SAINT ALBERT THE GREAT

On the Predicables

De Praedicabilibus

VOLUME I · II

SABBATISMUS

Saint Albert the Great (1200–1280)
De Praedicabilibus · On the Predicables

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Facing-page bilingual edition: Latin on the left-hand pages, English on the right.
Sabbatismus is the imprint of the Inversiones San Juan Diego foundation, San Pedro Sula, Honduras.
Set in EB Garamond and Cinzel.
sabbatismus.com

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CAPUT I — *Utrum Logica sit scientia et specialis?*

Intendentibus primum de logica, considerandum est qualis scientia sit logica, et an sit aliqua pars Philosophiæ, et ad quid necessaria, et cujus utilitatis : deinde autem de quo est, et quæ divisio ipsius : ut habitis omnibus partibus ipsius sciatur quando est perfecte vel imperfecte tradita vel descripta. Circa omnia enim hæc diversa dicere videntur Antiqui. Quidam enim Antiquorum logicam nullam esse scientiam contenderunt, dicentes non posse esse scientiam id quod est omnis scientiæ sive doctrinæ modus. Modus autem omnis doctrinæ logica est : eo quod aliquo genere persuasionis utitur omnis qui docet, vel astruere conatur aliquid : omnis autem persuasio per sermonem logica est, sive syllogismo, sive enthymemate, sive inductione, sive exemplo utatur qui docet vel persuadet. Modus igitur omnis doctrinæ logica est. Et sic omnis doctrinæ modus est scientia logica. Nulla igitur est doctrina specialis, quæ logica sit dicenda. Propter quod et Aristoteles in secundo *primæ philosophiæ* suæ, et similiter Averroes dicunt omnis scientiæ modum esse ipsam scientiam quæ est et vocatur logica, et quod non simul addisci potest scientia et scientiæ modus, sed oportet prius discere modum, et deinde per modum jam perfecte apprehensum, addiscere tentare scientiam.

Sed non satis consideraverunt, quod quamvis scientiæ sint multæ, et quælibet specialem habeat modum, qui differt

a modo alterius, sicut et unaquæque scientia differt ab altera : est tamen unus communis modus scientiæ per quoddam commune quod est in omni scientia. Et hoc est quod per investigationem rationis ex cognito devenitur ad cognitionem incogniti : hoc enim fit in omni scientia quocumque modo dicta, sive sit demonstrativa, sive non demonstrativa. Et gratia illius communis, est in omni scientia modus unus communis omnis scientiæ. Et hic modus est per actum rationis, qui ratiocinatio sive argumentatio est, de cognitione cogniti procedens in scientiam ejus quod erat incognitum, secundum quod Isaac in libro de *Diffinitionibus* rationem diffiniens, dicit quod ratio est animæ intellectualis virtus, faciens currere causam in causatum. Causam generaliter vocans et large, omne quod secundum intellectum simpliciter, vel quoad nos antecedit ut cognitum, per cujus cognitionem ductu rationis devenitur in notitiam incogniti. Hic autem modus quamvis communis sit per hoc quod ponitur in qualibet scientia, tamen secundum se consideratus et non immixtus scientiis, est quoddam per se distinctum ab omnibus aliis. Et hoc modo consideratus hic modus, potest esse subjectum scientiæ, et scientia specialis de ipso est: in qua tamen scientia eumdem modum observari necesse est, quia scientia talis modi non nisi modo logico doceri potest: ut enim dicit Avicenna, modus hic omnibus hominibus (per hoc quod intellectuales sunt quodammodo per naturam) inditus est.

CHAPTER I — *Whether Logic is a science and a specific one?*

For those first intending to treat of logic, it must be considered what kind of science logic is, and whether it is any part of Philosophy, and for what it is necessary, and of what utility: then however of what it is about, and what its division is: so that, all its parts having been possessed, it may be known when it is perfectly or imperfectly handed down or described. For concerning all these things the Ancients seem to say different things. For some of the Ancients contended that logic is no science, saying that that which is the method of every science or doctrine cannot be a science. But logic is the method of every doctrine: because everyone who teaches, or tries to assert something, uses some kind of persuasion: but every persuasion through speech is logic, whether he who teaches or persuades uses a syllogism, or an enthymeme, or induction, or an example. The method therefore of every doctrine is logic. And thus the method of every doctrine is the science of logic. Therefore there is no special doctrine which ought to be called logic. On account of which also Aristotle in the second book of his *First Philosophy*, and similarly Averroes say that the method of every science is the science itself which is and is called logic, and that science and the method of science cannot be learned at the same time, but it is necessary first to learn the method, and then through the method already perfectly apprehended, to attempt to learn science.

But they have not sufficiently considered, that although sciences are many, and each has a special method, which differs

from the method of another, just as each science differs from another: there is however one common method of science through something common which is in every science. And this is that through the investigation of reason from the known one comes to the knowledge of the unknown: for this happens in every science in whatever way spoken of, whether it be demonstrative or non-demonstrative. And by grace of that common thing, there is in every science one common method of every science. And this method is through the act of reason, which is reasoning or argumentation, proceeding from the knowledge of the known into the science of that which was unknown, according to what Isaac says in the book of *Definitions*, defining reason, that reason is the intellectual power of the soul, making the cause run into the caused. Calling cause generally and broadly everything which according to the intellect simply, or as far as we are concerned, precedes as known, through the knowledge of which by the lead of reason one comes into the notice of the unknown. But this method, although it is common through this that it is placed in any science, nevertheless considered in itself and not mixed with the sciences, is something distinct by itself from all others. And this method considered in this way, can be the subject of a science, and there is a special science about it: in which science nevertheless it is necessary that the same method be observed, because the science of such a method cannot be taught except in a logical way: for as Avicenna says, this method is indwelt in all men (through this that they are intellectual in some way by nature).

Sed imperfectus est qui in natura est : perficitur autem per artem adhibitam. Id enim quod in natura est, seminarium et imperfectum est, et quasi in potentia existens. Ex hoc enim quod homo intellectualis est et intelligentiæ stratum, in quo sternuntur formæ intellectuales in actu luminis intelligentiæ, et per intellectum compositivus est unius formæ cum alia per compositionem vel divisionem, fit homo admirativus eorum quæ comprehendit accipiendo per sensum et intellectum, vel per intellectum solum. Per hoc autem quod admirativus est, suspenditur ad inquisitionem, et per inquisitionem comparat unum alteri. Per comparationem autem unius cum altero, ab eo quod est notum deducitur ad ignoti notitiam. Et sic hic logicæ modus a natura quidem incipit : perficitur autem arte, et usu et exercitio recipit perfectionem : sicut et Victorinus optime dicit, quod *natura facit habilem, ars facilem, usus autem potentem* : sic enim natura perfectæ sunt omnes artes et omnes scientiæ. Et hinc est, quod ars naturam imitatur. Et sicut dicit Hesiodus : Quidam per solam naturam in talibus sunt perfecti et boni : quidam autem non per naturam, sed quia Doctores talium in animo ponunt : et illi boni efficiuntur talia in animo ponentes, per comprehensionem principiorum artis et scientiæ : quidam vero tam erronei sunt, quod nihil talium in se habent, nec ab aliis suscipere possunt, quos Hesiodus ad verum et bonum cognoscendum reputat inutiles.

Patet igitur quod logica una est specialium scientiarum, sicut in fabrili in qua specialis est ars fabricandi malleum: cujus tamen usus omnibus adhibetur, quæ arte fabrili fabricantur. Investigatio enim, sive ratio investigans ignotum per notum, speciale quoddam est, quod passiones habet et differentias et partes et principia : quæ dum de ipso probantur, ars et scientia efficitur specialis, cujus usus postea omnibus adhibetur scientiis. Sic igitur patet, quod logica generaliter dicta, scientia est specialis, de qua nunc est tractandum.

CAPUT II — *Utrum logica sit pars philosophiæ?*

Hanc autem scientiam qui modus est omnis philosophiæ, quidam nullam partem esse philosophiæ contendunt, dicentes non nisi tres esse partes philosophiæ, scilicet physicam, mathematicam sive disciplinabilem, et metaphysicam sive divinam. Cum enim diffinitio dicens quid et propter quid medium sit in scientia, et diffinitio non possit variari nisi tripliciter, scilicet quod aut concipiat materiam sensibilem, quæ cum motu est et mutatione ; aut concipiat materiam intelligibilem, cujus essentia non est cum motu et mutatione secundum

But that which is in nature is imperfect: but it is perfected through applied art. For that which is in nature is a seed-bed and imperfect, and existing as if in potency. For from this that man is intellectual and the stratum of intelligence, in which are spread the intellectual forms in the act of the light of intelligence, and through the intellect he is compositive of one form with another through composition or division, man becomes admirative of those things which he comprehends by receiving through sense and intellect, or through intellect alone. But through this that he is admirative, he is suspended to inquisition, and through inquisition he compares one to another. But through the comparison of one with another, he is deduced from that which is known to the knowledge of the unknown. And thus this method of logic indeed begins from nature: but it is perfected by art, and receives perfection by use and exercise: just as Victorinus also very well says, that *nature makes one able, art makes one easy, use however makes one powerful*: for thus by nature all arts and all sciences are perfect. And hence it is, that art imitates nature. And as Hesiod says: Some are perfect and good in such things through nature alone: but some not through nature, but because Teachers of such things place them in the soul: and those become good placing such things in the soul, through the comprehension of the principles of art and science: but some truly are so erroneous, that they have nothing of such things in themselves, nor can they receive them from others, whom Hesiod reputes useless for knowing the true and the good.

It is clear therefore that logic is one of the special sciences, just as in the smith's craft in which the art of making a hammer is special: the use of which nevertheless is applied to all things which are made by the smith's art. For investigation, or reason investigating the unknown through the known, is a certain special thing, which has passions and differences and parts and principles: which while they are proved concerning it, a special art and science is produced, the use of which is afterwards applied to all sciences. Thus therefore it is clear, that logic generally spoken of, is a special science, about which must now be treated.

CHAPTER II — *Whether logic is a part of philosophy?*

But some have [contended] that this science which is the method of all philosophy, [is] no part...

part of philosophy, contending that there are only three parts of philosophy, namely physics, mathematics or the disciplinable, and metaphysics or the divine. For since definition, saying what and for what a thing is, is the medium in science, and definition cannot be varied except in a threefold way, namely that it either conceives of sensible matter, which is with motion and change; or conceives of intelligible matter, whose essence is not with motion and

rationem, quamvis secundum esse sit in materia quæ est cum mutatione et motu, sicut est magnitudo et numerus ; aut nec secundum essentiam, nec secundum esse concipiat materiam sensibilem : videtur quod philosophia non habeat nisi tres partes essentiales, sicut et Aristoteles dicere videtur. Propter quod nonnulli logicam scientiam sive rationalem, nullam partem dicunt esse philosophiæ. Addunt etiam ad suæ assertionis confirmationem, quod nullius rei modus, cum re cujus modus est, venit in generis sui divisionem. Constat autem, quod logica generaliter dicta modus philosophiæ est. Non ergo venire videtur ad philosophiæ divisionem, nec videtur in aliqua parte hujus generis quod est philosophia contineri.

Hanc autem opinionem alii quidam impugnantes dicunt philosophiæ generalis esse intentionem omnem, omnium quocumque modo entium comprehendere veritatem, quantum homini possibile est comprehendere eam secundum rationem et intellectum. Ea autem quæ sunt, dicuntur esse aut ab opere nostro, sive a voluntate, sive etiam ab intellectu scientiam quærente : aut a natura generaliter dicta, quæ ab opere nostro causari non potest. Et cum ea quæ a natura sunt, nostræ sint causæ scientiæ, et non nos sumus causa ipsorum, non potest de illis esse scientia practica. Relinquitur ergo, quod de talibus apud nos non est nisi scientia contemplativa, quæ lumine intelligentiæ perficitur.

Eorum autem quorum nos sumus causa per voluntatem, non potest esse apud nos scientia speculativa, sed tantum practica. Eadem enim sunt in quolibet scibili principia et causæ et elementa cognoscendi, quæ sunt principia essendi : quia aliter sequeretur, quod id quod scitur a nobis, non scitur secundum id quod est, sed potius sciretur secundum id quod non est. Et sic falso modo sciretur omne quod scitur, quod absurdum est. Relinquitur igitur quod de entibus a natura causatis, non potest esse scientia per ea quæ sunt a nobis, sed potius scientia eorum habetur ex principiis causantibus essentiam et esse eorum in natura, quæ non nisi per contemplationem sunt in omnibus. Eorum autem quæ sunt a nobis, non potest esse scientia vera apud nos nisi per ea principia quæ sunt in nobis, per quæ nos sumus causa eorum, quæ a nobis sunt : cujus finis non est verum, sed bonum, quod nobis bonum est. Similiter igitur alicujus philosophiæ erit intention comprehendere veritatem ejus quod in nobis est, secundum rationem qua nititur comprehendere veritatem ejus quod rationis ductu via est in omnem cognitionem omnium eorum quorum cognitio fit in nobis per ea quæ cognita sunt apud nos, ex quibus nos proficiscimur ad scientiam incognitorum. Erit igitur de intentione philosophiæ etiam logica scientia quæ est rationalis.

change according to reason, although according to being it is in matter which is with change and motion, such as is magnitude and number; or conceives of sensible matter neither according to essence nor according to being: it seems that philosophy has only three essential parts, as also Aristotle seems to say. On account of which some say that the science of logic or rational science is no part of philosophy. They also add for the confirmation of their assertion, that the method of no thing, along with the thing of which it is the method, comes into the division of its own genus. But it is clear, that logic generally spoken of is the method of philosophy. Therefore it does not seem to come into the division of philosophy, nor does it seem to be contained in any part of this genus which is philosophy.

But some others impugning this opinion say that it is the intention of general philosophy to comprehend the truth of all, of all beings in whatever way they are, as much as it is possible for man to comprehend it according to reason and intellect. But those things which are, are said to be either from our work, or from will, or even from the intellect seeking science: or from nature generally spoken of, which cannot be caused by our work. And since those things which are from nature are the causes of our science, and we are not the cause of them, there cannot be practical science about them. It remains therefore, that concerning such things among us there is only contemplative science, which is perfected by the light of intelligence.

But of those things of which we are the cause through will, there cannot be speculative science among us, but only practical. For in any scible the principles and causes and elements of knowing are the same as the principles of being: because otherwise it would follow, that that which is known by us, is not known according to that which it is, but rather would be known according to that which it is not. And thus everything that is known would be known in a false way, which is absurd. It remains therefore that of beings caused by nature, there cannot be science through those things which are from us, but rather the science of them is had from the principles causing their essence and being in nature, which are in all only through contemplation. But of those things which are from us, there cannot be true science among us except through those principles which are in us, through which we are the cause of them, which are from us: the end of which is not the true, but the good, which is good for us. Similarly therefore it will be the intention of some philosophy to comprehend the truth of that which is in us, according to the reason by which it strives to comprehend the truth of that which by the lead of reason is the way into all knowledge of all those things whose knowledge happens in us through those things which are known among us, from which we set out into the science of the unknown. Therefore even the science of logic which is rational will be of the intention of philosophy.

Adhuc autem hujus signum dicunt, quod apud Peripateticos philosophia in tres partes prima divisione divisa est, in physicam scilicet generaliter dictam, et ethicam generaliter dictam, et rationalem similiter acceptam. Dico autem physicam generaliter dictam, quæ comprehendit et naturalem et disciplinalem et divinam. Ethicam autem generalem, quæ in se continet et monasticam et œconomicam et civilem. Rationalem autem generalem

quæ comprehendit omnem modum deveniendi de noto ad ignotum quocumque modo: quod per multa genera probationum fit, ut in sequenti ostendetur. Manifestum est igitur, quod logica aliqua pars est philosophiæ.

Adhuc autem si aliquid est de intentione philosophiæ : tunc hoc maxime de intentione philosophiæ erit, sine quo nullus in philosophia in aliquam devenire potest cognitionem. Ignorans autem logicam nullus ignoti perfectam potest acquirere cognitionem, eo quod ignorat modum per quem devenire oportet de noto ad ignoti notitiam. Videtur ergo logicam præcipue esse de intentione philosophiæ.

Hanc autem contentionem Avicenna [1] et Alfarabius dicunt esse frivolam et infructuosam. Frivolam quidem, quia in contradicendo sibi intentionem ad idem eodem modo dictum non referunt. Dicentes enim logicam philosophiæ partem non esse, realem et contemplativam philosophiam vocant. Contradicentes autem his, et dicentes logicam partem philosophiæ esse, omnem comprehensionem veritatis qualitercumque existentis, sive in se, sive in nobis cognoscentibus vel operantibus, vocant philosophiam. Et sic frivole contendunt non ad idem suam referentes intentionem. Infructuosa etiam hujus contentio, quia de proposita nihil declarat intentione. Et sic nihil prodest ad propositum.

Est igitur logica una partium philosophiæ generaliter dictæ, quæ omnis admirabilis intendit comprehendere veritatem secundum modum, secundum quem possibile est comprehendere eam ex propriis principiis ejus quod admiratur. Hoc enim variatur secundum uniuscujusque scientiæ proprietatem. Sicut enim in philosophia reali secundum diversitatem diffusionis (quæ medium in demonstratione est) variatur philosophia, sic in logicis sive rationalibus secundum variationes ratiocinationis variatur scientia, hoc est, sciendi modus. Si enim ratio procedit ex signis facientibus præsumptionem, erit logicæ generalis pars una quæ rhetorica vocatur. Si autem procedit ex fictis facientibus delectationem vel abominationem, erit alia pars logicæ quæ vocatur poesis vel poetica. Si autem procedit ex probabilibus communibus, quæ in pluribus inveniuntur, erit pars alia quæ vocatur dialectica. Si autem procedit ex causis essentialibus et propriis, erit alia pars quæ vocatur demonstrativa. Si ex his quæ videntur et non sunt, erit pars alia quæ vocatur sophistica. Si autem ex cautelis provocantibus respondentem doceat procedere, erit alia pars logicæ generalis quæ vocatur tentativa : et sic facile est de omnibus aliis intelligere.

Moreover of this they say is a sign, that among the Peripatetics philosophy in the first division is divided into three parts, namely into physics generally spoken of, and ethics generally spoken of, and rational similarly accepted. But I say physics generally spoken of, which comprehends both natural and disciplinal and divine. But general ethics, which contains in itself both monastic and economic and civil. But general rational

which comprehends every mode of arriving from the known to the unknown in whatever mode: which is done through many kinds of probations, as will be shown in the following. It is manifest therefore, that logic is some part of philosophy.

Moreover if anything is of the intention of philosophy: then this especially will be of the intention of philosophy, without which no one in philosophy can arrive at any knowledge. But one ignorant of logic can acquire no perfect knowledge of the unknown, because he is ignorant of the mode by which it is necessary to arrive from the known to the notice of the unknown. It seems therefore that logic is especially of the intention of philosophy.

But Avicenna and Alfarabi say that this contention is frivolous and unfruitful. Frivolous indeed, because in contradicting each other they do not refer their intention to the same thing said in the same mode. For those saying that logic is not a part of philosophy, call philosophy real and contemplative. But those contradicting them, and saying that logic is a part of philosophy, call philosophy every comprehension of truth existing in whatever way, whether in itself, or in us knowing or operating. And thus they frivolously contend not referring their intention to the same thing. Unfruitful also is the contention of this, because it declares nothing about the proposed intention. And thus it profits nothing for the proposition.

Therefore logic is one of the parts of philosophy generally speaking, which all admirable intends to comprehend truth according to the mode, according to which it is possible to comprehend it from the proper principles of that which is admired. For this is varied according to the property of each and every science. For just as in real philosophy according to the diversity of diffusion (which is the middle in demonstration) philosophy is varied, so in logical or rational things according to the variations of ratiocination the science, that is, the mode of knowing, is varied. For if reason proceeds from signs making presumption, there will be one part of general logic which is called rhetoric. But if it proceeds from fictions making delight or abomination, there will be another part of logic which is called poesis or poetics. But if it proceeds from common probabilia, which are found in many cases, there will be another part which is called dialectic. But if it proceeds from essential and proper causes, there will be another part which is called demonstrative. If from those things which seem and are not, there will be another part which is called sophistic. But if it teaches to proceed from cautions provoking the respondent, there will be another part of general logic which is called tentative: and thus it is easy to understand concerning all others.

Horum autem quæ dicta sunt, rationem ponit Avicenna dicens res omnes triplici-ter esse accipiendas, scilicet quod primo accipiantur in essentiæ suæ principiis : secundo in esse quod habent in singularibus propriis : tertio autem secundum quod acceptæ sunt in intellectu. Multa enim secundum essentiæ suæ principia separata sunt a motu et a materia quæ tamen secundum esse sunt vel possunt esse in motu et materia, sicut substantia, unitas, identitas, multitudo, et diversitas, et alia hujusmodi, quæ quidem in essentiæ suæ principiis ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia sunt : et hoc modo secundum Platonem sunt rerum principia formalia, propter quod ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia talia Plato esse dicit. Et si talia dicantur generari vel corrumpi, hoc non erit nisi secundum accidens, hoc est, secundum esse quod habent in generatis et corruptis. Acceptio autem rei secundum esse quod habet in suppositis, erit secundum existentiam illorum suppositorum, et secundum diffinitionem quam habere possunt secundum esse quod habent in illis. Acceptio autem rerum secundum quod sunt in intellectu,

est secundum cognitionem quam habent, non secundum quod in se sunt, sed secundum quod acceptæ sunt per intellectum. Et secundum omnes istos tres modos sunt etiam consequentia accidentia quæ vocantur propriæ passiones ipsius. Et sic quo-libet istorum modorum trium philosophia de ipsis intendit acquirere veritatem. Et hoc est per ductum rationis aliquem qui ad logicam pertinet. Res enim prout habent esse in anima, accidentia habent propria, sicut aliquid esse notum apud hominem, et aliquid esse ignotum: et cum comparata ad invicem in aliquo se conjungant, erit via rationis, procedendo de noto ad ignotum, per comparationem noti ad ignotum secundum convenientiam vel differentiam noti ad ignotum. Ex quo comprehenditur, quod unum componitur cum alio, et prædicatur de illo : vel unum dividitur ab alio, et removetur ab ipso : secundum enim hunc modum devenitur de uno in alterum. Hoc igitur modo logica est de intentione philosophiæ generalis.

CAPUT III — *De utilitate dialecticæ.*

Summe autem necessaria et utilis est logica philosophiæ. Ex quo enim logica docet qualiter ignotum fiat notum, patet quod in nulla philosophia aliquid notum fieri potest nisi per logicæ doctrinæ facultatem. Est enim, ut dicit Boetius in *Topicis*, ratio disserendi, hoc est, docens qualiter de quolibet disserendum est, quæ in duas, ut dicit, distribuitur partes, scilicet scientiam inveniendi, quam topicam Græci vocaverunt : et scientiam judicandi, quam Græci analyticam, Latini autem resolutoriam nuncupa-verunt.

But of these things which have been said, Avicenna posits the reason saying that all things are to be accepted in three ways, namely that first they be accepted in the principles of their essence: secondly in the being which they have in proper singulars: but thirdly according as they are accepted in the intellect. For many things according to the principles of their essence are separated from motion and matter, which nevertheless according to being are or can be in motion and matter, such as substance, unity, identity, multitude, and diversity, and other such things, which indeed in the principles of their essence are ungenerable and incorruptible: and in this mode according to Plato they are the formal principles of things, because of which Plato says such things are ungenerable and incorruptible. And if such things are said to be generated or corrupted, this will not be except according to accident, that is, according to the being which they have in generated and corrupted things. But the acceptance of a thing according to the being which it has in supposita, will be according to the existence of those supposita, and according to the definition which they can have according to the being which they have in them. But the acceptance of things according as they are in the intellect,

is according to the knowledge which they have, not according to what they are in themselves, but according to as they are received through the intellect. And according to all these three modes there are also consequent accidents which are called its own proper passions. And thus in any of these three modes philosophy intends to acquire the truth about them. And this is through some lead of reason which belongs to logic. For things as they have being in the soul, have proper accidents, such as for something to be known by man, and for something to be unknown: and when compared to each other they join in something, it will be the way of reason, proceeding from the known to the unknown, through the comparison of the known to the unknown according to the agreement or difference of the known to the unknown. From which it is comprehended, that one is composed with another, and is predicated of it: or one is divided from another, and is removed from it: for according to this mode one comes from one to the other. In this way therefore logic is of the intention of general philosophy.

CHAPTER III — *On the utility of dialectic.*

Logic is most highly necessary and useful to philosophy. For from this that logic teaches how the unknown becomes known, it is clear that in no philosophy can anything become known except through the faculty of the doctrine of logic. For it is, as Boethius says in the *Topics*, the reason of discoursing, that is, teaching how one must discourse about anything, which is distributed into two parts, as he says, namely the science of finding, which the Greeks called topics: and the science of judging, which the Greeks called analytics, but the Latins called resolutory.

Constat autem quod sine dissertione et inquisitione non venitur de noto ad ignotum : quæ dissertio non est nisi inquisitio disserens qualiter notum comparatur ad ignotum, qualiter se habet ad illud, ut causa, vel principium, vel signum, vel conjectura ad illud : vel contrario modo ut repugnans ad ipsum, sine quo in nulla scientia aliquid sciri potest. Quoad hoc ergo, quod scientia est docens disserere de omni re, non tantum est utilis in se, sed etiam necessaria est ad omne quod scire intendimus. Propter quod Aristoteles frequenter dicit in diversis libris suis, quod causa erroris antiquorum fuit, quia scientiam logicam non invenerunt sive habuerunt. Docet enim logica principia qualiter hoc et quibus principiis et quibus argumentis de quolibet scibili disserendum est : qui modus nisi sciatur, scibile inveniri non potest ; quia is qui quærit modum inveniendi scientiam scibilis illius non habet propter quid. Etiam Aristoteles dicit quod modus sciendi ante scientiam quamlibet discendus est ut per illum modum scientia cujuslibet scibilis inveniatur. Cum enim scientia habitus sit conclusionis, oportet quod concludere sciat ille qui scientiam accipit. Non autem concludere scit, qui nescit quod concludere debeat. Et cum nihil concludi debeat nisi quæstio, porteto quod sciat quid et qualiter quærendum est id quod concludi intenditur. Adhuc concludere se nescit qui nescit ex quibus et qualibus et qua conclusione concludendum est. Hæc autem omnia nulla docet philosophia nisi tantum logica. Non ergo tantum utilis est et adminiculans ad omnes scientias, sed etiam necessaria. Propter quod nescientes logicam, etiam id quod scire videntur, nesciunt se scire : quia nesciunt qualiter unumquodque sciri oportet, et qualiter probandum vel improbandum est. Adhuc autem tales in scitis suis nullam habent potestatem, dum nesciunt propter quod scitis suis assentiunt, nec qualiter contradicentibus respondere debeant. Hoc autem scit logicus, si perfecte

scientiam disserendi de quolibet sit adeptus. Adhuc autem nesciens logicam, etsi scire aliquid videatur, nescit tamen, sicut jam supra diximus, cum rationem sui sciti nesciat : et se habet ad scitum et ad actum sciendi, sicut ignis ad comburere lignum. Et ideo scientis est (ut in *prima philosophia* docet Aristoteles [1]) posse docere. Docere autem non potest, qui rationem sciti nescit exponere. Nescit autem exponere sui sciti rationem, qui causas et principia logicæ non novit. Erit igitur talis etiam in his quæ scire videtur, sicut idiota se habet ad habentem litteram.

But it is clear that without discourse and inquisition one does not come from the known to the unknown: which discourse is nothing else but an inquisition discoursing how the known is compared to the unknown, how it relates to it, as a cause, or a principle, or a sign, or a conjecture to it: or in the contrary way as repugnant to it, without which in no science can anything be known. As far as this is concerned therefore, that science is teaching to discourse about every thing, it is not only useful in itself, but it is also necessary for everything which we intend to know. On account of which Aristotle frequently says in his various books, that the cause of the error of the ancients was, because they did not find or have the science of logic. For logic teaches the principles how this and by what principles and by what arguments one must discourse about any scible: which method unless it be known, the scible cannot be found; because he who seeks the method of finding the science of that scible does not have the "wherefore" (propter quid). Also Aristotle says that the method of knowing must be learned before any science so that through that method the science of any scible may be found. For since science is the habit of a conclusion, it is necessary that he who receives science knows how to conclude. But he does not know how to conclude, who does not know that he ought to conclude. And since nothing ought to be concluded except a question, it is necessary that he knows what and how that which is intended to be concluded is to be sought. Moreover he does not know how to conclude who does not know from what and what kind and by what conclusion it is to be concluded. But no philosophy teaches all these things except only logic. Therefore it is not only useful and adminiculating to all sciences, but also necessary. On account of which those not knowing logic, even that which they seem to know, they do not know that they know: because they do not know how each thing ought to be known, and how it is to be proved or disproved. Moreover such persons have no power in their known things, while they do not know why they assent to their known things, nor how they ought to respond to those contradicting. But the logician knows this, if [he is] perfectly

he has obtained the science of discoursing concerning anything. Moreover, the one ignorant of logic, although he may seem to know something, nevertheless does not know, as we have already said above, since he does not know the reason of his known thing: and he relates to the known thing and to the act of knowing, just as fire to burning wood. And therefore it is the mark of the one who knows (as Aristotle teaches in his *First Philosophy*) to be able to teach. But he cannot teach, who does not know how to expound the reason of what is known. But he does not know how to expound the reason of his known thing, who does not know the causes and principles of logic. Therefore such a one will be even in those things which he seems to know, just as an idiot relates to one having letters.

Talis etiam neque suum neque alterius deprehendit errorem, quia non habet habitum per quem dijudicet utrum recte sciat quod scit, vel non recte.

Adhuc autem per hoc quod inveniendi quodlibet scitum scientia est per habitudines unius ad alterum, quæ topicæ sive locales vocantur, quibus intellectus vel opinio vel fides vel existimatio vel suspicio locatur in alio, quod jam intus habetur in animo quærentis. Sine logica nec ad inquirendum, neque ad inveniendum aliquid procedi potest : nec etiam quando quæsitum invenitur, sciri potest an inventum vel non inventum sit. Manifestum est igitur, quod etiam quoad hoc logica non tantum utilis est, sed necessaria etiam est ad omnem philosophiam.

Adhuc autem etiam per hoc quod judicandi scientia est (quia id quod inventum est, dijudicatur an recte per sua principia scitum sit) necessaria ad omnem philosophiam est logica scientia. Hoc autem docet logica dupliciter, resolvere docens scitum in principia, scilicet consequentiæ quæ sunt in figuris et modis consequentiarum syllogisticarum : et in principia realia ejus quod sequitur sicut in causas immediatas et essentiales et convertibiles cum eo quod scitum est per conclusionem : quo judicio omne quod scitur, quasi ponderatur, ad æquilibram rationis reducens omne quod in omnibus physicis quæritur ad sciendum. Est autem non tantum necessaria, sed etiam utilis hæc scientia [2], sicut bonum est felicitas hominis secundum optimæ partis animæ hominis perfectissimum actum, hoc est, secundum intellectum contemplativum : nec contemplari poterit intellectus, nisi noverit contemplationis principia, et sciat invenire quod quærit contemplari, et dijudicare idipsum quod jam contemplatur inventum [3]. Patet conclusio; quod præ omnibus utilis est ad felicitatem hæc scientia, sine qua non attingitur felicitatis actus, et per quam ipse felix actum non impeditæ recipit operationis. Hæc enim scientia à phantasiis (quæ videntur et non sunt) liberat, errores damnat, et ostendit falsitates, et lumen dat rectæ contemplationis in omnibus. Præ omnibus igitur consideranda est hæc scientia.

<!-- cap:1.1.4 -->

CAPUT IV — *De quo sit logica ut de subjecto?*

Cum autem logica sit scientia contemplativa, docens qualiter, et per quæ devenitur per notum ad ignoti notitiam, oportet necessario quod logica sit de hujusmodi rationis instrumento, per quod acquiritur per notum ignoti scientia in omni eo quod de ignoto notum efficitur. Hoc autem est argumentatio, secundum quod argumentatio est ratiocinatio mentem arguens et convincens per habitudinem noti ad ignotum de ignoti scientia. Inter species autem argumentationis præcipua est syllogismus.

Such a one also detects neither his own error nor that of another, because he does not have the habit through which he may judge whether he knows rightly what he knows, or not rightly.

Moreover through the fact that the science of finding any known thing is through the habitudes of one to another, which are called topical or local, by which intellect or opinion or faith or estimation or suspicion is located in another, which is already held within in the mind of the seeker. Without logic one can proceed neither to inquiring, nor to finding anything: nor even when that which is sought is found, can it be known whether it is found or not found. It is manifest therefore, that even in respect to this logic is not only useful, but also is necessary for all philosophy.

Moreover also through the fact that it is the science of judging (because that which is found, is judged whether it is rightly known by its principles) logical science is necessary for all philosophy. But logic teaches this in two ways, teaching to resolve the known thing into principles, namely of consequence which are in the figures and modes of syllogistic consequences: and into the real principles of that which follows just as into immediate and essential causes, convertible with that which is known by conclusion: by which judgment everything that is known, is as it were weighed, reducing to the equilibrium of reason everything that is sought to be known in all of physics. But this science is not only necessary, but also useful, just as happiness is the good of man according to the most perfect act of the best part of the soul of man, that is, according to the contemplative intellect: nor will the intellect be able to contemplate, unless it knows the principles of contemplation, and knows how to find what it seeks to contemplate, and to judge that very thing which it already contemplates as found. The conclusion is evident; that before all others this science is useful for happiness, without which the act of happiness is not attained, and through which the happy man himself receives the act of unimpeded operation. For this science liberates from phantasies (which seem to be and are not), condemns errors, and shows falsities, and gives the light of right contemplation in all things. Before all others therefore must this science be considered.

<!-- cap:1.1.4 -->

CHAPTER IV — *Concerning what is logic as its subject?*

But since logic is a contemplative science, teaching how, and through what things one arrives from the known to the notice of the unknown, it is necessary that logic be about this kind of instrument of reason, through which the science of the unknown is acquired through the known in everything which becomes known concerning the unknown. But this is argumentation, according as argumentation is ratiocination arguing and convincing the mind through the habitude of the known to the unknown concerning the science of the unknown. But among the species of argumentation the principal one is the syllogism.

Propter quod quidam dixerunt quod logica tota est de syllogismo et partibus syllogismi [4] : determinantes commune subjectum logicæ secundum id quod est subjectum principale. Non enim de omnibus fides esse poterit per syllogismum, propter hoc quod dis-

cursus syllogisticus non est nisi ab universali universaliter accepto : quod in multis scientiis esse non poterit, ut in rhetoricis. Propterea quod in illis præcipue locales habitudines attenduntur, a quibus per enthymemata concluditur id quod quæsitum est. Cum igitur logica, ut dicit Aristoteles, det omni scientiæ modum disserendi, et inveniendi, et dijudicandi quod quæsitum est : oportet quod de tali sit ut de subjecto, quod omnibus in omni æqualiter applicabile est. Sunt autem adhuc quædam in quibus ex singularibus quærimus invenire quod ignotum est, sicut in experimentalibus, in quibus utimur vel syllogismo vel inductione ad universale accipiendum, et non possumus uti syllogismo perfecto. Propter quod syllogismus commune subjectum logicæ esse non potest. Propter hoc etiam in logicis quæ ab Antiquis scriptæ sunt, non solum docetur quid syllogismus, et qualiter, et ex quibus sit : sed hic etiam docetur quid argumentatio, et quæ partes, et species ejus.

Sunt tamen qui logicam interpretantur idem quod sermocinalem, dicentes logicam generalem idem esse quod sermocinalem scientiam, sub qua dicunt contineri grammaticam, poeticam, et rhetoricam, et eam quam vocant dialecticam. Et ideo dicunt logicæ generalis subjectum esse sermonem, prout est designativus rerum quæ significantur per ipsum. Quam opinionem impugnat Avicenna dicens, quod sermo de se nihil significat : si enim aliquid de se significaret, semper et apud omnes illud significaret : quod falsum est. Significationem ergo accipit a placito instituentis. Non ergo significat nisi secundum quod conceptus est in intellectu instituentis. Tali autem sermone (secundum quod sic significativus est concepti) utitur homo ad seipsum et ad alium. Propter quod dicit Damascenus, quod in duo dividitur, scilicet in encordialem, hoc est, sermonem interius in mente dispositum, et in eum qui ex signis, qui angelus intelligendo est sui cordis nuntius, quia conceptus cordis nuntiat ad alterum. Propter quod logicus et ad se et ad alterum utitur sermone per accidens, et non per se : quia sine sermone designativo procedere non potest ad notitiam ejus quod ignotum est. Ratiocinatione autem utitur per se ad notitiam faciendam ejus quod declaratum est. Propter quod cum logici intentio sit docere ea, per quæ per se venitur in notitiam ignoti per quod notum est, logicæ subjectum est argumentatio: quia per argumentationem efficitur id quod intenditur.

For which reason some have said that the whole of logic is about the syllogism and the parts of the syllogism: determining the common subject of logic according to that which is the principal subject. For faith will not be able to be about all things through the syllogism, because of this, that the dis-

the syllogistic course is only from a universal universally accepted: which in many sciences cannot be, as in rhetorics. Because in those especially local habits are attended to, from which what is sought is concluded through enthymemes. Since therefore logic, as Aristotle says, gives to every science the method of discoursing, and finding, and dijudicating what is sought: it is necessary that it be about such a thing as a subject, which is equally applicable to all in everything. But there are still some things in which from singulars we seek to find what is unknown, as in experimentals, in which we use either a syllogism or induction to receive the universal, and we cannot use a perfect syllogism. On account of which the syllogism cannot be the common subject of logic. On account of this also in the logical [works] which were written by the Ancients, not only is it taught what a syllogism is, and how, and from what it is: but here it is also taught what argumentation is, and what its parts and species are.

However there are some who interpret logic as the same as sermocinal, saying that general logic is the same as the sermocinal science, under which they say are contained grammar, poetry, and rhetoric, and that which they call dialectic. And therefore they say that the subject of general logic is speech, insofar as it is designative of the things which are signified through it. Which opinion Avicenna impugns saying, that speech of itself signifies nothing: for if it signified anything of itself, it would always and among all signify that: which is false. Therefore it receives signification from the pleasure of the institutor. It does not signify therefore except according to as it is conceived in the intellect of the institutor. Such speech (according to as it is thus significative of the concept) man uses to himself and to another. On account of which Damascene says, that it is divided into two, namely into encordial, that is, speech interiorly disposed in the mind, and into that which is from signs, which in being understood is the messenger of his heart, because it announces the concepts of the heart to another. On account of which the logician uses speech to himself and to another by accident, and not by itself: because without designative speech he cannot proceed to the notice of that which is unknown. But he uses reasoning by itself for making notice of that which has been declared. On account of which since the intention of the logician is to teach those things through which by itself one comes into the notice of the unknown through that which is known, the subject of logic is argumentation: because through argumentation that which is intended is effected.

Adhuc sermo incomplexus quamvis designet aliquid apud intellectum simplicem, tamen fidem non facit an aliquid sit vel non sit, quia non aliquid esse significat vel non esse. Non autem venitur ad notitiam ignoti nisi per aliquid, quod de ignoto fidem facit, quod ita sit vel non sit. Sermo igitur incomplexus non potest esse instrumentum per quod de ignoto intellectus ad notitiam deducatur : quod principaliter intendit logicus. Sermo igitur incomplexus non assumitur a logico nisi per accidens, in quantum est pars sermonis complexi, qui est intellectus compositi designativus.

Amplius sermo complexus in eo quod complexus est, nec significat esse vel non esse : si enim hoc esset, omnis sermo complexus rem esse vel non esse significaret : et sic oratio deprecativa, vel optativa, vel subjunctiva, rem esse vel non esse significaret, quod falsum est. Sermo ergo complexus per hoc quod enuntiativus est, rem esse vel non esse significat : per hoc autem quod rem esse vel non esse significat, non habet arguere et fidem facere de enuntiato. Per hoc por tanto que es enunciativo, no est instrumentum per quod logicus consequatur id

quod intendit. Fidem autem facit per hoc quod ad formam argumenti collectivus est. Argumentatio igitur logici instrumentum est. Logica autem generalis et docens de hoc est ut de subjecto, per quod utens logicus in scientiam venit ignoti per notum. Argumentatio igitur logicæ docentis proprium subjectum est. Et hæc est trium Philosophorum sententia, Avicennæ scilicet, Alfarabii, et Algazelis. Utuntur tamen sermone omnes sermocinales scientiæ scilicet, poetica, et rhetorica, et ea quæ vocatur logica. Grammatica prout modus inflexionum et constructionum intellectus simplicis et compositi complexe designativus existit simpliciter absque eo quod sciat de significato utrum sit vel non sit. Poetica autem utitur eo prout modulus pronuntiatus delectatione, vel abominatione provocat audientem ad aliquid faciendum vel fugiendum, propter quod ex variis compositis et secundum metalogiam sive fabulam fingit tentans mendacia quæ provocent audientes. Rhetorica autem sermone utitur prout est designativus ejus per quod persuadere intendit. Solus autem logicus sermone utitur prout est pars instrumenti, per quod solum fides fit de incognito, cum notitia ipsius ex noto arguitur per complexionem argumenti. Propter alterum ergo sermone utitur, et non propter seipsum. Hujus autem probatio est, quod notum (per quod ignoti scientia accipitur) dupliciter consideratur, scilicet prout est res extra animam noscentis accepta, et prout est notio quædam in anima noscentis.

Moreover incomplex speech although it designates something in the simple intellect, nevertheless does not make faith whether something is or is not, because it does not signify something to be or not to be. But one does not come to the notice of the unknown except through something which makes faith about the unknown, that it is so or not so. Incomplex speech therefore cannot be the instrument through which the intellect is deduced to notice of the unknown: which the logician principally intends. Incomplex speech therefore is not assumed by the logician except by accident, in quantum it is a part of complex speech, which is designative of the composite intellect.

Furthermore complex speech in that it is complex, signifies neither to be nor not to be: for if this were so, every complex speech would signify a thing to be or not to be: and thus a deprecative or optative or subjunctive oration would signify a thing to be or not to be, which is false. Complex speech therefore by this that it is enunciative, signifies a thing to be or not to be: but by this that it signifies a thing to be or not to be, it does not have to argue and make faith about the enunciation. By this therefore that it is enunciative, it is not the instrument through which the logician follows that

which he intends. But it makes faith through this that it is collective to the form of the argument. Argumentation therefore is the instrument of the logician. But general and teaching logic is about this as about a subject, through using which the logician comes into the science of the unknown through the known. Argumentation therefore is the proper subject of teaching logic. And this is the opinion of the three Philosophers, namely Avicenna, Alfarabi, and Algazel. However all the sermocinal sciences use speech, namely, poetry, and rhetoric, and that which is called logic. Grammar exists simply insofar as the mode of inflections and constructions of the simple and composite intellect is designative in a complex way without knowing about the signified whether it is or is not. But poetry uses it insofar as the pronounced modulus provokes the listener by delight or abomination to doing or fleeing something, on account of which it feigns from various composites and according to metalogy or fable, attempting lies which provoke the listeners. But rhetoric uses speech insofar as it is designative of that through which it intends to persuade. But the logician alone uses speech insofar as it is part of the instrument, through which alone faith is made about the unknown, when the notice of it is argued from the known through the complexion of the argument. Therefore he uses speech on account of another, and not on account of itself. But the proof of this is, that the known (through which the science of the unknown is received) is considered in a twofold way, namely insofar as it is a thing accepted outside the soul of the knower, and insofar as it is a certain notion in the soul of the knower.

Non autem facit notitiam ignoti prout est res extra animam noscentis accepta, sed potius prout est notio rei in anima noscentis existens : sic enim significativa est et illativa ejus quod ignotum est : quod ignotum ipsi aliquo modo percipit intellectus perfecta comprehensione. Hoc ergo modo voces significativas rerum considerat logicus et non aliter. Dico autem perfecta comprehensione : quia sunt forte quidam adeo perspicaces, quod ex intellectu unius vocis complexæ statim de ignoto fidem concipiunt : sed hoc est imperfectum, et non generale. Et ideo non sufficit, sed opus est argumentatione perfecte hoc faciente. Si quis autem quærit unde efficiatur notum id, ex quo ignoti accipitur scientia et fides, hoc nihil est quærere : quia in quolibet aliquid per se notum est homini et naturæ insitum, per quod ignoti potest accipere scientiam. Aliter enim homo nullius esset perceptibilis scientiæ vel disciplinæ, sicut nec brutum animal, si prima cognoscendi principia per seipsa non inessent homini. De argumentatione igitur vel syllogismo est logica tota ut de subjecto. De aliis autem vocibus incomplexis est propter illam.

CAPUT V — *De divisione logicæ, et quæ sint partes ipsius, et de voce significante ad placitum, quid et qualiter significet.*

Divisio autem logicæ, et quæ sunt partes ipsius, ut dicunt Avicenna et Alfarabius, accipienda sunt ex intentione ipsius. Sicut vero jam ante dictum est, logica intendit docere principia per quæ per id quod notum est, devenire potest in cognitionem ignoti. Est autem incomplexum, de quo quæritur quid sit : aut complexum, de quo quæritur an verum vel falsum sit. Sciri autem non potest incomplexum de quo quæritur quid sit, nisi per diffinitionem. Complexum autem, de quo quæritur an verum vel falsum sit, non potest sciri nisi per argumentationem. Istæ ergo sunt duæ partes logicæ. Una quidem ut doceantur principia per quæ sciatur diffinitio rei et quidditas : ita quod per principia illa doceatur quæ sit vera rei diffinitio, et quæ non, et quæ videatur esse et non sit. Alia vero ut doceantur principia qualiter per argumentationem probetur enuntiationis veritas vel falsitas. Et ut doceatur illius argumentationis forma, quantum ad figuram

et modum, et quietationem seu complexionem : et ut doceatur ejusdem argumentationis materia. Et ut doceatur quæ videatur esse argumentatio, et non sit : eo quod apparentiam aliquam quidem habet, sed veram existentiam non habet. Et ut doceantur cautelæ quibus opponens vel respondens per aliquam occasionem impediatur vel commoveatur a conjectu veritatis, vel ad hoc quod perfecte videat veritatem et non divertat ab ipsa.

But it does not produce notice of the unknown insofar as it is a thing accepted outside the soul of the knower, but rather insofar as it is a notion of the thing existing in the soul of the knower: for thus it is significative and illative of that which is unknown: which unknown the intellect itself perceives in some way by perfect comprehension. In this way therefore the logician considers the significative voices of things and not otherwise. But I say by perfect comprehension: because there are perhaps some so perspicacious, that from the understanding of one complex voice they immediately conceive faith about the unknown: but this is imperfect, and not general. And therefore it is not sufficient, but there is need of argumentation perfectly doing this. If however anyone asks whence that known is produced, from which science and faith of the unknown is received, this is nothing to ask: because in everyone something is known by itself to man and indwelt in nature, through which he can receive the science of the unknown. For otherwise man would be perceptible of no science or discipline, just as a brute animal, if the first principles of knowing were not in man by themselves. Therefore the whole of logic is about argumentation or the syllogism as about a subject. But about other incomplex voices it is on account of that.

CHAPTER V — *On the division of logic, and what its parts are, and on the voice signifying at pleasure, what and how it signifies.*

But the division of logic, and what its parts are, as Avicenna and Alfarabi say, are to be taken from its intention. But just as was already said before, logic intends to teach the principles through which through that which is known, one can come into the knowledge of the unknown. But it is either incomplex, about which it is asked what it is: or complex, about which it is asked whether it is true or false. But the incomplex about which it is asked what it is, cannot be known except through definition. But the complex, about which it is asked whether it is true or false, cannot be known except through argumentation. These therefore are the two parts of logic. One indeed so that the principles are taught through which the definition of the thing and the quiddity are known: so that through those principles it may be taught what is the true definition of the thing, and what is not, and what seems to be and is not. But the other so that the principles are taught how through argumentation the truth or falsity of the enunciation is proved. And so that the form of that argumentation may be taught, as to the figure

and as to mode, and quietation or complexion: and that the matter of the same argumentation may be taught. And that it may be taught what seems to be argumentation, and is not: because it has indeed some appearance, but does not have true existence. And that the cautions may be taught by which the opponent or respondent is impeded or moved by some occasion from the conjecture of truth, or to this that he may perfectly see the truth and not be diverted from it.

Sed prima harum partium[1] vel ab Antiquis tradita non est, vel ad nos non pervenit. Hanc etiam partem dicunt Avicenna et Alfarabius ad Arabes non pervenisse. Dicit tamen Aristoteles in plerisque locis hanc causam erroris fuisse Antiquis : quia artem diffiniendi non habebant. Quod autem quidam dicunt hanc tradidisse Aristotelem in sexto *Topicorum*, frivolum est : ibi enim partem diffiniendi non tradidit, sed docet terminare problema illud quo quæritur quid insit ut diffinitio. Adhuc autem quidam alii dicunt hæc pertinere ad metaphysicam, et Aristotelem hanc tradidisse in septimo et octavo *primæ philosophiæ* : sed hoc absurdum est. Aristoteles enim ibi docet quæ sint diffinientia tam substantiam quam accidens, et quæ sit diffinitio physica, et qualiter diffinitio est unum et non multa, et talia hujusmodi. Sed qualiter diffiniendo respondetur ad quæstionem qua quæritur quid est res per essentiam et quidditatem, non docet : quia hoc ad logicam pertinet, et non ad primam philosophiam. Patet igitur, quod hæc pars nondum ad nos pervenit. Sunt et harum partium subdivisiones quæ exequitur logica : de quibus in sequentibus erit tractatus.

Quia autem logica omnia considerat prout sunt in anima sive in intellectu ejus, qui quærit per notum sibi venire in notitiam ignoti : gratia horum considerat de voce significante ad placitum, et quid et qualiter significet : quod antiquiores Peripatetici (ut dicunt Alfarabius et Algazel) in quinque modis distinxerunt. Primo quidem et principaliter dictio significat id ad quod prima institutione significare est instituta, ut homo hominem, et domus domum, et sic de aliis. Secundo modo significare dicitur quod ex consequenti supponitur in ipsa, sicut domus significat fundamentum et parietem, et quodlibet totum integrale sic significat suas partes integrales et principales. Tertio modo quando res comitatur significationem ipsius : sicut si paries est, fundamentum esse significat, et si tectum est, fundamentum et parietem esse significat. Quarto quando unum est in intellectu alterius, sicut homo significat animal, et significat rationale. Et ad hunc modum reducitur, quod accidens et passio significat subjectum, sicut simus significat nasum, et sicut album significat corpus terminatum, et cætera hujusmodi. Quinto sicut oppositio significat oppositionem, et oppositum significat oppositum : sicut disgregatio albi significat aggregationem nigri, et motus ad centrum frigidi significat motum a centro calidi, et cætera hujusmodi. Et hoc ad logicam pertinet per hoc, quod logica est disserendi scientia : disseri autem non potest, ut dicit Aristoteles[2], nisi detur quod nomina aliquid significant, eo quod non significant infinita. Gratia hujus etiam considerat de communibus et vocibus incomplexis.

But the first of these parts either was not handed down by the Ancients, or has not reached us. Avicenna and Alfarabi also say that this part did not reach the Arabs. Nevertheless Aristotle says in many places that this was the cause of error for the Ancients: because they did not have the art of defining. But what some say, that Aristotle handed this down in the sixth book of the *Topics*, is frivolous: for there he did not hand down the part of defining, but he teaches how to terminate that problem by which it is asked what is in as a definition. Moreover some others say that these things pertain to metaphysics, and that Aristotle handed this down in the seventh and eighth books of the *First Philosophy*: but this is absurd. For Aristotle there teaches what the definers are both of substance and of accident, and what the physical definition is, and how a definition is one and not many, and such things of this kind. But how by defining it is answered to the question by which it is asked what a thing is through essence and quiddity, he does not teach: because this pertains to logic, and not to the first philosophy. It is evident therefore, that this part has not yet reached us. There are also subdivisions of these parts which logic executes: concerning which there will be a treatise in the following.

But because logic considers all things according as they are in the soul or in the intellect of him, who seeks through what is known to him to come into the notice of the unknown: for the sake of these it considers concerning the voice signifying at pleasure, and what and how it signifies: which the older Peripatetics (as Alfarabi and Algazel say) distinguished in five modes. First indeed and principally a diction signifies that which by first institution it was instituted to signify, as man signifies man, and house signifies house, and so concerning others. In a second mode it is said to signify what consequently is supposed in it, just as house signifies foundation and wall, and any integral whole thus signifies its integral and principal parts. In a third mode when a thing accompanies its signification: just as if a wall is, it signifies a foundation to be, and if a roof is, it signifies a foundation and a wall to be. Fourth when one is in the intellect of the other, just as man signifies animal, and signifies rational. And to this mode is reduced, that accident and passion signify the subject, just as snub signifies nose, and just as white signifies a terminated body, and other such things. Fifth just as opposition signifies opposition, and the opposite signifies the opposite: just as the disgregation of white signifies the aggregation of black, and the motion of cold to the center signifies the motion of hot from the center, and other such things. And this pertains to logic through this, that logic is the science of discoursing: but it cannot be discoursed, as Aristotle says, unless it be given that names signify something, because they do not signify infinite things. For the sake of this it also considers concerning common and incomplex voices.

Complexio autem et incomplexio non accidunt rei secundum quod res est, nec etiam voci secundum quod est vox : sed accidunt voci secundum quod refertur ad intellectum simplicem vel compositum. Simplicem autem dico intellectum, qui simplex unius rei est intuitivus. Talis enim intellectus non significatur ad alium, nisi voce sive dictione incomplexa.

Compositum autem dico intellectum, qui accipit rem unam in alia vel ut divisam ab alia : qui intellectus voce incomplexa designari non potest, sed potius complexa : sicut homo est animal, vel homo ambulat, vel homo non est lapis, et hujusmodi. Propter quod diffinientes incomplexum veteres Peripatetici dixerunt, quod dictio significativa ad placitum incomplexa est[1], cujus partes nihil significant de intentione[2] totius : sicut cum dicitur *homo*, pars ita quæ est *ho*, et pars alia quæ est *mo*, nihil significant de *hominis* intentione. Quod si etiam nomen aliquod rei unius simplicis sit compositum, sicut *Adeodatus*, tamen, secundum quod unius simplicis rei nomen est, incomplexa dictio est. Et hoc quod dico *Adeo*, et hoc quod dico *datus*, nihil significant de intentione totius nominati per hoc nomen *Adeodatus*. Complexa autem dictio est, cujus partes aliquid significant de intentione totius, sicut cum dicimus, *homo ambulat* ; et hæc dictio *homo*, et hæc dictio *ambulat*, aliquid significant de intentione hujus complexi, *homo ambulat*.

