeatur quia ex nihilo aliquid efficiatur? Praeterea , nihil aut significat aliquid, aut non significat aliquid. Sed si nihil est aliquid, quaecunque facta sunt ex nihilo, facta sunt est aliquo. Si vero nihil non est aliquid: quoniam intelligi non potest ut ex eo quod penitus non est, fiat aliquid, nihil fit ex nihilo; sicut vox omnium est quia nihil de nihilo. Unde videtur consequi ut quidquid fit, fiat ex aliquo: aut enim fit de aliquo, aut de nihilo. Sive igitur nihil sit aliquid, sive nihil non sit aliquid; consequi videtur ut quidquid factum est, factum sit ex aliquo. Quod si verum esse ponitur, omnibus, quae supra disposita sunt , opponitur. Unde quoniam quod erat nihil, aliquid erit; id quod maxime aliquid erat, nihil erit . Ex eo namque quod quamdam substantiam maxime omnium existentem inveneram, ad hoc ut omnia alia sic facta essent ab ea, ut nihil esset unde facta essent, ratiocinando perveneram. Quare si illud unde facta sunt, quod putabam esse nihil, est aliquid; quidquid inventum aestimabam de summa essentia, est nihil. Quid igitur intelligendum est de nihilo? nam nihil quod videam posse objici, vel pene fatuum , jam statui in hac meditatione negligere.

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.---Nothing itself cannot be the cause of anything that is: and the voice of all is, nothing from nothing. Whence it seems that whatever is made, is made from something. If this is true, all that has been established above concerning the supreme essence, which made all things from nothing, collapses. Indeed, a substance can be said to be made from nothing in three ways: 1. such that it is understood as not made at all: thus it is said of a silent person, he speaks of nothing. 2. When it is signified as made from nothing as if from something: and this signification is always false. 3. When it is said to be made from nothing in such a way that it is understood as made not from something. In this sense all things, except the supreme essence, are said to be made from nothing: that is, what were previously nothing, are now something: just as someone is said to become rich from being poor, or healthy from being sick. And this is the meaning: he who was poor or sick, is now rich or healthy.

But a certain doubt arises concerning "nothing". For from whatever something is made, that thing is the cause of what is made from it, and every cause must necessarily offer some assistance to the essence of the effect. This all hold so firmly by experience that it cannot be wrested from anyone by argument, and can scarcely be stolen from anyone by deception. If, therefore, something was made from nothing, nothing itself was the cause of that which was made from it. But how did that which had no being help something to come into being? But if no assistance comes from nothing to something, to whom or how can it be persuasive that something is made from nothing? Furthermore, "nothing" either signifies something, or it does not signify something. But if "nothing" is something, then whatever things were made from nothing, were made from something. If, however, "nothing" is not something: since it cannot be understood how something can be made from that which utterly is not, nothing is made from nothing; as the voice of all says, "nothing from nothing." Whence it seems to follow that whatever is made, is made from something: for it is made either from something, or from nothing. Therefore, whether "nothing" is something, or "nothing" is not something, it seems to follow that whatever has been made, has been made from something. But if this is supposed to be true, it is opposed to all that has been set forth above. Whence, since what was nothing will be something, that which was most of all something will be nothing. For I had arrived by reasoning from the fact that I had found a certain substance existing most of all, to the conclusion that all other things were so made by it that there was nothing from which they were made. Wherefore, if that from which they were made, which I thought to be nothing, is something, then whatever I thought I had discovered about the supreme essence is nothing. What, therefore, is to be understood about "nothing"? For I have now resolved in this meditation to neglect nothing that I see can be objected, even if it is almost foolish.

[al., Cap. 8.] Tribus itaque, ut puto, modis, quod ad praesentis impedimenti sufficit expeditum, exponi potest, si qua substantia dicitur esse facta ex nihilo. Unus quidem modus est, quo volumus intelligi penitus non esse factum quod dicitur ex nihilo esse : cui simile est, cum quaerenti de tacente, unde loquatur, respondetur de nihilo, id est, non loquitur. Secundum quem modum de ipsa summa essentia, et de eo quod penitus nec fuit, nec est, quaerenti unde factum sit, recte responderi potest, de nihilo, id est, nequaquam factum est: qui sensus de nullo eorum, quae facta sunt, intelligi potest. Alia significatio est, quae dici quidem potest, vera tamen esse non potest : ut, si dicatur aliquid sic esse factum ex nihilo, ut ex ipso nihilo , id est, ex eo quod penitus non est, factum sit: quasi ipsum nihil sit aliquid existens , ex quo possit aliquid fieri: quod quoniam semper falsum est; quoties esse ponitur, impossibilis inconvenientia consequitur. Tertia interpretatio, qua dicitur aliquid esse factum de nihilo, est cum intelligimus esse quidem factum, sed non esse aliquid, unde sit factum. Per similem significationem dici videtur, cum homo contristatus sine causa, dicitur contristatus de nihilo. Secundum igitur hunc sensum si intelligatur, quod supra conclusum est, quia praeter summam essentiam cuncta, quae sunt ab eadem, ex nihilo facta sunt, id est, non ex aliquo: sicut ipsa conclusio praecedentia convenienter consequetur , ita ex eadem conclusione nihil inconveniens subsequetur; quamvis non inconvenienter et sine omni repugnantia, ea quae facta sunt a creatrice substantia dici possint esse ex nihilo facta; eo modo quo dici solet dives factus ex paupere, et recepissee quis sanitatem ex aegritudine: id est, qui prius pauper erat, nunc est dives, quod antea non erat; et qui prius habebat aegritudinem, nunc habet sanitatem quam antea non habebat. Hoc igitur modo non inconvenienter intelligi potest, si dicatur creatrix essentia universa fecisse de nihilo, sive quod universa per illam facta sint de nihilo: id est, quae prius nihil erant nunc sunt aliquid. Hac ipsa quippe voce qua dicitur, quia illa fecit, sive, quia ista facta sunt; intelligitur quia cum illa fecit, aliquid fecit ; et cum ista facta sunt, non nisi aliquid facta sunt . Sic enim aspicientes aliquem de valde humili fortuna, multis opibus, honoribusve ab aliquo exaltatum, dicimus: Ecce ille fecit istum de nihilo, aut factus est ille ab isto de nihilo: id est, ipse qui prius quasi nihilum reputabatur , nunc illo faciente vere aliquid aestimatur.

[or, Chap. 8] Therefore, in three ways, I think, which is a sufficient solution for the present difficulty, it can be explained if any substance is said to be made from nothing. One way, indeed, is that by which we wish it to be understood that what is said to be from nothing is not made at all: similar to this is when, to one asking of a silent person from what he speaks, it is answered, "from nothing," that is, he does not speak. According to this way, concerning the supreme essence itself, and concerning that which utterly neither was nor is, to one asking from what it was made, it can be rightly answered, "from nothing," that is, it was not made at all: which sense cannot be understood of any of those things that have been made. Another signification, which can indeed be stated, but cannot be true, is this: if something is said to be made from nothing in such a way that it was made from nothing itself, that is, from that which utterly is not, as if nothing itself were some existing thing from which something could be made: since this is always false, whenever it is supposed to be, an impossible absurdity follows. The third interpretation, by which something is said to be made from nothing, is when we understand that it was indeed made, but that there is not anything from which it was made. It seems to be said with a similar signification when a man who is sad without cause is said to be sad about nothing. Therefore, if what was concluded above—that besides the supreme essence, all things that are, were made by it from nothing, that is, not from something—is understood according to this sense, just as this conclusion itself will follow fittingly from the preceding arguments, so also from this same conclusion nothing unfitting will follow. Although, not unfittingly and without any contradiction, those things which were made by the creator substance can be said to be made from nothing in the way that it is customary to say that a rich man was made from a poor one, and that someone has recovered health from sickness: that is, he who was previously poor is now rich, which he was not before; and he who previously had sickness now has health, which he did not have before. In this way, therefore, it can be understood not unfittingly if it is said that the creator essence made all things from nothing, or that all things were made by it from nothing: that is, those things which were previously nothing are now something. For by this very word by which it is said that "it made" or that "these were made," it is understood that when it made, it made something; and when these were made, they were made as nothing other than something. For thus, when we see someone of very humble fortune exalted by someone with great wealth or honors, we say: "Behold, that one made this one from nothing," or "This one was made from nothing by that one": that is, he who was previously regarded as almost nothing is now, by that one's doing, truly esteemed as something.

Nihil rationabiliter ab aliquo fit, nisi in ipso praecedat rei faciendae forma. Erat igitur in ratione summa naturae quid, aut qualia, aut quomodo futura essent universa, priusquam fierent. Ergo antequam essent, non erant nihil; nec ex nihilo sunt, quando sunt, quantum ad rationem facientis.

Verum videor mihi videre quiddam quod non negligenter discernere cogit, secundum quid ea quae facta sunt, antequam fierent, dici possint fuisse nihil. Nullo namque pacto fieri potest aliquid rationabiliter ab aliquo, nisi in facientis ratione praecedat aliquod rei faciendae quasi exemplum, sive (ut aptius dicitur) forma, vel similitudo, aut regula. Patet itaque quoniam priusquam fierent universa, erat in ratione summae naturae, quid aut qualia aut quomodo futura essent: quare cum ea quae facta sunt, clarum sit nihil fuisse antequam fierent, quantum ad hoc, quia non erant quod nunc sunt, nec erat ex quo fierent; non tamen nihil erant, quantum ad rationem facientis, per quam et secundum quam fierent.

Illa autem forma rerum, quae in ejus ratione res creandas praecedebat, quid aliud est quam rerum quaedam in ipsa ratione locutio; veluti cum faber facturum aliquod suae artis opus, prius illud intra se dicit mentis conceptione? Mentis autem sive rationalis locutionem hic intelligo, non cum voces rerum significativae cogitantur; sed cum res ipsae, vel futurae, vel jam existentes acie cogitationis in mente conspiciuntur. Frequenti namque usu cognoscitur quia rem unam tripliciter loqui possumus. Aut enim res loquimur signis sensibilibus, id est, quae sensibus corporeis sentiri possunt, sensibiliter utendo; aut eadem signa, quae foris sensibilia sunt, intra nos insensibiliter cogitando; aut nec sensibiliter, nec insensibiliter his signis utendo, sed res ipsas, vel corporum imaginatione, vel rationis intellectu, pro rerum ipsarum diversitate, intus in nostra mente dicendo. Aliter namque hominem dico, cum eum hoc nomine, quod est, homo, significo; aliter cum idem nomen tacens cogito; aliter cum eum ipsum hominem mens, aut per corporis imaginem, aut per rationem intuetur; per corporis quidem imaginem, ut cum ejus sensibilem figuram imaginatur: per rationem vero, ut cum universalem ejus essentiam, quae est, animal rationale mortale, cogitat. Hae vero tres loquendi varietates singulae verbis sui generis constant; sed illius, quam tertiam et ultimam posui, locutionis verba, cum de rebus non ignoratis sunt, naturalia sunt, et apud omnes gentes sunt eadem. Et quoniam omnia alia verba propter haec sunt inventa; ubi ista sunt, nullum aliud verbum est necessarium ad rem cognoscendam; et ubi ista esse non possunt, nullum aliud est utile ad rem ostendendam.

Nothing is made rationally by anyone, unless the form of the thing to be made precedes in him. Therefore, in the reason of the highest nature there existed what, or of what sort, or how all things were to be, before they were made. Therefore, before they existed, they were not nothing; nor are they from nothing, when they exist, with respect to the reason of the maker.

But I seem to see something that compels me to discern not negligently in what respect those things that were made can be said to have been nothing before they were made. For in no way can anything be made rationally by anyone, unless in the reason of the maker there precedes some exemplar, as it were, of the thing to be made, or (as it is more aptly called) a form, or likeness, or rule. It is clear, therefore, that before all things were made, there existed in the reason of the highest nature what, or of what sort, or how they were to be: wherefore, although it is clear that the things which have been made were nothing before they were made—in respect to this, that they were not what they now are, nor was there anything from which they might be made—yet they were not nothing with respect to the reason of the maker, through which and according to which they were to be made.

But that form of things, which in its reason preceded the things to be created, what else is it than a certain speaking of things in that very reason; just as when an artisan, about to make some work of his art, first says it within himself by a conception of the mind? Here, however, I understand the speaking of the mind or of reason not as when the signifying words of things are thought, but when the things themselves, whether future or already existing, are beheld in the mind by the keenness of thought. For it is known from frequent experience that we can speak of one thing in three ways. For we either speak of things by using sensible signs—that is, signs which can be perceived by the bodily senses—sensibly; or by thinking insensibly within ourselves those same signs which are sensible externally; or by using these signs neither sensibly nor insensibly, but by speaking the things themselves inwardly in our mind, either by the imagination of bodies or by the understanding of reason, according to the diversity of the things themselves. For I speak of a man in one way when I signify him by this name, which is "man"; in another way when I silently think the same name; and in another way when the mind beholds that very man, either through an image of his body or through reason—through an image of his body, as when it imagines his sensible figure; but through reason, as when it thinks his universal essence, which is "rational mortal animal." These three varieties of speaking each consist of words of their own kind; but the words of that speaking which I have placed third and last, when they are about things not unknown, are natural and are the same among all peoples. And since all other words were invented for the sake of these, where these latter exist, no other word is necessary for knowing the thing; and where these cannot exist, no other word is useful for showing the thing.

Possunt etiam non absurde dici tanto veriora, quanto magis rebus, quarum sunt verba, similia sunt, et eas expressius significant, exceptis namque rebus illis, quibus ipsis utimur pro nominibus suis ad easdem significandas, ut sunt quaedam voces, velut A vocalis: exceptis, inquam, his, nullum aliud verbum sic videtur rei simile, cujus est verbum, aut sic eam exprimit, quomodo illa similitudo quae in acie mentis rem ipsam cogitantis exprimitur. Illud igitur jure dicendum est maxime proprium et principale rei verbum. Quapropter si nulla de qualibet re locutio tantum propinquat rei, quantum illa quae hujusmodi verbis constat; nec aliquid aliud tam simile rei vel futurae, vel jam existenti in ratione alicujus potest esse: non immerito videri potest apud summam substantiam, talem rerum locutionem et fuisse, antequam essent, ut per eam fierent; et esse, cum facta sunt, ut per eam sciantur.

CAPUT XI

[al., X]. Quod tamen multa sit in hac similitudine fabri dissimilitudo.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.

--Summi artificis et fabri dissimilitudo est: 1. in eo quod summus artifex formam non aliunde compingat; 2. in eo quod summus artifex nullam exigat materiam ex qua praeconceptionum opus perficiat; 3. in eo quod creatricis substantiae opera non sunt aliquid nisi quod sunt per illam: quae vero a fabro fiunt, penitus non essent nisi essent aliquid quod non sunt per ipsum.

Sed quamvis summam substantiam constet prius in se quasi dixisse cunctam creaturam, quam eam secundum eandem, et per eandem suam intimam locutionem conderet; quemadmodum faber prius mente concipit, quod postea secundum inentis conceptionem opere perficit. Multam tamen in hac similitudine intueor dissimilitudinem. Illa namque nihil omnino aliunde assumpsit, unde vel eorum quae factura erat, formam in se ipsa compingeret, vel ea ipsa, id quod sunt, perficeret; faber vero penitus nec mente potest aliquid corporeum concipere imaginando, nisi id quod aut totum simul, aut per partes, ex aliquibus rebus aliquo modo jam didicit; nec opus mente conceptum perficere, si desit aut materia, aut aliquid, sine quo opus praecogitatum fieri non possit: quanquam enim homo tale aliquod animal possit cogitando vel pingendo, quale nusquam sit, confingere; nequaquam tamen hoc facere valet, nisi componendo in eo partes, quas ex rebus alias cognititis in memoriam attrahit.

They can also, not absurdly, be called truer to the extent that they are more similar to the things of which they are the words and signify them more expressly; for, with the exception of those things which we use as their own names to signify themselves (such as certain sounds, like the vowel A)—with the exception of these, I say—no other word seems so similar to the thing of which it is the word, or so expresses it, as does that likeness which is expressed in the keenness of the mind thinking the thing itself. Therefore, that must rightly be called the most proper and principal word of the thing. Therefore, if no speaking about any thing so approaches the thing as that which consists of words of this kind, and if nothing else can be so similar to a thing—whether future or already existing—in anyone's reason, it can seem not without reason that in the supreme substance there was such a speaking of things before they existed, so that through it they might be made, and that there is such a speaking now that they have been made, so that through it they may be known.

CHAPTER XI

[alternatively, X]. That there is nevertheless much dissimilarity in this comparison to the craftsman.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.

--The dissimilarity between the supreme artist and the craftsman is: 1. in that the supreme artist does not fashion the form from any other source; 2. in that the supreme artist requires no matter from which to perfect the preconceived work; 3. in that the works of the creative substance are nothing except what they are through it: whereas those things which are made by a craftsman would not exist at all unless they were something that they are not through him.

But although it is established that the supreme substance first, as it were, spoke the whole of creation within itself, before it founded it according to that same and through that same intimate locution of its own; just as a craftsman first conceives in his mind what he afterwards perfects in his work according to the conception of his mind. Nevertheless, I perceive much dissimilarity in this comparison. For that [supreme substance] took absolutely nothing from any other source from which to either fashion within itself the form of those things it was about to make, or to perfect those things themselves into that which they are; whereas a craftsman is utterly unable to conceive anything corporeal in his mind by imagining, unless it is something he has already learned in some way from other things, either as a whole or in parts; nor can he perfect the work conceived in his mind if matter is lacking, or anything else without which the pre-conceived work cannot be made: for although a man can, by thinking or painting, fashion some such animal as exists nowhere, he is nevertheless unable to do this except by composing in it parts which he has drawn into his memory from other known things.

Quare in hoc differunt ab invicem illae in creatrice substantia, et in fabro suorum operum faciendorum intimae locutiones, quod illa nec assumpta, nec adjuta aliunde, sed prima, et sola causa sufficere potuit suo artifice ad suum opus perficiendum; ista vero nec prima, nec sola, nec sufficiens est ad suum incipiendum. Quapropter ea quae per illam creata sunt, omnia non sunt quod non sunt per illam . Quae vero per istam fiunt , penitus non essent, nisi essent aliquid quod non sunt per ipsam .

CAPUT XII

[al., XI]. Quod haec summae essentiae locutio sit summa essentia.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Summa substantia per semetipsam omnia fecit. Per naturalem autem et intimam locutionem omnia fecit. Ergo naturalis haec locutio est ipsa summa substantia.

Sed cum pariter ratione docente sit certum quia quidquid summa substantia fecit, non fecit per aliud quam per semetipsam; et quidquid fecit, per suam intimam locutionem fecit, sive singula singulis verbis, sive potius uno verbo simul omnia dicendo; quid magis necessarium videri potest, quam hanc summae essentiae locutionem non esse aliud quam summam essentiam? Non igitur negligenter praetereundam hujus locutionis considerationem puto: sed priusquam de illa possit tractari, diligenter ejusdem summae substantiae proprietates aliquas studiose investigandas existimo.

CAPUT XIII

[al., XII]. Quod sicut omnia per summam essentiam facta sunt, ita vigeant per ipsam.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Sicut omnia quae sunt, per unum aliquid sunt, quod solum est per seipsum; ita omnia per unum aliquid videntur, quod solum viget per seipsum. Ergo sicut nihil factum est nisi per creatricem essentiam, ita nihil viget nisi per eandem servatricem praesentiam.

Therefore, the intimate locutions for making their works in the creative substance and in the craftsman differ from each other in this: that the former, being neither taken from nor aided by any other source, but being the first and sole cause, was able to suffice for its artist to perfect its work; whereas the latter is neither the first, nor the sole, nor a sufficient cause for beginning its own. Wherefore, the things that were created through it are nothing except what they are through it. But the things that are made by the latter would not exist at all, unless they were something that they are not through it.

CHAPTER XII

[alternatively, XI]. That this locution of the supreme essence is the supreme essence.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---The supreme substance made all things through itself. But it made all things through a natural and intimate locution. Therefore, this natural locution is the supreme substance itself.

But since it is equally certain, with reason as our teacher, that whatever the supreme substance made, it did not make through anything other than through itself; and whatever it made, it made through its own intimate locution, whether by saying individual things with individual words, or rather by saying all things at once with a single word; what can seem more necessary than that this locution of the supreme essence is nothing other than the supreme essence? Therefore, I do not think that the consideration of this locution should be negligently passed over; but before it can be treated, I judge that some properties of this same supreme substance must be diligently and studiously investigated.

CHAPTER XIII

[alt., XII]. That just as all things were made through the highest essence, so they flourish through it.

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.---Just as all things that are, are through some one thing, which alone is through itself; so all things flourish through some one thing, which alone flourishes through itself. Therefore, just as nothing was made except through the creative essence, so nothing flourishes except through the same preserving presence.

Constat ergo per summam naturam esse factum, quidquid non est idem illi. Dubium autem nonnisi rationali menti esse potest, quod cuncta, quae facta sunt, eodem ipso sustinente vigent et perseverant esse quandiu sunt, quo faciente de nihilo habent esse quod sunt. Simili namque per omnia ratione, qua collectum est omnia, quae sunt, esse per unum aliquid, unde ipsum solum est per seipsum, et alia per aliud; simili, inquam, ratione potest probari quia quaecunque vigent per unum aliquid vigeant : unde illud solum viget per seipsum, et alia per aliud. Quod quoniam aliter esse non potest, nisi ut ea, quae sunt facta, per aliud vigeant, et id a quo facta sunt, vigeat per seipsum, necesse est ut sicut nihil factum est nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, ita nihil vigeat, nisi per ejusdem servatricem praesentiam .

CAPUT XIV

[al., XIII]. Quod illa sit in omnibus, et per omnia et omnia sint ex illa, et per illam, et in illa.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.--Ex quo consequitur ut ibi ipsa non est, nihil sit. Ubique igitur, et per omnia, et in omnibus est. Cum enim creatum nullatenus valeat exire creantis et foveatis immensitatem, creans vero et fovens excedere possit omne quod creatum est, liquet quod summa essentia ipsa est quae cuncta alia portat, superat, claudit et penetrat; et ipsa in omnibus est et per omnia; et ipsa, et per ipsam, et in ipsa sunt omnia.

Quod si ita est, imo quia ex necessitate sic est, consequitur ut ubi ipsa non est, nihil sit. Ubique igitur est, et per omnia, et in omnibus. At quoniam absurdum est, ut, scilicet, quemadmodum nullatenus aliquid creatum potest exire creantis et foveatis immensitatem; sic creans et fovens nequaquam valeat aliquo modo excedere factorum universitatem; liquet quoniam ipsa est quae cuncta alia portat et superat, claudit et penetrat. Si igitur haec illis, quae superius sunt inventa, jungantur, eadem est quae in omnibus est, et per omnia, et ex qua, et per quam, et in qua.

Jam non immerito valde moveor quam studiose possum inquirere quid omnium, quae de aliquo dici possunt, huic tam admirabili naturae queat convenire substantia-liter. Quanquam enim mirer si possit in nominibus vel verbis, quae aptamus rebus factis de nihilo, reperiri quod digne dicatur de creatrice universorum substantia; tentandum tamen est ad quid hanc indagacionem ratio perducet .

It is therefore established that whatever is not the same as that supreme nature was made by it. However, it can be doubtful only to a rational mind that all things which have been made flourish and persevere in being as long as they are, sustained by the very same one by whose making they have their being from nothing. For by a similar reasoning in all respects to that by which it was inferred that all things that are, are through some one thing, whereby it alone is through itself and others through another; by a similar reasoning, I say, it can be proven that whatever things flourish, flourish through some one thing, whereby that one alone flourishes through itself, and others through another. Since this cannot be otherwise than that those things which have been made flourish through another, and that by which they have been made flourishes through itself, it is necessary that just as nothing was made except through the present creative essence, so nothing flourishes except through its preserving presence.

CHAPTER XIV

[alt., XIII]. That it is in all things, and through all things, and all things are from it, and through it, and in it.

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.---From which it follows that where it is not, nothing is. Therefore, it is everywhere, and through all things, and in all things. For since the created can in no way go beyond the immensity of the creator and sustainer, while the creator and sustainer can indeed exceed all that is created, it is clear that the highest essence is itself that which bears, surpasses, encloses, and penetrates all other things; and it is in all things and through all things; and from it, and through it, and in it are all things.

If this is so, or rather because it is necessarily so, it follows that where it is not, nothing is. Therefore, it is everywhere, and through all things, and in all things. But since it is absurd that, just as no created thing can go beyond the immensity of the creator and sustainer, so the creator and sustainer should in no way be able to exceed the universe of things made, it is clear that it is itself that which bears and surpasses, encloses and penetrates all other things. If, therefore, these things are joined to those which were discovered above, it is the same essence which is in all things, and through all things, and from which, and through which, and in which all things are.

Now I am not unjustly moved to inquire, as diligently as I can, what among all the things that can be said of anything, can belong substantially to this so admirable nature. For although I would be surprised if, in the nouns or verbs which we apply to things made from nothing, anything could be found that might be worthily said of the substance that is the creator of all things, nevertheless, it must be attempted to see where reason will lead this investigation.

Itaque de relativis quidem nulli dubium quia nullum eorum substantiale est illi, de quo relative dicitur. Quare si quid de summa natura dicitur relative, non est ejus significativum substantiae. Unde hoc ipsum quod summa omnium sive major omnibus quae ab illa facta sunt, vel aliud aliquid similiter relative dici potest, manifestum est quoniam non ejus naturalem designat essentiam. Si enim nulla earum rerum unquam esset, quarum relatione summa et major dicitur; ipsa nec summa, nec major intelligeretur: nec tamen idcirco minus bona esset, aut essentialis suae magnitudinis in aliquo detrimentum pateretur. Quod ex eo manifeste cognoscitur, quoniam ipsa quidquid boni vel magni est, non est per aliud quam per seipsam. Si igitur summa natura sic potest intelligi non summa, ut tamen nequaquam sit major aut minor, quam cum intelligitur summa omnium: [al. omit. m. e. q. s.] manifestum est quoniam summum non simpliciter significat illam essentiam, quae omnino major et melior est, quam quidquid non est quod ipsa est. Quod autem ratio docet de summo, non dissimiliter invenitur in similiter relativis.

Illis itaque, quae relative dicuntur, omissis, quia nullum eorum simpliciter demonstrat alicujus essentiam, ad alia discutienda se convertat intentio. Et quidem si quis singula diligenter intueatur, quidquid est praeter relativa, aut tale est, ut ipsum omnino melius sit, quam non ipsum; aut tale, ut non ipsum in aliquo melius sit, quam ipsum. Ipsum autem et non ipsum, non aliud hic intelligo, quam verum non verum, corpus non corpus, et his similia. Melius quidem est omnino aliquid quam non ipsum: ut, sapiens quam non ipsum sapiens, id est, melius est sapiens quam non sapiens. Quamvis enim justus non sapiens melior videatur, quam non justus sapiens, non tamen melius simpliciter est, non sapiens quam sapiens: omne enim non sapiens, simpliciter inquantum non sapiens, est minus quam sapiens; quia omne non sapiens melius esset, si esset sapiens. Similiter omnino melius est verum quam non ipsum, id est, quam non verum; et justum quam non justum; et vivit quam non vivit. Melius autem est in aliquo non ipsum quam ipsum, ut non aurum quam aurum. Nam melius est homini esse non aurum quam aurum; quamvis forsitan melius esset alicui aurum esse quam non aurum esse, ut plumbo. Cum enim utrumque, scilicet, homo et plumbum sit non aurum, tanto melius aliquid est homo quam aurum, quanto inferioris naturae esset, si esset aurum: et plumbum tanto vilius est quanto pretiosius esset, si aurum esset.

Patet autem ex eo quod summa natura sic intelligi potest non summa, ut nec summum omnino melius sit quam non summum; nec non summum alicui melius quam summum: multa relativa esse, quae nequaquam hac contineantur divisione. Utrum autem aliqua contineantur, inquirere supersedeo, cum ad propositum sufficiat quod de illis notum est, nullum, scilicet, eorum simplicem summae naturae substantiam designare.

Therefore, concerning relatives, indeed, no one doubts that none of them is substantial to that of which it is said relatively. Wherefore, if anything is said of the supreme nature relatively, it is not significative of its substance. Hence it is manifest that this very fact—that it can be called supreme over all, or greater than all things which were made by it, or anything else similarly relative—does not designate its natural essence. For if none of those things in relation to which it is called supreme and greater had ever existed, it would be understood as neither supreme nor greater; and yet, it would not for that reason be less good, nor would it suffer any detriment to its essential greatness. This is manifestly known from the fact that whatever good or great it is, it is not through another but through itself. If, therefore, the supreme nature can be so understood as not supreme, yet without being in any way greater or less than when it is understood as supreme over all, it is manifest that "supreme" does not simply signify that essence which is altogether greater and better than whatever is not what it is. Moreover, what reason teaches concerning "supreme" is found not dissimilarly in other similar relatives.

Therefore, leaving aside those things which are said relatively, since none of them simply demonstrates the essence of anything, let our attention turn to discussing other things. And indeed, if one diligently considers individual things, whatever exists, besides relatives, is either such that "it" is altogether better than "not it," or such that "not it" is in some respect better than "it." By "it" and "not it," I here understand nothing other than true and not true, body and not body, and things similar to these. Indeed, something is altogether better than "not it": for example, wise than not-it-wise, that is, it is better to be wise than not wise. For although a just but not wise person may seem better than an unjust but wise person, nevertheless, "not wise" is not simply better than "wise": for everything that is not wise, simply insofar as it is not wise, is less than wise; because everything not wise would be better if it were wise. Similarly, "true" is altogether better than "not it," that is, than "not true"; and "just" than "not just"; and "lives" than "does not live." But in some respect, "not it" is better than "it," as "not gold" is better than "gold." For it is better for a man to be not gold than to be gold; although perhaps it would be better for something to be gold than not to be gold, as for lead. For since both, namely, man and lead, are not gold, a man is something so much better than gold, as he would be of an inferior nature if he were gold: and lead is so much viler as it would be more precious if it were gold.

But it is clear from the fact that the supreme nature can be so understood as not supreme, that neither is "supreme" altogether better than "not supreme," nor is "not supreme" in any way better than "supreme": that there are many relatives which are by no means contained in this division. But whether any are contained, I forbear to inquire, since for our purpose it is sufficient what is known of them, namely, that none of them designates the simple substance of the supreme nature.

Cum igitur quidquid aliud est, si singula dispiciantur, aut ipsum sit melius quam non ipsum, aut non ipsum in aliquo sit melius quam ipsum: sicut nefas est putare quod substantia summae naturae sit aliquid, quo melius sit aliquo modo non ipsum; sic necesse est ut sit quidquid omnino melius est quam non ipsum. Illa enim sola est, qua penitus nihil est melius; et quae melior est omnibus, quae non sunt quod est ipsa. Non est igitur corpus, vel aliquid eorum quae corporei sensus discernunt. Quippe his omnibus melius est aliquid quod non est quod ipsa sunt. Mens enim rationalis, quae nullo corporeo sensu quid, vel qualis, vel quanta sit percipitur; quanto minor esset, si esset aliquid eorum quae corporeis sensibus subjacent, tanto major est, quam quodlibet eorum. Penitus enim ipsa summa essentia tacenda est esse aliquid eorum, quibus est aliquid, quod non est quod ipsa sunt, superius: et est omnino, sicut ratio docet, dicenda quodlibet eorum, quibus est omne, quod non est quod ipsa sunt, inferius. Quare necesse est eam esse viventem, sapientem, potentem et omnipotentem, veram, justam, beatam, aeternam, et quidquid similiter absolute melius quam non ipsum.

Quid ergo quaeratur amplius quid summa illa sit natura, si manifestum est quid omnium sit, aut quid omnium non sit?

CAPUT XVI [al., XV] . Quod idem sit illi esse justam, quod est esse justitiam: et eodem modo de his quae similiter de illa dici possunt; et quod nihil horum monstret qualis illa, vel quanta sit, sed quid sit.

Summa natura non per aliud sed per se est quidquid est; ipsa autem est justa, et quidem per justitiam. Ergo ipsa summa natura est ipsa sua justitia; et cum per justitiam justa dicitur, per se justa intelligitur. Deinde si quaeratur quid sit summa natura, quid verius respondetur quam justitia? Ergo de summa natura non proprie dicitur quod habet justitiam, sed quod existit justitia: et cum dicitur existens justitia, non dicitur qualis sed quid est. Ergo cum dicitur justa, non dicitur qualis sit, sed quid ipsa sit: et idem est ac si diceretur, ipsa est justitia. Sic intellige et de caeteris quae de Deo similiter dicuntur. Porro quodlibet bonum summa natura sit, summe illud est. Illa igitur est summa essentia, summa vita, summa ratio, summa justitia, etc., quod non est aliud quam summe ens, summe vivens, summe rationale, summe justum, etc.

Since, therefore, whatever else exists, if individual things are examined, is either such that "it" is better than "not it," or "not it" is in some respect better than "it": just as it is wicked to think that the substance of the supreme nature is something than which "not it" is in any way better, so it is necessary that it be whatever is altogether better than "not it." For it alone is that than which absolutely nothing is better, and which is better than all things that are not what it is. Therefore, it is not a body, or any of those things which the corporeal senses discern. For indeed, better than all these is something which is not what they are. For the rational mind, which is perceived by no corporeal sense as to what, of what kind, or how great it is, is by so much greater than any of them, as it would be less if it were one of those things which are subject to the corporeal senses. For that supreme essence must by no means be said to be any of those things to which there is something superior which is not what they are; and it must, as reason teaches, be said to be altogether any of those things to which everything that is not what they are is inferior. Wherefore, it is necessary that it be living, wise, powerful and omnipotent, true, just, blessed, eternal, and whatever is similarly absolutely better than "not it."

What more, then, is to be sought as to what that supreme nature is, if it is manifest what it is among all things, or what it is not among all things?

CHAPTER XVI [or XV]. That for it to be just is the same as for it to be justice: and in the same way concerning those things that can be similarly said of it; and that none of these shows what its quality or quantity is, but what it is.

The supreme nature is whatever it is not through another but through itself; moreover, it is just, and indeed through justice. Therefore, the supreme nature itself is its own justice; and when it is called just through justice, it is understood as just through itself. Then, if it is asked what the supreme nature is, what is more truly answered than "justice"? Therefore, it is not properly said of the supreme nature that it has justice, but that it is justice; and when it is called "being justice," it is not said of what quality it is, but what it is. Therefore, when it is called just, it is not said of what quality it is, but what it itself is: and it is the same as if it were said, "it is justice." Understand this in the same way concerning the other things that are similarly said of God. Furthermore, whatever good the supreme nature may be, it is that good supremely. It is, therefore, the supreme essence, supreme life, supreme reason, supreme justice, etc., which is nothing other than supremely being, supremely living, supremely rational, supremely just, etc.

Sed fortasse cum dicitur *justa*, vel *magna*, vel aliquid *similium*, non ostenditur quid sit, sed potius qualis, vel quanta sit. Per qualitatem quippe, vel quantitatem, quodlibet horum dici videtur. Omne namque quod *justum* est, per *justitiam* *justum* est; et alia hujusmodi similiter. Quare ipsa *summa natura* non est *justa*, nisi per *justitiam*. Videtur igitur participatione qualitatis, *justitiae* scilicet, *justa* dici *summe bona substantia*: quod si ita est, per aliud est *justa*, non per se. At hoc contrarium est veritati perfectae; quia *bona*, vel *magna*, vel *subsistens*, quod est omnino, per se est, non per aliud. Si igitur non est *justa*, nisi per *justitiam*, nec *justa* esse potest nisi per se: quid magis conspicuum, quid magis necessarium, quam quod eadem *natura*, est ipsa *justitia*: et cum dicitur esse *justa* per *justitiam*, idem est quod per se; et cum *justa* per se dicitur esse, non aliud intelligitur quam per *justitiam*. Quapropter, si quaeratur quid sit ipsa *summa natura* de qua agitur; quid verius respondetur quam *justitia*? Videndum igitur quomodo intelligendum sit quando illa *natura*, quae est ipsa *justitia*, dicitur *justa*. Quoniam enim homo non potest esse *justitia*, *justitiam* autem habere potest; non intelligitur *justus* homo existens *justitia*, sed habens *justitiam*. Quoniam igitur de *summa natura* non proprie dicitur quia habet *justitiam*, sed existit *justitia*: cum dicitur *justa*, proprie intelligitur existens *justitia*, non autem habens *justitiam*. Quare si, cum dicitur existens *justitia*, non dicitur qualis est sed quid est; consequitur ut, cum dicitur *justa*, non dicatur qualis sit, sed quid sit. Deinde, quoniam de illa *suprema essentia* idem est dicere quia est *justa*, et quia est existens *justitia*: et cum dicitur, est existens *justitia*, non est aliud quam est *justitia*: nihil differt in illa, sive dicatur, est *justitia*, sive est *justa*. Quapropter cum quaeritur de illa quid est, non minus congrue respondetur *justa*, quam *justitia*: quod vero in exemplo *justitiae* raturum esse conspicitur, hoc de omnibus, quae similiter de ipsa *summa natura* dicuntur, intellectus sentire per rationem constringitur. Quidquid igitur eorum de illa dicatur, non qualis, vel quanta; sed magis quid sit monstratur. Sed palam est quia quodlibet bonum *summa natura* sit, *summe* illud est. Illa igitur est *summa essentia*, *summa vita*, *summa ratio*, *summa salus*, *summa justitia*, *summa sapientia*, *summa veritas*, *summa bonitas*, *summa magnitudo*, *summa pulchritudo*, *summa immortalitas*, *summa incorruptibilitas*, *summa immutabilitas*, *summa beatitudo*, *summa aeternitas*, *summa potestas*, *summa unitas*; quod non est aliud quam *summe ens*, *summe vivens*: et alia similiter.

CAPUT XVII [al., XVI]. Quod ita sit simplex, ut omnia, quae de ejus *essentia* dici possunt, unum idemque sint in illa; et nihil de ea dici possit substantialiter, nisi in eo quod quid est.

But perhaps when it is called just, or great, or something similar, it is not shown what it is, but rather of what quality or of what quantity it is. For each of these seems to be said through quality or quantity. For everything that is just, is just through justice; and other things of this kind similarly. Therefore, the supreme nature itself is not just, except through justice. It seems, therefore, that the supremely good substance is called just by participation in a quality, namely justice: but if this is so, it is just through another, not through itself. But this is contrary to the perfect truth; because it is good, or great, or subsistent—which it is completely—through itself, not through another. If, therefore, it is not just except through justice, and it cannot be just except through itself, what is more evident, what more necessary, than that this same nature is justice itself? And when it is said to be just through justice, this is the same as through itself; and when it is said to be just through itself, nothing other is understood than through justice. Therefore, if it is asked what this supreme nature under discussion is, what is more truly answered than "justice"? It must be seen, therefore, how it is to be understood when that nature, which is justice itself, is called just. For since a man cannot be justice, but can have justice, a just man is not understood as being justice, but as having justice. Since, therefore, it is not properly said of the supreme nature that it has justice, but that it is justice, when it is called just, it is properly understood as being justice, not as having justice. Therefore, if, when it is called "being justice," it is not said of what quality it is but what it is, it follows that when it is called just, it is not said of what quality it is, but what it is. Furthermore, since concerning that supreme essence it is the same to say that it is just and that it is "being justice," and since when it is said "it is being justice," this is nothing other than "it is justice," it makes no difference in it whether one says "it is justice" or "it is just." Therefore, when it is asked of it "what is it?", it is answered no less fittingly "just" than "justice"; and what is seen to be established in the example of justice, the intellect is constrained by reason to perceive concerning all things that are similarly said of the supreme nature itself. Therefore, whatever of these things may be said of it, it is not shown of what quality or of what quantity, but rather what it is. But it is plain that whatever good the supreme nature may be, it is that good supremely. It is, therefore, the supreme essence, supreme life, supreme reason, supreme salvation, supreme justice, supreme wisdom, supreme truth, supreme goodness, supreme greatness, supreme beauty, supreme immortality, supreme incorruptibility, supreme immutability, supreme blessedness, supreme eternity, supreme power, supreme unity; which is nothing other than supremely being, supremely living, and the others similarly.

CHAPTER XVII [or, XVI]. That it is so simple that all things which can be said of its essence are one and the same thing in it; and that nothing can be said of it substantially, except in terms of what it is.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.--Omne compositum indiget his ex quibus componitur, illis debet quod est, et per illa est quidquid est; quod autem illa sunt, per illud non sunt: et proinde summum non est. Haec autem de summa natura dicere nefas est. Ergo illa non est composita. Et cum ipsa tot bona sit, vita, ratio, bonitas, justitia, etc., quae de Deo dicuntur, necesse fit ut haec omnia bona non plura sed unum sint. Ergo unum illorum est idem quod omnia, sive simul, sive singula. Et cum summa natura una consideratione sit quidquid est, quia essentialiter est hoc totum quod ipsa est: nihil de illa dicitur in eo quod qualis vel quanta; sed in eo quod quid sit.

Quid ergo, si illa summa natura tot bona est, eritne composita tam pluribus bonis; an potius non sunt plura bona, sed unum bonum tam pluribus nominibus significatum? Omne enim compositum, ut subsistat, indiget his ex quibus componitur; et illis debet quidem quod est, quia quidquid est, per illa est; et illa quod sunt, per illud non sunt: et idcirco penitus summum non est. Si igitur natura illa composita est ex pluribus bonis, haec omnia, quae omni composito insunt, in illam incidere necesse est: quod nefas falsitatis aperta ratione destruit et obruit tota, quae supra patuit, necessitas veritatis. Cum igitur illa natura nullo modo composita sit et tamen omnimodo tot illa bona sit, necesse est ut illa omnia non plura, sed unum sint. Idem igitur est quodlibet unum illorum, quod omnia, sive simul, sive singula; ut cum dicitur justitia, vel essentia, idem significat, quod alia, vel omnia simul, vel singula. Quemadmodum itaque unum est, quidquid essentialiter de summa substantia dicitur; ita ipsa uno modo una consideratione est, quidquid est essentialiter. Cum enim aliquis homo dicitur et corpus, et rationalis, et homo; non uno modo vel consideratione haec tria dicitur. Secundum aliud est enim corpus, et secundum aliud rationalis, et singulum horum non est totum id quod est homo. Illa vero summa essentia nullo modo sic est aliquid, ut illud idem secundum alium modum, aut secundum aliam considerationem non sit; quia quidquid aliquo modo essentialiter est, hoc est totum quod ipsa est. Nihil igitur quod de ejus essentia, vere dicitur, in eo quod qualis, vel quanta; sed in eo quod quid sit, accipitur. Quidquid enim est, vel quale, vel quantum, est etiam aliud in eo quod quid est, unde non simplex, sed compositum est.

CAPUT XVIII

[*al., XVII]. Quod sit sine principio, et sine fine.*

CHAPTER SYNOPSIS.---Every composite thing needs those things from which it is composed, it owes its being to them, and through them it is whatever it is; but what they are, they are not through it: and therefore it is not the highest. But it is impious to say these things of the supreme nature. Therefore, it is not composite. And since it is so many goods—life, reason, goodness, justice, etc.—which are said of God, it is necessary that all these goods be not many, but one. Therefore, any one of them is the same as all of them, whether together or individually. And since the supreme nature, in one respect, is whatever it is, because it is essentially this whole which it itself is: nothing is said of it in terms of quality or quantity, but in terms of what it is.

What then, if that supreme nature is so many goods, will it be composed of so many goods; or rather, are they not many goods, but one good signified by so many names? For every composite thing, in order to subsist, needs those things from which it is composed; and to them it owes what it is, because whatever it is, it is through them; and what they are, they are not through it: and for that reason it is not utterly supreme. If, therefore, that nature is composed of many goods, it is necessary that all these things which are inherent in every composite thing should befall it: which impiety the whole necessity of truth, which was evident above, destroys and overwhelms with clear reason of its falsity. Since, therefore, that nature is in no way composite and yet is in every way all those goods, it is necessary that all those things be not many, but one. Therefore, any one of them is the same as all of them, whether together or individually; so that when justice or essence is spoken of, it signifies the same thing as the others, or all together, or each one singly. Just as, therefore, whatever is said essentially of the supreme substance is one thing, so it itself, in one way and in one respect, is whatever it is essentially. For when a certain man is called a body, and rational, and a man, these three are not said in one way or in one respect. For it is a body according to one thing, and rational according to another, and each of these is not the whole of what man is. But that supreme essence is in no way something such that it is not that same thing in another way, or in another respect; because whatever it is in any way essentially, this is the whole of what it is. Therefore, nothing that is truly said of its essence is understood in terms of quality or quantity, but in terms of what it is. For whatever is either a quality or a quantity is also something else in terms of what it is, whence it is not simple, but composite.

CHAPTER XVIII

[or, XVII]. That it is without beginning and without end.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.--Si summa substantia principium habet, aut ex se, aut ex alio, aut ex nihilo habet. Non ex alio, aut ex nihilo habet: cum probatum sit eam non esse ex alio, aut ex nihilo. Non etiam ex se vel per se initium habet: sic enim est ex se vel per se, ut non alia sit essentia quae est per se et ex se, et alia per quam et ex qua est: alioquin jam non esset per se, sed per aliud. Summa igitur natura non incoepit per se vel ex se. Sed nec finem habebit. Si enim finem habitura est: 1. Non est summe vita, seu immortalis et incorruptibilis; 2. aut volens aut nolens deficiet: non volens, quia non est simplex bonum cuius voluntate perit summum bonum; si vero nolens, non est summe potens; 3. non esset aeterna; 4. veritas principium vel finem habere nequit cogitari. Nunquam enim non verum fuit quia futurum erat aliquid; et nunquam non verum erit quia praeteritum est aliquid.

Ex quo igitur haec tam simplex natura creatrix et vigor omnium fuit, vel usquequo futura est? An potius nec ex quo, nec usquequo est; sed sine principio et sine fine est? Si enim principium habet, aut ex se vel per se hoc habet; aut ex alio vel per aliud; aut ex nihilo vel per nihil. Sed constat per veritatem jam perspectam quia nullo modo ex alio, vel ex nihilo, vel per aliud, vel per nihil est. Nullo igitur modo per aliud, vel ex alio, aut per nihil, vel ex nihilo initium sortita est.

Ex seipsa vero, vel per se initium habere non potest, quanquam ex seipsa, et per seipsam sit. Sic enim est ex se et per se, ut nullo modo sit alia essentia, quae est per se et ex se, et alia per quam et ex qua est. Quidquid autem ex aliquo vel per aliquid incipit esse, non est omnino idem illi ex quo, vel per quod incipit esse. Summa igitur natura non incoepit per se, vel ex se.

Quoniam igitur nec per se, nec ex se, nec per aliud, nec ex alio, nec per nihil, nec ex nihilo habet principium, nullo modo habet principium. Sed neque finem habebit. Si enim finem habitura est, non est summe immortalis et summe incorruptibilis; sed constat quia est summe immortalis et incorruptibilis: non habebit igitur finem. Amplius: Si finem habitura est, aut volens, aut nolens deficiet. Sed pro certo non est simplex bonum, cuius voluntate perit summum bonum: at ipsa est verum et simplex bonum; quare sua sponte non deficiet ipsa, quam certum est esse summum bonum.

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.—If the highest substance has a beginning, it has it either from itself, or from another, or from nothing. It does not have it from another, or from nothing, since it has been proven that it is not from another or from nothing. Nor does it have a beginning from itself or through itself: for it is from itself or through itself in such a way that the essence which is through itself and from itself is not one thing, and that through which and from which it is, another; otherwise, it would no longer be through itself, but through another. Therefore, the highest nature did not begin through itself or from itself. But neither will it have an end. For if it were to have an end: 1. It is not supremely life, or immortal and incorruptible; 2. it will fail either willingly or unwillingly: not willingly, because it is not a simple good by whose will the highest good perishes; but if unwillingly, it is not supremely powerful; 3. it would not be eternal; 4. truth cannot be conceived to have a beginning or an end. For it was never not true that something was going to be; and it will never not be true that something has passed away.

From when, therefore, has this so simple creative nature and force of all things existed, or until when will it exist? Or rather, is it neither from when nor until when, but is without beginning and without end? For if it has a beginning, it has it either from itself or through itself; or from another or through another; or from nothing or through nothing. But it is established by the truth already perceived that in no way is it from another, or from nothing, or through another, or through nothing. Therefore, in no way did it receive its beginning through another, or from another, or through nothing, or from nothing.

But it cannot have a beginning from itself or through itself, although it is from itself and through itself. For it is from itself and through itself in such a way that the essence which is through itself and from itself is in no way one thing, and that through which and from which it is, another. But whatever begins to be from something or through something is not entirely the same as that from which or through which it begins to be. Therefore, the highest nature did not begin through itself or from itself.

Since, therefore, it has a beginning neither through itself, nor from itself, nor through another, nor from another, nor through nothing, nor from nothing, it has a beginning in no way. But neither will it have an end. For if it were to have an end, it is not supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible; but it is established that it is supremely immortal and incorruptible: therefore, it will not have an end. Furthermore: If it is to have an end, it will fail either willingly or unwillingly. But certainly, it is not a simple good by whose will the highest good perishes: but it is itself the true and simple good; wherefore it will not fail of its own accord, it which is certain to be the highest good.

Si vero nolens peritura est, non est summe potens, nec omnipotens; sed rationis necessitas asseruit eam summe potentem esse et omnipotentem. Non ergo nolens deficiet.

Quare si nec volens, neque nolens [al. omit.] summa natura finem habebit, nullo modo 11 finem habebit. Amplius: Si illa summa natura finem habet, vel principium, non est vera aeternitas: quod esse supra inexpugnabiliter inventum est. Deinde cogitet, qui potest, quando incoepit, aut quando non fuit hoc verum; scilicet, quia futurum erat aliquid: aut quando desinet, et non erit hoc verum; scilicet, quia praeteritum erit aliquid. Quod si neutrum horum cogitari potest, et utrumque hoc verum sine veritate esse non potest; impossibile est vel cogitare quod veritas principium vel finem habeat. Denique si veritas habuit principium, vel habebit finem; antequam ipsa inciperet, verum erat tunc quia non erat veritas; et postquam finita erit quia non erit. Atqui verum non potest esse sine veritate: erat igitur veritas, antequam esset veritas; et erit veritas, postquam finita erit veritas; quod inconvenientissimum est. Sive igitur dicatur veritas habere, sive intelligatur non habere principium vel finem, nullo claudi potest veritas principio vel fine: quare idem sequitur de summa natura, quia ipsa summa veritas est.

Sed ecce iterum insurgit nihil, et quaecunque hactenus ratio veritate et necessitate concorditer attestantibus, disseruit, asserit esset nihil. Si enim ea, quae supra digesta sunt, necessariae veritatis munimine firmata sunt, non fuit aliquid ante summam essentiam, nec erit aliquid post eam: quare nihil fuit ante eam, et nihil erit post eam. Nam aut aliquid, aut nihil necesse est praecessisse, vel subsecuturum esse. Qui autem dicit quia nihil fuit ante ipsam, et nihil erit post ipsam, id pronuntiare videtur. Quia fuit ante ipsam, quando nihil erat; et erit post ipsam, quando nihil erit. Quando ergo nihil erat, illa non erat; et quando nihil erit, illa non erit. Quomodo ergo non incoepit ex nihilo, aut quomodo non deveniet ad nihilum: si illa nondum erat, cum jam erat nihil; et eadem jam non erit, cum adhuc erit nihil? Quid ergo molita est tanta moles argumentorum, si tam facile demolitur nihilum molimina eorum? Si namque constituitur ut summum esse nihilo et praecedenti succedat, et subsequenti decedat quidquid supra statuit verum, necesse destituitur per inane nihilum.

But if it is to perish unwillingly, it is not supremely powerful, nor omnipotent; but the necessity of reason has asserted it to be supremely powerful and omnipotent. Therefore, it will not fail unwillingly.

Wherefore, if the highest nature will have an end neither willingly nor unwillingly [some mss. omit], it will have an end in no way. Furthermore: If that highest nature has an end, or a beginning, it is not true eternity: which has been found above to be irrefutably the case. Then let him who can, conceive when this truth began, or when it was not true—namely, that something was going to be; or when it will cease, and this will not be true—namely, that something will have passed away. But if neither of these can be conceived, and both these truths cannot exist without truth, it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning or an end. Finally, if truth had a beginning, or will have an end, then before it began, it was true that there was no truth; and after it has ended, it will be true that it will not be. But the true cannot be without truth: therefore, there was truth before there was truth; and there will be truth after truth has ended; which is most absurd. Therefore, whether truth is said to have, or is understood not to have, a beginning or an end, truth can be enclosed by no beginning or end: wherefore the same follows for the highest nature, because it is the highest truth.

But behold, nothingness rises up again, and asserts that whatever reason has thus far discussed, with truth and necessity concordantly attesting, is nothing. For if those things which have been set forth above are fortified by the defense of necessary truth, then not anything was before the supreme essence, nor will anything be after it: wherefore nothing was before it, and nothing will be after it. For it is necessary that either something or nothing preceded or will follow. But he who says that nothing was before it, and nothing will be after it, seems to pronounce this: that there was a time before it, when nothing was; and there will be a time after it, when nothing will be. Therefore, when nothing was, it was not; and when nothing will be, it will not be. How then did it not begin from nothing, or how will it not come to nothing: if it was not yet, when nothing already was; and the same will no longer be, when nothing will still be? What then has so great a mass of arguments accomplished, if nothingness so easily demolishes their efforts? For if it is established that the supreme being succeeds a preceding nothingness and yields to a subsequent one, whatever truth has been established above is necessarily undone by the empty nothingness.

An potius repugnandum est nihilo, ne tot structurae necessariae rationis a nihilo expugnentur; et summum bonum, quod lucerna veritatis quaesitum et inventum est, amittatur pro nihilo. Potius igitur asseratur, si fieri potest, quia nihil non fuit ante summam essentiam, nec erit post illam; quam, cum locus datur ante vel post illam nihilo, per nihilum reducatur ad nihilum illud esse, quod per seipsum conduxit id quod erat nihil, esse. Duplicem namque una pronuntiatio gerit sententiam, cum dicitur quia nihil fuit ante summam essentiam. Unus enim est ejus sensus, quia, priusquam summa essentia esset, fuit, cum erat nihil. Alter vero ejus est intellectus, quia ante summam essentiam non fuit aliquid, veluti si dicam, nihil docuit me volare: aut hoc sic exponam, quia ipsum nihil, quod significat non aliquid, docuit me volare; et erit falsum: aut quia non me docuit aliquid volare, quod est verum. Prior itaque sensus est, quem sequitur supra tractata inconvenientia, et omnimoda ratione pro falso repellitur. Alter vero est, qui superioribus perfecta cohaeret convenientia et tota illorum contexione verus esse compellitur. Quare cum dicitur quia nihil fuit ante illam, secundum posteriorem intellectum accipiendum est; nec sic est exponendum, ut intelligatur aliquando fuisse, quando illa non erat, et nihil erat; sed ita ut intelligatur quia ante illam non fuit aliquid. Eadem ratio est duplicis intellectus si nihil dicatur post illam esse futurum. Si ergo haec interpretatio, quae facta est de nihilo, diligenter discernitur, verissime nec aliquid nec nihil summam essentiam aut praecessisse aut subsecuturum esse, et nihil fuisse ante vel post illam esse secuturum concluditur, et tamen nulla jam constitutorum soliditas nihili inanitate concutitur.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Creatrix essentia ubique et semper est, 1. quia nunquam incoepit aut desinet esse; 2. quia summa natura aut ubique et semper est, aut tantum alicubi et aliquando, aut nusquam et nunquam. At repugnat, 1 ut quod verissime et summe est, id nusquam et nunquam sit; 2. ut ullum bonum vel aliquid sit sine ipsa creatrice essentia, sine qua nusquam vel nunquam est aliquid. Denique quia nec determinate est alicubi et aliquando; ubi enim ipsa non est, ibi nulla est essentia: nec determinate per se in uno loco et tempore; in caeteris vero per suam potentiam; nam potentia ejus est ipsius essentia. Ergo ubique et semper est.

Or rather, must we not fight back against nothingness, lest so many structures of necessary reason be conquered by nothingness; and the supreme good, which was sought and found by the lamp of truth, be lost for nothing? Therefore, let it rather be asserted, if it can be done, that 'nothing' was not before the supreme essence, nor will be after it; than that, when a place is given to nothingness before or after it, that being—which by itself brought it about that what was nothing should come to be—be reduced to nothing by nothingness. For the single pronouncement, 'that nothing was before the supreme essence,' carries a double meaning. For one of its senses is that, before the supreme essence was, there was a time when nothing was. But its other meaning is that before the supreme essence there was not anything, just as if I were to say, 'nothing taught me to fly': I might explain this in one way, that 'nothing' itself, which signifies 'not something,' taught me to fly; and this would be false: or that not anything taught me to fly, which is true. Therefore, the first sense is the one which the aforementioned difficulty follows, and it is rejected as false by every kind of reason. But the other is the one which coheres with the preceding arguments in perfect harmony and is compelled to be true by their whole context. Wherefore, when it is said that 'nothing was before it,' it must be taken according to the latter meaning; nor should it be explained in such a way that it is understood that there was a time when it was not, and nothing was; but so that it is understood that before it there was not anything. The same reasoning of a double meaning applies if it is said that nothing will be after it. If, therefore, this interpretation that has been made concerning 'nothing' is diligently discerned, it is most truly concluded that neither something nor nothing preceded or will follow the supreme essence, and that 'nothing' was before or will be after it, and yet the solidity of what has already been established is in no way shaken by the emptiness of nothingness.

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.---The creative essence is everywhere and always, 1. because it never began or will cease to be; 2. because the supreme nature is either everywhere and always, or only somewhere and sometimes, or nowhere and never. But it is contradictory, 1. that what most truly and supremely is, should be nowhere and never; 2. that any good or anything at all should exist without the creative essence itself, without which nothing is anywhere or ever. Finally, because it is not determinately somewhere and sometimes—for where it is not, there is no essence—nor determinately through itself in one place and time, but in others through its power, for its power is its very essence. Therefore, it is everywhere and always.

Quamquam autem supra conclusum sit, quia creatrix haec natura ubique, et in omnibus, et per omnia sit: et ex eo, quia nec incoepit, nec desinet esse consequatur quia semper fuit, et est, et erit, sentio tamen quiddam contradictionis submurmurare; quod me cogit diligentius, ubi et quando illa sit, indagare. Itaque summa essentia, aut ubique et semper est, aut tantum alicubi et aliquando, aut nusquam et nunquam: quod dico, aut in omni loco et tempore; aut determinate in aliquo, vel in nullo. Sed quid videtur repugnantius, quam ut quod verissime et summe est, id nusquam et nunquam sit. Falsum est igitur nusquam vel nunquam illam esse. Deinde, quoniam nullum bonum, nec penitus aliquid est sine ea: si ipsa nusquam vel nunquam est, nusquam vel nunquam aliquod bonum est, et nusquam vel nunquam omnino aliquid est. Quod quam falsum sit, nec dicere opus est: falsum igitur est et illud, quod illa nusquam aut nunquam sit. Aut est ergo determinate alicubi et aliquando; aut ubique et semper. At si determinate est in aliquo loco vel tempore; ibi et tunc tantum, ubi et quando ipsa est, potest aliquid esse. Ubi vero et quando ipsa non est, ibi et tunc penitus nulla est essentia, quia sine ea nihil est: unde consequetur ut sit aliquis locus et aliquod tempus, ubi et quando omnino nihil est. Quod quoniam est falsum; ipse namque locus et tempus ipsum aliquid est; non potest esse summa natura alicubi, vel aliquando determinate. Quod si dicitur quod determinate ipsa per se alicubi et aliquando est; sed per potentiam suam est ubicunque, vel quandocunque aliquid est; non est verum: quoniam enim potentiam ejus nihil aliud quam ipsam esse manifestum est; nullo modo potentia ejus sine ipsa est. Cum ergo non sit alicubi vel aliquando determinate, necesse est ut sit ubique et semper, id est in omni loco et tempore.

Quod si ita est, aut tota est in omni loco vel tempore, aut tantum quaelibet pars ejus, ut altera pars sit extra omnem locum et tempus. Si vero partim est, et partim non in omni loco vel tempore, partes habet: quod falsum est. Non igitur partim est ubique et semper. Tota autem quomodo est ubique et semper? Aut enim sic est intelligendum, ut tota simul sit in omnibus locis vel temporibus, et per partes in singulis; aut sic, ut tota sit etiam in singulis. Verum si per partes est in singulis, non effugit partium compositionem et divisionem: quod valde alienum a summa natura inventum est. Quapropter non est ita tota in omnibus locis et temporibus, ut per partes sit in singulis. Restat altera pars discutienda, scilicet, qualiter summa natura sit tota in omnibus, et singulis locis et temporibus. Hoc nimirum esse non potest, nisi aut simul, aut diversis temporibus. Sed quoniam ratio loci, aut ratio temporis, quas hactenus simul progressas eisdem vestigiis una potuit indagare prosecutio, hic ab invicem digredientes disputationem videntur diversis quasi fugere anfractibus, singillatim suis investigentur discussionibus.

Although it has been concluded above that this creative nature is everywhere, and in all things, and through all things, and from the fact that it neither began nor will cease to be it follows that it always was, and is, and will be, yet I sense a certain murmur of contradiction, which compels me to investigate more diligently where and when it is. Therefore, the supreme essence is either everywhere and always, or only somewhere and sometimes, or nowhere and never: that is to say, either in every place and time, or determinately in some, or in none. But what seems more contradictory than that what most truly and supremely is, should be nowhere and never? It is false, therefore, that it is nowhere or never. Furthermore, since no good, nor anything at all, exists without it, if it itself is nowhere or never, then nowhere or never is there any good, and nowhere or never is there anything at all. How false this is, there is no need to say; therefore, it is also false that it is nowhere or never. Therefore, it is either determinately somewhere and sometimes, or everywhere and always. But if it is determinately in some place or time, then only there and then, where and when it is, can anything exist. But where and when it is not, there and then there is absolutely no essence, because without it there is nothing; from which it would follow that there is some place and some time where and when there is absolutely nothing. Since this is false—for place itself and time itself are something—the supreme nature cannot be determinately somewhere or sometimes. But if it is said that it is determinately through itself somewhere and sometimes, but through its power is wherever or whenever anything is, this is not true: for since it is manifest that its power is nothing other than itself, its power is in no way without itself. Since, therefore, it is not determinately somewhere or sometimes, it is necessary that it be everywhere and always, that is, in every place and time.

But if this is so, either it is whole in every place or time, or only some part of it is, such that another part is outside every place and time. If, however, it is partly in and partly not in every place or time, it has parts: which is false. Therefore, it is not partly everywhere and always. But how is it whole everywhere and always? For it must be understood either in this way, that it is whole at once in all places or times, and by parts in individual ones; or in this way, that it is also whole in individual ones. But if it is in individual places or times by parts, it does not escape the composition and division of parts: which was found to be very foreign to the supreme nature. Therefore, it is not whole in all places and times in such a way that it is in individual ones by parts. The other alternative remains to be discussed, namely, how the supreme nature is whole in all, and in individual, places and times. This, to be sure, cannot be, except either at the same time, or at different times. But since the reasoning concerning place and the reasoning concerning time—which, having thus far progressed together, could be traced in the same footsteps by a single inquiry—here seem to diverge from each other and to flee, as it were, through different winding paths of argument, let them be investigated in their own separate discussions.

Primum ergo videatur si summa natura tota possit esse in singulis locis, aut simul aut per diversa tempora. Deinde idipsum in temporibus inquiratur. Si igitur tota est simul in singulis locis, per singula loca sunt singulae totae. Sicut enim locus a loco distinguitur ut singula loca sint, ita id quod totum est in uno loco, ab eo quod eodem tempore totum est in alio loco distinguitur, ut singula tota sint. Nam quod totum est in aliquo loco, nihil ejus est quod non sit in ipso loco. At de quo nihil est quod non sit in aliquo loco, nihil est de eo quod sit eodem tempore extra eundem locum. Quod igitur totum est in aliquo loco, nihil est ejus quod eodem tempore sit extra ipsum locum. Sed de quo nihil est extra quemlibet locum, nihil ejus est eodem tempore in alio loco. Quare quod totum est in quolibet loco, nihil ejus est simul in alio loco. Quod igitur totum est in aliquo loco, quomodo totum quoque simul est in alio loco, si nihil de eo potest esse in alio loco? Quoniam igitur unum totum non potest esse simul in diversis locis totum, consequitur ut per singula loca, singula sint tota, si in singulis locis simul aliquid est totum. Quapropter si summa natura tota est uno tempore in singulis omnibus locis, quot singula loca esse possunt, tot singulae sunt naturae summae, quod irrationabile est opinari. Non est igitur tota uno tempore in singulis locis. At vero si diversis temporibus tota est in singulis locis, quando est in uno loco, nullum bonum et nulla essentia est interim in aliis locis, quia sine ea prorsus aliquid non existit. Quod absurdum esse vel ipsa loca probant, quae nonnihil, sed aliquid sunt. Non est itaque summa natura tota in singulis locis, diversis temporibus. Quod si nec eodem tempore, nec diversis temporibus tota est in singulis locis, liquet quia nullo modo est tota in singulis omnibus locis. Nunc igitur est indagandum si eadem summa natura sit tota in singulis temporibus, aut simul, aut distincte per singula tempora. Sed quomodo est aliquid totum simul in singulis temporibus, si ipsa tempora simul non sunt? Si vero separatim et distincte tota est in singulis temporibus, quemadmodum aliquis homo totus est heri, et hodie, et cras; proprie dicitur quia fuit, et est, et erit. Ergo ejus aetas, quae nihil aliud est quam ejus aeternitas, non est tota simul; sed est partibus extensa per temporum partes. At ejus aeternitas nihil aliud est, quam ipsa. Summa igitur essentia erit divisa per partes, secundum temporum distinctiones. Si enim ejus aetas per temporum cursus producit, habet cum ipsis temporibus praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Quid autem aliud est ejus aetas, vel existendi diuturnitas, quam ejus aeternitas?

First, therefore, let us see if the supreme nature can be whole in individual places, either at the same time or at different times. Then, let the same be inquired into with respect to times. If, therefore, it is whole at the same time in individual places, then for each individual place there is an individual whole. For just as place is distinguished from place so that there are individual places, so that which is whole in one place is distinguished from that which at the same time is whole in another place, so that there are individual wholes. For that which is whole in some place, nothing of it is what is not in that place. But of that of which nothing is what is not in some place, nothing of it is what is at the same time outside that same place. Therefore, that which is whole in some place, nothing of it is what is at the same time outside that place. But of that of which nothing is outside any given place, nothing of it is at the same time in another place. Wherefore, that which is whole in any given place, nothing of it is at the same time in another place. Therefore, that which is whole in some place, how is it also whole at the same time in another place, if nothing of it can be in another place? Since, therefore, one whole cannot be whole at the same time in different places, it follows that for each individual place, there is an individual whole, if something is whole in individual places at the same time. Therefore, if the supreme nature is whole at one time in all individual places, then there are as many individual supreme natures as there can be individual places, which is irrational to suppose. Therefore, it is not whole at one time in individual places. But if it is whole in individual places at different times, then when it is in one place, no good and no essence exists in the meantime in other places, because without it absolutely nothing exists. That this is absurd is proven even by the places themselves, which are not nothing, but something. Therefore, the supreme nature is not whole in individual places at different times. But if it is whole in individual places neither at the same time nor at different times, it is clear that it is in no way whole in all individual places. Now, therefore, it must be investigated whether this same supreme nature is whole in individual times, either at once, or distinctly through individual times. But how is something whole at once in individual times, if the times themselves are not at once? If, however, it is whole separately and distinctly in individual times, just as some man is whole yesterday, and today, and tomorrow, it is properly said that he was, and is, and will be. Therefore its age, which is nothing other than its eternity, is not whole at once, but is extended in parts through the parts of time. But its eternity is nothing other than itself. The supreme essence, therefore, will be divided into parts, according to the distinctions of time. For if its age is drawn out through the courses of time, it has, with the times themselves, a present, a past, and a future. But what else is its age, or the duration of its existence, than its eternity?

Ergo cum ejus aeternitas nihil aliud sit quam ejus essentia, sicut supra digesta ratio indubitabiliter probat: si ejus aeternitas habet praeteritum, praesens et futurum, consequenter quoque ejus essentia habet praeteritum, praesens, et futurum. At quod praeteritum est, non est praesens vel futurum; et quod praesens est, non est praeteritum, nec futurum; et quod futurum est, non est praeteritum, vel praesens. Quomodo ergo stabit quod supra rationabili et perspicua necessitate claruit, scilicet, quia illa summa natura nullo modo composita, sed summe simplex et summe incommutabilis, si aliud et aliud est in diversis temporibus, et per tempora distributas habet partes; aut potius, si illa vera sunt; imo quia liquido vera sunt, quomodo haec possible sunt? Nullo igitur modo creatrix essentia, aut aetas, aut aeternitas ejus recipit praeteritum vel futurum. Praesens enim quomodo non habet, si vere est? sed fuit, significat praeteritum; et erit, futurum. Nunquam igitur illa fuit, vel erit; quare non est distincte, sicut nec simul tota in diversis singulis temporibus. Si igitur, sicut discussum est, nec sic est tota in omnibus locis vel temporibus, ut semel sit tota in omnibus, et per partes in singulis; nec sic, ut tota sit in singulis, manifestum est quia non est ullo modo in omni loco vel tempore tota. Et quoniam similiter pervisum est quia nec sic est in omni loco vel tempore, ut pars sit in omni, et pars sit extra omnem locum vel tempus, impossibile est ut sit ubique et semper. Nullatenus enim potest intelligi esse ubique et semper, nisi aut tota, aut pars. Quod si nequaquam est ubique et semper, aut erit determinate in aliquo loco vel tempore, aut in nullo; determinate autem eam in aliquo non posse esse, jam discussum est. In nullo igitur vel tempore, id est, nusquam et nunquam est. Non enim potest esse, nisi aut in omni, aut in aliquo. Sed rursus cum constet inexpugnabiliter non solum quia est per se, et sine principio, et sine fine; sed quia aliquid sine ea nec usquam nec nunquam est, necesse illam esse ubique et semper.

Haec tam contraria secundum prolationem, et necessaria secundum probationem, inter se conveniunt: siquidem unum totum non posse simul esse in diversis locis vel temporibus, verum est duntaxat de iis quae sic sunt in loco et tempore, ut loci spatium vel temporis diuturnitatem non excedant. Illius enim duntaxat rei est locus, cujus quantitatem locus circumscribit ac continet: et illius solum rei est aliquod tempus, cujus diuturnitatem metiendo terminat. At summa natura nullis terminis clauditur; sed ejus potentia, quae est ipsius essentiae, omnia sub se concludit. Ergo ipsam nulla loci vel temporis cohibitio includit, et cum nullam localis vel temporalis distensionis magnitudinem vel parvitatem sicut nec partem, suscipiat; nullo loco aut tempore circumscribitur. At tamen necessitas exigit summam essentiam totam nulli loco vel tempori deesse: et nulla lex loci aut temporis prohibet eam omni loco et tempori simul totam adesse. Ipsa igitur tota simul omnibus et singulis locis et temporibus praesens est. Ideo enim in loco vel tempore esse dicitur, non quia continetur; sed quia praesens est.