Adhuc autem vox secundum quod refertur ad intellectum ejus qui quærit invenire ignotum per notum, habet quod dividitur in commune, seu universale : et proprium, sive singulare : talium enim nihil accidit ei secundum quod ad rem designatam refertur. Res enim omnes sunt singulares quæ cadunt sub sensu et secundum quod constituuntur a natura : et commune quod est in eis, accipitur ab intellectu. Et ideo dicunt Aristoteles[3] et Boetius, quod universale est dum intelligitur, singulare vero dum sentitur. Commune tamen quod est in eis, est tribus modis, scilicet id quod est actu in pluribus, ut homo quod actu divisibile est in plures, ita quod totum est in singulis per naturam et rationem : et id quod actu est in uno, aptitudine vero naturæ potest esse in pluribus, sicut hoc commune quod est sol : et id quod nec actu est in pluribus, nec in aliquo vel uno solo, sed aptitudine non repugnat et ratione quin possit esse in multis, sicut eptangulum si ponimus, nihil esse eptangulum secundum actum, tamen secundum aptitudinem est et potest esse in multis. Et ut generaliter dicatur, omne nomen vel dictio, quod imponitur a forma communicabili multis, sive illa forma sit accidentalis, sive substantialis, commune est et universale, sive secundum actum multis communicetur, sive non.

But complexion and incomplexion do not happen to a thing according as it is a thing, nor even to a voice according as it is a voice: but they happen to a voice according as it is referred to a simple or composite intellect. But I call an intellect simple, which is simply intuitive of one thing. For such an intellect is not signified to another, except by an incomplex voice or diction.

But I call an intellect composite, which accepts one thing in another or as divided from another: which intellect cannot be designated by an incomplex voice, but rather by a complex one: just as man is an animal, or man walks, or man is not a stone, and such things. For which reason the ancient Peripatetics defining the incomplex said, that an incomplex diction significant at pleasure is that, whose parts signify nothing of the intention of the whole: just as when it is said *homo* [man], so the part which is *ho*, and the other part which is *mo*, signify nothing of the intention of *man*. But if even some name of one simple thing be composite, just as *Adeodatus*, nevertheless, according as it is the name of one simple thing, it is an incomplex diction. And this that I say *Adeo*, and this that I say *datus*, signify nothing of the intention of the whole named by this name *Adeodatus*. But a complex diction is that, whose parts signify something of the intention of the whole, just as when we say, *man walks*; and this diction *man*, and this diction *walks*, signify something of the intention of this complex, *man walks*.

Moreover a voice according as it is referred to the intellect of him who seeks to find the unknown through the known, has that it is divided into common, or universal: and proper, or singular: for nothing of such things happens to it according as it is referred to the designated thing. For all things are singular which fall under the sense and according as they are constituted by nature: and the common which is in them, is accepted by the intellect. And therefore Aristotle and Boethius say, that the universal is while it is understood, but the singular while it is sensed. Nevertheless the common which is in them, is in three modes, namely that which is in act in many, as man which is actively divisible into many, so that the whole is in singulars through nature and reason: and that which is in act in one, but by the aptitude of nature can be in many, just as this common which is the sun: and that which is neither in act in many, nor in some or one alone, but by aptitude and reason it is not repugnant but that it could be in many, just as a heptagon if we posit, nothing to be a heptagon according to act, nevertheless according to aptitude it is and can be in many. And that it may be said generally, every name or diction, which is imposed from a form communicable to many, whether that form be accidental, or substantial, is common and universal, whether according to act it be communicated to many, or not.

Proprium autem sive singulare est quod imponitur a forma accidentali significante accidentium collectionem quam impossibile est inveniri nisi in uno solo, ut socratitas, vel platonitas : quæ ex parentibus subjectis, et loco nativitatis, et aliis hujusmodi, non nisi uni convenire potest, et impossibile est ut in alio reperiatur. Et hoc dupliciter fit : vel enim fit nomine proprio, vel nutu demonstrationis ad hoc singulare, ut cum dicimus, *hæc lignum*, vel *hoc album* : hoc enim sic est *hoc*, quod non potest esse aliud.

Adhuc dictio sive vox significativa est articulata, non ex hoc quod refertur ad rem designatam, sed ex hoc quod est in intellectu quærentis scire ignotum per notum : licet etiam quædam ipsius sit nomen, quædam autem verbum. Pronomen autem (sicut et nomen suum testatur) vice nominis in supponendo accipitur: et participium cum suppletione verbi substantivi in apponendo vel prædicando supplet vicem verbi : sicut cum dicitur, homo *est amans*, vel homo *amat*, vel homo *fuit amans*, vel homo *amavit*, vel homo *erit amans*, vel homo *amabit*. Cæteræ autem partes indeclinabiles sine adjunctis nullum habent intellectum : ut si dicatur, homo est *in*, non intelligitur nisi addatur *in quo sit*, ut *in domo*. Et similiter cum dicitur, homo est *supra* et non addatur *supra quid* ; et si dicatur, homo

autem, et non addatur cui adverset conjunctio : vel si dicatur, homo *ergo*, nisi addatur quid inferatur. Nomen autem, ut in sequentibus habebitur, significativum est ad placitum sine tempore. verbum autem cum tempore quod ei subjicitur. Idem prædicatur, vel dicitur, vel negatur, vel affirmatur uni.

Adhuc autem voci significativæ ad placitum secundum quod est in intellectu quærentis scientiam ignoti per notum, accidunt quinque, scilicet quod sit *univoca*, et quædam *diversivoca*, quædam autem *multivoca*, etiam quædam *æquivoca*, quædam vero *analoga* sive proportionata, quæ apud Arabes vocantur convenientia. *Univoca* autem sunt, quæ a tali forma imposita sunt, ad quam omnium participantium eam est respectus unus secundum rem et rationem sine magis et minus : sicut *animal* participatur a speciebus animalium, et *homo* participatur ab individuis quæ sunt sub ipso. *Diversivoca* autem sunt diversa nomina unius et ejusdem rei secundum substantiam : eo quod instituens nomina illa instituendo diversis rei proprietatibus fuit affectus, ut ensis, mucro, spata, gladius, vestis, tunica, et hujusmodi. *Multivoca* sunt diversarum rerum diversa nomina : eo quod instituens diversis diversarum rerum proprietatibus instituendo fuit affectus, ut equus, et asinus.

But a proper or singular is that which is imposed from an accidental form signifying a collection of accidents which it is impossible to be found except in one alone, as socratity, or platonity: which from the subject parents, and place of nativity, and other things of this kind, can convene to none except one, and it is impossible that it be found in another. And this is done in two ways: for either it is done by a proper name, or by the nod of demonstration to this singular, as when we say, *this wood*, or *this white*: for this is so *this*, that it cannot be another.

Moreover a significant diction or voice is articulated, not from this that it is referred to the designated thing, but from this that it is in the intellect of the one seeking to know the unknown through the known: although also a certain one of it is a name, but a certain one a verb. But a pronoun (just as its name testifies) is accepted in place of a name in supposing: and a participle with the suppletion of a substantive verb in apposing or predicating supplies the place of a verb: just as when it is said, man *is loving*, or man *loves*, or man *was loving*, or man *loved*, or man *will be loving*, or man *will love*. But the other indeclinable parts without adjuncts have no intellect: as if it be said, man is *in*, it is not understood unless it be added *in what he is*, as *in the house*. And similarly when it is said, man is *above* and it is not added *above what*; and if it be said, man

however, and there is not added that to which the conjunction is adverse: or if it is said, man *therefore*, unless it is added what is inferred. But a name, as will be had in the following, is significative at pleasure without time. But a verb [is significative] with time which is subjected to it. The same is predicated, or said, or denied, or affirmed of one.

Furthermore to the voice significative at pleasure according to as it is in the intellect of him seeking the science of the unknown through the known, five things happen, namely that it be *univocal*, and some *diversivocal*, some however *multivocal*, also some *equivocal*, but some *analogous* or proportioned, which among the Arabs are called convenient. But *univocal* are those which are imposed from such a form, to which there is one respect of all participating in it according to thing and reason without more and less: just as *animal* is participated by the species of animals, and *man* is participated by the individuals which are under him. But *diversivocal* are different names of one and the same thing according to substance: because he instituting those names in instituting was affected by different properties of the thing, such as ensis, mucro, spata, gladius [sword], vestis, tunica, and such like. *Multivocal* are different names of different things: because he instituting in instituting was affected by different properties of different things, such as horse and ass.

Æquivoca sunt quando unum nomen diversis secundum diversam rationem impositum est : eo quod una aliqua proprietas inventa in diversis afficit instituentem ; quæ tamen proprietas non per unam rationem est in illis, ut *canis*, quod nomen est impositum latrabili, et stellæ cœlesti, et marino pisci propter unam proprietatem inventam in illis, quæ est omnia hæc esse mordacia, cum tamen non una ratione mordacia sint. *Analoga* autem sunt proportionaliter dicta, ut Arabes dicunt, convenientia : et sunt media inter univoca et æquivoca, quæ sunt imposita diversis secundum esse et substantiam per respectum ad unum cui proportionantur, sicut ens, quod dicitur de substantia primo et principaliter, et de accidente secundario, quia est aliquid entis : et quantitas dicitur ens, quia est mensura entis : et qualitas dicitur ens, quia est dispositio entis. Et hoc, ut dicit Joannes Damascenus in logica sua, fit tribus modis, scilicet proportione ad unum subjectum, ut ens : et proportione ad unum efficiens actum, ut medicus dicitur vere medicus qui secundum eam quæ in ipso est medicinam operatur : et medicus dicitur idiota, medicum per experta vel experimenta imitans in opere medicandi, et non secundum eam quæ in ipso sit artem medicinæ : et medicus dicitur instrumentum medicinæ per quod fit medicatio, ut clyster, vel embotum, vel aliud hujusmodi : tertio proportione ejusdem, sicut sanum quod principaliter consistit in æqualitate complexionis animalium, et est in cibo sicut in conservante eamdem sanitatem, et in urina sicut in indicante, et in aere vel in loco sicut in fovente, et similiter est in aliis. Hæc autem omnia de logicis extracta sunt : eo quod hæc conveniunt voci significativæ et articulatæ, secundum quod per institutionem afficit intellectum ejus, qui per notum certificari quærit de ignoto. Volumus enim secundum consuetudinem quam in aliis habemus, omnia quantum possimus ponere, quæ ad illuminationem pertinent doctrinæ.

CAPUT VI — *De parte logicæ quæ certificat incomplexum, et de requisitis ad veram diffinitionem, ejusque peccatis, ac de modis diffinitionis.*

Ex his autem quæ dicta sunt patet, quod si quis quærit scire incomplexum quod ignotum est, per id quod non potest sibi esse ignotum, non potest inve-

nire notitiam ejus nisi per diffinitionem vel aliquid aliud quod diffinitionem imitatur incomplexi aliqua declaratione.

Hujus autem principia et regulæ sunt quinque, et quinque corruptiones.

Equivocal are when one name is imposed on different things according to a different reason: because some one property found in different things affects the institutor; which property nevertheless is not in them through one reason, such as *dog*, which name is imposed on the barker, and the celestial star, and the marine fish on account of one property found in them, which is that all these are biting, although nevertheless they are not biting by one reason. But *analogous* are spoken of proportionally, as the Arabs say, convenient: and they are media between univocal and equivocal, which are imposed on different things according to being and substance through respect to one to which they are proportioned, such as being, which is said of substance first and principally, and of accident secondarily, because it is something of being: and quantity is called being, because it is the measure of being: and quality is called being, because it is the disposition of being. And this, as John Damascene says in his logic, happens in three modes, namely by proportion to one subject, such as being: and by proportion to one effecting the act, as a doctor is truly called a doctor who works according to the medicine which is in him: and a doctor is called an idiot [layman], imitating a doctor through expert or experiments in the work of medicating, and not according to the art of medicine which is in him: and a doctor is called the instrument of medicine through which medication is done, as a clyster, or an embotum, or another such like: thirdly by proportion of the same, such as healthy which principally consists in the equality of the complexion of animals, and is in food as in that conserving the same health, and in urine as in that indicating, and in the air or in the place as in that fostering, and similarly it is in others. But all these things are extracted from the logicals: because these convenient to the significative and articulate voice, according to as by institution it affects the intellect of him who through the known seeks to be certified about the unknown. For we wish according to the custom which we have in others, to place all things as much as we can which pertain to the illumination of the doctrine.

CHAPTER VI — *On the part of logic which certifies the incomplex, and on the requisites for a true definition, and its faults, and on the modes of definition.*

From these things however which have been said it is clear, that if anyone seeks to know the incomplex which is unknown, through that which cannot be unknown to him, he cannot find

the notice of it except through definition or something else which imitates a definition by some declaration of the incomplex.

But its principles and rules are five, and five corruptions.

Primum quidem, quod omnia posita in diffinitione sunt substantialia et substantialiter in diffinito existentia : quia diffinitio dicitur id quod omnes fines essentiæ diffinit, conjungit et unit, et explicat quæ sunt principia diffiniti sive esse diffiniti, scilicet essentiam, potentiam, et ultimum actum complentem esse diffiniti, sicut dicimus animal rationale, mortale, voluntarie mobile, diffinitionem esse hominis. *Animal* autem secundum quod in se includit corpus animatum sensibile et substantiam, prima potentia est, in qua inchoatum est esse hominis. Hæc autem inchoatio per *rationale* determinata est essentialiter ad actum rationis. Per *mortale* autem ad speciem est determinatum, præcipue secundum Stoicos, qui calodæmones et cacodæmones animalia rationalia, corpora aerea, et vita immortalia esse dicebant, ut dicunt Themistius et Apuleius. Per hoc autem quod *mobile voluntarie* dicitur, separatur ab aliis quæ apta a natura et phantasia sunt ad motum. Et hoc est primum.

Secundum autem est (quod Aristoteles docet in *Metaphysicis* [1]) quod ultima differentia sit cum diffinito convertibilis, quæ totam diffinitionem facit esse convertibilem : sicut hoc ipsum quod est voluntarie mobile, convertitur cum homine secundum quod voluntas sonat appetitum qui est in ratione.

Tertium autem, quod prius positum in diffinitione, se habeat ad sequens, sicut potentia propinqua ad actum, et sicut determinatum ad determinans, et sicut distinctum ad distinguens, sicut animatum ad sensibile, et sicut sensibile ad rationale, et sicut mortale ad rationale, et sicut mobile voluntarie ad mortale : ita quod in uno motu generationis semper posterius procedat ex antecedente.

Quartum est, quod diffiniens primum sit per se notum apud eum qui quærit cognoscere diffinitum et in substantia et potestate ; quia nisi sit notum in substantia, non potest esse principium cognitionis ignoti : et nisi sit notum in potestate, non potest per divisionem ipsius venari diffinitio ejus quod quæritur cognosci.

Quintum autem, quod diffinitio dicat totum esse diffiniti : quia aliter non attingeret a fine usque ad finem in quidditate et esse diffiniti, et sic verum nomen diffinitionis non haberet. Et per hoc habet diffinitio, quod est unum et non multa, sicut motus est unus et non multus, qui est a prima potentia per viam mediam usque ad ultimum actum. Hæc igitur diffinitive considerata faciunt talem diffinitionem, quod vere et totum certificat diffinitum.

First indeed, that all things posited in a definition are substantial and exist substantially in the defined: because a definition is said to be that which defines all ends of essence, conjoins and unites, and explicates what are the principles of the defined or the being of the defined, namely essence, potency, and the ultimate act completing the being of the defined, just as we say rational, mortal, voluntarily mobile animal, to be the definition of man. But *animal* according as it includes in itself a sensible animated body and a substance, is the first potency, in which the being of man is inchoated. But this inchoation is essentially determined through *rational* to the act of reason. But through *mortal* it is determined to species, especially according to the Stoics, who used to say that good demons and evil demons were rational animals, aerial bodies, and immortal in life, as Themistius and Apuleius say. But through this that it is said *voluntarily mobile*, it is separated from others which are apt by nature and phantasy to motion. And this is the first.

But the second is (what Aristotle teaches in the *Metaphysics*) that the ultimate difference be convertible with the defined, which makes the whole definition to be convertible: just as this very thing which is voluntarily mobile, is converted with man according as will sounds the appetite which is in reason.

But the third, that what is posited prior in a definition, relates to the following, just as a proximate potency to act, and just as the determined to the determining, and just as the distinct to the distinguishing, just as animated to sensible, and just as sensible to rational, and just as mortal to rational, and just as voluntarily mobile to mortal: so that in one motion of generation the posterior always proceeds from the antecedent.

The fourth is, that the first defining thing be per se known to him who seeks to know the defined both in substance and in power; because unless it is known in substance, it cannot be the principle of the cognition of the unknown: and unless it is known in power, the definition of that which is sought to be known cannot be hunted through the division of it.

But the fifth, that the definition say the whole being of the defined: because otherwise it would not reach from end to end in the quiddity and the being of the defined, and thus it would not have the true name of definition. And through this a definition has, that it is one and not many, just as a motion is one and not many, which is from the first potency through the middle way up to the ultimate act. Therefore these definitively considered make such a definition, that it truly and wholly certifies the defined.

Peccata ipsius sunt et quinque his opposita, quamvis quodlibet peccatorum sit multis modis : sicut et in aliis in quibus bonum fit ex una re et causa, malum autem omnifariam et modis infinitis, ut dicit Pythagoras [2]. Primum ergo peccatum est, si per accidentale unum vel per accidentalia plura vel omnia, notitia essentialis quæratur diffiniti : sicut si dicam, quod homo est animal risibile, vel quod sol est (ut dicit Empedocles) res alba calida.

Secundum peccatum est, si ultima differentia sit non convertibilis : tunc ipsa præcedentia quæ in plus sunt, per differentiam ultimam non determinantur ad esse diffiniti nisi in potentia : nec quidditas et esse diffiniti scitur per ea scientia universali, sed in potentia, non in actu : et sic non perfecte scitur esse diffiniti.

Tertium peccatum est , si inordinate ponantur in diffinitione quæ ponuntur :

sic enim actus significaretur præcedere potentiam in eodem : quod nunquam contingit in aliquo esse diffiniti, in quo est potentia et actus. In omnibus enim talibus potentia immediate præcedit actum : et ideo per talem diffinitionem esse (sicut est) diffiniti non declararetur. Et hujus exemplum, sicut si dicam, quod homo est vivum, rationabile, sensibile.

Quartum peccatum est, quod primum diffiniens sit non per se notum in substantia et potestate. Et hoc contingit quatuor modis : quia cum diffinitur per id quod est idem, aut æque ignotum, aut per ignotius illo, aut per id quod non potest esse notum nisi per diffinitum, aut per id quod per aliud est notum. Per id quod est idem : exemplum est, sicut quando diffinitur tempus quod est mensura motus : quod enim dicitur de tempore, dicitur de mensura motus : quia tempus nihil aliud est, nisi mensura motus : et qui ignorat tempus, ignorat id quod est mensura motus. Cum vero diffinitur per æque ignotum : est, sicut cum diffinitur albedo per id quod est esse contrarium nigredini : æque enim ignotum est quid sit albedo, et quid sit ejus contrarium, scilicet nigredo. Et sic de diffinitione relativorum per se invicem, sicut inferius in sequentibus erit manifestum[1]. De illo autem quod est ignotius : exemplum est, sicut qui diffinit ignem, dicens quod ignis est res inter corpora spiritui vel animæ simillima : diffinit enim ignem per animam, quæ ignotior est quam ignis per substantiam et diffinitionem.

And its sins are five opposed to these, although any of the sins be in many modes: just as also in others in which good is done from one thing and cause, but evil multifariously and in infinite modes, as Pythagoras says. Therefore the first sin is, if through one accidental or through many or all accidentals, the essential notice of the defined is sought: as if I say, that man is a risible animal, or that the sun is (as Empedocles says) a white hot thing.

The second sin is, if the ultimate difference be non-convertible: then those preceding things which are in more, are not determined to the being of the defined through the ultimate difference except in potency: neither are the quiddity and the being of the defined known through them by a universal science, but in potency, not in act: and thus the being of the defined is not perfectly known.

The third sin is, if what are posited in a definition be posited inordinately:

for thus the act would be signified to precede the potency in the same: which never happens in any being of a defined thing, in which there is potency and act. For in all such things the potency immediately precedes the act: and therefore through such a definition the being of the defined (just as it is) would not be declared. And an example of this, as if I should say, that man is living, rational, sensible.

The fourth sin is, that the first defining thing be not per se known in substance and power. And this happens in four ways: because when it is defined through that which is the same, or equally unknown, or through that which is more unknown than it, or through that which cannot be known except through the defined, or through that which is known through another. Through that which is the same: an example is, just as when time is defined that it is the measure of motion: for what is said of time, is said of the measure of motion: because time is nothing else, than the measure of motion: and he who is ignorant of time, is ignorant of that which is the measure of motion. But when it is defined through the equally unknown: it is, just as when whiteness is defined through that which is to be contrary to blackness: for it is equally unknown what whiteness is, and what its contrary is, namely blackness. And thus concerning the definition of relatives through each other, as will be manifest below in the following. But concerning that which is more unknown: an example is, just as he who defines fire, saying that fire is a thing among bodies most similar to a spirit or soul: for he defines fire through a soul, which is more unknown than fire through substance and definition.

De eo quod diffinitur res per id quod non potest cognosci nisi per diffinitum : exemplum est, sicut qui diffinit solem, dicens quod sol est planeta illuminatione sua faciens diem. Cum enim dies sit mora luminis solis super nostrum hemisphærium, constat quod illuminatio diei cognoscitur per diffinitum : et sic circularis erit diffinitio, quod valde est inconveniens[2]. Omnia autem conveniunt in uno, scilicet quod diffinitur res per id quod per aliud debet esse notum : sic enim nunquam stabit, sed semper diffinitur per aliud, et ibitur in infinitum.

Quintum peccatum est, quod diffinitio non dicat totum esse diffiniti : si enim non totum diceret et explicaret, non diceret quid est esse diffiniti, et non certificaret diffinitum nisi in parte. Sicut qui diffiniens triangulum, dicit quod triangulus est figura trium angulorum tres angulos habens æquales duobus rectis. Cum enim non ponatur in diffinitione, quod triangulus est figura rectilinea habens tres angulos æquos duobus rectis, non dicitur totum esse diffiniti : potest enim esse figura trium angulorum habens tres angulos majores tribus rectis, si ex arcubus sit composita figura triangula. Alia etiam de causa peccat dicta diffinitio : quia ponit quod non est essentiale diffiniti. Habere enim tres angulos æquos duobus rectis, non est essentiale constituens triangulum rectilineum, sed est passio essentiam diffiniti consequens. Aliud exemplum ejusdem (et est convenientius isto quod dicitur) est, quod circulus est figura plana una linea contenta. Hæc enim diffinitio non totum dicit esse diffiniti : quia de eo quod est principium formale circuli, et ex quo producitur, non facit mentionem, hoc est, de centro. Perfecta ergo erit si sic dicatur : circulus est figura plana una linea contenta, in cujus medio punctum est, a quo omnes lineæ ad circumferentiam productæ in continuum et directum sunt æquales. Hæc ergo sunt quæ in diffinitionibus sunt attendenda et cavenda, si per diffinitionem debeat certificari diffinitum.

Sunt tamen aliæ quædam notificationes, non propriæ diffinitiones, datæ aliquando per materiam, aliquando per efficientem tantum assignatæ, quæ nisi reducantur ad diffinitiones quæ per genus et essentiales differentias datæ sunt, diffinitiones dici non possunt, sed quales-

qualescumque notificationes. Reducantur autem hoc modo, quod materia non ut materia simplex accipitur, sed prout ipsa est prima potentia ad esse. Sic enim accipitur secundum quod in ipsa est jam forma essentialis inchoata, et in qua potestate formali sunt inchoatæ constituentes et dividentes differentiæ. Sicut si dicatur, quod homo est constitutus ex corpore et anima rationali : tunc enim corpus non absolutum a forma sumitur, sed potius dicitur animatum sensibile : quod animatum sensibile est, ex cujus potencyia et inchoatione producitur rationale.

Concerning that in which a thing is defined through that which cannot be known except through the defined: an example is, just as he who defines the sun, saying that the sun is a planet by its illumination making the day. For since the day is the dwelling of the light of the sun over our hemisphere, it is certain that the illumination of the day is known through the defined: and thus the definition will be circular, which is very inconvenient. But all these convene in one, namely that a thing is defined through that which must be known through another: for thus it will never stand, but is always defined through another, and it will go to infinity.

The fifth sin is, that the definition does not say the whole being of the defined: for if it did not say and explicate the whole, it would not say what the being of the defined is, and it would not certify the defined except in part. Just as he who defining a triangle, says that a triangle is a figure of three angles having three angles equal to two right angles. For since it is not posited in the definition, that a triangle is a rectilinear figure having three angles equal to two right ones, the whole being of the defined is not said: for it can be a figure of three angles having three angles greater than three right angles, if the triangular figure be composed from arcs. Also the said definition sins for another cause: because it posits what is not essential to the defined. For to have three angles equal to two right ones, is not an essential constituting a rectilinear triangle, but is a passion consequent to the essence of the defined. Another example of the same (and it is more convenient than that which is said) is, that a circle is a plane figure contained by one line. For this definition does not say the whole being of the defined: because concerning that which is the formal principle of a circle, and from which it is produced, it makes no mention, that is, concerning the center. It will therefore be perfect if it be said thus: a circle is a plane figure contained by one line, in the middle of which is a point, from which all lines produced to the circumference in continuous and direct are equal. Therefore these are the things which must be attended to and cautioned against in definitions, if the defined ought to be certified through a definition.

Nevertheless there are some other notifications, not proper definitions, given sometimes through the matter, sometimes assigned through the efficient only, which unless they be reduced to definitions which are given through genus and essential differences, cannot be called definitions, but whatever-

whatever notifications. But they are reduced in this way: that matter is not accepted as simple matter, but as it is the first potency for being. For it is thus accepted according as there is already in it an inchoate essential form, and in which formal power are inchoate the constituting and dividing differences. Just as if it were said that man is constituted from body and a rational soul: for then the body is not taken as absolute from form, but rather is called an animated sensible: which animated sensible is that from whose potency and inchoation the rational is produced.

Et sic redit ad illam diffinitionem quæ est ex genere et differentia : quia corpus animatum sensibile est animal, et animatum anima rationali est rationale. Quæ autem per efficientem datur, est, ut si dicatur, quod homo est quod generatur ab homine. Tunc enim agens non sumitur ut efficiens tantum, sed ut agens secundum formam et univoce. Univoce autem agens, dat formam secundum quod de potentia formali exit ad actum. Unde generatum ab homine non est vivum et animal simul, nec animal et homo simul secundum actum : sed primo vivum in actu, et potentia sensibile : secundo sensibile in actu, et potentia rationale. Et etiam diffinitio per causam efficientem data, reducitur ad eam quæ est ex genere et differentia. Aliter accepta causa efficiens, erit de essentia diffiniti, et non certificabit ipsum.

Omnis autem alia incomplexi declaratio quæ fit per accidentalia, non est diffinitio, sed descriptio vocatur. Talis autem declaratio non debet fieri per accidentalia communia, quia hæc convertibilia non sunt : sed per accidentalia propria, quia de illis intelligitur quod Aristoteles dicit, quod accidentia sive accidentium cognitio maximam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est. Hæc enim sunt accidentia naturæ, et de ipsius naturæ aptitudine procedunt, et ideo substantiam notificant, sicut sæpe id quod prius est cognoscitur per id quod est posterior, non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Hoc autem in sequentibus erit manifestum. Talibus tamen utitur logicus in accipiendo notitiam ignoti, sicut etiam utitur aliis argumentationibus in accipiendo notitiam complexi, quæ sunt minus certificantes quam syllogismus.

Aliis autem declarationibus utitur logicus quandocumque sunt majoris declarationis quam ipsum nomen vel dictio incomplexa, cujus quærit notitiam : quæ quamvis non perfecte certificent, tamen aliquo modo declarant id quod quæritur. Et quia, sicut dicit Ptolemæus, stultus est qui quando non perfecte potest cognoscere quod quærit, abjicit id per quod cognoscere potest de quæsito conjectans. Talium igitur regulas et principia dare est logici ad incomplexi cognitionem, per quæ a principiis per se cognitis incipiat et deveniat in cognitionem eorum quæ quæruntur : non enim omnia possunt esse incognita : quia sic quærendo procederetur in infinitum. Principia enim prima sunt quasi semina per naturam cognitioni hominis inserta, ex quibus quasi seminibus magni oriuntur fructus scientiarum de his quæ cognoscuntur per ipsa : primis enim positis per divisionem, cognoscitur quid potentia sit in ipsis. Et etiam divisio producit usque ad ultimum ; propter quod ipsa divisionis scientia necessaria est logico, ut dicit Boetius.

And thus it returns to that definition which is from genus and difference: because the animated sensible body is an animal, and that which is animated by a rational soul is rational. That, however, which is given through the efficient [cause], is as if it were said that man is that which is generated by man. For then the agent is not taken as an efficient only, but as an agent according to form and univocally. But a univocal agent gives form according as it goes out from formal potency into act. Hence that which is generated by man is not living and animal at the same time, nor animal and man at the same time according to act: but first living in act, and potentially sensible: secondly sensible in act, and potentially rational. And also the definition given through the efficient cause is reduced to that which is from genus and difference. Otherwise, the efficient cause being accepted [differently], it will be of the essence of the thing defined, and will not certify it.

Every other declaration of the incomplex which is made through accidentals is not a definition, but is called a description. But such a declaration should not be made through common accidentals, because these are not convertible: but through proper accidentals, because concerning these it is understood what Aristotle says, that accidents or the knowledge of accidents contribute the greatest part to knowing what a thing is. For these are accidents of nature, and proceed from the aptitude of that very nature, and therefore they notify the substance, just as often that which is prior is known through that which is posterior, not simply, but as far as we are concerned. This, however, will be manifest in what follows. Nevertheless, the logician uses such things in receiving knowledge of the unknown, just as he also uses other argumentations in receiving knowledge of the complex, which are less certifying than the syllogism.

The logician uses other declarations whenever they are of greater declaration than the name itself or the incomplex diction whose knowledge he seeks: which, although they do not perfectly certify, nevertheless in some way declare that which is sought. And because, as Ptolemy says, he is a fool who, when he cannot perfectly know what he seeks, rejects that through which he can know by conjecturing about what is sought. Therefore, it belongs to the logician to give rules and principles for the knowledge of the incomplex, through which he may begin from principles known through themselves and arrive at the knowledge of those things which are sought: for not all things can be unknown: because thus in seeking one would proceed to infinity. For the first principles are like seeds inserted by nature into the knowledge of man, from which seeds, as it were, great fruits of the sciences arise concerning those things which are known through them: for with the first things posited through division, it is known what is potentially in them. And also division leads even to the ultimate; for which reason the science of division itself is necessary to the logician, as Boethius says.

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CAPUT VII — *De parte logicæ qua certificatur quæstio de complexo et de necessitate totius logicæ, et quod varietur modus sciendi secundum diversitatem materiarum in quibus quæritur scientia.*

Sicut autem logicus docens quærere-

scientiam incomplexi[1], docet instrumentum quo accipiatur notitia illius secundum diffinitionem, et ea quæ ad diffinitionem faciunt, et quæ diffinitionem circumstant, et quæ diffinitionem perficiunt, et ea quæ diffinitionem mutant : sic docens accipere scientiam complexi, docet syllogismum qui est illius proprium instrumentum, et docet alias species argumentationum, et principia syllogismi, et ea quæ circumstant ipsum, et principia ipsius, et partes, et materiam in qua poni potest forma syllogismi, et aliarum argumentationum forma, et quæ syllogismum immutant. Et ideo ea de quibus habet tractare logicus, secundum ista dividuntur et multiplicantur.

Ejus complexi cujus potest accipi scientia, non est differentia : quia sola indicativa oratio est, cujus est esse verum vel falsum. Et ideo tantum illius scientia potest accipi : quia scientia tantum veri est[2]. Sed hæc est duplex, categorica scilicet, et hypothethica : sive (ut Arabes dicunt) enuntiatio et conjunctio : propter quod duas species docet constituere syllogismorum. Docet enim constituere syllogismum categoricum, et syllogismum hypotheticum, quamvis hypotheticus ad categoricum habeat reduci.

Constructio autem syllogismi dupliciter fit, ut jam diximus in antehabitis, ad inveniendum scilicet, et judicandum. Inventio autem esse non potest, nisi per habitudinem noti ad ignotum, quæ habitudo topica est et in *topicorum* scientia docetur. Judicandi autem scientia per resolutionem inventi est, quod resolvitur aut in formalia syllogismi principia, aut materialia, quæ sunt principia certificantia rem per hoc quod sunt causæ ejus quod sequitur, et illatum est. Et duæ sunt partes, *priorum* scilicet *Analyticorum*, et *poste-riorum Analyticorum* : et docere principia et regulas istorum logici proprium est. Ne autem fiat deceptio circa ea quæ dicta sunt, inventa est scientia de sophisticis elenchis. Adhuc autem ne fiat impedimentum ex parte ejus qui quærit accipere, inventæ sunt cautelæ tentatoris, in quibus omnibus doctrina logici est, ut scientia complete accipi possit enuntiationis, cujus scientia quæritur per argumentationem.

CHAPTER VII — On that part of logic by which the question concerning the complex is certified, and on the necessity of the whole of logic, and that the mode of knowing is varied according to the diversity of the matters in which science is sought.

Just as the logician, teaching how to seek-

the science of the incomplex, teaches the instrument by which the notice of it is accepted according to definition, and those things which make to definition, and which stand around definition, and which perfect definition, and those things which change definition: thus teaching to accept the science of the complex, he teaches the syllogism which is the proper instrument of it, and teaches other species of argumentations, and the principles of the syllogism, and those things which stand around it, and its principles, and parts, and the matter in which the form of the syllogism can be posited, and the form of other argumentations, and what things change a syllogism. And therefore those things concerning which the logician has to treat, are divided and multiplied according to these.

Of that complex of which science can be accepted, there is no difference: because the indicative speech alone is that, whose it is to be true or false. And therefore only of it can science be accepted: because science is only of the true. But this is twofold, namely categorical, and hypothetical: or (as the Arabs say) enunciation and conjunction: for which reason he teaches to constitute two species of syllogisms. For he teaches to constitute the categorical syllogism, and the hypothetical syllogism, although the hypothetical has to be reduced to the categorical.

But the construction of a syllogism is done twofoldly, as we have already said in the foregoing, namely to discovering, and to judging. But discovering cannot be, except through the habitude of the known to the unknown, which habitude is topical and is taught in the science of the *Topics*. But the science of judging is through the resolution of the discovered, which is resolved either into the formal principles of a syllogism, or the material, which are the principles certifying the thing through this that they are the causes of that which follows, and is inferred. And there are two parts, namely of the *Prior Analytics*, and of the *Posterior Analytics*: and to teach the principles and rules of these is proper of the logician. But lest a deception might happen concerning those things which are said, the science concerning the *Sophistical Refutations* was discovered. Moreover lest an impediment might happen from the part of him who seeks to accept, the cautions of the tempter were discovered, in all of which the doctrine of the logician is, so that the science of the enunciation can be completely accepted, whose science is sought through argumentation.

Quia vero syllogismus non scitur an sit compositum et complexum quid, nisi sciatur ex quibus et quot et qualibus est, et qualiter conjunctus, ideo habet agere logicus de enuntiatione et partibus et qualitatibus et compositione enuntiationis. Et in his perficitur opus logicum : quæ omnia fiunt actu rationis, qui est ratiocinatio, qui actus discursus rationis est ex uno ad aliud. Et ideo tales scientiæ a Dionysio vocantur discursivæ disciplinæ. Non autem potest sic ex uno in aliud discurrere ratio, nisi prius accipiat unum in alio esse divisum per se vel per accidens. Et hoc esse non potest, nisi accipiatur unum esse ordinatum ad aliud per se vel per accidens. Ordo autem est prioris et posterioris secundum naturam et esse : et sic accipit universale et particulare per se vel per accidens. Et sic invenit modum prædicandi unum de altero, vel negandi. Et quoad ordinem inventa est scientia *Uni-versalium*, et scientia *Prædicamentorum*. Et quoad modum educendi unum de alio, inventa est scientia divisionum. Rationis enim opus est ordinare, componere, et colligere, et resolvere ea quæ collecta sunt : quo opere utitur quasi instrumento in accipiendo scientiam quando procedit a noto ad ignotum : quorum notitia (si perfecte traditur) præparatus est logicus ad acceptionem scientiæ, dummodo sciat cavere errores et fallacias, de quibus sufficienter instruitur in sophisticis elenchis.

Hæ igitur sunt partes logicæ quæ generaliter habent docere modum accipiendi scientiam de quolibet scibili incomplexo vel complexo. Et hoc jam ante nos determinavit Alfarabius. Hic tamen modus secundum materiam in qua ponitur, variatur secundum diversitatem materiæ in qua quæritur scientia. Nam in sermocinalibus aliter est in grammatica, quæ dictionum significantium attendit modum tam in flexione quam in conjunctione constructionis. Aliter etiam est in poetica, quæ ex fictis et imaginatione movere intendit ad delectationem, vel abominationem, vel appetitum, vel amorem, vel odium. Et ideo fabula et recitatione factorum heroicorum, et in oratione cantu utitur modulato brevi et longo, ut demulceat auditum, ut facilius provocet. Et aliter est in rhetoricis, quæ dicendi docent copiam ad persuadendum judicem, ut provocetur ad vindictam vel privationem ejus de quo persuadet, sumens locos rhetoricos tam in persuadendo, quam etiam in conquestione et accusatione. Et sunt etiam colores orationis, ut lepida sit oratio, et vigeat accepta propter sermonis culturam. Aliter etiam in laudabilibus et ethicis, in quibus laudis vel vituperationis demonstratione acceptabile et laudabile fit quod proponitur priusquam virtute persuasionis.

But because a syllogism is not known whether it be a composite and complex somewhat, unless it be known out of what and how many and what kind of things it is, and how conjoined, therefore the logician has to treat of the enunciation and the parts and qualities and composition of the enunciation. And in these the logical work is perfected: which all are done by the act of reason, which is ratiocination, which act is the discourse of reason from one to another. And therefore such sciences are called by Dionysius discursive disciplines. But reason cannot thus discourse from one into another, unless first it accepts one to be divided in another per se or per accidens. And this cannot be, unless one be accepted to be ordered to another per se or per accidens. But order is of the prior and the posterior according to nature and being: and thus it accepts the universal and the particular per se or per accidens. And thus it discovers the mode of predicating one of another, or denying. And as to the order the science of *Universals* was discovered, and the science of the *Predicaments* [Categories]. And as to the mode of bringing one out of another, the science of divisions was discovered. For the work of reason is to order, to compose, and to collect, and to resolve those things which are collected: which work it uses as an instrument in accepting science when it proceeds from the known to the unknown: with whose notice (if it is perfectly delivered) the logician is prepared to the acceptation of science, provided he knows to caution against errors and fallacies, concerning which he is sufficiently instructed in the sophistical refutations.

These therefore are the parts of logic which generally have to teach the mode of accepting the science of any knowable whatever, incomplex or complex. And this already before us de-

...termined Al-Farabi. But this mode, according to the matter in which it is posited, varies according to the diversity of the matter in which the science is sought. For in the logical disciplines it is otherwise in grammar, which attends to the mode of significant dictions both in inflection and in the conjunction of construction. It is also otherwise in poetics, which intends to move from fictions and imagination to delight, or abomination, or appetite, or love, or hate. And therefore it uses fable and the recitation of heroic deeds, and in speech a modulated song brief and long, that it may soothe the hearing, that it may more easily provoke. And it is otherwise in rhetoric, which teaches an abundance of speaking to persuade a judge, that he may be provoked to vengeance or privation of him concerning whom one persuades, taking rhetorical topics both in persuading, as also in complaining and accusing. And there are also colors of speech, that the speech may be charming, and may flourish being accepted on account of the cultivation of discourse. It is also otherwise in the laudable and ethical sciences, in which by the demonstration of praise or vituperation that which is proposed becomes acceptable and laudable before the virtue of persuasion.

Etenim in realibus scientiis, aliter est in probabilibus, et aliter in necessariis et demonstrantibus, et aliter in conjectantibus quæ non sunt scientiæ demonstrationum, sicut in physiognomia, et secunda parte astronomiæ, et nicromantia, et aliis hujusmodi scientiis.

Talibus igitur et his quæ dicta sunt habitis, perfectum erit omne negotium logicum, quo tradere intendimus methodum, qua omne quod ignotum est, notum fieri potest ex eo quod per se notum est vel positum vel acceptum ut notum. Quædam enim sunt per se nota in quibusdam : quædam autem sunt accepta ab aliis ut nota, sicut in scientiis conjecturalibus, in quibus nulla sunt secundum rem per se nota.

CAPUT I.

Quomodo universale est de consideratione logici, et de numero universalium, ac de utilitate libri universalium.

Primum autem quod in scientia logica est considerandum, universale est : quia si ratio prædicabilis de aliis secundum veritatem attendatur, proprie et vere prædicari de alio non potest, nisi quod inest illi de quo prædicatur. Cum autem nihil insit sibiipsi (hoc enim secundum intellectum intelligi non potest, quod aliquid sit in seipso, vel insit sibiipsi, ut dicit Aristoteles) oportet, quod omne quod inesse alii accipitur, aut insit ut natura essentialis, aut ut accidens. Et per hoc quod inest, sequitur de necessitate, quod communicabile sit omnibus quibus inesse significatur. Communicabile ergo multis est secundum aptitudinem et in multis et de multis. Omne autem quod sic inest, et hac ipsa de causa prædicabile est. Ratio ergo et causa prædicabilis est, quod sit universale. Cum ergo primus actus rationis (qui scientiam ignoti investigat per notum) sit ordinatio prædicabilium, ordinatio autem prædicabilium cognosci non potest, nisi sciatur per quam rationem prædicabile sit id quod prædicatur : quæ ratio sumitur ex hoc, quod prædicabile est. (Est enim prius considerare prædicabile secundum id quod prædicabile est, quam considerare ordinem prædicabilium.) Cum ergo ex hoc quod universale sit, prædicabile sit, oportet primo ponere scientiam universalis.

Si autem quis objiciat, quod etiam particulare de seipso prædicatur, Dicemus quod hæc prædicatio non perfectam habet prædicationis rationem : et de hoc in sequentibus in loco opportuno pertractabitur. Sic ergo ad prædicabilium rationem, et necessarium est et utile de universali præmittere tractatum.

For indeed in the real sciences, it is otherwise in the probable, and otherwise in the necessary and demonstrative, and otherwise in the conjectural which are not sciences of demonstrations, as in physiognomy, and the second part of astronomy, and necromancy, and other sciences of this kind.

Therefore with such and those things which have been said being had, every logical business will be perfect, by which we intend to deliver the method, by which everything that is unknown can be made known from that which is known per se or posited or accepted as known. For some things are known per se in some: but some are accepted from others as known, as in the conjectural sciences, in which no things are according to the thing per se known.

CHAPTER I.

How the universal is of the consideration of the logician, and on the number of universals, and on the utility of the book of universals.

The first thing that must be considered in the science of logic is the universal: because if the reason of being predicable of others according to truth is attended to, it cannot properly and truly be predicated of another unless it is in that of which it is predicated. But since nothing is in itself (for this cannot be understood according to the intellect, that something be in itself, or be in itself, as Aristotle says), it is necessary that everything which is accepted to be in another, either be in it as an essential nature, or as an accident. And through this, that it is in it, it follows by necessity that it is communicable to all to which its being in is signified. It is therefore communicable to many according to aptitude, and in many, and of many. But everything that is thus in, for this very reason is predicable. Therefore, the reason and cause of being predicable is that it is a universal. Since, therefore, the first act of reason (which investigates the science of the unknown through the known) is the ordering of predicables, and the ordering of predicables cannot be known unless it is known by what reason that which is predicated is predicable: which reason is taken from this, that it is predicable. (For it is prior to consider the predicable according to that which is predicable, than to consider the order of predicables.) Since, therefore, from this that it is universal, it is predicable, it is necessary first to posit the science of the universal.

But if anyone should object that the particular is also predicated of itself, we shall say that this predication does not have the perfect reason of predication: and concerning this, it will be treated in what follows in the opportune place. Thus, therefore, for the reason of predicables, it is both necessary and useful to prefix a treatise on the universal.

Universale autem est, quod cum sit in uno, aptum natum est esse in pluribus, ut in antehabitis ostensum est. Et per hoc quod in multis per aptitudinem est, prædicabile est de illis. Et sic universale est, quod de sua aptitudine est in multis et de multis. Et hoc modo prout ratio est prædicabilitatis, ad logicum pertinet de universali tractare, quamvis secundum quod est natura quadam et differentia entis, tractare de ipso pertineat ad metaphysicum. Prædicare enim et prædicari rationis est ordinantis et componentis prædicabilia secundum prædicabilium propriam rationem.

Universale autem sic acceptum prout est prædicabile quod in multis et de multis, aut inest essentialiter, aut accidentaliter : sive ut essentia, sive ut accidens. Si inest ut essentia : aut inest ut tota essentia, aut ut pars essentialis. Si inest ut tota formalis essentia, constat quod est species, quia species totum est formale esse individuorum de quibus prædicatur : quia quidquid est post speciem, est de materia vel individuantibus. Si autem ut pars essentialis : tunc aut est secundum potentiam in qua est esse per inchoationem, aut est pars secun-

dum actum in quo est esse secundum actum perfectum. Et priori quidem modo est genus, secundo vero modo est differentia. Si vero inest ut accidens : aut inest ut accidens naturæ, quod de ipsius naturæ aptitudine causatur et emanat : aut ut accidens commune, quod est accidens individui. Et priori quidem modo est proprium, et secundo modo est accidens vocatum. Et de omnibus his tractare est necessarium logico, propter hoc quod prædicabilium considerat ordinem et prædicatorum compositionem.

Qualiter omnia ista prædicantur per notam compositionis, et qualiter per hoc verbum substantivum *est*, in sequentibus erit manifestum : sed hic tantum sufficiat, quod quidquid prædicatur, prædicatur non ut pars, sed ut idem secundum esse. Idem autem dico per se, vel per accidens. De his igitur in hoc nostro libro erit tractatus. Nec considerabimus hic res ipsas quibus talia ad ordinem unum prædicabilis referuntur. Hoc enim in libro *Prædicamentorum* habet determinari. Sed accidens ipsis rebus, quo eorum primum prædicabilium *generis* habet nomen et rationem, et secundum *speciei*, et tertium *differentiæ*, quartum vero *proprii*, quintum autem *accidentis*. Hoc enim ad istius primi libri pertinet intentionem. Per hoc enim accidentia diversum modum accipiunt prædicandi in quid vel in quale : quamvis conveniant omnia in hoc, quod quodlibet ipsorum est prædicabile : per quod etiam scientia est una, et non multæ. Diffiniri autem universale vera diffinitione non potest : quia per hoc quod prædicabile est de multis, non est unius et ejusdem rationis, sed est dictum per prius et posterius de illis de quibus est per ambitum suæ communitatis prædicatum.

But the universal is that which, while it is in one, is by nature apt to be in many, as has been shown in the preceding. And through this, that it is in many through aptitude, it is predicable of them. And thus the universal is that which by its aptitude is in many and of many. And in this way, insofar as it is the reason of predicability, it pertains to the logician to treat of the universal, although according as it is a certain nature and a difference of being, to treat of it pertains to the metaphysician. For to predicate and to be predicated is of the reason ordering and composing the predicables according to the proper reason of the predicables.

But the universal thus accepted as it is a predicable which is in many and of many, either is in essentially, or accidentally: whether as essence, or as accident. If it is in as essence: either it is in as the whole essence, or as an essential part. If it is in as the whole formal essence, it is certain that it is a species, because the species is the whole formal being of the individuals of which it is predicated: because whatever is after the species is of matter or individuating [principles]. But if it is as an essential part: then either it is according to potency in which there is being through inchoation, or it is a part according-

[according to] act in which there is being according to perfect act. And in the first way indeed it is genus, but in the second way it is difference. But if it is in as an accident: either it is in as an accident of nature, which is caused and emanates from the aptitude of that very nature: or as a common accident, which is an accident of the individual. And in the first way indeed it is a property [proprium], and in the second way it is called an accident. And to treat of all these is necessary for the logician, for the reason that he considers the order of predicables and the composition of predicates.

How all these are predicated through the mark of composition, and how through this substantive verb *is* [est], will be manifest in what follows: but here let it only suffice that whatever is predicated, is predicated not as a part, but as the same according to being. But I say "the same" either through itself [per se], or through accident. Therefore, concerning these there will be a treatise in this our book. Nor shall we consider here the things themselves to which such things are referred for one order of the predicable. For this has to be determined in the book of *Predicaments*. But the accident to the things themselves, by which the first of their predicables has the name and reason of *genus*, and the second of *species*, and the third of *difference*, the fourth indeed of *property*, the fifth however of *accident*. For this pertains to the intention of this first book. For through this, accidents receive a diverse mode of predicating in *what* [in quid] or in *of what kind* [in quale]: although they all agree in this, that any of them is predicable: by which also the science is one, and not many. But the universal cannot be defined by a true definition: because through this, that it is predicable of many, it is not of one and the same reason, but is said by prior and posterior of those of which it is predicated through the circuit of its community.

Tractantes autem de his, modum et ordinem tenebimus Porphyrii. Ut duplex utilitas habeatur nostri operis : et de universalibus habeatur doctrina, et etiam libri Porphyrii habeatur intellectus, quem scripsit ad quemdam Grisarotium suum discipulum.

Cum autem sit duplex necessarium, scilicet inevitabile, et utile, ad eam quæ est apud Aristotelis libros doctrinam prædicamentorum (quæ cæteris doctrinis prædicamentorum præexcellentior est) nosse quid sit genus, quid differentia, quid species, quid proprium, et quid accidens, secundum quod hæc universalia habent rationem prædicabilium, oportet tractare de istis. Inevitabile enim est, secundum quod rationem prædicabilis oportet cognoscere ante prædicabilium ordinem. Utile est secundum quod adminiculum est scire intentionem generis et speciei et differentiæ et proprii accidentis, antequam determinetur de his quæ in uno genere ordinantur ut species, et antequam determinetur quæ ex uno genere dividuntur per oppositas differentias, et antequam assignentur uniuscujusque generis propria, et ampla distinctio generum in substantia, et accidentium genera determinentur.

Est autem necessarium et utile ad diffinitionum assignationem : quæ omnes prout prædicabiles sunt, ex genere et differentiis constituuntur, in quibus cavere oportet ne aliquod accidentale ponatur. Non enim potest vitari malum nisi cognitum, ut dicit Boetius. Omnino etiam necessarium ad demonstrationem, cujus medium secundum potissimum modum demonstrandi diffinitio est dicens quid et propter quid. Est enim talis diffinitio, ut dicit Aristoteles, demonstratio positione differens. Necessarium est etiam et utile ad divisionum scientiam : quia omnis divisio vel est generis in species, vel totius in partes, vel accidentis in accidentia, vel subjecti in accidentia, vel accidentis in subjecta, vel vocis in significationes. Et patet, quod quædam in divisione sunt, quæ sine doctrina istorum sciri non possunt. Quare scientia generis, speciei, differentiæ, proprii, et accidentis, adminiculum est-

ad scientiam divisionum generis in species, et accidentis in accidentia, vel accidentis in subjecta, vel subjecti in accidentia. Si autem non ad omnem utilis est divisionem, per hoc non removetur quin sit ad divisionem. Scientiam enim divisionis non habet etiam qui unam ignorat divisionis rationem.

Treating however of these, we shall hold the mode and order of Porphyry. So that a double utility of our work may be had: both that the doctrine concerning universals be had, and also that the understanding of the book of Porphyry be had, which he wrote to a certain Grisarotius, his disciple.

Since however there are two kinds of necessity, namely the inevitable and the useful: for that doctrine of the predicaments which is in the books of Aristotle (which is more excellent than the other doctrines of predicaments), to know what is genus, what difference, what species, what property, and what accident, according as these universals have the reason of predicables, it is necessary to treat of them. For it is inevitable, according as the reason of the predicable must be known before the order of the predicables. It is useful according as it is a help to know the intention of genus and species and difference and property [and] accident, before it is determined concerning those things which are ordered in one genus as species, and before those are determined which are divided from one genus through opposite differences, and before the properties of each genus are assigned, and the ample distinction of genera in substance, and the genera of accidents are determined.

It is also necessary and useful for the assignment of definitions: which all, insofar as they are predicable, are constituted from genus and differences, in which one must take care lest any accidental be placed. For evil cannot be avoided unless it is known, as Boethius says. It is altogether necessary for demonstration, whose medium according to the most powerful mode of demonstrating is the definition saying what it is and for the sake of what. For such a definition is, as Aristotle says, a demonstration differing in position. It is also necessary and useful for the science of divisions: because every division is either of genus into species, or of a whole into parts, or of an accident into accidents, or of a subject into accidents, or of an accident into subjects, or of a voice into significations. And it is clear that there are certain things in division which cannot be known without the doctrine of these. Wherefore the science of genus, species, difference, property, and accident, is a help-

to the science of divisions of genus into species, and of accident into accidents, or of accident into subjects, or of subject into accidents. But if it is not useful to every division, through this it is not removed that it is to division. For he does not have the science of division even who is ignorant of one reason of division.

Cum ergo tam utile sit hoc negotium istarum rerum prout universalia quædam sunt, istarum quinque rerum prout in ratione sunt, speculatione sive consideratione tentabo traditionem compendiosam faciens doctrinam monstrare. Modus enim noster quasi introductorius erit, ut imperitis sufficiat. Ea autem quæ ab Antiquis de his dicta sunt colligemus : et quamvis in modo introductionis ab altioribus quæstionibus abstinendum sit, tamen propter doctrinæ bonitatem etiam illas tangemus. Cum tamen in modo introductionis simpliciora facile ab imperitis intelligibilia mediocriter sint potius conjectanda, ut facilior fiat instructio. De una enim et eadem re subtili demonstratione et introductoria disertione potest tractari. Non enim per causas altissimas ista hic demonstrabimus, sed per similitudines et exempla de his faciemus instructionem.

CAPUT II.

A quibus quæstionibus circa universalia sit abstinendum.

Ne autem videatur quod nulla scientia de his sit, quæ per logicæ principia determinari non possunt : sed oportet quod altissimæ sapientiæ principiis determinentur. Prima quidem est, an ista quæ genera et species dicuntur, in re subsistant, aut non quidem in rerum natura sint subsistentia, sed in solis nudis purisque intellectibus per abstractionem a rebus factam sint posita ? Et dico solis intellectibus per exclusionem rerum, ita quod non in rebus sint. Nudos autem dico intellectus ab appendiciis materiæ separatos, qui illorum tantum sunt, quæ nunquam in materia fuerunt. Quæ enim in materia fuerunt, non in nudis sunt intellectibus, sed sunt in intellectibus qui immixti sunt phantasiæ et sensui. Puros autem voco intellectus ex parte intelligibilis, ad quod nihil movet nisi solius intelligentiæ lumen, et non phantasma receptum.

Sunt tamen qui aliter ea quæ dicta sunt, interpretantur dicentes, quod in solis intellectibus sunt illa quoad nos, quæ utrum sint et quomodo esse habeant, solus scit intellectus. Et tale esse in intellectu universalia habere dixerunt illi qui vocabantur Nominales, qui communitatem (ad quam particularia universalium, de quibus dicuntur ipsa universalia, referuntur) tantum in intellectu esse dicebant. Nudos autem vocant intellectus, qui ad scibile quod accipiunt non habent præscriptos habitus, qui disponant intellectum ad speculationem eorum quæ in ipso sunt.

Since therefore this business of those things as they are certain universals is so useful, I will attempt to show the doctrine of those five things as they are in reason, by speculation or consideration, making a compendious tradition. For our mode will be as if introductory, that it may suffice for the unskillful. But we will collect those things which have been said concerning these by the Ancients: and although in the mode of introduction one ought to abstain from higher questions, nevertheless on account of the goodness of the doctrine we will touch upon them also. Although nevertheless in the mode of introduction the simpler things easily intelligible by the unskillful are rather to be mediately conjectured, that instruction may become easier. For concerning one and the same thing it can be treated by a subtle demonstration and by an introductory dissertation. For we will not demonstrate these things here through the highest causes, but we will make instruction concerning them through similitudes and examples.

CHAPTER II.

From what questions concerning universals one must abstain.

Lest however it might seem that there is no science concerning these, which cannot be determined through the principles of logic: but it is necessary that they be determined by the principles of the highest wisdom. The first indeed is whether those things which are called genera and species subsist in the thing, or whether they do not indeed subsist in the nature of things, but are posited in sole naked and pure intellects through an abstraction made from things? And I say sole intellects through the exclusion of things, so that they are not in things. But I call naked intellects those separated from the appendages of matter, which are of those alone which never were in matter. For those which were in matter, are not in naked intellects, but are in intellects which are immixed with phantasy and sense. But I call pure intellects from the part of the intelligible, to which nothing moves except the light of the intelligence alone, and not a received phantasm.

However there are those who interpret those things which have been said otherwise, saying that those things are in sole intellects as to us, which whether they are and how they have being, the intellect alone knows. And those who were called Nominalists said that universals have such a being in the intellect, who said the community (to which the particulars of the universals, of which the universals themselves are said, are referred) to be only in the intellect. But they call naked intellects those which to the knowable which they accept do not have prescribed habits, which dispose the intellect to the speculation of those things which are in it.

Sicut intellectus conclusionum præscriptum quærit habitum principiorum per quem fit conclusio, et intellectus principiorum præscriptum sibi quærit habitum notitiæ terminorum, et sic de aliis. Puros autem dicunt intellectus, qui mediante phantasmate non accipiuntur.

Sunt autem adhuc qui hoc referunt ad intellectum causantem et cognoscentem ista, qui est intellectus intelligentiæ illius quæ irradiat super intellectuale animæ nostræ. Et dicunt quod in solis intellectibus sunt, quæ esse non habent nisi in lumine illius intelligentiæ. Et sunt illi qui dicunt universalia non nisi ideale habere esse secundum quod universalia sunt, et non esse res conjunctas materiæ, sed implere omnem materiam suam imaginibus particularium, sicut unus masculus multas implet fœminas. Hi autem nudos dicunt intellectus separatos ab imaginibus, quas imprimunt in materiam. Puros autem dicunt, eo quod impuritati naturalium principiorum in causando non permiscentur, sed ex suo lu-

mine producunt formas universales, quæ per distantiam ab ipsis impuritati materialium principiorum permiscentur, et tunc particulantur et determinantur.

Nonnulli etiam dixerunt quod multiplicatio ista non ponitur nisi ad expressionem ejusdem rei per verborum quamdam inculcationem. Ab his ergo quæstionibus et aliis quæ circumstant istas (quæ determinari non possunt, nisi per principia quibus determinari habet intelligentiarum natura et illuminatio) abstinebimus : quamvis tangemus eas, ut sciantur quæ sunt. Cum per hujus scientiæ principia discuti et ad plenum determinari non possint, eo quod sapientiæ primæ quoad altissimam ejus partem est hujusmodi negotium ; et ideo majoris et subtilioris egens est inquisitionis. Illud vero quod de his ex probabilibus scire utile est logico, in isto libro tentabo monstrare colligens probabilia ex Antiquorum dictis, et præcipue dicta sequens Peripateticorum, quæ secta in philosophia probabilissima mihi videtur.

Secunda vero quæstio est, a qua hic abstineo, quod si detur quod subsistant in re extra intellectum, utrum sint subsistentia corporalia, an incorporalia sint ?

Tertia quæstio est, utrum sint in sensibilibus singularibus suis posita secundum esse, an sint extra singularia in rebus solis metaphysicis, sicut dixisse Plato refertur ? Hoc enim per rationes logicas ad plenum sciri non poterit, sed metaphysico determinanda relinquuntur. Tres igitur sunt istæ quæstiones de universalibus. Prima quidem de esse ipsorum. Secunda de quidditate eorumdem. Tertia vero de comparatione ipsorum ad sua particularia.

Just as the intellect of conclusions seeks the prescribed habit of principles by which the conclusion is made, and the intellect of principles seeks for itself the prescribed habit of the notice of terms, and so of others. But they call pure intellects those which are not accepted mediately by a phantasm.

But there are still those who refer this to the intellect causing and knowing these things, which is the intellect of that intelligence which irradiates over the intellectual of our soul. And they say that they are in sole intellects, which do not have being except in the light of that intelligence. And they are those who say that universals do not have except an ideal being according as they are universals, and are not things conjoined to matter, but fill all their matter with the images of particulars, just as one male fills many females. But these call naked intellects those separated from the images, which they impress in matter. But they call them pure, from the fact that they are not commixed with the impurity of natural principles in causing, but out of their li-

-ght produce universal forms, which through distance from themselves are commixed with the impurity of material principles, and then are particulated and determined.

Some also said that this multiplication is not posited except to the expression of the same thing through a certain inculcation of words. From these questions therefore and others which stand around them (which cannot be determined, except through the principles by which the nature and illumination of intelligences has to be determined) we shall abstain: although we shall touch upon them, that they may be known what they are. Since through the principles of this science they cannot be discussed and fully determined, from the fact that a business of this kind belongs to the first wisdom as to its highest part; and therefore is needing of a greater and more subtle inquisition. But that which concerning these it is useful for the logician to know out of the probable, I will attempt to show in this book, collecting probables out of the sayings of the Ancients, and chiefly following the sayings of the Peripatetics, which sect in philosophy seems to me most probable.

But the second question is, from which I abstain here, that if it be given that they subsist in the thing outside the intellect, whether they are corporeal subsistents, or whether they are incorporeal?

The third question is, whether they are posited in their sensible singulars according to being, or whether they are outside singulars in sole metaphysical things, as Plato is reported to have said? For this will not be able to be fully known through logical reasons, but are left to be determined by the metaphysician. Therefore there are these three questions concerning universals. The first indeed concerning their being. The second concerning the quiddity of the same. But the third concerning the comparison of them to their particulars.

Et ideo quamvis hæ quæstiones de omnibus sint universalibus vel esse possunt : tamen de generibus et speciebus ista præcipue quæruntur tribus de causis. Quarum una est : quia ista cum prædicentur in quid, per se esse significantur. Alia autem universalia cum prædicentur in quale, significant esse in alio, et ideo minus per se esse videntur.

Secunda ratio est : quia alia tria in istis esse significantur : differentia enim in genere est potestate, et in specie secundum actum : proprium autem in specie et genere ut vere accidens : accidens autem commune in individuo. Tertiam rationem quidam dicunt, quod omnia alia ad rationes istorum referuntur. Est enim quoddam differentiarum genus, cujus species sunt differentiæ speciales : et similiter est in propriis et accidentibus. Sed hæc ultima ratio parvi valoris est. Prima autem ratio optima, et secunda bona, et secundum intentiones eorum qui hæc dicebant sumpta.

CAPUT III.

De declaratione et examinatione primæ quæstionis.

Quamvis autem hæc determinata sint supra vires logicæ, eo quod oportet in his uti rationibus sumptis ex principiis entis secundum quod est ens, ex quibus cognoscitur quid sit subsistens in intellectu solo, nudo, et puro, et aliam subsistentiam non habet. Et quid est subsistens extra intellectum in natura secundum esse completum. Ad quod non sufficiunt rationes logicæ. Tamen propter bonitatem doctrinæ, et ne sit suspensus lectoris animus, hæc aliquantulum explanare tentandum est.

Ad quæstionem ergo primam, difficultates majores quæ dubitationem pro parte faciunt, sunt inducendæ, ut visa ratione dubitationis melius intelligatur veritas soluta dubitatione. Est ergo quæstio prima, utrum universalia et præcipue genera et species, quæ quidem significantur, subsistant in natura secundum esse separatum ab intellectu : aut non quidem sic subsistant, sed in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus posita sint. Ita quod separatum non habeant esse, sed tantum sint accepta prout sunt rationes et intentiones in mente et lumine intellectus acceptæ.

Sic ergo explicata quæstione, hi qui dicunt in solis, nudis, purisque intellecti-

And therefore although these questions are or can be concerning all universals: nevertheless these are chiefly sought concerning genera and species for three causes. Of which one is: because these when they are predicated in what [quid], are signified to be per se. But the other universals when they are predicated in what kind [quale], signify to be in another, and therefore are seen less to be per se.

The second rea-

-son is: because the other three are signified to be in these: for the difference is in the genus in potency, and in the species according to act: but the property in the species and genus as a true accident: but the common accident in the individual. A third reason some say, that all others are referred to the reasons of these. For there is a certain genus of differences, whose species are special differences: and similarly it is in properties and accidents. But this last reason is of little value. But the first reason is best, and the second good, and assumed according to the intentions of those who said these things.

CHAPTER III.

On the declaration and examination of the first question.

But although these are determined above the powers of logic, from the fact that it is necessary to use in these reasons assumed from the principles of being according as it is being, from which it is known what is subsistent in the intellect alone, naked, and pure, and does not have another subsistence. And what is subsistent outside the intellect in nature according to complete being. To which logical reasons do not suffice. Nevertheless on account of the goodness of the doctrine, and lest the mind of the reader be in suspense, it is to be attempted to explain these things a little.

Therefore to the first question, the greater difficulties which make doubt for a part, are to be induced, that the reason of the doubt having been seen, the truth having solved the doubt may be better understood. Therefore the first question is, whether universals and chiefly genera and species, which indeed are signified, subsist in nature according to being separated from the intellect: or whether indeed they do not subsist thus, but are posited in sole, naked, and pure intellects. So that they do not have separate being, but are only accepted according as they are reasons and intentions accepted in the mind and light of the intellect.

Thus therefore the question having been explicated, those who say in sole, naked, and pure intellects-

bus posita esse septem pro se fortiores inducunt rationes. Dicunt enim, quod Boetius et Aristoteles et Avicenna dicunt, quod omne quod separatum in natura est, ideo est quia unum numero est. Universale autem quod est genus et species non unum numero est, eo quod universale est unum in multis, et de multis. Quod autem est unum in multis et de multis, separatum non est a multis. Ergo ipsum separatum non est : non ergo unum numero est. Et si unum numero non est, sequitur ipsum non esse. Ergo universale separatum non est. Si ergo aliquo modo est, non nisi in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus est. In solis quidem, quia in re non est : nudis autem, quia universale denudatum est a phantasmatibus ; puris autem, quia non nisi purum intelligentiæ lumen est, nulli comparatum materiæ sensibili.

Secundam adducunt rationem. Dicunt enim quod omne quod separatum a natura est, separatum habens esse extra intelligentiam, hoc aliquid est. Et hoc quidem dictum est Aristotelis et Avicennæ, et probatur per inductionem. Sed universale non est hoc aliquid, sed quale quid. Ergo universale in natura existens non est. Si ergo est, oportet quod in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus sit.

Tertiam adducunt rationem. Si omne quod est secundum esse separatum in natura, particulare et individuum est, ut omnis forma quæ est in individuo individua est, sive sit substantialis, sive accidentalis, individuatur enim per materiam quæ omnis individuationis principium est et causa. Universale autem ponitur esse in suo particulari, ut in subjecto et substantia in qua subsistit, et quæ sibi substat, ut dicit Aristoteles in *Prædicamentis*. Universale ergo si subsistat extra intellectum in suo particulari, particulare est : quod absurdum est, quia particulare nec est in multis, nec de multis est. Universale autem est in multis et de multis.

Quarto ad idem inducunt, quod Aristoteles in prima probat philosophia multi-

-pliciter, quod in eodem idem est esse universalis et particularis : quia aliter homo esset duo et non unum. Si ergo universale esse habet unum cum esse particularis, hoc esse secundum quod in particulari, est particulare : et particularis esse est non esse de multis et in multis : hic enim homo singularis est, et non in multis et de multis : a destructione consequentis arguitur. Si universale secundum suum esse, in multis et de multis est, universalis esse, non est esse particularis.

...posited in [sole, naked, and pure intellects] induce seven stronger reasons for themselves. For they say, what Boethius and Aristotle and Avicenna say, that everything which is separated in nature, is therefore so because it is one in number. But the universal which is genus and species is not one in number, from the fact that the universal is one in many, and of many. But that which is one in many and of many, is not separated from many. Therefore it is not separated: therefore it is not one in number. And if it is not one in number, it follows that it is not. Therefore the universal is not separated. If therefore it is in any mode, it is not except in sole, naked, and pure intellects. In sole indeed, because it is not in the thing: but naked, because the universal is denuded from phantasms; but pure, because it is nothing except the pure light of intelligence, compared to no sensible matter.

They adduce a second reason. For they say that everything which is separated from nature, having separated being outside intelligence, this is a "this somewhat" [hoc aliquid]. And this indeed is the saying of Aristotle and Avicenna, and it is proved by induction. But the universal is not a "this somewhat", but a "what kind" [quale quid]. Therefore the universal existing in nature is not. If therefore it is, it is necessary that it be in sole, naked, and pure intellects.

They adduce a third reason. If everything which is according to separated being in nature, is particular and individual, as every form which is in an individual is individual, whether it be substantial or accidental, for it is individuated through matter which is the principle and cause of all individuation. But the universal is posited to be in its particular, as in a subject and substance in which it subsists, and which stands under it, as Aristotle says in the *Categories*. Therefore if the universal subsists outside the intellect in its particular, it is particular: which is absurd, because the particular is neither in many, nor of many. But the universal is in many and of many.

Fourthly to the same they induce, that Aristotle in the first philosophy proves multi-

-ply, that in the same thing the being of the universal and of the particular is the same: because otherwise man would be two and not one. If therefore the universal has one being with the being of the particular, this being according as it is in the particular, is particular: and the being of the particular is not to be of many and in many: for this singular man is, and not in many and of many: it is argued from the destruction of the consequent. If the universal according to its being, is in many and of many, the being of the universal is not the being of the particular.

Est autem esse particularis si extra est. Ergo non extra in natura est, sed in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus est : quia aliter universale nullo modo esset : quod valde inconveniens est. An vero universale sit nunquam aliquis dubitavit. Et ideo Antiqui non quærebant an universale sit, vel non sit, sed quærebant an universale extra intellectum separatum in natura sit, an in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus positum sit et fundatum ; eo quia extra intellectum sit in rerum natura.

Quinto opponunt dicentes quæ Avicenna dixit et Algazel, quod universale quod est genus vel species, si extra intellectum est, aut cœpit esse, aut non cœpit esse. Si dicatur quod non cœpit esse, sequitur quod æternum sit : quod esse non potest, cum causam habeat intelligentiæ lumen quod facit et dat omnes formas. Si autem cœpit esse, aut cœpit esse a seipso, aut ab alio. Non autem cœpit esse a seipso : quia nihil incipit a se, cum Plato dicat quod nihil est cujus ortum legitima causa non præcesserit. Si autem ab alio cœpit, per actum agentis cœpit. Nihil autem fit per actum agentis, nisi particulare et individuum : quia omnis actus circa particularia est. Ergo universale particulare et individuum est. Destruamus ergo consequens, dicentes quod universale particulare et individuum non est, sicut jam superius probatum est : ergo universale non cœpit esse, nec in æternum est. Ergo universale non est in natura, sed in intellectu est.

Sextum quod in assertionem suæ inducunt opinionis, est, quod in arte (quæ naturam imitatur) duo esse videntur in forma artis. Si enim consideretur secundum quod in artifice est, communis est ad omnia quæ sunt ejusdem generis et speciei, quia in artifice est per modum artificis. Et sicut unus est artifex valens producere multa artificiata : ita forma in artifice commune exemplar est ad omnia in quibus illa forma potest exemplificari. Quando autem extra artem artificis est in materia artificiata, particulata est, et nulli potest esse communis, nec aliquam habet aptitudinem ad hoc quod in alio et de alio sit. Similiter autem in formis naturalibus esse videntur. In his enim intelligentia est ut artifex, et forma naturalis est forma in rebus, sicut forma artis in materia artificiati. Videtur ergo, quod si universale commune est et aptum natura esse in multis, quod hoc non habeat, nisi secundum quod est in intelligentia quæ communis artifex est. Universale ergo ut universale est, non est nisi quod in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus est.

But it is the being of the particular if it is outside. Therefore it is not outside in nature, but it is in sole, naked, and pure intellects: because otherwise the universal would in no way be: which is very inconvenient. But whether the universal be, no one ever doubted. And therefore the Ancients did not ask whether the universal be, or be not, but they asked whether the universal be separated outside the intellect in nature, or be posited and founded in sole, naked, and pure intellects; from the fact that outside the intellect it is in the nature of things.

Fifthly they oppose saying what Avicenna said and Algazel, that the universal which is genus or species, if it is outside the intellect, either began to be, or did not begin to be. If it be said that it did not begin to be, it follows that it is eternal: which cannot be, since it has as cause the light of intelligence which makes and gives all forms. But if it began to be, either it began to be from itself, or from another. But it did not begin to be from itself: because nothing begins from itself, since Plato says that there is nothing whose origin a legitimate cause has not preceded. But if it began from another, it began through the act of an agent. But nothing is made through the act of an agent, except the particular and individual: because every act is circa particulars. Therefore the universal is particular and individual. Let us therefore destroy the consequent, saying that the universal is not particular and individual, as has already been proved above: therefore the universal did not begin to be, nor is it in eternity. Therefore the universal is not in nature, but is in the intellect.

The sixth [reason] which they bring into the assertion of their opinion is that in art (which imitates nature) two [things] seem to be in the form of art. For if it is considered according as it is in the artisan, it is common to all things which are of the same genus and species, because it is in the artisan by the mode of the artisan. And just as there is one artisan able to produce many artificial things: so the form in the artisan is a common exemplar to all in which that form can be exemplified. But when it is outside the art of the artisan in the artificial matter, it is particularized, and can be common to nothing, nor has it any aptitude for being in another and of another. Similarly, it seems to be in natural forms. For in these the intelligence is as an artisan, and the natural form is the form in things, just as the form of art in the matter of the artificial thing. It seems therefore that if the universal is common and apt by nature to be in many, it does not have this except according as it is in the intelligence which is a common artisan. The universal therefore, as it is a universal, is not except that which is in only, bare, and pure intellects.

Septimo etiam per hoc confirmant hoc quod dicunt, quod in libro *de Causis* multipliciter probatum est, quod res in causa non est, nisi per modum et virtutem effecti per causam. In effectu autem causa non est, nisi per formam quam in effectum causa producit : quia omne quod de potentia producitur ad effectum, non producit nisi per id quod est in effectu tam in univocis accidentibus, quam in æquivocis : quia æquivocas ad univocas reduci necesse est. Forma igitur primæ intelligentiæ agentis in hoc quod effectus est, non est id nisi per conditionem et virtutem effectus. Effectus autem individuus et singularis est. Ergo forma, sive substantialis, sive accidentalis, in effectu procedens ab intelligentia, individua est et singularis. Universale autem nec individuum, nec singulare est. Universale ergo in effectu naturæ extra intelligentiam procedens non est ; in solis ergo et nudis, purisque intellectibus positum est.

Hæc sunt quæ ut fortiora inducunt, qui universalia in solo intellectu posita esse concedunt. Et ideo dicunt Aristotelem dixisse, quod universale est, dum intelligitur ; singulare autem est, dum extra sentitur.

Econtra autem illi qui universalia dicunt esse res extra intellectum existentes per se, fortiora inducunt septem, quibus maxime innituntur. Quorum primum est, quod *hic homo* non est nisi a simpliciter homine : et eadem ratione alius homo non est nisi a simpliciter homine, et sic de omnibus aliis. Non autem potest homo esse, nisi ab eo quod est secundum rem in natura extra intellectum existens simpliciter. Propter quod dicitur homo dignissima creaturarum. Si enim hoc conveniret huic homini secundum quod *hic homo*, non conveniret alii. Similiter quod *homo* est rationalis, non convenit huic secundum quod *hic* : quia tunc alii non conveniret. Ergo convenit secundum quod homo. Ergo homo secundum quod homo, et non *hic homo*, est aliquid in natura præter intellectum existens. Eadem ratio est de animali secundum quod animal.

Secundum est, quod sicut dicit Aristoteles, eadem sunt quibus res est, et quibus cognoscitur et scitur. Non est autem scientia nisi de universali et per universale. Ergo res non est, nisi per id quod universale est. Scientia enim non est nisi de rebus et per res, præcipue in physicis. Ergo universalia sunt res extra intellectum. Si enim essent in intellectu tantum, essent rerum intentiones, et non res ipsæ.

Seventh also through this they confirm what they say, which in the book *Of Causes* is manifoldly proved, that a thing is not in the cause except by the mode and power of that which is effected through the cause. But in the effect the cause is not except through the form which the cause produces in the effect: because everything which is produced from potency to effect, is not produced except through that which is in the effect both in univocal accidents and in equivocal ones: because it is necessary that equivocal ones be reduced to univocal ones. Therefore the form of the first acting intelligence in this which is the effect, is not that except through the condition and power of the effect. But the effect is individual and singular. Therefore the form, whether substantial or accidental, proceeding into the effect from the intelligence, is individual and singular. But the universal is neither individual nor singular. Therefore the universal in the effect of nature proceeding outside the intelligence is not; in only, therefore, and bare, pure intellects it is placed.

These are the things which they bring as stronger, who concede that universals are placed only in the intellect. And therefore they say that Aristotle said that the universal is, while it is understood; but the singular is, while it is sensed outside.

On the other hand, however, those who say that universals are things existing by themselves outside the intellect, bring seven stronger [reasons], upon which they especially rely. Of which the first is, that *this man* is not except from man simply: and by the same reason another man is not except from man simply, and so of all others. But man cannot be, except from that which is simply existing in nature according to the thing outside the intellect. On account of which man is called the most worthy of creatures. For if this were appropriate to this man according as he is *this man*, it would not be appropriate to another. Similarly, that *man* is rational is not appropriate to this one according as *this*: because then it would not be appropriate to another. Therefore it is appropriate according as he is man. Therefore man according as he is man, and not *this man*, is something existing in nature besides the intellect. The same reason is concerning the animal according as it is an animal.

The second is, that as Aristotle says, those things are the same by which a thing is, and by which it is known and learned. But there is no science except concerning the universal and through the universal. Therefore a thing is not, except through that which is universal. For science is not except concerning things and through things, especially in physics. Therefore universals are things outside the intellect. For if they were in the intellect only, they would be intentions of things, and not the things themselves.

Tertio inducunt, quod forma quæ dat esse, non habet esse a materia, quamvis sit in materia : sed habet esse ab agente secundum formam et agente univoco. Et secundum quod est ab agente, vere est, et est extra intellectum : et tamen non est hoc vel illud, sed est simpliciter. Sed universale est, quod secundum se non est hoc vel-

illud, sed est simpliciter communicabile factum hoc vel illud. Ergo universale simpliciter et secundum se separatum ab agente et in natura existens est, quamvis non sit hoc vel illud. Universale ergo simpliciter est, et magis est quam particulare, sive hoc vel illud. Et hæc fuit objectio Platonis, qui dixit universalia esse formas.

Quarto adducunt : quia id quod est ab agente formaliter, vere est in natura : et tamen de esse suo formali nihil habet a materia : sed ab eo quod est in materia, habet quod est forma hujus vel illius. Ens autem vere ab agente non secundum quod est hujus vel illius, verissime habet esse in natura et agente formaliter : quia uno modo se habet ad omnia quæ ab eo exemplificantur. Quod ergo sic est, verissime est apud naturam : quia esse suum non est ab aliquo obumbratum vel variatum. Forma autem secundum quod uno modo se habet ad omnia particularia sua sic est, et tale habet esse. Hoc autem modo est universale. Ergo universale verissime est in natura, et verius est quam particulare.

Quinto inducunt, quod forma dat esse rei et specie et ratione : et natura non est nisi lumen intelligentiæ terminatum ad hoc, et incorporatum isti. Quod ergo dat esse et rationem, aut habet ab hoc quod est incorporatum isti, et terminatum ad hoc, aut non. Constat autem quod non habet dare esse et rationem secundum quod est terminatum ad hoc, et secundum quod est incorporatum isti : quia hoc accidit isti, et ab hoc accidente non potest habere actum substantialem. Habet ergo ab hoc quod est lumen intelligentiæ, quæ est dans esse in natura. Non autem dat esse in natura, nisi quod vere in natura est. Ergo forma quæ dat esse in natura, vere in natura est extra intellectum. Sicut forma artis non dat artificiato esse in genere et specie artificiati, nisi secundum quod in artificiato vere est, et extra intellectum artificis : quamvis hoc quod dat esse artificiato, non habeat ab eo secundum quod in ar-

-tificiato est, sed secundum quod est ab artifice.

Sexto adducunt, quod lumen faciens colores, non amittit aliquid per hoc quod est in corpore terminato : nec aliquid accipit essentiæ vel virtutis ad agendum, quamvis ei quod constituitur per ipsum, multa accidant per hoc quod ad hoc vel illud terminatur.

Third they bring [the reason] that the form which gives being does not have being from matter, although it be in matter: but it has being from the agent according to form and a univocal agent. And according as it is from the agent, it truly is, and it is outside the intellect: and yet it is not this or that, but it is simply. But the universal is, that which according to itself is not this or-

that, but is simply communicable made this or that. Therefore the universal simply and according to itself is separated from the agent and existing in nature, although it be not this or that. Therefore the universal simply is, and is more than the particular, whether this or that. And this was the objection of Plato, who said universals to be forms.

Fourthly they adduce: because that which is from the agent formally, truly is in nature: and nevertheless of its formal being it has nothing from matter: but from this that it is in matter, it has that it is the form of this or that. But the being truly from the agent not according as it is of this or that, most truly has being in nature and in the agent formally: because in one mode it holds itself to all things which are exemplified by it. That therefore which is thus, most truly is with nature: because its being is not overshadowed or varied by anything. But the form according as it holds itself in one mode to all its particulars is thus, and has such a being. But in this mode is the universal. Therefore the universal most truly is in nature, and is more truly than the particular.

Fifthly they induce, that the form gives being to the thing both in species and in reason: and nature is nothing except the light of intelligence terminated to this, and incorporated in this. What therefore gives being and reason, either has it from this that it is incorporated in this, and terminated to this, or not. But it is evident that it does not have to give being and reason according as it is terminated to this, and according as it is incorporated in this: because this happens to this, and from this accident it cannot have a substantial act. Therefore it has it from this that it is the light of intelligence, which is giving being in nature. But it does not give being in nature, except what truly is in nature. Therefore the form which gives being in nature, truly is in nature outside the intellect. Just as the form of art does not give the articulated thing to be in the genus and species of the articulated thing, except according as it truly is in the articulated thing, and outside the intellect of the artificer: although this that it gives being to the articulated thing, it does not have from it according as it is in the ar-

-ticulated thing, but according as it is from the artificer.

Sixthly they adduce, that the light making colors, does not lose anything through this that it is in a terminated body: nor does it receive anything of essence or virtue to acting, although to that which is constituted through it, many things happen through this that it is terminated to this or that.

Ergo similiter lumen intelligentiæ, quod de se formas largitur, non amittit id quod de se vel ab efficiente habet, per hoc quod est in isto vel in illo : nec aliquid accipit essentiæ vel virtutis ab hoc quod terminatur ad hoc vel illud, quamvis ei quod constituitur ab isto multa conveniant secundum quod lumen istud constituens agit in hoc vel illo. Sic autem virtutem constituendi habens, est vere in natura, et non secundum quod est in isto vel in illo. Hoc autem dicitur existens simpliciter et verissime et ex natura unam aptitudinem habens ad omnia quibus dat esse et rationem. Hoc autem est genus et species prout sunt universalia. Genus ergo et species universalia verissime sunt in natura.

Septimo inducunt, quod id quod secundum naturam et virtutem est ante rem, ab eo quod est post ipsum, nec esse accipit nec unitatem vel multiplicationem secundum seipsum, nisi secundum quod habet in isto vel illo quod post ipsum est. Universale autem sive forma quæ est rei causa et principium, est ante rem secundum causam et naturæ ordinem. Ergo ab eo in quo est, nec accipit esse, nec unitatem, nec multiplicationem secundum quod ipsum est in se : quamvis multiplicetur tantum secundum esse quod habet in isto vel illo. Si ergo in se accipiatur, nihil horum habet ab eo in quo est. Secundum seipsum autem acceptum verissime est : quia secundum se acceptum non habet hoc quod non sit nisi in intellectu : quamvis ab intellectu cognoscente et causante. Secundum se ergo acceptum verissime est res in natura simplici existens. Sic autem universale est aptitudinem habens ad omnia sua singularia.

Universale ergo verissime est et res in natura est, etiam absque eo quod in intellectu solo, puro, et nudo sit acceptum.

Ecce hæc fortiora sunt, quæ illi pro una parte et alia inducunt in suarum assertionem opinionum.

Nos autem quantum sufficit præsenti intentioni ista solventes, dicimus quod universale triplicem habet considerationem, scilicet secundum quod in seipso est natura simplex et invariabilis : et secundum quod refertur ad intelligentiam : et secundum quod est in isto vel in illo. Primo quidem modo simplex est natura, quæ dat esse et rationem et nomen, et verissimum est inter omnia quæ sunt, nihil habens alienæ naturæ admixtum, nec conditione alienæ naturæ variatum. Per hoc autem quod est in isto vel in illo, multa accidunt ei secundum esse : quorum primum est, quod est particulatum et individuatum : secundum, quod est multiplicabile, vel multiplicatum : tertium autem, quod est incorporatum, et habens in se diverseas passiones quibus est subjectum, et alia hujusmodi infinita, quia materiæ infinita accidunt. Per hoc autem quod est in intellectu, dupliciter consideratur, scilicet aut secundum relationem ad intellectum intelligentiæ primæ cognoscentis et causantis ipsum, cujus illa natura simplex radius quidam est. Aut secundum relationem ad intellectum per abstractionem cognoscentem ipsum.

Therefore similarly the light of intelligence, which of itself bestows forms, does not lose that which it has from itself or from the efficient, through this that it is in this or in that: nor does it receive anything of essence or virtue from this that it is terminated to this or that, although to that which is constituted by this many things convene according as that constituting light acts in this or that. But thus having the virtue of constituting, it truly is in nature, and not according as it is in this or in that. But this is called existing simply and most truly and from nature having one aptitude to all things to which it gives being and reason. But this is genus and species as they are universals. Therefore universal genus and species most truly are in nature.

Seventhly they induce, that that which according to nature and virtue is before the thing, from that which is after it, neither receives being nor unity or multiplication according to itself, except according to what it has in this or that which is after it. But the universal or the form which is the cause and principle of the thing, is before the thing according to cause and the order of nature. Therefore from that in which it is, it neither receives being, nor unity, nor multiplication according as it is in itself: although it is multiplied only according to the being which it has in this or that. If therefore it be accepted in itself, it has none of these from that in which it is. But accepted according to itself it most truly is: because accepted according to itself it does not have this that it be not except in the intellect: although from the intellect knowing and causing. Therefore accepted according to itself it most truly is a thing existing in a simple nature. But thus the universal is having aptitude to all its singulars.

Therefore the universal most truly is and is a thing in nature, even without this that it be accepted in the intellect alone, pure, and bare.

Behold these are the stronger [reasons], which those on one part and the other bring in the assertion of their opinions.

We, however, solving these as far as suffices for the present intention, say that the universal has a threefold consideration, namely according as it is in itself a simple and invariable nature: and according as it is referred to the intelligence: and according as it is in this [individual] or in that one. In the first way indeed it is a simple nature, which gives being and reason and name, and is the most true among all things that are, having nothing of an alien nature mixed in, nor varied by the condition of an alien nature. But through this, that it is in this one or in that one, many things happen to it according to being: of which the first is, that it is particularized and individuated: the second, that it is multiplicable, or multiplied: the third however, that it is incorporated, and having in itself diverse passions of which it is the subject, and other infinite things of this kind, because infinite things happen to matter. But through this, that it is in the intellect, it is considered in two ways, namely either according to the relation to the intellect of the first intelligence knowing and causing it, of which that simple nature is a certain ray. Or according to the relation to the intellect knowing it through abstraction.

Et primo quidem modo accidit ipsi radium et lumen intelligentiæ agentis esse et simplex et purum esse, et immateriale et immobile et incorporale et incorruptibile, et perfectibile intellectus possibilis, et ejusdem possibilis intellectus esse motivum ad actum : sicut color movet visum ad actum secundum actum lucidi quod est in ipso quando secundum actum color est. Secundum autem relationem quam habet ad intellectum cognoscentem, non causantem, habet quod talis intellectus

secundum quod abstrahit ipsum, agit in ipso universalitatem (quam de natura sua ante habuit) per hoc quod separat ipsum a materia et materialibus individuitatibus. Et sic intelligitur quod dicit Aristoteles, quod universale est dum intelligitur : particulare vero dum sentitur. Et illud Avicennæ dictum, quod intellectus in formis agit universalitatem.

Et hoc est quod dixerunt antiqui triplices esse formas, ante rem scilicet, quæ sunt formæ secundum se acceptæ, principia rerum existentes : et in re sive cum re ipsa, quæ sunt formæ existentes in ipsis, dantes eis nomen et rationem, per id quod sunt aptæ esse in multis et universales, non tamen secundum quod sunt in illis : secundum enim quod sunt in illis, particularizatæ et individuatæ et ad singularitatem ductæ sunt. Sunt etiam formæ post rem, quæ sunt formæ per abstractionem intellectus ab individuantibus separatæ et in quibus intellectus agit universalitatem. Et primæ quidem substantialia rerum principia sunt, secundæ autem rerum substantiæ, tertiæ autem accidentia et qualitates, quæ notæ rerum in anima acceptæ vocantur et dispositiones vel habitus.

His ergo supra prælibatis dicimus, quod universalia, hoc est, naturæ quæ universalia vocantur, secundum se accepta, sunt et verissime sunt ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia et invariabilia. Sunt etiam extra, vel præter intellectum solum, nudum, et purum, sicut incontradicibiliter probant secundæ inductæ rationes : secundum autem quoddam esse, in rebus sunt, scilicet secundum esse individuatum quod actu est in his quæ sunt ultimo et in esse perfecto constituta in natura : propter quod illa res natura a physicis vocatur. Adhuc autem secundum quoddam esse sunt in intellectu : et hoc dupliciter, scilicet in intellectu per cognitionem causante et agente, et in-

intellectu cognoscente per abstractionem ea per universalitatem agente et educente.

And in the first way indeed it happens to it that it is a ray and light of the acting intelligence and is both simple and pure being, and immaterial and immobile and incorporeal and incorruptible, and the perfectible of the possible intellect, and the motive of the same possible intellect to act: just as color moves the sight to act according to the act of the lucid which is in it when according to act it is color. But according to the relation which it has to the knowing, not causing, intellect, it has that such an intellect

according as it abstracts it, acts in it universality (which it previously had from its nature) by this, that it separates it from matter and material individualities. And thus is understood what Aristotle says, that the universal is while it is understood: but the particular while it is sensed. And that saying of Avicenna, that the intellect acts universality in forms.

And this is what the ancients said, that forms are threefold, namely before the thing, which are forms accepted according to themselves, existing as principles of things: and in the thing or with the thing itself, which are forms existing in them, giving them name and reason, through this, that they are apt to be in many and are universal, yet not according as they are in them: for according as they are in them, they are particularized and individuated and led to singularity. There are also forms after the thing, which are forms separated by the abstraction of the intellect from individuating [principles] and in which the intellect acts universality. And the first indeed are the substantial principles of things, the second however the substances of things, the third however the accidents and qualities, which are called the notes of things accepted in the soul and dispositions or habits.

These things therefore having been previously tasted above, we say that universals, that is, the natures which are called universals, accepted according to themselves, are and most truly are ungenerable and incorruptible and invariable. They are also outside, or besides the only, bare, and pure intellect, as the second brought reasons prove incontestably: but according to a certain being, they are in things, namely according to the individuated being which is in act in those things which are ultimately and in perfect being constituted in nature: on account of which that thing is called nature by the physicists. Moreover, according to a certain being they are in the intellect: and this in two ways, namely in the intellect causing and acting through knowledge, and in-

the intellect knowing through abstraction acting and educting them through universality.

Ad id ergo quod primo medio pro prima parte opinionis inducitur, quod cum dicunt Aristoteles et Boetius, quod omne quod est, ideo est, quia unum numero est : hoc intelligitur de his quæ ultimo actu in natura perfecta sunt, de illis enim verum est. Sed universalia hoc modo non sunt : sunt enim ut rerum principia, et non ut res ultimo actu in natura constitutæ et completæ. Aut sic intelligitur [1], quod unum numero sit dictum a numero ultimi esse, vel a numero essentiæ. Esse enim quod est unum numero, habet esse suæ essentiæ : sicut et universale unum numero, est unum numero essentiæ et non duo vel tria (quamvis numerus materiæ et accidentis sit) in multis et de multis. Et hoc accidit sibi et non convenit ei secundum se : et sic intelligitur quod dicitur, quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.

Similiter dicendum ad id quod secundo dicunt, quod illud quod separatum habet esse extra intellectum in natura, est hoc aliquid : quia separatum esse habere dicitur duobus modis. Uno scilicet modo quo separatum esse habet id quod in se habet esse non dependens ad aliquid, ad hoc quod esse habeat quod sit extra ipsum : et sic non generaliter verum quod dicunt : quia universale sic separatum, habet esse in natura, et tamen non est hoc aliquid. Alio modo separatum esse dicitur, quod in se est indivisum, et ab aliis per discretionem divisum et separatum. Et hoc modo generaliter verum est quod dicunt : quia sic non nisi singulariter existentia separatum habent esse.

Ad id quod tertio inducunt per dictum Avicennæ, dicendum quod omne quod est in individuo (secundum quod est in individuo) singulare est. Sed id

quod in individuo est, nil prohibet esse universale, non secundum quod est in individuo acceptum : hoc enim secundum se acceptum, nihil prohibet esse quale quid, et non hoc aliquid.

Si quis autem sic objiciat, Quod est in individuo est in eo per modum individui. Individuum autem est hoc aliquid. Ergo illud quod est in individuo, est singulare et hoc aliquid. Non valet argumentum. Quod enim est in individuo, non semper est in eo per modum esse individui, sed aliquando per modum principii individui. Et non oportet quod hoc secundum id quod est, sit individuum et hoc aliquid : quia potest esse quale quid. Et ideo in argumento paralogismus est figuræ dictionis : quia interpretatur quale quid ut hoc aliquid.

To that therefore which by the first medium is induced for the first part of the opinion, that when Aristotle and Boethius say, that everything which is, is therefore so, because it is one in number: this is understood of those which by ultimate act in perfect nature are, for concerning them it is true. But universals are not in this mode: for they are as principles of things, and not as things by ultimate act in nature constituted and completed. Or thus it is understood [1], that one in number be said from the number of ultimate being, or from the number of essence. For the being which is one in number, has the being of its essence: just as the universal one in number, is one in the number of essence and not two or three (although the number of matter and accident be) in many and of many. And this happens to it and does not convene to it according to itself: and thus is understood what is said, that by participation of the species many men are one man.

Similarly it is to be said to that which they say secondly, that that which has separated being outside the intellect in nature, is a "this somewhat": because to have separated being is said in two modes. Namely in one mode in which that has separated being which in itself has an independent being to anything, to this that it have a being which is outside it: and thus it is not generally true what they say: because the universal thus separated, has being in nature, and nevertheless is not a "this somewhat". In another mode it is called separated being, which in itself is undivided, and divided and separated from others through discretion. And in this mode generally it is true what they say: because thus none but singularly existing things have separated being.

To that which thirdly they induce through the saying of Avicenna, it is to be said that everything which is in the individual (according as it is in the individual) is singular. But that

which is in the individual, nothing prohibits to be universal, not according as it is accepted in the individual: for this accepted according to itself, nothing prohibits to be a "what kind", and not a "this somewhat".

But if someone should thus object, What is in the individual is in it through the mode of the individual. But the individual is a "this somewhat". Therefore that which is in the individual, is singular and a "this somewhat". The argument is not valid. For what is in the individual, is not always in it through the mode of the being of the individual, but sometimes through the mode of the principle of the individual. And it is not necessary that this according to that which it is, be individual and a "this somewhat": because it can be a "what kind". And therefore in the argument there is a paralogism of a figure of speech: because it interprets a "what kind" as a "this somewhat".

Ad id autem quod quarto inducunt, dicendum quod universale secundum esse quod habet in singulari, non habet aliud esse quam esse singularis : et hoc probat Aristoteles [2] contra eos qui dixerunt formas universales distinctum et divisum esse retinere præter esse singularis (sicut ex sigillo receptum) esse separatum ab illo sicut separatum est esse sigilli et ceræ sigillatæ : sed quod id quod est in singulari, non habeat esse naturæ et principii, non secundum quod est in singulari, sed secundum se acceptum, non probat Aristoteles : quia hoc est verum et necessarium in omni natura.

Ad id quod quinto objicitur, dicendum quod essentiæ rerum secundum quod essentiæ sunt, non incipiunt esse nisi per accidens et per aliud, scilicet incipientibus esse his in quibus sunt. In his enim per consequens etiam illa esse incipiunt. Et hoc non accidit eis, nisi secundum quod in illis sunt : secundum seipsa autem nec incipiunt nec desinunt esse secundum naturam, sed sunt radii luminis intelligentiæ universaliter agen-

tis, quæ Deus est : quæ cum seipsa sit agens, non est assignare quod incipiat vel desinat nisi secundum quod agit hoc vel illud in singulari.

Ad id autem quod sexto inducunt, dicendum quod quamvis forma artis habeat quod exemplar commune est, ab hoc quod a tali exivit artifice : tamen postquam exivit, adhuc habet id quando secundum se ut forma artis accipitur : et habet hoc in lignis, et lapidibus, quamvis hoc non habeat secundum quod existit in lignis et lapidibus. Et similiter de formis naturalibus existentibus ab intelligentia. Et ideo secundum se acceptæ sunt communes et universales etiam quæ sunt in singularibus, quamvis non secundum quod sunt in singularibus habeant id.

Si autem quis inferat dicens : Si non secundum quod sunt in singularibus habent id : ergo habent secundum quod non sunt in singularibus. Est paralogismus secundum fallaciam divisionis : quia divisum infert ex eo quod secundum compositionem dictum fuerat.

Ad id autem quod septimo et ultimo inducitur, dicendum esse videtur, quod omne quod est in effectu secundum quod effectus esse habet ultimum, secundum quod est in effectu illo, singulare est : et sic intelligitur quod probatur in libro de Causis [1]. Sed id quod in effectu secundum se acceptum per modum principii et causæ formalis ipsius effectus secundum se accepti, nihil prohibet de se communicabile et commune esse, sicut jam sæpius dictum est.

Ea autem quæ secundo inducta sunt, puto de necessitate concludere.

CAPUT IV. _Utrum universalia sint corporalia ?_

But to that which fourthly they induce, it is to be said that the universal according to the being which it has in the singular, has no other being than the being of the singular: and this Aristotle proves [2] against those who said universal forms to retain a distinct and divided being besides the being of the singular (as received from a seal) a separated being from it just as separated is the being of the seal and of the sealed wax: but that that which is in the singular, has not the being of nature and principle, not according as it is in the singular, but accepted according to itself, Aristotle does not prove: because this is true and necessary in every nature.

To that which fifthly is objected, it is to be said that the essences of things according as they are essences, do not begin to be except by accident and through another, namely those beginning to be in which they are. For in these consequently also those things begin to be. And this does not happen to them, except according as they are in them: but according to themselves they neither begin nor cease to be according to nature, but they are rays of the light of intelligence universally act-

acting, who is God: which since it is acting of itself, it is not to assign that it begins or ceases except according as it acts this or that in the singular.

But to that which they induce sixthly, it is to be said that although the form of art has that it is a common exemplar, from this that it went out from such an artificer: nevertheless after it went out, it still has it when according to itself it is accepted as a form of art: and it has this in woods and stones, although it does not have this according as it exists in woods and stones. And similarly concerning natural forms existing from intelligence. And therefore accepted according to themselves they are common and universal even those which are in singulars, although they do not have it according as they are in singulars.

But if someone should infer saying: If they do not have it according as they are in singulars: therefore they have it according as they are not in singulars. It is a paralogism according to the fallacy of division: because it infers the divided from that which had been said according to composition.

But to that which is induced seventhly and lastly, it seems it should be said, that everything which is in effect according as the effect has ultimate being, according as it is in that effect, is singular: and thus is understood what is proved in the book of Causes [1]. But that which in the effect accepted according to itself through the mode of the principle and formal cause of the effect itself accepted according to itself, nothing prohibits to be of itself communicable and common, as has now very often been said.

But those things which were induced secondly, I think conclude of necessity.

CHAPTER IV. _Whether universals are corporeal?_

Secunda autem quæstio est, an universalia sint incorporalia vel corporalia ? quæ ex Platonicis inducta est sicut prima. Dicebat enim Plato mathematicas lineas et superficiem esse separata quædam, ex quibus corpora mathematica componuntur : sicut omne divisibile ex indivisibilibus dicebat componi, accipiens hæc ab Epicureis qui ante philosophari cœperunt. Melissus autem et Parmenides talia dicebant, et quidam alii. Ex mathematicis autem magnis et parvis omnem materialem dicebant constare quantitatem.

Suæ autem opinionis tres potissimas inducebant rationes. Quarum fuit prima, quod videbant, quod substantia tam materia quam forma de se, et secundum quod substantia est, et secundum seipsam accepta, indivisibilis est, sicut expresse dicit Aristoteles. [2] Oportet ergo aliud divisibilitatis esse principium indivisibile. Divisibile autem non est nisi quantitas : quantitas autem omnis sive sit discreta, sive continua, non procedit nisi ab indivisibili. Adhuc omnis species quantitatis non procedit nisi ab indivisibili proximo : quia unumquodque genus et species causatur ab aliquibus suis proximis principiis. Corpus enim quod omni modo divisibile est, non potest causari (sicut ex proximo suæ constitutionis principio) ab eo quod omni modo est indivisibile sicut punctum, vel ab eo quod uno modo tantum divisibile sicut linea. Sed oportet, quod causetur ab eo quod est pluribus modis divisibile. Sicut superficies quæ non est indivisibilis nisi in profundum, sed in latum et longum divisibilis est. Et ex compositione unius superficiei cum alia fit divisibilis in profundum : sicut punctum omni modo indivisibile, compositione puncti cum puncto fit divisibile in longum, recto motu puncti in continuum. Punctum enim est substantia positionem habens, et ideo motu suo in continum facit lineæ positæ divisionem. Et similiter est de superficie constituta à linea mota in latum : qui motus lineam com-

ponit cum alia existente una primo mota in latum continui : quod motu ejus constituitur.

Et similiter est de corpore quod motu superficiei motæ in profundum constituitur. Et quia non sunt plures situs continui in quod aliquid indivisibile moveri possit ad quantitatis constitutionem, ideo non sunt plures quantitatis continuæ species nisi tres, et non nisi tres diversitates. Cum autem materia sensibilis de se sit indivisibilis et immobilis, non potest esse quanti vel quantitatis principium. Materia enim de se nihil habet quantitatis.

The second question is, whether universals are incorporeal or corporeal? which was induced from the Platonists just as the first. For Plato said mathematical lines and the surface to be certain separate things, from which mathematical bodies are composed: just as he said every divisible thing to be composed from indivisibles, accepting these from the Epicureans who began to philosophize before. But Melissus and Parmenides said such things, and certain others. But from great and small mathematicals they said every material quantity to consist.

But of their opinion they induced three most powerful reasons. Of which the first was, that they saw, that substance as much matter as form of itself, and according as it is substance, and accepted according to itself, is indivisible, as Aristotle expressly says. [2] It is necessary therefore that another principle of divisibility be indivisible. But the divisible is nothing but quantity: but all quantity whether it be discrete, or continuous, does not proceed except from an indivisible. Still every species of quantity does not proceed except from a proximate indivisible: because each genus and species is caused by some of its proximate principles. For a body which is in every way divisible, cannot be caused (as from a proximate principle of its constitution) by that which is in every way indivisible like a point, or by that which is divisible in only one way like a line. But it is necessary, that it be caused by that which is divisible in several ways. Just as the surface which is not indivisible except in depth, but is divisible in breadth and length. And from the composition of one surface with another it becomes divisible in depth: just as the point in every way indivisible, by the composition of a point with a point becomes divisible in length, by the straight motion of the point into a continuum. For the point is a substance having position, and therefore by its motion into a continuum it makes the division of a placed line. And similarly it is concerning a surface constituted from a line moved in breadth: which motion com-

ponit [componit] with another existing one first moved in the breadth of the continuum: which by its motion is constituted.

And similarly it is concerning a body which by the motion of a surface moved in depth is constituted. And because there are not several sites of the continuum into which something indivisible could be moved to the constitution of quantity, therefore there are not several species of continuous quantity except three, and not unless three diversities. But since sensible matter of itself is indivisible and immobile, it cannot be a principle of a "how much" or of quantity. For matter of itself has nothing of quantity.

Oportet autem, quod omne quod est alicujus generis essentiale principium, sit aliquid illius generis, tam in genere substantiæ, quam in genere accidentium. Probatum est autem in _Physicis_[1], quod principia corruptibilium sunt incorruptibilia, et principia sensibilium sunt insensibilia. Quia aliter in principiis et principiorum principiis iretur in infinitum. Constat etiam, quod istæ naturæ quæ simplices et universales dicuntur, eorum sunt principia quæ sunt singularia, ut jam in antehabita quæstione habitum est et determinatum. Et horum materialium et corporalium non possunt esse principia, nisi sint corporalia et principiis quantitatis determinata. Sequitur ergo de necessitate, ut videtur, quod universalia sint corporalia, et corpora per quantitates corporales dimensa, et ista ratio directe est secundum intentionem Platonis, qui talia separata ponebat. Et ideo per nos est per multa explanata, ut melius quid intendit, intelligatur.

Secunda ratio est, quod principium alicujus generis vel speciei, non potest esse, vel hoc vel illud in numero determinatum : quia sic non esset universale illius generis vel speciei acceptum. Principia ergo generum et specierum, genera sunt et species : et cum principiata sint corpora sensibilia et quanta, sequitur quod principia illorum sint genera et species quantitatum. Hæc enim sunt principia sensibilia per hic et nunc individuata.

Substantia enim secundum quod substantia in principiis ejus, nec ad hic nec ad nunc determinatur vel individuatur : et ideo talibus principiis non causatur. Et ideo Plato dixit omnium istorum sensibilium principia circa mathematica in rationibus generum vel specierum accepta : substantiam autem secundum quod substantia non esse sicut principiatum, sed per quantitatem esse determinatam ad hic et nunc. Ex hoc autem ulterius inferebat, quod genera et species, quæ sunt horum singularium prinpia, sunt corporalia.

Tertia ratio Platonis fuit : quia quod est in ordine naturæ primum, est causa et principium ejusdem quod secundum se in eodem naturæ ordine posterius est, sicut in libro fontis vitæ et in libro de causis est probatum. Quantum autem secundum rationem quantitatis acceptum constat quod secundum ordinem naturæ est ante hoc quantum sensibile. Ergo secundum ordinem naturæ causa est ipsius, et principium. Non est autem causa et principium nisi quod est simplex et universale principium. Ergo quod est simplex et universale, quantum est et corporale.

Istæ absque dubitatione rationes sunt Platonis in hoc quod universalia dixit esse corporalia quædam in mathematicis rationibus et formis constituta. Quod autem quidam dicunt de universalibus immaterialium, ut angeli, et animæ, nihil penitus valet ad propositum.

But it is necessary, that everything which is an essential principle of any genus, be something of that genus, as much in the genus of substance, as in the genus of accidents. But it has been proved in the _Physics_ [1], that the principles of corruptible things are incorruptible, and the principles of sensible things are insensible. Because otherwise in principles and the principles of principles it would go into infinity. It is also certain, that those natures which are called simple and universal, are principles of those which are singular, as has already been held and determined in the previously held question. And of these material and corporeal things there cannot be principles, unless they be corporeal and determined by the principles of quantity. It follows therefore of necessity, as it seems, that universals are corporeal, and bodies measured through corporeal quantities, and this reason is directly according to the intention of Plato, who placed such separate things. And therefore it is by us explained through many things, so that better what he intends, may be understood.

The second reason is, that the principle of any genus or species, cannot be, either this or that determined in number: because thus it would not be an accepted universal of that genus or species. The principles therefore of genera and species, are genera and species: and since the things principled are sensible bodies and "how muchs", it follows that their principles are genera and species of quantities. For these are sensible principles individuated through here and now.

For substance according as it is substance in its principles, is neither determined nor individuated to here nor to now: and therefore by such principles it is not caused. And therefore Plato said the principles of all these sensible things to be around mathematicals accepted in the reasons of genera or species: but substance according as it is substance not to be like a thing principled, but through quantity to be determined to here and now. But from this he further inferred, that genera and species, which are the principles of these singulars, are corporeal.

The third reason of Plato was: because that which is first in the order of nature, is the cause and principle of the same which according to itself is later in the same order of nature, as in the book of the _Fountain of Life_ and in the book of _Causes_ is proved. But a "how much" accepted according to the reason of quantity it is certain that according to the order of nature it is before this sensible "how much". Therefore according to the order of nature it is its cause, and principle. But it is not a cause and principle except what is a simple and universal principle. Therefore that which is simple and universal, is a "how much" and corporeal.

These without doubt are the reasons of Plato in this that he said universals to be certain corporeal things constituted in mathematical reasons and forms. But that which some say concerning universals of immaterial things, as angels, and souls, nothing at all is valid to the proposal.

Talia enim dixit Plato ab æterno consistere, et radios quosdam lucis primæ esse, et non esse causata a principiis materialibus per compositionem, et in talibus dixit esse particulare non universale : sed in talibus dixit, quod sunt in nobis per hoc quod luces eorum et essentiæ sunt in nobis, sive existentibus per ea, sive cognoscentibus ea. Propter quod Avicenna in sua metaphysica, ubi stabilit species qualitatis, dicit quod hoc dictum verum est. Cujus signum dicit : quia ea in quibus sunt

sive existentibus sive cognoscentibus ea, non recipiunt ea secundum hic et nunc, sed ubique et semper, quantum est de ipsis. Anima enim non est in corpore secundum hic et nunc, nec daemon sive intelligentia, sive etiam angelus, non est in eo in quo est per operationem vel cognitionem ut hic et nunc, sed secundum possibilitatem ejus in quo est, est in eo secundum ubique et semper: quia non habet in eo positionis discretionem. Haec opinio Platonis est.