Therefore, since its eternity is nothing other than its essence, as the argument set forth above indubitably proves: if its eternity has a past, present, and future, consequently its essence also has a past, present, and future. But what is past is not present or future; and what is present is not past nor future; and what is future is not past or present. How then will that stand which was made clear above with reasonable and perspicuous necessity, namely, that the supreme nature is in no way composite, but supremely simple and supremely unchangeable, if it is one thing and another at different times, and has parts distributed through time; or rather, if those things are true—indeed, because they are clearly true—how are these things possible? In no way, therefore, does the creating essence, or its age, or its eternity, admit of a past or a future. For how does it not have a present, if it truly is? But "was" signifies the past, and "will be" the future. Therefore, it never was, nor will be; wherefore it is not distinctly, just as it is not at once, whole in different individual times. If, therefore, as has been discussed, it is neither whole in all places or times in such a way that it is at once whole in all and by parts in individual ones, nor in such a way that it is whole in individual ones, it is manifest that it is in no way whole in every place or time. And since it has likewise been seen that it is not in every place or time in such a way that a part is in every one, and a part is outside every place or time, it is impossible for it to be everywhere and always. For in no way can it be understood to be everywhere and always, except either as a whole or as a part. But if it is in no way everywhere and always, it will either be determinately in some place or time, or in none; but that it cannot be determinately in some has already been discussed. Therefore, it is in no place or time, that is, it is nowhere and never. For it cannot be, except either in all or in some. But on the other hand, since it stands unassailably established not only that it exists through itself, and without beginning, and without end, but also that without it nothing exists anywhere or at any time, it is necessary that it be everywhere and always.

These things, so contrary in their statement and so necessary in their proof, are reconciled with each other: for it is true that one whole cannot be simultaneously in different places or times only for those things that are in a place and time in such a way that they do not exceed the space of the place or the duration of the time. For a place belongs only to that thing whose quantity the place circumscribes and contains; and a certain time belongs only to that thing whose duration it terminates by measuring. But the supreme nature is enclosed by no boundaries; rather, its power, which is its very essence, encloses all things under itself. Therefore, no confinement of place or time includes it, and since it admits no magnitude or parvitude of local or temporal extension, nor any part, it is circumscribed by no place or time. And yet, necessity demands that the whole supreme essence be absent from no place or time; and no law of place or time prohibits it from being present whole and simultaneously to every place and time. Therefore, it is present whole and simultaneously to all and to each place and time. For this reason, it is said to be *in* a place or time, not because it is contained, but because it is present.

Aptius tamen haec diceretur esse cum loco et tempore, quam in loco et tempore; quia esse in loco vel tempore, proprie intelligitur contineri. Itaque in omni loco et tempore summa natura est, quia nulli abest; et in nullo loco vel tempore est, quia nulla clauditur, nec loci aut temporis legibus subjicitur.

Quomodo ergo convenient haec tam necessaria secundum prolationem, et tam necessaria secundum probationem? Fortasse quodam modo est summa natura in loco vel tempore, quo non prohibetur sic esse simul tota in singulis locis vel temporibus, ut tamen non sint plures totae, sed una sola tota; nec ejus aetas, quae non est nisi vera aeternitas, non sit distributa in praeteritum, praesens et futurum. Non enim videntur hac lege loci ac temporis cogi, nisi ea quae sic sunt in loco vel tempore, ut loci spatium vel temporis diuturnitatem non excedant. Quare, sicut de his quae hujusmodi sunt, unum idemque totum simul non posse esse totum in diversis locis vel temporibus omni veritate asseritur; ita in his quae hujusmodi non sunt, idipsum nulla necessitate concluditur. Jure namque dici videtur, quod tantum ejus rei sit aliquis locus, cujus quantitatem locus circumscribendo continet, et continendo circumscribit, et quod ejus rei solum sit aliquod tempus, cujus diuturnitatem tempus metiendo aliquo modo terminat, et terminando metitur. Quapropter cujus amplitudini, aut diuturnitati, nulla meta vel a loco vel a tempore opponitur; ulli nullum esse locum vel tempus vere proponitur. Quoniam namque nec locus illi facit, quod locus; nec tempus, quod tempus: non irrationabiliter dicitur quia nullus locus est ejus locus, et nullum tempus est ejus tempus. Quod vero nullum locum aut tempus habere conspicitur, id profecto nullatenus loci aut temporis legem subire convincitur. Nulla igitur lex loci aut temporis naturam ullam aliquo modo cogit, quam nullus locus aut tempus aliqua continentia claudit. Quenam autem rationalis consideratio omnimoda ratione non concludat, ut creatricem summamque omnium substantiam, quam necesse est alienam esse et liberam a natura et jure omnium, quae ipsa fecit de nihilo, nulla loci cohibitio vel temporis includat, cum potius ejus potentia, quae non est aliud quam ejus essentia, cuncta a se facta sub se continendo concludat. Quomodo quoque non est impudentis imprudentiae dicere quod summae veritatis aut locus circumscribat quantitatem, aut tempus metiatur diuturnitatem: quae nullam penitus localis vel temporalis distensionis magnitudinem suspicit vel parvitatem? Quoniam itaque loci haec est vel temporis conditio, ut tantummodo quidquid eorum metis clauditur, nec partium fugiat rationem, vel qualem suscipit locus ejus secundum quantitatem, vel qualem patitur tempus ejus secundum diuturnitatem; nec ullo modo possit totum a diversis locis vel temporibus simul contineri: quidquid vero loci

It would be more fitting, however, to say that it is *with* a place and time, rather than *in* a place and time; because to be *in* a place or time is properly understood as being contained. Therefore, the supreme nature is in every place and time, because it is absent from none; and it is in no place or time, because it is enclosed by none, nor is it subject to the laws of place or time.

How then will these things, so necessary in their statement and so necessary in their proof, be reconciled? Perhaps the supreme nature is in a place or time in a certain way, one which does not prevent it from being thus simultaneously whole in individual places or times, such that there are not many wholes, but one single whole; nor is its age, which is nothing but true eternity, distributed into past, present, and future. For only those things seem to be constrained by this law of place and time which are in a place or time in such a way that they do not exceed the space of the place or the duration of the time. Therefore, just as concerning things of this kind, it is asserted with all truth that one and the same whole cannot be simultaneously whole in different places or times, so concerning things that are not of this kind, this same thing is concluded by no necessity. For it seems rightly said that a place belongs only to that thing whose quantity the place contains by circumscribing it, and circumscribes by containing it; and that a time belongs only to that thing whose duration time in some way terminates by measuring it, and measures by terminating it. Therefore, for that whose amplitude or duration no boundary is set either by place or by time, it is truly proposed that no place or time belongs to it at all. For since place does not act as place for it, nor time as time, it is not unreasonably said that no place is its place, and no time is its time. But that which is seen to have no place or time is certainly proven to be in no way subject to the law of place or time. Therefore, no law of place or time in any way constrains any nature which no place or time encloses with any containment. For what rational consideration would not conclude with every reason that no confinement of place or time encloses the creative and supreme substance of all things—which must necessarily be foreign to and free from the nature and law of all things which it itself made from nothing—since rather its power, which is nothing other than its essence, encloses by containing under itself all things made by it? Also, how is it not of impudent imprudence to say that place circumscribes the quantity of the supreme truth, or that time measures its duration, when it admits absolutely no magnitude or parvitude of local or temporal extension? Since, therefore, this is the condition of place or time, that only whatever is enclosed by their boundaries does not escape the principle of parts (either such as its place admits according to quantity, or such as its time undergoes according to duration), and cannot in any way be contained whole simultaneously by different places or times; whereas whatever is in no way coerced by the containment

vel temporis continentia nequaquam coercetur, nulla locorum vel temporum lege ad partium multiplicitem cogatur; aut praesens esse totum simul pluribus locis aut temporibus prohibeatur; quoniam, inquam, haec est conditio loci aut temporis, procul dubio summa substantia, quae nulla loci vel temporis continentia cingitur, nulla eorum lege constringitur. Quare quoniam summam essentiam totam et inevitabilis necessitas exigit nulli loco vel tempori deesse, et nulla ratio loci aut temporis prohibet omni loco vel tempori simul totam adesse, necesse est eam simul totam omnibus et singulis locis et temporibus praesentem esse. Non enim, quia huic loco vel tempori praesens est, idcirco prohibetur illi vel illi loco, aut tempori simul et similiter praesens esse; nec quoniam fuit, aut est, aut erit, ideo aeternitatis ejus aliquid evanuit a praesenti tempore cum praeterito, quod jam non est; aut transit cum praesenti, quod vix est; aut venturum est cum futuro, quod nondum est. Nullatenus namque cogitur vel prohibetur lege locorum vel temporum, alicubi aut aliquando esse vel non esse, quod nullo modo intra locum vel tempus claudit suum esse. Nam, si ipsa summa essentia dicitur esse in loco aut tempore, quamvis de illa et de localibus sive temporalibus naturis una sit prolatio, propter loquendi consuetudinem, diversus tamen est intellectus, propter rerum dissimilitudinem. In illis namque duo quaedam eadem prolatio significat, id est, quia praesentia sunt locis et temporibus, in quibus esse dicuntur; et quia continentur ab ipsis. In summa vero essentia unum tantum praecipitur, id est, quia praesens est; non etiam quia continentur. Unde, si usus loquendi admitteret, convenientius dici videretur esse cum loco vel tempore, quam in loco vel tempore. Verius enim significatur contineri aliquid, cum dicitur esse in alio, quam cum dicitur esse cum alio. In nullo itaque loco vel tempore proprie dicitur esse, quia omnino a nullo alio continetur: et tamen in omni loco vel tempore suo quodam modo dici potest esse; quoniam quidquid aliud est, ne in nihilum cadat, ab ea praesente sustinetur: in omni loco et tempore est, quia nulli abest; et in nullo est, quia nullum locum aut tempus habet, nec in se recepit distinctiones locorum aut temporum; nec hic vel illic, vel alicubi, vel tunc, vel nunc, vel aliquando; nec secundum labile praesens tempus quo utimur, est aut secundum praeteritum, vel futurum, fuit, vel erit, quoniam haec circumscriptorum et mutabilium propria sunt; quod illa non est. Et tamen haec de ea quodammodo dici possunt; quoniam sic est praesens omnibus circumscriptis et mutabilibus, ac si illa circumscribatur eisdem locis, et mutetur temporibus. Patet itaque, quantum satis est ad dissolvendam, quae insonabat, contrarietatem; qualiter summa omnium essentia ubique et semper, et nusquam et nunquam, id est, in omni et in nullo loco, aut tempore sit, juxta diversorum intellectuum concordem veritatem.

of place or time is not compelled by any law of places or times to a multiplicity of parts, nor is it prohibited from being present whole simultaneously in multiple places or times; since, I say, this is the condition of place or time, without a doubt the supreme substance, which is girded by no containment of place or time, is constrained by no law of theirs. Wherefore, since inevitable necessity requires the whole supreme essence to be absent from no place or time, and no principle of place or time prohibits it from being present whole simultaneously to every place or time, it is necessary for it to be present whole simultaneously to all and to each place and time. For it is not prohibited from being simultaneously and similarly present to that or that other place or time just because it is present to this place or time; nor, because it was, or is, or will be, has therefore something of its eternity vanished from the present time with the past, which is no more; or is passing away with the present, which scarcely is; or is to come with the future, which is not yet. For in no way is that which in no way encloses its being within place or time compelled or prohibited by the law of places or times to be or not to be somewhere or sometime. For if the supreme essence itself is said to be in a place or time, although the expression is one for it and for local or temporal natures, on account of the custom of speech, yet the understanding is different, on account of the dissimilarity of the things. For in the latter, the same expression signifies two things: that is, that they are present to the places and times in which they are said to be, and that they are contained by them. But in the supreme essence, only one thing is understood: that is, that it is present, not also that it is contained. Hence, if the usage of speech allowed it, it would seem more fitting to say it is **with** a place or time than **in** a place or time. For that something is contained is more truly signified when it is said to be **in** another than when it is said to be **with** another. Therefore, it is properly said to be in no place or time, because it is contained by nothing else at all; and yet in its own way it can be said to be in every place and time, since whatever else exists is sustained by its presence, lest it fall into nothingness: it is in every place and time, because it is absent from none; and it is in none, because it has no place or time, nor does it admit within itself the distinctions of places or times, nor 'here' or 'there' or 'somewhere', nor 'then' or 'now' or 'sometime'; nor, according to the fleeting present time which we use, 'is' it, or according to the past or future, 'was' it or 'will be', since these are properties of circumscribed and mutable things, which it is not. And yet these things can in a certain way be said of it, since it is present to all circumscribed and mutable things as if it were itself circumscribed by the same places and changed by the same times. Thus it is clear, as much as is sufficient to resolve the contradiction that was sounding, how the supreme essence of all things is everywhere and always, and nowhere and never—that is, is in every and in no place or time—according to the concordant truth of different understandings.

Cum localia verba (ubi, ibi, etc.) saepe irreprehensibiliter attribuantur rebus quae nec loca sunt, nec circumscriptione locali continentur, ut cum dicitur ibi esse intellectus in anima, ubi est rationalitas: summa natura ubique, id est in omnibus quae sunt, esse aptius dicitur, quam esse in omnibus locis. Non enim velut quae contineatur, sed quae penetrando cuncta contineat in omnibus est.

Verum cum constet eamdem summam naturam non magis esse in omnibus locis, quam in omnibus quae sunt, non velut quae contineatur, quae penetrando cuncta contineat: cur non dicatur esse ubique, hoc sensu, ut potius intelligatur esse in omnibus quae sunt, quam tantum in omnibus locis, cum hunc intellectum et rei veritas exhibeat, et ipsa localis verbi proprietas nequaquam prohibeat. Solemus namque localia verba saepe irreprehensibiliter attribuere rebus, quae nec loca sunt, nec circumscriptione locali continentur, velut si dicam ibi esse intellectum in anima, ubi est rationalitas. Nam cum ibi, et ubi, adverbialia localia sint; non tamen locali circumscriptione aut anima continet aliquid, aut intellectus aut rationalitas continetur. Quare summa natura secundum rei veritatem, aptius dicitur ubique esse secundum hanc significationem, ut intelligatur esse in omnibus quae sunt, quam si intelligatur tantum in omnibus locis. Et quoniam, sicut supra expositae rationes docent, aliter esse non potest; necesse est eam sic esse in omnibus quae sunt, ut una eademque perfecte tota simul sit in singulis.

Summa natura non habet principium aut finem, nec praesens, praeteritum aut futurum, quae sunt temporales differentiae; quoniam aeternitas ejus, quae nihil aliud est quam ipsa, immutabilis et sine partibus est. Cum ergo vox semper, magis proprie significet aeternitatem, et tempus dicat varietatem, magis congrue summa natura dicitur semper esse, quam esse in omni tempore. Et cum aeternitas sit interminabilis vita simul perfecte tota existens, soli huic naturae summae convenit, quae principio et fine et omni termino caret.

Eamdem quoque summam substantiam constat sine principio et sine fine esse; nec habere praeteritum, aut futurum, nec temporale, hoc est, labile praesens, quo nos utimur, quoniam aetas sive aeternitas ejus quae nihil aliud est quam ipsa, immutabilis et sine partibus est. Nonne ergo semper quod videtur designare totum tempus, multo verius (si de illa dicitur) intelligitur significare aeternitatem, quae sibi ipsi nunquam est dissimilis, quam temporum varietatem, quae sibi ipsi semper est in aliquo non similis.

Since local words (where, there, etc.) are often irreprehensibly attributed to things that are neither places nor contained by local circumscription, as when it is said that the intellect is in the soul *there*, *where* rationality is: the supreme nature is more aptly said to be everywhere, that is, in all things that are, than to be in all places. For it is in all things not as something that is contained, but as that which, by penetrating all things, contains them.

But since it is established that this same supreme nature is not more in all places than it is in all things that are—not as something that is contained, but as that which, by penetrating all things, contains them—why should it not be said to be everywhere in this sense: that it be understood to be in all things that are, rather than only in all places, since both the truth of the matter presents this understanding, and the very property of the local word by no means prohibits it? For we are accustomed to often irreprehensibly attribute local words to things which are neither places nor are contained by local circumscription, as when I say that the intellect is in the soul *there*, *where* rationality is. For although "there" and "where" are local adverbs, nevertheless, neither does the soul contain anything by local circumscription, nor is the intellect or rationality so contained. Therefore, the supreme nature, according to the truth of the matter, is more aptly said to be everywhere according to this meaning—that it be understood to be in all things that are—than if it were understood to be only in all places. And since, as the reasons set forth above teach, it cannot be otherwise, it is necessary that it be in all things that are in such a way that the one and same whole is perfectly and simultaneously in each single thing.

The supreme nature has no beginning or end, nor present, past, or future, which are temporal differences; since its eternity, which is nothing other than itself, is immutable and without parts. Therefore, since the word "always" more properly signifies eternity, and "time" implies variation, it is more fittingly said that the supreme nature "is always" than that it "is in all time." And since eternity is an interminable life existing simultaneously and perfectly whole, it befits this supreme nature alone, which lacks beginning, end, and every limit.

It is also established that this same supreme substance is without beginning and without end; nor does it have a past, or a future, or a temporal—that is, a fleeting—present, which we experience, since its age or eternity, which is nothing other than itself, is immutable and without parts. Therefore, is it not the case that "always," which seems to designate all of time, is much more truly understood (if it is said of that substance) to signify eternity, which is never dissimilar to itself, than the variation of times, which is always in some respect dissimilar to itself?

Quare si dicitur semper esse, quoniam idem est illi esse et vivere; nihil melius intelligitur, quam aeternae esse vel vivere, id est, interminabilem vitam simul perfecte totam obtinere. Videtur enim ejus aeternitas esse interminabilis vita simul perfecte tota existens. Cum enim supra jam satis liqueat quod eadem substantia non sit aliud quam vita sua, et aeternitas sua; nec sit aliquo modo terminabilis, nec nisi simul et perfecte tota, quid aliud est vera aeternitas, quae soli illi convenit, quam interminabilis vita simul et perfecte tota existens? Nam vel hoc solo, veram aeternitatem soli inesse illi substantiae, quae sola non facta, sed factrix esse inventa est, aperte percipitur; quoniam vera aeternitas principii finisque meta carere intelligitur: quod nulli rerum creaturarum convenire, eo ipso quod de nihilo factae sunt, convincitur.

CAPUT XXV

Quod nullis mutabilis sit accidentibus.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Accidentia alia mutationem efficiunt: alia, ut relationes, nullam mutationem inducunt. Summa autem natura, quia simplex est, non subest accidentibus quae mutationem faciunt. Ergo nec susceptibilis est ullius accidentis: accidentia enim improprie dicuntur, quae rem non mutant. Igitur nullo prorsus modo summa essentia mutabilis est; cum semper sit eadem substantialiter. et nullo unquam modo diversa sit accidentaliter.

Sed haec essentia, quam patuit omnimode sibi esse eandem substantialiter, nonne est aliquando a se diversa vel accidentaliter. Verum quomodo est summe incommutabilis, si per accidentia potest, non dicam esse, sed vel intelligi variabilis? Et e contra quomodo non est particeps accidentis; cum et hoc ipsum, quod major est omnibus aliis naturis, et quod illis dissimilis est, illi videatur accidere? Sed quid repugnant quorundam, quae accidentia dicuntur, susceptibilitas, et naturalis incommutabilitas; si ex eorum assumptione nulla substantiam consequatur variabilitas? Omnium quippe quae accidentia dicuntur, alia non nisi cum aliqua participantis variatione adesse et abesse posse intelliguntur, ut omnes colores, alia omnino nullam vel accidendo vel recedendo mutationem circa id de quo dicuntur, efficere noscuntur, ut quaedam relationes. Constat namque quia homini post annum praesentem nascituro, nec major, nec minor, nec aequalis sim, nec similis. Omnes autem relationes has, utique cum natus fuerit, sine omni mei mutatione, ad illum habere potero et amittere, secundum quod crescet, vel per qualitates diversas mutabitur.

Wherefore, if it is said to "be always"—since for it, to be and to live are the same—nothing is better understood than that it is or lives eternally, that is, that it possesses an interminable life simultaneously and perfectly whole. For its eternity seems to be an interminable life existing simultaneously and perfectly whole. For since it is already sufficiently clear from the above that this same substance is nothing other than its own life and its own eternity, and is in no way terminable, nor exists except simultaneously and perfectly whole, what else is true eternity, which befits it alone, than an interminable life existing simultaneously and perfectly whole? For by this alone it is clearly perceived that true eternity inheres only in that substance which alone is found to be not made, but the maker; since true eternity is understood to lack the boundary of a beginning and an end: which is proven to befit none of the created things, by the very fact that they were made from nothing.

CHAPTER XXV.

That It is Mutable by No Accidents.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Some accidents effect change; others, like relations, induce no change. But the supreme nature, because it is simple, is not subject to accidents that cause change. Therefore, it is not susceptible to any accident: for those things are improperly called accidents which do not change the thing. Therefore, the supreme essence is in no way whatsoever mutable, since it is always substantially the same, and is never in any way accidentally diverse.

But this essence, which has been shown to be in every way substantially the same as itself, is it not at some time diverse from itself, even accidentally? Truly, how is it supremely incommutable, if through accidents it can, I will not say be, but even be understood as variable? And on the other hand, how is it not a partaker of accident; when this very fact, that it is greater than all other natures, and that it is dissimilar to them, seems to be an accident to it? But what contradiction is there between the susceptibility to certain things that are called accidents, and natural incommutability; if from their assumption no variability follows for the substance? For of all things that are called accidents, some are understood to be able to be present and absent only with some variation of the participant, such as all colors, while others are known to effect absolutely no mutation in that of which they are said, either by their coming or their going, such as certain relations. For it is certain that to a man who will be born a year from now, I am neither greater, nor less, nor equal, nor similar. But all these relations, I will be able to have and to lose with respect to him, certainly when he has been born, without any mutation of myself, according as he will grow, or will be changed through diverse qualities.

Palam itaque fit quia eorum quae accidentia dicuntur, quaedam aliquatenus attrahant commutabilitatem, quaedam vero nullatenus subtrahant incommutabilitatem. Sicut igitur summa natura accidentibus mutationem efficientibus nunquam in sua simplicitate locum tribuit; sic secundum ea, quae nullatenus summae incommutabilitati repugnant, aliquando dici aliquod non respuit, et tamen aliquid ejus essentiae, unde ipsa variabilis intelligi possit, non accidit. Unde hoc quoque concludi potest, quia nullius accidentis susceptibilis est: quippe quemadmodum illa accidentia, quae mutationem aliquam accedendo vel recedendo faciunt, ipso suo effectu vere accidere rei, quam mutant, perpenduntur; sic illa, quae a simili effectu deficiunt, improprie dici accidentia deprehenduntur. Sicut igitur semper sibi est omnimodo eadem substantialiter, ita nunquam est a se diversa ullo modo, vel accidentaliter. Sed quoquo modo sese habeat ratio de proprietate nominis accidentium, illud sine dubio verum est, quia de summe incommutabili natura nihil potest dici, unde mutabilis possit intelligi.

Sed si ratum est quod de hujus naturae simplicitate perspectum est, quomodo substantia est? Nam cum omnis substantia admistionis differentiarum, vel mutationis accidentium sit susceptibilis, hujus immutabilis sinceritas omnimodae admistioni, sive mutationi est inaccessibleis; quomodo ergo obtinebitur eam esse quamlibet substantiam, nisi dicatur substantia pro essentia, et sic sit extra, sicut est supra omnem substantiam? Nam quantum illud esse, quod per se est quidquid, et de nihilo facit omne aliud esse, diversum est ab eo esse, quod per aliud fit de nihilo quidquid est; tantum omnino distat summa substantia ab his quae non sunt idem quod ipsa. Cumque ipsa sola omnium naturarum habeat a se, sine alterius naturae auxilio, esse quidquid est; quomodo non est singulariter, absque suae creaturae consortio, quidquid ipsa est? Unde si quando illi est cum aliis nominis alicujus communio, valde procul dubio intelligenda est diversa significatio.

CAPUT XXVII

[al. XXVI] Quod non contineatur in communi tractatu substantiarum; et tamen sit substantia, et individuus spiritus.

Thus it is clear that of those things which are called accidents, some to some extent bring about commutability, while others in no way take away incommutability. Therefore, just as the supreme nature in its simplicity never gives place to accidents that effect mutation, so it does not refuse to be sometimes spoken of according to those things which in no way oppose its supreme incommutability; and yet nothing happens to its essence from which it could be understood as variable. From this it can also be concluded that it is susceptible of no accident: for just as those accidents which cause some mutation by their coming or going are considered, by their very effect, to truly "happen" to the thing they change; so those which lack a similar effect are found to be improperly called accidents. Therefore, just as it is always in every way substantially the same as itself, so it is never in any way diverse from itself, even accidentally. But however the reasoning concerning the proper meaning of the name "accidents" may stand, this is without doubt true: that nothing can be said of the supremely incommutable nature from which it could be understood as mutable.

But if what has been perceived concerning the simplicity of this nature is established, how is it a substance? For since every substance is susceptible to the admixture of differences or to the change of accidents, while the immutable purity of this nature is inaccessible to every kind of admixture or change, how then will it be maintained that it is any substance at all, unless "substance" is said for "essence," and thus it is beyond, just as it is above, all substance? For just as much as that being, which through itself is whatever it is and from nothing makes every other being to be, is different from that being, which through another is made from nothing to be whatever it is; so much altogether does the highest substance differ from those things which are not the same as it is. And since it alone of all natures has from itself, without the help of another nature, the being to be whatever it is, how is it not singularly, without the company of its creature, whatever it is? Hence, if at any time it has a commonality of some name with other things, a very different meaning must, without a doubt, be understood.

CHAPTER XXVII

[or XXVI]. That it is not contained in the common treatment of substances; and yet it is a substance, and an individual spirit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Omnis substantia aut est, universalis, hoc est pluribus communis, aut est individea, quae cum aliis communem habet. Summa vero natura nec in plures substantias se dividit, nec cum alia se essentia communione colligit. Ergo non includitur in communi substantiarum tractatu. Quia tamen summe existit, ideo maxime substantia dici potest: et quia dignior est, ideo non corpus, sed spiritus est; et quidem individuus, quia nec partibus constat, nec differentiis aut accidentibus est mutabilis, nec proinde ulla ratione divisibilis.

Constat igitur quia illa substantia nullo communi tractatu substantiarum includitur, a cujus essentiali communione omnis natura excluditur. Nempe, cum omnis substantia tractetur aut esse universalis, quae pluribus substantiis essentialiter communis est, ut, hominem esse, commune est singulis hominibus; aut esse individua, quae universalem essentiam communem habet cum aliis, quemadmodum singuli homines commune habent cum singulis, ut homines sint; quomodo aliquis summam naturam in aliarum substantiarum tractatu contineri intelligit, quae nec in plures substantias se dividit, nec cum aliqua alia per essentialem communionem se colligit?

Quoniam tamen ipsa non solum certissime existit, sed etiam summe omnium existit, et cujuslibet rei essentia dici solet substantia; profecto, si quid digne dici potest, non prohibetur dici substantia. Et quoniam non noscitur dignior essentia quam spiritus aut corpus; et ex his dignior est spiritus quam corpus: utique eadem asserenda est esse spiritus, non corpus. Quoniam autem nec ullae partes sunt ejusdem spiritus, nec plures esse possunt ejusmodi spiritus, necesse est ut sit omnino individuus spiritus. Quoniam enim, sicut supra constat, nec partibus est compositus, nec ullis differentiis vel accidentibus intelligi potest esse mutabilis, impossibile est ut qualibet sectione sit divisibilis.

Videtur ergo consequi ex praecedentibus quod iste spiritus, qui sic suo quodam mirabiliter singulari et singulariter mirabili modo est, quadam ratione solus sit; alia vero quaecunque videntur esse huic collata, non sint. Si enim diligenter intendatur, ille solus videbitur simpliciter et perfecte et absolute esse; alia vero omnia fere non esse, et vix esse, quoniam namque idem spiritus, propter incommutabilem aeternitatem suam, nullo modo secundum aliquem motum dici potest quia fuit, aut erit; sed simpliciter, est: nec mutabiliter est aliquid, quod aliquando aut non fuit, aut non erit; neque non est quod aliquando fuit, aut erit; sed quidquid est, semel et simul, et interminabiliter est. Quoniam, inquam, hujusmodi est esse ejus; jure ipse simpliciter et absolute et perfecte dicitur esse.

CHAPTER SUMMARY.---Every substance is either universal, that is, common to many, or it is individual, which has a common essence with others. But the supreme nature neither divides itself into several substances, nor does it join itself with any other in a communion of essence. Therefore, it is not included in the common treatment of substances. Because, however, it exists supremely, it can therefore most properly be called a substance: and because it is more worthy, it is therefore not a body, but a spirit; and indeed an individual one, because it neither consists of parts, nor is it mutable through differences or accidents, nor, consequently, is it divisible by any means.

It is clear, therefore, that that substance is not included in any common treatment of substances, from whose essential communion every other nature is excluded. Indeed, since every substance is treated as being either universal, which is essentially common to several substances (as "to be human" is common to individual humans), or as being individual, which has a universal essence in common with others (just as individual humans have it in common with other individuals that they are human), how can anyone understand the supreme nature to be contained in the treatment of other substances, when it neither divides itself into several substances, nor joins itself with any other through an essential communion?

Nevertheless, since it not only most certainly exists, but also exists as the highest of all things, and since the essence of any thing is usually called its substance, surely, if anything can be worthily so called, it is not forbidden to be called a substance. And since no essence is known to be more worthy than spirit or body, and of these, spirit is more worthy than body, it must certainly be asserted to be a spirit, not a body. But since there are no parts of this same spirit, nor can there be several spirits of this kind, it is necessary that it be an altogether individual spirit. For since, as was established above, it is neither composed of parts, nor can it be understood to be mutable through any differences or accidents, it is impossible for it to be divisible by any kind of section.

It seems to follow, therefore, from the preceding arguments that this spirit, which exists in its own wonderfully unique and uniquely wonderful way, in a certain sense alone is; while all other things whatsoever that seem to exist, when compared to it, are not. For if one considers it diligently, that spirit alone will be seen to be simply, perfectly, and absolutely; while all other things will be seen almost not to be, and scarcely to be. For indeed the same spirit, on account of its unchangeable eternity, can in no way, according to any motion, be said to have been or to be going to be, but simply, is; nor is it changeably something that at some time either was not or will not be; nor is it not something that at some time was or will be; but whatever it is, it is at once, simultaneously, and unendingly. Since, I say, its being is of this kind, it is rightly said to be simply, absolutely, and perfectly.

Quoniam vero omnia alia secundum aliquid mutabiliter aliquando aut fuerunt, aut erunt quod non sunt; aut sunt quod aliquando non fuerunt, vel non erunt: et quoniam hoc quia fuerunt, jam non est; illud autem, scilicet quia erunt, nondum est; et hoc quia in labili brevissimoque et vix existente praesenti sunt, vix est. Quoniam ergo tam mutabiliter sunt, non immerito negantur simpliciter et perfecte et absolute esse; et asseruntur fere non esse, vix esse. Deinde, cum omnia, quaecunque aliud sunt quam ipse, de non esse venerint ad esse, non per se, sed per aliud; et cum de esse redeant ad non esse, quantum ad se, nisi sustineantur per aliud, quomodo illis simpliciter convenit, aut perfecte sive absolute esse, et non magis fere vix non esse? Cumque esse solius ejusdem ineffabilis Spiritus intelligi nullo modo possit, aut ex non esse incoeptum, aut aliquem pati posse, ex eo quod est in non esse, defectum; et quidquid ipse est, non sit per aliud quam per se, id est, per hoc quod ipse est, nonne hujus esse merito solum intelligitur simplex perfectumque et absolutum? Quod vero sic simpliciter et omnimoda ratione solum est perfectum, simplex et absolutum, id nimium quodammodo jure dici potest solum esse: et e contra, quidquid per superiorem rationem, nec simpliciter, nec perfecte, nec absolute esse; sed vix esse, aut fere non esse cognoscitur; id utique aliquo modo recte, non esse dicitur. Secundum hanc igitur rationem ille solus creator Spiritus est, et omnia creata, non sunt; nec tamen omnino non sunt, quia per illum qui solus absolute est, de nihilo aliquid facta sunt.

Summus Spiritus nihil fecit nisi per seipsum; quidquid autem fecit, per suam locutionem fecit. Ergo ejus locutio seu verbum non est aliud quam ipse summus Spiritus. Deinde ista locutio per quam factum est quidquid creatum est, non est creatura, sed est omni creatura prior. Ergo ipsa est creans Spiritus. Rursus: Ista locutio est summi Spiritus intelligentia; summa autem natura, cum sit simplex, est ipsa sua intelligentia. Ergo summa natura est ipsa sua locutio; et haec est illi consubstantialis, quia ipse individuus est Spiritus.

But since all other things, in some respect, changeably either were at some time, or will be what they are not, or are what they at some time were not or will not be; and since this, that they were, now is not, while that, namely that they will be, is not yet, and this, that they are in the fleeting, very brief, and scarcely existing present, scarcely is. Since, therefore, they exist so changeably, it is not without reason that they are denied to be simply, perfectly, and absolutely, and are asserted to be almost not, and scarcely to be. Furthermore, since all things whatsoever that are other than that spirit itself have come from non-being to being, not through themselves but through another, and since they return from being to non-being, as far as in them lies, unless they are sustained by another, how can it befit them to be simply, or perfectly, or absolutely, and not rather to be almost and scarcely not-being? And since the being of that same ineffable Spirit alone can in no way be understood either to have begun from non-being, or to be able to suffer any defect from that which is into non-being; and since whatever it is, it is not through another but through itself, that is, through that which it itself is, is not its being deservedly understood to be alone simple, perfect, and absolute? But that which is thus simply and in every way alone perfect, simple, and absolute, can with too much right, in a way, be said alone to be: and conversely, whatever, by the foregoing reasoning, is known to be neither simply, nor perfectly, nor absolutely, but scarcely to be, or almost not to be, that indeed is in some way rightly said not to be. According to this reasoning, therefore, that creator Spirit alone is, and all created things are not; yet they are not entirely nothing, because through him who alone absolutely is, they have been made something from nothing.

The supreme Spirit made nothing except through Himself; but whatever He made, He made through His utterance. Therefore, His utterance or word is nothing other than the supreme Spirit Himself. Furthermore, that utterance through which whatever has been created was made, is not a creature, but is prior to every creature. Therefore, it is itself the creating Spirit. Again: This utterance is the intelligence of the supreme Spirit; but the supreme nature, since it is simple, is its own intelligence. Therefore, the supreme nature is its own utterance; and this is consubstantial with it, because it is itself an indivisible Spirit.

Jam vero his quae de proprietatibus hujus summae naturae ad praesens mihi ducem rationem sequenti occurrerunt perspectis, opportunum existimo ut de ejus locutione, per quam facta sunt omnia, si quid possim, considerem. Etenim cum omnia quae de illa supra potuit animadvertere, rationis robur inflexibile teneant, illud me maxime cogit de illa diligentius discutere, quia id ipsum, quod ipse summus spiritus est, probatur esse. Si enim ille nihil fecit, nisi per seipsum, et quidquid ab eo factum est per illam est factum, quomodo illa est aliud quam quod est idem ipse? Amplius: asserunt utique inexplicabiliter ea quae jam inventa sunt, quia nihil omnino potuit unquam aut potest subsistere praeter creantem spiritum et ejus creaturam. Hanc vero spiritus ejusdem locutionem impossibile est inter creata contineri: quoniam quidquid creatum subsistit, per illam factum est; illa vero per se fieri non potuit. Nihil quippe per seipsum fieri potest, quia quidquid fit, posterius est eo per quod fit; et nihil est posterius seipso. Relinquitur itaque ut haec summi spiritus locutio, cum creatura esse non possit, non sit aliud quam summus spiritus. Denique, haec ipsa locutio nihil aliud potest intelligi quam ejusdem spiritus intelligentia, qua cuncta intelligit. Quid enim est aliud illi rem loqui aliquam, hoc loquendi modo, quam intelligere? Nam non, ut homo, non semper dicit quod intelligit. Si igitur summe simplex natura non est aliud quam quod est sua intelligentia, quemadmodum est idem quod est sua sapientia, necesse est ut similiter non sit aliud quam quod est sua locutio. Sed quoniam jam manifestum est summum spiritum unum tantum esse, et omnimode individuum, necesse est ut sic illi haec sua locutio sit consubstantialis, ut non sint duo, sed unus spiritus.

Cur igitur dubitem quod supra dubium dimiseram, scilicet, utrum haec locutio in pluribus verbis an in uno verbo consistat? Nam si sic est summae naturae consubstantialis, ut non sint duo, sed unus spiritus, utique sicut illa summe simplex est, ita et ista. Non igitur constat pluribus verbis; sed est unum Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia.

Verbum quo dicuntur et per quod facta sunt omnia est consubstantiale summae incommutabilitati, quia consubstantiale est summae naturae quae est ipsa sua incommutabilitas. Ergo Verbum illud non est vera similitudo mutabilium, quae tamen ad illius exemplum facta sunt. Verum cum illius essentia summe sit, et sola vere sit, ipsum est existendi veritas, caetera vero non sunt nisi illius imitatio. Unde creatura tanto magis est, et tanto praestantior, quanto similior est illi Verbo quod summe est, et summe magnum.

Now indeed, having surveyed those things which have occurred to me at present concerning the properties of this supreme nature while following reason as my guide, I think it opportune to consider, if I am able, something about His utterance, through which all things were made. For since all the things that could be observed about it above possess the inflexible force of reason, this especially compels me to discuss it more diligently, because it is proved to be the very same thing that the supreme spirit is. For if He made nothing except through Himself, and whatever was made by Him was made through that utterance, how is that utterance anything other than what He Himself is? Furthermore, the things already discovered inexplicably assert that absolutely nothing could ever or can subsist besides the creating spirit and its creature. But it is impossible for this utterance of the same spirit to be included among created things: for whatever created thing subsists was made through it; but it could not have been made by itself. For indeed, nothing can be made by itself, because whatever is made is posterior to that by which it is made; and nothing is posterior to itself. It remains, therefore, that this utterance of the supreme spirit, since it cannot be a creature, is nothing other than the supreme spirit. Finally, this utterance itself can be understood as nothing other than the intelligence of the same spirit, by which it understands all things. For what else is it for Him to speak of some thing, in this manner of speaking, than to understand it? For He is not like a man, who does not always say what he understands. If, therefore, the supremely simple nature is nothing other than its own intelligence, just as it is the same as its own wisdom, it is necessary that it likewise be nothing other than its own utterance. But since it is now manifest that the supreme spirit is only one, and in every way indivisible, it is necessary that this His utterance be consubstantial with Him in such a way that they are not two, but one spirit.

Why then should I doubt what I had left in doubt above, namely, whether this locution consists of multiple words or of one word? For if it is so consubstantial with the supreme nature that they are not two, but one spirit, then surely, just as that nature is supremely simple, so also is this locution. Therefore, it does not consist of multiple words; but it is one Word, through which all things were made.

The Word by which all things are spoken and through which they are made is consubstantial with the highest incommutability, because it is consubstantial with the highest nature which is its own incommutability itself. Therefore, that Word is not a true likeness of mutable things, which nevertheless were made according to its example. But since its essence supremely is, and alone truly is, it is the truth of existing, while other things are but an imitation of it. Hence a creature is the more, and the more excellent, the more similar it is to that Word which supremely is, and is supremely great.

Hinc naturae viventes praestant non viventibus, sentientes non sentientibus, rationales non rationalibus. Hinc etiam liquet quia illa magis sunt quam ista: nam illa natura magis est quae similior est summae essentiae. Quae autem plura participat, similior est seu in pluribus est similis summae essentiae; illa vero plura participat, cui plura possunt saltem cogitatione auferri. Porro cum omnis essentia eo ipso magis sit et praestantior, quo similior est illi essentiae quae summe est et summe praestat, manifestum est quia Verbum non est creaturae similitudo, sed vera essentia; et in creatis non est absoluta essentia, sed verae essentiae imitatio: sicque ipsa creata eo magis vel minus sunt vera, quo magis vel minus illi appropinquant.

Sed ecce videtur mihi suboriri nec facilis nec ullatenus sub ambiguitate relinquenda quaestio. Etenim omnia huiusmodi verba, quibus res quaslibet mente dicimus, id est cogitamus, similitudines et imagines sunt rerum quarum verba sunt; et omnis similitudo, vel imago, tanto magis vel minus est vera, quanto magis vel minus imitatur rem cuius est similitudo. Quid igitur tenendum est de Verbo, quo dicuntur et per quod facta sunt omnia? Erit, an non erit similitudo eorum quae per ipsum facta sunt? Si enim ipsum est vera mutabilium similitudo, non est consubstantiale summae incommutabilitati: quod falsum est. Si autem non omnino vera, sed qualiscunque similitudo mutabilium est, non est Verbum summae veritatis omnino verum: quod absurdum est. At si nullam mutabilium habet similitudinem, quomodo ad illius exemplum facta sunt? Verum forsitan nihil huius remanebit ambiguitatis, si quemadmodum in vivo homine veritas hominis esse dicitur, in picto vero similitudo sive imago illius veritatis, sic existendi veritas intelligitur in Verbo, cuius essentia sic summe est, ut quodammodo illa sola sit, in his vero quae in ejus comparatione quodammodo non sunt, et tamen per illud et secundum illud facta sunt aliquid, aliqua imitatio illius summae essentiae perpendatur. Sic quippe Verbum summae veritatis, quod et ipsum est summa veritas, nullum augmentum vel detrimentum sentiet, secundum hoc quod magis vel minus creaturis sit simile; sed potius necesse erit omne quod creatum est tanto magis esse et tanto esse praestantius, quanto similis est illi quod summe est, et summe magnum est. Hinc etenim fortasse, imo non fortasse, sed pro certo, hinc omnis intellectus iudicat naturas quolibet modo viventes praestare non viventibus, sentientes non sentientibus, rationales irrationalibus.

From this, living natures are more excellent than non-living, sentient than non-sentient, rational than non-rational. From this it is also clear that the former are more than the latter: for that nature is more which is more similar to the highest essence. Now, that which participates in more things is more similar, or is similar in more respects, to the highest essence; and that participates in more things from which more things can be taken away, at least in thought. Furthermore, since every essence is by that very fact more and more excellent, the more similar it is to that essence which supremely is and is supremely excellent, it is manifest that the Word is not a likeness of the creature, but true essence; and in created things there is not an absolute essence, but an imitation of the true essence: and thus created things themselves are more or less true, the more or less they approach it.

But behold, a question seems to me to arise that is neither easy nor by any means to be left in ambiguity. For all words of this kind, by which we speak any things whatsoever in the mind, that is, we think them, are likenesses and images of the things of which they are the words; and every likeness, or image, is more or less true, the more or less it imitates the thing of which it is the likeness. What, therefore, is to be held concerning the Word, by which all things are spoken and through which all things were made? Will it, or will it not be, a likeness of those things which were made through it? For if it is a true likeness of mutable things, it is not consubstantial with the highest incommutability: which is false. But if it is not an entirely true, but some sort of likeness of mutable things, it is not the wholly true Word of the highest truth: which is absurd. Yet if it has no likeness to mutable things, how were they made according to its example? But perhaps none of this ambiguity will remain, if, just as in a living man the truth of man is said to be, but in a painted one the likeness or image of that truth, so the truth of existing is understood in the Word, whose essence so supremely is that in a certain way it alone is, whereas in those things which in comparison to it in a certain way are not, and yet through it and according to it have been made something, some imitation of that highest essence is perceived. Thus indeed the Word of the highest truth, which is itself the highest truth, will experience no increase or decrease according as it is more or less similar to creatures; but rather it will be necessary that everything that is created is the more, and is the more excellent, the more similar it is to that which supremely is, and is supremely great. For from this perhaps—nay, not perhaps, but for certain—from this every intellect judges that natures which are in any way living are more excellent than non-living ones, sentient ones than non-sentient, rational ones than irrational.

Quoniam enim summa natura suo quodam modo singulari non solum est, sed et vivit, et sentit, et rationalis est, liquet quoniam omnium quae sunt, id quod aliquo modo vivit magis est illi simile, quam id quod nullatenus vivit; et quod modo quolibet vel corporeo sensu cognoscit aliquid, magis quam quod nihil omnino sentit; et quod rationale est, magis quam quod rationis capax non est. Quoniam vero simili ratione quaedam naturae magis minusve sunt quam aliae, perspicuum est. Quemadmodum enim natura illud praestantius est, quod per naturalem essentiam propinquius est praestantissimo, ita utique illa natura magis est, cujus essentia similior est summae essentiae. Quod sic quoque animadverti facile posse existimo. Nempe si cuilibet substantiae, quae et vivit, et sensibilis, et rationalis est, cogitatione auferatur quod rationalis est, deinde quod sensibilis, et postea quod vitalis, postremo ipsum nudum esse, quod remanet; quis non intelligat quod illa substantia quae sic paulatim destruitur, ad minus et minus esse, et ad ultimum ad non esse gradatim perducitur? Quae autem singulatim assumpta quamlibet essentiam ad minus et minus esse deducunt, eadem ordinatim assumpta, illam ad magis et magis esse perducunt. Patet igitur quia magis est vivens substantia quam non vivens, et sensibilis quam non sensibilis, et rationalis quam non rationalis. Non est itaque dubium quod omnis essentia eo ipso magis est, praestantiorque est, quo similior est illi essentiae quae summe est et summe praestat. Satis itaque manifestum est in Verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, non esse eorum similitudinem, sed veram simplicemque essentiam; in factis vero non esse simplicem absolutamque essentiam, sed verae illius essentiae vix aliquam imitationem. Unde necesse est non idem Verbum, secundum rerum creaturarum similitudinem, magis vel minus esse verum, sed omnem creatam naturam eo altiori gradu essentiae dignitatisque consistere, quo magis illi propinquare videtur.

Summus spiritus est ipsa summa sapientia: summa sapientia se ipsam aeternae et summe intelligit, et idem est dicere quod intelligere. Ergo summus spiritus aeternae se dicit, et proinde habet Verbum coaeternum. Cum mens rationalis se et ipsam summam sapientiam intelligat, summus spiritus, qui est aeternus, principaliter aeternae se intelligit. At si se aeternae intelligit, aeternae se dicit; si aeternae se dicit, aeternae est Verbum ejus apud ipsum. Et ita etiam si nulla alia existeret essentia, necesse foret Verbum illius esse illi coaeternum.

Sed cum ita sit, quomodo illud quod simplex est veritas potest esse Verbum eorum quorum non est similitudo? cum omne verbum quo aliqua res sic mente dicitur, similitudo sit rei ejusdem; et, si non est verbum eorum quae facta sunt per ipsum, quomodo constabit quia sit Verbum? Nempe omne verbum alicujus rei verbum est. Denique si nunquam creatura esset, nullum ejus esset verbum. Quid igitur?

For since the highest nature in its own singular way not only is, but also lives, and perceives, and is rational, it is clear that of all things that exist, that which in some way lives is more similar to it than that which in no way lives; and that which in any way or by bodily sense knows something, is more so than that which perceives nothing at all; and that which is rational, is more so than that which is not capable of reason. That some natures, by a similar reasoning, are more or less than others, is perspicuous. For just as that nature is more excellent which by its natural essence is closer to the most excellent, so certainly that nature **is** more, whose essence is more similar to the highest essence. Which I think can also easily be noted in this way. For if from any substance that both lives, is sentient, and is rational, one takes away in thought that it is rational, then that it is sentient, and after that that it is vital, and finally the bare being that remains; who would not understand that that substance which is thus gradually destroyed is led step by step to less and less being, and at last to non-being? But those things which, taken away one by one, reduce any essence to less and less being, the same things, assumed in order, lead it to more and more being. It is clear, therefore, that a living substance **is** more than a non-living one, a sentient one more than a non-sentient, and a rational one more than a non-rational. There is no doubt, therefore, that every essence by that very fact **is** more, and is more excellent, the more similar it is to that essence which supremely is and is supremely excellent. It is therefore sufficiently manifest that in the Word, through which all things were made, there is not a likeness of them, but a true and simple essence; whereas in things made there is not a simple and absolute essence, but scarcely any imitation of that true essence. Hence it is necessary not that the same Word be more or less true according to its likeness to created things, but that every created nature subsists at a higher degree of essence and dignity, the more it seems to approach it.

The highest spirit is the highest wisdom itself: the highest wisdom eternally and supremely understands itself, and to speak is the same as to understand. Therefore, the highest spirit eternally speaks himself, and consequently has a coeternal Word. Since the rational mind understands itself and the highest wisdom itself, the highest spirit, who is eternal, principally and eternally understands himself. But if he eternally understands himself, he eternally speaks himself; if he eternally speaks himself, his Word is eternally with him. And so, even if no other essence existed, it would be necessary for his Word to be coeternal with him.

But since this is so, how can that which is simple truth be the Word of those things of which it is not a likeness? since every word by which a thing is thus spoken in the mind is a likeness of that same thing; and, if it is not the word of those things which were made through it, how will it be established that it is the Word? For indeed, every word is the word of some thing. Finally, if a creature never existed, there would be no word of it. What then?

An concludendum est quia si nullo modo esset creatura, nequaquam esset Verbum illud, quod est summa et nullius indigens essentia; aut fortasse ipsa summa essentia, quae Verbum est, essentia quidem esset aeterna, sed Verbum non esset, si nihil unquam per illam fieret? Ejus enim quod non fuit, nec est, nec futurum est, nullum verbum esse potest. Verum secundum hanc rationem, si nunquam ulla praeter summum spiritum esset essentia, nullum omnino esset verbum in illo. Si nullum in illo verbum esset, nihil apud se diceret, si nihil apud se diceret, cum idem sit illi, sic dicere aliquid quod est intelligere, non aliquid intelligeret; si nihil intelligeret, ergo summa sapientia, quae non est aliud quam idem spiritus, nihil intelligeret: quod absurdissimum est. Quid igitur? Si enim nihil intelligeret, quomodo esset summa sapientia? Aut si nullo modo esset aliquid praeter illam, quid illa intelligeret? Sed nunquid seipsam non intelligeret? At quomodo vel cogitari potest quod summa sapientia se aliquando non intelligat; cum mens rationalis possit non solum suimet, sed et illius summae sapientiae reminisci; et illam, et se intelligere? Si enim mens humana nullam ejus aut sui habere memoriam aut intelligentiam posset, nequaquam se ab irrationalibus creaturis, et illam ab omni creatura, secum sola tacite disputando, sicut nunc mens mea facit, discerneret. Ergo summus ille spiritus, sicut est aeternus; ita aeternae sui memor est, et intelligit se ad similitudinem mentis rationalis; imo non ad ullius similitudinem, sed ille principaliter, et mens rationalis ad ejus similitudinem. At si aeternae se intelligit, aeternae se dicit. Si aeternae se dicit, aeternae est Verbum ejus apud ipsum. Sive igitur ille cogitetur nulla alia existente essentia, sive aliis existentibus, necesse est Verbum illius coaeternum illi esse cum ipso.

CAPUT XXXIII

[al. XXXI]. Quod consubstantiali uno Verbo dicat se, et quod facit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.--Verbum, quo seipsum summus Spiritus dicit, est idipsum quod summus spiritus, ut supra demonstratum est. Verbum etiam, quo dicit ea quae facta sunt, est ipse summus spiritus, ut supra pariter est probatum. Ergo unum est sibi consubstantiale Verbum quo summus spiritus se dicit, et quo ea dicit quae facit. Praeterea Verbum, quo se dicit summa sapientia, convenientissime dici potest Verbum ejus, quia perfectam ejus tenet similitudinem: Verbum enim est imago rei ex cogitatione formata; et ideo tanto verius est verbum, quanto verius rem mens cogitat.

Must we conclude that if there were in no way a creature, that Word, which is the highest and self-sufficient essence, would not exist at all; or perhaps that the highest essence itself, which is the Word, would indeed be an eternal essence, but would not be the Word, if nothing were ever made through it? For of that which was not, nor is, nor will be, there can be no word. But according to this reasoning, if there were never any essence besides the highest spirit, there would be no word at all in him. If there were no word in him, he would speak nothing to himself; if he spoke nothing to himself, since for him to speak something in this way is the same as to understand it, he would not understand anything; if he understood nothing, then the highest wisdom, which is nothing other than that same spirit, would understand nothing: which is most absurd. What then? For if it understood nothing, how would it be the highest wisdom? Or if there were in no way anything besides it, what would it understand? But would it not understand itself? But how can it even be thought that the highest wisdom does not at some time understand itself, when the rational mind can remember not only itself, but also that highest wisdom, and understand both it and itself? For if the human mind could have no memory or understanding of it or of itself, it would in no way distinguish itself from irrational creatures, and that wisdom from every creature, by silently reasoning with itself, as my mind now does. Therefore, that highest spirit, just as he is eternal, so he is eternally mindful of himself, and understands himself in the likeness of the rational mind; nay, not in the likeness of any, but he does so principally, and the rational mind in his likeness. But if he eternally understands himself, he eternally speaks himself. If he eternally speaks himself, his Word is eternally with him. Therefore, whether he is conceived of with no other essence existing, or with others existing, it is necessary that his Word be coeternal with him.

CHAPTER XXXIII

[or XXXI]. That He speaks Himself, and what He makes, by one consubstantial Word.

CHAPTER SUMMARY.---The Word by which the supreme Spirit speaks Himself is the very same as the supreme Spirit, as has been demonstrated above. The Word also, by which He speaks those things that have been made, is the supreme Spirit Himself, as has likewise been proven above. Therefore, it is one consubstantial Word with Himself by which the supreme Spirit speaks Himself, and by which He speaks those things that He makes. Furthermore, the Word by which the supreme wisdom speaks itself can most fittingly be called its Word, because it holds a perfect likeness to it: for a word is an image of a thing formed from thought; and therefore, the more truly the mind thinks the thing, the truer is the word.

Iterum, mens rationalis, cum se cogitando intelligit, imaginem suam seu verbum sui producit quod a se non nisi ratione potest separari. Ergo et summa sapientia, cum se dicendo intelligit, gignit consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam, id est Verbum suum. Verbum istud dici potest et imago et figura et character ejus: Verbum autem quo creaturam dicit, verbum, aut imago, aut figura creaturae dici non potest; quia est principalis ejus essentia. Ergo summus spiritus creaturam non dicit Verbo creaturae, sed suo. Ergo quidquid dicit, Verbo suo dicit. Ergo unico eodemque Verbo dicit seipsum et cuncta quae fecit.

Sed ecce quaerenti mihi de Verbo quo Creator dicit omnia quae facit, obtulit se Verbum quo seipsum dicit qui omnia facit. An ergo alio verbo dicit seipsum, et alio ea quae facit; aut potius eodem ipso Verbo quo dicit seipsum, dicit quaecunque facit? Nam hoc quoque Verbum, quo seipsum dicit, necesse est idipsum esse quod ipse est, sicut constat de Verbo illo quo dicit ea quae facta sunt a se. Cum enim, etiamsi nihil unquam aliud esset nisi summus ille spiritus, ratio tamen cogat Verbum illud quo se dicit ex necessitate esse, quid verius quam hoc Verbum ejus non esse aliud quam quod ipse est? Ergo si et seipsum, et ea quae facit, consubstantiali sibi Verbo dicit, manifestum est quia Verbi quo se dicit, et Verbi quo creaturam dicit, una substantia est. Quomodo ergo, si una substantia est, duo verba sunt? Sed forsitan non cogit identitas substantiae Verbi unitatem admittere. Nam idem ipse qui his verbis loquitur, eandem cum illis habet substantiam, et tamen Verbum non est.

Sed utique verbum, quo se dicit summa sapientia, convenientissime dici potest Verbum ejus secundum superiorem rationem, quia ejus perfectam tenet similitudinem. Nam nulla ratione negari potest, cum mens rationalis seipsam cogitando intelligit imaginem ipsius nasci in sua cogitatione: imo ipsam cogitationem sui esse suam imaginem, ad ejus similitudinem, tanquam ex ejus impressione formatam. Quamcunque enim rem mens, seu per corporis imaginationem seu per rationem cupit veraciter cogitare, ejus utique similitudinem, quantum valet, in ipsa sua cogitatione conatur exprimere. Quod quanto verius facit, tanto rem ipsam verius cogitat; et hoc quidem, cum cogitat aliquid aliud quod ipsa non est, et maxime cum aliquod cogitat corpus, clarius perspicitur. Cum enim cogito notum mihi hominem absentem, formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem imaginem ejus qualem illam per visum oculorum in memoriam attraxi; quae imago in cogitatione, verbum est ejusdem hominis, quem cogitando dico.

Again, when the rational mind understands itself by thinking, it produces its own image or word of itself, which can be separated from it only by reason. Therefore, the supreme wisdom also, when it understands itself by speaking itself, begets its own consubstantial likeness, that is, its Word. This Word can be called its image and figure and character: but the Word by which He speaks the creature cannot be called the word, or image, or figure of the creature; because it is its principal essence. Therefore, the supreme Spirit does not speak the creature by the creature's word, but by His own. Therefore, whatever He speaks, He speaks by His own Word. Therefore, by one and the same Word He speaks Himself and all things that He has made.

But behold, as I was inquiring about the Word by which the Creator speaks all that He makes, the Word by which He who makes all things speaks Himself presented itself. Does He therefore speak Himself by one word, and the things He makes by another; or rather, by that same Word by which He speaks Himself, does He speak whatever He makes? For this Word also, by which He speaks Himself, must necessarily be the very same as He Himself is, just as is established concerning that Word by which He speaks the things that have been made by Him. For since, even if nothing else ever existed but that supreme Spirit, reason would still compel that the Word by which He speaks Himself exists of necessity, what is more true than that this Word of His is nothing other than what He Himself is? Therefore, if He speaks both Himself and the things He makes by a Word consubstantial (*consubstantialis*) with Himself, it is manifest that the substance of the Word by which He speaks Himself and of the Word by which He speaks the creature is one. How then, if the substance is one, are there two words? But perhaps the identity of substance does not compel us to admit the unity of the Word. For the very same person who speaks with these words has the same substance as them, and yet is not the Word.

But certainly the word by which the supreme wisdom speaks itself can most fittingly be called its Word according to the preceding argument, because it holds a perfect likeness to it. For it can in no way be denied that when a rational mind understands itself by thinking, an image of it is born in its thought: indeed, that the very thought of itself is its image, formed in its likeness, as if from its impression. For whatever thing the mind desires to think truly, whether through the imagination of the body or through reason, it endeavors to express a likeness of it, as far as it is able, in its own thought. The more truly it does this, the more truly it thinks the thing itself; and this is perceived more clearly when it thinks something other than what it is, and especially when it thinks of some body. For when I think of a man known to me who is absent, the focus of my thought is formed into such an image of him as I have drawn into my memory through the sight of my eyes; which image in thought is the word of that same man, whom I speak by thinking.

Habet igitur mens rationalis, cum se cogitando intelligit, secum imaginem suam ex se natam, id est cogitationem sui ad suam similitudinem, quasi sua impressione formatam, quamvis ipsa se a sua imagine, non nisi ratione sola, separare possit, quae imago ejus verbum ejus est. Hoc itaque modo, quis neget summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam, id est Verbum suum? Quod Verbum, licet de re tam singulariter eminenti proprie aliquid satis convenienter dici non possit, non tamen inconvenienter, sicut similitudo, ita et imago, et figura et character, ejus dici potest. Verbum autem quo creaturam dicit, nequaquam similiter est verbum creaturae, quia non est ejus similitudo, sed principalis essentia. Consequitur igitur ut ipsam creaturam non dicat verbo creaturae. Cujus ergo verbo eam dicit, si non dicit eam verbo ejus? Nam quod dicit, verbo dicit; et verbum alicujus est verbum, id est similitudo. Sed si nihil aliud dicit quam se aut creaturam nihil dicere potest, nisi aut suo, aut ejus verbo. Si ergo nihil dicit verbo creaturae, quidquid dicit, Verbo suo dicit. Uno igitur eodemque Verbo dicit seipsum, et quaecunque fecit.

Ipse est summa ratio, in qua sunt omnia quae facta sunt. Ergo cum dicit seipsum, dicit omnia quae facta sunt. Creaturae autem in seipsis sunt essentia mutabilis; in ipso sunt ipsa prima essentia, et prima existendi veritas.

Sed quomodo tam differentes res, scilicet creans et creata essentia, dici possunt uno Verbo, praesertim cum Verbum ipsum sit dicenti coaeternum; creatura autem non sit illi coaeterna? Forsitan quia ipse est summa sapientia et summa ratio, in qua sunt omnia quae facta sunt; quemadmodum opus, quod fit secundum aliquam artem, non solum quando fit, verum et antequam fiat, et postquam dissolvitur, semper est in ipsa arte non aliud quam quod est ars ipsa. Idcirco cum ipse summus Spiritus dicit seipsum, dicit omnia quae facta sunt. Nam et antequam fierent, et cum jam facta sunt, et cum corrumpuntur, seu aliquo modo variantur, semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in seipsis, sed quod est idem ipse. Etenim in seipsis sunt essentia mutabilis, secundum immutabilem rationem creata; in ipso vero sunt ipsa prima essentia, et prima existendi veritas cui, prout magis utcunque illa similia sunt, ita verius et praestantius existunt. Hoc itaque modo non irrationabiliter asseri potest quia, cum seipsum dicit summus ille Spiritus, dicit etiam quidquid factum est uno eodemque Verbo.

Therefore, the rational mind, when it understands itself by thinking, has with it its own image born from itself, that is, a thought of itself in its own likeness, formed as if by its own impression, although it can separate itself from its image only by reason alone; which image of it is its word. In this way, therefore, who would deny that the supreme wisdom, when it understands itself by speaking itself, begets its own consubstantial likeness, that is, its Word? And this Word, although nothing can be said properly and with sufficient fitness concerning a thing so singularly eminent, can nevertheless not unfittingly be called its likeness (*similitudo*), as well as its image (*imago*), and figure (*figura*), and character (*character*). But the Word by which He speaks the creature is by no means in a similar way the word of the creature, because it is not its likeness, but its principal essence (*essentia*). It follows, therefore, that He does not speak the creature itself by a word of the creature. By whose word, then, does He speak it, if He does not speak it by its own word? For what He speaks, He speaks by a word; and a word is the word of something, that is, a likeness. But if He speaks nothing other than Himself or the creature, He can speak nothing except by His own word, or by its word. If, therefore, He speaks nothing by the word of the creature, whatever He speaks, He speaks by His own Word. Therefore, by one and the same Word He speaks Himself and whatever He has made.

He is the supreme reason, in which are all things that have been made. Therefore, when He speaks Himself, He speaks all things that have been made. But creatures in themselves are a mutable essence; in Him, they are the primary essence itself, and the primary truth of existing.

But how can such different things, namely the creating and the created essence, be spoken by one Word, especially since the Word itself is coeternal with the one who speaks, while the creature is not coeternal with Him? Perhaps because He is the supreme wisdom and the supreme reason, in which are all things that have been made; just as a work that is made according to some art, not only when it is being made, but also before it is made, and after it is dissolved, is always in the art itself nothing other than what the art itself is. Therefore, when that supreme Spirit speaks Himself, He speaks all things that have been made. For both before they were made, and when they have already been made, and when they are corrupted or are varied in any way, they are always in Him, not as what they are in themselves, but as what He Himself is. For in themselves they are a mutable essence, created according to an immutable reason; but in Him they are the primary essence itself, and the primary truth of existing, to which, the more similar they are in any way, the more truly and excellently they exist. In this way, therefore, it can be asserted not unreasonably that when that supreme Spirit speaks Himself, He also speaks whatever has been made by one and the same Word.

Omnia quae sunt in summo Spiritu, eadem et eodem modo sunt in Verbo ejus, quia ipsum est illi consubstantiale. Ergo omnia sunt in Verbo vita et veritas. Et quandoquidem scire est idem illi quod dicere, sicut omnia sunt in Verbo vita et veritas, ita sunt in scientia ejus.

Verum cum constet quia Verbum ejus consubstantiale est illi et perfecte simile, necessario consequitur ut omnia quae sunt in illo, eadem et eodem modo sint in Verbo ejus. Quidquid igitur factum est, sive vivat, sive non vivat, aut quomodocunque sit in se, in illo est ipsa vita et veritas. Quoniam autem idem est summo Spiritui scire quod intelligere, sive dicere, necesse est ut eodem modo sciat omnia quae scit quod ea dicit aut intelligit. Quemadmodum igitur omnia sunt in Verbo ejus vita et veritas, ita sunt in scientia ejus.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Cum res in nostra scientia sint non secundum earum essentiam, sed secundum similitudinem; verius sunt in ipsis, quam in nostra scientia. Et tamen constat quod tanto verius sint in Verbo, quam in seipsis; quanto verius existit creatrix, quam creata essentia. Quod humana scientia comprehendere non potest.

Qua ex re manifestissime comprehendi potest quomodo dicat idem Spiritus, vel quomodo sciat ea quae facta sunt, ab humana scientia comprehendi non posse. Nam nulli dubium creatas substantias multo aliter esse in seipsis, quam in nostra scientia. In seipsis namque sunt per ipsam suam essentiam; in nostra vero scientia non sunt earum essentiae sed earum similitudines. Restat igitur ut tanto verius sint in seipsis, quam in nostra scientia; quanto verius sunt alicubi per suam essentiam, quam per suam similitudinem. Cum ergo et hoc constet, quia omnis creata substantia tanto verius est in Verbo, id est in intelligentia Creatoris, quam in seipsa; quanto verius existit creatrix quam creata essentia: quomodo comprehendat humana mens, cujusmodi sit illud dicere et illa scientia, quae sic longe superior et verior est creatis substantiis; si nostra scientia tam longe superatur ab illis, quantum earum similitudo distat ab earum essentia.

CAPUT XXXVII

[al. XXXVI]. Quod quidquid ipse est ad creaturam, hoc sit et Verbum ejus; nec tamen ambo simul pluraliter.

All things that are in the highest Spirit are the same and in the same way in His Word, because it is consubstantial with Him. Therefore, all things are life and truth in the Word. And since for Him to know is the same as to speak, just as all things are life and truth in the Word, so they are in His knowledge.

But since it is established that His Word is consubstantial with Him and perfectly like Him, it necessarily follows that all things that are in Him are the same and in the same way in His Word. Whatever, therefore, has been made, whether it lives or does not live, or however it may be in itself, in Him is life and truth itself. Now since for the highest Spirit to know is the same as to understand or to speak, it is necessary that He know all the things He knows in the same way that He speaks or understands them. Just as, therefore, all things are life and truth in His Word, so they are in His knowledge.

SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.---Since things are in our knowledge not according to their essence, but according to their likeness, they are more truly in themselves than in our knowledge. And yet it is established that they are in the Word so much more truly than in themselves, by as much as the creating essence exists more truly than the created essence. This, human knowledge cannot comprehend.

From this it can be most manifestly understood that how the same Spirit speaks, or how He knows those things which have been made, cannot be comprehended by human knowledge. For no one doubts that created substances exist in themselves much differently than in our knowledge. For in themselves they exist through their own essence; but in our knowledge, it is not their essences but their likenesses that exist. It remains, therefore, that they exist so much more truly in themselves than in our knowledge, by as much as they exist more truly anywhere through their essence than through their likeness. Since, therefore, it is also established that every created substance exists so much more truly in the Word, that is, in the intelligence of the Creator, than in itself, by as much as the creating essence exists more truly than the created essence: how can the human mind comprehend of what sort that speaking and that knowledge is, which is thus so far superior to and truer than created substances, if our knowledge is so far surpassed by them by as much as their likeness is distant from their essence?

CHAPTER XXXVII

[for XXXVI]. That whatever He is in relation to the creature, His Word is also; and yet both together are not so in the plural.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Summus Spiritus per Verbum fecit omnia. Ergo et ipsum Verbum fecit eadem omnia: quod enim summus Spiritus per Verbum facit per se facit; et Verbi summi Spiritus una est essentia, quae sola est creatrix et principium omnium quae sunt. Quidquid ergo summus Spiritus est ad creaturam, hoc et Verbum ejus est: et proinde sicut ille est creator, ita et istud; nec tamen sunt duo, sed unus creator et unum principium.

Verum cum manifeste rationes superiores doceant summum Spiritum per Verbum suum fecisse omnia, nunquid non et ipsum Verbum fecit eadem omnia? Quoniam enim illi est consubstantiale, cujus est Verbum, necesse est ut sit summa essentia. Summa autem essentia non est nisi una, quae sola creatrix et solum principium est omnium quae facta sunt. Ipsa namque sola fecit, non per aliud quam per se, omnia ex nihilo. Quare quaecunque summus Spiritus facit, eadem et Verbum ejus facit, et similiter .

Quidquid igitur 18 summus spiritus est ad creaturam; hoc et Verbum ejus est et similiter. Nec tamen ambo simul pluraliter, quia non sunt plures creatrices summae essentiae. Sicut igitur ille creator est rerum et principium; sic et Verbum ejus: nec tamen sunt duo, sed unus creator, et unum principium.

CAPUT XXXVIII

[al. XXXVII]. Quod dici non possit quid duo sint, quamvis necesse sit esse duos.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Quidquid summus Spiritus et Verbum sunt in essentia et ad creaturam, nempe quod sit veritas, et quod sit creator, hoc unicuique et utrique sic convenit; ut tamen non sint duo, aut duae veritates, aut duo creatores; sed unum sint. Ille tamen, cujus est Verbum, non potest esse verbum suum: nec verbum potest esse ille, cujus est verbum. Ergo in eo solo quod ille non est ex isto, hoc autem est ex illo, admittitur pluralitas. Constat ergo quod sint duo; sed exprimi non potest quid duo sint: non enim sunt duo spiritus, nec duo creatores, nec duo verba, nec duae imagines.

Studiose itaque attendendum est quiddam, quod, valde insolitum aliis rebus, in summo Spiritu et Verbo ejus videtur evenire. Nam certum est sic unicuique singulatim, et utrisque simul inesse quidquid sunt in essentia, et quidquid sunt ad creaturam, ut et singulatim perfectum sit ambobus, et tamen pluralitatem non admittat in duobus. Licet enim singulatim et ille perfecte sit summa veritas et Creator, et verbum ejus sit summa veritas et creator; non tamen ambo simul sunt duae veritates, aut duo creatores.

CHAPTER SUMMARY. The supreme Spirit made all things through the Word. Therefore, the Word itself also made the same all things: for what the supreme Spirit does through the Word, He does through Himself; and the essence of the Word and of the supreme Spirit is one, which alone is the creatrix and the principle of all things that are. Whatever, therefore, the supreme Spirit is in relation to the creature, this His Word also is: and accordingly, just as He is creator, so is the Word; yet they are not two, but one creator and one principle.