In contrarium hujus sufficiunt etiam tres rationes, quae sunt inter multas quae adduci possunt, potiores. Quarum prima est, quod si universalia (horum singularium principia) sunt corporalia: aut sunt principia in quantum incorporalia, aut sunt principia eorum in quantum corporalia sunt et hic et nunc determinata. Si sunt principia horum in quantum corporalia sunt: corporale autem non efficitur corporale nisi per aliud corporale: sed principium constituens est etiam corporale: ergo et ipsum corporale non efficitur corporale nisi per aliud corporale: et sic procederetur in infinitum. Sequitur ergo, quod principium corporalis sit incorporale, sicut principium corruptibilis est incorruptibile, et principium sensibilis est insensibile, et principium mobilis est immobile, et sic de omnibus aliis.

Secunda ratio est, quod si universalia sint corporalia, sequitur quod sunt quantitatibus et figuris determinata. Rationes autem quantitatum non sunt quantae, et rationes figurarum non sunt figuratae. Si autem universalia quanta figurata sunt, sequitur quod suscipiens ea, figuretur per ipsa, et quantitate distendatur. Suscipit autem talia possibilis intellectus. Intellectus ergo possibilis quantus erit et figuratus, quod nemo unquam opinatus est, quia omnes Anaxagoram laudabant dicentem, quia intellectus est purus et immixtus, nihil ulli habens commune. Universale ergo corporale esse non potest, et in re corporali: cum prout universale est, motivum est intellectus possibilis.

For Plato said such things to consist from eternity, and to be certain rays of the first light, and not to be caused from material principles through composition, and in such things he said there to be the particular not the universal: but in such things he said, that they are in us by this that their lights and essences are in us, whether existing through them, or knowing them. On account of which Avicenna in his _Metaphysics_, where he establishes the species of quality, says that this saying is true. Of which he says the sign: because those in which they are-

whether existing or knowing them, do not receive them according to here and now, but everywhere and always, as much as is of them. For the soul is not in the body according to here and now, nor a demon or intelligence, or even an angel, is not in that in which it is through operation or cognition as here and now, but according to the possibility of that in which it is, it is in it according to everywhere and always: because it does not have the discretion of position in it. This is the opinion of Plato.

Against this there suffice even three reasons, which are among the many that can be adduced, the more powerful ones. Of which the first is, that if universals (the principles of these singulars) are corporeal: either they are principles in as much as they are incorporeal, or they are their principles in as much as they are corporeal and determined to here and now. If they are the principles of these in as much as they are corporeal: but the corporeal is not made corporeal except through another corporeal: but the constituting principle is also corporeal: therefore the corporeal itself also is not made corporeal except through another corporeal: and thus it would be proceeded into infinity. It follows therefore, that the principle of the corporeal is incorporeal, just as the principle of the corruptible is incorruptible, and the principle of the sensible is insensible, and the principle of the mobile is immobile, and thus concerning all others.

The second reason is, that if universals are corporeal, it follows that they are determined by quantities and figures. But the reasons of quantities are not quantified, and the reasons of figures are not figured. But if universals are figured quantified things, it follows that the one receiving them, is figured by them, and is distended by quantity. But the possible intellect receives such things. Therefore the possible intellect will be quantified and figured, which no one ever opined, because all praised Anaxagoras saying, that the intellect is pure and unmixed, having nothing common to any. Therefore the universal cannot be corporeal, and in a corporeal thing: since in so far as it is universal, it is the motive of the possible intellect.

Tertia ratio est, quod si universale corpus vel corpoream est habens quantitatem, oportet quod sua quantitas corporea sit et perpetua. Est autem singulare suum in quo est quocumque modo corporeum et corpus: aut igitur haec duo sunt unum corpus, aut duo corpora. Si sunt unum et idem, sequitur quod corruptibile sit incorruptibile, et sensibile insensibile, et faciens factum, et constituens constitutum, si sint unum et idem: quod est inconveniens et non intelligibile. Si autem sunt duo corpora, sequitur quod duo corpora sint in eodem loco. Mathematicis enim datur locus sicut et physicis, ut dicit Aristoteles. Probatum est autem a nobis in Physicis, quod si duo corpora sint in eodem loco, de necessitate duo erunt unum et idem corpus. Sequitur ergo, quod si sunt duo diversa corpora, quod sunt unum et idem corpus: quod impossibile est omnino.

Nos autem quae inducta sunt determinantes, distinguimus quod corporale multipliciter dicitur, scilicet quatuor modis. Uno quidem modo dicitur corporale quantitate corporea distensum, ita quod ipsa quantitas sit aliquid sui. Et sic habentia quantitatem corpoream, corporalia dicuntur et mobilia omnia et sensibilia. Secundo modo corporalia dicuntur non quidem quantitatem ut aliquid sui habentia, sed tamen secundum distensionem quantitatis in subjecto ea suscipiente sunt distensa, sicut albedo et nigredo, et caliditas et frigiditas, et figura, et circa aliquid constans forma, dicuntur corporalia: quamvis quantitas nihil sit essentiae ipsorum. Tertio modo dicitur corporale omne corpori sicut suscipienti determinatum, sicut sensus et imaginatio et caeterae virtutes sensibiles. Et universaliter omnis anima sensibilis et vegetabilis sunt corporales formae. Quarto modo dicitur corporale, non quod aliquid sit partis vel quantitatis corporalis, sed quia corporis quantitatis est principium.

Et sic punctum dicitur esse corporale. Similiter autem multipliciter dicitur incorporale: quia si unum oppositorum est multiplex, et reliquum. Nullo autem istorum modorum universale est corporale: quia est sicut natura corporis vel corporei, cui per aptitudinem dicendi de multis accidit universale esse: et est incorruptibilis, quia (sicut optime probatum est) aliter motivum intellectus possibilis esse non potest, quia penitus incorporeus et incorruptibilis est. Est enim simplex notio et natura ab omni quantitate distensionis abstracta.

The third reason is, that if the universal is a body or has a corporeal quantity, it is necessary that its quantity be corporeal and perpetual. But its singular in which it is is in whatever mode corporeal and a body: either therefore these two are one body, or two bodies. If they are one and the same, it follows that the corruptible is incorruptible, and the sensible insensible, and the making the made, and the constituting the constituted, if they be one and the same: which is inconvenient and not intelligible. But if they are two bodies, it follows that two bodies are in the same place. For place is given to mathematical things just as to physical things, as Aristotle says. But it has been proved by us in the *Physics*, that if two bodies are in the same place, of necessity the two will be one and the same body. It follows therefore, that if they are two diverse bodies, that they are one and the same body: which is completely impossible.

But we determining those things which have been induced, distinguish that corporeal is said multifariously, namely in four modes. In one mode indeed corporeal is said distended by corporeal quantity, such that the quantity itself is something of it. And thus having corporeal quantity, all mobile and sensible things are called corporeal. In a second mode corporeal things are called indeed not having quantity as something of themselves, but nevertheless according to the distension of quantity in the subject receiving them they are distended, just as whiteness and blackness, and hotness and coldness, and figure, and form consisting about something, are called corporeal: although quantity be nothing of their essence. In a third mode is called corporeal everything determined to a body as to a receiver, just as sense and imagination and other sensible powers. And universally every sensible and vegetative soul are corporeal forms. In a fourth mode is called corporeal, not because something is of a corporeal part or quantity, but because it is the principle of the quantity of a body.

And thus the point is said to be corporeal. But similarly it is called incorporeal in many ways: because if one of the opposites is multiple, so is the other. But in none of these modes is the universal corporeal: because it is like the nature of the body or the corporeal, to which through the aptitude of being said of many it happens to be universal: and it is incorruptible, because (as has been very well proved) otherwise it cannot be the motive of the possible intellect, because it is entirely incorporeal and incorruptible. For it is a simple notion and nature abstracted from all quantity of distension.

Ad hoc ergo quod primo objicitur, dicendum quod et quanti essentiam constituens est duplex, scilicet secundum quantitatis essentiam et constitutionem ejus quod est quantum vel quantitas. Et de tali principio procedit objectio et est necessaria. Alia est constitutio quanti secundum esse specificum et rationem, non secundum id quod est quantitas et dans nomen et diffinitionem quantitatis. Et hoc principium constituens speciem et genus quantitatis non est quantitas vel quantum, sed potius quantitatis natura simplex et ratio. Et haec natura sic simplicitate sua accepta est universale.

Ad id autem quod secundo inducitur, dicendum quod hoc quod ponunt simpliciter esse verum principium hujus, in esse et specie secundum naturam vel in genere non est ad hoc vel illud determinatum: quia si hoc esset verum, non esset principium universale, sed hujus vel illius. But this principle is not mathematical quantity in those things which are corporeal: but it is the simple nature constituting in genus and species, and giving the name and reason. Et in hoc patet, quod quamvis punctum sit essentiale et quasi materiale principium lineae, tamen formae lineae non habet nomen nec rationem. Sed aliud est principium secundum formam, quo linea lineae nomen et rationem habet. Et hoc principle simpliciter acceptum natura est lineae, cui accidit esse universale, per hoc quod pluribus est comunicabilis natura illa. Patet igitur quod corporalium universale est in corporale. Et hoc est vere dictum Peripateticorum.

Ad id autem quod tertio inducunt, dicendum quod verum est quod ponitur: dummodo bene intelligatur, quod essentialiter per modum materialis constituti principium est essentiale, non in ordine naturae primum: etiamsi daretur quod constituerent et principiarent naturalia corpora, non principiarent ea, nisi secundum id quod est quantitas subjecta, et non secundum hoc quo quantitas est in ratione vel specie vel genere. Et ideo non sunt propria ad ea secundum ordinem formalem naturae, vel secundum ordinem efficientis causae. But those which are constituting those which are corporeal in reason, name, and species, and genus, priora sunt secundum ordinem naturae: et illae sunt simplices naturae, et essentiae eorum, et notiones ipsorum. Haec autem omnia et incorporalia sunt et universalia per antedicta. Et hanc subtilitatem invenit Aristoteles, et ideo in omnibus quae dixit, Platoni praeponatur in positione principiorum. Haec est vera secundum Peripateticos hujus quaestionis determinatio; et sic tenendum est, nec est curandum de sophisticis quibusdam, qui ante nos quaedam scripserunt.

CAPUT V. _Utrum universalia sint separata a sensibilibus, an in ipsis sensibilibus posita?_

To that therefore which is first objected, it is to be said that both that which constitutes the essence of the "how much" is twofold, namely according to the essence of quantity and its constitution which is a "how much" or quantity. And from such a principle proceeds the objection and it is necessary. Another is the constitution of the "how much" according to specific being and reason, not according to that which is quantity and giving the name and definition of quantity. And this principle constituting the species and genus of quantity is not quantity or a "how much", but rather the simple nature and reason of quantity. And this nature thus accepted in its simplicity is the universal.

But to that which is induced secondly, it is to be said that this which they place simply to be the true principle of this, in being and species according to nature or in genus is not determined to this or that: because if this were true, it would not be a universal principle, but of this or that. But this principle is not mathematical quantity in those things which are corporeal: but it is the simple nature constituting in genus and species, and giving the name and reason. And in this it is clear, that although the point be an essential and as it were material principle of the line, nevertheless it does not have the name nor the reason of the form of the line. But another is the principle according to form, by which the line has the name and reason of the line. And this principle simply accepted is the nature of the line, to which it happens to be universal, by this that that nature is communicable to several. It is clear therefore that the universal of corporeal things is incorporeal. And this is truly the saying of the Peripatetics.

But to that which they induce thirdly, it is to be said that it is true what is placed: provided that it be well understood, that essentially by mode of a material constituted principle it is essential, not first in the order of nature: even if it were given that they constituted and principled natural bodies, they would not principle them, except according to that which is the subject quantity, and not according to this by which quantity is in reason or species or genus. And therefore they are not proper to them according to the formal order of nature, or according to the order of the efficient cause. But those which are constituting those which are corporeal in reason, name, and species, and genus, are prior according to the order of nature: and those are simple natures, and their essences, and their notions. But all these are both incorporeal and universal through the previously said things. And this subtlety Aristotle found, and therefore in all things which he said, he is preferred to Plato in the position of principles. This is the true determination of this question according to the Peripatetics; and thus it is to be held, nor is there care for certain sophistical things, which certain people before us have written.

CHAPTER V. _Whether universals are separate from sensibles, or placed in the sensibles themselves?_

Restat nunc de difficillima quaestione disserere, quam tertiam tangit Porphyrius, utrum scilicet universalia sint separata a sensibilibus, an in sensibilibus sive singularibus posita sint, et ab illis separatum esse non habeant? De hoc autem semper fuit contentio inter Stoicos et Peripateticos. Aristoteles enim ponere videtur universale extra particulare esse non habere: unde in _Posterioribus_ dicere videtur [1], quod universale non est nisi in hoc, hoc est, singulari.

Dicit etiam contra Platonem loquens, quod universale esse unum aliquid extra multa, non necesse est si demonstratio erit; esse tamen unum de multis, verum est dicere. Ac si dicat, ad hoc quod demonstrativa sit scientia, non necesse est dicere, quod universale (de quo est sciencia) sit separatum extra singularia: quia sufficit, quod universale sit unum in multis, et de multis. Adhuc autem dicit Aristoteles, quod nulla necessitas est opinari, quod universale sit praeter hoc.

In prima etiam philosophia [2] adhuc inducit rationes multas ad inconveniens ducentes: quia si esset universale separatum secundum esse actuale a singulari, sequeretur quod esset coelum praeter hoc coelum, et terra praeter hanc terram, et homo praeter hunc hominem: et cum scientiae de naturis rerum sequantur res, et de separatis sit alia scientia quam de materiam concipientibus, sicut patet in metaphysicis et physicis: esset alia scientia de coelo, et alia de hoc coelo: et alia medicina de homine, et alia de hoc homine: et alia geometria de terra, et alia de hac terra, et sic de aliis.

Hoc idem probatur per diffinitionem universalis, tam ex Aristotelis verbis [3], quam ex verbis Avicennae et Alfarabii. Est enim universale unum de multis et in multis. Si autem est in multis, non habet esse separatum ab illis. Et ideo dicunt quod universale est, quod est aptum esse in multis, et in hoc differt a singulari. Res autem secundum naturam est in eo in quo est apta nata esse, et non in eo in quo non est apta nata esse. Universale ergo est in multis, et non separatum habet esse ab illis: quia non est aptum natum habere separatum esse ab illis. Adhuc autem si universale esset actu secundum perfectum esse praeter multa, sequeretur quod esset existens per seipsum solum, et indivisum in se, et ab aliis divisum, et sic esse hoc aliquid et singulare. Nihil autem quod in se est unum et hoc aliquid, praedicabile est de multis, nisi solo nomine, et non re aliqua quae sit in illis. Et qui sic ponit universale esse, ignorat universalis rationem: quae nomine, re, et ratione rei quae in multis est, praedicatur de illis.

It remains now to discourse concerning a most difficult question, which Porphyry touches as the third, whether namely universals are separate from sensibles, or are placed in sensibles or singulars, and do not have a separate being from them? But concerning this there was always contention between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. For Aristotle seems to place that the universal does not have being outside the particular: whence in the _Posteriors_ he seems to say-

detur [videtur] [1], that the universal is not except in this, that is, the singular.

He also says speaking against Plato, that for the universal to be one certain thing outside the many, is not necessary if there will be demonstration; however for it to be one of the many, it is true to say. As if he should say, to this that science be demonstrative, it is not necessary to say, that the universal (concerning which science is) be separate outside singulars: because it suffices, that the universal be one in many, and of many. Still further Aristotle says, that there is no necessity to opine, that the universal be besides this.

In the first philosophy [2] he further induces many reasons leading to the inconvenient: because if the universal were separate according to actual being from the singular, it would follow that there would be a heaven besides this heaven, and a earth besides this earth, and a man besides this man: and since sciences concerning the natures of things follow things, and concerning separate things there be another science than concerning those conceiving matter, as is clear in metaphysics and physics: there would be another science concerning the heaven, and another concerning this heaven: and another medicine concerning man, and another concerning this man: and another geometry concerning the earth, and another concerning this earth, and so concerning others.

This same is proved through the definition of the universal, as much from the words of Aristotle [3], as from the words of Avicenna and Alfarabi. For the universal is one of many and in many. But if it is in many, it does not have separate being from them. And therefore they say that the universal is, what is apt to be in many, and in this it differs from the singular. But a thing according to nature is in that in which it is apt by nature to be, and not in that in which it is not apt by nature to be. The universal therefore is in many, and does not have separate being from them: because it is not apt by nature to have separate being from them. Still further if the universal were in act according to perfect being besides the many, it would follow that it would be existing through itself alone, and undivided in itself, and divided from others, and thus it would be a "this somewhat" and singular. But nothing which in itself is one and a "this somewhat", is predicable of many, except by the name alone, and not by some thing which be in them. And he who thus places the universal to be, ignores the reason of the universal: which by name, thing, and the reason of the thing which is in many, is predicated of them.

Adhuc autem si sic esset per se existens, non posset alii esse causa in natura et ratione, quia non posset esse forma ipsius: sed si constitueret id, hoc esset per modum compositionis elementalis admixtionis: et tunc praedicari non posset de ente formali praedicatione: et tunc destrueretur omnis utilitas ipsius. Sic enim nullius rei posset esse principium, neque ad esse, neque ad scientiam quae de esset per notitiam universalis. Adhuc omnes tales propositiones essent falsae et impossibiles, in quibus universale de particulari substantialiter praedicatur: ut cum dicitur, hic homo est homo, vel hoc lignum est lignum, et omnes similes istis, quae sunt maxima inconvenientia et absurda. Si autem aliquis diceret, quod universale particulari unitur, et tamen remanet in se separatum, hic non evadit inconvenientia inducta: taliter enim unitum non est unum, et secundum esse non praedicatur de eo cui est unitum. Et ideo non posset dici, quod Socrates vel hic homo est homo: quia sibi esset unitus homo, et quasi homini ut sigillo impressus: sicut non potest dici, quod cera sigillata sit sigillum. Videtur ergo, quod universale separatum esse non habeat extra suum singulare. In contrarium autem hujus est, quod omne quod hahet esse, non habens illud per aliud vel ab alio, potest esse sine illo. Universale autem habet esse, non per singulare, nec ab illo. Ergo potest esse sine illo: ergo secundum esse est separabile a singulari. Hoc etiam sic probatur: Esse univer-

salis [universalis] est esse commune aptum natum esse in pluribus et multis communicabile. Hoc autem esse non potest habere a singulari : quia singularia sunt discreta et incommunicabilia. Communicabile ergo esse quod est esse universalis, universale non habet a singulari.

Si forte aliquis dicat, quod ista ratio non probat, quod universale non habeat esse discretum : sed probat quod a singulari destructo remanet esse universalis secundum aliquem modum. Hoc videtur contra Aristotelem esse, qui ponens, quod universale esse habeat in singulari, dicit quod destructis primis impossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere [1]. Et hoc secundum rationem inductam destruitur : quia si universale habet esse separatum vel separabile ab esse singulari, universale manebit existente singulari et non existente singulari æqualiter : eo quod suum esse ab esse singularis non dependet aliquo modo, nisi secundum esse in ipso, et non secundum esse simpliciter.

Still further if it were thus existing through itself, it could not be a cause to another in nature and reason, because it could not be its form: but if it constituted that, this would be through the mode of elemental composition of admixture: and then it could not be predicated of the being by formal predication: and then every utility of it would be destroyed. For thus it could be the principle of no thing, neither to being, nor to science which would be through the knowledge of the universal. Still all such propositions would be false and impossible, in which the universal is substantially predicated of the particular: as when it is said, this man is a man, or this wood is wood, and all similar to these, which are the greatest inconveniences and absurdities. But if someone should say, that the universal is united to the particular, and nevertheless remains in itself separate, here he does not escape the induced inconveniences: for such a united thing is not one, and according to being it is not predicated of that to which it is united. And therefore it could not be said, that Socrates or this man is a man: because to him would be united a man, and as it were impressed to the man as to a seal: just as it cannot be said, that sealed wax be the seal. It seems therefore, that the universal separate being may not have outside its singular. To the contrary however of this is, that everything which has being, not having it through another or from another, can be without it. But the universal has being, not through the singular, nor from it. Therefore it can be without it: therefore according to being it is separable from the singular. This also is thus proved: To be univer-

salis [universalis] is a common being apt by nature to be in several and communicable to many. But this being it cannot have from the singular: because singulars are discrete and incommunicable. Therefore the communicable being which is the being of the universal, the universal does not have from the singular.

If perhaps someone should say, that this reason does not prove, that the universal does not have discrete being: but proves that from the singular destroyed the being of the universal remains according to some mode. This seems to be against Aristotle, who placing, that the universal has being in the singular, says that the first things being destroyed it is impossible for any of the others to remain [1]. And this according to the induced reason is destroyed: because if the universal has separate being or separable from singular being, the universal will remain the singular existing and the singular not existing equally: for the reason that its being does not depend on the being of the singular in any way, except according to being in it, and not according to being simply.

Adhuc autem universale semper est et ubique : particulare autem sive singulare est hic et nunc. Si autem universale est ubique et semper, est alicubi ubi non est singulare : et est aliquando quando non singulare. Quæcumque autem loco et tempore sunt separata, simpliciter et substantialiter secundum esse et subjecta sunt separata. Cum ergo universale et particulare loco et tempore differant sive separata sint, simpliciter secundum esse et subjecta substantialiter separata esse videntur.

Adhuc non potest idem esse intelligi corruptibile et incorruptibile. Universale autem incorruptibile est, singulare vero corruptibile. Non idem erit ergo esse universalis et singularis. Si enim idem esset utrisque esse, sequeretur contradictoria simul esse vera : quia si corruptibile est secundum esse, erit aliquando quando esse non habebit. Probatum enim est de *cœlo et mundo* in primo [2], quod corruptibile necessario aliquando corrumpetur : et tunc non erit incorruptibile, aut semper erit. Ergo aliquod tempus erit, quando id secundum esse et erit et non erit, quod est impossibile.

Adhuc autem constat, quod universale habet esse in quo multa uniuntur in unum nomen et rationem : quæ nomen et ratio dicunt esse diffiniti. Hoc autem esse nullo modo habet in esse singularis. Ergo habet hoc esse separatum ab esse singularis. Cum ergo habet hoc esse : aut habet ipsum secundum quod instrumentum primi agentis est, aut habet hoc secundum quod est in anima per abstractionem ipsum cognoscentem, aut in re ipsa extra agentem et cognoscentem existens. Si dicatur quod habet illud in efficiente, tunc universale non habet esse nisi ideale : et cum prædicatur de singulari, non prædicatur nisi sicut idea : hæc autem prædicatio non est substantialis, sed exemplaris tantum, et sic destruitur omnis prædicatio substantialis. Si autem habet in anima apprehendente, tunc relatio universalis ad multa, non est nisi in anima, et non in re, et sic prædicatur nomine, et non re. Et sic universalia non sunt res, sed nomina : quod falsum jam esse ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo quod habent id secundum quod est res in se existens et ab agente et cognoscente et a singulari separata. Ergo esse universalis est separatum ab esse singularis, et e converso. Ex omnibus autem his et similibus videtur quod esse universalis separatum sit substantia, loco, et tempore ab esse singularis.

Moreover, the universal is always and everywhere: but the particular or singular is here and now. But if the universal is everywhere and always, it is somewhere where the singular is not: and it is at some time when the singular is not. But whatever things are separate in place and time, are separate simply and substantially according to being and subjects. Since therefore the universal and particular differ in place and time or are separate, they seem to be separate simply according to being and substantially as subjects.

Further, the same being cannot be understood as corruptible and incorruptible. But the universal is incorruptible, while the singular is corruptible. Therefore the being of the universal and of the singular will not be the same. For if the being were the same for both, it would follow that contradictories are true at the same time: because if it is corruptible according to being, there will be some time when it will not have being. For it was proved concerning the *heaven and the world* in the first [book] [2], that the corruptible will necessarily be corrupted at some time: and then it will not be incorruptible, or it will always be. Therefore there will be some time, when that same thing according to being both will be and will not be, which is impossible.

Moreover it is clear, that the universal has being in which many are united in one name and reason: which name and reason say the being of the defined. But this being it has in no way in the being of the singular. Therefore it has this being separate from the being of the singular. Since therefore it has this being: either it has it according as it is the instrument of the first agent, or it has this according as it is in the soul through abstraction of the one knowing it, or existing in the thing itself outside the agent and the one knowing. If it be said that it has that in the efficient [cause], then the universal has no being except ideal: and when it is predicated of the singular, it is not predicated except as an idea: but this predication is not substantial, but only exemplary, and thus all substantial predication is destroyed. But if it has it in the apprehending soul, then the relation of the universal to many is only in the soul, and not in the thing, and thus it is predicated by name, and not by thing. And thus universals are not things, but names: which has already been shown to be false. It remains therefore that they have that according as it is a thing existing in itself and separate from the agent and the knower and from the singular. Therefore the being of the universal is separate from the being of the singular, and vice versa. From all these and similar things it seems that the being of the universal is separate in substance, place, and time from the being of the singular.

Ad hæc autem non est difficile respondere ei qui bene novit positionem Peripateticorum. Nam per distinctionem esse universalis omnia hæc facile determinantur. Est enim esse universalis secundum quod universale est secundum universalitatis rationem, et est esse ejus quod est universale. Similiter esse singularis secundum quod singulare est et secundum singularitatis rationem : et est esse ejus quod est singulare, prout est substantia-

substans communi naturæ. Dicimus ergo, quod esse universalis in eo quod universale, est ratione separatum, et oppositum est illi quod est esse singularis in eo quod singulare est, quamvis non ut in eodem subjecto. Esse autem naturæ illius quæ universale est, non est separatum ab esse singularis secundum quod est substantia substans illi communi naturæ : sed potius esse universalis est esse particularis, et non divisum ab illo. Est enim, sicut diximus, universale secundum esse in particulari : quamvis non sit universale secundum hoc quod est in illo, sed nec commune, nec communicabile, sicut in prima quæstione satis declaratum est. Et nisi sic esset, non esset quæstio nec scientia de aliquo, sicut in primis probatur objectis. Nec est curandum de solutione quam quidam inducunt, scilicet quod universale secundum se habeat esse, sed non habeat esse completum, nisi in particulari : universale enim habet esse completum in hoc, quod omnia habet quæ exiguntur ad esse universalis : sicut particulare habet esse completum, quando habet omnia quæ exiguntur ad esse particularis.

Ad id autem quod primo contra hoc inducitur, dicendum quod omne quod habet esse non per aliud, potest esse sine illo : nisi ita sit, quod esse suum quamvis non sit per aliud, tamen sit in alio cui ipsum est causa esse. Et hoc est esse in alio, sicut pars essentialis ipsius esse secundum quod est in alio : et hoc modo universale sive substantia secunda est in alio : sed per hoc quod est in illo, est particulatum et determinatum. Et ideo esse quidem habet in seipso sed non determinatum et particulatum.

Si autem quæratur, utrum idem esse sit quod universale habet per se acceptum, et quod habet determinatum et particulatum ? Dicendum quod nec idem omnino, nec diversum omnino : sed idem vel unum dupliciter. In substantia enim idem est : duplex autem ut idem et unum

indeterminatum et determinatum.

Et hæc est solutio trium Philosophorum, Avicennæ, et Alfarabii, et ejusdem Joannis grammatici apud Arabes nominati : et est vera quia concordat dictis Aristotelis.

To these things however it is not difficult to respond to him who well knows the position of the Peripatetics. For through the distinction of the being of the universal all these things are easily determined. For there is the being of the universal according as it is universal according to the reason of universality, and there is the being of that which is universal. Similarly the being of the singular according as it is singular and according to the reason of singularity: and there is the being of that which is singular, insofar as it is a substance-

standing under the common nature. We say therefore, that the being of the universal in that which is universal, is separated by reason, and is opposed to that which is the being of the singular in that which is singular, although not as in the same subject. But the being of that nature which is the universal, is not separated from the being of the singular according as it is a substance standing under that common nature: but rather the being of the universal is the being of the particular, and not divided from it. For it is, as we have said, the universal according to being in the particular: although it may not be universal according to this that it is in it, but neither common, nor communicable, as in the first question is sufficiently declared. And unless it were thus, there would not be question nor science concerning anything, as in the first things objected is proved. Nor is to be cared about the solution which certain ones induce, namely that the universal according to itself has being, but does not have complete being, except in the particular: for the universal has complete being in this, that it has all things which are required to the being of the universal: just as the particular has complete being, when it has all things which are required to the being of the particular.

But to that which first against this is induced, it is to be said that everything which has being not through another, can be without it: unless it be thus, that its being although it be not through another, nevertheless is in another to which it itself is the cause of being. And this is to be in another, as an essential part of its being according as it is in another: and in this mode the universal or second substance is in another: but through this that it is in it, it is particulated and determined. And therefore it indeed has being in itself but not determined and particulated.

But if it be asked, whether the same being is what the universal has accepted per se, and what it has determined and particulated? It is to be said that neither the same entirely, nor diverse entirely: but the same or one doubly. For in substance it is the same: but double as the same and one

undetermined and determined.

And this is the solution of three Philosophers, Avicenna, and Alfarabi, and the same John the grammarian named among the Arabs: and it is true because it accords with the sayings of Aristotle.

Ad id autem quod secundo inducunt, quod aptum natum esse in pluribus non convenit universali secundum quod est in singularibus, concedendum est quod hoc est verum : sed hoc habet natura illa in quantum simplex est et indeterminata. Quanto enim aliquid est simplicius, tanto magis est communicabile multis. Sed dico simplex non per privationem differentiarum, quæ conveniunt in esse ipsius, sed per privationem eorum quæ determinant et contrahunt ipsum ad hoc esse vel id secundum speciem vel individuum. Sed per hoc non sequitur, quod habeat esse determinatum sive singulare : quia quamvis tale esse non habeat a singulari, tamen non habet nisi in singulari : sicut et commune non habet esse nisi in eo, in quo determinatur et ad esse distinctum contrahitur. Nihil enim est simplex in natura, nisi quod ad esse distinctum est et determinatum, sicut genus non est nisi in speciebus, et species non est nisi in individuis suis.

Ad id autem quod objicitur, dicitur quod objectio non probat, quod universale habeat esse separatum, sed quod remaneat destructis pluribus particularibus concedendum est. Sed quod Aristoteles dicit, quod destructis primis impossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere, intelligitur in esse determinato et distincto in rebus naturæ. Sed tamen possibile est remanere in esse naturæ simplicis communis et indeterminatæ. Si autem quæritur in quo et ubi manet secundum id esse, hoc in proximo sequenti capitulo declarabitur.

Ad id autem quod dicitur Aristotelem dicere, quod universale est ubique et semper, singulare autem hic et nunc : dicendum quod verum est quod dicit Aristoteles, quod universale in esse universa-

salis acceptum, non discernit locum sive loci differentias vel tempus : quia indeterminatum est, et commune ad omnem locum et tempus : sed secundum idem suum esse substantiale efficitur hic et nunc quando determinatur in particulari ad hoc et id.

Si quis autem dicat, quod secundum hoc idem sit in pluribus tempore et loco et substantia differentibus : dicendum quod hoc non est inconveniens de eo quod est natura simplex et communicabile : quia potius hoc est necessarium, quia simplicitatem ejus consequitur communicabilitas. Sed in esse determinato et distincto non est in pluribus substantia, loco, et tempore divisis. Et ideo ejusdem rationis est homo in omni tempore, et in omni loco, et in omnibus individuis.

Ad id autem quod dicitur, quod universale est incorruptibile, singulare autem corruptibile : dicendum quod hoc verum est : quia aliter scientia non esset de ipso : sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod esse universalis separatum sit ab esse singularis : unumquodque enim dicitur incorruptibile vel corruptibile per rationem principiorum constituentium esse ipsius.

But to that which secondly they induce, that to be naturally apt to be in many does not belong to the universal according as it is in singulars, it is to be conceded that this is true: but this that nature has in as much as it is simple and undetermined. For by how much something is simpler, by so much more it is communicable to many. But I say simple not through the privation of differences, which convene in its being, but through the privation of those things which determine and contract it to this being or that according to species or individual. But through this it does not follow, that it should have determined or singular being: because although such being it may not have from the singular, nevertheless it does not have it except in the singular: just as also the common does not have being except in that, in which it is determined and to distinct being contracted. For nothing is simple in nature, except that which to distinct being is and determined, just as a genus is not except in species, and a species is not except in its individuals.

But to that which is objected, it is said that the objection does not prove, that the universal has separated being, but that it remains with many particulars destroyed is to be conceded. But what Aristotle says, that with the firsts destroyed it is impossible that anything of the others remain, is understood in determined and distinct being in the things of nature. But nevertheless it is possible to remain in the being of simple common and undetermined nature. But if it is asked in what and where it remains according to that being, this in the next following chapter will be declared.

But to that which is said that Aristotle says, that the universal is everywhere and always, but the singular here and now: it is to be said that true is what Aristotle says, that the universal in the universa-

-sal accepted, does not discern place or differences of place or time: because it is undetermined, and common to all place and time: but according to its same substantial being it is made here and now when it is determined in the particular to this and that.

But if anyone should say, that according to this the same is in many things differing in time and place and substance: it is to be said that this is not inconvenient concerning that which is a simple and communicable nature: because rather this is necessary, because communicability follows its simplicity. But in determined and distinct being it is not in many things divided by substance, place, and time. And therefore of the same reason is man in all time, and in all place, and in all individuals.

But to that which is said, that the universal is incorruptible, but the singular corruptible: it is to be said that this is true: because otherwise the science would not be concerning it: but from this it does not follow, that the being of the universal would be separated from the being of the singular: for everything is said to be incorruptible or corruptible by reason of the principles constituting its being.

Et ideo cum esse universalis secundum id quod vere est universale, hoc est, secundum id quod est natura simplex et indistincta, non dependeat secundum esse nisi a principiis simplicibus, sequetur quandoque, quod incorruptibile sit : probatur enim in ultima parte libri *de Causis* quod simplex est incorruptibile. Sed hoc idem ut determinatum et distinctum in singulari secundum esse particularis, quod dat esse ei determinatum, propter corruptibilium principiorum adjunctionem nihil prohibet esse corruptibile. Et idem est corruptibile et incorruptibile comparatione principiorum diversorum. Et hoc non improbat Aristoteles in libro *de cœlo et mundo*.

Ad hoc autem quod dicunt negari non posse, quod universale habeat esse commune in quo multa uniuntur et conveniunt in substantia et ratione : dicimus quod hoc verum est : et hoc esse est sibi proprium, et non habet a singulari : sed nec hoc potest negari quin illud idem commune esse sit determinabile et designabile in singulari : quia aliter non esset communicabile in singulis : et per illam distinctionem esse id non fit diversum secundum substantiam, sed tantum efficitur habens modum essendi diversum, quod non facit simpliciter esse diversum, sed unum esse duplex ex co quod diversum modum esse accipit, sicut sæpius dictum est.

Si quis autem dicat, quod ut dicit Aristoteles, motis nobis moventur ea quæ in nobis sunt : et per hoc intelligitur de motu corruptionis : et sic corruptis primis impossibile est universale remanere : dicendum quod hoc omnino est verum quod dicit Aristoteles, et ita intelligitur, sicut dictum est. Et verum est quod universale corrumpitur in eis quæ corrumpuntur, sed corrumpitur secundum quod est in eis. Est enim in eis secundum principia determinata et distrahentia ipsum ad esse particularis. Et sic est hoc modo corruptibile, quo in libro *de Causis* dicitur, quod incorruptibile est, quod est delatum super id quod est corruptibile, et est corruptibile per aliud et per accidens. Sed nihil prohibet quin maneat secundum substantiam et esse naturæ simplicis et indistinctæ et non particulatæ.

CAPUT VI

Qualiter universale est in anima, et qua- liter in seipso, et qualiter in singulari, et in quo sit verius secundum esse suæ naturæ.

Est autem difficilis quæstio valde, qualiter universale est in anima, et qualiter in seipso, et qualiter in singulari, et in quo verius sit secundum esse naturæ suæ. Quod enim in anima sit, ex dictis Peripateticorum supponitur omnium dicentium, quod universale est dum intelligitur, par-

And therefore since the being of the universal according to that which truly is universal, that is, according to that which is simple and indistinct nature, does not depend according to being except upon simple principles, it will follow sometimes, that it is incorruptible: for it is proved in the last part of the book *On Causes* that the simple is incorruptible. But this same thing as determined and distinct in the singular according to the being of the particular, which gives it determined being, on account of the adjunction of corruptible principles nothing prohibits being corruptible. And the same thing is corruptible and incorruptible by comparison of diverse principles. And this Aristotle does not disprove in the book *On Heaven and Earth*.

But to this that they say it cannot be denied, that the universal has common being in which many are united and convene in substance and reason: we say that this is true: and this being is proper to it, and it does not have it from the singular: but neither can this be denied but that that same common being may be determinable and designable in the singular: because otherwise it would not be communicable in singulars: and through that distinction that being does not become diverse according to substance, but only is made having a diverse mode of being, which does not make simply a diverse being, but one being double from this that it accepts a diverse mode of being, as has been said quite often.

But if anyone should say, that as Aristotle says, with us moved those things are moved which are in us: and through this it is understood concerning the motion of corruption: and thus with the firsts corrupted it is impossible that the universal remain: it is to be said that this is entirely true what Aristotle says, and so it is understood, as has been said. And it is true that the universal is corrupted in those things which are corrupted, but it is corrupted according as it is in them. For it is in them according to principles determined and distracting it to the being of the particular. And thus it is corruptible in this mode, by which in the book *On Causes* it is said, that the incorruptible is, what is brought down upon that which is corruptible, and is corruptible through another and by accident. But nothing prohibits but that it remain according to substance and the being of simple and indistinct and not particulated nature.

CHAPTER VI

How the universal is in the soul, and how in itself, and how in the singular, and in which it may be more truly according to the being of its nature.

But there is a very difficult question, how the universal is in the soul, and how in itself, and how in the singular, and in which it may be more truly according to the being of its nature. For that it is in the soul, is supposed from the words of all the Peripatetics saying, that the universal is while it is understood, the par-

ticulare [particulare] autem dum sentitur [1]. Adhuc autem Averroes [2], et Avicenna dicunt, quod intellectus in formis agit universalitatem. Adhuc autem universale in intellectu, ut dicit Aristoteles, principium est artis et scientiæ : nec posset esse principium artis et scientiæ, nisi esset in intellectu practico et speculativo. Ars enim est factivum principium entium in ratione, et ideo est in intellectu practico. Scientia autem est habitus conclusionum ex principiis speculationis probatus, et ideo est in intellectu speculativo : et sic oportet quod universale sit in intellectu. Est iterum universale secundum esse naturæ simplicis, cui accidit universale esse secundum suam communicabilitatem : hoc enim non habet ab hoc quod est in anima principium artis et scientiæ. Est etiam universale in singulari communicatum et distinctum ab individuantibus et materia.

Quæratur ergo, secundum quem modum divisum est in istis, cum ipsum de se sit unum, et idem est indivisum et indivisibile secundum essentiam. Adhuc color non esset in corpore terminato et in perspicuo et in oculo vidente, nisi esset unum et idem agens ipsum in omnibus illis, quod est de formali essentia coloris : et hoc est lux sive lumen, in cujus actu color movet visum : quod idem est in superficie terminati corporis diffusum. Et quod vere est unum et idem secundum actum perspicui secundum actum illuminati : et ita videtur esse etiam in forma universalis. Oportet enim esse unum quod agat ipsum in se et in anima et in singulari : quia aliter non posset intelligi qualiter esset in istis tribus simul et semel indivisum secundum essentiam, quamvis secundum esse aliquid sit divisum.

Quæritur etiam, in quo illorum verius et nobilius sit et evidentius secundum esse ? Et iterum quæritur, utrum secundum se sit in anima, vel per solam similitudinem suam ? sicut Aristot. dicere videtur [3], dicens, quod res non sunt in anima, sed similitudines rerum. Quod enim nobilius et verius sit in anima quam alibi, videtur per illam Aristotelis considerationem in sexto *Topicorum* [4], ubi dicit, quod prius et verius et evidentius est ens ubi est in quiete, quam ubi est in motu : et non accipit quietem secundum quod opponitur motui privative vel contrarie : sed accipit quietem pro immobilitate quacumque per quam impossibile est rem subjici motui vel mutationi. Sic autem non est universale in singulari, sed sic est in anima : verius ergo est secundum quod est in anima, quam sit in singulari. Sed hoc videtur irrationale valde, quia singulari dat esse nomen et rationem, et hoc non dat animæ. Verius autem est res in eo cui dat esse et rationem, quam in eo cui nihil talium donat.

ticulare [particulare] however while it is sensed [1]. Moreover Averroes [2], and Avicenna say, that the intellect acts universality in forms. Moreover the universal in the intellect, as Aristotle says, is the principle of art and science: nor could it be the principle of art and science, unless it were in the practical and speculative intellect. For art is the factive principle of beings in reason, and therefore it is in the practical intellect. Science however is the habit of conclusions proved from the principles of speculation, and therefore it is in the speculative intellect: and thus it is necessary that the universal be in the intellect. There is again the universal according to the being of simple nature, to which it happens to be universal according to its communicability: for it does not have this from this that it is in the soul as the principle of art and science. There is also the universal in the singular communicated and distinct from the individuating [principles] and matter.

Let it be asked therefore, according to what mode it is divided in those, since it of itself is one, and the same is undivided and indivisible according to essence. Moreover color would not be in a terminated body and in the perspicuous [medium] and in the seeing eye, unless it were one and the same agent [acting] it in all those, which is of the formal essence of color: and this is light or lumen, in the act of which color moves the sight: which same thing is diffused in the surface of the terminated body. And that which truly is one and the same according to the act of the perspicuous according to the act of the illuminated: and so it seems to be also in the form of the universal. For it is necessary to be one which may act it in itself and in the soul and in the singular: because otherwise it could not be understood how it would be in those three at once and once undivided according to essence, although according to being something be divided.

It is also asked, in which of those it be more truly and nobly and evidently according to being? And again it is asked, whether according to itself it be in the soul, or through its likeness alone? just as Aristotle seems to say [3], saying, that things are not in the soul, but the likenesses of things. That it be more noble and true in the soul than elsewhere, seems through that consideration of Aristotle in the sixth [book] of the *Topics* [4], where he says, that a being is prior and truer and more evident where it is in rest, than where it is in motion: and he does not accept rest according as it is opposed to motion privatively or contrarily: but he accepts rest for any immobility through which it is impossible for a thing to be subjected to motion or change. But thus the universal is not in the singular, but thus it is in the soul: more truly therefore it is according as it is in the soul, than it be in the singular. But this seems very irrational, because it gives being, name, and reason to the singular, and this it does not give to the soul. But a thing is more truly in that to which it gives being and reason, than in that to which it gives nothing of such things.

Tamen in fine etiam *Posteriorum* [5] videtur Aristoteles dicere, quod universale quiescit in anima, ubi dicit ex omni quiescente universali in anima uno præter multa : quod cum in omnibus unum sit idem et artis principium, est et scientiæ. Videtur ergo quod nobilius et verius sit in anima quam extra animam.

Ad hoc autem si quis bene novit positionem Peripateticorum, non habet difficile determinare et respondere. Dicendum igitur primo, quod universale unum numero et essentia est in anima et in seipso et in singulari, nec differt nisi secundum esse determinans ipsum ad hoc vel illud : secundum enim simplicitatem acceptum in se secundum seipsum est : ut principium autem artis et scientiæ est in anima, et ut communicatum ad esse naturæ particularis est distinctum in particulari.

Et si quæratur quid unum sit, quod faciat ipsum esse in tribus his : dicendum, quod inducta similitudo de luce et-

colore [colore] bona est. Et dicendum quod id unum quod in tribus ipsum facit esse, est vis intelligentiæ primæ, quæ causa universi esse est in omnibus : cujus etiam ipsa simplex natura (quæ est hoc quod est universale vel illud) contingens radius est. Et quia contactus talis multiplex est secundum diversas naturas ad quas pertingit, ideo universalia multa sunt, reducibilia tamen aliquo modo ad unum, quod causæ primæ primum causatum est. Hoc autem unum intelligentiæ lumen est extensum per omnem naturam et animam, sicut lux solis extendit se per omnem naturam et animam in eo quod est imago ipsius propinqua. Et anima intellectualis facit et operatur et invenit formas suas sub specie et forma luminis, sicut lux solis et colorem facit in perspicuo sive pervio, quem quidem accipit visus per id quod perspicuo componitur ejus organum : accipit tamen in virtute vitæ et sensus per hoc quod oculus perspicuum animatum sensitivum et determinatum corpus est : et accipit clarum vel tenebrosum per hoc quod superficies clara est vel tenebrosa. Ita etiam lux intelligentiæ primæ, quæ fons et causa est omnium formarum, facit et invehit formas quas in se quidem acceptas habet simplices et indistinctas, et ideo universales et in simplici lumine constitutas : quæ (quia universale est ubique et semper) secundum quod sic sunt, ubique et semper sunt, incorruptibiles sunt et immobiles et innumerabiles.

Nevertheless in the end also of the *Posteriors* [5] Aristotle seems to say, that the universal rests in the soul, where he says from every resting universal in the soul one besides the many: which since in all it is one same and the principle of art, it is also of science. It seems therefore that it be more noble and truer in the soul than outside the soul.

To this however if anyone well knows the position of the Peripatetics, he does not have difficulty to determine and respond. It must be said therefore first, that the universal is one in number and essence in the soul and in itself and in the singular, nor does it differ except according to the being determining it to this or that: for accepted according to simplicity in itself it is according to itself: but as the principle of art and science it is in the soul, and as communicated to the being of particular nature it is distinct in the particular.

And if it be asked what it be one, which makes it to be in these three: it must be said, that the induced likeness concerning light and-

colore [colore] is good. And it must be said that that one thing which makes it to be in the three, is the power of the first intelligence, which is the cause of the universe to be in all: of which also the simple nature itself (which is this that is universal or that) is a touching ray. And because such contact is manifold according to the diverse natures to which it reaches, therefore universals are many, reducible nevertheless in some mode to one, which is the first caused of the first cause. Moreover this one light of intelligence is extended through every nature and soul, just as the light of the sun extends itself through every nature and soul in that which is its near image. And the intellectual soul makes and operates and finds its forms under the species and form of light, just as the light of the sun also makes color in the perspicuous or pervasive, which indeed the sight accepts through that which its organ is composed of the perspicuous: it accepts nevertheless in the power of life and sense through this that the eye is an animated sensitive perspicuous and determined body: and it accepts clear or dark through this that the surface is clear or dark. So also the light of the first intelligence, which is the fount and cause of all forms, makes and brings in the forms which it has accepted in itself indeed simple and indistinct, and therefore universal and constituted in simple light: which (because the universal is everywhere and always) according as they are so, are everywhere and always, are incorruptible and immobile and innumerable.

Secundum autem quod ad hoc vel illud sunt terminatæ, sic accipiunt diversum modum in esse. Et in anima (quæ vitæ intellectualis principium est) accipiuntur, ut principia operis vel speculationis : cum talis anima et imago instrumentum sit luminis intelligentiæ, in materia sensibili (quæ non nisi subjectum operantis intelligentiæ est) invehit eas, ut sunt principium esse hujus vel illius singularis. Et ideo una et eadem est essentia in se et in anima et in singulari : sed in anima secundum esse spirituale, in singulari secundum esse mate- riale et naturale, in se autem in esse simplici.

Et quod dicit Aristoteles quod verius esse est in quo est sicut in quiete, Dicendum est quod verius esse dicitur dupliciter : est enim verius secundum actum naturæ proprium, et verius secundum constituentium proprietatem. Et verius quidem secundum substantialem naturæ ipsius actum est in singulari, cui dat esse substantiale et nomen et rationem : qui est proprius et substantialis naturæ communis actus. Secundum autem veritatem constituentium illam naturam verius est et in anima et in se, quam in singulari : quia ibi purius est et impermixtius naturæ alienæ : sicut verius dicitur aurum quod alienæ naturæ est impermixtius. Et sic intelligitur deducta Aristotelis consideratio in sexto *Topicorum*. Quod autem in fine secundi *Posteriorum* deductum est, contra mentem Aristotelis adductum est, quamvis faciat pro ista quæstione confirmanda. Intendit enim ibi Aristoteles universale esse de multis acceptionem per experimentum et memoriam : quod quiescere in anima dicitur, quando sibi acquiescit anima non inveniens instantiam universalis acceptionis.

Quod autem quæritur, qualiter sit in anima et in se et in singulari : dico cum Aristotele et Peripateticis, quod est in omnibus his per suam præsentiam realem, et realiter acceptum : quam præsentiam facit intelligentiæ lumen, sicut dictum est. Quod autem dicit Aristoteles, quod res non sunt in anima, sed similitudines rerum : dicendum quod res dicuntur singularia quæ sola sunt ens ratum in natura. Similitudines autem sunt universalia, quæ, ut dicit Boëtius, non nisi similitudo essentialis sunt suorum suppositorum et singularium : quod patet ex hoc, quod id quod est in anima intelligente, non fit in ea nisi per abstractionem : abstractio autem non fit nisi ab individuantibus, quibus et materialibus separatis remanet id quod ubique et semper est, quod per lumen intelligentiæ-

prius [prius] efficitur, et quod per naturam intellectualem quam in substantia sua participat, stramentum est intelligentiæ, in quo sternit formas veras suo lumine, quæ secundum vitæ operationem perficitur contemplando et operando.

Moreover according as they are terminated to this or that, so they accept a diverse mode in being. And in the soul (which is the principle of intellectual life) they are accepted, as principles of work or speculation: since such a soul and image be the instrument of the light of intelligence, in sensible matter (which is not except the subject of the operating intelligence) it brings them in, as they are the principle of being of this or that singular. And therefore one and the same is the essence in itself and in the soul and in the singular: but in the soul according to spiritual being, in the singular according to material and natural being, but in itself in simple being.

And that which Aristotle says that truer being is in which it is as in rest, It must be said that truer being is said doubly: for it is truer according to the proper act of nature, and truer according to the property of the constituents. And truer indeed according to the substantial act of the nature itself it is in the singular, to which it gives substantial being and name and reason: which is the proper and substantial act of the common nature. Moreover according according to the truth of the constituents of that nature it is truer both in the soul and in itself, than in the singular: because there it is purer and more unmixed with alien nature: just as gold is said truer which is more unmixed with alien nature. And so is understood the induced consideration of Aristotle in the sixth [book] of the *Topics*. Moreover that which in the end of the second [book] of the *Posteriors* was induced, was brought against the mind of Aristotle, although it makes for the confirming of that question. For Aristotle intends there the acceptance of the universal from many through experiment and memory: which is said to rest in the soul, when the soul acquiesces to itself not finding an instance of the universal acceptance.

Moreover that which is asked, how it be in the soul and in itself and in the singular: I say with Aristotle and the Peripatetics, that it is in all these through its real presence, and really accepted: which presence the light of intelligence makes, as was said. Moreover that which Aristotle says, that things are not in the soul, but the likenesses of things: it must be said that things are called singulars which alone are established being in nature. Moreover likenesses are universals, which, as Boethius says, are not except the essential likeness of their supposites and singulars: which is clear from this, that that which is in the intelligent soul, does not become in it except through abstraction: but abstraction does not become except from the individuating [principles], which and material [principles] being separated there remains that which is everywhere and always, which through the light of intelligence-

prius [prius] is effected, and which through the intellectual nature which it participates in its substance, is the straw [stramentum] of intelligence, in which it spreads true forms by its light, which is perfected according to the operation of life by contemplating and operating.

Hæc videtur vera hujus quæstionis determinatio, secundum hoc quod traditur in scientia de intelligentiis, de quibus Aristoteles loquitur in secundo *primæ* *philosophiæ*. Scito tamen, quod aliter multi dicunt Latinorum, contra quos ego non contendo : quia non contentioni studeo, sed ad explanandas opiniones Peripateticorum. Quod autem dicitur, quod universale est dum intelligitur, et particulare sive singulare dum sentitur : non ideo dictum est, quod ab intellectu intelligentis accipiat universale esse, vel a sensu accipiat esse particulare : hoc enim fuit error Pythagoræ, quem impugnat Aristoteles, sed ideo dictum est, quia non accipitur in intellectu nisi in intelligentiæ lumine, et sic est universale : nec accipitur a sensu nisi sensibili accidente distinctum, et sic est singulare. Et hæc est solutio quæstionis inductæ.

CAPUT VII ### *Qualiter universale producatur in esse.*

Multos etiam movet, qualiter universale producitur philosophice, et non de productione illa qua cuncta in natura procreatione producit Deus : secundum physicam enim nihil creatur, nisi quod producitur nullo quodam alio producto : et sic solum ens producitur per creationem, alia autem per informationem producuntur, sicut in scientia libri causarum est determinatum [1]. Hoc ergo modo quæratur, qualiter universale in esse producitur ? cum enim productum producentis intelligentiæ et agentis fit terminus, et producere et agere per intellectum, terminus autem actionis sit compositum et hoc aliquid : cum universale producatur, videtur quod universale sit compositum et hoc aliquid. Hoc autem falsum est, cum universale sit forma, et quale quid, et non hoc aliquid.

Hoc autem adhuc videtur ex eo, quod id quod ab intelligentia in esse producitur, per exemplar et ideam, est in ipsa : non autem per ideam et exemplar est in intelligentia, nisi quod est hoc aliquid et compositum : aliter enim oporteret, quod plures essent ideæ ejusdem, quædam quidem secundum formam, quædam secundum materiam, et quædam secundum genus, aut secundum speciem, et quædam secundum differentias : quod valde est absurdum.

Adhuc autem oportet quod omnia producantur ab agente intelligentia in quantum sunt in natura perfecta, et hoc aliquid existentia. Si ergo ab agente intelligentia (quæ causa prima est, sive aliquid aliud secundarum causarum) universale producitur, videtur quod universale sit hoc aliquid et compositum ex materia et forma.

This seems the true determination of this question, according to that which is handed down in the science concerning the intelligences, concerning which Aristotle speaks in the second [book] of *First Philosophy*. Know nevertheless, that many of the Latins say otherwise, against whom I do not contend: because I do not study for contention, but for explaining the opinions of the Peripatetics. Moreover that which is said, that the universal is while it is understood, and the particular or singular while it is sensed: was not therefore said, that from the intellect of the one understanding it accepts universal being, or from the sense it accepts particular being: for this was the error of Pythagoras, which Aristotle impugns, but it was therefore said, because it is not accepted in the intellect except in the light of intelligence, and thus it is universal: nor is it accepted by the sense except distinct by a sensible accident, and thus it is singular. And this is the solution of the induced question.

CHAPTER VII ### *How the universal be produced in being.*

It also moves many, how the universal is produced philosophically, and not concerning that production by which God produces all things in nature by procreation: for according to physics nothing is created, except what is produced with no other certain thing produced: and thus only being is produced through creation, others however are produced through information, just as is determined in the science of the book of causes [1]. In this mode therefore let it be asked, how the universal is produced in being? since indeed the product of the producing and acting intelligence becomes the term, and to produce and to act through the intellect, but the term of the action be the composite and this somewhat: since the universal be produced, it seems that the universal be a composite and this somewhat. This however is false, since the universal be a form, and a "of what sort somewhat" [quale quid], and not this somewhat [hoc aliquid].