But since the preceding arguments manifestly teach that the supreme Spirit made all things through His Word, did not the Word itself also make these same all things? For since it is consubstantial with Him whose Word it is, it is necessary that it be the supreme essence. But the supreme essence is but one, which alone is the creatrix and the sole principle of all things that have been made. For it alone made all things from nothing, not through another but through itself. Therefore, whatever the supreme Spirit does, His Word does the same, and in a similar manner.

Whatever, therefore, the supreme spirit is in relation to the creature, this His Word also is, and in a similar manner. And yet both are not so together in the plural, because there are not multiple creative supreme essences. Therefore, just as He is the creator and principle of things, so also is His Word; and yet they are not two, but one creator and one principle.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

[al. XXXVII]. That it cannot be said what they are as two, although it is necessary that they be two.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Whatever the supreme Spirit and the Word are in essence and towards creation, namely that it is truth, and that it is creator, this so belongs to each and to both; that nevertheless they are not two, nor two truths, nor two creators; but they are one. He, however, whose Word it is, cannot be his own word: nor can the word be him, whose word it is. Therefore, only in this, that he is not from that one, but this one is from him, is plurality admitted. It is certain therefore that they are two; but it cannot be expressed what they are as two: for they are not two spirits, nor two creators, nor two words, nor two images.

It is therefore to be studiously noted that something, very unusual in other things, seems to occur in the supreme Spirit and in his Word. For it is certain that whatever they are in essence, and whatever they are towards creation, is so present to each individually, and to both together, that it is individually perfect for both, and yet does not admit of plurality in the two. For although each individually is perfectly the supreme truth and Creator, and his word is the supreme truth and creator; yet both together are not two truths, or two creators.

Sed cum haec ita sint, miro tamen modo apertissimum est quia nec ille, cujus est Verbum, potest esse Verbum suum; nec Verbum potest esse iste cujus est Verbum, ut in eo quod significat vel quid sint substantialiter, vel quid sint ad creaturam semper individua teneant unitatem. In eo vero, quod ille non est ex isto: hoc autem est ex illo; ineffabilem admittant pluralitatem: ineffabilem certe; quamvis enim necessitas cogat ut sint duo, nullo tamen modo exprimi potest quid duo sint. Nam etsi forte duo pares aut aliquid aliud similiter adinvicem possint dici, in his ipsis tamen relativis si quaeratur quid sit illud de quo dicuntur, non potest dici pluraliter, quemadmodum dicuntur duae pares lineae, aut duo homines similes. Quippe nec sunt duo pares spiritus, nec duo pares creatores, nec duo aliquid, quod significet eorum aut essentiam aut habitudinem ad creaturam; sed nec duo aliquid, quod designet propriam habitudinem alterius ad alterum, quia nec duo verba, nec duae imagines. Verbum namque hoc ipsum quod Verbum est, aut imago, ad alterum est; quia non nisi alicujus Verbum est aut imago; et sic propria sunt haec alterius, ut nequaquam alteri coaptentur. Nam ille, cujus est Verbum aut imago nec imago, nec Verbum est. Constat igitur quia exprimi non potest quid duo sint, summus Spiritus et Verbum ejus, quamvis quibusdam singulorum proprietatibus cogantur esse duo. Etenim proprium unius est esse ex altero, et proprium est alterius alterum esse ex illo.

CAPUT XXXIX.

Quod idem Verbum sit a summo Spiritu, nascendo.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.--Verbum summi Spiritus sic ex eo est, quasi idem ipsum de eodem ipso. Et ita perfectam ejus, quasi proles parentis, tenet similitudinem. Ergo non convenientius cogitari potest ex illo esse, quam nascendo. Et quidem congruentius de illo nasci dicitur; quam multa dicantur nasci de aliquo a quo habent ut sint, sed cum quo nullam habent similitudinem: ut capilli qui de capite nasci dicuntur.

Quod ipsum nullo utique verbo videtur familiarius posse proferri, quam si dicatur proprium esse unius nasci ex altero; et proprium alterius, nasci alterum ex ipso. Certum namque jam constat quia Verbum summi Spiritus non sic est ex eo, quemadmodum ea quae ab illo facta sunt; sed quemadmodum Creator de Creatore, summum de summo. Et ut plena brevitate omnimoda absolvatur similitudo, penitus idem ipsum est de eodem ipso, et ita ut nullatenus sit nisi ex eo.

But since these things are so, in a wonderful way it is most evident that neither he, whose Word it is, can be his own Word; nor can the Word be he whose Word it is, so that in that which signifies either what they are substantially, or what they are towards creation, they always maintain an undivided unity. But in this, that he is not from that one: while this one is from him; they admit an ineffable plurality: an ineffable one indeed; for although necessity compels that they be two, nevertheless it can in no way be expressed what they are as two. For even if perhaps it could be said that they are two equals or something else similar to each other, yet in these very relatives if it is sought what that is of which they are said, it cannot be spoken of in the plural, as one speaks of two equal lines, or two similar men. For they are neither two equal spirits, nor two equal creators, nor two somethings, which signify either their essence or their relation to creation; but neither are they two somethings which designate the proper relation of one to the other, because they are neither two words, nor two images. For the Word by the very fact that it is a Word, or an image, is towards another; because it is not unless it is the Word or the image of someone; and thus these belong properly to the other, so that they by no means fit the other. For he, whose Word or image it is, is neither image nor Word. Therefore it is evident that it cannot be expressed what they are as two, the supreme Spirit and his Word, although by certain properties of each they are compelled to be two. For it is the property of one to be from the other, and it is the property of the other that the other is from him.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

That the same Word is from the supreme Spirit, by being born.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---The Word of the supreme Spirit is so from him, as if the very same from the very same itself. And thus it maintains his perfect likeness, as the offspring of a parent. Therefore, it cannot be thought more suitably to be from him, than by being born. And indeed it is more fittingly said to be born of him; than many things are said to be born of something from which they have their being, but with which they have no likeness: as hairs which are said to be born from the head.

Which itself surely seems to be able to be expressed by no word more familiarly, than if it is said to be the property of one to be born from the other; and the property of the other, that the other be born from him. For it is already established as certain that the Word of the supreme Spirit is not from him in the same way as those things which are made by him; but as Creator from Creator, the supreme from the supreme. And so that the total likeness may be summed up with full brevity, the exact same is from the exact same itself, and in such a way that it is in no way except from him.

Cum igitur pateat Verbum summi Spiritus sic esse ex ipso solo, ut perfectam ejus quasi proles parentis teneat similitudinem: nec si esse ex ipso ut fiat ab eo, profecto nullo modo convenientius cogitari potest ex illo esse quam nascendo. Nempe si innumerabiles res indubitanter dicuntur nasci ex his ex quibus habent ut sint; cum nullam eorum, de quibus nasci dicuntur, teneant similitudinem sicut proles parentis. Dicimus enim capillos nasci de capite et poma ex arbore, licet nec illi capitis, nec ista arboris similia sint. Si, inquam, multa hujusmodi non absurde dicuntur nasci, tanto congruentius dici potest Verbum summi Spiritus ex illo existere, nascendo; quanto perfectius, quasi proles parentis, trahit ejus similitudinem ex illo existendo.

CAPUT XL

[al. XXXIX]. Quod verissime ille parens, illud vero proles.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Tanto verius ille parens, et istud proles dicitur: quanto magis ille ad hanc generationem solus sufficit, et istud similitudinem ejus exprimit nulla admista dissimilitudine. Ergo illius proprium est, verissimum esse parentem: istius vero, esse verissimam prolem.

Quod si convenientissime dicitur nasci, et tam simile est illi de quo nascitur, cur aestimetur simile, quasi proles parenti; non potius asseratur quia tanto verior est ille parens, et istud proles, quanto magis et ille ad hujus nativitatis perfectionem solus sufficit, et quod nascitur ejus similitudinem exprimit? Namque in rebus aliis, quas parentis prolisque certum est habitudinem habere, nulla sic gignit ut omnino nullius indigens sola per se ad gignendam prolem sufficiat; nulla sic gignitur, ut nulla admista dissimilitudine omnimodam similitudinem parentis exhibeat. Si ergo Verbum summi Spiritus sic est omnino ex ipsius sola essentia, et sic singulariter est illi simile ut nulla proles sic sit omnino ex sola parentis essentia, aut sic similis parenti, profecto nullis rebus tam convenienter videtur aptari habitudo parentis et prolis, quam summo Spiritui et Verbo ejus. Quapropter illius est proprium verissimum esse parentem, istius vero verissimam esse prolem.

CAPUT XLI

[al. XL]. Quod ille verissime gignat, illud verissime gignatur.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Ergo summi Spiritus est verissime gignere, et Verbi ejus verissime gigni.

Since therefore it is clear that the Word of the supreme Spirit is from him alone in such a way, that it maintains his perfect likeness as an offspring of a parent: and yet that it is not from him by being made by him, surely it can in no way be thought more suitably to be from him than by being born. For indeed, if innumerable things are undoubtedly said to be born of those things from which they have their being; although they maintain no likeness of those from which they are said to be born, as the offspring does of the parent. For we say that hair is born from the head and apples from a tree, although the former are not like the head, nor the latter like the tree. If, I say, many things of this kind are not absurdly said to be born, with so much more suitability can the Word of the supreme Spirit be said to exist from him, by being born; by how much more perfectly, as the offspring of a parent, he draws his likeness from him by existing.

CHAPTER XL

[al. XXXIX]. That he is most truly the parent, and that one truly the offspring.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---So much more truly is he called the parent, and that the offspring: by how much more he alone suffices for this generation, and that expresses his likeness with no admixture of unlikeness. Therefore it is his property, to be most truly the parent: while it is the property of that one, to be most truly the offspring.

But if it is most appropriately said to be born, and is so similar to him from whom it is born, why should it be thought similar, as an offspring to a parent; and not rather be asserted that he is so much truer the parent, and that the offspring, by how much more he alone suffices for the perfection of this birth, and what is born expresses his likeness? For in other things, which it is certain have the relationship of parent and offspring, nothing so generates that it suffices in itself alone for generating the offspring, being entirely in need of nothing else; nothing is so generated, that it exhibits the overall likeness of the parent with no admixture of unlikeness. If therefore the Word of the supreme Spirit is so entirely from his sole essence, and is singularly so similar to him that no offspring is so entirely from the sole essence of the parent, or so similar to the parent, surely the relationship of parent and offspring seems to be adapted to no things so suitably, as to the supreme Spirit and his Word. Wherefore it is the property of one to be most truly the parent, but of the other to be most truly the offspring.

CHAPTER XLI

[al. XL]. That he most truly begets, and that it is most truly begotten.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Therefore it belongs to the supreme Spirit to beget most truly, and to his Word to be begotten most truly.

At hoc constare non poterit, nisi pariter ille verissime gignat; et istud verissime gignatur. Sicut igitur illud est perspicuum, ita hoc esse certissimum necesse est. Quare summi Spiritus est verissime gignere, et Verbi ejus verissime gigni.

CAPUT XLII.

Quod alterius verissime sit esse genitorem et Patrem; alterius genitum et Filium.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Ergo hic Pater, hoc Filius est, non vero hic mater, et hoc filia dici debet: non quod sit ulla in his sexus differentia; nec quod validior sit ut plurimum sexus masculinus: sed potius quia Patris nomen magis quam matris huic convenit, cui ad gignendum nulla alia causa sociatur: et nomen Filii magis quam filiae huic congruit, qui similior est Patri: cum Filius semper sit Patri similior, quam filia quae est disparis sexus.

Vellem jam quidem, et forte possem, illum esse verissime Patrem; hoc vero verissime esse Filium concludere. Sed nec hoc negligendum existimo, an Patris et Filii, et an matris et filiae magis illis apta sit appellatio, cum in eis nulla sit sexus discretio. Nam si idcirco convenienter est ille Pater, et proles ejus Filius, quia uterque est Spiritus: cur non pari ratione alteri convenit esse matrem. alteri filiam, quia uterque est veritas et sapientia? An quia in his naturis, quae sexus habent differentiam, melioris sexus est patrem esse vel filium; minoris vero, matrem vel filiam? Et hoc quidem naturaliter in pluribus; in quibusdam vero econtrario, ut in quibusdam avium generibus, in quibus femineus sexus semper major et validior est; masculinus vero minor et infirmior. Aut certe idcirco magis convenit summo Spiritui dici Patrem quam matrem, quia prima et principalis causa prolis semper est in patre. Nam si maternam causam quolibet modo semper paterna praecedit, nimis est incongruum ut illi parenti adaptetur nomen matris, cui ad gignendam profem nulla alia causa aut sociatur, aut praecedit. Verissimum est igitur summum Spiritum Patrem esse prolis suae. Quod si filius semper similior est patri quam filia; nihil autem similius est alteri quam summo Patri proles sua; verissimum est hanc prolem non esse filiam, sed Filium. Sicut igitur proprium est illius verissime gignere, istius vero gigni, sic proprium est illius esse verissimum gignitorem, istius vero verissimum esse genitum. Et sicut alter est verissimus parens, alter verissima proles; sic alter est verissimus Pater, alter verissimus Filius.

But this could not be established, unless equally he most truly begets; and that is most truly begotten. As therefore the former is evident, so the latter must necessarily be most certain. Therefore it belongs to the supreme Spirit to beget most truly, and to his Word to be begotten most truly.

CHAPTER XLII.

That it most truly belongs to the one to be the begetter and Father; to the other, the begotten and Son.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Therefore this one is the Father, this one is the Son, but this one ought not to be called the mother, and this one the daughter: not because there is any difference of sex in them; nor because the masculine sex is for the most part stronger: but rather because the name of Father, more than that of mother, belongs to him, to whom no other cause is joined for begetting; and the name of Son, more than that of daughter, belongs to this one, who is more similar to the Father: since the Son is always more similar to the Father, than the daughter who is of an unequal sex.

I would wish indeed already, and perhaps I could, to conclude that he is most truly the Father; but that this one is most truly the Son. But neither do I think this [19] should be neglected, whether the appellation of Father and Son, or of mother and daughter is more apt for them, since there is no distinction of sex in them. For if for this reason he is suitably Father, and his offspring Son, because each is Spirit: why does it not by equal reason suit one to be mother, the other daughter, because each is truth and wisdom? Is it because in those natures, which have a difference of sex, it belongs to the better sex to be father or son; but to the lesser, mother or daughter? And this indeed naturally in most; but in some to the contrary, as in certain kinds of birds, in which the female sex is always larger and stronger; but the masculine lesser and weaker. Or certainly for this reason is it more suitable for the supreme Spirit to be called Father than mother, because the first and principal cause of the offspring is always in the father. For if the paternal cause always precedes the maternal cause in whatever way, it is excessively incongruous that the name of mother be adapted to that parent, to whom for begetting offspring no other cause is either joined or precedes. It is most true therefore that the supreme Spirit is the Father of his offspring. But if a son is always more similar to the father than a daughter; but nothing is more similar to the other than his offspring to the supreme Father; it is most true that this offspring is not a daughter, but a Son. As therefore it is proper of the former most truly to beget, but of the latter to be begotten, so it is proper of the former to be the most true begetter, but of the latter to be the most truly begotten. And just as one is the most true parent, the other the most true offspring; so one is the most true Father, the other the most true Son.

CAPUT XLII.

Retractatio communionis amborum, et proprietatum singulorum.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Ita impossibile est eundem esse qui gignit, et eum qui gignitur; ut tamen necesse sit idem esse illum qui gignit, et eum qui gignitur: et ita alius est genitor, alius genitus; ut non aliud sit genitor, quam quod est genitus. Itaque patet quia duo sunt, sed quid duo sunt latet: nec enim sunt duo Spiritus, nec duo Patres, nec duo Filii. Sic enim solis relationibus oppositi sunt, ut alter nunquam suscipiat, quod est proprium alterius: et sic concordet natura, ut alter semper teneat alterius essentiam. Unde nec Pater unquam dicitur Filius, nec Filius unquam dicitur Pater; sed in Patre est essentia Filii, et in Filio est essentia Patris.

Inventis tot et tantis singulorum proprietatibus, quibus mira quaedam tam ineffabilis quam inevitabilis in summa unitate probatur esse pluralitas, valde mihi videtur delectabile retractare saepius tam impenetrabile secretum. Ecce enim cum sic impossibile sit eundem esse qui gignit, et eum qui gignitur; atque eundem esse parentem et prolem: ut necesse sit alium esse genitorem, alium genitum; et alium esse Patrem, alium Filium: sic tamen necesse est idem esse illum qui gignit, et illum qui gignitur, nec non parentem et prolem, ut impossibile sit aliud esse genitorem, quam quod est genitus; aliud esse Patrem, quam quod est Filius. Et cum ita sit alius ille, et alius ille, ut omnino pateat quod duo sint; sic tamen unum et idem ipsum est, id quod est ille et ille, ut penitus lateat qui duo sint. Nam sic est alius Pater, alius Filius, ut, cum ambos dixerim, videam me duos dixisse; et sic est idipsum quod est, et Pater et Filius, ut non intelligam quid duos dixerim. Quamvis namque singulus Pater sit perfecte summus Spiritus, et singulus Filius sit perfecte summus Spiritus; sic tamen unum idemque est Spiritus Pater et Spiritus Filius, ut Pater et Filius non sint duo Spiritus, sed unus Spiritus: ut sicut singula propria singulorum non recipiunt pluralitatem, quia non sunt duorum; ita id quod commune est amborum, individuum teneat unitatem, quamvis totum sit singulorum. Nam sicut non sunt duo patres, aut duo filii; sed unus Pater, et unus Filius, quoniam singula sunt singulorum propria; ita non sunt duo, sed unus Spiritus; quamvis et singuli Patris, et singuli Filii, sit perfectum esse Spiritum. Sic sunt oppositi relationibus, ut alter nunquam suscipiat proprium alterius; sic sunt concordet natura ut alter semper teneat essentiam alterius.

CHAPTER XLII.

Review of the communion of both, and the properties of each.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---It is so impossible for the one who begets to be the same as him who is begotten; that nevertheless it is necessary that he who begets and he who is begotten be the same: and so one is the begetter, another is the begotten; that the begetter is not other than what the begotten is. Therefore it is evident that they are two, but what the two are lies hidden: for they are neither two Spirits, nor two Fathers, nor two Sons. For they are so opposed by relations alone, that one never takes up what is proper to the other: and so harmonious in nature, that one always holds the essence of the other. Whence neither the Father is ever called the Son, nor is the Son ever called the Father; but in the Father is the essence of the Son, and in the Son is the essence of the Father.

Having discovered so many and such great properties of each, by which a certain wonderful plurality as ineffable as it is inevitable is proven to be in the supreme unity, it seems very pleasant to me to review more frequently such an impenetrable secret. For behold, although it is so impossible for the one who begets to be the same as the one who is begotten; and for the parent and offspring to be the same: that it is necessary that the begetter be one, the begotten another; and the Father be one, the Son another: yet it is so necessary that he who begets and he who is begotten be the same, as well as the parent and the offspring, that it is impossible for the begetter to be other, than what the begotten is; for the Father to be other, than what the Son is. And although that one is one thing, and the other is another, so that it is entirely evident that they are two; yet it is so one and the very same itself, that which that one and that one is, that it lies completely hidden what the two are. For so one is the Father, the other the Son, that, when I speak of both, I see that I have spoken of two; and so that very same itself is what it is, both the Father and the Son, that I do not understand what I have spoken of as two. For although individually the Father is perfectly the supreme Spirit, and individually the Son is perfectly the supreme Spirit; yet so one and the same is the Spirit Father and the Spirit Son, that the Father and the Son are not two Spirits, but one Spirit: so that just as the individual properties of each do not receive plurality, because they do not belong to the two; so that which is common to both, holds an undivided unity, although the whole belongs to each individually. For just as there are not two fathers, or two sons; but one Father, and one Son, since individual things are proper to individuals; so they are not two, but one Spirit; although both of the individual Father, and of the individual Son, it is perfect to be Spirit. They are so opposed by relations, that one never receives the property of the other; they are so harmonious in nature that one always holds the essence of the other.

Sic enim diversi sunt, per hoc quod alter est Pater, et alter Filius, ut nunquam dicatur aut Pater Filius, aut Filius Pater; et sic idem sunt per substantiam, ut semper sit in Patre essentia Filii, et in Filio essentia Patris. Est enim non diversa, sed eadem; non plures, sed una utriusque essentia.

CAPUT XLIV.

Quomodo alter alterius sit essentia.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Alter alterius essentia recte dici potest ut summa unitas simplicitasque commendetur communis naturae. Non tamen dicitur Pater essentia Filii, et Filius essentia Patris; quasi alter non per se, sed per alterum existat: summa enim essentia semper est per se, sicut summa sapientia semper sapit per se. Unde Pater per se est, et pariter Filius per se est; quia Pater est summa essentia, et pariter Filius est summa essentia. Filius quidem est essentia nata de Patris essentia, et sapientia de sapientia; sed non idcirco minus perfecta est, nihilominus enim ipsa per se est, et per se sapit. Nec repugnat quod Filius et per se subsistat, et de Patre habeat esse. Nam a Patre habet ut per se sit et per se sapiat; alioquin non esset idem esse Patris et Filii. Denique utrique non aliud est habere essentiam, quam essentiam esse. Ergo sicut habet alter alterius essentiam; ita alter est alterius essentia, hoc est, idem esse est alteri, quod est alteri.

Unde etiam si alter alterius dicatur essentia, non erratur a veritate; sed summa unitas simplicitasque commendatur communis naturae. Non enim quemadmodum intelligitur sapientia hominis, per quam homo sapiens est, qui per se non potest esse sapiens; ita intelligi potest, si dicatur Pater essentia Filii, et Filius essentia Patris, ut eo modo sit Filius existens per patrem, et Pater per Filium, quasi non possit alter existens esse nisi per alterum; sicut homo non potest esse sapiens, nisi per sapientiam. Sicut namque summa sapientia semper sapit per se; ita summa essentia semper est per se.

For they are so diverse, through the fact that one is the Father, and the other the Son, that the Father is never called the Son, nor the Son the Father; and they are so the same through substance, that always in the Father is the essence of the Son, and in the Son the essence of the Father. For it is not diverse, but the same; not multiple, but one essence of both.

CHAPTER XLIV.

How one is the essence of the other.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---One can rightly be called the essence of the other so that the supreme unity and simplicity of the common nature may be commended. However, the Father is not called the essence of the Son, and the Son the essence of the Father; as if one exists not through itself, but through the other: for the supreme essence is always through itself, just as supreme wisdom always is wise through itself. Whence the Father is through himself, and equally the Son is through himself; because the Father is the supreme essence, and equally the Son is the supreme essence. The Son indeed is essence born from the essence of the Father, and wisdom from wisdom; but it is not therefore less perfect, for nevertheless it is itself through itself, and is wise through itself. Nor is it repugnant that the Son both subsists through himself, and has his being from the Father. For he has it from the Father that he is through himself and is wise through himself; otherwise the being of the Father and of the Son would not be the same. Finally, for both it is not other to have essence, than to be essence. Therefore just as one has the essence of the other; so one is the essence of the other, that is, it is the same being for one, which is for the other.

Whence even if one is called the essence of the other, one does not wander from the truth; but the supreme unity and simplicity of the common nature is commended. For not in the way the wisdom of a man is understood, through which a man is wise, who through himself cannot be wise; can it thus be understood, if the Father is called the essence of the Son, and the Son the essence of the Father, so that in that way the Son is existing through the Father, and the Father through the Son, as if the one existing could not be except through the other; just as a man cannot be wise, except through wisdom. For just as supreme wisdom always is wise through itself; so the supreme essence always is through itself.

Est autem perfecte summa essentia Pater, et perfecte summa essentia Filius; pariter ergo perfectus Pater per se est, et pariter perfectus Filius per se est, sicut uterque sapit per se. Non enim idcirco minus perfecta est essentia vel sapientia Filius, quia est essentia nata de Patris essentia, et sapientia de sapientia; sed tunc minus perfecta essentia vel sapientia esset, si non esset per se aut non saperet per se. Nequaquam enim repugnat ut Filius et per se subsistat, et de Patre habeat esse. Sicut enim Pater habet essentiam, et sapientiam, et vitam in semetipso; ut non per alienam, sed per suam essentiam sit, per suam sapientiam sapiat, per suam vitam vivat; ita gignendo, dat Filio essentiam habere, et sapientiam et vitam in semetipso; ut non per extraneam, sed suam essentiam, sapientiam et vitam subsistat, sapiat et vivat; alioquin non erit idem esse Patris et Filii, nec erit par Patri Filius: quod quam falsum sit liquidissime superius pervisum est. Quare non repugnat Filium et subsistere per se, et esse de Patre; quia hoc ipsum, id est, per se ipsum posse subsistere, necesse est illum de Patre habere. Nam si quis sapiens suam esse sapientiam, cujus prius experts essem, doceret, utique hoc ipsa sapientia ejus facere non incongrue diceretur, sed quamvis mea sapientia ab illius sapientia haberet esse et sapere; tamen cum jam esset, nonnisi sua essentia esset, nec saperet nisi seipsa. Multo igitur magis aeterni Patris coaeternus Filius, qui sic habet a Patre esse, ut non sint duae essentiae, per se subsistit, sapit et vivit. Non igitur sic intelligi potest quod Pater Filii, aut Filius Patris sit essentia; quasi alter non possit subsistere per se sed per alterum; sed ad significandum quam habent communionem summe simplicis, summeque unius essentiae, sic congrue dici et intelligi potest quia sic est alter idipsum quod alter, ut alter habeat essentiam alterius. Hac itaque ratione, quoniam utique non aliud est habere essentiam, quam essentiam esse: sicut habet alter alterius essentiam, ita est alter alterius essentia, id est, idem esse est alteri, quod alteri.

CAPUT XLV

[al. XLIV]. Quod aptius dici possit Filius essentia Patris, quam Pater essentia Filii: et quod similiter sit Filius Patris virtus, et sapientia, et similia.

But the Father is perfectly the supreme essence, and the Son is perfectly the supreme essence; therefore equally the perfect Father is through himself, and equally the perfect Son is through himself, just as each is wise through himself. For the Son is not therefore a less perfect essence or wisdom, because he is essence born from the essence of the Father, and wisdom from wisdom; but then it would be a less perfect essence or wisdom, if it were not through itself or were not wise through itself. For by no means is it repugnant that the Son both subsists through himself, and has his being from the Father. For just as the Father has essence, and wisdom, and life in himself; so that he is not through another's, but through his own essence, is wise through his own wisdom, lives through his own life; so in begetting, he gives to the Son to have essence, and wisdom and life in himself; so that he subsists, is wise and lives not through an extraneous, but his own essence, wisdom and life; otherwise the being of the Father and the Son will not be the same, nor will the Son be equal to the Father: how false this is was most clearly foreseen above. Wherefore it is not repugnant for the Son both to subsist through himself, and to be from the Father; because this very thing, that is, to be able to subsist through himself, it is necessary for him to have from the Father. For if some wise man were to teach me his wisdom, of which I was previously destitute, surely this would not incongruously be said to be done by his wisdom itself, but although my wisdom would have its being and its being wise from his wisdom; yet since it already was, it would not be except by its own essence, nor would it be wise except by itself. Much more therefore does the coeternal Son of the eternal Father, who so has his being from the Father, that they are not two essences, subsist, be wise and live through himself. Therefore it cannot be thus understood that the Father is the essence of the Son, or the Son of the Father; as if one could not subsist through himself but through the other; but to signify what communion they have of the supremely simple, and supremely one essence, so it can congruously be said and understood that one is so the very same itself as the other, that one has the essence of the other. And thus by this reason, since indeed it is not other to have essence, than to be [20] essence: just as one has the essence of the other, so one is the essence of the other, that is, it is the same being for one, which for the other.

CHAPTER XLV

[al. XLIV]. That it can more aptly be said that the Son is the essence of the Father, than that the Father is the essence of the Son: and that similarly the Son is the power of the Father, and wisdom, and similar things.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Magis tamen congruit Filium dici essentiam Patris, quam Patrem dici essentiam Filii: cum enim Filius habeat essentiam a Patre, dici potest habere essentiam Patris, et proinde esse essentia Patris. Sic Filius dicitur Patris virtus, sapientia, veritas, justitia, etc., quia haec habet a Patre.

Quod licet secundum perspectam rationem verum sit, valde tamen magis congruit Filium dici essentiam Patris, quam Patrem essentiam Filii, quoniam namque Pater a nullo habet essentiam nisi a seipso, non satis apte dicitur habere essentiam alicujus nisi suam; quia vero Filius essentiam suam habet a Patre, et eandem quam habet Pater, aptissime dici potest habere essentiam Patris. Quare quoniam neuter aliter habet essentiam, quam existendo essentia; sicut aptius intelligitur habere Filius Patris essentiam quam Pater Filii, ita convenientius dici potest Filius Patris essentia quam Pater Filii. Nam haec una si fiat prolatio, satis acuta brevitate commendat Filium non solum eandem essentiam habere cum Patre, sed hanc ipsam habere de Patre: ut hoc sit, Filius est essentia Patris, quod est, Filius est non differens essentia de Patris essentia, imo de Patre essentia. Similiter ergo est Filius Patris virtus, et sapientia, seu veritas et justitia; et quidquid summi Spiritus convenit essentiae.

CAPUT XLVI

[al. XLV]. Quomodo quaedam ex his quae sic proferuntur, aliter quoque possint intelligi.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Filius dici etiam potest intelligentia et sapientia, scientia et cognitio Patris; quia intelligit, scit et novit ipsam Patris essentiam. Veritas etiam Patris eo sensu dici potest, quia non est imperfecta imitatio, sed integra veritas et ipsa essentia paternae substantiae, et non est aliud quam quod est Pater.

Videntur tamen quaedam, ex his quae sic proferri et intelligi possunt, aliam quoque non incongruam sub hac ipsa pronuntiatione intelligentiam suscipere. Liquet enim Filium esse verum Verbum, id est perfectam intelligentiam, sive perfectam totius paternae substantiae cognitionem, et scientiam, et sapientiam, id est, quae ipsam Patris intelligit essentiam, et cognoscit, et scit, et sapit. Si igitur hoc sensu dicatur Filius Patris intelligentia, et sapientia, et scientia, et cognitio, sive notitia; quoniam intelligit, sapit, scit et novit Patrem, nequaquam a veritate disceditur.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---However, it is more fitting for the Son to be called the essence of the Father, than for the Father to be called the essence of the Son: for since the Son has essence from the Father, he can be said to have the essence of the Father, and therefore to be the essence of the Father. Thus the Son is called the power, wisdom, truth, justice, etc., of the Father, because he has these from the Father.

Although this is true according to the reason already perceived, it is nevertheless much more fitting for the Son to be called the essence of the Father, than the Father the essence of the Son, for since the Father has essence from no one except himself, he is not quite aptly said to have the essence of anyone except his own; but because the Son has his essence from the Father, and the same which the Father has, he can most aptly be said to have the essence of the Father. Wherefore since neither has essence in any other way than by existing as essence; just as it is more aptly understood that the Son has the essence of the Father than the Father of the Son, so it can more conveniently be said that the Son is the essence of the Father than the Father of the Son. For if this one expression be made, with enough acute brevity it commends that the Son not only has the same essence with the Father, but has this very thing from the Father: so that this, "the Son is the essence of the Father," is this, "the Son is an essence not differing from the essence of the Father, indeed an essence from the Father." Similarly therefore the Son is the power of the Father, and wisdom, or truth and justice; and whatever befits the essence of the Supreme Spirit.

CHAPTER XLVI

[al. XLV]. How certain of these things which are thus uttered, can also be understood otherwise.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---The Son can also be called the intelligence and wisdom, the knowledge and cognition of the Father; because he understands, knows, and is acquainted with the very essence of the Father. He can also be called the truth of the Father in this sense, because it is not an imperfect imitation, but the whole truth and the very essence of the paternal substance, and is not other than what the Father is.

Nevertheless certain of these things, which can be thus uttered and understood, seem to receive under this very pronounciation also another, not incongruous understanding. For it is clear that the Son is the true Word, that is perfect intelligence, or the perfect cognition of the whole paternal substance, and knowledge, and wisdom, that is, which understands, and cognizes, and knows, and is wise concerning the very essence of the Father. If therefore in this sense the Son is called the intelligence, and wisdom, and knowledge, and cognition, or acquaintance of the Father; since he understands, is wise about, knows and is acquainted with the Father, one by no means departs from the truth.

Veritas quoque Patris aptissime dici potest Filius, non solum eo sensu, quia est eadem Filii veritas quae est et Patris, sicut jam perspectum est; sed etiam hoc sensu ut in eo intelligatur non imperfecta quaedam imitatio, sed integra veritas paternae substantiae, quia non est aliud quam quod est Pater.

CAPUT XLVII.

Quod Filius sit intelligentia intelligentiae et Veritas veritatis.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Id patet, quia Filius est intelligentia, et scientia, et sapientia, et veritas paternae substantiae, quae ipsa est intelligentia, et scientia, et sapientia, et veritas.

At si ipsa substantia Patris est intelligentia, et scientia, et sapientia, et veritas, consequenter colligitur quia sicut Filius est intelligentia, et scientia, et sapientia, et veritas paternae substantiae; ita est intelligentia intelligentiae, scientia scientiae, sapientia sapientiae, et veritas veritatis.

CAPUT XLVIII

[al. XLVI]. Quod et quomodo Filius sit intelligentia vel sapientia memoriae, et memoria Patris et memoriae.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Verbum rei est ipsa cogitatio ad ejus similitudinem ex memoria formatae. Ergo Verbum ex memoria nascitur. Ergo sicut Filius dicitur Verbum; sic Pater, ex quo gignitur, dici potest memoria. Ergo sicut Filius est intelligentia et sapientia Patris, ita est intelligentia et sapientia paternae memoriae. Et quia Filius quidquid sapit et intelligit, ejus et meminit; Filius est memoria Patris, et memoria memoriae, id est memoria memor Patris qui est memoria de nullo nata; Filius vero est memoria nata de memoria, hoc est de Patre.

De memoria vero quid sentiendum est? an aestimandus est Filius intelligentia memoriae, sive memoria Patris, aut memoria memoriae? Equidem cum summa sapientia sui memor esse negari non possit, nihil competentius quam in memoria Pater, sicut in Verbo Filius intelligitur; quoniam de memoria nasci Verbum videtur, quod clarius in nostra mente percipitur. Quoniam namque mens humana non semper se cogitat, sicut sui semper meminit, liquet, cum se cogitat, quia verbum ejus nascitur de memoria. Unde apparet quia si semper se cogitaret, semper verbum ejus de

Moreso the Son can most aptly be called the truth of the Father, not only in that sense, because it is the same truth of the Son which is also of the Father, just as has already been clearly seen; but also in this sense so that in it there is understood not some imperfect imitation, but the whole truth of the paternal substance, because he is not other than what the Father is.

CHAPTER XLVII.

That the Son is the intelligence of intelligence and the truth of truth.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---This is clear, because the Son is the intelligence, and knowledge, and wisdom, and truth of the paternal substance, which itself is intelligence, and knowledge, and wisdom, and truth.

But if the very substance of the Father is intelligence, and knowledge, and wisdom, and truth, consequently it is gathered that just as the Son is the intelligence, and knowledge, and wisdom, and truth of the paternal substance; so he is the intelligence of intelligence, knowledge of knowledge, wisdom of wisdom, and truth of truth.

CHAPTER XLVIII

[al. XLVI]. That and how the Son is the intelligence or wisdom of memory, and the memory of the Father and of memory.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---The Word of a thing is the very thought formed to its likeness from memory. Therefore the Word is born from memory. Therefore just as the Son is called Word; so the Father, from whom he is begotten, can be called memory. Therefore just as the Son is the intelligence and wisdom of the Father, so he is the intelligence and wisdom of the paternal memory. And because the Son whatever he is wise about and understands, he also remembers; the Son is the memory of the Father, and the memory of memory, that is a mindful memory of the Father who is memory born from no one; the Son indeed is memory born from memory, that is from the Father.

But what must be thought concerning memory? whether the Son must be esteemed to be the intelligence of memory, or the memory of the Father, or the memory of memory? Indeed since supreme wisdom cannot be denied to be mindful of itself, nothing is more competent than that the Father is understood in memory, just as the Son in the Word; since the Word is seen to be born from memory, which is more clearly perceived in our mind. For since the human mind does not always think of itself, just as it always remembers itself, it is clear, when it thinks of itself, that its word is born from memory. Whence it appears that if it always thought of

memoria nasceretur. Rem etenim cogitare, cujus memoriam habemus, hoc est mente eam dicere; verbum vero rei, est ipsa cogitatio ad ejus similitudinem ex memoria formata. Hinc itaque liquido animadverti potest de summa sapientia, quae sic semper se dicit, sicut semper sui memor est, quia de aeterna memoria ejus coaeternum Verbum nascitur. Sicut igitur Verbum congrue intelligitur proles; ita memoria, parentis nomen aptissime suscipit. Si ergo proles, quae omnino de solo summo Spiritu nata est, proles est memoriae ejus; nihil consequentius, quam quia memoria sua est idem ipse. Quippe non in eo quod sui memor est, sic est in sua memoria, velut alia res in alia; quemadmodum ea quae sic sunt in humanae mentis memoria, ut non sint ipsa nostra memoria; sed sic est memor sui, ut ipse memoria sua sit. Consequitur itaque ut quomodo Filius est intelligentia sive sapientia Patris, ita sit et paternae memoriae. At quidquid Filius sapit, aut intelligit; ejus similiter et meminit. Est igitur Filius memoria Patris, et memoria memoriae, id est, memoria memor Patris, qui est memoria, sicut est sapientia Patris, et sapientia sapientiae, id est, sapientia sapiens Patrem sapientiam: et Filius quidem memoria nata de memoria, sicut sapientia nata de sapientia; Pater vero de nullo nata memoria vel sapientia.

CAPUT XLIX.

Quod summus Spiritus se amet.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Summus Spiritus, sicut sui memor est et se intelligit, ita se amat. Nam et ipsa mens rationalis se et illum amare posse convincitur ex eo quod se et illum possit intelligere.

Sed ecce dum hujus Patris Filiique proprietates communionemque delectabiliter intueor, nihil delectabilius in illis contemplandum invenio quam mutui amoris affectum. Quam enim absurde negetur summus Spiritus se amare, sicut sui memor est, et se intelligit! cum et mens rationalis et se et illum amare posse vincatur ex eo, quia sui et illius memor esse, et se et illum intelligere potest: otiosa namque, et penitus inutilis est memoria et intelligentia cujuslibet rei; nisi, prout ratio exigit, res ipsa ametur aut reprobetur. Amat ergo seipsum summus Spiritus; sicut sui meminit, et se intelligit.

CAPUT L

[al. XLVIII] Quod idem amor pariter procedat a Patre et Filio.

itself, its word would always be born from memory. For to think of a thing, of which we have memory, is this: to say it in the mind; but the word of a thing, is the very thought formed to its likeness from memory. Hence therefore it can be clearly noticed concerning supreme wisdom, which thus always speaks itself, just as it is always mindful of itself, that from its eternal memory its coeternal Word is born. Therefore just as the Word is congruously understood as offspring; so memory most aptly receives the name of parent. If therefore the offspring, which is born entirely from the sole supreme Spirit, is the offspring of his memory; nothing is more consequential, than that his memory is the very same himself. For not in that he remembers himself, is he so in his memory, as if another thing in another; like those things which are so in the memory of the human mind, that they are not our memory itself; but he is so mindful of himself, that he himself is his memory. It follows therefore that just as the Son is the intelligence or wisdom of the Father, so he is also of the paternal memory. But whatever the Son is wise about, or understands; he similarly also remembers it. Therefore the Son is the memory of the Father, and the memory of memory, that is, a mindful memory of the Father, who is memory, just as he is the wisdom of the Father, and the wisdom of wisdom, that is, wisdom being wise about the Father who is wisdom: and the Son indeed is memory born from memory, just as wisdom born from wisdom; but the Father is memory or wisdom born from no one.

CHAPTER XLIX.

That the supreme Spirit loves himself.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---The supreme Spirit, just as he is mindful of himself and understands himself, so he loves himself. For even the rational mind itself is convinced that it can love itself and him from the fact that it can understand itself and him.

But behold while I delightfully intuit the properties and communion of this Father and Son, I find nothing more delightful to contemplate in them than the affection of mutual love. For how absurdly it would be denied that the supreme Spirit loves himself, just as he is mindful of himself, and understands himself! since even the rational mind may be convinced that it can love both itself and him from this, that it can be mindful of itself and him, and understand both itself and him: for the memory and intelligence of any thing is idle, and entirely useless; unless, as reason demands, the thing itself is loved or reprobated. Therefore the supreme Spirit loves himself; just as he remembers himself, and understands himself.

CHAPTER L

[al. XLVIII] That the same love proceeds equally from the Father and the Son.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Patet autem summi Spiritus amorem ex eo procedere quia sui memor est et se 21 intelligit: nulla enim res amatur sine ejus memoria et intelligentia. Ergo amor ille procedit a Patre qui est memoria, et a Filio qui est intelligentia.

Palam certe est rationem habenti, eum non idcirco sui memorem esse aut se intelligere, quia se amat, sed ideo se amare, quia sui meminit, et se intelligit; nec eum se posse amare, si sui non sit memor, aut se non intelligat. Nulla enim res amatur, sine ejus memoria aut intelligentia; et multa tenentur memoria et intelliguntur quae non amantur. Patet igitur amorem summi Spiritus ex eo procedere, quia sui memor est, et se intelligit. Quod si in memoria summi Spiritus intelligitur Pater, in intelligentia Filius manifestum est quia a Patre pariter et a Filio, summi Spiritus amor procedit.

CAPUT LI

[al. XLIX]. Quod uterque pari amore diligit se, et alterum.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Summus Spiritus se amat. Ergo Pater se amat, et Filius se amat; et alter alterum amat: summus enim et individuus Spiritus est Pater et Filius, et ambo simul sunt unus spiritus. Uterque etiam se et alterum intelligit, quia sui et alterius meminit. Et quoniam in utroque quod amat idipsum est quod amatur, uterque pari amore se et alterum diligit.

Sed si se amat summus Spiritus, procul dubio se amat Pater, amat se Filius, et alter alterum; quia singulus Pater est summus Spiritus, et singulus Filius, summus Spiritus; et ambo simul, unus spiritus. Et quia uterque pariter sui et alterius meminit, et se et alterum intelligit: et quoniam omnino idipsum est quod amat, vel amatur in Patre, et quod in Filio necesse est ut pari amore uterque diligit se et alterum.

CAPUT LII

[al. L] Quod tantus sit iste amor, quantus est ipse summus Spiritus.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Id constat quia tantus est amor iste, quantum ille se intelligit; tantum autem intelligit, quantus est.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---But it is clear that the love of the supreme Spirit proceeds from the fact that he is mindful of himself and understands [21] himself: for no thing is loved without the memory and intelligence of it. Therefore that love proceeds from the Father who is memory, and from the Son who is intelligence.

It is certainly evident to one having reason, that he is not therefore mindful of himself or understands himself, because he loves himself, but therefore he loves himself, because he is mindful of himself, and understands himself; nor could he love himself, if he is not mindful of himself, or does not understand himself. For no thing is loved, without the memory or intelligence of it; and many things are held in memory and understood which are not loved. Therefore it is clear that the love of the supreme Spirit proceeds from this, that he is mindful of himself, and understands himself. But if the Father is understood in the memory of the supreme Spirit, and the Son in the intelligence, it is manifest that the love of the supreme Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son equally.

CHAPTER LI

[al. XLIX]. That each loves himself and the other with an equal love.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---The supreme Spirit loves himself. Therefore the Father loves himself, and the Son loves himself; and one loves the other: for the Father and the Son are the supreme and individual Spirit, and both together are one spirit. Each also understands himself and the other, because he is mindful of himself and the other. And since in each what he loves is the very same as what is loved, each loves himself and the other with an equal love.

But if the supreme Spirit loves himself, without doubt the Father loves himself, the Son loves himself, and the one the other; because individually the Father is the supreme Spirit, and individually the Son is the supreme Spirit; and both together, one spirit. And because each equally is mindful of himself and of the other, and understands himself and the other: and since it is entirely the very same which loves, or is loved in the Father, and what in the Son, it is necessary that each loves himself and the other with an equal love.

CHAPTER LII

[al. L] That this love is as great, as the supreme Spirit himself is.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---This is established because this love is as much, as he understands himself; but he understands as much, as he is.

Quantus ergo est amor iste summi Spiritus, sic communis Patri et Filio! Sed si se tantum diligit, quantum sui meminit et se intelligit: tantum autem sui memor est et intelligit se, quanta est ejus essentia, quod aliter esse non potest: profecto tantus est amor ejus, quantus ipse est.

CAPUT LIII

[al. LI]. Quod idem amor sit idipsum quod est summus Spiritus; et tamen ipse sit cum Patre et Filio unus spiritus.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Nihil potest esse par summo Spiritui nisi summus Spiritus. Cum ergo amor iste tantus sit, quantus est summus Spiritus, liquet quia iste amor est summus Spiritus. Deinde etsi nihil unquam existeret quam summus Spiritus, Pater et Filius nihilominus seipsos et invicem diligerent. Ergo amor iste non est aliud quam quod est Pater et Filius, quod est summa essentia. Denique summae essentiae plures esse nequeunt. Ergo utriusque amor una est cum Patre et Filio summa essentia. Ergo amor ipse est summa sapientia, summa veritas, summum bonum, et quidquid de summi Spiritus substantia dici potest.

Verum quid potest esse par summo Spiritui, nisi summus Spiritus? Iste itaque amor est summus Spiritus. Denique si nulla unquam creatura, id est si nihil unquam aliud esset quam summus Spiritus, Pater et Filius nihilominus seipsos et invicem Pater et Filius diligerent. Consequitur itaque hunc amorem non esse aliud quam quod est Pater et Filius, quod est summa essentia. At quoniam summae essentiae plures esse non possunt, quid magis necessarium quam Patrem et Filium, et utriusque amorem unam esse summam essentiam? Est igitur idem amor summa sapientia, summa veritas, summum bonum, et quidquid de summi Spiritus substantia dici potest.

CAPUT LIV

[al. LII]. Quod totus procedat a Patre, totus a Filio; et tamen non sit nisi unus amor.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Amor iste non eo procedit in quo Pater et Filius plures sunt, sed ex eo in quo sunt unum. Non enim procedit ex relationibus, quae plures sunt, cum alia sit relatio Patris, et alia relatio Filii; sed ex ipsa sua essentia, quae pluralitatem non admittit, Pater et Filius emittunt tantum bonum; sic tamen, ut totus a Patre et totus a Filio et totus ab utroque unus idemque

Therefore how great is this love of the supreme Spirit, so common to the Father and the Son! But if he loves himself as much, as he is mindful of himself and understands himself: but he is as mindful of himself and understands himself as much, as his essence is great, which cannot be otherwise: surely his love is as great, as he himself is.

CHAPTER LIII

[al. LI]. That the same love is the very thing which the Supreme Spirit is; and yet it itself is one spirit with the Father and the Son.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Nothing can be equal to the Supreme Spirit except the Supreme Spirit. Since therefore this love is as great as the Supreme Spirit is, it is clear that this love is the Supreme Spirit. Then even if nothing ever existed but the Supreme Spirit, the Father and the Son would nevertheless love themselves and each other. Therefore this love is not other than what the Father and the Son are, which is the supreme essence. Finally, there cannot be several supreme essences. Therefore the love of both is one supreme essence with the Father and the Son. Therefore love itself is supreme wisdom, supreme truth, supreme good, and whatever can be said of the substance of the Supreme Spirit.

But what can be equal to the Supreme Spirit, except the Supreme Spirit? This love therefore is the Supreme Spirit. Finally, if no creature ever existed, that is, if nothing ever were other than the Supreme Spirit, the Father and the Son would nevertheless love themselves and each other. It follows therefore that this love is not other than what the Father and the Son are, which is the supreme essence. But since there cannot be several supreme essences, what is more necessary than that the Father and the Son, and the love of both, be one supreme essence? Therefore the same love is supreme wisdom, supreme truth, supreme good, and whatever can be said of the substance of the Supreme Spirit.

CHAPTER LIV

[al. LII]. That it proceeds wholly from the Father, wholly from the Son; and yet there is but one love.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---This love does not proceed from that in which the Father and the Son are several, but from that in which they are one. For it does not proceed from the relations, which are several, since the relation of the Father is one, and the relation of the Son another; but from their essence itself, which does not admit plurality, the Father and the Son emit so great a good; yet in such a way, that it proceeds as one and the same, wholly

procedat; quia a Patre, qui singulus et summus Spiritus, non procedit nisi summus Spiritus, et a Filio qui singulus pariter est summus Spiritus, non procedit nisi summus Spiritus; et a Patre et Filio, qui non duo sed unus sunt Spiritus, non procedere potest nisi unus summus spiritus.

Intuendum est diligenter utrum sint duo amores, unus a Patre procedens, alter a Filio: an unus, non totus ab uno procedens, sed partim a Patre, partim a Filio: an nec plures, nec unus partim procedens a singulis, sed unus totus a singulis, et idem totus a duobus simul. Sed hujusmodi dubitationis certitudo hinc indubitanter cognoscitur, quia non ex eo procedit, in quo plures sunt Pater et Filius, sed ex eo in quo unum sunt. Nam non ex relationibus suis, quae plures sunt, alia est enim relatio Patris, alia Filii; sed ex ipsa sua essentia, quae pluralitatem non admittit, emittunt Pater et Filius tantum pariter bonum. Sicut ergo singulus Pater est summus Spiritus et singulus Filius est summus Spiritus et simul Pater et Filius non duo, sed unus spiritus; ita a singulo Patre manat totus amor summi Spiritus et a singulo Filio totus; et simul a Patre et Filio non duo toti, sed unus idemque totus.

CAPUT LV

[al. LIII]. *Quod non sit eorum Filius amor*

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Amor tamen iste nec Patris nec Verbi, a quibus procedit, est Filius, quia ex quo ab illis procedit, non refert eorum similitudinem: licet omnino idem sit quod est Pater et Filius. Deinde si proles eorum est, aut alter eorum erit pater ejus, alter mater, quod repugnat; cum non aliter a Patre quam a Filio procedat: aut uterque pater sive mater ejus est: nulla autem natura admittit duo aliqua quae singula perfectam et omnino eandem ad aliquid unum, patris et matris habeant habitudinem.

Quid ergo? cum hic amor pariter habeat esse a Patre et Filio, et sic similis sit ambobus ut nullatenus dissimilis sit illis, sed omnino idem sit quod illi: nunquid Filius eorum, aut proles, aestimandus est? Sed sicut Verbum, mox ut consideratur, se prolem esse ejus, a quo est, evidentissime probat, promptam praeferendo, parentis imaginem; sic amor aperte se prolem negat; quia dum a Patre et Filio procedere intelligitur, non statim tam perspicuam exhibet se contemplanti ejus, ex quo est, similitudinem, quamvis ipsum considerata ratio doceat omnino idipsum esse, quod est Pater et Filius.

from the Father and wholly from the Son and wholly from both; because from the Father, who is individually and supreme Spirit, only supreme Spirit proceeds, and from the Son who is individually likewise supreme Spirit, only supreme Spirit proceeds; and from the Father and the Son, who are not two but one Spirit, only one supreme spirit can proceed.

It must be considered diligently whether there be two loves, one proceeding from the Father, another from the Son: or one, not wholly proceeding from one, but partly from the Father, partly from the Son: or neither several, nor one proceeding partly from each, but one wholly from each, and the same wholly from the two together. But the certainty of such a doubt is known from this without doubt, because it does not proceed from that in which the Father and the Son are several, but from that in which they are one. For not from their relations, which are several, for the relation of the Father is one, the Son's another; but from their essence itself, which does not admit plurality, the Father and the Son emit so great a good together. Just as therefore the Father individually is the supreme Spirit and the Son individually is the supreme Spirit and together the Father and the Son are not two, but one spirit; so from the Father individually flows the whole love of the supreme Spirit and from the Son individually the whole; and together from the Father and the Son not two wholes, but one and the same whole.

CHAPTER LV

[al. LIII]. That their love is not a Son.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Nevertheless, this love is not the Son of either the Father or the Word, from whom it proceeds, because in proceeding from them, it does not reflect their likeness: although it is altogether the same as what the Father and the Son are. Then if it is their offspring, either one of them will be its father, the other its mother, which is repugnant; since it does not proceed from the Father otherwise than from the Son: or both are its father or mother: but no nature admits two things which individually have the perfect and altogether same relationship to some one thing, of father and mother.

What then? since this love has being equally from the Father and the Son, and is so similar to both that it is in no way dissimilar to them, but is altogether the same as they are: is it to be estimated their Son, or offspring? But just as the Word, as soon as it is considered, most evidently proves itself to be the offspring of him from whom it is, by presenting a prompt image of the parent; so love openly denies itself to be an offspring; because while it is understood to proceed from the Father and the Son, it does not immediately exhibit to the one contemplating it as clear a likeness of him from whom it is, although considered reason teaches it to be altogether the same itself, which is the Father and the Son.

Denique si proles eorum est, aut alter eorum erit pater ejus, alter mater; aut uterque pater, sive mater est: quae omnia veritati repugnare videntur. Quoniam namque nullatenus aliter a Patre procedit, quam a Filio; nulla veritas patitur ut dissimili vocabulo ad illum Pater et Filius referantur: non est igitur alter pater ejus, alter mater. Ut autem duo aliqua sint, quae singula perfectam, et nulla consideratione differentem habeant pariter ad aliquid unum, patris aut matris habitudinem, nulla natura aliquo monstrari concedit exemplo. Ergo non est uterque, scilicet Pater et Filius, pater aut mater amoris a se manantis. Nequaquam itaque videtur veritati convenire, ut idem amor eorum filius sit aut proles.

CAPUT LVI

[al. LIV]. *Quod solus Pater sit genitor, et ingenitus; solus Filius genitus, solus amor nec genitus, nec ingenitus.*

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Ergo amor iste non potest proprie dici genitus, sicut Verbum: sed nec omnino ingenitus dicendus est; quia non omnino non est ab alio. Hoc itaque soli Patri convenit, quod sit genitor et ingenitus; soli Verbo, quod sit genitum; soli amori, quod nec proprie genitus nec omnino ingenitus, sed procedens sit; quia nec proles est nec omnino non est ab alio.

Sed videtur tamen amor idem, nec omnino, secundum communis locutionis usum, dici posse ingenitus; nec ita proprie, sicut Verbum, genitus. Solemus enim saepe dicere aliquid gigni ex ea re de qua existit: ut cum dicimus splendorem aut calorem gigni ab igne, seu aliquod effectum ex causa sua. Secundum hanc igitur rationem, amor a summo Spiritu exiens, non omnino asseri potest ingenitus; ita vero proprie, sicut Verbum, dici genitus non potest; quia Verbum verissimam esse prolem, et verissimum filium; amorem vero nullatenus filium aut prolem esse, manifestum est. Potest itaque, imo debet dici solus ille, cujus Verbum est, genitor et ingenitus; quia solus est Pater et parens, et nullo modo ab alio est: solum autem Verbum genitum, qui solum filius et proles est. Solus vero amor utriusque, nec genitus, nec ingenitus, quia nec filius est, nec proles est, nec omnino non est ab alio.

CAPUT LVII [al. LV]. *Quod amor idem sic sit increatus et creator, sicut Pater et Filius: et tamen ipse cum illis non tres, sed unus increatus, et unus creator. Et quod idem possit dici Spiritus Patris et Filii.*

Finally, if it is their offspring, either one of them will be its father, the other its mother; or both are father, or mother: all which seem to be repugnant to the truth. For since it proceeds in no way otherwise from the Father than from the Son; no truth allows the Father and the Son to be referred to it by a dissimilar name: therefore one is not its father, the other its mother. But that there be two things, which individually have a perfect relationship, differing by no consideration, equally to some one thing, of father or mother, no nature allows to be shown by any example. Therefore both, namely the Father and the Son, are not the father or mother of the love emanating from them. By no means therefore does it seem to befit the truth, that the same love of theirs be a son or offspring.

CHAPTER LVI

[al. LIV]. That the Father alone is begetter, and unbegotten; the Son alone begotten, love alone neither begotten, nor unbegotten.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Therefore this love cannot properly be called begotten, like the Word: but neither at all is it to be called unbegotten; because it is not altogether not from another. This therefore befits the Father alone, that he is begetter and unbegotten; to the Word alone, that it is begotten; to love alone, that it is neither properly begotten nor altogether unbegotten, but proceeding; because it is neither offspring nor is it altogether not from another.

But the same love seems, nevertheless, not at all, according to the use of common speech, to be able to be called unbegotten; nor so properly, as the Word, begotten. For we are often accustomed to say something is begotten from that thing from which it exists: as when we say splendor or heat is begotten from fire, or some effect from its cause. According to this reason therefore, love going out from the Supreme Spirit, cannot be altogether asserted unbegotten; but yet it cannot properly be called begotten, as the Word; because it is manifest that the Word is the truest offspring, and the truest son; but love in no way a son or offspring. Therefore he alone, whose Word it is, can, indeed ought to be called begetter and unbegotten; because he alone is Father and parent, and is in no way from another: but the Word alone begotten, who alone is son and offspring. But love alone of both, neither begotten, nor unbegotten, because it is neither son, nor is it offspring, nor is it altogether not from another.

CHAPTER LVII [al. LV] . That the same love is so uncreated and creator, as the Father and the Son: and yet it itself with them is not three, but one uncreated, and one creator. And that the same can be called the Spirit of the Father and of the Son.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Cum amor iste una eademque sit cum Patre et Filio summa essentia, quae sola a nullo facta, per se omnia fecit; necesse est sicut Pater et Filius, ita et iste amor sit increatus et creator: et iste tres, non plures, sed unus sint increatus et unus creator. Patrem itaque nullus facit, sive creat, aut gignit. Filium Pater solus gignit, sed non facit. Pater et Filius non faciunt aut gignunt, sed spirant suum amorem, quia ab eis procedit non discedendo a summa illa essentia, sed existendo ex illa. Hinc summae essentiae Spiritus recte potest appellari. Communio etiam Patris et Filii dici potest, tum quia nomen habet commune Patri et Filio tum quia ipse illud ipsum omnino est, quod Pater et Filius.

Quoniam autem idem amor singulus est summa essentia, sicut Pater et Filius, et tamen simul Pater, et Filius, et utriusque amor non plures, sed una summa essentia, quae sola a nullo facta, non per aliud quam per se omnia fecit. Necesse est ut quemadmodum singulus Pater, et singulus Filius est increatus et creator; ita et amor singulus sit increatus et creator, et tamen omnes tres simul, non plures, sed unus increatus et unus creator. Patrem itaque nullus facit, sive creat, aut gignit; Filium vero Pater solus gignit, sed non facit : Pater autem pariter et Filius non faciunt, neque gignunt; sed quodammodo, si sic dici potest, spirant suum amorem: quamvis enim non nostro modo spirat summe incommutabilis essentia, tamen ipsum suum amorem a se ineffabiliter procedentem, non discedendo ab illa, sed existendo ex illa, forsitan non alio modo videtur posse dici aptius ex se emittere quam spirando. Quod si dici potest, sicut Verbum summae essentiae Filius est ejus; ita ejusdem amor satis convenienter appellari potest Spiritus ejus: ut cum essentialiter ipse sit spiritus, sicut Pater et Filius, illi non putentur alicujus spiritus; quia nec Pater ab ullo alio est, nec Filius a Patre quasi spirante nascitur; iste autem aestimetur Spiritus utriusque; quia ab utroque, suo quodam inenarrabili modo, spirante mirabiliter procedit. Qui etiam ex eo quia est communio Patris et Filii, non absque ratione quasi proprium assumere posse videtur aliquod nomen, quod Patri Filioque commune sit; si proprii nominis exigit indigentia. Quod quidem si fiat, scilicet, ut ipse amor nomine Spiritus, quod substantiam pariter Patris et Filii significat, quasi proprio designetur: ad hoc quoque non inutiliter valebit, ut per hoc idipsum esse, quod est Pater et Filius, quamvis ab illis esse suum habeat, intimetur.

CAPUT LVIII [al. LVI] . Quod sicut Filius est essentia vel sapientia Patris, eo sensu, quia habet eandem essentiam vel sapientiam quam Pater; sic idem Spiritus sit Patris et Filii essentia et sapientia, et similia.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Since this love is one and the same supreme essence with the Father and the Son, which alone, made by no one, made all things through itself; it is necessary that just as the Father and the Son, so also this love be uncreated and creator: and these three, not several, but one be uncreated and one creator. No one therefore makes, or creates, or begets the Father. The Father alone begets the Son, but does not make him. The Father and the Son do not make or beget, but breathe their love, because it proceeds from them not by departing from that supreme essence, but by existing from it. Hence it can rightly be called the Spirit of the supreme essence. It can also be called the communion of the Father and the Son, both because it has a name common to the Father and the Son, and because it itself is altogether that very thing which the Father and the Son are.

But since the same love individually is the supreme essence, just as the Father and the Son, and yet at the same time the Father, and the Son, and the love of both are not several, but one supreme essence, which alone made by no one, made all things through itself, not through another but through itself. It is necessary that just as individually the Father, and individually the Son is uncreated and creator; so also individually love be uncreated and creator, and yet all three together, not several, but one uncreated and one creator. No one therefore makes, or creates, or begets the Father; but the Father alone begets the Son, but does not make him: but the Father equally and the Son do not make, nor beget; but in a certain way, if it can be so said, they breathe their love: for although the supremely immutable essence does not breathe in our way, yet that very love of its, ineffably proceeding from it, not by departing from it, but by existing from it, seems perhaps unable to be said more aptly to be emitted from itself than by breathing. But if it can be so said, just as the Word is the Son of the supreme essence; so its love can conveniently enough be called its Spirit: so that while essentially it itself is a spirit, just as the Father and the Son, they may not be thought to be of some spirit; because neither is the Father from any other, nor is the Son born from the Father as if breathing; but this may be estimated the Spirit of both; because from both, in its own inenarrable way, it proceeds wonderfully by breathing. Which also because it is the communion of the Father and the Son, seems not without reason able to assume as its own some name which is common to the Father and the Son; if the lack of a proper name requires it. Which indeed if it be done, namely, that love itself be designated by the name of Spirit, which signifies equally the substance of the Father and of the Son, as if by its own name: it will also avail not uselessly for this, that through this it may be intimated to be that very thing itself which is the Father and the Son, although it has its being from them.

CHAPTER LVIII [al. LVI]. That just as the Son is the essence or wisdom of the Father, in that sense, because he has the same essence or wisdom as the Father; so the same Spirit is the essence and wisdom of the Father and of the Son, and similar things.

Potest quoque quemadmodum Filius est substantia, et sapientia, et virtus Patris, eo sensu quia habet eandem essentiam, et sapientiam, et virtutem, quam Pater; ita utriusque Spiritus intelligi essentia, vel sapientia, vel virtus Patris et Filii, quia habet omnino eandem quam habent illi.

CAPUT LIX

[al. LVII]. *Quod Pater, et Filius, et eorum Spiritus, pariter sint in se invicem.*

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Hi tres sunt una eadem summa essentia, quae nec sine se, nec extra se, nec major vel minor seipsa esse potest. Ergo hi tres sunt in se invicem; ita ut nullus alium excedat. Deinde memoria summae essentiae tota est in ejus intelligentia et amore, et intelligentia in ejus memoria et amore, et amor in memoria et intelligentia ejus. Ergo totus Pater qui est memoria, est in Filio, qui est intelligentia, et in Spiritu, qui est amor: et totus Filius est in Patre et Spiritu, et totus Spiritus in Patre et Filio: et unus illorum non potest esse sine aliis.

Jucundum est intueri in Patre, et Filio et utriusque Spiritu, quomodo sint in se invicem tanta aequalitate ut nullus alium excedat. Praeter hoc enim, quia unusquisque eorum sic est perfecte summa essentia, ut tamen omnes tres simul non sint nisi essentia una summa, quae nec sine se vel extra se, nec major vel minor seipsa esse potest: per singulos tamen idipsum non minus valet probari. Est etenim totus Pater in Filio et communi Spiritu; et Filius in Patre, et eodem Spiritu; et idem Spiritus in Patre et Filio; quia memoria summae essentiae tota est in ejus intelligentia et in amore, et intelligentia in memoria et in amore, et amor in memoria et in intelligentia. Totam quippe suam memoriam summus intelligit Spiritus, et amat; et totius intelligentiae meminit, et totam amat; et totius amoris meminit, et totum intelligit. Intelligitur autem in memoria Pater; in intelligentia Filius; in amore, utriusque Spiritus. Tanta igitur Pater et Filius, et utriusque Spiritus, aequalitate sese complectuntur, et sunt in se invicem ut eorum nullus alium excedere aut sine eo esse probetur.

CAPUT LX [al. LVIII] . Quod nullus eorum alio indigeat ad memorandum, vel intelligendum, vel amandum; quia singulus quisque est memoria, et intelligentia, et amor, et quidquid necesse est inesse summae essentiae.

It can also be understood that just as the Son is the substance, and wisdom, and power of the Father, in that sense because he has the same essence, and wisdom, and power as the Father; so the Spirit of both is the essence, or wisdom, or power of the Father and of the Son, because it has altogether the same which they have.

CHAPTER LIX

[al. LVII]. That the Father, and the Son, and their Spirit, are equally in one another.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---These three are one and the same supreme essence, which can neither be without itself, nor outside itself, nor greater or less than itself. Therefore these three are in each other; so that none exceeds another. Then the memory of the supreme essence is wholly in its intelligence and love, and the intelligence in its memory and love, and the love in its memory and intelligence. Therefore the whole Father, who is memory, is in the Son, who is intelligence, and in the Spirit, who is love: and the whole Son is in the Father and the Spirit, and the whole Spirit in the Father and the Son: and one of them cannot be without the others.

It is pleasant to behold in the Father, and the Son and the Spirit of both, how they are in each other with such equality that none exceeds another. For besides this, because each of them is so perfectly the supreme essence, that nevertheless all three together are but one supreme essence, which can neither be without itself or outside itself, nor greater or less than itself: yet through each one this same thing is no less able to be proved. For the Father is wholly in the Son and the common Spirit; and the Son in the Father, and the same Spirit; and the same Spirit in the Father and the Son; because the memory of the supreme essence is wholly in its intelligence and in love, and the intelligence in memory and in love, and the love in memory and in intelligence. For the Supreme Spirit understands his whole memory, and loves it; and he remembers his whole intelligence, and loves it all; and he remembers his whole love, and understands it all. But the Father is understood in memory; in intelligence the Son; in love, the Spirit of both. With such equality therefore do the Father and the Son, and the Spirit of both, embrace each other, and are in each other that none of them is proved to exceed another or to be without another.

CHAPTER LX [al. LVIII] . That none of them needs another for remembering, or understanding, or loving; because each one individually is memory, and intelligence, and love, and whatever is necessary to be in the supreme essence.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Nec tamen nullus eorum alio indiget sive ad memorandum, sive ad intelligendum, sive ad amandum. Cum enim quisque sit summa essentia, singulus quisque per se est memoria, intelligentia et amor; et ita singulus quisque per se meminit, per se intelligit, et per se amat; sicut per se est.

Sed in his nullatenus negligenter memoriae commendandum, quod intuenti mihi occurrit, existimo. Sic enim necesse est ut Pater intelligatur memoria, Filius intelligentia, Spiritus amor; ut nec Pater indigeat Filio, aut communi Spiritu, nec Filius Patre vel eodem Spiritu, sive idem Spiritus Patre aut Filio ; quasi Pater per se meminisse solum possit, intelligere autem nonnisi per Filium, et amare nonnisi per suum Filiique Spiritum; et Filius per se intelligere tantum queat, per Patrem autem memor sit, et per Spiritum suum amet; et idem Spiritus per se non aliud quam amare valeat, sed Pater illi sit memor, et Filius illi intelligat. Nam cum in his tribus, unusquisque singulus sit summa essentia et summa sapientia sic perfecta, ut ipsa per se memor sit et intelligat, et amet, necesse est ut nullus horum trium alio indigeat, 23 aut ad memorandum, aut ad intelligendum, aut ad amandum. Singulus enim quisque essentialiter est et memoria, et intelligentia, et amor, et quidquid summae essentiae necesse est inesse .

CAPUT LXI

[al. LIX]. Quod tamen non sint tres, sed unus, seu Pater, seu Filius, seu utriusque Spiritus.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Quamvis autem Pater sit intelligentia et amor, non tamen est Filius, aut alicujus Spiritus; quia non est intelligentia genita, nec amor ab aliquo procedens. Et licet Filius sit memoria et amor, non tamen est Pater. aut Spiritus alicujus; quia non est memoria gignens, nec amor ab alio procedens, sicut Spiritus. Sic etsi Spiritus est memoria et intelligentia, non tamen Pater, aut Filius, quia non est memoria gignens, nec intelligentia genita. Unus itaque in summa essentia Pater, unus Filius, unus Spiritus: et non tres Patres, nec tres Filii; nec tres Spiritus.

Quandam hic video quaestionem occurrere. Nam si Pater ita est intelligentia et amor, sicut est memoria, et Filius sic est memoria et amor, quomodo est intelligentia; et utriusque Spiritus non minus est memoria et intelligentia, quam amor: quomodo non est Pater, Filius, et alicujus Spiritus; et quare non est Filius, Pater et alicujus Spiritus, et cur non est idem Spiritus, alicujus Pater, et alicujus Filius? sic quippe intelligebatur quod memoria esset Pater, Filius intelligentia, utriusque Spiritus amor.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---Nor yet does any of them need another either for remembering, or for understanding, or for loving. For since each is the supreme essence, each one individually through himself is memory, intelligence and love; and so each one individually through himself remembers, through himself understands, and through himself loves; just as through himself he is.

But in these things I think it is by no means to be negligently committed to memory, what occurs to me as I contemplate. For it is necessary that the Father be understood as memory, the Son as intelligence, the Spirit as love; so that neither the Father needs the Son, or the common Spirit, nor the Son the Father or the same Spirit, nor the same Spirit the Father or the Son; as if the Father through himself could only remember, but understand only through the Son, and love only through his and the Son's Spirit; and the Son through himself could only understand, but through the Father be mindful, and through the Spirit love; and the same Spirit through himself could do no other than love, but the Father be mindful for him, and the Son understand for him. For since in these three, each one individually is the supreme essence and supreme wisdom so perfect, that it itself through itself is mindful and understands, and loves, it is necessary that none of these three need another, either for remembering, or for understanding, or for loving. For each one individually is essentially both memory, and intelligence, and love, and whatever is necessary to be in the supreme essence.