This however still seems from this, that that which is produced in being by the intelligence, through exemplar and idea, is in it: not however through idea and exemplar is it in the intelligence, unless it is this somewhat and composite: for otherwise it would be necessary, that there were several ideas of the same, some indeed according to form, some according to matter, and some according to genus, or according to species, and some according to differences: which is very absurd.

Moreover it is necessary that all things be produced by the acting intelligence in as much as they are in perfect nature, and existing this somewhat. If therefore by the acting intelligence (which is the first cause, or some other of the second causes) the universal is produced, it seems that the universal be this somewhat and composite from matter and form.

Adhuc autem videtur hoc ex hoc quod ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest [2]. Quod autem ab artifice producitur et est in artifice per modum exemplaris, non est forma simplex, sed compositum, ut domus vel tripoda. Sic ergo videtur etiam fieri in productione intelligentiæ in natura : supponimus enim, quod totum opus naturæ est opus intelligentiæ agentis, cujus virtus etiam informat semen generationis, ex quo res naturæ producuntur.

Adhuc autem in omni natura productum semper est res naturæ. Res autem naturæ non est nisi hypostasis communi naturæ supposita et substans per seipsam. Taliter autem substans naturæ communi, individuum et singulare est. Si ergo universale sic producitur, sequitur quod universale sit singulare : quod est inconveniens.

Ad omnia autem hæc et his similia non est difficile respondere. Universale enim-

secundum [secundum] quod in esse producitur per intelligentiam agentem, sive generationem, quæ est agentis intelligentiæ instrumentum, non nisi in hypostasi producitur, quæ est hoc aliquid in illa natura communi vel illa. Et ideo cum non producatur ut existens per se solum, non oportet quod productum sit hoc aliquid. Hoc autem modo omnes procedunt objectiones : et ideo patet quod nihil valent. Quod autem in alio producitur, ut in phycisis docet Aristoteles, dupliciter producitur : aut ex consequenti, aut per accidens. Ex consequenti autem quia hic generans est homo, ideo sequitur quod homo generat hominem, et quod hic generans est homo et animal et substantia, et sic de aliis : et sic in omni prædicatione substantiali : ita quod Aristoteles dicit, quod domus est ex domo, et sanitas ex sanitate, et sic de aliis : quia productum semper est ad formam producentis, eo quod æquivocum ad univocum necessarium est reduci. Per accidens autem producitur, quod accidit producto ex ipsa productione. Si enim producitur per generationem, ad similitudinem formæ et speciei generantis producitur : et ideo per accidens productus est filius, et producens est pater, et sic de aliis. Producitur autem universale ex consequenti in esse naturæ : propter quod dicit Auctor sex principiorum, quod natura occulte operatur in illis : et ideo etiam in physica Aristotelis [1] secundæ substantiæ vocantur. Si autem universale secundum seipsum consideretur, ipsum est imago luminis in re naturæ.

Still further this seems from this that art imitates nature in as much as it can [2]. Moreover that which is produced by the artisan and is in the artisan by mode of exemplar, is not a simple form, but a composite, as a house or a tripod. Thus therefore it seems also to become in the production of the intelligence in nature: for we suppose, that the whole work of nature is the work of the acting intelligence, whose power also informs the seed of generation, from which the things of nature are produced.

Moreover in every nature the product is always a thing of nature. But a thing of nature is not except a hypostasis supposed to the common nature and standing under by itself. But such a thing standing under the common nature, is an individual and singular. If therefore the universal is thus produced, it follows that the universal be singular: which is inconvenient.

To all these however and similar to these it is not difficult to respond. For the universal-

secundum [secundum] as it is produced in being by the acting intelligence, or generation, which is the instrument of the acting intelligence, is not produced except in a hypostasis, which is this somewhat in that common nature or that. And therefore since it be not produced as existing by itself alone, it is not necessary that the product be this somewhat. In this mode all objections proceed: and therefore it is clear that they are worth nothing. Moreover that which is produced in another, as Aristotle teaches in the *Physics*, is produced doubly: either from the consequent, or by accident. From the consequent however because this generator is a man, therefore it follows that a man generates a man, and that this generator is a man and an animal and a substance, and so concerning others: and so in every substantial predication: so that Aristotle says, that a house is from a house, and health from health, and so concerning others: because the product is always to the form of the producer, for the reason that it is necessary for the equivocal to be reduced to the univocal. By accident however is produced, what happens to the product from the production itself. For if it is produced through generation, it is produced to the likeness of the form and species of the generator: and therefore by accident the produced is a son, and the producer is a father, and so concerning others. Moreover the universal is produced from the consequent in the being of nature: for which reason the Author of the *Six Principles* says, that nature operates occultly in those: and therefore also in the *Physics* of Aristotle [1] they are called second substances. If however the universal be considered according to itself, it is the image of light in the thing of nature.

Imago, dico, luminis agentis intelligentiæ : quod lumen terminatum est ad hoc aliquid et incorporatum illi : et hoc modo universale naturæ producitur in esse ab agente intelligentia, quæ operatur per suum intellectuale lumen in omni natura, et est causa rei naturalis in omnibus : quod quidem lumen in se acceptum inest universali, et ratione universale est : acceptum autem ut determinatum ad hoc aliquid, et incorporatum illi, est esse et substantia particularis dans esse substantiale et rationem singulari.

CAPUT VIII. ### *An universale sit forma, vel materia, vel compositum : et si forma, cujusmodi forma sit?*

Est autem adhuc dubium apud quosdam, an universale sit forma, an compositum, an materia : et si est forma, utrum sit forma totius, vel partis? Quod enim universale non sit materia, patet ex hoc quod materia ei, in quo est, nec dat esse, nec nomen, nec rationem : quæ omnia dat universale substantiale ei cujus est universale : igitur non est materia. Adhuc autem materia non est imago agentis in eo quod producitur. Universale autem est imago agentis intelligentiæ in eo quod producitur, ut jam probatum est. Adhuc autem omne quod prædicatur de eo in quo est, forma est. Universale prædicatur de eo in quo est. Ergo universale forma est. Adhuc autem nihil est communicabile multis unum existens in eis secundum essentiam nisi forma : materia enim non est communicabilis multis, nisi per divisionem, ita quod non tota est in singulis. Universale autem totum est in singulis. Ergo universale non est materia, sed forma.

Sed quia innegabiliter verum est, ideo quæritur cujusmodi forma sit? Est enim forma totius, ut humanitas est forma hominis : aut forma partis, sicut anima est forma corporis humani. Forma autem partis sive materiæ non prædicatur de re cujus est forma, sed universale bene prædicatur. Universale ergo non est forma partis vel materiæ secundum quod materia perficitur per formam. Eodem modo probari videtur, quod nec forma totius-

est : quia etiam humanitas de homine non prædicatur, et est de ratione ejus de quo prædicatur.

Hæc autem et similia solvere non est difficile. Dicendum enim est, quod universale est forma, et quod est forma totius. Sed forma totius dupliciter designatur in nomine : designatur enim ut forma tantum, sicut humanitas est forma designata ut forma tantum, quæ est essentia formalis : et ideo non prædicatur de eo cujus est forma, quia homo non est essentia sua formalis, nec aliquid aliorum quæ formas habent.

An image, I say, of the light of the acting intelligence: which light is terminated to this somewhat and incorporated to that: and in this mode the universal of nature is produced in being by the acting intelligence, which operates through its intellectual light in every nature, and is the cause of the natural thing in all: which light indeed accepted in itself is in the universal, and by reason is universal: accepted however as determined to this somewhat, and incorporated to that, it is the being and particular substance giving substantial being and reason to the singular.

CHAPTER VIII. ### *Whether the universal be form, or matter, or composite: and if form, what sort of form it be?*

It is however still a doubt among some, whether the universal be form, or composite, or matter: and if it is form, whether it be form of the whole, or of a part? For that the universal be not matter, is clear from this that matter to that in which it is, neither gives being, nor name, nor reason: all which the substantial universal gives to that of which it is the universal: therefore it is not matter. Still further matter is not the image of the agent in that which is produced. Moreover the universal is the image of the acting intelligence in that which is produced, as has already been proved. Still further everything which is predicated of that in which it is, is a form. The universal is predicated of that in which it is. Therefore the universal is a form. Still further nothing is communicable to many existing one in them according to essence except form: for matter is not communicable to many, except through division, so that it is not whole in singulars. Moreover the universal is whole in singulars. Therefore the universal is not matter, but form.

But because it is innegably true, therefore it is asked what sort of form it be? For there is form of the whole, as humanity is the form of man: or form of a part, just as the soul is the form of the human body. Moreover the form of a part or of matter is not predicated of the thing of which it is the form, but the universal is well predicated. The universal therefore is not the form of a part or of matter according as matter is perfected through form. In the same mode it seems to be proved, that neither the form of the whole-

is it: because even humanity is not predicated of man, and yet it is of the reason of that of which it is predicated.

To solve these and similar things however is not difficult. For it must be said, that the universal is a form, and that it is the form of the whole. But the form of the whole is designated doubly in a name: for it is designated as form only, just as humanity is the form designated as form only, which is the formal essence: and therefore it is not predicated of that of which it is the form, because man is not his own formal essence, nor any other of those things which have forms.

Designatur etiam ut forma totius totum esse dicens cujus est forma : et tunc designatur per esse quod dat ei in quo est et nomen, sicut homo dicit esse formale quod forma totius dat huic composito quod est hic homo. Et hoc docet Aristoteles [1] dicens : cum dico cœlum, dico formam : cum dico hoc cœlum, dico formam in materia. Et forma est universale prædicabile nomine et ratione de eo cujus est universale secundum substantiam : cujus probatio est, quia nisi universale tale esset forma, diffinitio data secundum nomen universalis non diceret totum esse rei, nec totam quidditatem ipsius secundum illud nomen secundum quod diffinitur, sive nomen generis sive speciei. Relinquitur ergo, quod universale sit forma totius ut totum esse dicens designata : propter hoc etiam prædicatur de eo de quo prædicatur, ita quod et statim posito subjecto per intellectum concipitur in illo sive subjectum sit in actu, sive non : omni tempore enim verum est, quod homo est animal, sive homo sit, sive non sit : et quod animal est corpus animatum, et quod corpus animatum sit substantia : sed ex hoc non sequitur, ergo corpus animatum est ens secundum actum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna [2], quod esse et existentia accidit ei quod est : verum enim est hominem esse animal, sive aliquod animal sit, sive non sit : et accidit ei esse, vel non esse.

Hæc igitur sunt, quæ digrediendo a proposito, et altioris scientiæ assumendo negotium, de universalibus propter doctrinæ perfectionem esse dicenda videbantur.

Redeuntes igitur ad propositum dicamus, quod cum ad scientiam prædicamentorum Aristotelis utile et necessarium sit nosse quid genus, quid species, quid differentia, quid proprium, et quid accidens sit. Præterea utile ad demonstrationem et diffinitionem et divisionum scientiam, tentabo tradere istarum rerum (quæ universalia dicuntur) speculationem sive scientiam speculativam compendiosam, brevem quidem, sed tamen sufficientem et facilem, quæ competat introducendis, per assignationes et similitudines tradens scientiam, tentans aggredi quæ ab antiquis dicta sunt, ut qualia dicta sunt accipiantur. Hoc autem faciam ab altioribus quidem quæstionibus abstinens : quæ licet tactæ sint propter doctrinæ perfectionem, tamen ex principiis propositæ intentionis determinari non possunt. Simpliciores vero de his universalibus quæstiones mediocriter inter subtilem et rudem tractatum conjectans, ex probabilibus sive similibus tractare, conjecturare est : multa enim talia oportet adducere, ut fides fiat de eo de quo tractatur.

It is also designated as the form of the whole saying the whole being of that of which it is the form: and then it is designated through the being which it gives to that in which it is and the name, just as "man" says the formal being which the form of the whole gives to this composite which is this man. And this Aristotle [1] teaches saying: when I say "heaven," I say the form: when I say "this heaven," I say the form in matter. And the form is a universal predicable by name and reason of that of which it is the universal according to substance: the proof of which is, because unless such a universal were the form, the definition given according to the name of the universal would not say the whole being of the thing, nor the whole quiddity of it according to that name according to which it is defined, whether the name of genus or of species. It remains therefore, that the universal be the form of the whole designated as saying the whole being: on account of this also it is predicated of that of which it is predicated, so that even immediately with the subject placed it is conceived in it through the intellect whether the subject be in act, or not: for at all times it is true, that man is an animal, whether man be, or be not: and that animal is an animated body, and that an animated body be a substance: but from this it does not follow, therefore an animated body is a being according to act. And therefore Avicenna [2] says, that being and existence happen to that which is: for it is true that man is an animal, whether some animal be, or be not: and it happens to it to be, or not to be.

These therefore are the things which, by digressing from the purpose, and assuming the business of a higher science, seemed were to be said concerning universals for the perfection of doctrine.

Returning therefore to the purpose let us say, that since for the science of the Categories of Aristotle it be useful and necessary to know what genus is, what species, what difference, what property, and what accident is. Furthermore being useful for demonstration and definition and the science of divisions, I will attempt to hand down a speculation or compendious speculative science of these things (which are called universals), brief indeed, but nevertheless sufficient and easy, which may be suitable for those to be introduced, handing down the science through assignments and likenesses, attempting to approach those things which have been said by the ancients, so that what sort of things were said may be received. This however I will do by abstaining indeed from higher questions: which although they have been touched upon for the perfection of doctrine, nevertheless cannot be determined from the principles of the proposed intention. But conjecturing the simpler questions concerning these universals moderately between a subtle and a rude treatise, to treat from probables or likenesses, is to conjecture: for it is necessary to bring forward many such things, so that faith may be made concerning that of which it is treated.

Ne autem lateant ea quæ ex istius scientiæ principiis tractari non possunt de universalibus, mox, id est, prima facie occurrit quærendum de generibus, et speciebus, utrum scilicet subsistant, vel in solis, nudis purisque intellectibus posita sint : si etiam sint subsistentia extra intellectum posita, utrum sint corporalia, sive incorporalia : et sive hoc vel illo modo sint, utrum sint separata secundum esse a sensibilibus sive singularibus, an in ipsis sensibilibus posita sint. Et alia quædam circa tales difficultates circumstantia in hoc libro dicere recusabo. Hujusmodi enim negotium altissimum est, quia altis-

simæ scientiæ proprium, et ideo majoris
et subtilioris egens est inquisitionis : altioris quidem quoad subjecti nobilitatem, majoris autem inquisitionis quoad demonstrationum subtilitatem. In his enim duobus scientiæ differunt, ut Aristoteles
dicit in principio libri *de Anima* [1]. Illud
vero quod de his dicendum videtur probabiliter quemadmodum de his tractaverunt antiqui Philosophi, et horum maxime Peripatetici (quos hic sequi suscepimus) nunc tantabo demonstrare modo
introductionis.

<!-- cap:1.2.9 -->
CAPUT IX.
Quomodo universale prædicatur de quinque universalibus, et de sufficientia ac ordine quinque universalium?

Quia autem inter incomplexa primo de
universalibus occurit tractandum : videndum prius est qualiter universale dicitur de quinque quæ sunt inducta. Universale
enim simplex natura est, sua simplicitate
communicabile et determinabile ad particulare in quo ipsum est nomine et ratione. Dico autem ratione essentiali quæ
competit universali quod prædicatur : et
hoc dico propter proprium et accidens,
quæ etsi ut universalia perfectas diffinitiones habere non possunt, tamen secundum quas habent, prædicantur de his de
quibus prædicantur sicut de substantiis,
ut album de hoc albo, et risibile de hoc
risibili, et sic de aliis.

Cum ergo quodlibet istorum quinque
dicatur universale, sciendum quod universale non dicitur communiter de ipsis ut genus, sed ut commune proportionis
ad unum quod vocatur commune secundum analogiam. Unum autem ad cujus proportionem universale dicitur de his
quinque, est aptum natum esse in multis et de multis.

Lest however those things which cannot be treated from the principles of this science concerning universals be hidden, soon, that is, at first glance it occurs to be asked concerning genera and species, namely whether they subsist, or are placed in sole, naked and pure intellects: if they also be subsisting things placed outside the intellect, whether they be corporeal, or incorporeal: and whether they be in this or that mode, whether they be separated according to being from sensibles or singulars, or be placed in the sensibles themselves. And certain other things surrounding such difficulties I will refuse to say in this book. For business of this kind is highest, because high-

proper to a highest science, and therefore it is in need of a greater and more subtle inquiry: higher indeed as to the nobility of the subject, but of a greater inquiry as to the subtlety of demonstrations. For in these two things sciences differ, as Aristotle says in the beginning of the book *On the Soul* [1]. But that which seems necessary to be said about these things probably in the manner in which the ancient Philosophers have treated them, and of these especially the Peripatetics (whom we have undertaken to follow here), I will now attempt to demonstrate by way of introduction.

<!-- cap:1.2.9 -->

CHAPTER IX.

How the universal is predicated of the five universals, and concerning the sufficiency and order of the five universals?

But because among the incomplex (*incomplexum*) things it first occurs to treat of universals: it must first be seen how the universal is said of the five which have been introduced. For the universal is a simple nature, communicable by its simplicity and determinable to a particular in which it is itself by name and reason. But I say by the essential reason which corresponds to the universal which is predicated: and I say this on account of property (*proprium*) and accident (*accidentia*), which although as universals they cannot have perfect definitions, nevertheless according to those which they have, they are predicated of those of which they are predicated as of substances, as white of this white thing, and capable of laughing of this capable of laughing, and so of others.

Since therefore any one of these five is called a universal, it must be known that the universal is not said commonly of them as a genus, but as a common of proportion to one which is called common according to analogy. Now the one to the proportion of which the universal is said of these five, is that which is apt by nature to be in many and of many.

Hoc autem nec per unam
rationem convenit his quæ substantia-

-liter (hoc est per hoc quod substantiale
est) sunt in multis et de ipsis, et his quæ
per accidentale aliqued sunt in multis et
de multis : nec per unam rationem convenit ei quod per accidentale consequens
naturam est in multis et de multis, et ei
quod per accidens commune quod est accidens individui. Adhuc autem nec de his quæ per essentiale sunt in multis et de multis convenit per essentialem rationem : quædam enim istorum sunt in multis et de multis per essentiale quod est quid, et quasi subjecta substantia in ipsis, sicut genus quod est quasi fundamentum in quo formatur et fundatur esse speciei : et sicut species quod est totum esse substantiale individui, quia quidquid sequitur speciem, est accidens individuans, aliud etiam est in multis et de multis per quale quid quod facit esse fundamentum in genere. Et sic patet, quod non per unam rationem sunt hæc in multis et de multis : et
per prius hoc convenit generi et speciei,
per posterius autem differentiæ. Adhuc
cum esse in multis et de multis prius
conveniat ei, quod in multis et de multis
est specie et numero differentibus, quam
ei quod est in multis et de multis solo numero differentibus : constat quod per
prius convenit universale generi, et per
posterius speciei. Hæc enim est ratio
communitatis analogicæ, ut in quinto
primæ philosophiæ docet Aristoteles, quod
commune analogice simplex est in uno,
in aliis autem non est nisi secundum
quamdam proportionem ad illud. Et per
hoc patet, quod universale non prædicatur de his ut genus, vel ut species, vel ut differentia, vel ut proprium, vel ut accidens : sed prædicatur de his ut commune secundum analogiam ad communitatem
generis proportionatam.

Numerus autem horum universalium
ex hoc patet. Omne quod est in multis et
de multis, aut est in illis et de illis per
substantiale, aut per aliquod accidentale.

But this neither by one reason belongs to those which substantially (that is, through what is substantial) are in many and of them, and to those which through some accidental thing are in many and of many: nor by one reason does it belong to that which through an accidental consequent to nature is in many and of many, and to that which is through a common accident which is an accident of the individual. Furthermore, neither of those which through an essential are in many and of many does it belong by an essential reason: for some of these are in many and of many through an essential which is what, and as a subjected substance in them, just as a genus which is like a foundation in which the being of the species is formed and founded: and just as a species which is the whole substantial being of the individual, because whatever follows the species is an individuating accident, also another is in many and of many through what sort of thing which makes the foundation to be in a genus. And thus it is evident, that it is not by one reason that these are in many and of many: and this belongs by priority to genus and species, but by posteriority to difference. Moreover since being in many and of many previously belongs to that which is in many and of many differing in species and number, than to that which is in many and of many differing in number alone: it is certain that the universal belongs priorly to genus, and posteriorly to species. For this is the definition of analogical community, as Aristotle teaches in the fifth book of *First Philosophy*, that an analogically common thing is simple in one, but in the others it is not except according to a certain proportion to that one. And through this it is evident, that the universal is not predicated of these as a genus, or as a species, or as a difference, or as a property, or as an accident: but it is predicated of these as common according to analogy proportioned to the community of a genus.

Now the number of these universals is evident from this. Everything that is in many and of many, is either in them and of them through something substantial, or through something accidental.

Siquidem est in illis per aliquod, quod in illis est substantiale, non debet dividi, quod aut insit per substantiale quod est pars esse, aut per id quod est totum, sicut quidam dicunt : quia quod est pars, non prædicatur de eo in quo est secundum quod est pars. Sed sic dividi debet, quod si est in multis et de multis, aut est in eis per id quod est esse secundum potentiam inchoationis : aut in eis est per essentiale quod est totum secundum actum perficientis esse ipsum : aut est in eis secundum totum esse perfectum et constitutum. Et primo quidem modo est genus, secundo autem modo differentia, tertio vero modo species. Et patet quod divisio sufficiens et ex immediatis est : quia substantiale quod est in multis et de multis, aut est principium, aut principiatum. Et si est principium : aut est principium secundum potentiam, aut secundum actum. Si autem est principiatum et in substantiali esse perfectum, tunc est altero modo a duobus dictis modis. Si autem est in multis et de multis secundum esse accidentale existens in illis, non potest esse in eis, nisi aut secundum accidens naturæ communis per quam refertur ad singularia, et hoc est proprium : aut secundum accidens individui aut singularis, per quod refertur ad naturam communem, et tunc est accidens. Socrates enim est risibilis per communem naturam quæ est in Socrate. Homo autem est albus per hoc quod Socrates est albus, in quo natura hominis est. Et patet iterum per hoc, quod illa divisio ex immediatis est : quia in nullo est, nisi vel

-natura communis, vel hypostasis sive suppositum vel singulare quod substat naturæ communi. Et cum commune quod est in multis et de multis pluribus modis verificari non possit per immediatam divisionem : ideo universalia non possunt esse formaliter differentia nisi quinque.

Per hoc etiam patet ordo istorum quinque universalium : constat enim quod ea quæ sunt in multis et de multis per essentiale quod est in illis, sunt priora eis quæ sunt in multis et de multis per accidentale quod est in illis. Adhuc autem quod est in multis et de multis per accidentale fluens a natura, prius est quam id quod est in multis et de multis per accidentale individui quod est accidens infinitum.

If indeed it is in them through something which is substantial in them, it ought not to be divided, that either it is present through a substantial which is a part of being, or through that which is a whole, as some say: because what is a part, is not predicated of that in which it is according as it is a part. But it ought to be divided thus, that if it is in many and of many, either it is in them through that which is being according to the potency of inchoation: or it is in them through an essential which is the whole according to the act of the perfecting being itself: or it is in them according to the whole perfect and constituted being. And indeed in the first way it is a genus, but in the second way a difference, but in the third way a species. And it is clear that the division is sufficient and from immediate things: because a substantial which is in many and of many, either is a principle, or something principled. And if it is a principle: either it is a principle according to potency, or according to act. But if it is something principled and perfect in substantial being, then it is in another way from the two ways mentioned. But if it is in many and of many according to an accidental being existing in them, it cannot be in them, unless either according to an accident of common nature through which it refers to singulars, and this is a property (*proprium*): or according to an accident of the individual or singular, through which it refers to common nature, and then it is an accident (*accidens*). For Socrates is capable of laughing through a common nature which is in Socrates. But a man is white through this that Socrates is white, in whom the nature of man is. And again it is clear through this, that this division is from immediate things: because it is in nothing, except either a common nature, or a hypostasis or a supposit or a singular which stands under a common nature. And since a common thing which is in many and of many cannot be verified in many ways through an immediate division: therefore universals cannot be formally different except five.

Through this also the order of these five universals is clear: for it is certain that those which are in many and of many through an essential which is in them, are prior to those which are in many and of many through an accidental which is in them. Furthermore, what is in many and of many through an accidental flowing from nature, is prior than that which is in many and of many through an accidental of the individual which is an infinite accident.

Adhuc autem quod est in multis
et de multis per essentiale quod est in illis
secundum inchoationis potentiam, prius
est quam id quod est in multis et de multis per actum ad esse speciei distinguentem et determinantem : quia semper in eodem potentia præcedit actum. Utrumque
autem est constitutum ex his, sicut et
principium et principiatum. Et sic prius
est genus, consequenter autem differentia,
et tertio species. Et quamvis hic ordo sit
universalium natura, secundum quod
etiam in antehabitis enumerata sunt : tamen in ordine tractatus ponemus tractatum de specie ante tractatum de differentia : quia propter correlationem generis et speciei, unius tractatus dependet a tractatu alterius : eo quod unum relativorum diffinite cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur et reliquum.

CAPUT I. ### *De diversis signis generis.*

Primo igitur in tractatu de universalibus de genere loquendum est. Sed quia genus secundum intentionem logicam diffiniri non potest, nec diffinite cognosci, nisi prius multiplicitas hujus nominis, genus, determinetur : ideo in primis determinanda est et distinguenda nominis generis multiplicitas, et maxime in his modis qui aliquam habent similitudinem ad intentionem illam generis, secundum quam logici genere utuntur. De aliis intentionibus [1] quia ad propositam intentionem non valent, est omittendum. Nihil enim confert ad propositum scire masculinum genus, vel fœminum, vel activum, vel passivum in grammaticis non ad propositam intentionem. Et ideo de similibus generis intentionibus non est hic interponendum.

Dicitur autem per similitudinem et per proprietatem, ad quod etiam genus per similitudinem dictum transfertur. Per similitudinem autem dicitur dupliciter. Uno scilicet modo dicitur genus multitudo aliquorum uno quodam modo se habentium ad unum aliquod, quod sui aliquid habet in tota multitudine illa, ita quod est in singulis ipsorum : in quo etiam communi existente in omnibus quodam modo secundum convenientiam se habent ad invicem, ita quod quilibet ad alium habeat similitudinem in illo quod inest sibi ex illo uno primo, quod causa est similitudinis in tota alia collectione.

Moreover, what is in many and of many through an essential which is in them according to the potency of inchoation, is prior than that which is in many and of many through an act distinguishing and determining to the being of a species: because always in the same thing potency precedes act. But each of the two is constituted from these, as both a principle and a principled thing. And thus first is genus, and consequently difference, and thirdly species. And although this is the order of universals by nature, according to which they have also been enumerated in what has gone before: nevertheless in the order of the treatise we will place the treatise concerning species before the treatise concerning difference: because on account of the correlation of genus and species, the treatise of one depends upon the treatise of the other: for the reason that one of the relatives cannot be known definitely, unless the other is also known.

CHAPTER I. ### *Concerning the diverse signs of genus.*

First therefore in the treatise concerning universals it must be spoken concerning genus. But because genus according to the logical intention cannot be defined, nor definitively known, unless first the multiplicity of this name, *genus*, be determined: therefore in the first place the multiplicity of the name *genus* must be determined and distinguished, and especially in those modes which have some likeness to that intention of genus, according to which logicians use genus. Concerning other intentions [1] because they are not valid for the proposed intention, it is to be omitted. For it contributes nothing to the purpose to know masculine genus, or feminine, or active, or passive in grammar not to the proposed intention. And therefore it is not to be interposed here concerning similar intentions of genus.

It is spoken however through likeness and through property, to which also genus spoken through likeness is transferred. Through likeness however it is spoken doubly. In one way namely genus is called a multitude of some things having themselves in one certain mode to one certain thing, which has something of itself in that whole multitude, so that it is in singulars of them: in which also being common in all they have themselves in a certain mode according to agreement to one another, so that anyone has a likeness to another in that which is in himself from that first one, which is the cause of likeness in the whole other collection.

Secundum quam significationem Romanorum genus dicitur collectio tota parentelæ quæ a Romulo descendit per successivam generationem. Hoc enim totum dicitur Romuleum genus secundum habitudinem qua se habet ad unum primum parentem, scilicet Romulum. Et in hoc genere distinguitur illa collectio ab illa collectione quæ ab aliquo alio parente descendit, sicut a primo genere Priami cum quo tota collectio ista Priami genus vocatur. Hoc autem advertendum est in ista generis significatione, quod unum est in omnibus illis qui ad illam pertinent generationem. Et hoc est semen propagationis a Romulo perfusum in tota illa collectione.

Secundo modo adhuc dicitur genus per annexum modum ad ante habitum, id quod est uniuscujusque generationis sive multitudinis generatæ principium, quo fortissime generatum et a quo fortissima virtute exortum est. Et hoc dupliciter dicitur : vel a patre, qui primus genitor est in genere illo : vel ab eo loco in quo quis genitus est. Et priori quidem modo dicimus Orestem quidem a Tantalo proavo suo habere genus ; Hilum vero dicimus habere genus ab Hercule, a quo sicut ab atavo genitus est. Secundo autem modo (secundum quem patria sive locus principium generationis est) dicimus Pindarum Thebanum esse genere, Platonem vero dicimus genere Atheniensem. Sicut enim pater est principium generationis per translationem seminis ex quo in omnes-

-funditur ex uno virtus formativa multorum secundum propagationem, sic etiam patriam sive locum generationis dicimus esse principium, quia in loco et centro loci generationis tota virtus periodi cælestis adunatur, ut dicit Ptolemæus, et in omnes in illo loco natos diffunditur. Et ideo frequenter magis accedunt ad unum colorem et ad unum morem, qui ex uno loco nati sunt. Unde etiam elementa in diversis locis valde sunt diversa in virtutibus suis quibus conveniunt ad generatorum constitutionem. In isto etiam modo patet, quod multitudo ab uno patre vel ab uno loco natorum ad unum refertur in quo continetur per unum quod in omnibus est, et ab illo quod principium illius multitudinis est, in omnes derivatur.

Differunt autem istæ duæ generis significationes : quia prima est unius partiti in multa, secunda autem est multorum respicientium ad unum, quod est principium generationis eorum secundum modum parentis vel loci in quo generatur aliquis ad illius loci complexionem vel figuram.

According to which signification the genus of the Romans is called the whole collection of the parentage which descends from Romulus through successive generation. For this whole is called the Romulean genus according to the habit by which it has itself to one first parent, namely Romulus. And in this genus that collection is distinguished from that collection which descends from some other parent, just as from the first genus of Priam with which that whole collection is called the genus of Priam. This however must be noticed in that signification of genus, that one thing is in all those who pertain to that generation. And this is the seed of propagation poured from Romulus into that whole collection.

In a second mode still genus is called through a mode annexed to the before held, that which is the principle of each generation or generated multitude, by which it was most strongly generated and from which it arose with strongest power. And this is spoken doubly: either from the father, who is the first generator in that genus: or from that place in which someone was generated. And in the first mode indeed we say that Orestes indeed has his genus from Tantalus his great-grandfather; but we say that Hyllus has his genus from Hercules, from whom as from a great-great-grandfather he was generated. In the second mode however (according to which the fatherland or place is the principle of generation) we say that Pindar is a Theban by genus, but we say that Plato is an Athenian by genus. For just as the father is the principle of generation through the translation of the seed from which into all-

-there is poured from one the formative power of many according to propagation, so also we say that the fatherland or place of generation is the principle, because in the place and center of the place of generation the whole power of the celestial period is united, as Ptolemy says, and is diffused into all born in that place. And therefore those who are born from one place frequently approach more to one color and to one manner. Whence also the elements in diverse places are very diverse in their powers by which they agree to the constitution of generated things. In this mode also it is clear, that the multitude of those born from one father or from one place is referred to one in which it is contained through the one which is in all, and from that which is the principle of that multitude, it is derived into all.

These two significations of genus however differ: because the first is of one partitioned into many, but the second is of many looking back to one, which is the principle of their generation according to the mode of a parent or of a place in which someone is generated to the complexion or figure of that place.

Quod enim quidam dicunt patriam et locum non esse principium generationis, nisi quoad figuram, penitus falsum est : quia sic tota destrueretur scientia generationis uniuscujusque, quam in libro qui dicitur arabice *Adarba*, *quadripartitum* autem latine Ptolemæus ostendit : in quo ostendit periodi virtutem in centro loci ejus qui nascitur congregari : et ex virtute sic in centro nati congregata natum accipere complexionem et formam et figuram et colorem et morem et fortunam.

Et hæc quidem secunda generis significatio (propter hoc quod est in uno in multa se diffundendo secundum suæ virtutis potentiam, in quo omnia uniuntur et continentur) videtur promptissima ad generis logici declarationem. Secundum hanc rationem sunt et dicuntur, qui ex genere Romuli descenderunt. Nec collectio illa diceretur genus unum, nisi esset unum continens ea sicut principium a quo per generationem descenderunt. Et hoc modo dicuntur multi Cecropidæ, qui ex genere successive descenderunt primi Cecropis : et horum proximi secundum lineam ejusdem consanguineitatis. Sic enim multa essent ab uno, sicut in genere logico ab uno genere primo per divisionem differentiarum essent multæ species, in quibus omnibus salvatur generis natura potestate sive virtute ad speciem determinatam, sicut et semen generantis primi per successivam generationem formatur ad hunc et ad illum. Patet igitur, quod primus modus generis causatur a secundo, et reducitur ad ipsum sicut ad causam. Et ideo secundus modus principalior est, quam primus, et promptior ad designandum genus logicum, sicut per similitudinem potest describendo designari.

Per prius ergo quoad istam similitudinem dicitur genus uniuscujusque generationis principium. Dehinc autem et per posterius dicitur genus et multitudo collecta eorum quæ ab uno principio ut Romulo descenderunt, sicut dictum est in prima generis designatione. Hujus autem probatio est : quia multitudinem sive collectionem dividentes sive discernentes et ab aliis separantes, qui sunt alterius generis, dicebamus ante illam collectionem genus esse Romanorum vel Romuleorum, et in hoc ab aliis collectionibus separari : nec multitudinem genus esse diceremus, nisi prius intelligeretur unum generationis principium, a quo illa descendit multitudo. Et ideo primus modus generis non dicitur genus, nisi per secundum, et ideo reducitur primus ad secundum sicut ad causam. Fuit etiam prius a nobis positus, quia minus facit ad propositum : sicut et de ambabus istis significationibus prius dicimus, quam de genere logico, ut minus intenta dimittantur, et longius a proposito ponantur. Et ut sciatur, quod similia paulatim et gradatim perficiuntur ad propositi declarationem. Et ideo etiam genus intentum post omnia similia dicimus ultimo.

For that which certain ones say that the fatherland and place is not the principle of generation, except as to figure, is inwardly false: because thus the whole science of the generation of each one would be destroyed, which in the book which is called in Arabic *Adarba*, but in Latin *Quadripartitum*, Ptolemy showed: in which he shows that the power of the period is gathered in the center of the place of him who is born: and from the power thus gathered in the center of the born, the born receives complexion and form and figure and color and manner and fortune.

And this second signification of genus indeed (on account of this that it is in one diffusing itself into many according to the potency of its power, in which all are united and contained) seems readiest for the declaration of logical genus. According to this reason are and are called, those who descended from the genus of Romulus. Nor would that collection be called one genus, unless there were one containing them as a principle from which through generation they descended. And in this mode are called many Cecropidæ, who from the genus successively descended of the first Cecrops: and those nearest of these according to the line of the same consanguinity. For thus many would be from one, just as in logical genus from one first genus through the division of differences there would be many species, in all which the nature of the genus is saved in potency or power to the determined species, just as also the seed of the first generator through successive generation is formed to this and to that one. It is clear therefore, that the first mode of genus is caused by the second, and is reduced to it as to a cause. And therefore the second mode is more principal than the first, and readier to designate logical genus, just as through likeness it can be designated by describing.

By priority therefore as to that likeness the principle of each generation is called genus. From then on however and by posteriority the collected multitude of those which descended from one principle like Romulus is called genus, as was said in the first designation of genus. The proof of this however is: because dividing or discerning the multitude or collection and separating from others, who are of another genus, we said before that collection that the genus is of the Romans or of the Romuleans, and in this it is separated from other collections: nor would we call the multitude a genus, unless first there were understood one principle of generation, from which that multitude descends. And therefore the first mode of genus is not called genus, except through the second, and therefore the first is reduced to the second as to a cause. It was also placed first by us, because it makes less to the purpose: just as also concerning both these significations we speak first, before concerning logical genus, so that the less intended may be dismissed, and placed further from the purpose. And that it may be known, that like things are perfected little by little and step by step for the declaration of the purpose. And therefore also we say the intended genus last after all like things.

Est autem attendendum, quod a matre una a qua multi descenderunt, non sumitur ad genus logicum similitudo : quia mater non est principium formale multorum, sed materiale, et sicut formatum, et non sicut formans. Genus autem logicum principium est ut forma : quia aliter non prædicaretur de eo cujus est genus : sed est ut forma indistincta, quæ totum est esse speciei secundum esse informe et indistinctum, distinguibile tamen ad formam speciei.

Et quamvis a loco similitudo trahatur ad generis logici designationem, tamen a tempore non trahitur aliqua similitudo : quia tempus est mensura et numerus motus et mutationis. Et ideo est in fieri, et non est in esse generatorum principaliter. Genus autem natorum est et in esse constitutorum. Propter quod etiam in libro de intelligibilibus dicitur locum esse mensuram entis, tempus autem esse mensuram motus dicitur, quia ejus esse est in motu et mutatione.

Est autem attendendum, quod Avicenna dicit [1] quod isti ambo modi [2] extenduntur etiam ad artificialia. Aliquando enim dicuntur *coriarii omnes*, qui sunt de collectione *coriariorum* ab uno aliquo qui excellebat in illo artificio : sicut nautæ dicuntur *calepsitæ* a quodam Calepso, qui floruit in arte nautica : et fabri dicuntur *Tubalcaitæ* a Tubalcaim, qui artem fabrorum invenit : et musici dicuntur, *pythagorici* a Pythagora, qui perfecit ea quæ in arte sunt musica. Hoc tamen est minus proprium : quia id quod est in omnibus ex isto principio, non est substantiale et naturale, sed accidentale illis in quibus est. Genus autem logicum omnibus speciebus inest ut natura et substantia. His ergo modis genus dicitur in quolibet. Aliter autem accipitur apud Philosophos, sicut in sequenti patebit capitulo [3].

It must however be noticed, that from one mother from whom many descended, is not taken-

a similitude is not drawn to a logical genus: because a mother is not the formal principle of many, but the material, and as something formed, and not as something forming. But a logical genus is a principle as a form: because otherwise it would not be predicated of that of which it is a genus: but it is as an indistinct form, which is the whole being of the species according to an unformed and indistinct being, distinguishable nevertheless to the form of a species.

And although from place a similitude is drawn to the designation of a logical genus, yet from time no similitude is drawn: because time is the measure and number of motion and mutation. And therefore it is in becoming, and is not principally in the being of generated things. Whereas genus is of those born and of those constituted in being. On account of which also in the book concerning intelligible things place is said to be the measure of a being, but time is said to be the measure of motion, because its being is in motion and mutation.

But it must be attended to, that Avicenna says [1] that these two modes [2] are extended also to artificial things. For sometimes *all leather-workers* are called those who are of the collection of *leather-workers* from some one who excelled in that artifice: just as sailors are called *Calepsites* from a certain Calepsus, who flourished in the nautical art: and smiths are called *Tubalcaites* from Tubalcain, who invented the art of smiths: and musicians are called *Pythagoreans* from Pythagoras, who perfected those things which are in the art of music. This however is less proper: because that which is in all from this principle, is not substantial and natural, but accidental to those in which it is. But a logical genus is present in all species as a nature and substance. Therefore in these ways genus is said in any whatever. But it is taken otherwise among Philosophers, as will be evident in the following chapter [3].

Colligentes igitur summatim quæ dicta
sunt, dicimus quod videtur neque genus
neque species simpliciter sive modo uno

et in una intentione dici. Dico autem videtur, et non, est : quia istæ generis acceptiones magis sunt in nostra acceptione
et cognitione, quam in rei natura et existentia. Et primo quidem quoad nos dicitur genus collectio multorum quodammodo uno modo se habentium ad unum aliquod, quod est illius collectionis secundum generationem principium, et quæ se aliquo modo habent ad invicem in uno
quod a principio suæ generationis est in
singulis ipsorum secundum totam illam
collectionem. Secundum quam significationem Romanorum collectio genus dicitur ab habitudine unius, dico autem Romuli. Et dicitur genus multitudinis illius per relationem aliquo modo ad invicem
secundum id quod est in eis ex Romulo. Et hoc est, quia habent ad invicem eam quæ ab illo Romulo est cognationem secundum divisionem vel separationem ab aliis generibus aliorum avorum, quæ dicitur vel denominatur ab aliis patribus vel avis.

Dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus
quod est unius generationis principium
ab eo parente qui genuit, vel ab eo loco
in quo quis generatus est propter causam
quæ in ante habitis posita est. Sic enim
Orestem dicimus a Tantalo quidem habere genus : Hilum autem cum domo et familia sua genus habere ab Hercule. Et
rursus quidem a loco denuntiantes Pindarum Thebanum esse, Platonem vero Atheniensem. Etenim patria uniuscujusque generationis principium est, quemadmodum et pater, ut in præhabitis expositum est. Hæc autem secunda generis acceptio videtur esse promptissima generis
significatio. Romani ideo dicti sunt Romani, quia illi a genere descenderunt Romuli : et Cecropidæ sunt, qui ex genere
descenderunt Cecropis : et horum proximi per eamdem causam sunt de eodem genere. Et prius quidem, hoc est, per
prius appellatur genus uniuscujusque ge-

Collecting therefore summarily the things which have been said, we say that it seems that neither genus nor species is said simply or in one mode

and in one intention. But I say it seems, and not, it is: because these acceptions of genus are rather in our acception and cognition, than in the nature and existence of the thing. And indeed firstly as to us a genus is called a collection of many holding themselves in a certain one way to a certain one thing, which is the principle of that collection according to generation, and which hold themselves in some way to each other in one thing which from the principle of their generation is in each single one of them according to that whole collection. According to which signification the collection of the Romans is called a genus from the habitude of one, I say however Romulus. And it is called the genus of that multitude through a relation in some way to each other according to that which is in them from Romulus. And this is, because they have to each other that kindred which is from that Romulus according to the division or separation from other genera of other grandfathers, which is called or denominated from other fathers or grandfathers.

Now again a genus is said otherwise that which is the principle of one generation from that parent who begot, or from that place in which someone was generated on account of the cause which was posited in what has been previously discussed. For thus we say indeed that Orestes has his genus from Tantalus: but Hilus with his house and family to have his genus from Hercules. And again indeed from a place declaring Pindar to be a Theban, but Plato an Athenian. For indeed a fatherland is the principle of the generation of each one, just as also a father, as was expounded in what was previously discussed. But this second acception of genus seems to be the most ready signification of genus. The Romans therefore were called Romans, because they descended from the genus of Romulus: and they are Cecropidae, who descended from the genus of Cecrops: and their neighbors for the same cause are of the same genus. And priorly indeed, that is, priorly it is called the genus of each single gen-

nerationis principium : dehinc autem et per posterius dicitur genus etiam multitudo eorum qui descenderunt ab uno principio, ut a Romulo Romulei. Cujus signum est : namque dividentes hoc genus sive discernentes et ab aliis generibus separantes ipsum, dicebamus omnem illam Romanorum collectionem esse genus Romanorum. Est autem in duobus dissimilitudo ad genus logicum. In uno quidem : quia principium generationis non secundum substantiam et secundum se totum est in collectione quæ genus dicit, ita quod sit in quolibet totum. Genus autem logicum secundum se totum et secundum substantiam est in collectione specierum et in qualibet specie : propter quod etiam non prædicatur nomine et ratione principium generationis de collectione multorum qui descenderunt de ipso nisi denominative. Dicuntur enim Romani vel Romulei, non Romuli. Genus autem logicum prædicatur prædicatione substantiali de his quorum est genus. In alio etiam est dissimilitudo : quia collectio quæ dicitur genus, est quasi totum integrale ad genus vel in genere, cujus quilibet est pars integralis, et omnes sunt totum. Genus autem logicum est totum essentiale, cujus quælibet species est pars subjectiva. In hoc tamen aliquid similitudinis est : quia quamvis genus logicum secundum totam essentiam salvetur in qualibet specie, tamen non salvatur in qualibet specie secundum totum ambitum suæ potestatis. Et hoc habet aliquid similitudinis cum toto integrali prædicativo, cujus potestas ex multis potestatibus particularis integratur.

CAPUT II. ### *De genere philosophico, et quomodo assimilatur aliis ?*

Sic ergo (ut in civilibus accipitur genus) non utuntur genere philosophi : sed utuntur genere in illa significationis intentione, qua dicitur, genus est cui supponitur species directa et immediata suppositione. Genus enim consequitur differentiam, et differentia in genere est potestate, et ideo aliquo modo est sub ambitu communitatis generis : sed tamen non ponitur ut substans sub genere, sed adjungitur lateraliter ad generis determinationem et contractionem. Erit autem de genere ad potestatis ipsius divisionem. Et ideo nec differentia divisiva, nec etiam differentia constitutiva directe supponitur generi, ut substantia stans sub genere. Nec etiam species sic supponitur differentiæ. Sed differentia constitutiva est in genere ad determinandam generis potestatem et contrahendum ad speciem constitutam, et quasi lateraliter venit ad speciem : propter quod non supponitur generi, ut quid generis, vel ut quale quid sicut species : et ideo differentia non est cui supponitur in ordine naturæ species, sed totius est speciei et generis.

eration's principle: from then on however and by posteriority even the multitude of those who descended from one principle is called genus, as from Romulus the Romuleans. Of which this is a sign: for dividing this genus or discerning and separating it from other genera, we said that all that collection of Romans was the genus of the Romans. There is however in two things a dissimilarity to logical genus. In one indeed: because the principle of generation is not according to substance and according to itself whole in the collection which calls itself genus, so that it be whole in any whatever. But logical genus according to itself whole and according to substance is in the collection of species and in any species whatever: on account of which also the principle of generation is not predicated by name and reason of the multitude of many who descended from it except denominatively. For they are called Romans or Romuleans, not Romuluses. But logical genus is predicated by substantial predication of those of which it is the genus. In another thing also there is dissimilarity: because the collection which is called genus, is as it were an integral whole to the genus or in the genus, of which anyone is an integral part, and all are the whole. But logical genus is an essential whole, of which any species is a subjective part. In this nevertheless there is something of likeness: because although logical genus according to the whole essence be saved in any species whatever, nevertheless it is not saved in any species according to the whole scope of its power. And this has something of likeness with a predicative integral whole, whose power is integrated from many particular powers.

CHAPTER II. ### *Concerning philosophical genus, and how it is assimilated to others?*

In this way therefore (as genus is accepted in civil affairs) philosophers do not use genus: but they use genus in that intention of signification, in which it is said, genus is that to which species is supposed by direct and immediate supposition. For genus follows difference, and difference is in the genus in potency, and therefore in some mode it is under the scope of the community of the genus: but nevertheless it is not placed as substating under the genus, but is joined laterally to the determination and contraction of the genus. It will be however of the genus to the division of its own power. And therefore neither the divisive difference, nor even the constitutive difference is directly supposed to the genus, as a substance standing under the genus. Nor even is the species thus supposed to the difference. But the constitutive difference is in the genus for determining the power of the genus and contracting it to the constituted species, and it comes as it were laterally to the species: on account of which it is not supposed to the genus, as a what (*quid*) of the genus, or as a of-what-sort somewhat (*quale quid*) just as the species: and therefore difference is not that to which in the order of nature species is supposed, but it is of the whole species and genus.

Quamvis autem individuum generi supponatur, non tamen immediate substat positione. Adhuc nec subsistit : genus enim non contrahitur in ipso pro se, sed species : nec in eo contrahitur species, sed potius secundum esse dividitur divisione materiæ et divisione accidentis, et individuantis : quod non proprie est substare in ordine substantis et superstantis : sed est diffusio substantis et superstantis ad multiplicationem materialem. Proprium etiam post speciem est secundum ordinem naturæ. Nec etiam proprium secundum quod proprium substare habet, sed potius in esse, et post illud accidens. Et ideo solum genus est per se et proprie, cui supponitur species. Genus enim cum dicat ordinem superioris ad inferius apud Philosophos, optime notificatur sua significatio, quando determinatur per id ad quod dicit ordinem. Et cum determinetur significatio generis apud Philosophos, fortasse hæc intentio dicta est sic : quia in hac intentione habet similitudinem quamdam ad genus dictum in civilibus secundum utramque præinductarum intentionum. Genus enim sic dictum, principium-

quoddam est specierum quæ sunt sub ipso, non quidem materiale, sed etiam effectivum, ut pater. Pater enim est, ut dicit
Aristoteles [1], qui aliquid sui habet in filio. Id enim quod aliquid sui habet in filio formali effectivo, est totus pater : pater
enim totius secundum principium formativum est in semine, ut artifex in artificiato. Propter quod etiam Plato opinatur
semen esse parvum animal, quod egreditur a generante, et quod est ut parvus
pater quantitate, sed totus et integer pater virtute. Et similiter genus est totum in specie secundum substantiam : a quo
etiam producitur differentia formans speciem et constituens in esse formato. Et sic genus est sicut generationis principium, quod in ante habitis principalem dicimus esse generis significationem in
civilibus. Est autem etiam principium ut
locus speciei, in quo fundatur species secundum substantiam : et ex eo determinatur species ad quid et substantiam per
se substantem, et in alio quodam fundatam : sicut res fundatur in loco suæ generationis et salvatur.

Although however the individual be supposed to the genus, nevertheless it does not immediately substate by position. Still it does not even subsist: for the genus is not contracted in it for itself, but the species: nor is the species contracted in it, but rather according to being it is divided by the division of matter and the division of accident, and of the individuating: which is not properly to substate in the order of the substating and superstanding: but it is the diffusion of the substating and superstanding to material multiplication. The property also is after the species according to the order of nature. Nor even has the property to substate according as it is a property, but rather in being, and after that the accident. And therefore alone genus is by itself and properly, to which species is supposed. For since genus says the order of the superior to the inferior among Philosophers, its signification is best notified, when it is determined through that to which it says the order. And when the signification of genus among Philosophers is determined, perhaps this intention was called so: because in this intention it has a certain likeness to the genus spoken in civil affairs according to both of the pre-induced intentions. For genus so called, the principle-

is a certain principle of the species which are under it, not indeed material, but also effective, as a father. For a father is, as Aristotle says [1], he who has something of himself in the son. For that which has something of itself in a formally effective son, is the whole father: for the father is of the whole according to a formative principle in the seed, as a craftsman in an artifact. On account of which also Plato opines that seed is a small animal, which goes out from the generating one, and which is as a small father in quantity, but a whole and entire father in power. And similarly a genus is whole in a species according to substance: from which also a difference is produced forming the species and constituting it in formed being. And thus a genus is as a principle of generation, which in what has previously been discussed we called the principal signification of genus in civil things. But it is also a principle as the place of a species, in which the species is founded according to substance: and from it a species is determined to what and to a substance substanding by itself, and founded in some other thing: just as a thing is founded in the place of its generation and is saved.

Propterea differentia non habet loci similitudinem : quia
ipsa constitutiva existens fundatur in alio
quodam, et magis proprium, et accidens. Species autem quid locatum in genere,
et non locus solum. Genus igitur est ad
ipsam se habens ut pater, et ut locus,
prout pater et locus generationis sunt
principia. Habet autem etiam similitudinem ad genus quod in civilibus secundario dicitur quadammodo habentium se ad
aliquid, et ad se invicem, in hoc quod genus in eo quod genus est, necessario continet multitudinem quamdam specierum
quæ sunt sub eo. Nec potest esse genus unius solius speciei contentivum : eo quod species non
exit a genere, nisi per oppositas differentias divisivas : quæ (cum eductæ fuerint a genere) plures et oppositas constituent
species de necessitate. Non sic autem se

habet species ad individuum.

Non enim
species sui divisione constituit individuum, sed tota est in individuo per substantiam et potestatem : unde materiæ determinatione ex accidente individuante individuatur.
Solum ergo genus ambiens
species et multitudinem, continetur in
una generis natura. Differentia enim cum
se habeat ad genus ut divisiva, non est
continens, sed separans et in multitudinem agens. Proprium autem cum sit consequens speciem, et accidens commune
consequens individuum, continentis non
potest habere rationem, sed potius sunt
contenta in aliis secundum suum esse et
rationem. Cum autem tripliciter in usu loquentium dicatur genus, de tertio est sermo apud Philosophos et in philosophia :
quod ut dictum est, fortasse dictum est ad
similitudinem aliorum. Dico autem fortasse, ne videatur aliter dissimile propter duas dissimilitudines in præcedenti capitulo determinatas. Et hoc quidem summatim perstringere possumus, dicendo
quod aliter quam in civilibus rursus genus dicitur esse, cui supponitur species, ad horum generum (quæ in civilibus dicta sunt) fortasse similitudinem quamdam sic dictum. Hoc enim genus a civilibus ad
philosophiam translatum est.

Therefore a difference does not have the similitude of a place: because it existing as constitutive is founded in some other thing, and more so a property, and an accident. But a species is what is placed in a genus, and not only a place. Therefore a genus is to it holding itself as a father, and as a place, in as much as a father and the place of generation are principles. Now it also has a similitude to a genus which in civil things secondarily is said in some way of those holding themselves to something, and to each other, in this that a genus in that it is a genus, necessarily contains a certain multitude of species which are under it. Nor can a genus be the container of one sole species: for the reason that a species does not go out from a genus, except through opposite divisive differences: which (when they have been educed from a genus) will constitute several and opposite species of necessity. But not thus does

a species hold itself to an individual.

For a species does not constitute an individual by the division of itself, but it is whole in an individual through substance and power: whence by the determination of matter from an individuating accident it is individuated. Therefore only an ambient genus containing species and a multitude, is contained in one nature of genus. For a difference since it holds itself to a genus as divisive, is not containing, but separating and acting into a multitude. But a property since it is consequent to a species, and a common accident consequent to an individual, cannot have the reason of a container, but rather they are contained in others according to their being and reason. But when a genus is said in three ways in the use of speakers, the discourse among the Philosophers and in philosophy is concerning the third: which as has been said, perhaps was said in the similitude of the others. But I say perhaps, lest it seem otherwise dissimilar on account of the two dissimilarities determined in the preceding chapter. And indeed we can summarily touch upon this, saying that otherwise than in civil things again a genus is said to be that to which a species is supposed, to a certain similitude of these genera (which were said in civil things) perhaps thus said. For this genus was translated from civil things to philosophy.

Est ergo genus principium quoddam specierum hujusmodi, quale Priamus est communis
pater, et quale est communis locus, ut explanatum est : et sic habet similitudinem cum intentione principali. Videtur enim
genus in una natura communi omnem
multitudinem specierum quæ sub ipso est
continere : et in hoc habet similitudinem
cum secundaria generis significatione. Tripliciter ergo cum sic dicatur genus, de tertio modo suæ significationis apud Philosophos de genere sermo est.