CHAPTER LXI

[al. LIX]. That yet they are not three, but one, whether Father, or Son, or the Spirit of both.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.---However, although the Father is intelligence and love, he is not therefore the Son, or anyone's Spirit; because he is not begotten intelligence, nor love proceeding from anyone. And although the Son is memory and love, he is not therefore the Father, or someone's Spirit; because he is not begetting memory, nor love proceeding from another, like the Spirit. So even if the Spirit is memory and intelligence, he is not therefore Father, or Son, because he is not begetting memory, nor begotten intelligence. One therefore in the supreme essence is the Father, one the Son, one the Spirit: and not three Fathers, nor three Sons; nor three Spirits.

I see a certain question occur here. For if the Father is intelligence and love, as he is memory, and the Son is memory and love, as he is intelligence; and the Spirit of both is no less memory and intelligence, than love: why is he not Father, Son, and someone's Spirit; and why is the Son not Father and someone's Spirit, and why is the same Spirit not someone's Father, and someone's Son? for so it was understood that memory was the Father, intelligence the Son, the Spirit of both love.

Verum haec quaestio non difficile solvitur, si ea quae jam ratione inventa sunt considerentur. Idirco enim non est Pater Filius, aut alicujus Spiritus, licet sit intelligentia et amor; quia non est intelligentia genita, aut amor ab aliquo procedens; sed quidquid est, gignens est tantum, et a quo procedit alius. Filius quoque ideo non est Pater, aut alicujus Spiritus; quamvis seipso et memor sit, et amet; quia non est memoria gignens, aut amor ab alio, ad similitudinem sui Spiritus, procedens; sed quidquid existit, tantum gignitur, et est a quo Spiritus procedit. Spiritum quoque non cogit esse Patrem aut Filium, hoc, quia contentus est memoria aut intelligentia sua, cum non sit memoria gignens, aut intelligentia genita, sed solum, quidquid est, procedat. Quid igitur prohibet concludi quia unus tantum est in summa essentia Pater, unus Filius, unus Spiritus; et non tres Patres, aut Filii, aut Spiritus?

CAPUT LXII

[al. LX]. Quomodo ex his tribus plures filii nasci videantur.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Cum singulus quisque illorum trium se et alios intelligat, ac proinde dicat, videtur quod singulus quisque producat suum Verbum seu Filium: et quod proinde plures sint Filii.

Sed ne forte repugnet huic assertioni quod intueor: nam dubium esse non debet quia Pater, et Filius, et eorum Spiritus, unusquisque seipsum et alios ambos dicit; sicut se, et alios intelligit. Quod si ita est, quomodo non sunt in summa essentia tot verba quot sunt dicentes, et quot sunt qui dicuntur? Si enim plures homines unum aliquid cogitatione dicant, tot ejus videntur esse verba quot sunt cogitantes; quia in singulorum cogitationibus verbum ejus est. Item, si unus homo cogitat aliqua plura, tot verba sunt in mente cogitantis quot sunt res cogitatae. Sed in hominis cogitatione, cum cogitat aliquid quod extra ejus mentem est, non nascitur verbum cogitatae rei ex ipsa re; quia ipsa absens est a cogitationis intuitu, sed ex rei aliqua similitudine vel imagine, quae est in cogitantis memoria, aut forte quae tunc, cum cogitat, per corporeum sensum ex re praesenti in mentem attrahitur. In summa vero essentia sic sibi semper sunt praesentes Pater, et Filius, et eorum Spiritus: est enim, sicut jam perspectum est, unusquisque non minus in aliis quam in seipso; ut cum invicem se dicunt, sic videatur idem ipse, qui dicitur, gignere verbum suum, quemadmodum cum a seipso dicitur. Quomodo ergo nihil gignit Filius, aut ejus Patrisque Spiritus; si unusquisque eorum verbum gignit suum, cum a seipso dicitur vel ab alio? Quot autem verba probari possunt de summa nasci substantia, tot eam necesse est, secundum superiorem considerationem, filios gignere, et tot emittere spiritus.

But this question is not difficultly solved, if those things which have already been found by reason are considered. For therefore the Father is not the Son, or anyone's Spirit, although he be intelligence and love; because he is not begotten intelligence, or love proceeding from anyone; but whatever he is, he is begetting only, and from whom another proceeds. The Son also therefore is not the Father, or anyone's Spirit; although by himself he be both mindful, and love; because he is not begetting memory, or love proceeding from another, according to the likeness of his Spirit; but whatever exists, is only begotten, and is he from whom the Spirit proceeds. Nor does it force the Spirit to be the Father or the Son, this, that he is content with his memory or intelligence, since he is not begetting memory, or begotten intelligence, but only, whatever he is, proceeds. What therefore prohibits it being concluded that there is only one Father in the supreme essence, one Son, one Spirit; and not three Fathers, or Sons, or Spirits?

CHAPTER LXII

[al. LX]. How more sons might seem to be born from these three.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—Since each one of those three understands himself and the other two, and accordingly speaks, it seems that each one produces his own Word or Son: and that accordingly there are many Sons.

But lest perchance what I behold should be repugnant to this assertion: for it ought not to be a doubt that the Father, and the Son, and their Spirit, each one speaks himself and both the others; just as he understands himself and the others. But if it is so, how are there not in the supreme essence as many words as there are speakers, and as many as there are those who are spoken? For if many men speak one thing in thought, there seem to be as many words of it as there are thinkers; because in the thoughts of each one is his word. Likewise, if one man thinks many things, there are as many words in the mind of the thinker as there are things thought. But in the thought of man, when he thinks something that is outside his mind, the word of the thing thought is not born from the thing itself; because it is absent from the intuition of thought, but from some likeness or image of the thing, which is in the memory of the thinker, or perhaps which then, when he thinks, is drawn into the mind from the present thing through the bodily sense. But in the supreme essence the Father, and the Son, and their Spirit are always so present to themselves: for, as has already been seen, each one is no less in the others than in himself; so that when they speak each other in turn, thus the very one who is spoken seems to beget his word, just as when he is spoken by himself. How therefore does the Son beget nothing, or the Spirit of him and the Father; if each one of them begets his word, when he is spoken by himself or by another? However many words can be proved to be born from the supreme substance, so many it is necessary, according to the superior consideration, to beget sons, and to emit so many spirits.

CAPUT LXIII

Quomodo non sit ibi nisi unus unius; hoc est, unum Verbum, et ex solo Patre.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Attamen cum nec plures sint dicentes, nec plura sint quae dicuntur, sed una sit essentia quae intelligit et intelligitur, constat quia neque sunt plures patres, nec plura verba, nec plures filii; sed unus esticens, seu Pater, et unum Verbum, seu unus Filius.

Licet ergo Pater, Verbum, et Spiritus pariter se et ambos alios dicant, unum solum ibi est Verbum, quod nec ullatenus omnium trium, sed duntaxat unius ipsorum, scilicet Patris, Verbum dici potest. Non enim imago aut Filius est suimet, aut a se procedentis Spiritus. Nam nec ex seipso, nec ex procedente a se nascitur; nec seipsum, aut procedentem a se, existendo imitatur. Restat igitur hoc solum Verbum illius solius esse de quo nascendo habet esse, et ad cuius omnimodam similitudinem existit.

Hac itaque ratione videntur in illa esse non solum multi patres, et filii, et procedentes, sed et aliae necessitudines; aut certe Pater, et Filius, et eorum Spiritus, de quibus jam certissimum est quia vere existunt, non sunt tres dicentes, quamvis singulus quisque siticens; nec sunt plura, quae dicuntur, cum unusquisque seipsum, et alios duos dicit. Sicut enim summae sapientiae inest scire et intelligere; ita utique aeternae incommutabilisque scientiae et intelligentiae naturale est, id semper praesens intueri, quod scit et intelligit. Nihil autem aliud est summo spiritui huiusmodi dicere, quam quasi cogitando intueri: sicut nostrae mentis locutio nihil aliud est quam cogitantis inspectio. Certissimum autem jam consideratae rationes reddiderunt, quidquid summae naturae inest essentialiter, id perfecte convenire Patri, et Filio, et eorum Spiritui, singulatim; et tamen idipsum, si simul dicatur de tribus, non admittere pluralitatem. Cum ergo constet quia sicut pertinet ad eius essentiam scientia et intelligentia, sic eius scire et intelligere non est aliud quam dicere, id est semper praesens intueri quod scit et intelligit: necesse est ut quemadmodum singulus Pater, singulus Filius, et singulus eorum Spiritus esticiens et intelligens, et tamen hi tres simul non sunt plures scientes aut intelligentes, sed unusiciens, et unus intelligens; ita singulus quisque siticens; nec tamen sint tres dicentes simul, sed unusicens.

CHAPTER LXIII.

How there is there only one of one; that is, one Word, and from the Father alone.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—Nevertheless, since there are neither many speakers, nor many things which are spoken, but there is one essence which understands and is understood, it is established that there are neither many fathers, nor many words, nor many sons; but there is one speaker, or Father, and one Word, or one Son.

Therefore, although the Father, the Word, and the Spirit equally speak themselves and both the others, there is there only one Word, which in no way can be called the Word of all three, but only of one of them, namely the Father. For he is not the image or Son of himself, or of the Spirit proceeding from himself. For he is born neither from himself, nor from that which proceeds from himself; nor in existing does he imitate himself, or that which proceeds from himself. It remains, therefore, that this Word is of him alone from whom in being born he has being, and to whose complete likeness he exists.

And so by this reasoning there seem to be in it not only many fathers, and sons, and proceeding ones, but also other relationships; or certainly the Father, and the Son, and their Spirit, of whom it is already most certain that they truly exist, are not three speakers, although each one is a speaker; nor are there many things which are spoken, when each one speaks himself and the other two. For as it belongs to the supreme wisdom to know and to understand; so certainly it is natural to eternal and immutable knowledge and understanding always to behold as present that which it knows and understands. But for the supreme spirit to speak in this manner is nothing else than to behold as if by thinking: just as the speech of our mind is nothing else than the inspection of the one who thinks. But the reasons already considered have rendered it most certain that whatever is essentially in the supreme nature, that perfectly fits the Father, and the Son, and their Spirit, individually; and yet that same thing, if it be said of the three together, does not admit plurality. Since therefore it is established that as knowledge and understanding belong to its essence, so its knowing and understanding is nothing else than speaking, that is, always beholding as present what it knows and understands: it is necessary that just as each individual Father, each individual Son, and each individual Spirit of them is knowing and understanding, and yet these three together are not many knowing or understanding ones, but one knowing, and one understanding; so each individual should be a speaker; and yet they should not be three speakers together, but one speaker.

Hinc illud quoque liquide cognosci potest quia, cum hi tres dicuntur, vel a seipsis, vel ab invicem, non sunt plura quae dicuntur. Quid namque ibi dicitur, nisi eorum essentia? Si ergo illa una sola est, unum solum est, quod dicitur: ergo si unum solum est in illis, quod dicit, et unum, quod dicitur; una quippe sapientia est, quae in illis dicit, et una substantia quae dicitur: consequitur non ibi esse plura verba, sed unum. Licet igitur unusquisque seipsum, et omnes invicem se dicant, impossibile tamen est in summa essentia esse verbum aliud praeter illud, de quo jam constat quod sic nascitur ex eo cujus est Verbum, ut et vera ejus dici possit imago, et vere Filius ejus sit. In quo mirum quiddam et inexplicabile video. Ecce enim cum manifestum sit unumquemque, scilicet Patrem, et Filium, et Patris Filiique Spiritum, pariter se et ambos alios dicere, et unum solum ibi esse Verbum; nullatenus tamen ipsum Verbum videtur posse dici Verbum omnium trium, sed tantum unius eorum. Constat enim ipsum esse imaginem et Filium ejus cujus est Verbum: et patet quia nec imago, nec Filius suimet, aut a se procedentis Spiritus congrue dici potest. Nam nec ex seipso, nec ex procedente a se, nascitur: nec seipsum, aut procedentem a se, existendo imitatur. Seipsum quippe non imitatur, nec a se trahit existendi similitudinem; quia imitatio et similitudo non est in uno solo, sed in pluribus; illum vero non imitatur nec ad ejus similitudinem existit, quia iste non habet ab illo esse, sed ille ab isto. Restat igitur hoc solum Verbum illius solius esse, de quo nascendo habet esse, et ad cujus omnimodam similitudinem existit. Unus ergo Pater, non plures patres; unus Filius, non plures filii, unus procedens Spiritus, non plures procedentes spiritus, sunt in summa essentia. Qui cum ita tres sint, ut nunquam Pater sit Filius, aut procedens Spiritus; nec Filius aliquando sit Pater, aut Spiritus procedens; nec unquam Spiritus Patris et Filii sit Pater, aut Filius, et singulus quisque sic sit perfectus, ut nullo indigeat: id tamen quod sunt, sic est unum; ut sicut de singulis pluraliter dici non potest, ita nec tribus simul. Et cum pariter unusquisque seipsum, et omnes invicem se dicant; non tamen sunt ibi plura verba, sed unum: et ipsum non singulorum, aut omnium simul, sed unius tantum.

CAPUT LXIV

[al. LXII]. Quod hoc licet inexplicabile sit, tamen credendum sit.

Hence this also can be clearly known, that when these three are spoken, either by themselves or by each other, they are not many things which are spoken. For what is spoken there, except their essence? If therefore that is one alone, one alone is that which is spoken: therefore if there is only one in them which speaks, and one which is spoken; for it is one wisdom which speaks in them, and one substance which is spoken: it follows that there are not many words there, but one. Therefore, although each one speaks himself, and all speak each other in turn, it is nevertheless impossible that in the supreme essence there should be any other word besides that one, concerning which it is already established that it is so born from him whose Word it is, that it can be called both his true image and truly his Son. In which I see something wonderful and inexplicable. For behold, since it is manifest that each one, namely the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son, equally speaks himself and both the others, and there is only one Word there; nevertheless that Word in no way seems to be able to be called the Word of all three, but only of one of them. For it is established that he is the image and Son of him whose Word he is: and it is clear that he can be appropriately called neither the image nor the Son of himself, or of the Spirit proceeding from himself. For he is born neither from himself, nor from that which proceeds from himself; nor in existing does he imitate himself, or that which proceeds from himself. For he does not imitate himself, nor does he draw the likeness of existing from himself; because imitation and likeness are not in one alone, but in many; but he does not imitate that one nor exist according to his likeness, because the former does not have being from the latter, but the latter from the former. It remains, therefore, that this Word is of him alone from whom in being born he has being, and to whose complete likeness he exists. One Father, therefore, not many fathers; one Son, not many sons; one proceeding Spirit, not many proceeding spirits, are in the supreme essence. These being three in such a way that the Father is never the Son or the proceeding Spirit; nor is the Son ever the Father or the proceeding Spirit; nor is the Spirit of the Father and the Son ever the Father or the Son, and each individual is so perfect that he lacks nothing: yet that which they are is so one; that as it cannot be said plurally of each, so neither of the three together. And although each one equally speaks himself, and all speak each other in turn; nevertheless there are not many words there, but one: and it is not of individuals, or of all together, but of one only.

CHAPTER LXIV

[al. LXII]. That although this be inexplicable, yet it is to be believed.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Hoc certissime sic esse mens humana cognoscat, etiam si penetrare nequeat quomodo sit. Incomprehensibile est quomodo summa sapientia sciat ea quae fecit. Ergo multo minus potest explicari quomodo sciat aut dicat seipsam.

Videtur mihi hujus tam sublimis rei secretum transcendere omnem intellectus aciem humani: et idcirco conatum explicandi qualiter hoc sit, continendum puto. Sufficere namque debere existimo rem incomprehensibilem indaganti, si ad hoc ratiocinando pervenerit ut eam certissime esse cognoscat; etiamsi penetrare nequeat intellectu, quomodo ita sit: nec idcirco minus his adhibendam fidei certitudinem, quae probationibus necessariis, nulla alia repugnante ratione asseruntur; si suae naturalis altitudinis incomprehensibilitate explicari non patiantur. Quid autem tam incomprehensibile, tam ineffabile, quam id quod supra omnia est? Quapropter si ea, quae de summa essentia hactenus disputata sunt, necessariis rationibus sunt asserta, quamvis sic intellectu penetrari non possint, ut et verbis valeant explicari; nullatenus tamen certitudinis eorum nutat soliditas. Nam, si superior consideratio rationabiliter comprehendit incomprehensibile esse, quomodo eadem summa sapientia sciat ea quae fecit, de quibus tam multa nos scire necesse est: quis explicet quomodo sciat aut dicat seipsam, de qua aut nihil, aut vix aliquid ab homine sciri possibile est? Ergo si non eo quod seipsam dicit, generat Pater, et generatur Filius: Generationem ejus quis enarrabit? (Isa. LIII, 8.)

CAPUT LXV.

Quomodo de ineffabili re verum disputatum sit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Hoc autem licet ineffabile sit secundum proprietatem, nihil prohibet verum esse quod hactenus de summa natura disputatum est per aenigmata, imaginem ac similitudinem. Quaecunque nomina, quae de illa natura dicuntur, non tam illius proprietatem innuunt, quam similitudinem: significant enim quod in rebus factis concipimus: nec tamen falsum est quod per verba de ipsa intimatur vel aestimatur. Quod de ipsa cognoscitur, verum est; licet non totum cognoscatur quod ipsa vere est.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—The human mind should know most certainly that this is so, even if it cannot penetrate how it is. It is incomprehensible how the supreme wisdom knows those things which it has made. Therefore much less can it be explained how it knows or speaks itself.

It seems to me that the secret of such a sublime thing transcends every edge of human intellect: and therefore I think that the attempt at explaining how this is should be restrained. For I think it ought to suffice for one investigating an incomprehensible thing, if by reasoning he has arrived at this, that he knows most certainly that it is; even if he cannot penetrate by intellect how it is so: nor for that reason is a less certainty of faith to be applied to these things, which are asserted by necessary proofs, with no other reason repugnant; if by the incomprehensibility of their natural height they do not allow themselves to be explained. But what is so incomprehensible, what so ineffable, as that which is above all things? Wherefore if those things, which have been disputed thus far concerning the supreme essence, are asserted by necessary reasons, although they cannot be so penetrated by intellect that they may also be explained in words; nevertheless the solidity of their certainty in no way wavers. For if the superior consideration has reasonably comprehended that it is incomprehensible how the same supreme wisdom knows those things which it has made, concerning which it is necessary that we know so many things: who shall explain how it knows or speaks itself, concerning which either nothing or scarcely anything is possible to be known by man? Therefore if it is not by this that he speaks himself, that the Father begets and the Son is begotten: Who shall declare his generation? (Isa. LIII, 8.)

CHAPTER LXV.

How the truth has been disputed concerning an ineffable thing.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—But although this be ineffable according to its property, nothing prohibits what has been disputed thus far concerning the supreme nature through enigmas, image, and likeness from being true. Whatever names are said of that nature, do not so much hint at its property as at a likeness: for they signify what we conceive in things made: yet it is not false what is hinted or estimated concerning it through words. What is known concerning it is true; although all that it truly is be not known.

Sed rursum, si ita se ratio ineffabilitatis illius habet, imo quia sic est: quomodo stabit quidquid de illa secundum Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus procedentis habitudinem disputatum est? Nam si vera illud ratione explicitum est, qualiter est illa ineffabilis? Aut si ineffabilis est, quomodo est ita, sicut disputatum est? An quodatenus de illa potuit explicari: et ideo nihil prohibet esse verum quod disputatum est. But because it could not be fully comprehended, for that reason it is ineffable. Sed ad illud quid responderi poterit, quod jam supra in hac ipsa disputatione constitit; quia sic est summa essentia supra et extra omnem aliam naturam, ut si quando de illa dicitur aliquid verbis, quae communia sunt aliis naturis, sensus nullatenus sit communis? Quem enim sensum in omnibus his verbis, quae cogitavi, intellexi nisi communem et usitatum? Si ergo usitatus sensus verborum alienus est ab illa; quidquid ratiocinatus sum, non pertinet ad illam. Quomodo igitur verum est inventum esse aliquid de summa essentia; si quod est inventum, longe diversum est ab illa? Quid ergo? An quodammodo inventum est aliquid de incomprehensibili re; et quodammodo nihil perspectum est de ea? Saepe namque multa dicimus, quae proprie sicut sunt non exprimimus; sed per aliud significamus id quod proprie aut nolumus, aut non possumus depromere, ut cum per aenigmata loquimur. Et saepe videmus aliquid, non proprie quemadmodum res ipsa est; sed per aliquam similitudinem aut imaginem, ut cum vultum alicujus consideramus in speculo. Sic quippe unam eamdemque rem dicimus et non dicimus; videmus et non videmus: dicimus et videmus per aliud; non dicimus et non videmus per suam proprietatem. Hac itaque ratione nihil prohibet et verum esse quod disputatum est hactenus de summa natura; et ipsam tamen nihilominus ineffabilem persistere: si nequaquam illa putetur per essentiae suae proprietatem expressa; sed utcunque per aliud designata. Nam, quaecunque nomina de illa natura dici posse videntur, non tam mihi eam ostendunt per proprietatem quam per aliquam innuunt similitudinem. Etenim cum earumdem vocum significationes cogito, familiarius concipio mente quod in rebus factis conspicio, quam id quod omnem humanum intellectum transcendere intelligo: nam valde minus aliquid, imo longe aliud in mente mea sua significatione constituunt, quam sit illud ad quod intelligendum per hanc tenuem significationem mens ipsa mea conatur proficere.

But again, if the reason of its ineffability is such, or rather because it is so: how shall stand whatever has been disputed concerning it according to the relationship of Father, and Son, and proceeding Spirit? For if it has been explained by true reason, how is it ineffable? Or if it is ineffable, how is it so, as has been disputed? Or could something of it be explained to some extent: and therefore nothing prohibits what has been disputed from being true? But because it could not be fully comprehended, for that reason it is ineffable. But what can be answered to that which already stood above in this very dispute; that the supreme essence is so above and outside every other nature, that if ever anything is said of it in words, which are common to other natures, the sense is in no way common? For what sense in all these words, which I have thought, have I understood except the common and accustomed one? If therefore the accustomed sense of words is foreign to it; whatever I have reasoned does not pertain to it. How therefore is it true that something has been found concerning the supreme essence; if what has been found is far diverse from it? What then? Or has something been found in a certain way concerning an incomprehensible thing; and in a certain way nothing has been perceived concerning it? For often we say many things, which we do not express properly as they are; but through another thing we signify that which properly we either do not wish, or are not able to bring forth, as when we speak through enigmas. And often we see something, not properly as the thing itself is; but through some likeness or image, as when we consider someone's face in a mirror. For so we say and do not say one and the same thing; we see and do not see: we say and see through another thing; we do not say and do not see through its own property. By this reasoning, therefore, nothing prohibits both that what has been disputed thus far concerning the supreme nature be true; and yet that it nevertheless persist in being ineffable: if it be in no way thought to be expressed through the property of its essence; but in some way designated through another thing. For whatever names seem to be able to be said of that nature, do not so much show it to me through its property as they hint at some likeness. For when I think the significations of those same words, I conceive more familiarly in the mind what I behold in things made, than that which I understand transcends all human intellect: for they constitute in my mind something much less, or rather far different by their signification, than is that for the understanding of which my mind itself attempts to advance through this thin signification.

Nam, nec nomen sapientiae mihi sufficit ostendere illud, per quod omnia facta sunt de nihilo, et servantur a nihilo; nec nomen essentiae mihi valet exprimere illud, quod per singularem altitudinem longe est supra omnia, et per naturalem proprietatem valde est extra omnia. Sic ergo illa natura et ineffabilis est; quia per verba, sicuti est nullatenus valet intimari: et falsum non est, si quid de illa, ratione docente, per aliud velut in aenigmate potest aestimari.

CAPUT LXVI

[al. LXIV]. Quod per rationalem mentem maxime accedatur ad cognoscendum summam essentiam.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.--Nihil itaque de illa natura potest percipi per proprietatem, sed per aliud. Ergo tanto altius creatrix essentia cognoscitur, quanto per propinquiorem ipsi creaturam indagatur. Sicut itaque sola mens rationalis ad ejus investigationem assurgere valet, ita eadem sola est, per quam maxime ipsamet ad ejus inventionem proficere queat: quia haec illi propinquat. Unde quanto studiosius mens ad se discendum intendit, tanto efficacius ad illius summae essentiae cognitionem ascendit: et quanto se intueri negligit, tanto a creatricis essentiae speculatione et intuitu descendit.

Cum igitur pateat quia nihil de hac natura possit percipi per suam proprietatem, sed per aliud, certum est quia per illud magis ad ejus cognitionem acceditur, quod illi magis per similitudinem propinquat. Quidquid enim inter creata constat illi esse similius, id necesse est esse natura praestantius. Quapropter id et per majorem similitudinem plus juvat mentem indagantem summae veritati propinquare; et per excellentiorem creatam essentiam plus docet quid de creante mens ipsa debeat aestimare. Procul dubio itaque tanto altius creatrix essentia cognoscitur, quanto per propinquiorem sibi creaturam indagatur. Nam quod omnis essentia, inquantum est, intantum sit similis summae essentiae, ratio jam supra considerata dubitare non permittit. Patet itaque quia sicut sola est mens rationalis inter omnes creaturas, quae ad ejus investigationem assurgere valeat; ita nihilominus eadem sola est, per quam maxime ipsamet ad ejusdem inventionem proficere queat. Nam, jam cognitum est quia haec illi maxime per naturalis essentiae propinquat similitudinem. Quid igitur apertius, quam quia mens rationalis quanto studiosius ad se discendum intendit; tanto efficacius ad illius cognitionem ascendit: et quanto seipsam intuerit negligit, tanto ab ejus speculatione descendit?

For neither does the name of wisdom suffice for me to show that, through which all things were made from nothing, and are preserved from nothing; nor does the name of essence avail for me to express that, which by a singular height is far above all things, and by a natural property is greatly outside all things. Thus therefore that nature is both ineffable; because by words, as it is, it in no way avails to be hinted: and it is not false, if anything concerning it, as reason teaches, can be estimated through another thing as if in an enigma.

CHAPTER LXVI

[al. LXIV]. That the supreme essence is most approached for knowledge through the rational mind.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—Nothing therefore of that nature can be perceived through its property, but through something else. Therefore the creator essence is known so much more deeply, as it is investigated through a creature nearer to it. Therefore, as only the rational mind is able to rise to its investigation, so it alone is that through which it can most advance toward finding it: because this mind is near to it. Whence the more zealously the mind applies itself to learning about itself, the more effectively it ascends to the knowledge of that supreme essence: and the more it neglects to behold itself, the more it descends from the speculation and intuition of the creator essence.

Since therefore it is manifest that nothing of this nature can be perceived through its own property, but through something else, it is certain that its knowledge is approached more through that which is nearer to it by likeness. For whatever among created things is established to be more like it, that must be more excellent in nature. Wherefore both through a greater likeness it helps more the mind investigating the supreme truth to approach it; and through a more excellent created essence it teaches more what the mind itself ought to estimate concerning the creator. Without doubt, therefore, the creator essence is known so much more deeply, as it is investigated through a creature nearer to it. For that every essence, insofar as it is, is so far like the supreme essence, the reason already considered above does not allow one to doubt. It is manifest, therefore, that as only the rational mind is among all creatures that which is able to rise to its investigation; so nevertheless it alone is that through which it can most advance to the finding of the same. For it has already been known that this mind most approaches it through the likeness of natural essence. What therefore is clearer, than that the rational mind, the more zealously it applies itself to learning about itself, the more effectively it ascends to the knowledge of that essence: and the more it neglects to behold itself, the more it descends from its speculation?

CAPUT LXVII

[al. LXV]. Quod mens ipsa speculum ejus, et imago ejus sit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Quoniam sola mens et sui et hujus summae essentiae memor et intelligens et amans esse potest: ideo ea sola vera est imago illius essentiae, quae per sui memoriam, intelligentiam, et amorem, in Trinitate ineffabili consistit. Maxime autem in hoc mens est similis summae essentiae quod possit reminisci, intelligere et amare id quod optimum et maximum est, hoc est, summam essentiam.

Aptissime igitur ipsa sibimet esse velut speculum dici potest, in quo speculetur, ut ita dicam, imaginem ejus quam facie ad faciem videre nequit. Nam, si mens ipsa sola ex omnibus quae facta sunt, sui memor et intelligens et amans esse potest, non video cur negetur esse in illa vera imago illius essentiae, quae per sui memoriam, et intelligentiam, et amorem in Trinitate ineffabili consistit. Aut certe inde verius esse illius se probat imaginem; quia illius potest esse memor, illam intelligere et amare. In quo enim major est et illi similior, in eo verior illius esse imago cognoscitur. Omnino autem cogitari non potest rationali creaturae naturaliter esse datum aliquid tam praecipuum, tamque simile summae sapientiae quam hoc, quia potest reminisci, et intelligere, et amare id quod optimum et maximum est omnium. Nihil igitur aliud est inditum alicui creaturae quod sic praeferat imaginem Creatoris.

CAPUT LXVIII.

Quod rationalis creatura ad amandum illam facta sit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Ergo mens rationalis nihil tantum studere debet, quam hanc imaginem naturaliter sibi impressam, per voluntarium effectum exprimere. Ergo cum praecipuum quod potest, si reminisci et intelligere, et amare summum bonum, id praecipue debet velle: quae enim meliora sunt in potestate, ea magis esse debent in voluntate. Deinde non aliud est esse rationalem, quam posse discernere justum a non justo, verum a non vero, bonum a non bono, magis bonum a minus bono. Frustra autem ista potest nisi quod discernit, amet vel reprobet, secundum verae discretionis iudicium; magis videlicet vel minus amando quod magis vel minus bonum esse judicat. Ergo rationalis creatura ad hoc facta est, ut summam essentiam, quae est summum bonum, amet super omnia bona; imo ut nihil amet nisi illam, quia illa est bona per se, et nihil est bonum nisi per illam.

CHAPTER LXVII

[al. LXV]. That the mind itself is its mirror and its image.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—Since the mind alone can be mindful and understanding and loving of both itself and of this supreme essence: therefore it alone is the true image of that essence, which consists in the ineffable Trinity through the memory, intelligence, and love of itself. But the mind is most like the supreme essence in this, that it can remember, understand, and love that which is best and greatest, that is, the supreme essence.

Most fitly therefore can it be said to be like a mirror to itself, in which it may behold, so to speak, the image of him whom it cannot see face to face. For, if the mind itself alone of all things which have been made can be mindful and understanding and loving of itself, I do not see why it should be denied that there is in it the true image of that essence, which consists in the ineffable Trinity through the memory, and intelligence, and love of itself. Or certainly from this it proves itself to be more truly the image of that one; because it can be mindful of that one, understand that one, and love that one. For in that in which it is greater and more like him, in that it is known to be the more true image of him. But it cannot be thought at all that there has been naturally given to a rational creature anything so excellent, and so like the supreme wisdom as this, that it can remember, and understand, and love that which is best and greatest of all. Nothing else therefore has been implanted in any creature which thus bears the image of the Creator.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

That the rational creature has been made for loving it.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—Therefore the rational mind ought to study nothing so much, as to express this image naturally impressed on it, through voluntary effect. Therefore since the chief thing it can do is to remember and understand and love the supreme good, it ought chiefly to will that: for those things which are better in power, ought to be more in the will. Next, for a rational nature it is nothing else to be rational than to be able to discern the just from the non-just, the true from the non-true, the good from the non-good, the more good from the less good. But in vain it can do these things unless what it discerns, it loves or reprobates, according to the judgment of true discretion; namely by loving more or less what it judges to be more or less good. Therefore the rational creature has been made for this, that it may love the supreme essence, which is the supreme good, above all goods; rather that it may love nothing except it, because it is good through itself, and nothing is good except through it.

Consequi itaque videtur quod rationalis creatura nihil tantum debet studere, quam hanc imaginem sibi per naturalem potentiam impressam, per voluntarium effectum exprimere. Etenim praeter hoc, quod creanti se debet hoc ipsum quod est: hinc quoque, quia nihil tam praecipuum posse, quam reminisci et intelligere et amare summum bonum, cognoscitur, nimirum nihil tam praecipue debere velle convincitur. Quis enim neget quaecunque meliora sunt in potestate, ea magis esse debere in voluntate? Denique rationali naturae non est aliud esse rationalem, quam posse discernere justum a non justo, verum a non vero, bonum a non bono, magis bonum a minus bono: hoc autem posse omnino inutile est illi et supervacuum, nisi quod discernit amet vel reprobet secundum verae discretionis iudicium. Hinc itaque satis patenter videtur omne rationale ad hoc existere, ut sicut ratione discretionis aliquid magis, vel minus bonum sive non bonum iudicat; ita magis aut minus id amet, aut respuat. Nihil igitur apertius quam rationalem creaturam ad hoc esse factam, ut summam essentiam amet super omnia bona, sicut ipsa est summum bonum: imo ut nihil amet nisi illam, aut propter illam; quia illa est bona per se, et nihil aliud est bonum nisi per illam. Amare autem eam nequit, nisi ejus reminisci, et eam studuerit intelligere. Clarum est ergo rationalem creaturam, totum suum posse et velle ad memorandum, et intelligendum, et amandum summum bonum impendere debere, ad quod ipsum esse suum se cognoscit habere.

CAPUT LXIX

[al. LXVII]. Quod anima semper illam amans, aliquando vere beate vivat.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.--At anima humana est rationalis creatura. Ergo ad hoc facta est ut amet summam essentiam, et quidem sine fine. Nefas enim est aestimare quod summa sapientia ad hoc fecerit ut aliquando vel sponte vel violenter hunc amorem amittat. Restat igitur eam esse ad hoc factam, ut sine fine amet summam essentiam. At hoc facere non potest, nisi semper vivat. Sic igitur est facta ut semper vivat, si semper velit facere ad quod facta est. Deinde Deo bono non convenit ut quod fecit esse ad se amandum, id faciat non esse, quandiu vere amaverit; et quod sponte dedit non amanti, ut semper amaret, id auferat vel auferri permittat amanti, ut ex necessitate non amet: cum dubitari non debeat quod ipse omnem naturam se vere amantem amet. Ergo liquet humanae naturae nunquam auferri suam vitam, si semper studeat amare summam vitam. Sed absurdum est ut aliqua natura semper amando illum qui est summe bonus et omnipotens, semper misere vivat.

It seems therefore to follow that the rational creature ought to study nothing so much, as to express this image impressed on it through natural power, through voluntary effect. For besides this, that it owes to its creator this very thing which it is: from this also, because nothing is known to be so preeminent a power as to remember and understand and love the supreme good, certainly it is convinced that it ought to will nothing so preeminently. For who would deny that whatever things are better in power, those ought to be more in the will? Finally for a rational nature it is nothing else to be rational, than to be able to discern the just from the non-just, the true from the non-true, the good from the non-good, the more good from the less good: but to be able to do this is altogether useless to it and superfluous, unless what it discerns it loves or reprobates according to the judgment of true discretion. Hence therefore it seems clearly enough that every rational thing exists for this, that just as by the reason of discretion it judges something more, or less good or not good; so it may love that more or less, or reject it. Nothing therefore is more open than that the rational creature has been made for this, that it may love the supreme essence above all goods, just as it itself is the supreme good: rather that it may love nothing except it, or on account of it; because it is good through itself, and nothing else is good except through it. But it cannot love it, unless it remembers it, and studies to understand it. It clear therefore that the rational creature ought to expend its whole ability and will to remembering, and understanding, and loving the supreme good, for which it knows that it itself has its being.