CAPUT III. ### *De diffinitione vel descriptione generis physici.*

Genus ergo cum tripliciter dicatur apud Philosophos, secundum tertiam sumitur suæ significationis intentionem. Et secundum hanc generis intentionem describunt genus dicentes : Genus est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid est prædicatur. Quæ descriptio est generis prout genus dicit ordinem unius ad alterum, sicut superioris ad inferius, non simpliciter, sed in ipsa re quæ sic ordinatur : sicut animal est genus, et corpus animatum, et substantia : substantia enim et vivum et animal sunt ea quibus accidit genera esse. Sed generalitas quæ est in ipsis rationem dicit hujus ordinis sive habitudinis quibus ordinantur ad sua inferiora : propter quod in ante habitis dictum est, quod genus est cui supponitur species sive specierum multitudo.

In omnibus communibus substantialibus sic est, quod ex ipsa communitate qua unum substantialiter est in alio, aliæ plures resultant analogiæ, sive proportionis communitates. Ex hoc enim, quod animal est in homine et de homine, et est in asino et de asino, et sic de aliis speciebus, ex simili quodam respectu animalis ad species supposita resultat, quod est commune et universale ut genus : quia generis nomen est animali impositum a tali respectu : et sic de specie, et de simili respectu hominis et asini et aliorum ad animal : quæ omnes species quia participant animalis nomine et ratione, surgit communitas alia, quia unumquodque inferiorum sic superius respicientium dicitur species : ad talis enim respectus similitudinem imponitur nomen speciei. Et sic est in respectu individuorum ad speciem : ex simili enim respectu hujus ad hominem et illius et alterius, et sic de aliis, efficitur quod hic est suppositum hominis et illi et omnes alii. Ex hoc autem, quod una similitudine in qualibet natura commune determinatur, quilibet dicitur particularis homo : et ex hoc, quod similiter omnes accidente discernente particulariter naturam communem determinantur, quilibet dicitur individuum. Et sic ex respectibus naturæ communis ad inferiora, et respectibus inferioris ad superius, multæ causantur communitates : et secundum quodlibet nomen fit universalis prædicatio.

Therefore a genus is a certain principle of species of this sort, such as Priam is a common father, and such as is a common place, as has been explained: and thus it has a similitude with the principal intention. For a genus seems in one common nature to contain the whole multitude of species which is under it: and in this it has a similitude with the secondary signification of genus. Therefore when a genus is thus said in three ways, the discourse among the Philosophers concerning genus is concerning the third mode of its signification.

CHAPTER III. ### *Concerning the definition or description of physical genus.*

Genus therefore since it be spoken in three ways among Philosophers, according to the third the intention of its signification is taken. And according to this intention of genus they describe genus saying: Genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species in that which it is (*in eo quod quid est*). Which description is of genus insofar as genus says the order of one to another, just as of the superior to the inferior, not simply, but in the thing itself which is so ordered: just as animal is a genus, and animated body, and substance: for substance and living thing and animal are those things to which it happens to be genera. But the generality which is in them says the reason of this order or habitude by which they are ordered to their inferiors: on account of which it was said in what was previously discussed, that genus is that to which species or a multitude of species is supposed.

In all substantial commons it is thus, that from the community itself by which one is substantially in another, other multiple analogies or communities of proportion result. For from this, that animal is in man and of man, and is in the ass and of the ass, and so concerning other species, from a certain similar respect of animal to the supposed species it results, that it is common and universal as a genus: because the name of genus was imposed on animal from such a respect: and so concerning species, and concerning a similar respect of man and of the ass and of others to animal: which all species because they participate in the name and reason of animal, another community arises, because each one of the inferiors so looking back to the superior is called a species: for to the likeness of such a respect the name of species is imposed. And so it is in the respect of individuals to the species: for from a similar respect of this one to man and of that one and of another, and so concerning others, it is effected that this one is a supposit of man and that one and all others. From this however, that by one likeness in any nature the common is determined, anyone is called a particular man: and from this, that similarly all are determined by a discerning accident particularly to the common nature, anyone is called an individual. And thus from the respects of the common nature to inferiors, and the respects of the inferior to the superior, many communities are caused: and according to any name whatever a universal predication is made.

Quia tamen unum solum est, quod nomine et natura et ratione generis prædicatur, unum solum est id quod est genus, et aliæ sunt prædicationes per modum generis prædicatæ per accidens, quod accidit prædicato vel subjecto ex tali respectu ad invicem, vel tali ad superius. Et ex tali est, quod non sequitur cum dicitur : homo est animal, et homo est species, ergo animal est species : vel homo est animal, animal est genus, ergo homo est genus : vel Socrates est homo, Socrates est individuum, ergo homo est individuum. In talibus enim omnibus est fallacia accidentis : talis enim communitas ab accidente causatur, quod fundatur in modo respectus superioris ad inferius, vel inferioris ad superius, vel etiam respectu particularis ad naturam communem : qui omnes respectus ex hoc causantur, quod natura communis intelligitur in natura minus communi, quæ species est vel individuum. Et ideo patet quod non sequitur, genus prædicatur de pluribus differentibus speciebus : ergo genus est genus : et sic iretur in infinitum. Soli enim quod est genus per naturam quæ est in pluribus differentibus specie convenit esse genus : ita ut genus dicat rationem ordinis, et prædicationis : animal autem id quod est sic prædicatum, prædicatur ut genus. Attende autem, quod prædicari idem est quod attribuere per notam compositionis : quando enim unum alteri attribuitur mediante compositione, quam significat hoc verbum, *est*, tunc prædicatur : et quando unum ab altero dividitur mediante-

negatione talis compositionis, sicut cum dicitur, homo non est lapis : tunc lapis dividitur ab eo. Et hoc fit in intellectu componente vel dividente : in re enim ipsa sine nota compositionis vel divisionis, unum in altero est, vel non est. Sed intellectus componens vel dividens hic sine nota compositionis vel divisionis, hoc significare non potest : et, ut hoc significet, invenit modum compositionis unius cum alio : et hoc est prædicare unum de alio, vel negare unum ab alio. Fit autem hoc quandoque essentialiter, quandoque autem accidentaliter. Essentialiter autem quando unum accipitur in alio per naturam et substantiam. Et hoc tripliciter contingit : aut enim accipit ut priorem naturam in posteriori, aut naturam communem in materia determinatam, aut convertibilem, et idem in convertibili. Primo quidem modo prædicatur ut genus, secundo autem ut species, tertio vero modo ut diffinitio de diffinito. De differentia vero inferius tractabitur. Genus igitur est id quod dicto modo prædicatur.

Because nevertheless there is one only thing, which is predicated by the name and nature and reason of genus, there is one only thing which is the genus, and others are predications by the mode of genus predicated by accident, which happens to the predicate or subject from such a respect to one another, or such to the superior. And from such a thing it is, that it does not follow when it is said: man is an animal, and man is a species, therefore animal is a species: or man is an animal, animal is a genus, therefore man is a genus: or Socrates is a man, Socrates is an individual, therefore man is an individual. For in all such things there is the fallacy of accident: for such a community is caused by an accident, which is founded in the mode of the respect of the superior to the inferior, or of the inferior to the superior, or even in the respect of the particular to the common nature: which all respects are caused from this, that the common nature is understood in the less common nature, which is species or individual. And therefore it is clear that it does not follow, "genus is predicated of many differing species: therefore genus is a genus": and thus one would go into infinity. For to that alone which is genus through the nature which is in many differing in species does it belong to be a genus: so that genus says the reason of order, and of predication: animal however that which is so predicated, is predicated as a genus. Notice however, that to be predicated is the same as to attribute through a mark of composition: for when one is attributed to another by means of composition, which this verb "is" signifies, then it is predicated: and when one is divided from another by means of-

negation of such composition, just as when it is said, "man is not a stone": then the stone is divided from him. And this occurs in the intellect composing or dividing: for in the thing itself without a mark of composition or division, one is in the other, or is not. But the intellect composing or dividing here cannot signify this without a mark of composition or division: and, so that it may signify this, it finds a mode of composition of one with another: and this is to predicate one of another, or to deny one from another. Moreover, this occurs sometimes essentially, and sometimes accidentally. Essentially, however, when one is taken in another through nature and substance. And this happens in three ways: for either it takes it as a prior nature in a posterior one, or a common nature determined in matter, or a convertible one, and the same in the convertible. In the first way, indeed, it is predicated as a genus; in the second, however, as a species; and in the third way as a definition of the defined. Concerning the difference, however, it will be treated below. Genus, therefore, is that which is predicated in the said manner.

Non enim aliquod commune substantiale per quod diffiniatur genus potest poni : quia sic omni generi supponeretur substantiale commune quod non est verum : quando enim dico *animal*, est quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Et si quæras quid est animal, dico quod animal est vivum sensibile quod de pluribus differentibus specie prædicatur. Sed cum dico, *genus*, est quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Si quæras quid est genus per aliquid communius illo : quia sicut jam dictum est, genus est nomen impositum ab accidente quod est ratio ordinis, et respectus superioris naturæ ad inferiorem, in qua est substantialiter et acceptum in intellectu ipsius. Et id nomen transcendens est, nec potest notificari per aliud significationis certæ nomen aliquod : sed oportet quod notificetur per infinitum, hoc est, per nomen significationis non diffinitæ, dicendo : genus est quod prædicatur. Et est idem ac si diceretur : illud quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie vocatur genus : quamvis id in quantum infinitum, ignotum sit et incertæ significationis. Et sic poni potest in notificatione descriptionis vel diffinitionis.

Quod autem additur de pluribus differentibus specie, est ideo, quia genus ad speciem non deducitur nisi divisum per differentias : quæ cum oppositæ sint et divisivæ respectu generis, constitutivæ autem respectu speciei, oportet plures esse. Differentia divisiva, ut dicit Damascenus, est causa materiæ formarum, sicut divisio per materiam est causa numeri individuorum. Et ideo communitas generis ambit species constitutas oppositis differentiis.

Quod etiamsi poneretur, quod non esset nisi una species, ut diceremus non esse nisi hominem et nullam aliam speciem animalis, adhuc prædicatur animal de homine ut genus : quia de potestate et ambitu naturali animalis est et de aptitudine generis, quod dividatur oppositis differentiis. Non enim solum universale est quod prædicatur, sed quod aptum natum est prædicari de multis, ut jam in ante habitis dictum est. Et si illa multa differunt formis (quam differentiam et numerum facit divisio differentiarum, quæ potestatem naturæ dividit primum et per se) tunc prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, quia genus differentiis dividitur divisa sua potestate. Alia enim potestate genus est in specie una, et alia in alia : et non talis divisio est speciei per materiam : eadem enim potestate species est in uno individuo et in alio, nec est divisa, sed secundum esse integrum manente sua naturali potestate est in quolibet individuorum.

For no substantial common through which genus might be defined can be posited: because thus a substantial common would be supposed to every genus, which is not true: for when I say "animal," it is that which is predicated of many things differing in species. And if you ask what animal is, I say that animal is a sensible living thing which is predicated of many things differing in species. But when I say, "genus," it is that which is predicated of many things differing in species. If you seek to ask what genus is through something more common than it: because as has already been said, genus is a name imposed from an accident which is the reason of order, and the respect of a superior nature to an inferior one, in which it is substantially and taken in its intellect. And that name is transcending, nor can it be notified through another name of any certain signification: but it is necessary that it be notified through the infinite, that is, through a name of non-defined signification, by saying: genus is that which is predicated. And it is the same as if it were said: that which is predicated of many things differing in species is called a genus: although that, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown and of uncertain signification. And thus it can be posited in the notification of a description or a definition.

Moreover, that which is added, "of many differing in species," is for this reason, because genus is not deduced to species except as divided through differences: which, since they are opposite and divisive with respect to genus, but constitutive with respect to species, must be several. A divisive difference, as Damascene says, is the cause of the matter of forms, just as division through matter is the cause of the number of individuals. And therefore the community of genus encompasses species constituted by opposite differences.

Because even if it were posited that there were only one species, as if we were to say there is nothing but man and no other species of animal, animal is still predicated of man as a genus: because it is of the power and natural scope of animal and of the aptitude of genus that it be divided by opposite differences. For not only is that a universal which is predicated, but that which is apt by nature to be predicated of many, as has already been said in what was previously discussed. And if those many differ in forms (which difference and number the division of differences makes, which divides the power of nature first and through itself), then it is predicated of many things differing in species, because genus is divided into differences by its divided power. For by one power genus is in one species, and by another in another: and such a division of species is not through matter: for by the same power the species is in one individual and in another, nor is it divided, but according to its entire being, with its natural power remaining, it is in each of the individuals.

Quod autem additur in eo quod quid est, ideo additum est, quia omne superius quod per essentiam et nomen et differentiam est in inferiori, est quid ipsius, secundum quod quid est quidditas. Et si aliquis dicat, quod non est tota quidditas, dicimus quod est totum esse ipsius, sed non est perfectum esse ipsius speciei : totum enim esse est in potentia : et nihil est de esse quod in potentia non sit ante ultimum actum ad quem terminatur motus potentiæ : esse autem in potentia est esse in genere, et hæc est causa vera quod genus prædicatur. Non ideo tantum quia est forma, sed quia est forma et secundum aliquem modum totum esse dicit. Et quod sic se habet ad subjectum, prædicatur de illo non per denominationem accidentalem, sed essentiali prædicatione.

Et hoc est quod a multis dicitur, quod est forma partis quæ non prædicatur, et est forma totius quæ prædicatur. Sed oportet addere, quod forma quæ prædicatur, totius sit, et totum esse significet, et non significet essentiam cujus est actus proprius : *animalitas* enim non prædicatur, nec etiam *humanitas* : quamvis animalitatis esse sit animal, et humanitatis esse sit homo. Talis ergo forma designans formam totius et esse, prædicatur, et non aliter : et anima sensibilis loco animalis posita non prædicatur, quia animal non est anima sensibilis : et similiter anima hominis non prædicatur de homine : hæc enim dicit formam partis, et non totius esse. Animalitas autem et humanitas non prædicatur de his quorum formæ sunt : non enim designant formas ut esse subjecti, sed ut essentias. Animal autem et homo prædicantur, quia designant formas, ut esse totum subjecti, vel in potentia vel actu : subjecti dico de quo prædicantur. Et sic etiam in formis accidentalibus omnibus. Et ideo homo est risibilis, et non risibilitas ; et homo est albus, et non albedo. Hoc est igitur quod dicitur, quod genus est quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod

quid est : quod enim quid est et esse ipsius est de quo prædicatur. Et ideo genus est universale quod immediata et substantiali prædicatione est in multis speciebus et de multis.

Now that which is added in that which is a what, is therefore added, because every superior which through essence and name and difference is in an inferior, is the what of it, according to what a quiddity is. And if anyone should say, that it is not the total quiddity, we say that it is its total being, but it is not the perfect being of that species: for the total being is in potency: and there is nothing of being which is not in potency before the ultimate act to which the motion of potency is terminated: but to be in potency is to be in a genus, and this is the true cause that a genus is predicated. Not only therefore because it is a form, but because it is a form and according to some mode speaks of the whole being. And what thus has itself to a subject, is predicated of it not through an accidental denomination, but by an essential predication.

And this is what is said by many, that there is a form of a part which is not predicated, and there is a form of a whole which is predicated. But it behooves to add, that the form which is predicated, is of a whole, and signifies the total being, and does not signify the essence of which it is the proper act: for *animality* is not predicated, nor even *humanity*: although an animal is the being of animality, and man is the being of humanity. Such a form therefore designating the form of a whole and of being, is predicated, and not otherwise: and a sensible soul posited in place of an animal is not predicated, because an animal is not a sensible soul: and similarly the soul of a man is not predicated of man: for this speaks of the form of a part, and not of the whole being. But animality and humanity are not predicated of those whose forms they are: for they do not designate forms as the being of a subject, but as essences. But animal and man are predicated, because they designate forms, as the total being of a subject, either in potency or in act: of a subject I say of which they are predicated. And thus also in all accidental forms. And therefore man is risible, and not risibility; and man is white, and not whiteness. This is therefore what is said, that a genus is what is predicated of many differing in species in that which

is a what: for that which is a what and its being is that of which it is predicated. And therefore a genus is a universal which by an immediate and substantial predication is in many species and of many.

Sic ergo demonstratum est, quod genus est universale et inter universalia primum ; et qualiter communitas generis differt ab aliis communitatibus posterioribus ab accidentibus denominatis.

<!-- cap:1.3.4 -->
CAPUT IV.

Quod diffinitio generis nec abundet, nec deficiat, et ejus declaratio.

Quod autem inducta diffinitio generis ab omnibus aliis separetur, et in se nec superfluum aliquod contineat nec in aliquo deficiat, sic probatur. Eorum enim quæ prædicantur, quædam quidem de uno solo prædicantur, ut individua, ut Socrates, et Plato : et per nutum demonstrationis appropriata, ut hic et hæc et hoc, secundum omnem modum demonstrationis ad hoc singulare. Alia vero de pluribus prædicantur quemadmodum genera, et species, differentia, proprium, et accidens, quæ sunt universalia. Dico autem accidens, quod est commune accidens, et non proprium alicui individuorum. Accidens enim uni individuo proprium, est accidens quod vocatur individuans : et hoc quia soli convenit, de uno solo prædicatur, ut Socrates, vel Socratis accidens, quo homo individuus efficitur, dicendo, Socrates est Socrates, et Plato est Plato, et hic est hic et non alius, et hoc est hoc et non aliud, vel etiam aliquis homo est aliquis homo et non alius. Sed cum dicimus, homo est animal, et dicimus cum hoc, quod asinus est animal, et multa alia. Et similiter in specie dicimus, quod Socrates est homo, et Plato est homo, et multi alii : et quod Socrates est rationale, et etiam Plato, et multi alii. Et similiter est de proprio et de accidente, quorum quodlibet de pluribus prædicatur. Ab hoc, de pluribus prædicatur, habet genus, quod est universale, et differt ab eo quod est singulare quod de uno solo prædicatur.

Thus therefore it has been demonstrated, that a genus is a universal and the first among universals; and how the community of a genus differs from other posterior communities denominated from accidents.

<!-- cap:1.3.4 -->
CHAPTER IV.

That the definition of a genus neither abounds, nor is deficient, and its declaration.

Now that the induced definition of a genus is separated from all others, and in itself contains nothing superfluous nor is deficient in anything, is thus proved. For of those which are predicated, some indeed are predicated of one only, as individuals, as Socrates, and Plato: and appropriated through the nod of a demonstration, as this (masc.) and this (fem.) and this (neut.), according to every mode of demonstration to this singular. But others are predicated of many just as genera, and species, difference, proper, and accident, which are universals. Now I say an accident, which is a common accident, and not proper to any of the individuals. For an accident proper to one individual, is an accident which is called individuating: and this because it belongs to it alone, is predicated of one only, as Socrates, or an accident of Socrates, by which an individual man is effected, saying, Socrates is Socrates, and Plato is Plato, and this one is this one and not another, and this is this and not another, or even some man is some man and not another. But when we say, man is an animal, and we say with this, that an ass is an animal, and many others. And similarly in a species we say, that Socrates is a man, and Plato is a man, and many others: and that Socrates is rational, and also Plato, and many others. And similarly it is of a proper and of an accident, of which any whatever is predicated of many. From this, to predicate of many-

predicated of many, the genus has that it is a universal, and it differs from that which is singular which is predicated of one only.

Quod autem dico particulare sive singulare prædicari de se et de uno solo, non est proprie dictum : quia proprie loquendo, ut in *Prædicamentis* dicit Aristoteles, in prima substantia nulla est prædicatio. Et hoc probatur ex ratione prædicationis quæ in ante habitis posita est. Prædicari enim de alio est hoc in illo, et de illo esse, et intelligere, et per compositionem designare. Cum autem nihil in seipso sit, ut dicit Aristoteles, non potest prima substantia in seipsa aut esse de seipsa, nec proprie potest de seipsa esse designari. Et ideo prima substantia non prædicatur proprie de seipsa. Sed quando hoc fit quod de seipsa prædicatur, hoc fit quoad nos, et non secundum seipsum. Nisi forte diceretur, quod in talibus prædicationibus secundum id quod est subjicitur, et secundum id quod est ad ipsum prædicatur. Sic enim aliqua diversitas posset esse subjecti et prædicati, et sic prædicatum intelligitur, ut esse in subjecto, et esse de seipso : et sic est etiam in omnibus ubi idem de seipso prædicatur. Et sic intelligitur quod dicit Boëtius, quod nulla propositio est verior ea in qua idem prædicatur de seipso. In illa enim idem prædicatur de eodem ut id quo est. Et sic concedi potest, quod prima substantia de seipsa ut de uno prædicatur.

Particulare autem quod de seipso prædicatur, tripliciter designatur, scilicet ut singulare in nomine, ut Socrates et Plato. Secundo in nutu demonstrationis ad hoc, ut hic et hæc et hoc : hoc enim nutu demonstrationis ad unum solum non potest nisi de uno solo prædicari. Sed tertio ab Aristotele designatur in *Prædicamentis*, ut vagum, ut aliquis homo, et aliquis bos. Et de hoc potest esse dubium, utrum de uno solo, an de pluribus prædicetur : est enim Socrates aliquis homo, et Plato aliquis homo.

Sed est in talibus considerandum, quod cum dicitur aliquis homo, scilicet ex parte naturæ inclinatæ ad partem per signum particulare, scilicet ad partem hanc vel illam non determinatæ. Et sic considerato habet speciei prædicationem aliquo modo, et quoad hoc de pluribus differentibus numero prædicatur, vel generis prædicatione, ut cum dicitur, animal quoddam, vel aliquod animal. Sic ergo non prædicatur propria prædicatione, sed naturæ quæ ad partem inclinat. Genus autem est, quod propria prædicatione et immediata de pluribus differentibus specie prædicatur. Potest etiam considerari aliquod animal, vel aliquis homo ut particulare, sive ex parte particulantis ad partem determinatam, et sic non habet nisi prædicationem partis, et sic non prædicatur nisi de uno solo. Et sic id quod dicitur de particulari, quod de uno solo prædicatur, intelligitur de propria et immediata prædicatione, et not de illa quam individuum vagum habet mediante natura communi, sive generis, vel speciei, per ipsum ad partem inclinatæ.

Moreover, that which I say, that the particular or singular is predicated of itself and of one only, is not properly said: because properly speaking, as Aristotle says in the *Categories*, in the first substance there is no predication. And this is proved from the reason of predication which was posited in what was previously discussed. For to be predicated of another is to be this in that, and of that, and to understand, and to designate through composition. Since, however, nothing is in itself, as Aristotle says, the first substance cannot be in itself or be of itself, nor can it properly be designated to be of itself. And therefore the first substance is not properly predicated of itself. But when this occurs, that it is predicated of itself, this occurs with respect to us, and not according to itself. Unless perhaps it were said, that in such predications it is subjected according to that which it is, and it is predicated according to that which is to it. For thus some diversity could be of the subject and the predicate, and thus the predicate is understood, as being in the subject, and being of itself: and thus it is also in all things where the same is predicated of itself. And thus is understood what Boethius says, that no proposition is truer than that in which the same is predicated of itself. For in that the same is predicated of the same as that by which it is. And thus it can be conceded, that the first substance is predicated of itself as of one.

The particular, however, which is predicated of itself, is designated in three ways, namely as a singular in a name, as Socrates and Plato. Secondly in the sign of a demonstration to "this", as this (masc.) and this (fem.) and this (neut.): for by this sign of a demonstration to one only it cannot be predicated except of one only. But thirdly it is designated by Aristotle in the *Categories*, as a vague one, as "some man", and "some ox". And concerning this there can be doubt, whether it be predicated of one only, or of many: for Socrates is some man, and Plato is some man.

But it is to be considered in such things, that when it is said "some man", namely from the part of nature inclined to a part through a particular sign, namely to this or that part not determined. And so considered it has the predication of species in some way, and as to this it is predicated of many differing in number, or by a predication of genus, as when it is said, "a certain animal", or "some animal". So therefore it is not predicated by a proper predication, but of the nature which inclines to a part. Genus, however, is that which is predicated by a proper and immediate predication of many things differing in species. Some animal, or some man, can also be considered as a particular, or from the part of the particularizing to a determined part, and so it has nothing but the predication of a part, and so it is not predicated except of one only. And thus that which is said of the particular, that it is predicated of one only, is understood of a proper and immediate predication, and not of that which the vague individual has by means of a common nature, whether of genus or species, through it inclined to a part.

Per id ergo quod de pluribus prædicatur, differt genus a particulari sine singulari quod de uno solo prædicatur. Nam propria prædicatione, nisi forte unum et idem particulare multis modis synonymis designaretur, ut Socrates decorus crispus et hujusmodi, quæ synonyma sunt, ut ensis, mucro, sica, gladius, sicut dicitur Marcus Tullius Cicero : nihil prohibet-

singulare sub uno nomine notius esse, quam sub alio, et sic notius prædicari de se secundum quod est sub nomine minus noto : ut si quæram, quis sit talis ? et dicatur mihi, Tullius est Marcus : videtur enim aliquo modo propinquius esse propriæ prædicationi. Sic ergo genus distinguitur ab individuis per hoc quod est de pluribus prædicari.

A speciebus autem differt genus : quia quamvis de pluribus prædicetur, non tamen prædicatur de pluribus specie differentibus quoad naturæ aptitudinem, quæ secundum quod species est, per differentias oppositas formaliter secundum potestatem naturæ divisibilis non est : sed in pluralitatem agit numeralem per materiæ propriæ divisionem, et accidentis individuationem, sicut patet per antedicta. Et ideo cum dicitur, quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, intelligitur per causam efficientem : ita quod pluralitas formæ et speciei facta per differentias constitutivas fecit illa differre.

Sed si quis sophistice objiciat, quod homo, et asinus, et leo non differunt, sed conveniunt specie : quia quodlibet eorum species est. Erit constructio in habitudine causæ formalis : et sic incidit sophisma secundum amphibologiam. Per hoc quod est prædicari de differentibus specie, separatur et discernitur genus a specie, et prædicatio generis a prædicatione speciei.

A proprio autem differt genus, sive a proprii prædicatione differt prædicatio generis in hoc, quod proprium proprie sumptum quod convenit omni et soli et semper, de una sola specie (quam immediate consequitur) prædicatur. Et mediante illa communi specie, per quam transit ad individua, prædicatur de individuis illius speciei, sicut risibile prædicatur de solo homine et de individuis hominis, ut Socrate et Platone. Genus autem non ut consequens, sed ut prius natura prædicatur de pluribus speciebus et individuis illarum specierum : quia quod essentialiter est in subjecto, inferioribus nomen suum dat et rationem. Proprium enim (ut in sequentibus dicetur) consequitur speciem et est accidens speciei per commune speciei : quia quod essentiale est, particularibus nomen et rationem suam dat inferioribus et naturam : et trahitur mediante natura etiam proprium ad particularia, et prædicatur de illis ut proprium, sicut de specie.

Through that, therefore, which is predicated of many, genus differs from the particular or singular which is predicated of one only. For by a proper predication, unless perhaps one and the same particular were designated in many synonymous ways, as Socrates, handsome, curly-haired, and the like, which are synonyms, as sword, blade, dagger, falchion, just as it is said Marcus Tullius Cicero: nothing prohibits-

a singular from being better known under one name than under another, and so to be predicated as better known of itself according to what is under a less known name: as if I should ask, who is such a one? and it be said to me, "Tullius is Marcus": for it seems in some way to be closer to a proper predication. So therefore genus is distinguished from individuals through this, that it is predicated of many.

From species, however, genus differs: because although it be predicated of many, it is not nevertheless predicated of many differing in species as to the aptitude of nature, which according to what is a species, is not divisible through opposite differences formally according to the power of nature: but it acts into a numerical plurality through the division of proper matter, and the individuation of an accident, as is clear from the aforesaid. And therefore when it is said, that it is predicated of many differing in species, it is understood through the efficient cause: so that the plurality of form and species made through constitutive differences made those to differ.

But if someone should sophistically object, that man, and ass, and lion do not differ, but agree in species: because any of them is a species. The construction will be in the habitude of a formal cause: and thus a sophism according to amphiboly occurs. Through this, that it is to be predicated of those differing in species, genus is separated and discerned from species, and the predication of genus from the predication of species.

From the property, however, genus differs, or from the predication of the property the predication of genus differs in this, that the property properly taken which belongs to all and only and always, is predicated of one only species (which it immediately follows). And by means of that common species, through which it passes to individuals, it is predicated of the individuals of that species, just as risible is predicated of man alone and of the individuals of man, as Socrates and Plato. Genus, however, not as a consequent, but as prior by nature is predicated of many species and the individuals of those species: because that which essentially is in a subject, gives its name and reason to inferiors. For the property (as will be said in the following) follows the species and is an accident of the species through the common of the species: because that which is essential, gives its name and its reason to inferiors and nature: and the property is also drawn by means of nature to particulars, and is predicated of them as a property, just as of the species.

Et tamen talem modum prædicandi non habet genus secundum seipsum per hoc quod est in inferioribus et de inferioribus prædicatur. Sic ergo per eumdem modum diversimode acceptum (quod est de pluribus differentibus specie prædicari) genus differt a specie, et a proprio quod est accidens speciei.

A differentia vero differt et communiter accidentibus in eo quod genus prædicatur in quid : sed differentia et communiter accidentia prædicantur in quale. Quamvis enim etiam proprium in quale prædicetur. Cum tamen genus in duobus differat a proprii prædicatione, scilicet in eo quod est prædicari de pluribus differentibus specie, et etiam in prædicari in quid et non in quale : prius differt a proprio in hoc quod prædicatur de differentibus specie, quam in hoc quod prædicatur in quid. Et hoc probatur per hoc, quod si genus sumatur ut commune, sic est quædam qualitas speciei : esse enim commune respectu ejus quod subjicitur sibi, ut qualitas quædam est ipsius. Et ideo dividit Aristoteles ex proposito quale quid contra hoc aliquid. Et quoad hoc in modo prædicandi non differt a proprio. Substantialior igitur et prior differentia generis ad proprium est prædicari de pluribus differentibus specie, quam prædicari in quid, ut dictum est.

Est autem advertendum, quod cum dicitur, differentia prædicatur in quale, et communiter accidentia in quale : non sumitur uno modo quale, nisi in voce, et non secundum rationem : secundum enim rationem perfectivam qualis, tunc quale-

est qualitatis informatio et dispositio secundum quam quales dicimur : et hoc modo quale est, quod non convenit substantiæ nec generi alicujus accidentis nisi qualitatis. Alio modo et posterius dicitur quale, quod est consequens quid perfectum : et hoc modo accidens omne quale est, quod est accidens individui : et tunc dividitur quale contra quid perfectum in esse et substantia. Tertio modo dicitur quale, quod est consequens essentialia speciei et naturæ : et hoc modo dicitur proprium quale. Et hoc minus habet de quali quam id quod est consequens esse individui. Quarto modo quale dicitur, quod est potentiæ determinativum ad esse speciei : et hoc dicitur quale, quia est consequens quid sive subjectum primum quod est genus rei.

And yet genus does not have such a mode of predicating according to itself through this, that it is in inferiors and is predicated of inferiors. So therefore through the same mode accepted in different ways (which is to be predicated of many differing in species) genus differs from species, and from the property which is an accident of the species.

From the difference indeed it differs and from common accidents in that genus is predicated in the "what" (*in quid*): but the difference and common accidents are predicated in the "what sort" (*in quale*). For although even the property be predicated in the "what sort". Since nevertheless genus differs in two things from the predication of the property, namely in that which is to be predicated of many differing in species, and also in being predicated in the "what" and not in the "what sort": it first differs from the property in this, that it is predicated of those differing in species, than in this, that it is predicated in the "what". And this is proved by this, that if genus be taken as common, thus it is a certain quality of the species: for to be common with respect to that which is subjected to it, is as a certain quality of it. And therefore Aristotle purposely divides the "what sort somewhat" (*quale quid*) against "this somewhat" (*hoc aliquid*). And as to this, in the mode of predicating it does not differ from the property. The more substantial and prior difference of genus to the property is therefore to be predicated of many differing in species, than to be predicated in the "what", as was said.

It is to be noticed, however, that when it is said, the difference is predicated in the "what sort", and common accidents in the "what sort": "what sort" is not taken in one way, except in voice, and not according to reason: for according to the perfective reason of what sort, then the what sort-

is the information and disposition of a quality according to which we are said to be of what sort: and in this way "what sort" is that which does not belong to a substance nor to the genus of any accident except of quality. In another way and posteriorly "what sort" is said, which is a consequent to the perfect "what": and in this way every accident is "what sort", which is an accident of the individual: and then "what sort" is divided against the perfect "what" in being and substance. In a third way "what sort" is said, which is a consequent to the essentials of the species and nature: and in this way the property is called "what sort". And this has less of the "what sort" than that which is a consequent to the being of the individual. In a fourth way "what sort" is said, which is determinative of power to the being of the species: and this is called "what sort", because it is a consequent to the "what" or the first subject which is the genus of a thing.

Nec dicitur quale, quia sit in genere primo modo dicto, vel quia sit consequens quid speciei : sed tantum ideo, quia est consequens aliquid generis sicut actus consequens potentiam in eodem in quo est aliquid secundum potentiam et aliquid secundum actum. Et hoc quantum ad essentiam suam est substantia et substantiæ effectivum, licet habeat modum prædicandi in quale, in quantum est quid generis consequens : et hoc modo differentia prædicatur in quale. Et convenit cum quali accidente in quantum utrumque est ad quid consequens : quamvis quid ad quod consequitur accidens, sit ejus quod est hoc aliquid in individuo. Quid autem ad quod consequitur differentia, est quid imperfectum : ideo differentia consequens est perfectiva potentiæ illius secundum substantiam : et quantum ad essentiam est de genere substantiæ. Quia vero accidens commune est consequens quid perfectum in eo quod est hoc aliquid et post hoc aliquid, nihil est addere ei quod est esse secundum substantiam. Ideo quale id remanet in natura accidentis, quod cum sit in aliquo, non est in eo sicut pars quædam : quod differentiæ (quæ consequitur quid imperfectum) convenire non potest : non enim potest consequi quid et imperfectum, nisi id quod est pars esse ejus in quo est. Sic ergo et tot modis dicitur quale.

Alio modo etiam dicitur quale quid secundum quod dividitur contra hoc aliquid : et sic quale sumitur termino infinito, per quem quæritur quale, nec sumitur sive determinatur quæstio quousque stetur in hoc aliquid. Dicentes enim, quod Socrates est animal, quærimus quale animal : et dicimus, homo. Et quærentes, qualis homo, dicimus, quod est hic homo : et sic quod habet commune quale quid est respectu sui inferioris. Et etiam genus non prædicatur quidem in quale nec in quid determinatum, sed prædicatur in quale quid indeterminatum, et similiter species, et in quid determinatum sola prædicatur prima substantia.

Similiter etiam id quod dicitur prædicari in quid, dicitur multis modis. Dicitur enim prædicari in quid quod est de natura et modo prædicandi in quid : et hoc est solum illud quod est de natura sua subjectum in quo alia fundantur, sicut in prima substantia fundantur et secundæ substantiæ et accidentia communia, et sicut species in qua fundantur propria, et sicut genus in quo fundantur differentiæ. Dicitur etiam in quid quod non naturam, sed modum habet illius, sicut genera accidentium prædicantur de sibi subjectis speciebus et individuis, ut dicit Aristoteles.

Nor is it called "what sort" because it be in a genus in the first way spoken, or because it be a consequent to the "what" of a species: but only therefore because it is a consequent to something of the genus as an act following a potency in the same thing in which there is something according to potency and something according to act. And this as to its essence is a substance and effective of substance, although it have the mode of predicating in the "what sort", insofar as it is a consequent to the "what" of the genus: and in this way the difference is predicated in the "what sort". And it agrees with the accidental "what sort" insofar as both are consequent to the "what": although the "what" which the accident follows be of that which is "this somewhat" in the individual. But the "what" which the difference follows is an imperfect "what": therefore the consequent difference is perfective of that power according to substance: and as to its essence it is of the genus of substance. But because the common accident is a consequent to the perfect "what" in that which is "this somewhat" and after "this somewhat", there is nothing to add to that which is to be according to substance. Therefore that "what sort" remains in the nature of an accident, because since it be in something, it is not in it as a certain part: which cannot belong to the difference (which follows the imperfect "what"): for it cannot follow the "what" and the imperfect, except that which is a part of the being of that in which it is. So therefore and in so many ways is "what sort" said.

In another way also "what sort somewhat" (*quale quid*) is said according to which it is divided against "this somewhat" (*hoc aliquid*): and thus "what sort" is taken by an infinite term, through which it is asked of what sort, nor is the question taken or determined until one stands in "this somewhat". For saying that Socrates is an animal, we ask of what sort of animal: and we say, man. And asking, of what sort of man, we say, that he is this man: and so that which has a common "what sort somewhat" is with respect to its inferior. And even genus is not indeed predicated in the "what sort" nor in the determined "what", but it is predicated in the indeterminate "what sort somewhat", and similarly the species, and in the determined "what" the first substance alone is predicated.

Similarly also that which is said to be predicated in the "what", is said in many ways. For that is said to be predicated in the "what" which is of the nature and mode of predicating in the "what": and this is only that which is of its nature a subject in which others are founded, just as in the first substance are founded both second substances and common accidents, and just as the species in which the property is founded, and just as the genus in which the differences are founded. That is also said in the "what" which has not the nature but the mode of it, just as the genera of accidents are predicated of the species and individuals subjected to them, as Aristotle says.

Si quis albedine posita dixerit colorem esse, quid est dicit, et qualitatem significat. Adhuc autem dicitur prædicari in quid, quod totam dicit subjecti quidditatem, sicut diffinitio de diffinito prædicatur in quid.

Et ex his quæ dicta sunt, facile patet quod a differentia et communiter accidentibus differt genus in modo prædicandi : quia quamvis differentia de pluribus differentibus specie prædicetur, ut irra-

tionale quod de asino et leone prædicatur : et similiter commune accidens quamvis de differentibus specie prædicetur, ut
album de nive et cygno : non tamen differentia et commune accidens prædicantur in quid, sed in quale. Genus autem
per seipsum ut subjectum primum in
quid et non in quale prædicatur. Interrogantibus enim nobis, qualis est corvus? respondemus, quod niger, commune accidens respondentes : est enim rationale differentia, nigrum vero communiter accidens. Cum vero quid est homo interrogemur, respondemus, quod est animal :
eo quod animal proximum subjectum est
in esse hominis in quo fundatur differentia constitutiva. Animal autem genus est hominis : genus igitur in quid prædicatur.

Ex omnibus ergo quæ dicta sunt, patet
quod id quod ponitur in diffinitione generis, scilicet prædicari de pluribus, dividit genus ab his quæ de uno solo prædicantur, quæ sunt de numero eorum quæ
sunt individua. Hoc autem quod in diffinitione ponitur, differentibus specie, separat genus ab his prædicabilibus quæ
sunt species et quæ sunt propria. Quamvis etiam proprium assignetur generalissimum, ut Aristoteles in *Prædicamentis* dicit, quod proprium est substantiæ secundum sui mutationem esse susceptibile contrariorum : tamen proprie et immediate proprium est speciei, nec assignatur generi nisi per speciem, et sic transit ad genus : hoc ipsum enim quod est susceptibile esse contrariorum sui mutatione, substantiæ non convenit nisi per substare : quod primæ substantiæ non in quantum est hæc vel illa, sed in quantum est substantia, maxime convenit. Quod in
diffinitione ponitur, in eo quod quid sit
prædicari, dividit genus a communiter
accidentibus et differentiis, quæ ut dictum
est, non in eo quod quid sit prædicatur,
sed in eo quod quale sit.

If anyone with whiteness posited should say that it is a color, he says what it is, and signifies a quality. Moreover, that is said to be predicated in the "what", which says the total quiddity of the subject, just as a definition is predicated of the defined in the "what".

And from these which have been said, it is easily clear that from the difference and common accidents genus differs in the mode of predicating: because although the difference be predicated of many differing in species, as irra-

tional which is predicated of an ass and a lion: and similarly a common accident although it may be predicated of things differing in species, as white of snow and a swan: yet a difference and a common accident are not predicated in a what, but in a what sort. But a genus through itself as a primary subject is predicated in a what and not in a what sort. For when we ask, what sort is a raven? we answer, that it is black, answering a common accident: for rational is a difference, but black is a common accident. But when we are asked what man is, we answer, that he is an animal: because animal is the proximate subject in the being of a man in which the constitutive difference is founded. But animal is the genus of man: therefore a genus is predicated in a what.

From all therefore which have been said, it is evident that that which is posited in the definition of a genus, namely to be predicated of many, divides a genus from these which are predicated of one only, which are of the number of those which are individuals. But this which is posited in the definition, differing in species, separates a genus from those predicables which are species and which are propers. Although also a proper is assigned as most general, as Aristotle says in the *Categories*, that a proper of substance according to its mutation is to be susceptible of contraries: nevertheless properly and immediately a proper is of a species, nor is it assigned to a genus except through a species, and thus it transits to a genus: for this itself which is to be susceptible of contraries by its mutation, does not belong to a substance except through standing under: which most belongs to a primary substance not insofar as it is this or that, but insofar as it is a substance. What is posited in the definition, in that what it may be to be predicated, divides a genus from commonly accidents and differences, which as has been said, are not predicated in that what it may be, but in that what sort it may be.

Patet ergo ex quo diffinitio dicit omnia quæ sunt de esse generis, et separat genus ab omnibus universalibus aliis quæ secum dividunt hoc commune quod est universale : nihil superfluum, et nihil diminutum continet generis dicta descriptio. Hoc igitur est, quod dicere de genere intendimus in quantum est universale prædicabile.

CAPUT V.

De recapitulatione eorum quæ de sermone generis dicta sunt.

Capitulariter igitur ea quæ de generis diffinitione dicta sunt colligentes, dicimus, quod aliter quam in civilibus rursus dicitur genus, cui immediata et directa linea non transversaliter supponitur species. Ad horum generum, quæ in civilibus sunt, fortasse aliquam similitudinem dictum : hujusmodi enim genus est principium quoddam earum quæ directe sunt sub se specierum. Et hoc convenit cum acceptione generis secunda. Videtur etiam genus sic dictum omnem multitudinem specierum et individuorum continere in una sui natura, et nomine quod largitur eis. Et sic convenit cum acceptione generis, de qua est sermo apud Philosophos. Unde etiam taliter dictum genus describentes, dicunt et assignaverunt dicentes, quod genus est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid est prædicatur, ut animal quod de homine et de asino in eo quod quid est prædicatur. Eorum enim quæ prædicantur, alia quidem de uno solo prædicantur, sicut individua (quamvis hæc prædicatio non sit propria) ut Socrates, et Plato : et ut generaliter dicatur in omni genere individuorum, ut hic et hæc et hoc. Alia vero prædicabilium prædicantur de pluribus quemadmodum genera, et species, et differentia, et proprium, et accidens commune, sive accidentia communia, quæ non sunt alicui propria. Est autem ex. gr. genus quidem ut animal, species autem ut homo, differentia ut rationale, proprium ut risibile, accidens ut album, nigrum, et sedere, et hujusmodi.

Therefore it is evident from which the definition says all things which are of the being of a genus, and separates a genus from all other universals which divide with themselves this common which is a universal: the said description of a genus contains nothing superfluous, and nothing diminished. This therefore is, what we intend to say concerning a genus insofar as it is a predicable universal.

Chapter V.

Of the recapitulation of those things which have been said concerning the discourse of a genus.

Therefore collecting capitularly those things which have been said concerning the definition of a genus, we say, that otherwise than in civil things a genus is again said, to which by an immediate and direct line not transversally a species is supposed. To these genera, which are in civil things, perhaps to some similitude it is said: for a genus of this sort is a certain principle of those species which are directly under it. And this agrees with the second acceptation of a genus. A genus thus said seems also to contain the whole multitude of species and individuals in one nature of its own, and in the name which it bestows upon them. And thus it agrees with the acceptation of a genus, of which there is discourse among Philosophers. Whence also describing a genus thus said, they say and have assigned saying, that a genus is what is predicated of many and differing in species in that what it is, as an animal which is predicated of a man and of an ass in that what it is. For of those which are predicated, some indeed are predicated of one only, as individuals (although this predication is not proper) as Socrates, and Plato: and that it may be said generally in every genus of individuals, as this (masc.) and this (fem.) and this (neut.). But others of predicables are predicated of many just as genera, and species, and differences, and propers, and a common accident, or common accidents, which are not proper to anyone. Now for example a genus indeed is as an animal, a species however is as a man, a difference as ratio-

tional, property as risible, accident as white, black, and to sit, and the like.

Ab his ergo quæ de uno solo prædicantur, differunt genera per id quod in diffinitione inducta positum est : eo quod ipsa genera per diffinitionem præinductam assignata sunt in eo quod de pluribus prædicantur.

Ab his autem speciebus quæ de pluribus prædicatur, differunt genera : quoniam non prædicatur species de pluribus differentibus specie sicut genus, sed prædicatur de pluribus solo numero differentibus, non quidem secundum quod numerus est accidens, sed secundum quod numerus est in rebus numeratis : propter quod dicit Aristoteles, quod numero differunt quæcumque differunt materiæ divisione : homo enim cum sit species, de Socrate prædicatur, et de Platone, qui non specie differunt ab invicem, sed numero solum et divisione materiæ, quia materia Socratis non est materia Platonis. Animal autem cum sit genus, de homine prædicatur, et de bove, qui specie differunt a se invicem, et non numero solum.

A proprio vero differt genus : quoniam proprium quidem de una sola specie prædicatur, cujus est proprium, mediata et consequenti prædicatione, et de his individuis quæ sunt in illa una specie, quia per speciem proprium transit ad individua, quorum totum esse formale est ipsa species, quemadmodum risibile prædicatur de homine solo et particularibus hominibus qui sunt sub homine : genus autem non de una sola specie prædicatur, sed de pluribus et differentibus specie.

A differentia vero differt genus et ab aliis quæ sunt communiter accidentia : quia etsi de pluribus et differentibus specie prædicantur et differentia et communiter accidens, non tamen in eo quod quid sit prædicantur, sed in eo quod quale sit. Cujus ratio est : quia aliquibus interrogantibus nos id de quo ut de subjecto prædicatur hæc differentia et accidens, non in eo quod quid sit dicimus illa prædicari, sed magis in eo quod quale : et interroganti alicui et dicenti, qualis est homo? dicimus quoniam rationalis. Et interroganti qualis est corvus ? dicimus quoniam est niger. Est autem rationalis differentia quæ est essentialis qualitas hominis : nigrum autem est accidens commune et corvo et Æthiopi. Cum autem quid est homo interrogemur, respondemus quod est animal. Est autem genus hominis animal, et primum in esse homini subjectum.

Prædicari ergo de pluribus genus dividit sive separat ab his quæ de uno solo prædicatur, quæ sunt de numero eorum quæ sunt individua. Per id autem quod dicitur prædicari de differentibus specie, separatur genus ab his quæ ut species vel sicut propria prædicatur. In eo autem quod quid sit prædicari dicitur, dividitur genus à communiter accidentibus et a differentia, quæ non in eo quod quid sit, sed in eo quod quale sit prædicantur.

From these therefore which are predicated of one only, genera differ through that which was posited in the induced definition: because the genera themselves assigned through the pre-induced definition are in that they are predicated of many.

From these species however which are predicated of many, genera differ: since the species is not predicated of many differing in species as the genus, but it is predicated of many differing in number only, not indeed according to which number is an accident, but according to which number is in the things numbered: on account of which Aristotle says, that whatever things differ by the division of matter differ in number: for man since it be a species, is predicated of Socrates, and of Plato, who do not differ in species from one another, but in number only and by the division of matter, because the matter of Socrates is not the matter of Plato. Animal however since it be a genus, is predicated of man, and of the ox, which differ in species from one another, and not in number only.

From the property indeed genus differs: since the property indeed is predicated of one only species, of which it is the property, by a mediated and consequent predication, and of these individuals which are in that one species, because through the species the property passes to the individuals, whose whole formal being is the species itself, just as risible is predicated of man alone and the particular men who are under man: genus however is not predicated of one only species, but of many and differing in species.

From the difference indeed genus differs and from others which are common accidents: because although both the difference and the common accident are predicated of many and differing in species, nevertheless they are not predicated in that which it is (*in eo quod quid sit*), but in that which it is of what sort (*in eo quod quale sit*). The reason for which is: because to some asking us that of which as of a subject this difference and accident are predicated, we do not say those are predicated in that which it is, but rather in that which it is of what sort: and to someone asking and saying, of what sort is man? we say because rational. And to the asking of what sort is a crow? we say because it is black. Moreover, rational is a difference which is an essential quality of man: black however is a common accident both to the crow and to the Ethiopian. When however we are asked what man is, we respond that he is an animal. Animal however is the genus of man, and the first subject in being for man.

To be predicated therefore of many divides or separates genus from those which are predicated of one only, which are of the number of those which are individuals. By that however which is said to be predicated of those differing in species, genus is separated from those which are predicated as a species or as properties. In that however which it is said to be predicated in that which it is, genus is divided from common accidents and from the difference, which are predicated not in that which it is, but in that which it is of what sort.

Nihil ergo nec superfluum nec diminutum continet generis dicta a Philosophis descriptio. Et ideo talis diffinitio terminus vocatur, diffinitum perfecte (per omnia quæ sunt de esse ipsius) determinans, et ab omnibus aliis distinguens et separans. Hæc igitur quantum ad logicam intentionem pertinet de genere dicta sunt.

CAPUT I.

De diversis intentionibus specierum.

Tractaturi de specie tanquam secundo universali, cogimur differre tractatum de differentia, et tertio loco inter universalia ponere: quia quamvis differentia constitutiva sit de essentia speciei et principium essentiale ipsius, nec possit esse species, quæ non ex genere et differentia constituatur : tamen quia genus diffinitur per speciem, et species per genus, propter hoc quod genus habet dependentiam ad speciem, et species ad genus, eo quod correlativa sunt, et unum diffinite et certe cognosci non potest sine reliquo : ideo oportet tractatum de specie immediate ponere post tractatum de genere. Cujus tamen aliam rationem dicit esse Avicenna hanc : quia differentia non est in qua est genus per essentiam, cum differentia sit actus sive forma simplex : in specie autem per essentiam est genus. Adhuc autem differentia non est in genere nisi potestate : species autem est in genere sicut in continente ipsum : et ideo immediatius se habet species ad genus secundum rationem speciei, differentia secundum rationem differentiæ : quamvis in constitutione speciei differentia sit ante speciem, quia a genere non constituitur species, nisi potestas generis per differentiam determinetur et restringatur. Hac igitur de causa agendum est de specie post tractatum de genere immediate : et ponendæ sunt intentiones speciei, ut sciatur in qua acceptione vel significatione sit species intenta apud Philosophos.

Sicut autem de genere dicimus, quod non curamus ponere hic nisi illas generis intentiones quæ ad illam generis significationem quæ apud Philosophos est, aliquam habeant similitudinem : ita non curamus ponere intentionem speciei, quæ non habet similitudinem ad intentionem speciei apud Philosophos acceptam. Et ideo non curamus primitiva specie vel derivativa, quæ apud grammaticos consideratur : sed speciem in natura invenimus, et in civilibus, secundum quam similitudo quædam est ad speciei intentionem quæ apud Philosophos est.

Nothing therefore either superfluous or diminished does the description of genus said by the Philosophers contain. And therefore such a definition is called a term, determining the defined perfectly (through all things which are of its being), and distinguishing and separating it from all others. These things therefore, as far as pertains to the logical intention, have been said concerning genus.

CHAPTER I.

On the various intentions of species.

As we are about to treat of species as the second universal, we are compelled to defer the treatise on difference and place it in the third position among the universals: because although constitutive difference is of the essence of species and its essential principle, nor can there be a species which is not constituted from genus and difference: yet because genus is defined through species, and species through genus, on account of the fact that genus has a dependency on species, and species on genus, since they are correlatives, and one cannot be known definitely and certainly without the other: therefore it is necessary to place the treatise on species immediately after the treatise on genus. Of which, however, Avicenna says there is another reason, which is this: because difference is not that in which genus is through essence, since difference is an act or simple form: but in species genus is present through essence. Furthermore, difference is not in genus except potentially: but species is in genus as in that which contains it: and therefore species is more immediately related to genus according to the notion of species, and difference according to the notion of difference: although in the constitution of species, difference is before species, because species is not constituted from genus unless the power of genus is determined and restricted by difference. For this reason, then, one must deal with species immediately after the treatise on genus: and the intentions of species must be set forth, so that it may be known in what acceptance or significance species is intended among the Philosophers.

But just as we said of genus, that we do not care to place here except those intentions of genus which have some similarity to that significance of genus which exists among the Philosophers: so we do not care to place the intention of species which does not have similarity to the intention of species accepted among the Philosophers. And therefore we do not care for the primitive or derivative species which is considered among the grammarians: but we find species in nature, and in civil affairs, according to which there is a certain similarity to the intention of species which exists among the Philosophers.

Avicenna enim dicit, quod genus uniuscujusque primum essentiale et informe subjectum est: quod primum dicitur, quia in eo est prima potentia et prima inchoatio ad esse rei secundum substantiam et quidditatem ipsius : vel potius ipsum est prima potentia et inchoatio esse rei cujus est genus, et ideo est materia proxima et propria. Materia autem appetit formam, sicut turpe bonum sive pulchrum, ut dicit Aristoteles, in fine primi physicorum. Pulchrum igitur et bonum et divinum, quo determinatur potentialis turpitudo materiæ, forma est ad speciem determiminans.

Et ideo dicitur, quod species dicitur, quæ est uniuscujusque forma et pulchritudo, sive elegantia in commensuratione compositionis corporis et complexionis et staturæ et coloris, per similitudinem ad-

formam naturalem, quæ turpitudinem materiæ terminat ad pulchrum, bonum, et divinum. Sunt autem quædam (sicut in primo *Ethicorum* determinatum est) concomitantia felicitatem in eo qui felix est. Non enim felix est qui specie turpissimus est. Et etiam in civilibus species quæ talis formositas est, hac de causa refertur ad ea quæ maxime felici competunt in potestatibus et honoribus, secundum quod dicimus, quod species Priami Trojani regis (qui forma elegantissima fuit) digna estimperio : quia ex elegantia formæ demonstratur dispositio ad virtutes et ad perfectos actus felicitatis, sicut in signo. Quia sicut dicit Averroes : omnis diversitas quæ est in corpore quoad compositionem membrorum, est ex diversitate potentiarum quæ sunt in anima : et hoc modo etiam species ad intentionem philosophicam de specie habet similitudinem : quia sic dignitas attribuitur vel indignitas his quæ in specie sunt constituta, sicut homo dicitur dignissima creaturarum, bufo autem animal contemnendum. His ergo modis accepta species ad speciem sive speciei intentionem (quæ in philosophia est) habet similitudinem : et ab ista similitudine, ut dicit Avicenna, ad intentionem speciei Philosophorum nomen est translatum.