CHAPTER LXIX

[al. LXVIII]. That the soul, always loving it, at some time lives truly blessedly.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—But the human soul is a rational creature. Therefore it has been made for this, that it may love the supreme essence, and indeed without end. For it is wicked to estimate that the supreme wisdom made it for this, that it should at some time lose this love either voluntarily or by violence. It remains therefore that it has been made for this, to love the supreme essence without end. But it cannot do this unless it lives always. Thus therefore it has been made to live always, if it always wills to do that for which it has been made. Next, it does not befit a good God that he should cause that which he has made to be for loving him, not to be, as long as it has truly loved; and that which he gave freely to one not loving, so that it might always love, he should take away or allow to be taken away from one loving, so that from necessity it may not love: since it ought not to be doubted that he himself loves every nature truly loving him. Therefore it is clear that its life is never taken away from human nature, if it always studies to love the supreme life. But it is absurd that any nature, by always loving him who is supremely good and omnipotent, should always live miserably.

Ergo anima humana, quia rationalis est, ad hoc est facta ut si servet id ad quid facta est, aliquando secura a morte et ab omni molestia beate vivat.

Dubium autem non est animam humanam esse rationalem creaturam: ergo necesse est eam esse factam ad hoc ut amet summam essentiam. Necesse est igitur eam esse factam aut ad hoc, ut sine fine amet; aut ad hoc, ut aliquando vel sponte, vel violenter hunc amorem amittat. Sed nefas est aestimare summam sapientiam ad hoc eam fecisse, ut aliquando tantum bonum, aut contemnat, aut volens tenere aliqua violentia perdat. Restat igitur eam esse ad hoc factam, ut sine fine amet summam essentiam. At hoc facere non potest nisi semper vivat. Sic igitur est facta ut semper vivat, si semper velit facere ad quod facta est. Deinde inconveniens nimis est summe bono, summeque sapienti, et omnipotenti Creatori, ut quod fecit esse ad se amandum, id faciat non esse, quandiu vere amaverit; et quod sponte dedit non amanti, ut semper amaret, id auferat vel auferri permittat amanti, ut ex necessitate non amet; praesertim cum dubitari nullatenus debeat quod ipse omnem naturam se vere amantem amet. Quare manifestum est humanae animae nunquam auferri suam vitam, si semper studeat amare summam vitam. Qualiter ergo vivit? Quid enim magnum est longa vita, nisi sit a molestiarum incursione vere secura? Quisquis enim dum vivit, aut timendo, aut patiendo molestiis subjacet, aut falsa securitate fallitur, quid nisi misere vivit? Si quis autem ab his liber vivit, beate vivit. Sed absurdissimum est ut aliqua natura semper amando illum, qui est summe bonus et omnipotens, semper misere vivat. Liquet igitur humanam animam hujusmodi esse, ut si servet id ad quod est, aliquando vere secura ab ipsa morte et omni alia molestia beate vivat.

CAPUT LXX

[al. LXVIII]. Quod illa se amanti seipsam retribuatur ut aeternae beata sit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Repugnat eum, qui justissimus est, non discernere inter amantem et contemnentem id quod summe amari debet: et eum non amare amantem se, aut nihil prodesse ab eo amari. Ergo repugnat eum nihil retribuere amanti se. At hujus amoris, quo rationalis creatura aliis eminet, nihil potest esse praemium nisi quod supereminet in omnibus naturis: bonus enim quod sic se amari exigit, non minus se desiderari cogit. Nihil ergo summa bonitas retribuere potest amanti ac desideranti se, nisi seipsam.

Therefore the human soul, because it is rational, has been made for this, that if it preserves that for which it was made, it may at some time live blessedly, secure from death and from all trouble.

But there is no doubt that the human soul is a rational creature: therefore it is necessary that it be made for this, that it may love the supreme essence. It is necessary therefore that it be made either for this, that it may love without end; or for this, that at some time either voluntarily or by violence it may lose this love. But it is wicked to estimate that the supreme wisdom made it for this, that it should at some time either despise so great a good, or lose it by some violence while wishing to hold it. It remains therefore that it has been made for this, to love the supreme essence without end. But it cannot do this unless it lives always. Thus therefore it has been made to live always, if it always wills to do that for which it has been made. Next, it is far too inconvenient for the supremely good, and supremely wise, and omnipotent Creator, that he should cause that which he has made to be for loving him, not to be, as long as it has truly loved; and that which he gave freely to one not loving, so that it might always love, he should take away or allow to be taken away from one loving, so that from necessity it may not love; especially since it ought in no way to be doubted that he himself loves every nature truly loving him. Wherefore it is manifest that its life is never taken away from the human soul, if it always studies to love the supreme life. How then will it live? For what is great about a long life, unless it be truly secure from the incursion of troubles? For whoever while he lives, either by fearing or by suffering is subject to troubles, or is deceived by a false security, what does he do but live miserably? But if anyone lives free from these, he lives blessedly. But it is most absurd that any nature, by always loving him who is supremely good and omnipotent, should always live miserably. It is clear therefore that the human soul is of such a kind, that if it preserves that for which it is, it may at some time live blessedly, truly secure from death itself and every other trouble.

CHAPTER LXX

[al. LXVIII]. That it rewards itself to the one loving it, so that it may be eternally blessed.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—It is repugnant that he, who is most just, should not discern between the one loving and the one contemning that which ought to be supremely loved; and that he should not love the one loving him, or that it should be of no profit to be loved by him. Therefore it is repugnant that he should reward nothing to the one loving him. But of this love, by which the rational creature excels others, nothing can be the reward except what super-excels in all natures: for the good which thus requires itself to be loved, no less compels itself to be desired. Therefore the supreme goodness can reward nothing to the one loving and desiring it, except itself.

Si enim vult amari ut aliud retribuat, non vult amari propter se, sed propter aliud; et ita non se, sed aliud vult amari. Constat ergo quia is qui illam, ut debet, desideraverit, summa perfruetur beatitudine; et quod illam nunquam amittet, quia nec illam poterit non amare, nec illa amantem se poterit deserere. Ergo aeternae beata erit.

Denique nullatenus verum videri potest, ut iustissimus et potentissimus nihil retribuat amanti se perseveranter; cui non amanti tribuit essentiam, ut amans esse posset. Si enim nihil retribuit amanti, non discernit iustissimus inter amantem, et contemnentem id quod summe amari debet, nec amat amantem se, aut non prodest ab illo amari: quae omnia ab illo dissonant: retribuit igitur omni se amare perseveranti. Quid autem retribuit? Si nihilo dedit rationalem essentiam ut amans esset, quid dabit amanti, si amare non cesset? Si tam grande est quod amori famulatur, quam grande est quod amori recompensatur? Et si tale est amoris fulcimentum, quale est amoris emolumentum? Nam, si rationalis creatura, quae sibi inutilis est sine hoc amore, si eminet in omnibus creaturis: utique nihil potest esse praemium huius amoris, nisi quod supereminet in omnibus naturis. Etenim ipsum idem bonum, quod sic se amari exigit, non minus se ab amante desiderari cogit. Nam quis sic amet iustitiam, veritatem, beatitudinem, incorruptibilitatem ut his frui non appetat? Quid ergo summa bonitas retribuet amanti et desideranti se nisi seipsam? Nam quidquid aliud tribuat, non retribuit; quia nec compensatur amori, nec consolatur amantem, nec satiat desiderantem. Aut si se vult amari et desiderari, ut aliud retribuat, non se vult amari et desiderari propter se, sed propter aliud; et sic non vult se amari, sed aliud: quod cogitare nefas est. Nihil ergo verius quam quod omnis anima rationalis, si, quemadmodum debet, studeat amando desiderare summam beatitudinem, aliquando illam ad fruendum percipiat, ut quod nunc videt quasi per speculum et in aenigmate tunc videat facie ad faciem. Utrum autem ea sine fine fruatur, dubitare stultissimum est; quoniam illa fruens nec timore torqueri poterit, nec fallaci securitate decipi, nec ejus indigentiam jam experta; illam poterit non amare; nec illa deseret amantem se, nec aliquid erit potentius, quod eas separet invitas. Quare quaecunque anima summa beatitudine semel frui coeperit, aeternae beata erit.

For if it wills to be loved so that it may reward something else, it does not will to be loved for its own sake, but for the sake of something else; and thus it wills not itself, but something else to be loved. It is established therefore that he who shall have desired it as he ought, shall enjoy the supreme blessedness; and that he will never lose it, because neither will he be able not to love it, nor will it be able to desert the one loving it. Therefore it will be eternally blessed.

Finally, it can in no way seem true that the most just and most powerful one should reward nothing to the one loving him perseveringly; to whom while not loving he granted essence, so that it might be able to be loving. For if he rewards nothing to the one loving, the most just does not discern between the one loving and the one contemning that which ought to be supremely loved, nor does he love the one loving him, or it is not profitable to be loved by him: all of which are discordant from him: therefore he rewards everyone persevering in loving him. But what does he reward? If he gave rational essence to nothingness so that it might be loving, what will he give to the lover, if it does not cease to love? If that which serves love is so great, how great is that which is recompensed to love? And if such is the support of love, what is the profit of love? For if the rational creature, which is useless to itself without this love, excels in all creatures: certainly nothing can be the reward of this love except what super-excels in all natures. For the very same good, which thus requires itself to be loved, no less compels itself to be desired by the lover. For who so loves justice, truth, blessedness, incorruptibility that he does not yearn to enjoy these? What then will the supreme goodness reward to the one loving and desiring it except itself? For whatever else it may grant, it does not reward; because it is neither recompensed to love, nor consoles the lover, nor satisfies the one desiring. Or if it wills itself to be loved and desired so that it may reward something else, it does not will itself to be loved and desired for its own sake, but for the sake of something else; and thus it does not will itself to be loved, but something else: which it is wicked to think. Nothing therefore is truer than that every rational soul, if, as it ought, it studies by loving to desire the supreme blessedness, at some time perceives it for enjoyment, so that what it now sees as "through a mirror" and "in an enigma" it may then see "face to face". But whether it enjoys it without end, it is most foolish to doubt; since while enjoying it, it can neither be tortured by fear, nor deceived by false security, nor having already experienced its need; it will be able not to love it; nor will it desert the one loving it, nor will there be anything more powerful, which may separate them against their will. Wherefore whatever soul shall have once begun to enjoy the supreme blessedness, will be eternally blessed.

CAPUT LXXI.

Quod illam contemnens, aeternae misera sit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Econtrario qui summi boni amorem contemnet, aeternae miser erit: nam vel desinet esse, vel in aeterna erit miseria. Non sufficit autem ad poenam, quod non sit; esset enim post culpam id quod ante culpam fuit; et sic iustitia non discerneret inter id quod nullum bonum potest, et nullum malum vult, et id quod maximum bonum potest, et maximum malum vult. In aeterna ergo erit miseria, si summam essentiam amare contemnat.

Hinc utique consequenter colligitur, quod illa, quae summi boni amorem contemnit, aeternam miseriam incurret. Nam si dicitur quod pro tali contemptu sic iustius puniatur, ut ipsum esse, vel vitam perdat; quia se non utitur ad id ad quod est facta; nullatenus hoc admittit ratio, ut, post tantam culpam, pro poena recipiat esse quod erat ante omnem culpam. Quippe antequam esset, nec culpam habere, nec poenam sentire poterat. Si ergo anima contemnens id ad quod facta est, sic moritur, ut nihil sentiat, aut ut omnino nihil sit; similiter se habebit, et in maxima culpa, et sine omni culpa; nec discernet summe sapiens iustitia inter id quod nullum bonum potest, et nullum malum vult; et id quod maximum bonum potest, et maximum malum vult. At hoc satis patet quam inconveniens sit. Nihil igitur videri potest consequentius, et nihil credi debet certius, quam hominis animam sic esse factam, ut si contemnat amare summam essentiam, aeternam patiatur miseriam: ut sicut amans aeterno gaudebit praemio, ita contemnens aeterna poena doleat: et sicut illa sentiet immutabilem sufficientiam, ita ista sentiat inconsolabilem indigentiam.

CAPUT LXXII.

Quod omnis anima humana sit immortalis. Et quod aut semper misera, aut aliquando vere beata sit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Verum nec aeternae beata, nec aeternae misera esset anima, si esset mortalis. Ergo immortalis est. Omnes autem animae sunt ejusdem naturae: ergo omnes sunt immortales, cum saltem aliquae immortales sint. Porro omne quod vivit, aut nunquam, aut aliquando erit vere securum ab omni molestia: ergo omnis anima humana aut semper misera erit, aut erit aliquando vere beata.

CHAPTER LXXI.

That the one contemning it is eternally miserable.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—On the contrary, he who shall condemn the love of the supreme good will be eternally miserable: for he will either cease to be, or he will be in eternal misery. But it does not suffice for punishment that he should not be; for he would be after the fault that which he was before the fault; and thus justice would not discern between that which can do no good and wills no evil, and that which can do the greatest good and wills the greatest evil. Therefore he will be in eternal misery, if he contemns loving the supreme essence.

Hence it is consequently gathered that it, which contemns the love of the supreme good, will incur eternal misery. For if it is said that for such contempt it is more justly punished, so that it loses its very being or life; because it does not use itself for that for which it was made; reason in no way admits this, that after so great a fault, it should receive for punishment to be what it was before all fault. Certainly before it was, it could neither have fault nor feel punishment. If therefore the soul contemning that for which it was made, so dies that it feels nothing, or that it is absolutely nothing; it will have itself similarly both in the greatest fault and without any fault; nor will the supremely wise justice discern between that which can do no good and wills no evil, and that which can do the greatest good and wills the greatest evil. But it is sufficiently clear how inconvenient this is. Nothing therefore can seem more consequential, and nothing ought to be believed more certain, than that the soul of man is so made, that if it contemns loving the supreme essence, it suffers eternal misery: so that just as the lover will rejoice in an eternal reward, so the contemner may grieve in eternal punishment: and just as that one will feel immutable sufficiency, so this one may feel inconsolable indigence.

CHAPTER LXXII.

That every human soul is immortal. And that it is either always miserable, or sometime truly blessed.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—But neither eternally blessed, nor eternally miserable would the soul be, if it were mortal. Therefore it is immortal. But all souls are of the same nature: therefore all are immortal, since at least some are immortal. Furthermore everything which lives, either never, or sometime will be truly secure from every annoyance: therefore every human soul will either be always miserable, or will sometime be truly blessed.

Sed nec amantem animam necesse est aeternae beatam esse; nec contemnentem, miseram, si sit mortalis. Sive igitur amet, sive contemnat id ad quod amandum creata est, necesse est eam immortalem esse. Si autem aliquae sunt animae rationales, quae nec amantes, nec contemnentes judicandae sint, sicut esse videntur animae infantum, quid de his sentiendum est? Sunt mortales, an immortales? Sed procul dubio omnes humanae animae ejusdem naturae sunt. Quare, quoniam constat quasdam esse immortales, necesse est omnem humanam animam esse immortalem. Verum, cum omne quod vivit aut nunquam, aut aliquando sit vere securum ab omni molestia; nihilominus est necesse omnem humanam animam aut semper miseram esse, aut aliquando vere beatam.

CAPUT LXXIII

[al. LXXI]. Quod nulla anima injuste privetur summo bono, et quod omnino ad ipsum sit nitendum.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Quae autem sint animae sic amantes, ut aliquando beatae; aut sic contemnentes, ut aliquando miserae futurae sint, comprehendi non potest ab homine. Sufficiat quod summe justus neminem injuste privet summo bono. Ad illud itaque omni homini toto corde, tota anima, tota mente amando et desiderando nitendum est.

Quae vero animae incunctanter judicandae sint, sic amantes id, ad quod amandum factae sunt, ut illo quandoque frui; quae autem sic contemnentes, ut illo semper indigere mereantur, aut qualiter, quove merito illae, quae nec amantes nec contemnentes dici posse videntur, ad beatitudinem aeternam miseriamve distribuantur, aliquem mortalium disputando posse comprehendere, procul dubio vel difficillimum vel impossibile existimo. Quod tamen a summe justo summeque bono Creatore rerum nulla eo bono, ad quod facta est, injuste privetur, certissime est tenendum; et ad idem ipsum bonum est omni homini toto corde, tota anima, tota mente amando et desiderando nitendum.

CAPUT LXXIV

[al. LXXII]. Quod summa essentia sit speranda.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Ad illud vero tendere nemo potest, si ad illud se posse pervenire desperet. Ergo praeter amorem necessaria est spes

Sed in hac intentione humana anima nullatenus se poterit exercere, si desperet quod intendit se posse pervenire. Quapropter quantum illi est utile studium adnitendi, tantum necessaria est spes pertingendi.

But neither is it necessary for a loving soul to be eternally blessed; nor a contemning one, miserable, if it be mortal. Whether therefore it loves, or whether it contemns that which it was created for loving, it is necessary for it to be immortal. If however there are some rational souls, which are to be judged neither loving, nor contemning, as the souls of infants seem to be, what is to be thought of these? Are they mortal, or immortal? But without doubt all human souls are of the same nature. Wherefore, since it is established that some are immortal, it is necessary that every human soul is immortal. Truly, since everything which lives is either never, or sometime truly secure from every annoyance; nonetheless it is necessary that every human soul is either always miserable, or sometime truly blessed.

CHAPTER LXXIII

[al. LXXI]. That no soul is unjustly deprived of the supreme good, and that it is altogether to be striven for it.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—But which are the souls so loving, that they will be at some time blessed; or so contemning, that they will be at some time miserable, cannot be comprehended by man. Let it suffice that the supremely just deprives no one unjustly of the supreme good. For that, therefore, every man must strive by loving and desiring it with all his heart, all his soul, all his mind.

Truly, which souls are to be judged without hesitation as so loving that for which they were made, that they are some day to enjoy it; and which are so contemning it, that they deserve to be always in need of it; or in what way, or by what merit those which seem able to be called neither loving nor contemning are distributed to eternal blessedness or misery, I think it is without doubt either most difficult or impossible for any mortal to be able to comprehend by disputing. That, however, no soul is unjustly deprived of that good for which it was made by the supremely just and supremely good Creator of things, must be held most certainly; and for that same good every man must strive by loving and desiring it with all his heart, all his soul, all his mind.

CHAPTER LXXIV

[al. LXXII]. That the supreme essence is to be hoped for.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—But no one can tend to that, if he despairs that he can arrive at it. Therefore besides love, hope is necessary.

But in this intention the human soul can in no way exercise itself, if it despairs that it can arrive where it intends. Wherefore as much as the study of striving is useful to it, so much is the hope of reaching necessary.

CAPUT LXXV.

Quod credendum sit in illam, hoc est, credendo tendendum in illam.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Amare autem aut sperare non potest, quod non credit. Ergo et fides necessaria est qua non modo summam essentiam et ea sine quibus amari non potest, credat; sed qua credendo tendat in illam. In illam enim credere est credendo tendere in illam. Ergo non credit in illam qui, per hoc quod credit, non ad illam tendit. Qui vero credendo in illam tendit, ad illam sic perveniet ut intra illam permansurus sit. Unde aptius dicitur credendum et tendendum esse in illam, quam credendum aut tendendum esse ad illam.

Amare autem, aut sperare non potest quod non credit. Expedit itaque eidem humanae animae summam essentiam, et ea sine quibus illa amari non potest, credere, ut illam credendo, tendat in illam. Quod idem apte breviusque significari posse puto, si pro eo quod est credendo tendere in summam essentiam, dicatur credere in summam essentiam. Nam, si quis dicat se credere in illam, satis videtur ostendere, et per fidem quam profitetur, ad summam se tendere essentiam, et illa se credere, quae ad hanc pertinent intentionem: nam, non videtur credere in illam, sive qui credit quod ad tendendum in illam non pertinet, sive qui per hoc quod credit, non ad illam tendit. Et fortasse indifferenter dici potest, credere in illam, et ad illam: sicut pro eodem accipi potest credendo tendere in illam et ad illam, nisi quia quisquis tendendo ad illam pervenerit, non extra illam remanebit, sed intra illam permanebit. Quod expressius et familiarius significatur, si dicitur tendendum esse in illam, quam si dicitur ad illam. Hac itaque ratione puto congruentius posse dici credendum esse in illam quam ad illam.

CAPUT LXXVI

[al. LXXIV]. Quod in Patrem, et Filium, et eorum Spiritum pariter et in singulos, et simul in tres credendum sit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Sic credendum est, quia ipsi tres et singulus eorum est una summa essentia; in quam solam omnis homo debet credere, sicut haec sola est unicus finis quem in omni cogitatu, actuque suo homo per amorem debet intendere. Quemadmodum autem in illam tendere, nisi credat illam, nullus potest, ita illam credere, nisi tendat in illam, nulli prodest.

CHAPTER LXXV.

That it is to be believed in it, that is, by believing to tend into it.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—But it cannot love or hope for what it does not believe. Therefore faith also is necessary by which it may not only believe the supreme essence and those things without which it cannot be loved; but by which by believing it may tend into it. For to believe in it is by believing to tend into it. Therefore he does not believe in it who, through that which he believes, does not tend to it. Truly he who by believing tends into it, will so arrive at it that he is to remain within it. Whence it is more aptly said that it is to be believed and tended into it, than to be believed or tended to it.

But it cannot love, or hope for what it does not believe. It is expedient therefore for the same human soul to believe the supreme essence, and those things without which it cannot be loved, so that by believing it, it may tend into it. Which same thing I think can be signify aptly and more briefly, if instead of that which is to tend by believing into the supreme essence, it be said to believe in the supreme essence. For if anyone says that he believes in it, he seems to show sufficiently, both through the faith which he professes, that he tends to the supreme essence, and that he believes those things which pertain to this intention: for he does not seem to believe in it, whether he who believes that which does not pertain to tending into it, or he who through that which he believes, does not tend to it. And perhaps it can be said indifferently, to believe in it, and to it: just as for the same thing can be taken to tend by believing into it and to it, except because whoever shall have arrived by tending to it, will not remain outside it, but will remain within it. Which is signified more expressly and familiarly if it is said that it is to be tended into it, than if it is said to it. By this reason therefore I think it can be said more congruously that it is to be believed in it than to it.

CHAPTER LXXVI

[al. LXXIV]. That it is to be believed in the Father, and the Son, and their Spirit equally both in each, and together in the three.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—So it is to be believed, because those three and each of them is one supreme essence; in which alone every man ought to believe, just as this alone is the unique end which in every thought and act of his man ought to intend through love. However, just as no one can tend into it unless he believes it, so to believe it profits no one unless he tends into it.

Credendum igitur est pariter in Patrem, et Filium, et eorum Spiritum, et in singulos, et simul in tres; quia et singulus Pater, et singulus Filius, et singulus eorum Spiritus est summa essentia: et simul Pater, et Filius, cum suo Spiritu sunt una eademque summa essentia, in quam solam omnis homo debet credere; quia est solus finis, quem in omni cogitatu actuque solo per amorem debet intendere. Unde manifestum est quia sicut in illam tendere, nisi credat illam, nullus potest; ita illam credere, nisi tendat in illam, nulli prodest.

CAPUT LXXVII

[*al. LXXV*]. *Quae sit viva, quae mortua fides.*

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Ergo fides sine dilectione inutilis est, et quasi mortuum aliquid. Fides vero cum dilectione non est otiosa: nam quod summam justitiam diligit, nihil justum contemnere, nihil valet injustum admittere. Ergo et operosa fides vivit, quia habet vitam dilectionis sine qua non operaretur; et otiosa fides non vivit, quia caret vita dilectionis, cum qua non otiaretur. Ideo autem fides mortua dicitur quia non habet vitam, quam semper habere debet. Porro viva fides ea dicitur quae credit in id, in quod credi debet; mortua vero fides, ea quae credit tantum id, quod credi debet

Quapropter quantacunque certitudine credatur tanta res, inutilis erit fides, et quasi mortuum aliquid, nisi dilectione valeat et vivat. Etenim nullatenus fidem illam, quam competens comitatur dilectio, si se opportunitas offerat operandi, otiosam esse, sed magis se quadam operum exercere frequentia, quod sine dilectione facere non posset, vel hoc solo probari potest; quia quod summam justitiam diligit, nihil justum contemnere, nihil valet injustum admittere. Ergo, quoniam quod aliquid operatur, inesse sibi vitam, sine qua operari non valeret, ostendit: non absurde dicitur et operosa fides vivere, quia habet vitam dilectionis sine qua non operaretur, et otiosa fides non vivere, qui caret vita dilectionis, cum qua non otiaretur. Quare, si caecus dicitur, non tantum qui perdidit visum; sed qui cum debet habere, non habet: cur non similiter potest dici fides sine dilectione, mortua; non quia vitam suam, id est, dilectionem perdiderit; sed quia non habet quam semper habere debet? Quemadmodum igitur illa fides, quae per dilectionem operatur, viva esse cognoscitur; ita illa, quae per contemptum otiatur, mortua esse convincitur. Satis itaque convenienter dici potest viva fides credere in id, in quod credi debet; mortua vero fides credere tantum id, quod credi debet.

It is to be believed therefore equally in the Father, and the Son, and their Spirit, and in each, and together in the three; because both the Father individually, and the Son individually, and their Spirit individually is the supreme essence: and together the Father and the Son, with their Spirit, are one and the same supreme essence, in which alone every man ought to believe; because it is the only end, which in every thought and act alone he ought to intend through love. Whence it is manifest that just as no one can tend into it unless he believes it, so to believe it profits no one unless he tends into it.

CHAPTER LXXVII

[al. LXXV]. What is living, what is dead faith.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—Therefore faith without love is useless, and as it were something dead. But faith with love is not idle: for that which loves supreme justice can condemn nothing just, can admit nothing unjust. Therefore also active faith lives, because it has the life of love without which it would not work; and idle faith does not live, because it lacks the life of love, with which it would not be idle. Moreover faith is called dead because it does not have the life which it ought always to have. Furthermore living faith is called that which believes in that which ought to be believed; but dead faith is that which only believes that which ought to be believed.

Wherefore with whatever certainty so great a thing may be believed, faith will be useless, and as it were something dead, unless it prevails and lives by love. For that faith which a competent love accompanies can in no way be idle if the opportunity of working offers itself, but rather exercises itself in a certain frequency of works, which it could not do without love, or this alone can be proven; because that which loves supreme justice can condemn nothing just, can admit nothing unjust. Therefore, since that which works something shows that life is in it, without which it would not be able to work: it is not absurdly said both that active faith lives, because it has the life of love without which it would not work, and that idle faith does not live, which lacks the life of love, with which it would not be idle. Wherefore, if a man is called blind, not only who has lost sight, but who does not have it when he ought to have it: why can it not similarly be said that faith without love is dead; not because it has lost its life, that is, love; but because it does not have that which it ought always to have? Just as therefore that faith which works through love is known to be living; so that which is idle through contempt is convicted to be dead. It can therefore sufficiently conveniently be said that living faith believes in that in which it ought to be believed; but dead faith only believes that which ought to be believed.

CAPUT LXXVIII

[al. LXXVI]. Quod tres summa essentia quodammodo dici possit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.---Omni homini expedit ut credat in trinam unitatem, et unam Trinitatem; unam propter essentiam; trinam, propter tres nescio quid. Dici enim non potest quid sint tres personae, quo ipsae plures fiant. Nec enim sunt tot substantiae, quot personae, ut in hominibus, qui quot personae, tot individuae sunt substantiae. Itaque in summa essentia sicut non sunt plures substantiae, ita nec plures personae. Sola ergo indigentia nominis, quo pluralitas in essentia una significetur, dicitur esse tres personas sive substantias in una summa essentia seu natura. Individua maxime substant accidentibus: unde magis proprie nomen substantiae suscipiunt: et ita summa essentia, quae nullis subest accidentibus, non potest proprie dici substantia, nisi substantia ponatur pro essentia. Hac ratione irreprehensibiliter illa summa et una Trinitas dici potest una essentia, et tres personae, sive tres substantiae.

Ecce patet omni homini expedire ut credat in quamdam ineffabilem trinam unitatem, et unam Trinitatem: unam quidem et unitatem, propter unam essentiam; trinam vero et trinitatem, propter tres, nescio quid. Licet enim possim dicere Trinitatem, propter Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque Spiritum, qui sunt tres; non tamen possum proferre uno nomine, propter quid tres; velut si dicerem propter tres personas; sicut dicerem unitatem, propter unam substantiam. Non enim putandae sunt tres personae; quia omnes plures personae sic subsistunt separatim ab invicem, ut tot necesse sit esse substantias, quot sunt personae: quod in pluribus hominibus, qui quot personae, tot individuae sunt substantiae, cognoscitur. Quare in summa essentia, sicut non sunt plures substantiae; ita nec plures personae. Si quis itaque inde velit alicui loqui quid tres, dicet esse Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque Spiritum, nisi forte indigentia nominis proprie convenientis coactus elegerit, aliquod ex illis nominibus, quae pluraliter in summa essentia dici non possunt ad significandum id quod congruo nomine dici non potest: ut si dicat illam admirabilem Trinitatem esse unam essentiam, vel naturam; et tres personas, sive substantias.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

[al. LXXVI]. That the three can be called in some way the supreme essence.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—It is expedient for every man that he believe in the triune unity, and the one Trinity; one because of the essence; triune, because of three I know not what. For it cannot be said what the three persons are, by which they become more than one. For there are not as many substances as there are persons, as in men, who as many as are the persons, so many are the individual substances. Therefore in the supreme essence, just as there are not more substances, so neither are there more persons. Only the need of a name, by which plurality in one essence may be signified, causes it to be said that there are three persons or substances in one supreme essence or nature. Individuals especially subsist in accidents: whence they more properly receive the name of substance: and thus the supreme essence, which is subject to no accidents, cannot properly be called substance, unless substance is put for essence. By this reason that supreme and one Trinity can be called without reproach one essence, and three persons, or three substances.

Behold it is clear that it is expedient for every man to believe in a certain ineffable triune unity, and one Trinity: one indeed and unity, because of one essence; triune indeed and trinity, because of three, I know not what. For although I can say Trinity, because of the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit of both, who are three; yet I cannot utter in one name, for what they are three; as if I were to say because of three persons; just as I would say unity, because of one substance. For three persons are not to be thought; because all several persons so subsist separately from each other, that it is necessary that there be as many substances as there are persons: which is known in several men, who as many as are the persons, so many are the individual substances. Wherefore in the supreme essence, just as there are not more substances; so neither are there more persons. If anyone therefore wishes to speak to someone thence as to what the three are, he will say that they are the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit of both, unless perhaps compelled by the need of a properly convenient name he should choose some of those names, which cannot be said plurally in the supreme essence to signify that which cannot be said by a congruous name: as if he were to say that that admirable Trinity is one essence, or nature; and three persons, or substances.

Nam haec duo nomina aptius eliguntur ad significandam pluralitatem in summa essentia, quia persona non dicitur, nisi de individua rationali natura; et substantia principaliter dicitur de individuis, quae maxime in pluralitate subsistunt. Individua namque maxime substant, id est, subjacent accidentibus: et ideo magis proprie nomen substantiae suscipiunt. Unde jam supra manifestum est summam essentiam, quae nullis subjacet accidentibus, proprie non posse dici substantiam; nisi substantia ponatur pro essentia. Potest ergo hac necessitatis ratione irreprehensibiliter illa summa et una Trinitas, sive trina unitas, dici una essentia, et tres personae, sive tres substantiae.

CAPUT LXXIX.

Quod ipsa sit Deus, qui solus omnibus dominatur et omnia regit.

CONSPECTUS CAPITIS.--Huic soli summae essentiae, quae omnibus dominatur et omnia regit, proprie nomen Dei assignatur. Dei enim nomine non intelligitur nisi substantia quae est supra omnem naturam ab hominibus veneranda propter dignitatem, et exoranda propter imminentem quamlibet necessitatem. Sicut autem a summe bono, summeque sapiente Spiritu facta sunt omnia; ita ipse omnibus dominatur, et omnia regit. Ergo not ab alio, nec casu cuncta reguntur. Is ergo solus est quem omnis alia natura debet diligendo venerari, de quo solo prospera sunt speranda, ad quem solum ab adversis est fugiendum, cui soli pro quavis re supplicandum. Hic ergo solus vere est et dicitur Deus, ineffably trinus et unus.

Videtur ergo, imo incunctanter asseritur quia nec nihil est id quod dicitur Deus; et huic soli summae essentiae proprie nomen Dei assignatur. Quippe omnis qui Deum esse dicit, sive unum sive plures, non intelligit nisi aliquam substantiam, quam censet supra omnem naturam, quae Deus non est, ab hominibus et venerandam, propter ejus eminentem dignitatem, et exoranda sibi propter quamlibet imminentem necessitatem. Quid autem tam pro sua dignitate venerandum et pro qualibet re deprecandum, quam summe bonus et summe potens Spiritus, qui dominatur omnibus et regit omnia? Sicut enim constat quia omnia per summe bonam, summeque sapientem omnipotentiam ejus facta sunt et vigent, ita nimis inconueniens est, si aestimetur quod rebus a se factis ipse non dominetur; sive quod factae ab illo, ab alio minus potente, minusve bono, vel sapiente; aut nulla penitus ratione, sed sola casuum inordinata volubilitate regnantur: cum ille solus sit, per quem cuilibet, et sine quo nulli bene est, et ex quo, et per quem, et in quo sunt omnia.

For these two names are chosen more aptly to signify plurality in the supreme essence, because person is not said, except of an individual rational nature; and substance is principally said of individuals, which especially subsist in plurality. For individuals especially "substantiate" (substant), that is, are subject to accidents: and therefore they more properly receive the name of substance. Whence it is already manifest from above that the supreme essence, which is subject to no accidents, cannot properly be called substance; unless substance is put for essence. By this reason of necessity, therefore, that supreme and one Trinity, or triune unity, can be called without reproach one essence, and three persons, or three substances.

CHAPTER LXXIX.

That it itself is God, who alone rules over all and governs all things.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW.—To this supreme essence alone, which rules over all and governs all things, the name of God is properly assigned. For by the name of God is understood nothing but a substance which is above every nature, to be venerated by men because of its dignity, and to be entreated because of any imminent necessity. Moreover, just as all things were made by the supremely good, supremely wise Spirit; so he himself rules over all, and governs all things. Therefore not by another, nor by chance are all things governed. He therefore is the only one whom every other nature ought by loving to venerate, from whom alone prosperous things are to be hoped for, to whom alone one must flee from adversities, to whom alone one must supplicate for any thing. This one therefore alone truly is and is called God, ineffably triune and one.

It seems therefore, nay it is asserted without hesitation, that that which is called God is not nothing; and to this supreme essence alone is the name of God properly assigned. For everyone who says that God exists, whether one or several, understands nothing but some substance, which he considers above every nature that is not God, both to be venerated by men because of its eminent dignity, and to be entreated for any imminent necessity. What, however, is so to be venerated for its dignity and to be deprecated for any thing, as the supremely good and supremely powerful Spirit, who rules over all and governs all things? For as it is established that all things have been made and flourish through his supremely good and supremely wise omnipotence, so it is too inconvenient if it be estimated that he himself does not rule over the things made by himself; or that those made by him are governed by another less powerful, or less good or wise; or by no reason at all, but by the disordered volatility of chances alone: since he alone is, through whom it is well for anyone, and without whom it is well for no one, and "from whom, and through whom, and in whom are all things".

Cum igitur solus sit ipse, non solum bonus Creator, sed et potentissimus Dominus et sapientissimus rector omnium: liquidissimum est hunc solum esse, quem omnis alia natura, secundum totum suum posse, debet diligendo venerari, et venerando diligere; de quo solo prospera sunt speranda, ad quem solum ab adversis fugiendum, cui soli pro quavis re supplicandum. Vere igitur hic est non solum Deus, sed solus Deus, ineffabiliter trinus et unus .

Since therefore he himself alone is not only the good Creator, but also the most powerful Lord and wisest governor of all: it is most clear that this is the only one whom every other nature, according to all its power, ought by loving to venerate, and by venerating to love; from whom alone prosperous things are to be hoped for, to whom alone one must flee from adversities, to whom alone one must supplicate for any thing. Truly therefore this is not only God, but the only God, ineffably triune and one.