Secundum autem intentionem quæ est apud Philosophos dicimus speciem describentes, quæ est posita positione ordinis naturæ et participationis sub assignato genere. Dico autem assignatum genus idem quod certum : quia non potest esse species vaga sub genere ad hoc et ad illud genus inclinata : sed individuum vagum potest esse sub specie ad hoc vel illud suppositum inclinatum, sed ad nullum determinatum et distinctum sive discretum. Et hujus causa est : quia genus certum est in ipsa specie quidditate conceptum : propter quod sub genere non potest esse vagum.

For Avicenna says that the genus of each thing is the first essential and unformed subject: which is called first, because in it is the first potentiality and the first inchoation toward the being of the thing according to its substance and quiddity: or rather it itself is the first potentiality and inchoation of the being of the thing of which it is the genus, and therefore it is the proximate and proper matter. But matter desires form, as the base desires the good or the beautiful, as Aristotle says at the end of the first book of the *Physics*. The beautiful, therefore, and the good and the divine, by which the potential baseness of matter is determined, is the form determining it to species.

And therefore it is said that "species" is said of that which is the form and beauty of each thing, or elegance in the commensuration of the composition of the body and of the complexion and stature and color, through a similarity to-

natural form, which terminates the baseness of matter into the beautiful, good, and divine. There are, however, certain things (as determined in the first book of the *Ethics*) that accompany happiness in one who is happy. For he who is most base in species is not happy. And also in civil affairs, species, which is such formosity, is for this reason referred to those things which are most fitting for the happy in powers and honors, according to which we say that the species of Priam, the Trojan king (who was of most elegant form), was worthy of empire: because from the elegance of form, a disposition toward virtues and toward the perfect acts of happiness is demonstrated, as in a sign. Because, as Averroes says: every diversity which is in the body regarding the composition of the members is from the diversity of the powers which are in the soul: and in this way also species has a similarity to the philosophical intention of species: because thus dignity or undignity is attributed to those things which are constituted in species, just as man is said to be the most worthy of creatures, but the toad an animal to be despised. Species accepted in these ways, therefore, has a similarity to the species or the intention of species (which is in philosophy): and from this similarity, as Avicenna says, the name was transferred to the Philosophers' intention of species.

But according to the intention which exists among the Philosophers, we say, describing species, that it is placed in a position of the order of nature and of participation under an assigned genus. And I say assigned genus, meaning the same as certain: because there cannot be a vague species under a genus inclined toward this and toward that genus: but a vague individual can be under a species inclined toward this or that supposit, but determined and distinct or discrete toward none. And the cause of this is: because the certain genus is conceived in the quiddity of the species itself: because of which it cannot be vague under the genus.

Positionem autem ordinis vocamus : quia sicut genus secundum quod genus, dicit superius : ita species secundum quod species, dicit inferius secundum prædicationis et consequentiæ ordinem. Participationis autem positionem vocamus : quia species de necessitate participat genus, et addit supra ipsum differentiam, quæ coarctat in ipsa specie generis potestatem : et ideo sub genere posita est, et contenta ab ipso. Et hoc modo apud Philosophos solemus dicere hominem esse speciem animalis : cum animal ordinis positione et participationis sit genus hominis. Et sic est in aliis quorum essentiæ sunt perfectæ et absolutæ : hoc enim modo album sive albedinem, quæ color albus est, dicimus speciem coloris esse : quia utraque positione, scilicet naturæ ordinis et participationis albedo est sub colore. Hoc etiam modo dicimus triangulum esse speciem figuræ, cum secundum utraque prædicta triangulus sit sub figura. De aliis autem generibus non ponemus exemplum, quia esse non habent absolutum, sed in comparatione ad quædam alia diffiniuntur. Sic ergo species est quæ sub assignato genere posita est.

Dictum autem est in ante habito tractatu, quod genus est cui supponitur species : et sic et genus per speciem, et species per genus diffinitur : et videtur esse circularis diffinitio, et idem notius et ignotius altero, et idem notius et ignotius seipso, quia accidit idem diffiniri per seipsum. Cum enim dicitur, species est quæ sub assignato genere ponitur, species diffinitur per genus. Et si loco generis ponatur diffinitio generis, sicut dicit Aristoteles, tunc species est, quæ ponitur sub eo cui supponitur species : et sic species est in diffinitione speciei : et sic idem diffinitur per seipsum, quod valde videtur esse inconveniens. Idem etiam accidit per illam generis diffinitionem qua-

dictum est, genus est quod de differentibus specie in eo quod quid est prædicatur : si enim tunc loco generis ponatur diffinitio, tunc species est quod supponitur ei cui supponitur species, et quod de differentibus specie in eo quod quid est prædicatur : et sic iterum idem per seipsum diffinitur.

Sed ad hoc dicimus, quod si supra in priori tractatu, *de Genere*, genus per diffinitionem assignantes in diffinitione generis meminerimus speciem, dicentes genus esse per diffinitionem, quod de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid est prædicatur : nunc autem etiam speciem diffinientes dicimus speciem esse id quod est sub genere : nosse ad hujus dubii solutionem oportet, quod genus relativum vere est : est enim genus alicujus genus, et species alicujus species : est enim genus speciei genus, et species generis species :

But we call it a position of order: because just as genus, according to which it is genus, says "superior": so species, according to which it is species, says "inferior" according to the order of predication and consequence. But we call it a position of participation: because species necessarily participates in genus, and adds above it a difference, which narrows the power of the genus in the species itself: and therefore it is placed under the genus, and contained by it. And in this way among the Philosophers we are accustomed to say that man is a species of animal: since animal, by the position of order and participation, is the genus of man. And so it is in other things whose essences are perfect and absolute: for in this way we say that white or whiteness, which is the color white, is a species of color: because by both positions, namely of the order of nature and of participation, whiteness is under color. In this way also we say that a triangle is a species of figure, since according to both the aforesaid, a triangle is under figure. Of other genera, however, we shall not provide an example, because they do not have an absolute being, but are defined in comparison to certain other things. Thus, therefore, species is that which is placed under an assigned genus.

But it was said in the preceding treatise that genus is that to which species is subjected: and thus both genus is defined through species, and species through genus: and it seems to be a circular definition, and the same thing better known and less known than the other, and the same thing better known and less known than itself, because it happens that the same thing is defined through itself. For when it is said, species is that which is placed under an assigned genus, species is defined through genus. And if in place of genus the definition of genus is put, as Aristotle says, then species is that which is placed under that to which species is subjected: and thus species is in the definition of species: and thus the same thing is defined through itself, which seems to be very inconvenient. The same thing also happens through that definition of genus by which-

it was said, genus is that which is predicated of those differing in species in that which they are: for if the definition is then put in place of genus, then species is that which is subjected to that to which species is subjected, and which is predicated of those differing in species in that which they are: and thus again the same thing is defined through itself.

But to this we say that if above, in the prior treatise, *on Genus*, we remember species in assigning genus through a definition, saying that genus is, by definition, that which is predicated of several things differing in species in that which they are: and now also, defining species, we say that species is that which is under genus: it is necessary for the solution of this doubt to know that genus is truly relative: for genus is the genus of something, and species is the species of something: for genus is the genus of species, and species is the species of genus:

et ideo relativorum quæ sunt simul natura, unum diffinitur per reliquum, quorum utrumque dependentiam habet ad alterum : necesse est in utrorumque relativorum rationibus uti nominibus et diffinitionibus utrorumque. Non enim est inconveniens, quod unum relativorum ponatur in diffinitione alterius, et e converso. Quod etiam idem in diffinitione suiipsius si loco nominis positi in diffinitione diffinitio ponatur : quia relativorum esse est hoc ipsum quod est ad aliquid se habere, et quod ad aliud se habet secundum esse quod est : et cum diffinitio dicat esse rei, non potest diffinite sciri res, nisi per id ad quod se habet : et sic oportet utrumque diffiniri per reliquum.

Tripliciter enim relativa considerantur, scilicet in quantum simul sunt natura, et in quantum sunt ad invicem dependentia, et in quantum sunt ea quæ sunt relativa per aliquam relationem quæ in ipsis est causativa. In quantum enim simul sunt natura, oportet necessario, quod una natura sive una forma sit in eis, quæ æqualiter sit in utroque ipsorum : et hæc forma est ipsa relatio, quæ ut via media sumpta est eadem, per terminos autem differens in utroque relativorum : et secundum hoc paternitas et filiatio in medio idem sunt, terminis autem differunt, sicut motus et via quæ est de Thebis usque ad Athenas, et de Athenis ad Thebas : terminis autem differunt, et in patre quidem est paternitas, in filio autem filiatio : et sic est inter genus et speciem et e converso.

Si autem secundum dependentiam unius ad alterum consideretur, non est inconveniens utrumque esse notius et prius, et ignotius et posterius altero. In quantum enim genus dependet per intellectum ad speciem, dicitur genus non suum, sed speciei genus : oportet quod intellectus generis sumatur per speciem, et sic species notior et prior est genere. In quantum autem species non est sua vel absoluta, sed alterius species, et dicitur esse generis species : genus erit prius et notius quam species. Idem autem prius et notius esse reliquo, et e converso non est inconveniens, non secundum idem, sed secundum diversa : habito enim respectu generis ad speciem, species genere notior est. Si autem habetur respectus speciei ad genus, nihil prohibet genus quam species notius esse, et sic utrumque per reliquum diffiniri.

and therefore of relatives which are simultaneously by nature, one is defined through the other, of which both have a dependency on the other: it is necessary in the accounts of both relatives to use the names and definitions of both. For it is not inconvenient that one of the relatives be placed in the definition of the other, and vice versa. This also happens even in the definition of itself, if in place of the name placed in the definition, the definition is placed: because the being of relatives is this very thing which is to be related to something, and which is related to another according to the being which it is: and since the definition says the being of a thing, a thing cannot be known definitely except through that to which it is related: and thus it is necessary that each be defined through the other.

For relatives are considered in three ways, namely in as much as they are simultaneously by nature, and in as much as they are mutually dependent, and in as much as they are those things which are relative through some relation which is causative in them. For in as much as they are simultaneously by nature, it is necessarily required that one nature or one form be in them, which is equally in each of them: and this form is the relation itself, which, taken as a middle way, is the same, but differing by terms in each of the relatives: and according to this, paternity and filiation are the same in the middle, but differ in the terms, like a motion and a way which is from Thebes as far as Athens, and from Athens to Thebes: but they differ in the terms, and in the father indeed there is paternity, while in the son there is filiation: and so it is between genus and species and vice versa.

If, however, it is considered according to the dependency of one on the other, it is not inconvenient for each to be better known and prior, and less known and posterior to the other. For in as much as genus depends through the intellect on species, it is said to be not its own genus, but the genus of the species: it is necessary that the intellect of genus be taken through species, and thus species is better known and prior to genus. In as much, however, as species is not its own or absolute, but the species of another, and is said to be the species of genus: genus will be prior and better known than species. But for the same thing to be prior and better known than the other, and vice versa, is not inconvenient, not according to the same, but according to different respects: for having respect of genus to species, species is better known than genus. If, however, there is respect of species to genus, nothing prohibits genus from being better known than species, and thus each to be defined through the other.

Si autem consideretur id quod est relativum secundum causam quæ relationem inducit, nihil prohibet unum relativorum esse causam alterius, et non e converso : sicut si consideretur persona quæ est pater secundum actum generationis, per quam causa est filii, nihil prohibet patrem causam, et non e converso filium esse causam patris : quia sicut dicit Aristoteles, pater est qui sui aliquid habet in filio : filius autem nihil sui habet in patre. Et hoc modo genus, sive id quod est genus, principium speciei est, per id quod genus est principium speciei, et per id quod genus est in specie differentia-

constitutiva formatum et distinctum. Species autem nihil sui habet in genere per modum illum. Et sic unum diffinitur per reliquum, et non e converso. Et hæc est distinctio Alfarabii et Avicennæ.

Dicendum est ergo secundum eos, quod quædam diffinitio relativorum est sicut demonstrationis medium, et quædam sicut conclusio. Illa enim quæ datur de relativo secundum quod unum est causa alterius et non e converso, est sicut demonstrationis medium, vel sicut demonstratio positione differens. Illa autem qua relativa per se invicem diffiniuntur, est sicut conclusio : quia enim pater generando causa filii est, ex hoc concluditur, quod pater filii pater est, et diffinitur per filium : et quia filius a patre genitus est, inde est, quod filius non suiipsius, sed patris filius est et diffinite non cognoscitur nisi per patrem : et sic est inter genus et speciem, quia ex hoc quod genus principium speciei est, concluditur quod genus non suum, sed speciei genus est: et ex hoc quod species principiata est a genere hoc modo principiationis quo genus mediante differentia determinante et distinguente genus constituat speciem, concluditur quod species non sua, sed generis species est : et sic diffinite non cognoscitur nisi per genus. Hoc igitur modo ea quæ videntur esse inconvenientia, nihil habent de inconvenientia : sunt enim primo simul natura. Secundo modo unum est prius altero. Tertio autem modo utrumque prius alio, et e converso diversis respectibus.

Plurimi autem, et maxime Peripatetici quos hic imitamur, adhuc etiam sic assignant diffinientes speciem, dicentes quod species est quæ ponitur sub genere, et de qua genus in eo quod quid sit prædicatur. Et patet, quod in hac assignatione duo sunt de essentia speciei. Unum quidem secundum quod species principiatur et constituitur a genere : sic enim per determinationem differentiæ constitutivæ species ponitur sub genere et ordine et participatione. Alterum autem est secundum ordinem speciei ad genus, speciem ipsam constituens.

If, however, that which is relative is considered according to the cause which induces the relation, nothing prohibits one of the relatives from being the cause of the other, and not vice versa: just as if the person who is a father is considered according to the act of generation, through which he is the cause of the son, nothing prohibits the father from being the cause, and the son from not being the cause of the father vice versa: because, as Aristotle says, the father is he who has something of himself in the son: but the son has nothing of himself in the father. And in this way genus, or that which is genus, is the principle of species, through that which genus is the principle of species, and through that which genus is in species as-

constitutive form and distinct. But species has nothing of its own in genus in that manner. And thus one is defined through the other, and not vice versa. And this is the distinction of Alfarabi and Avicenna.

It must be said, therefore, according to them, that a certain definition of relatives is like the middle of a demonstration, and a certain one like the conclusion. For that which is given concerning a relative according to which one is the cause of the other and not vice versa, is like the middle of a demonstration, or like a demonstration differing in position. But that by which relatives are mutually defined through each other is like the conclusion: for because the father by generating is the cause of the son, from this it is concluded that the father is the father of the son, and is defined through the son: and because the son has been generated by the father, it is for that reason that the son is not his own, but the son of the father, and is not known definitely except through the father: and thus it is between genus and species, because from the fact that genus is the principle of species, it is concluded that genus is not its own, but the genus of species: and from the fact that species is principled from genus in this mode of principiation by which genus, by the mediation of a determining and distinguishing difference, constitutes species, it is concluded that species is not its own, but the species of genus: and thus it is not known definitely except through genus. In this way, therefore, those things which seem to be inconvenient have nothing of inconvenience: for they are first simultaneously by nature. In the second way one is prior to the other. In the third way, however, each is prior to the other, and vice versa in different respects.

Many, however, and especially the Peripatetics whom we here imitate, also assign it thus, defining species, saying that species is that which is placed under genus, and of which genus is predicated in that which it is. And it is clear that in this assignment two things are of the essence of species. One indeed according to which species is principled and constituted from genus: for thus, through the determination of constitutive difference, species is placed under genus both in order and in participation. The other, however, is according to the order of species to genus, constituting the species itself.

Sic enim genus est, quod prædicatur de specie hoc modo, quod respondetur ad quæstionem quid sit, et non ad quæstionem factam per quale. Cujus ratio jam ante dicta est : quia genus in omni eo in quo est per participationem, est quid, et non quale : est enim primum subjectum differentiis essentialibus determinatum et distinctum ad esse speciei. Subjectum autem quod substat in esse rei non potest esse quale, sed quid : propter quod etiam ipsum commune sic determinatum et distinctum non quale quid dicitur, quamvis non sit hoc aliquid. Ergo causa est, quod duo sunt in assignatione sive diffinitione ejus. Consideratur enim dupliciter, scilicet secundum constitutionem ipsius a genere, et secundum ordinem ad genus constituens quod est ens ratione ipsius : et quia per constitutionem accipit ordinem, ideo oportuit poni in assignatione quod ponitur sub genere : quia ex hoc causatur, quod genus de ipsa in eo quod quid sit prædicatur.

Si autem quis contra hanc assignationem objiciat, quod etiam individuum ponitur sub animali, de quo genus in eo quod quid prædicatur : et sic individuum videtur esse species sic diffinita. Dici potest, quod individuum non ponitur sub genere positione immediata. Species autem immediata positione ponitur sub genere.

Sed tunc objiciunt quidam de individuo generis : hoc enim sub genere ponitur immediate, ut scilicet hoc animal sub animali : non enim hoc animal est mediante specie, quamvis forte hoc animal sit hic homo vel ille. Et sic videtur, quod hoc animal sit species : quod falsum est. Ad hoc autem quidam dicunt, quod est positio ordinis, et est positio participationis. Et quantum ad positionem participationis individuum generis immediate ponitur sub genere : quia non mediante specie participat individuum generis naturam, sed seipso genus participatur ab ipso. Et secundum positionem coordinationis prædicabilium et scibilium dicunt,

quod non ponitur immediate sub genere
nisi species, et individuum per speciem
quod post speciem ordinatur.

Sed hæc solutio non est perfecta : quia
participatio est causa ordinis. In omnibus
enim participantibus et participatis, participatum est superius in ordine prædicabilium, et participans est inferius et subjectum : et ideo si immediatum est in participatione, erit etiam immediatum in ordine.

For thus genus is that which is predicated of species in this way, that it is answered to the question "what it is" (*quid sit*), and not to the question made through "of what sort" (*quale*). The reason for which has already been said before: because genus, in everything in which it is through participation, is "what" (*quid*), and not "of what sort" (*quale*): for it is the first subject determined by essential differences and distinct for the being of the species. But the subject which underlies in the being of a thing cannot be "of what sort," but "what": on account of which also that common thing thus determined and distinct is not called "of what sort somewhat" (*quale quid*), although it is not "this somewhat" (*hoc aliquid*). Therefore the cause is that there are two things in the assignment or definition of it. For it is considered in two ways, namely according to its constitution from genus, and according to the order to the constituting genus which is a being by reason of it: and because through the constitution it receives the order, therefore it was necessary to put in the assignment "that which is placed under genus": because from this it is caused that genus is predicated of it in that which it is.

If, however, anyone should object against this assignment that an individual is also placed under animal, of which genus is predicated in that which it is: and thus an individual seems to be a species thus defined. It can be said that an individual is not placed under genus by immediate position. But species is placed under genus by immediate position.

But then some object concerning the individual of a genus: for this is placed under genus immediately, as for example "this animal" under animal: for "this animal" is not by the mediation of a species, although perhaps "this animal" is this man or that one. And thus it seems that "this animal" is a species: which is false. To this, however, some say that there is a position of order, and there is a position of participation. And as for the position of participation, the individual of a genus is placed immediately under the genus: because the individual of a genus does not participate in the nature by the mediation of a species, but the genus is participated in by it through itself. And according to the position of the coordination of predicables and knowables they say,

that nothing is posited immediately under a genus except a species, and an individual through a species which is ordered after a species.

But this solution is not perfect: because participation is the cause of order. For in all participating and participated things, the participated is superior in the order of predicables, and the participating is inferior and a subject: and therefore if it is immediate in participation, it will also be immediate in order.

Propter quod aliter dici oportet, quod est positio quæ tota principiatur ex genere secundum id quod est in ejus potestate : et sic species ponitur sub genere, ita quod genus est principium suæ positionis. Et est positio quæ non causatur a genere, sed potius ex materia : et hæc est individui positio, et ideo hæc non sic ponitur sub genere, quod genus sit illius positionis principium. Unde cum dicitur, quæ ponitur *sub genere*, illa præpositio *sub* non tantum notat ordinem, sed etiam causam positionis sive principium.

Aliter autem Avicenna hanc impugnat diffinitionem : punctum enim species est quædam : et tamen non ponitur sub genere, nec de ipsa genus prædicatur sicut quantitas, nec prædicatur de puncto in eo quod quid sit. Sed hæc instantia nulla est : quia punctum non est in genere ut species quantitatis, sed potius ut terminus continuationis. Unde quod dicitur, quod punctum species quædam est, falsum est : quia si esset species, esset quantitas, quod est falsum. Hic autem modus speciei translatus est a naturalibus et politicis : quia in physicis dicitur species ex potentia materiæ ad esse determinatum, ut homo et asinus. Et in politicis dicitur species per elegantiam formæ et staturæ et figuræ, dignitati vel indignitati idoneam, sicut in ante habitis dictum est.

Amplius autem sic quoque assignant speciem in philosophia. Species est, quod de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid sit prædicatur. Et sic patet quod hæc assignatio de specie est secundum quod species est prædicatum : anterior autem de ipsa data est in quantum est subjectum. Nec est inconveniens plures ejusdem rei esse assignationes secundum diversa vel diversos modos vel rationes quæ sunt in ipsa : cum tamen una sola sit ejus diffinitio secundum quidditatem et substantiam data, sicut unum est esse et substantia et quidditas.

Because of which it is proper to be said otherwise, that there is a position which is wholly principled from a genus according to that which is in its potency: and thus a species is posited under a genus, so that a genus is the principle of its position. And there is a position which is not caused by a genus, but rather from matter: and this is the position of an individual, and therefore this is not thus posited under a genus, that a genus may be the principle of that position. Whence when it is said, what is posited *under a genus*, that preposition *under* not only notes an order, but also the cause of the position or its principle.

But otherwise Avicenna impugns this definition: for a point is a certain species: and yet it is not posited under a genus, nor is a genus predicated of it just as quantity, nor is it predicated of a point in that what it may be. But this instance is nothing: because a point is not in a genus as a species of quantity, but rather as a term of continuation. Whence what is said, that a point is a certain species, is false: because if it were a species, it would be a quantity, which is false. But this mode of a species is translated from natural and political things: because in Physics a species is said from the potency of matter to a determined being, as a man and an ass. And in politics a species is said through an elegance of form and stature and figure, suitable for dignity or indignity, just as was said in those had before.

But furthermore they also thus assign a species in philosophy. A species is, what is predicated of many differing in number in that what it is. And thus it is evident that this assignation concerning a species is according as a species is a predicate: but the anterior given concerning it is insofar as it is a subject. Nor is it inconvenient that there be many assignations of the same thing according to diverse or diverse modes or reasons which are in it: although nevertheless there may be only one definition of it given according to its quiddity and substance, just as being and substance and quiddity are one.

Dicit autem Avicenna [1] quod cum dicitur, quod
de pluribus differentibus numero prædicatur, intelligendum cum præcisione, ut
addatur differentibus numero solo : et
tunc non tenet quod objicitur de genere,
quia genus de pluribus differentibus numero prædicatur : non enim prædicatur
genus de pluribus solo numero differentibus,
sed etiam de differentibus specie.

Hæc quidem solutio est Avicennæ. Posset tamen (ut videtur) melius dici, quod
id quod prædicatur, prædicatur ut participatum, et quod participatur alio quodam
prius participato, prædicatur per aliud et
non per seipsum. Unde cum individui
participatione non participet immediate
nisi species, de differentibus numero non
prædicatur immediate nisi species. Differentia enim numero non est per differentiam
divisivam, sed per materiam, ut dicit Aristoteles. Talis autem divisio non
est propria generis, sed speciei specialissimæ : et ideo non proprie prædicatur de
differentibus numero solo immediata divisione : non enim genus dividitur et multiplicatur per materiam, sed per differentias secundum formam suam ipsum genus
dividentes.

Patet ergo, quod hæc ultima speciei
assignatio solum convenit speciei specialissimæ, quæ non prædicatur nisi de differentibus numero solo. Aliæ vero assignationes in ante habitis positæ non
sunt speciei specialissimæ, sed etiam specierum non specialissimarum. Hæc sunt
igitur assignationes datæ de intentionibus
speciei.

<!-- cap:1.4.2 --> ### CAPUT II — *De duabus quæstionibus circa prædicta.*

Alfarabius et Avicenna duas hic inducunt quæstiones. Una quidem : quia cum
duæ sint assignationes, una speciei subalternæ, altera speciei specialissimæ, ad quam
illarum nomen speciei prius translatum sit a similitudine ista, qua species dicitur
uniuscujusque forma et speciositas. Altera autem est quæstio : cum duæ sint speciei
diffinitiones, ut dictum est, secundum quam illarum species est universale unum de
quinque universalibus quæ in ante habitis enumerata sunt.

But Avicenna says that when it is said, that it is predicated of many differing in number, it is to be understood with precision, so that it be added differing in number only: and then what is objected concerning a genus does not hold, because a genus is predicated of many differing in number: for a genus is not predicated of many differing in number only, but also of those differing in species.

This indeed is the solution of Avicenna. But nevertheless it could (as it seems) better be said, that that which is predicated, is predicated as a participated thing, and what is participated by some other thing previously participated, is predicated through another and not through itself. Whence since nothing participates immediately by the participation of an individual except a species, nothing is predicated immediately of those differing in number except a species. For a difference in number is not through a divisive difference, but through matter, as Aristotle says. But such a division is not proper to a genus, but to a most special species: and therefore it is not properly predicated of those differing in number only by an immediate division: for a genus is not divided and multiplied through matter, but through differences dividing the genus itself according to its form.

It is evident therefore, that this ultimate assignation of a species only belongs to a most special species, which is not predicated except of those differing in number only. But other assignations posited in those had before are not of a most special species, but also of species not most special. These therefore are the assignations given concerning the intentions of a species.

<!-- cap:1.4.2 --> ### CHAPTER II — *On two questions concerning the foregoing.*

Alfarabi and Avicenna here introduce two questions. One indeed: since there are two assignations, one of the subalternate species, the other of the most special species, [the question is] to which of these the name "species" was first transferred, from that likeness whereby species is said to be the form and beauty of each thing. The other question is: since there are two definitions of species, as has been said, according to which of these the species is that one universal among the five universals which were enumerated in what has gone before.

Et circa solutionem primæ quæstionis dubitationes invenit Avicenna[1], et nescire se fatetur, ad quam primo significandam translatum sit nomen speciei. Species enim subalterna quæ sub assignato ponitur genere, et de qua genus in eo quod quid sit prædicatur, prius occurrit descendentibus, et ab uno quod principium speciei est in multitudinem venientibus : tunc enim subalterna species est, ad quam primo formatur et distinguitur generis potentia. Et sic videtur primo nomen speciei translatum esse ad illam. Adhuc autem id quod primo occurrit intellectui, est genus, et sic per divisionem devenitur ad speciem. Patet autem, quod prius occurrit ea quæ est et genus et species, quam illa quæ est species tantum. Videtur ergo nomen speciei prius translatum esse ad illam.

Ad oppositum autem hujus est, quod formatio potentiæ generis secundum substantialia perfecta non est nisi in specie specialissima : id enim quod est formatum in specie subalterna, adhuc est in potentia ad alteram formam : ergo suæ naturæ plenam non habet speciositatem. Id autem minus transfertur nomen plenæ est speciositatis, ita quod secundum illam rei attribuimus dignitatem secun-

dum felicitatem dictam determinatam. Videtur ergo, quod nomen hoc prius transfertur ad speciem specialissimam, quæ perfectam habet sui generis et potentiæ formationem. Inter has rationes dubitare se dicit Avicenna, quod potissimum dicatur : utrumque enim dicit rationabiliter posse dici secundum inductas rationes.

Sed sine præjudicio dici sipotest, quod cum translationes secundum similitudinem fierit debeant, quod magis proprie et prius transfertur nomen speciei ad speciem specialissimam, quam ad speciem subalternam. Species enim subalterna aliquid habet generis, et aliquid potentiæ, et aliquid privationis : nec tota est deducta ad speciei dignitatem sicut species specialissima. Et quod dicitur, descendentibus prius occurrit species subalterna : nihil facit ad translationem nominis : translatio enim non fit per rationem divisionis : nec etiam per rationem resolutionis, vel etiam compositionis : sed per solam rationem similitudinis. Ratione autem similitudinis planum est, quod prius transfertur ad speciem specialissimam, posterius ad speciem subalternam.

And concerning the solution of the first question Avicenna finds doubts, and confesses that he does not know to which the name "species" was first transferred to signify it. For the subalternate species, which is placed under the assigned genus, and of which the genus is predicated in respect of what it is, occurs first to those who descend, and to those coming from the one which is the principle of the species into multitude: for then the subalternate species is that to which the potency of the genus is first formed and distinguished. And thus it seems that the name "species" was first transferred to that one. Moreover, that which first occurs to the intellect is the genus, and thus through division one arrives at the species. But it is evident that that which is both genus and species occurs before that which is species only. It seems, therefore, that the name "species" was first transferred to that one.

But against this is the fact that the formation of the potency of the genus according to perfect substantial determinations occurs only in the most special species: for that which is formed in a subalternate species is still in potency to another form: therefore it does not have the full beauty proper to its nature. But that to which the name is transferred less is of full beauty, so that according to it we attribute to the thing its dignity,

in keeping with the aforesaid determinate felicity. It seems, therefore, that this name is first transferred to the most special species, which has the perfect formation of its genus and of its potency. Avicenna says that he is in doubt between these reasons as to which should be held the stronger: for he says that either can reasonably be maintained according to the reasons adduced.

But without prejudice it can be said that, since transferences ought to be made according to likeness, the name "species" is more properly and prior transferred to the most special species than to the subalternate species. For the subalternate species has something of genus, and something of potency, and something of privation: nor is it wholly brought to the dignity of species as the most special species is. And as for what is said, that to those descending the subalternate species occurs first: this contributes nothing to the transference of the name: for the transference does not happen by reason of division, nor even by reason of resolution or of composition, but by reason of likeness alone. But by reason of likeness it is plain that the name is transferred first to the most special species, and afterward to the subalternate species.

De secunda autem quæstione dubitare videtur Avicenna, scilicet secundum quam illarum diffinitionum species habeat quod est universale, quamvis valde modica videatur esse ratio dubitationis. Secundum primam enim speciei subalternæ diffinitionem species subjectum est et non prædicatum. Universale autem secundum quod universale est, et est et diffinitur in rationem prædicati et non subjecti. Videtur ergo, quod species per rationem illam qua subjectum est, non habeat quod sit universale : et conceditur fere ab omnibus antiquis.

Quod tamen aliquibus videtur non esse verum : quia scimus quod Aristoteles[2] in *Topicis* docet terminare de omni problemate, non docet formare vel terminare problema de specie : eo quod in

omni problemate subjicitur species, et sic videtur quod species est, subjici habet in problemate et non prædicari.

Adhuc species secundum quod specialissima est, non prædicatur nisi de differentibus numero solo. Quæ autem numero solo differunt, sensibilia singularia sunt, et eorum non potest fieri disciplina. Nec subjecta igitur videntur esse, nec prædicata in disciplina. Cujus signum est, quod scientia de prædicabilibus usque ad illa non descendit, nisi accipiantur ut stantia in natura et specie communi, ut aliquis homo, et aliquis bos. Et sic videtur, quod species per se non prædicatur de individuo, sed per accidens : accidit enim speciei in individuo esse, et sic accidit ei prædicari.

Ad hæc autem et similia videtur, quod omne universale in ratione prædicati habet determinari : universale enim secundum quod universale est, diffinitur quod est in multis et de multis. Non autem est de multis, nisi quia prædicatur de illis. Et ideo species habet quod est universale per diffinitionem illam qua diffinitur ut prædicatum, et non illam qua diffinitur ut subjectum. Quod autem dicitur, quod species subjectum est in problematibus, dicendum, quod verum est hoc : quia problemata non formantur nisi de his quæ insunt speciei vel simpliciter ut accidens, vel ut genus assignatum de specie, vel ut proprium quod fluit de natura speciei, vel ut diffinitio quæ totum dicit esse speciei. Et hac consideratione species non est universale. Est autem universale secundum quod est prædicatum.

Et quod dicitur, quod species specialissima non prædicatur nisi de his quæ differunt numero solo, in quibus speciei accidit esse, dicendum quod non sic accidit speciei esse in individuis, quod sit accidens eis, vel accidens in ipsis : quia, sicut dicit Boetius, species est totum esse individuorum, vel individuorum essentialis similitudo. Et ideo individua possunt dupliciter accipi, scilicet vel ut-

Concerning the second question, however, Avicenna seems to be in doubt, namely as to which of those definitions the species has that by which it is universal, although the reason for doubting seems very slight. For according to the first definition of the subalternate species, the species is a subject and not a predicate. But the universal, insofar as it is universal, both exists and is defined under the nature of a predicate and not of a subject. It seems, therefore, that the species, by that reason by which it is a subject, does not have that it is universal: and this is conceded by almost all the ancients.

Which, however, seems to some not to be true: because we know that Aristotle, in the Topics, teaches how to determine concerning every problem, but does not teach how to form or determine a problem concerning species: because in

every problem the species is subjected, and thus it seems that what is species has to be subjected in a problem and not predicated.

Furthermore, species according to which it is most specific (*specialissima*) is not predicated except of those differing by number alone. But those which differ by number alone are singular sensibles, and of them there can be no discipline. Neither subjects, therefore, nor predicates do they seem to be in discipline. A sign of which is that the science of the predicables does not descend as far as those, unless they are taken as standing in nature and common species, as "some man" and "some ox." And thus it seems that species is not predicated of the individual through itself, but by accident: for it happens to the species to be in the individual, and thus it happens to it to be predicated.

But to these and similar things it seems that every universal has to be determined in the reason of a predicate: for a universal according to which it is a universal is defined as that which is in many and of many. But it is not of many, except because it is predicated of them. And therefore species has that it is a universal through that definition by which it is defined as a predicate, and not that by which it is defined as a subject. But as to what is said, that species is a subject in problems, it must be said that this is true: because problems are not formed except of those things which are in the species either simply as an accident, or as an assigned genus of the species, or as a property which flows from the nature of the species, or as a definition which says the whole being of the species. And in this consideration, species is not a universal. But it is a universal according to which it is a predicate.

And as to what is said, that the most specific species is not predicated except of those which differ by number alone, in which it happens to the species to be, it must be said that it does not so happen to the species to be in individuals that it is an accident to them, or an accident in them: because, as Boethius says, species is the whole being of individuals, or the essential similarity of individuals. And therefore individuals can be taken in two ways, namely either as-

particularia in materia determinata, vel ut res naturæ communis in qua stat : vel in qua stat naturæ fluxus, qui fluxus est naturæ diffusio, et sic individuum sic sumitur, ut aliquis homo : et hoc individuum proprie et per se subjectum est, et est subjectum speciei : et hoc modo primum prædicatum de ipso est species, et secundum quod apta nata est esse in pluribus secundum totum esse substantiale, sic est universale. Et sic diffinitur, quando dicitur, quod species est, quæ prædicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid est. Per hoc autem quod aliud prædicatur de specie cui supponitur, accidit speciei quod sit universale : de quo enim aliud prædicatur, potest esse universale, et potest non esse universale.

Sic ergo dictum est de intentionibus speciei et assignationibus sive diffinitionibus quæ datæ sunt de intentionibus illis. Hoc autem sub compendio colligi potest, ut dicatur, quod secundum vulgarem in physicis vel politicis usum vel consuetudinem species dicitur, quæ est uniuscujusque forma sive formositas, secundum quam intentionem speciei vulgariter dictum est, quod species sive speciositas Priami digna est imperio. Dicitur autem ad hujus aliquam similitudinem species apud Philosophos ea quæ est sub assignato sive certo et determinato genere posita per differentiam constitutivam, quæ generis potestatem determinat et coarctat ad actum ad quem prius fuit in potentia : secundum quam intentionem speciei solemus dicere in philosophia hominem quidem speciem esse animalis, cum sit genus assignatum hominis animal : album sive albedinem solemus dicere coloris speciem esse, cum assignatum genus albedinis sit color. Et secundum quam solemus dicere triangulum esse speciem figuræ, cum figura sit genus assignatum.

Quod si etiam supra in præcedenti tractatu, qui de genere habitus est, genus per diffinitionem assignantes, speciei me-

minimus ponendo speciem in generis diffinitione, quando dicimus, quod genus est quod de differentibus specie prædicatur in eo quod quid sit : et nunc tractando de specie dicimus, quod species est id quod ponitur *sub genere* : et sic genus ponimus in diffinitione speciei : nemo reputet hoc inconveniens. In talibus enim nosse oportet, quoniam et genus non est absolutum, sed relativum : ideo genus alicujus est genus, et species est non absolutum quid, sed species alicujus species est, quia generis.

particulars in determined matter, or as things of common nature in which it stands: or in which the flux of nature stands, which flux is the diffusion of nature, and thus the individual is so taken, as "some man": and this individual is properly and through itself a subject, and is the subject of the species : and in this way the first predicated of it is the species, and according to which it is apt by nature to be in several according to the whole substantial being, so it is a universal. And thus it is defined, when it is said that species is that which is predicated of several differing in number in that which they are. But through the fact that another is predicated of the species to which it is subjected, it happens to the species that it is a universal: for of that which another is predicated, it can be a universal, and it can be not a universal.

Thus, therefore, it has been said of the intentions of species and the assignments or definitions which have been given of those intentions. This, however, can be collected in summary, so that it may be said that according to common use or custom in physics or politics, "species" is said of that which is the form or formosity of each thing, according to which intention of species it is commonly said that the species or speciosity of Priam is worthy of empire. But there is said, by some similarity to this, "species" among the Philosophers as that which is placed under an assigned or certain and determined genus through a constitutive difference, which determines the power of the genus and narrows it to the act to which it was previously in potentiality: according to which intention of species we are accustomed to say in philosophy that man is indeed a species of animal, since animal is the assigned genus of man : white or whiteness we are accustomed to say is a species of color, since the assigned genus of whiteness is color. And according to which we are accustomed to say that a triangle is a species of figure, since figure is the assigned genus.

But if also above in the preceding treatise, which was held concerning genus, assigning genus through a definition, we made mention of species-

ntioned putting species in the definition of genus, when we say that genus is that which is predicated of things differing in species in that which they are: and now treating of species we say that species is that which is placed *under genus*: and thus we put genus in the definition of species: let no one repute this as inconvenient. For in such things it is necessary to know that since genus is not absolute, but relative: therefore the genus of something is a genus, and species is not an absolute something, but the species of something is a species, because it is of a genus.

Et ideo necesse est in utrorumque, scilicet generis et speciei, rationibus diffinitivis utrisque uti : ita quod genus in diffinitione speciei, et species in diffinitione generis ponatur. Assignant ergo Philosophi per diffinitionem prædictas intentiones de specie, etiam sic speciem diffinientes : Species est quæ ponitur sub genere, et de qua genus in eo quod quid est prædicatur : prædicatur enim ut substantia et subjectum in specie, quod differentia constitutiva individuatur et formatur in specie, quod est quid speciei et non quale.

Amplius adhuc ipsi Philosophi sic quoque assignant diffinientes speciem : Species est quæ prædicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid est : et sic est formale quid individuorum, et totum esse ipsorum. Esse enim quod est post speciem in individuis, est et de individuantibus, et non est idem esse simpliciter, quia materia nulli dat esse, nec est proprie de esse : sed est actus essentiæ in eo quod est materia. Et ideo materiæ non est prædicari : quia in ante habitis jam diximus, quod non prædicatur nisi forma : nec etiam forma prædicatur secundum quod forma, sed forma totius : nec adhuc forma totius ut forma totius prædicatur, sed in quantum est notio totius esse vel in potentia vel in actu.

Inter hanc tamen assignationem et prædictam differentia est : quia hæc secunda assignatio est solum speciei specialissimæ : aliæ vero duæ præcedentes conveniunt et speciebus non specialissimis. Quid autem hic dictum sit, non potest sciri, nisi ponatur tota ordinatio prædicabilium in generalissimis et specialissimis et mediis : et ad hoc deinceps attingemus.

CAPUT III.

Qualiter inveniatur species specialissima, et de coordinatione prædicamentali.

CAPUT III — *Qualiter inveniatur species specialissima, et de coordinatione prædicamentali.*

Qua autem arte inveniantur species specialissimæ secundum diversas intentiones, de quibus dictum est, planum et manifestum erit hoc modo. In unoquoque enim prædicamento secundum omnia genera prædicamentorum sunt quædam in supremo secundum totam illius generis prædicabilium coordinationem, quæ dicuntur generalissima : non quia in uno sint plura, quia hoc impossibile est, et id quod per superabundantiam dicitur in uno ordine rerum, non nisi uni soli potest convenire, sed quod in quolibet genere est unum,

And therefore it is necessary in the definitive accounts of both, namely of genus and species, to use both: so that genus is put in the definition of species, and species in the definition of genus. The Philosophers therefore assign through a definition the aforesaid intentions concerning species, also defining species thus: Species is that which is placed under genus, and of which genus is predicated in that which it is: for it is predicated as substance and subject in the species, which by the constitutive difference is individuated and formed in the species, which is the "what" of the species and not "of what sort."

Furthermore, the Philosophers themselves also assign defining species thus: Species is that which is predicated of several differing in number in that which they are: and thus it is the formal "what" of individuals, and their whole being. For the being which is after the species in individuals is also of the individuating [principles], and it is not the same being simply, because matter gives being to none, nor is it properly of being: but it is the act of the essence in that which is matter. And therefore it is not for matter to be predicated: because in the preceding things we have already said that nothing is predicated except form: nor is form even predicated according to which it is form, but the form of the whole: nor yet is the form of the whole predicated as the form of the whole, but in as much as it is the notion of the whole being either in potentiality or in act.

Between this assignment, however, and the aforesaid, there is a difference: because this second assignment is only of the most specific species: the other two preceding ones, indeed, agree also with species that are not the most specific. What, however, has been said here cannot be known unless the whole ordination of the predicables into the most general and most specific and intermediate is set forth: and to this we shall next attain.

CHAPTER III.

How the most specific species is found, and concerning the predicamental coordination.

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By what art most specific species are found according to the various intentions of which it has been said, will be plain and manifest in this way. For in every predicament, according to all the genera of the predicaments, there are certain things in the supreme according to the whole coordination of the predicables of that genus, which are called most general (*generalissima*): not because there are many in one, because this is impossible, and that which is said through superabundance in one order of things can agree with only one alone, but because in every genus there is one,

et in eodem ordine prædicabilium sunt quædam secundum suas communitates et universalitates infima, quæ dicuntur specialissima, et in quolibet sunt plura, propter hoc quia quamvis specialissima in uno et eodem genere prædicabilium necesse est stare in uno, ubi resolvuntur ad unum, non tamen propter hoc secundum viam divisionis et compositionis (quæ ab uno incipit) necesse est, quod divisio stet in uno sicut in infimo : quia divisio multis viis procedit ex uno : et illæ viæ non sunt nisi per diversas formas et oppositas, quæ differentiæ vocantur, quas uniri ad unum est impossibile, et ideo divisio ex uno stat in multis ultimis : et quodlibet illorum est indivisibile secundum formam, non habens sub se commune, et ideo quodlibet illorum est specialissimum.

In tali autem prædicabilium ordine supremum ideo dicitur generalissimum, quia non habet supra se genus superius-

est quæ sub assignato genere ponitur : genus vero est idem corpus corporis animatis sive vivi, cum genus sit cui supponitur species, et in qua genus est secundum partem suæ naturalis potestatis. Omnino autem eodem modo id quod substat tertium in ordine secundum descensum a substantia (quod est corpus animatum sive vivum) est species quidem corporis, cui tanquam generi supponitur : genus vero est animalis, quia sibi animal tanquam assignato generi supponitur.

Animal vero secundum Stoicos species quidem est animati corporis sive vivi : genus vero est animalis rationalis, eo quod non habemus unum nomen, quod id commune significemus, quod continet hominem et Deos : quoniam secundum Stoicos substantiæ incorporeæ sunt animalia, ut dicit Apuleius in lib. de Deo Socratis. Homo vero species quidem est animalis rationalis, quia illi tanquam generi assignato supponitur : genus autem non est alicujus, quia in nullo communi (quod post ipsum sit) est secundum partem suæ naturalis potestatis, sed in quolibet secundum totum esse, et secundum totum esse suæ potestatis. Patet ergo, quod est species animalis rationalis, et non est genus particularium hominum.

Sic ergo patet quod omnia hæc triplicem habent modum et suæ positionis rationem : unum quidem supremum quod non potest esse species, aliud inter communia infimum indivisibile secundum suæ naturæ potestatem, et intermedia quæ respectu superiorum sunt species, respectu inferiorum sunt genera.

and in the same order of predicables there are certain things lowest according to their communities and universalities, which are called most specific (*specialissima*), and in each there are several, because although it is necessary for the most specific in one and the same genus of predicables to stand in one, where they are resolved into one, nevertheless on account of this it is not necessary according to the way of division and composition (which begins from one) that the division stand in one as in the lowest: because division proceeds from one by many ways: and those ways are not except through various and opposite forms, which are called differences, which to be united into one is impossible, and therefore division from one stands in many ultimates: and each of those is indivisible according to form, not having a common thing under itself, and therefore each of those is most specific.

In such an order of predicables, the supreme is therefore called most general, because it does not have above itself a higher genus-

...is that which is placed under an assigned genus: but the same 'body' is the genus of the animate or living body, since a genus is that to which a species is subjected, and in which the genus is according to a part of its natural power. And in exactly the same way, that which stands third in order according to the descent from substance (which is the animate or living body) is indeed a species of 'body', to which it is subjected as to a genus: but it is the genus of 'animal', because 'animal' is subjected to it as to an assigned genus.

Animal, moreover, according to the Stoics, is indeed a species of the animate or living body: but it is the genus of the rational animal, because we do not have a single name to signify that common thing which contains man and the Gods: since according to the Stoics incorporeal substances are animals, as Apuleius says in the book *De Deo Socratis*. Man, however, is indeed a species of rational animal, because he is subjected to it as to an assigned genus: but he is not the genus of anything, because he is not present in any common thing (which might be after him) according to a part of his natural power, but in each thing according to his whole being, and according to the whole being of his power. It is clear, therefore, that he is a species of rational animal, and is not a genus of particular men.

Thus it is clear, therefore, that all these have a threefold mode and rationale of their position: one indeed supreme which cannot be a species, another lowest among the common things, indivisible according to the power of its nature, and the intermediates which with respect to the superiors are species, and with respect to the inferiors are genera.

Comparemus ergo extrema ad invicem, et dicamus, quod quemadmodum substantia cum suprema sit, cum supra eam nihil sit quod possit esse genus ad ipsam, et ideo genus est generalissimum : sic homo quod infimum est in hac ordinis dispositione, est species specialissima, post quam non est alia inferior species ad quam possit esse genus : cum non post hominem sit aliquid eorum communium, quod differentiis oppositis possit dividi, vel in quibus sit secundum partem suæ naturalis potestatis, sed sola individua, quæ individua sunt post hominem : individua enim sunt Socrates, et Plato : quæ indivisibilia sunt, non quidem secundum materiam et quantitatem, sed sunt indivisibilia secundum formam suæ communitatis et secundum potestatem : quia homo remanet in quolibet eorum secundum suum esse totum, et secundum totam suæ naturæ potestatem. Et ideo erit species sola quæ non poterit esse genus, et erit ultima species, in qua stat hujusmodi formalis secundum potestatem divisio, et erit species, ut dictum est, specialissima.

Ea vero quæ sunt in medio istorum extremorum, ad utraque referuntur extrema. Eorum enim quæ sunt supra ipsa in ordine secundum ascensum, sunt species et subjecta secundum illam rationem speciei qua species dicitur, quæ sub assignato genere vere posita est, et de qua genus in eo quod quid est prædicatur. Eorum vero quæ post ipsa sunt in ordine ipsius positionis secundum descensum, erunt genera secundum illam generis diffinitionem, qua dicitur, quod genus est cui supponitur species. Relinquitur ergo ex his, quod illa quidem quæ sunt media, duas habent habitudinum comparationes. Habent enim habitudinem ad priora secundum ascensum, secundum quam habitudinem priorum species esse dicuntur. Habent etiam habitudinem ad posteriora secundum descensum, secundum quam habitudinem posteriorum genera esse dicuntur. In prima enim habitudine sunt in ipsis secundum esse et essentiam sua superiora, et sunt de ratione ipsorum, sicut genera sunt de ratione specierum. In secunda vero habitudine ipsa secundum essentiam suam et secundum suum esse sunt in posterioribus, et sunt de ratione ipsorum, sicut genera sunt de ratione specierum. Et hæc est causa, quod in priori habitudine sunt species, et in secunda habitudine sunt genera.

Attendendum autem est, quod hæc me-

Let us therefore compare the extremes to one another, and say that, just as substance is supreme, since there is nothing above it which could be a genus to it, and therefore it is the most general genus: so man, which is the lowest in this disposition of order, is the most specific species, after which there is no other inferior species to which he could be a genus: since after man there is none of those common things which could be divided by opposed differences, or in which he might be according to a part of his natural power, but only individuals, which individuals are after man: for the individuals are Socrates and Plato: which are indivisible, not indeed according to matter and quantity, but they are indivisible according to the form of their commonality and according to power: because 'man' remains in each of them according to his whole being, and according to the whole power of his nature. And therefore he will be a species alone which cannot be a genus, and he will be the ultimate species, in which such formal division according to power stops, and he will be, as was said, the most specific species.

But those which are in the middle of these extremes are related to both extremes. For of those which are above them in the order according to ascent, they are species and subjects according to that rationale of a species by which a species is called that which is truly placed under an assigned genus, and of which a genus is predicated in respect of what it is. And of those which are after them in the order of their actual position according to descent, they will be genera according to that definition of a genus by which it is said that a genus is that to which a species is subjected. It is concluded from these things, therefore, that those which are intermediates have two relations of habits. For they have a relation to the prior things according to ascent, according to which relation they are said to be species of the prior things. They also have a relation to the posterior things according to descent, according to which relation they are said to be genera of the posterior things. For in the first relation, their superiors are in them according to being and essence, and are of their rational account, just as genera are of the rational account of species. But in the second relation they themselves according to their essence and according to their being are in the posterior things, and are of their rational account, just as genera are of the rational account of species. And this is the reason why in the prior relation they are species, and in the second relation they are genera.

It should be noted, however, that these me-

dia alterius rationis sunt quam media quæ dicuntur per participationem extremorum, sicut in coloribus, et saporibus, et odoribus sunt media: illa enim (quia participatione utriusque extremi media sunt) ab extremis causantur et principiantur. Et ideo secundum naturam posteriorum sunt utrorumque extremorum. Ista autem quia non participatione media sunt, sed ordinis et positionis inter extrema, quia quodlibet medium est in toto medio universaliter, ideo superius quidem causa est et principium medii, et medium principium est et causa posterioris. Et ideo medium natura est posterius superiore, et prius est inferiore. Et medium participat totum superius, et participatur totum ab inferiori, et non participat utrumque extremorum. Nec participat unum extremorum illo modo participationis, quo medii colores vel medii sapores participant extremos colores vel sapores. Sensibilia enim media extrema sua non participant secundum essentias suas totas, et secundum totum esse, sed potius secundum mixtionem quamdam et intentionem et remissionem participant alterum. Sed secundum totam essentiam et secundum totum esse participant alterum suorum extremorum, et secundum totum esse participantur ab altero, sed secundum potestatem totam non participant id quod participant, nec secundum totam potestatem participantur ab eo a quo participantur. Taliter igitur media vocantur, et sic positione et ordine media dicto modo duas habent habitudines.

Extrema vero quæ simpliciter extrema sunt, ita quod non possunt esse media (quæ tantum duo sunt, generalissimum scilicet et specialissimum) unam tantum habent habitudinem. Generalissimum enim (cum supra se habeat nullum genus) eam habitudinem quæ est ad superiora habere non potest, nisi secundum negationem, sicut scilicet quod superius genus non habet. Illa autem sic per negationem dicta habitudo nihil ponit in genere generalissimo: per hanc enim nec est genus nec species : sed potius per eam habitudinem quam habet ad inferiora, habet generis rationem, quia genus est cui supponitur species. Sed per negationem habitudinis ad superiora, non habet quidem generis nec speciei rationem, sed excessum in generalitate. Et per specialitatis negationem, quod scilicet sic genus sit, quod non possit esse species, hoc est, quia superabundantia est, et in termino generalitatem significat: notificari non potest, nisi negatione, quia nihil habet quod affirmetur de ipso: et hoc est propter suam simplicitatis rationem sive perfectionem: et ideo per talem negationem nihil imperfectionis concludi potest de ipso. Adhuc autem sic per negationem notificatum et determinatum est (quamvis negatio secundum se sit infinita et indeterminata) quia negatio per quam determinatur, finitur: quando dicitur, quod ex abundantia simplicitatis et generalitatis et superioritatis superius habere non ponitur.

media of another account are they than the media which are called so through the participation of extremes, as there are media in colors, and savors, and odors: for those (because they are media by the participation of both extremes) are caused and originated by the extremes. And therefore according to the nature of posterior things they belong to both extremes. But these, because they are not media by participation, but of order and position between extremes, because any medium whatever is in the whole medium universally, therefore the superior is indeed the cause and principle of the medium, and the medium is the principle and cause of the posterior. And therefore the medium by nature is posterior to the superior, and prior to the inferior. And the medium participates in the whole superior, and is participated in as a whole by the inferior, and it does not participate in both extremes. Nor does it participate in one of the extremes in that mode of participation by which middle colors or middle savors participate in the extreme colors or savors. For sensible media do not participate in their extremes according to their whole essences and according to their whole being, but rather participate in one or the other according to a certain mixture and intention and remission. But according to the whole essence and according to the whole being they participate in one of their extremes, and according to the whole being they are participated in by the other, but according to the whole power they do not participate in that which they participate in, nor according to the whole power are they participated in by that by which they are participated in. In such a way, therefore, are they called media, and thus as media in position and order in the said manner they have two relations.

But the extremes which are simply extremes, such that they cannot be media (which are only two, namely, the most general and the most specific) have only one relation. For the most general (since it has no genus above itself) cannot have that relation which is towards superiors, except according to negation, namely, as that which does not have a higher genus. But that relation thus stated through negation posits nothing in the most general genus: for through this it is neither genus nor species: but rather through that relation which it has towards inferiors, it has the account of a genus, because a genus is that to which a species is subordinated. But through the negation of the relation towards superiors, it does not indeed have the account of genus nor of species, but an excess in generality. And through the negation of specificity, namely, that it is so a genus that it cannot be a species, that is, because there is an overabundance, and at the limit it signifies generality: it cannot be made known except by negation, because it has nothing that can be affirmed of itself: and this is on account of its account of simplicity or perfection: and therefore through such negation nothing of imperfection can be concluded about it. Furthermore, it is thus notified and determined through negation (although negation according to itself is infinite and indeterminate) because the negation by which it is determined is finished: when it is said that out of an abundance of simplicity and generality and superiority it is not posited to have a superior.

Si quis autem instet et dicat, quod substantia habet superius. Ens enim est ante substantiam per intellectum: quia omnis substantia est ens, sed non omne ens est substantia. Et non potest dici, quod per accidens prædicatur de substantia. Et similiter potest dici de quolibet quod genera transcendit, ut est res, unum, et aliquid. Inferius quidem subtiliter huic satisfaciemus objectioni: hic autem ad præsens sufficiat, quod cum ens prædicatur de substantia, vel res, vel unum, vel aliquid: non prædicatur prædicatione generis, cum non sit una ratione prædicatum de his de quibus prædicatur, sed per prius et posterius: sed talia prædicantur prædicatione principii non generis. Et hoc probat Avicenna et Alfarabius et Algazel et omnes Arabes-

sic. Sequitur enim, si homo est, animal est : et si animal est, corpus animatum sive vivum est : et si vivum est, corpus est : et si corpus est, substantia est, propter intellectum generis in specie. Sed non sequitur, si substantia est, ens est : quia sive sit aliquod, sive non, semper genus sequitur ad speciei positionem : eo quod secundum rationem et naturam genus concipitur in specie : et non potest intelligi species, nisi genus intelligatur in ipsa. Cum autem dicitur ens absolute, non intelligitur nisi ens actu existens : et ideo non sequitur si substantia est, ens est, quia esse ens accidit omni ei quod est : accidit enim omni ei quod actu esse potest. Patet ergo quod cum dicitur, substantia est ens, ens quod prædicatur est idem quod substantia, quia simpliciter ens non est nisi substantia.

Et si dicatur objiciendo contra hoc, quod secundum hoc debet converti consequentia : dicendum est, quod causa ejus quod non convertitur consequentia, non est quod ens genus sit substantiæ, vel communitas generis quæ sit in ente ad substantiam : sed causa illius est, quia est commune secundum prius et posterius dictum, et in hac communitate excedit substantiam : et ideo non convertitur consequentia ab ente ad substantiam. Et quando prædicatur de substantia, non prædicatur essentialiter vel accidentaliter : sed prædicatur ut idem cum substantia, quia ens simpliciter est idem cum substantia. Relinquitur ergo quod supremum quod est generalissimum, unam tantum habet habitudinem secundum quam genus est et vocatur generalissimum : est enim supremum et primum (omnium quæ in illa coordinatione sunt) principium : quoniam ab ipso essentialiter omnia inferiora principiantur.

But if anyone should insist and say that substance has a superior. For Being is before substance according to the intellect: because every substance is a being, but not every being is a substance. And it cannot be said that it is predicated of substance accidentally. And similarly it can be said of anything that transcends the genera, such as 'thing', 'one', and 'something'. Below indeed we shall subtly satisfy this objection: but here for the present let it suffice that when being is predicated of substance, or thing, or one, or something: it is not predicated by the predication of a genus, since it is not predicated by one account of those things of which it is predicated, but according to prior and posterior: but such things are predicated by the predication of a principle, not of a genus. And this Avicenna and Alfarabi and Algazel and all the Arabs prove-

thus. For it follows, if man is, animal is; and if animal is, an animated body or living thing is; and if a living thing is, body is; and if body is, substance is, on account of the understanding of the genus in the species. But it does not follow, if substance is, being is: because whether it be something or not, the genus always follows upon the position of the species: because according to reason and nature the genus is conceived in the species: and the species cannot be understood unless the genus is understood in it. But when 'being' is said absolutely, nothing is understood except being actually existing: and therefore it does not follow if substance is, being is, because to be a being happens to everything that is: for it happens to everything that can be in act. It is clear therefore that when it is said, 'substance is being', the being which is predicated is the same as substance, because simply being is nothing but substance.

And if it be said by objecting against this, that according to this the consequence ought to be converted: it must be said that the cause of the fact that the consequence is not converted is not that being is the genus of substance, or a community of genus which is in being towards substance: but the cause of it is that it is common according to that which is said as prior and posterior, and in this community it exceeds substance: and therefore the consequence is not converted from being to substance. And when it is predicated of substance, it is not predicated essentially or accidentally: but it is predicated as the same with substance, because being simply is the same with substance. It remains, therefore, that the supreme which is most general has only one relation according to which it is a genus and is called most general: for it is the supreme and first principle (of all things that are in that coordination): since from it essentially all inferior things are originated.

E contrario vero specialissimum unam tantum quidem habet habitudinem quæ est ad superiora, secundum quam etiam species dicitur : superiorum enim est species, eo quod sub superioribus est : et ex illa nomen et rationem habet speciei. Eam vero habitudinem (secundum quam aliquibus inferioribus insit ut prædicatum substantiale, quod secundum partem suæ potestatis participetur ab illis) non habet : et secundum hanc habitudinis ad inferiora negationem constituitur in specialitatis abundantia et termino. Et ideo dicitur specialissima per excessum : quamvis enim habeat inferiora quæ sunt individua, non se tamen habet sicut genus ad illa : est enim in quolibet eorum secundum totum esse, et secundum totum suæ potestatis esse : quod generi non convenit, quando suis inferioribus inest. Et ideo secundum habitudinem quam habet ad superiora, species est. Sed species est ad superiora, sicut a superioribus contenta, secundum hoc quod species est, quæ sub assignato ponitur genere. Species autem inferiorum individuorum sicut continens individua : continet autem in hoc, quod adunat ea in forma speciei, quod est totum esse individuorum secundum omnem suæ potestatis perfectionem. Sic ergo in specialissimo sunt tres intellectus se communicantes : ex hoc enim quod superioribus supponitur species, speciei habet intellectum. Ab hoc autem quod ad inferius habitudinem generis non habet, accipit intellectum specialissimi. Ab hoc autem quod perfecte in uno continetur individuo, accipit quod est prædicatum in quid de differentibus solo numero, et eis totum quid, et esse formale totum : esse autem formale ipsorum est substantiale. Hac ergo arte accipienda sunt generalissima, et specialissima, et intermedia etiam in aliis prædicamentis.

CAPUT IV. Qualiter ea quæ dicta sunt ad compendium reducantur.

Capitulariter autem ista ab antiquis tradita sunt dicentibus hic, quod dictum est planum esse hoc modo, quod in unoquoque prædicamento sunt generalissima-

quædam, ita quod non in uno plura, sed in singulis singula. Et rursus in unoquoque sunt quædam alia specialissima. Et inter generalissima et specialissima sunt quædam alia intermedia. Est autem generalissimum quidem, supra quod secundum ordinem superpositionis vel superveniens non est genus. Specialissimum autem, post quod non erit inferior species quæ sibi supponatur ut generi, et in qua sit secundum partem suæ potestatis. Inter generalissimum autem et specialissimum secundum ordinem positionis omnia quæ sunt, genera sunt et species, ad aliud quidem et ad aliud comparata.

On the contrary, however, the most specific indeed has only one relation which is towards superiors, according to which also it is called a species: for it is a species of superiors, because it is under superiors: and from that it has the name and account of species. But that relation (according to which it would be in some inferiors as a substantial predicate, which would be participated in by them according to a part of its power) it does not have: and according to this negation of relation towards inferiors it is constituted in the abundance and limit of specificity. And therefore it is called most specific by excess: for although it has inferiors which are individuals, it does not however relate as a genus to them: for it is in any of them according to the whole being, and according to the whole of its power's being: which does not belong to a genus when it is in its inferiors. And therefore according to the relation which it has towards superiors, it is a species. But it is a species towards superiors, as contained by superiors, according to that which is a species, which is placed under an assigned genus. But it is a species of inferior individuals as containing individuals: and it contains them in this, that it unites them in the form of the species, which is the whole being of individuals according to every perfection of its power. Thus therefore in the most specific there are three understandings communicating with each other: for from the fact that it is subordinated to superiors as a species, it has the understanding of species. But from the fact that it does not have the relation of a genus towards the inferior, it receives the understanding of the most specific. But from the fact that it is perfectly contained in one individual, it receives that which is a predicate in 'what' of those differing only in number, and is to them the whole 'what', and the whole formal being: but their formal being is substantial. By this art, therefore, are to be taken the most general, and the most specific, and the intermediate also in other predicaments.

CHAPTER IV. How those things which have been said may be reduced to a compendium.

Capitularly, however, these things have been handed down by the ancients saying here that what has been said is plain in this way: that in each predicament there are certain most general things-

certain things, so that there are not many in one, but one in each. And again in each one there are certain other most specific things. And between the most general and the most specific there are certain other intermediate things. But the most general is indeed that above which, according to the order of superposition or supervening, there is no genus. But the most specific is that after which there will be no inferior species which is subordinated to it as to a genus, and in which it is according to a part of its power. But between the most general and the most specific, according to the order of position, all things that are, are both genera and species, compared to one thing or to another.

Sic autem hoc quod dictum est, per exemplorum positionem in uno prædicamento substantiæ manifestum est : substantia enim perfectius genus est, et in ipsa exempla sunt magis nota : substantia enim est quid, et ipsa est genus, quia non habet cui ut generi supponatur, ut species fiat : et ideo tantum genus est, et non species. Sub hac autem substantia est corpus, sive substantia corporea. Sub corpore vero sicut sub genere est animatum corpus, sub quo sicut sub genere est animal. Sub animali vero sicut sub genere est animal rationale secundum Stoicos : quamvis Avicenna et Arabes dicant, quod animal rationale est ut genus ad hominem et ad Angelos : quod falsum est, quia Angelus nullo modo proprie est animal, sed dicitur animal aliquando propter vivere secundum intellectum. Et si rationalis Angelus dicitur, æquivoce dicetur rationale quod est differentia hominis : sed propter Stoicos et Epicureos dictum est, qui deos terrestres, sicut Cererem et Æsculapium, et deos infernales, sicut Plutonem et Vulcanum, animalia rationalia esse dicebant. Sub animali autem rationali sicut sub genere est homo : sub homine vero non sicut sub genere, sed sicut sub specie sunt Socrates, et Plato, qui sunt particulares homines.

Sed omnium horum substantia quidem est generalissimum : eo quod genus sit solum, et species esse non possit. Homo vero est specialissimum : eo quod species sit solum, et genus esse non possit. Corpus vero species quidem est substantiæ, cui tanquam generi supponitur : genus vero est corporis animati, quod sibi ut generi supponitur. Et animatum corpus species quidem corporis est, cui ut generi supponitur : genus vero est animalis per eamdem rationem quæ dicta est. Et animal secundum eamdem rationem species est corporis animati : genus autem animalis rationalis. Sed rationale animal eodem ordine species quidem animalis : genus autem hominis. Homo vero species est animalis rationalis : non est autem genus particularium hominum, sed species solum. Id autem quod ad individua proximum est, ut leo, et asinus, et equus, species erit solum et non genus.

Quemadmodum igitur substantia quæ est suprema (eo quod nihil sit genus supra eam) est generalissimum : sic et homo (cum sit species post quam non est alia inferior species, nec aliquid eorum quæ possunt dividi formaliter per oppositas differentias, sed sola individua sunt post eam, individua enim sicut diximus, sunt Socrates, et Plato) species erit sola ultima, in qua stat formalis divisio : erit autem species, ut dictum est, specialissima. Quæ vero sunt in medio extremorum eorum quidem quæ supra ipsa sunt, erunt species : eorum vero quæ post ipsa sunt, erunt genera.

Thus moreover what has been said is manifest through the positioning of examples in the one predicament of substance: for substance is a more perfect genus, and in it the examples are better known: for substance is a 'what', and it itself is a genus, because it does not have that to which it is subordinated as to a genus so that it might become a species: and therefore it is only a genus, and not a species. But under this substance is body, or corporeal substance. But under body, as under a genus, is animated body, under which, as under a genus, is animal. But under animal, as under a genus, is rational animal according to the Stoics: although Avicenna and the Arabs say that rational animal is as a genus towards man and towards the Angels: which is false, because an Angel is in no way properly an animal, but is sometimes called an animal on account of living according to the intellect. And if 'rational' is said of an Angel, that 'rational' which is the difference of man will be said equivocally: but it was said on account of the Stoics and Epicureans, who used to say that the terrestrial gods, such as Ceres and Aesculapius, and the infernal gods, such as Pluto and Vulcan, were rational animals. But under rational animal, as under a genus, is man: but under man, not as under a genus, but as under a species, are Socrates and Plato, who are particular men.

But of all these, substance indeed is the most general: because it is only a genus, and cannot be a species. But man is the most specific: because it is only a species, and cannot be a genus. But body is indeed a species of substance, to which it is subordinated as to a genus: but it is the genus of animated body, which is subordinated to it as to a genus. And animated body is indeed a species of body, to which it is subordinated as to a genus: but it is the genus of animal through the same account which has been said. And animal according to the same account is a species of animated body: but the genus of rational animal. But rational animal in the same order is indeed a species of animal: but the genus of man. But man is a species of rational animal: but it is not a genus of particular men, but only a species. But that which is closest to individuals, such as lion, and ass, and horse, will be only a species and not a genus.

In just the same way therefore that substance which is supreme (because there is no genus above it) is the most general: so also man (since it is a species after which there is no other inferior species, nor anything of those things which can be formally divided by opposite differences, but only individuals are after it, for individuals as we have said are Socrates and Plato) will be the only last species in which formal division stops: but it will be, as has been said, the most specific species. But those things which are in the middle of the extremes, of those which are above them indeed, they will be species: but of those which are after them, they will be genera.

Quare hæc quidem media duas habent habitudines : eam scilicet quæ est ad superiora, secundum quam species eorum dicuntur esse : et eam quæ est ad posteriora, secundum quam eorum genera esse dicuntur. Et sic via naturæ extrema in summo et infimo unam tantum habent habitudinem. Namque generalissimum solum ad ea quæ sibi posteriora sunt, unam solum habet habitudinem, cum secundum illam sit genus omnium posteriorum id quod est supremum. Eam vero habitudinem quæ est ad superiora non-

habet, cum sit supremum et principium primum, ex quo per divisionem omnia alia principiantur : et quod per nomen et rationem est substantia, hoc est, secundum id quod in omnibus est inferioribus. Specialissimum similiter unam habet tantum habitudinem, eam scilicet quæ est ad superiora quorum est species : eo quod supponitur omnibus illis ut generibus. Eam vero quæ est ad inferiora ut ad communia non habet : quia non superponitur communibus. Sed individuorum species dicitur, de quibus prædicatur ut indivisum secundum substantiam et potestatem. Aliter ergo individuorum dicitur species, et aliter superiorum. Dicitur enim species inferiorum quidem in eo quod est esse formale ipsorum eam continens. Species autem dicitur superiorum, sicut quæ ab his (in eo quod per differentias et potestate divisa sunt) continetur.

Et ad hunc modum figura per modum **[Diagram: Arbor Porphyriana]**

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*  **Substantia** (Generalissimum)
  *  *corporea* / *incorporea*
  *  **Corpus**
    *  *animatum* / *inanimatum*
    *  **Corpus animatum**
      *  *sensibile* / *insensibile*
      *  **Animal**
        *  *rationale* / *irrationale*
        *  **animal rationale**
          *  *mortale* / *immortale*
          *  **homo** (Specialissimum)
            *  *Socrates* / *Plato* (Individua)
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arboris scribi consuevit, quæ si secundum esse et essentiam consideratur, radices quibus principiatur, superius habet. Si autem secundum esse actuale consideretur, radices quæ sunt in individuis, habet inferius.

Wherefore these middle things indeed have two relations: namely, that which is towards superiors, according to which they are said to be their species: and that which is towards posteriors, according to which they are said to be their genera. And thus by the way of nature the extremes at the highest and lowest have only one relation. For the most general alone has only one relation towards those things which are posterior to it, since according to that relation that which is supreme is the genus of all posterior things. But that relation which is towards superiors it does not-

has, since it is the supreme and first principle, from which through division all other things are originated: and because through name and reason it is substance, that is, according to that which is in all inferiors. The most special similarly has only one habit, namely that which is towards the superiors of which it is a species: because it is subordinated to all of them as to genera. But that which is towards inferiors as to common things, it does not have: because it is not superimposed on common things. But it is called the species of individuals, of which it is predicated as undivided according to substance and power. Therefore it is called a species of individuals in one way, and of superiors in another. For it is called a species of inferiors indeed in that it is their formal being containing it. But it is called a species of superiors, as that which is contained by them (in that they are divided through differences and power).

And in this manner a figure in the manner of a tree is accustomed to be drawn, **[Diagram: Arbor Porphyriana]**

* **Substance** (Most General)
  * *corporeal* / *incorporeal*
  * **Body**
    * *animated* / *inanimated*
    * **Animated Body**
      * *sensible* / *insensible*
      * **Animal**
        * *rational* / *irrational*
        * **Rational Animal**
          * *mortal* / *immortal*
          * **Man** (Most Special)
            * *Socrates* / *Plato* (Individuals)

which if considered according to being and essence, has the roots by which it is originated, above. But if it is considered according to actual being, it has the roots, which are in individuals, below.

<!-- cap:1.4.5 -->
CAPUT V.
De manifestatione eorum quæ dicta sunt ex consequentibus et similibus.

[Drop Cap] Hæc autem quæ dicta sunt, adhuc manifestabimus per ea quæ sequuntur ad ipsa et similia. Resumentes ergo ea quæ dicta sunt, dicimus, quod ex dictis patet, quod Philosophi determinant generalissimum per hoc quod cum genus sit, non species est : hoc enim sequitur ad hoc, quod id est supremum cui omnia supponuntur : per hoc enim quod omnia supponuntur ei, et prædicatur de eis in quid, sequitur quod sit non subalternum sed generalissimum, quod non potest utique esse species alicujus. Sequitur etiam ex prius habitis, quod non habet sibi superveniens genus : quia si hoc esse posset, jam esset subalternum, et esset species illius generis quod sibi in ordine positionis superveniret, et esset medium, non extremum. Ex quo sequitur ulterius, quod non esset simplex sed compositum, et esset participans aliud et participatum ab alio, et multa alia quæ inconvenientia sunt. Si enim esset subalternum, hoc modo esset subalternum, quia sub altero esset positum. Sequeretur ergo, quod non esset supremum et primum principium, quod est contradictorium ad illud quod de ipso ante probatum est.

Specialissimum vero iidem Philosophi determinant, quod cum sit species, non est nec esse potest genus : est enim secundum utramque suam habitudinem species : secundum enim habitudinem quam habet ad superiora, species est et non genus, quia ipsum est quod supponitur generi, et de quo genus in eo quod quid est prædicatur. Secundum autem habitu-

dinem quam habet ad individua, non dividitur differentiis, ut secundum partem suæ potestatis sit in inferioribus, sed est in quolibet secundum totam suam essentiam, et secundum totam suam potestatem : quod non convenit generi, sed speciei, non in quantum species est, sed in quantum species specialissima, quæ nihil habet sub se nisi individuum, quod solum per materiam est numerabile et non per formam, in eo quod in materia totum esse et posse diffundit forma. Hoc ergo specialissimum cum sit species, nunquam dividitur vel dividi potest in species : quia divisio in species non est nisi generis per differentias formaliter oppositas : non ergo dividitur nisi per materiam. Et quia, ut dicit Aristoteles, divisio est causa numeri, et divisio materiæ est causa numeri materialis : sequitur quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus solo numero materiæ in eo quod quid sit : quia ipsum est quid et quidditas individuorum et totum esse ipsorum.

CHAPTER V.

On the manifestation of those things which have been said from consequents and similars.

[Drop Cap] These things however which have been said, we will further manifest through those things which follow upon them and similars. Resuming therefore those things which have been said, we say, that from what has been said it is clear, that the Philosophers determine the most general through this, that since it is a genus, it is not a species: for this follows upon this, that it is the supreme to which all are subordinated: for through this that all are subordinated to it, and it is predicated of them in quid, it follows that it is not subaltern but most general, which certainly cannot be a species of anything. It also follows from what was previously held, that it does not have a genus supervening to it: because if this could be, it would already be subaltern, and it would be a species of that genus which would supervene to it in the order of position, and it would be a middle, not an extreme. From which it further follows, that it would not be simple but composite, and would be participating in another and participated by another, and many other things which are inconvenient. For if it were subaltern, it would be subaltern in this way, because it would be placed under another. It would follow therefore, that it would not be the supreme and first principle, which is contradictory to that which was proved about it before.

But the most special the same Philosophers determine, that since it is a species, it is not and cannot be a genus: for it is a species according to both its habits: for according to the habit which it has towards superiors, it is a species and not a genus, because it itself is what is subordinated to the genus, and of which the genus is predicated in that which is 'what'. But according to the habit-

relation which it has towards individuals, it is not divided by differences, so as to be in inferiors according to a part of its power, but it is in any of them according to its whole essence, and according to its whole power: which does not belong to a genus, but to a species, not insofar as it is a species, but insofar as it is the most specific species, which has nothing under it except the individual, which is numerable only through matter and not through form, in that the form diffuses the whole being and power in matter. This most specific thing, therefore, since it is a species, is never divided nor can be divided into species: because division into species belongs only to a genus through formally opposite differences: therefore it is not divided except through matter. And because, as Aristotle says, division is the cause of number, and division of matter is the cause of material number: it follows that it is predicated of many differing only in the number of matter in that which is 'what': because it itself is the 'what' and quiddity of individuals and their whole being.

Ea vero omnia quæ sunt secundum ordinem positionis in medio istorum extremorum participantia et participata per substantiam, et per id quod sunt, vocantur quidem subalterna, et simul non secundum idem sunt genera et species : et ideo unumquodque talium simul genus et species esse potest : possunt ergo omnia talia genera esse et species, ad aliud quidem et ad aliud secundum comparationis habitudinem sumpta . Et sic omnia quæ secundum ordinem a specialissimo usque ad generalissimum disposita sunt secundum ascensum ab inferiori ad superius, sive a composito ad simplex, sive a posteriori in prius, secundum naturam et genera dicuntur et species, et dicuntur genera subalterna, et species subalternæ. Genus autem subalternum non dicitur quod sub se habeat genus : quia sic generalissimum esset subalternum, habet enim sub se aliud genus : sed dicitur subalternato genere positum.

Et similiter species specialissima non dicitur non subalterna, propter hoc quod generi non supponatur, generi enim supponitur : sed ideo dicitur non subalterna, quia nulla ei supponitur species communis ; hoc enim sonat nomen subalterni, quod scilicet alternato ordine participato supponatur et participanti supponatur : et quod non habet nisi unum istorum, non est subalternum. Superponitur enim generalissimum omni se participanti, sed alternato ordine nihil participat. Supponitur autem specialissimum omni participato, sed a nullo communi participatur. Et ideo hæc duo non habent alternatum ordinem, et ideo non sunt subalterna.

Attende autem, quod cum dicitur genus subalternum, videtur esse oppositio in adjecto : quia genus ut genus dicit supponere in ordine prædicabilium, et dicit id quod est principium et diffinitivum ejus quod sibi supponitur. Subalternum autem cum dicat id quod in ordine est alternatum, aliquo modo dicit id quod supponitur, et quod est principiatum et diffinitum. Sed hoc facile solvitur, si consideratur qualiter dicitur genus subalternum : genus enim esse habet ex ratione prioris et principii, et superpositionis : sed subalternum esse habet a suppositione alterna in superpositione. Et quia sic generalitas et subalternatio ad diversa referuntur, sequitur quod unum non privat et diminuit rationem alterius.

But all those things which are according to the order of position in the middle of these extremes, participating and participated in through substance, and through that which they are, are indeed called subaltern, and at once, though not according to the same thing, they are genera and species: and therefore each one of such things can be at once genus and species: all such things can therefore be genera and species, taken towards one thing and towards another according to the relation of comparison. And thus all things which are arranged according to order from the most specific up to the most general, according to the ascent from the inferior to the superior, or from the composite to the simple, or from the posterior to the prior, are according to nature called both genera and species, and are called subaltern genera and subaltern species. But a subaltern genus is not called so because it has a genus under itself: because thus the most general would be subaltern, for it has another genus under itself: but it is called so because it is placed as a subordinated genus.

And similarly the most specific species is not called non-subaltern because it is not subordinated to a genus, for it is subordinated to a genus: but it is called non-subaltern because no common species is subordinated to it; for this is what the name 'subaltern' sounds like, namely, that in an alternated order it is subordinated to the participated thing and is subordinated to the participant: and that which has only one of these is not subaltern. For the most general is superposed upon everything participating in it, but in an alternated order it participates in nothing. But the most specific is subordinated to everything participated in, but is participated in by no common thing. And therefore these two do not have an alternated order, and therefore they are not subaltern.

Note moreover that when 'subaltern genus' is said, there seems to be an opposition in the adjunct: because genus as genus means to be superposed in the order of predicables, and means that which is the principle and definitive of that which is subordinated to it. But 'subaltern', since it says that which is alternated in the order, in some way says that which is subordinated, and which is originated and defined. But this is easily solved if it is considered how it is called a subaltern genus: for it has its being a genus from the account of the prior and the principle, and of superposition: but it has its being subaltern from an alternated subordination in superposition. And because thus generality and subalternation refer to different things, it follows that one does not deprive or diminish the account of the other.

Adhuc autem cum dividitur genus per istas differentias, subalternum et non subalternum, pro certo divisio est subjecti in accidens. Accidit enim illi naturæ quæ est genus, quod sit in ordine prædicabilium stans in uno situ, vel quod sit alternata secundum ordinem positionum diversarum. Idem autem intelligendum est de specie subalterna et non subalterna : hoc enim accidit illi naturæ quæ est species : hæc enim nomina subalternum et non subalternum, rationes accidentium positionis in ordine tali prædicabilium-

positionis in ordine tali prædicabilium nominant in natura prædicabilium hujusmodi. Et ideo cum dicitur, prædicabilium quædam sunt secundum prædicationem subalterna, quædam non subalterna, est divisio subjecti in accidentia secundum rei veritatem.

Sed hoc verum est, quod si consideretur causa hujus divisionis et positionis, tunc præintelligitur quædam alia divisio, quæ est, quod natura prædicabilium talium alia est simplex, alia composita : et composita natura quædam est numerabilis et divisibilis per differentias, eo quod est composita ex genere et differentia : quædam autem est numerabilis numero solo, eo quod per differentias ultimas dividi non potest : et hæc divisio est generis in species, quia numerabilis natura per differentias, est genus compositum : numerabilis autem per materiam et non per differentias, est species specialissima.

Nec est aliquo modo dicendum, quod subalternum dicatur vel genus vel species, quod sic subalternari non potest, ut sit subtus et supra : sicut quidam dicunt, quod genus subalternum dicatur, quod est sub alio tantum : et species dicatur quæ super aliud : hæc enim non est ratio subalterni : alternum enim est, quod alternatim supponitur et superponitur, sicut dictum est. Si enim diceretur subalternum in genere, cui superponitur genus, et subalternum in specie, cui supponitur species, sicut quidam dixerunt, esset subalternum alterius et alterius rationis, quod falsum est. Unde subalternum simul ab utroque dicitur, secundum quod alternatim ponitur subtus et supra, potest esse genus et species. Et ideo generalissimum non potest esse subalternum : quia alternare se non potest, ut fiat subtus et subjectum ut species. Et specialissimum non potest esse subalternum, quia subalternare se non potest, ut respectu alicujus communis fiat subjectum et prædicatum.

Subalternorum autem et generalissimorum et specialissimorum quæ non subalternantur, exemplum et similitudo est in familiis, a quibus ut in tractatu generis dictum est, primo logicum genus est transsumptum.

Furthermore, when a genus is divided by these differences, subaltern and non-subaltern, for certain the division is of a subject into an accident. For it happens to that nature which is a genus that it be in the order of predicables standing in one position, or that it be alternated according to the order of diverse positions. The same thing moreover is to be understood concerning subaltern and non-subaltern species: for this happens to that nature which is a species: for these names 'subaltern' and 'non-subaltern' signify the accounts of the accidents of position in such an order of predicables-

of position in such an order of predicables signify within the nature of predicables of this kind. And therefore when it is said that of predicables some are subaltern according to predication, and some are not subaltern, it is a division of a subject into accidents according to the truth of the matter.

But this is true, that if the cause of this division and position is considered, then a certain other division is pre-understood, which is that the nature of such predicables is in one case simple, in another composite: and a certain composite nature is numerable and divisible through differences, because it is composed of genus and difference; but another is numerable by number alone, because it cannot be divided through ultimate differences: and this division is of genus into species, because a nature numerable through differences is a composite genus: but one numerable through matter and not through differences is the most specific species.

Nor is it in any way to be said that 'subaltern' is called either genus or species because it cannot be subalternated so as to be below and above: as some say that a subaltern genus is called so because it is only under another, and species is called so because it is above another; for this is not the account of 'subaltern': for 'alternated' is that which is alternately subordinated and superposed, as has been said. For if 'subaltern' were said in a genus to which a genus is superposed, and 'subaltern' in a species to which a species is subordinated, as some have said, it would be subaltern of one account and of another, which is false. Whence 'subaltern' is said at once of both, according to which it is alternately placed below and above, and it can be genus and species. And therefore the most general cannot be subaltern: because it cannot alternate itself so as to become below and a subject like a species. And the most specific cannot be subaltern, because it cannot subalternate itself so as to become subject and predicate with respect to some common thing.

But of subalterns and of the most general and most specific which are not subalternated, there is an example and likeness in families, from which, as was said in the treatise on genus, the logical genus was first transposed.

Si enim familia Jovis, hoc est quæ a Jove descendit, per domos sive familias distinguatur, dicemus quod Agamemnon sive domus et familia Agamemnonis, quæ ultima et inferior est, reducitur ad Atridem a quo descendit, et ab Atride duxit genus et originem : et sic Atrides genus dat Agamemnoni, Atrides autem duxit genus a Pelopide, et Pelopides genus traxit a Tantalide, Tantalides autem a Jove : quoniam Deus sublimis est et primus in ordine : quare generalissimi locum tenens, eo quod alii non subjiciatur. Jupiter autem deus sublimis ab omnibus antiquis appellabatur : omnes ergo intermedii et patres sunt et filii. In extremis autem Agamemnon filius tantum accipiens et non perfundens genus : Jupiter autem dans et non accipiens in illo ordine ab aliquo. Quia si etiam Jupiter filius Saturni esse dicatur : tamen quia patrem expulit de regno, in dignitate regali et familia regni et gradu honoris priorem non habuit : et ideo familia regalis stat in Jove in supremo, in Agamemnone autem in infimo. Intermedii autem alternatim sunt : et accipientes et dantes familiam ad regnum pertinentem. Et hoc est sicut in generibus subalternatim et non subalternatim positis, sicut ex prædictis manifestum est.

Sed in hoc est dissimilitudo : quia in familiis quidem omnia descendentia plerumque ad unum reducuntur principium. Dico autem plerumque in omni familia quæ ab uno descendit, ad unum principium fit reductio : quando autem ab uno non fit descensus, tunc ad unum reduci non possunt : ut si dicamus, quod in diversis quartis mundi divisa fuerunt hominis principia . Sola enim una terræ quarta nobis nota est, ut probat Ptolemæus in Almagesto, et in hac nostra habitabili omnes familiæ ad Adam reducuntur. In aliis autem quartis si habitabiles-

sunt, alia et alia habuerunt principia. Sed in generibus et speciebus logicis non sic se habet : quia omnia quæ sunt in omnibus generibus et speciebus tam substantiæ quam accidentium non ad aliquid unum (quod sit secundum unam rationem omnium principium) reduci possunt, eo quod ens (ad quod omnes aliquo modo reducuntur) non est commune omnium genus tam generum substantiæ quam generum accidentium. Non enim omnia et substantiæ et accidentia sunt ejusdem generis : sic enim accideret, quod omnia aut essent substantia, aut omnia essent accidentia, eo quod primum genus est quidem omnium aliorum : et unum genus non est principium nisi ejus quod est quidem unius et ejusdem rationis. Tunc ergo unius generis prædicamenta essent omnia tam substantiæ quam accidentia, si sumatur unum genus in illa generis ratione : quemadmodum in *Prædicamentis* dicit Aristoteles, quia scilicet nomine et substantiæ ratione in quid sic prædicatur de his quæ sunt in specie, sicut in genere.

For if the family of Jove, that is, that which descends from Jove, be distinguished through houses or families, we shall say that Agamemnon, or the house and family of Agamemnon, which is the last and inferior, is reduced to Atrides from whom it descends, and from Atrides it drew its genus and origin: and thus Atrides gives genus to Agamemnon, but Atrides drew his genus from Pelops, and Pelops drew his genus from Tantalus, and Tantalus from Jove: since God is sublime and first in the order: wherefore holding the place of the most general, because he is not subjected to another. But Jupiter was called the sublime god by all the ancients: all the intermediates, therefore, are both fathers and sons. But in the extremes, Agamemnon is a son only, receiving and not pouring forth the genus: Jupiter however giving and not receiving from anyone in that order. Because even if Jupiter be said to be the son of Saturn: yet because he expelled his father from the kingdom, in royal dignity and family of the kingdom and grade of honor he had no prior: and therefore the royal family stays in Jupiter at the supreme, but in Agamemnon at the lowest. But the intermediates are alternately: both receiving and giving the family belonging to the kingdom. And this is just as in genera placed subalternately and non-subalternately, as is manifest from what has been said before.

But in this there is a dissimilarity: because in families indeed all descending things are mostly reduced to one principle. But I say 'mostly' in every family that descends from one, there is a reduction to one principle: but when there is not a descent from one, then they cannot be reduced to one: as if we say that in different quarters of the world the principles of man were divided. For only one quarter of the earth is known to us, as Ptolemy proves in the Almagest, and in this habitable [quarter] of ours all families are reduced to Adam. In other quarters, however, if habitable-

they had other and other principles. But in logical genera and species it is not thus: because all things which are in all genera and species as much of substance as of accidents cannot be reduced to some one thing (which would be according to one reason the principle of all), in that being (to which all are in some way reduced) is not the common genus of all as much of genera of substance as of genera of accidents. For not all both substances and accidents are of the same genus: for thus it would happen, that all would either be substance, or all would be accidents, in that the first genus is indeed of all others: and one genus is not the principle except of that which is indeed of one and the same reason. Then therefore all predicaments as much of substance as accidents would be of one genus, if one genus is taken in that reason of a genus: just as Aristotle says in the *Categories*, because namely by name and reason of substance in 'what' thus it is predicated of those which are in a species, as in a genus.

Entia ergo secundum sui diversitatem in diversis generibus posita sunt, sicut in *Prædicamentis* ab Aristotele dictum est. Sunt enim decem genera quasi prima decem principia, quorum unum ad alterum reduci non potest. Et si omnia docet Aristoteles [1] reducere ad substantiam, hæc reductio omnium ad unum non est sicut ad unum genus, sed sicut reductio aliquorum ad unum subjectum : propter quod si quis dicat, quod omnia sunt entia, et quod ens sit commune prædicatum de omnibus, æquivoce, ut inquit Aristoteles, et non univoce omnia entia nuncupabit. Si autem unum commune genus esset omnium hoc ipsum quod dicimus ens, adhuc omnia univoce entia dicerentur, quia genus nomine et ratione prædicatur de his quorum est genus.

Cum enim decem sint principia prima communia et generalissima, si hæc dicuntur entia, erit prædicatio secundum communitatem nominis solum, et non erit communitas secundum rationem diffinitionis, quæ secundum nomen est assignanda. In talibus enim ens simpliciter est substantia, et alia non simpliciter entia sunt, sed sunt entis passiones, ut quantitas mensura entis, qualitas autem non ens simpliciter, sed entis dispositio : et sic de aliis. Tamen quia in talibus respectus est ad unum quod est simpliciter ens, ideo non simpliciter est æquivocum. Quare non omnium ad unum respicientium est idem modus et ratio respiciendi : unum enim est ut mensura, alterum ut dispositio. Ideo quoad hoc est æquivocum. Et ideo totum simul analogum, hoc est, commune secundum proportionem vocatur, quod medium est inter univocum et æquivocum : quod simpliciter, ut dicit Boetius, a casu et fortuna æquivocum est. Et univocum quod simpliciter per unitatem nominis et unitatem diffinitæ rationis est univocum. In tali enim univoco et ad quod multa respiciunt, unum et idem est esse in substantia, et in omnibus quæ respiciunt ad id, est unus modus et una ratio respectus et respiciendi ad ipsum.

Hæc quidem igitur decem quæ sunt prima omnium principia, sunt generalissima, et sunt numero finita denario. In his enim decem stat tanquam in generibus omnium resolutio. Specialissima vero (quæ sunt ante individua proxima, et oppositis non possunt dividi differentiis) sunt in numero quodam certo quidem secundum naturam, non tamen diffinitus et certus est quoad nos. Quod autem secundum naturam certus sit quantum ad hanc intentionem, sufficienter probatur ex hoc, quod nullum genus est cujus potentia sit infinita. Potentia autem generis determinatur ad actum speciei constitutivis differentiis. Constitutivæ ergo differentiæ sunt finitæ : quia aliter finitam generis potentiam non finirent. Ad nu-

Beings therefore according to their diversity are placed in diverse genera, as has been said by Aristotle in the *Categories*. For there are ten genera as if the first ten principles, of which one cannot be reduced to another. And if Aristotle[1] teaches to reduce all things to substance, this reduction of all to one is not as to one genus, but as the reduction of some things to one subject: on account of which if anyone says, that all things are beings, and that being is a common predicate of all, he will name all things beings equivocally, as Aristotle says, and not univocally. But if one common genus of all were this itself which we call being, still all things would be called beings univocally, because a genus is predicated by name and reason of those of which it is a genus.

For since there are ten first common and most general principles, if these are called beings, the predication will be according to the community of name only, and there will not be community according to the reason of definition, which according to the name is to be assigned. For in such things being simply is substance, and the others are not simply beings, but are passions of being, as quantity the measure of being, but quality not being simply, but the disposition of being: and thus of the others. Nevertheless because in such things there is a respect to one which is simply being, therefore it is not simply equivocal. Wherefore not of all respecting to one is there the same mode and reason of respecting: for one is as measure, the other as disposition. Therefore as to this it is equivocal. And therefore the whole together is analogous, that is, called common according to proportion, which is a middle between the univocal and the equivocal: which simply, as Boethius says, is equivocal by chance and fortune. And univocal which is simply univocal through the unity of name and unity of defined reason. For in such a univocal and to which many respect, one and the same is the being in substance, and in all which respect to it, there is one mode and one reason of respect and of respecting to it.

Therefore these indeed ten which are the first principles of all, are most general, and are finite in number by a denary. For in these ten as if in genera rests the resolution of all. But the most special (which are immediately before individuals, and cannot be divided by opposed differences) are in a certain number indeed according to nature, nevertheless it is not defined and certain as to us. But that it is certain according to nature as for this intention, is sufficiently proved from this, that there is no genus whose power is infinite. But the power of a genus is determined to the act of a species by constitutive differences. Constitutive differences therefore are finite: because otherwise they would not finish the finite power of the genus. To the nu-

merum autem finitum differentiarum constitutivarum generis potestatem finientium finitur numerus specierum. Numerus ergo specierum specialissimarum est finitus quoad naturam. Individua autem quæ sunt post specialissima quoad naturæ potestatem sunt infinita : est enim per naturæ potestatem divisibilis materia in infinitum per continuam allationem et ablationem primi generantis et dividentis materiam : oportet ergo, quod potestate materiæ individua sint infinita, et accidens individuans sic vel sic potentia naturæ est infinitum. Quamvis ergo loco et tempore et singula et omnia actu sint finita, tamen naturæ potestate, et divisione materiæ, et individuantis modo sunt infinita. Et ideo nec scientia nec arte comprehensibilia. Propterea Plato præcipit, quod descendens a generalissimis per divisionem, et usque ad specialissima deveniens, quiescat et non ulterius dividat : cujus rationem inducit, quia a generalissimis descendentem oportet ire et descendere per media : quia ab extremo in extremum non venitur nisi per medium, nec sic descendere potest nisi dividendo extremum in media specificis differentiis, ad quarum numerum multiplicatur numerus specierum. Est enim generis essentia numerabilis specificis differentiis, quæ in genere sunt, sicut actus in potentia : infinita autem potentia materiæ. Individua, inquit Plato, relinquenda sunt, quia de ipsis per divisionem certam et determinatam non potest sciri disciplina : et ideo nec scientia nec arte sunt determinabilia.

Totum autem quod in hoc capitulo dictum est, sub compendio colligitur sic, quod Philosophi et maxime Peripatetici determinant describentes, quod generalissimum est, quod cum sit genus, non potest esse species : et ideo non alternatur ratio generis in speciei rationem. Et rursus generalissimum determinant dicentes, quod ipsum est genus supremum, super quod non est aliud superveniens

genus, quia in illo ordine non potest esse aliquid superius supremo. Specialissimum vero e contrario dicunt esse, quod cum sit species, non est genus, nec alternari potest ut generis sumat rationem. Et rursus idem specialissimum determinant, quod cum sit species, nunquam dividitur in species, quia non est essentia numerabilis vel divisibilis per specificas differentias, sed numeratur divisione materiæ. Et ideo specialissimum est, quod de pluribus differentibus numero solo in eo quod quid sit prædicatur. Ea vero genera et species quæ sunt in medio extremorum prædictorum subalterna vocantur genera et species : quia unaquæque et genera esse possunt et species alternatim vel suppositive, quando ad aliud et ad aliud alternatim posita et comparata sunt. Ea vero quæ sunt a specialissimo usque ad generalissimum ascendendo, et genera dicuntur et species.

-ber however being finite of constitutive differences finishing the power of the genus the number of species is finished. The number therefore of the most special species is finite as to nature. But individuals which are after the most special as to the power of nature are infinite: for matter is divisible to infinity through the power of nature through the continuous bringing and taking away of the first generating and dividing matter: it is necessary therefore, that by the power of matter individuals are infinite, and the individuating accident thus or thus by the power of nature is infinite. Although therefore in place and time both single ones and all in act are finite, nevertheless by the power of nature, and the division of matter, and the mode of individuating they are infinite. And therefore comprehensible neither by science nor by art. Therefore Plato commands, that descending from the most general through division, and arriving all the way to the most special, one should rest and not divide further: of which he induces the reason, because it is necessary for one descending from the most general to go and descend through media: because from an extreme into an extreme one does not come except through a medium, neither thus can one descend except by dividing the extreme into media by specific differences, to the number of which the number of species is multiplied. For the essence of a genus is numerable by specific differences, which are in the genus as act in potency: but the potency of matter is infinite. Individuals, says Plato, are to be relinquished, because concerning them through a certain and determinate division discipline cannot be known: and therefore neither by science nor by art are they determinable.

But the whole which has been said in this chapter, is gathered under compendium thus, that the Philosophers and mostly the Peripatetics determine describing, that the most general is, that since it is a genus, it cannot be a species: and therefore the reason of a genus is not alternated into the reason of a species. And again they determine the most general saying, that it itself is the supreme genus, upon which there is not another supervening

genus, because in that order there cannot be anything superior to the supreme. But the most special on the contrary they say to be, that since it is a species, it is not a genus, nor can it be alternated so that it would take the reason of a genus. And again they determine the same most special, that since it is a species, it is never divided into species, because it is not an essence numerable or divisible by specific differences, but is numbered by the division of matter. And therefore it is the most special, which is predicated in that which is a 'what' of many differing in number alone. But those genera and species which are in the middle of the predicted extremes are called subaltern genera and species: because each can be both genera and species alternately or suppositively, when alternately placed and compared to one thing and to another. But those which are by ascending from the most special all the way to the most general, are called both genera and species.

Et dicuntur genera subalterna ut in familiis ab uno descendentibus, in quibus quilibet mediorum et genus dat et sumit, ut Agamemnon, Atrides, Pelopides, et Tantalides, et sic per omnes familias ascendendo usque ad ultimam Jovis familiam, a quo omnes illæ familiæ genus traxerunt, sicut a primo suæ generationis principio.

Sed in hoc dissimile est, quia in familiis plerumque omnia media ad unum reducuntur, quod vere est omnium principium ; verbi gratia ad Jovem primum patrem. In generibus autem et speciebus non sic se habet. Et hoc ideo est, quia non est idem commune genus omnium id commune quod dicitur ens : nec omnia generalissima reducta in ens, sunt ejusdem generis in ente, secundum quod unum genus est sumptum, quemadmodum dicit Aristoteles, debere sumi genus quod secundum unam rationem æque prædicatur de speciebus. Sed posita sunt genera in ente secundum prius et posterius, quemadmodum in Prædicamentis dictum est. Secundum enim illam doctrinam sunt genera generalissima quasi decem prædicabilium principia prima, quæ ulterius ad aliud principium quod sit principium eorum ut genus non reducuntur. Unde si omnia quis entia vocet, ita quod ens prædicetur de quolibet genere, æquivoce, inquit Aristoteles, entia nuncupabit, non univoce. Si enim unum et idem esset genus omnium prædicamentorum, scilicet ipsum ens, univoce dicerentur entia omnia prædicamenta, et univoce et æqualiter susciperent entis prædicationem. Cum enim, ut sæpius dictum est, decem sint prima omnium principia, nec essent principia si supra se haberent aliud principium, patet quod communitas quam habent in ente secundum nomen est solum, et non secundum rationem diffinitionis etiam quæ secundum nomen est : quia si ens una ratione de omnibus prædicaretur, aut omnia essent substantia, aut omnia accidens, quod impossibile est. Hæc ergo quidem sunt generalissima. Specialissima vero in numero sunt quodam quoad naturam finito, non tamen quoad nos in numero definito et certo. Individua autem quæ sunt post specialissima sunt infinita quoad materiæ potestatem. Quapropter usque ad specialissima a generalissimis descendentem jubet Plato quiescere dividendo. Jubet autem Plato descendere per media quæ sunt genera et species dividentem quodlibet illorum immediate generi specificis differentiis. Infinita enim, inquit Plato, relinquenda sunt, neque eorum quæ infinita sunt dicit Plato posse fieri disciplinam.

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CAPUT VI.

De modo veniendi a generalissimo ad specialissima, et e converso.

And they are called subaltern genera as in families descending from one, in which any of the media both gives and takes genus, as Agamemnon, Atrides, Pelopides, and Tantalides, and thus by ascending through all families all the way to the ultimate family of Jupiter, from whom all those families drew their genus, as from the first principle of their generation.

But in this it is dissimilar, because in families mostly all media are reduced to one, which is truly the principle of all; for example to Jupiter the first father. But in genera and species it is not thus. And this is therefore, because that common thing which is called being is not the same common genus of all: nor are all the most general reduced into being, of the same genus in being, according to which one genus is taken, just as Aristotle says, a genus ought to be taken which according to one reason is equally predicated of species. But genera are placed in being according to prior and posterior, as has been said in the *Categories*. For according to that doc-

-trine the most general genera are as if ten first principles of predicables, which further to another principle which would be their principle as a genus are not reduced. Whence if anyone calls all things beings, such that being is predicated of any genus, equivocally, says Aristotle, he will name them beings, not univocally. For if one and the same were the genus of all predicaments, namely being itself, all predicaments would be called beings univocally, and univocally and equally would they receive the predication of being. For since, as has often been said, there are ten first principles of all things, nor would they be principles if they had another principle above themselves, it is clear that the community which they have in being is according to name only, and not according to the reason of definition even that which is according to the name: because if being were predicated of all by one reason, either all would be substance, or all accident, which is impossible. These therefore indeed are the most general. But the most special are in a certain number finite as to nature, not however as to us in a defined and certain number. But individuals which are after the most special are infinite as to the power of matter. On which account Plato orders one descending from the most general all the way to the most special to rest from dividing. But Plato orders to descend through media which are genera and species dividing any of them immediately from the genus by specific differences. For infinite things, says Plato, are to be relinquished, nor of those things which are infinite does Plato say discipline can be made.

CHAPTER VI.

On the mode of coming from the most general to the most special, and conversely.

Quia autem in coordinatione extremorum et mediorum via est veniendi de extremo in extremum per media, oportet tangere qualiter procedit, quid de supremo prædicabili usque ad infimum vadit per media, et qualiter procedit, qui e contrario de infimo per media procedit ad supremum. Dicimus quod qui de supremo per media procedit ad infimum (quod specialissimum vocatur) necesse est, quod descendat a priori secundum naturam in posterius, et sic semper procedat descendendo usque ad prædicabile proximum. Et sic descendentem necesse est ire per multitudinem. Non enim devenitur in posterius, nisi per divisionem superioris. Divisio autem si perfecta sit, omnes partes divisi segregando, semper est causa multitudinis. Ideo enim est perfecta ex parte divisibilis divisio : quoniam per divisionem accipit omnes partes ejus quod est divisibile : propter quod quando corpus accipitur sub substantia, prius intelligere oportet substantiæ divisionem per corpoream et incorpoream substantiam, et tunc una differentia constitutiva conjuncta cum genere accipit corpus, et sic fit descensus per multitudinem, quam totam causat præintellecta et perfecta divisio. Accipere enim unam partem de toto non divisam ex opposito cum alia parte, imperfecta est divisio : non enim explicat perfecte quid partium est in toto.

Et e contrario autem si quis ascendat a specialissimis ad generalissima, necesse est colligere multitudinem in unum, ex quo per divisionem accepta est : resolvit enim sic ascendens et reducit omnia divisa (quæ non nisi per divisionem multa sunt) in unam formam ejus quod divisum est. Et sic ex multis procedit ad unum. Cujus causa est, quia id quod est commune multorum, est propter collectionem hoc modo quo collectio dicitur multorum in unam naturam quæ in eis est adunatio et resolutio. Sic enim multorum quæ divisione materiæ multa sunt collectivum in unam speciei naturam est species : quia una natura speciei in omnibus est individuis ejusdem speciei : non enim sic est in uno, quod non sit in alio : sed cum sit in uno, est etiam in alio per aptitudinem naturæ et formæ,

quamvis non secundum quod est in uno, sit etiam in alio sicut in principio et universalibus dictum est. Magis autem est collectivum et adunativum genus, quam species, in hoc quod plura colligit quam species, etsi etiam species magis secundum intentionem sit una, quam forma generis : minus enim a se distant et magis unum sunt quæ sunt unum in specie, quam ea quæ sunt unum in genere, cum plura uniat in se et colligat genus quam species : unit enim et colligit multas species et omnia quæ in speciebus colliguntur.

But because in the coordination of extremes and media there is a way of coming from extreme into extreme through media, it is necessary to touch upon how he proceeds, who goes from the supreme predicable all the way to the lowest through media, and how he proceeds, who on the contrary proceeds from the lowest through media to the supreme. We say that he who proceeds from the supreme through media to the lowest (which is called the most special) it is necessary, that he descend from the prior according to nature into the posterior, and thus always proceed by descending all the way to the proximate predicable. And thus it is necessary for one descending to go through a multitude. For one does not arrive into the posterior, except through the division of the superior. But if a division is perfect, by segregating all parts of the divided, it is always a cause of multitude. For therefore is a division perfect on the part of the divisible: since through division he takes all parts of that which is divisible: on account of which when body is taken under substance, first it is necessary to understand the division of substance through corporeal and incorporeal substance, and then one constitutive difference conjoined with the genus takes body, and thus the descent is made through a multitude, which whole is caused by the fore-understood and perfect division. For to take one part from the whole not divided from the opposite with the other part, is an imperfect division: for it does not perfectly explicate what is of parts in the whole.

And conversely however if anyone ascends from the most special to the most general, it is necessary to collect the multitude into one, from which through division it was taken: for thus ascending he resolves and reduces all divided things (which are not many except through division) into the one form of that which is divided. And thus from many he proceeds to one. The cause of which is, because that which is common of many, is because of collection in this mode by which collection is called of many into one nature which in them is adunation and resolution. For thus the collective of many which by the division of matter are many into one nature of a species is a species: because one nature of a species is in all individuals of the same species: for it is not thus in one, that it is not in another: but since it is in one, it is also in another through the aptitude of nature and form,

although not according to what is in one, is it also in another as has been said in the principle and the universals. But the genus is more collective and adunative than the species, in this that it collects more than the species, even if the species is more one according to intention than the form of the genus: for those things which are one in species are less distant from one another and more one than those which are one in genus, since the genus unites in itself and collects more than the species: for it unites and collects many species and all things which are collected in the species.

Particularia vero et singularia secundum quod hujusmodi sunt, semper sunt in multitudine : cujus multitudinis causa est divisio materiæ, et ideo per contrarium modum collectionum communis speciei, dividunt id quod est unum in natura in multa, non quidem divisione formæ, sed divisione materiæ, ut dictum est.

Dividitur autem totius universalis divisione, quod divisum per esse dividitur, et per naturam et formam, secundum totam suam essentiam et potentiam est in singulis. Et e contra species multa sicut divisa in unum colligit et unit : participatione enim speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. Non quidem sic, quod iste homo qui est unus homo per materiam, sit plures homines divisi per suas materias et sua supposita : sed quia ipsa participatione unius quod participatur a multis secundum quod ipsum in natura et essentia unum est, plures uniuntur, et unum sunt secundum hunc modum. Et hoc est idem ac si dicatur quod Socrates et Plato et alii singulares homines unum sunt in homine, secundum quod homo dicit naturam speciei prædicatæ de ipsis. Et si sic participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo, non sequitur ex hoc, quod simpliciter plures homines sint unus homo : quia unus homo et plures homines simpliciter dicuntur a materiæ subjectæ pluralitate vel unitate. Econtra vero particularibus sive particulatis per materiam hominibus, unus homo, una natura, et una forma communis omnium efficitur plures homines secundum esse singulare : et per subjectum divisus in omnes, indivisus tamen manens secundum naturam communem et formam et secundum esse universalis. Id enim quod singulare est et determinatum secundum esse et subjectum, semper est divisivum communis sui proximi et determinativum. Quod autem commune est et universale, semper est collectivum et adunativum.

Quamvis autem colligere et adunare sint idem in substantia, differunt tamen secundum rationem. Collectio enim incipit a multis, et terminatur ad unum : adunatio incipit ab uno, et terminatur ad multa, quæ in uno uniuntur. Hoc autem ut melius manifestetur, explanetur in pluribus. Est enim collectio tantum in unum locum continentem, sed non unientem, sicut acervus lapidum dicitur colligi. Et hæc proprie dicuntur nomina collectiva, ut acervus, turba, populus, et alia hujusmodi. In talibus quidem perfecta est collectio, sed imperfecta adunatio. Et ideo talia de suis partibus non prædicantur : quia singuli lapides non sunt acervus, nec singuli homines sunt populus vel turba.

But particulars and singulars insofar as they are of this kind, are always in a multitude: the cause of which multitude is the division of matter, and therefore by a contrary mode of collections of a common species, they divide that which is one in nature into many, not indeed by a division of form, but by a division of matter, as has been said.

But it is divided by the division of a universal whole, because that which is divided is divided through being, and through nature and form, according to its whole essence and power it is in individuals. And on the contrary the species collects and unites many things as if divided into one: for by participation in the species many men are one man. Not indeed thus, that this man who is one man through matter, would be many men divided through their matters and their supposites: but because by that very participation in one which is participated in by many according to what it is in nature and essence as one, many are united, and are one according to this mode. And this is the same as if it were said that Socrates and Plato and other singular men are one in man, according as man says the nature of the species predicated of them. And if thus by participation in the species many men are one man, it does not follow from this, that simply many men are one man: because one man and many men are simply said from the plurality or unity of the subjected matter. On the contrary, however, from men particular or particulated through matter, one man, one nature, and one common form of all is made many men according to singular being: and divided through the subject into all, remaining nevertheless undivided according to the common nature and form and according to universal being. For that which is singular and determined according to being and subject, is always divisive of its proximate common and determinative. But that which is common and universal, is always collective and adunative.

But although to collect and to adunate are the same in substance, nevertheless they differ according to reason. For collection begins from many, and is terminated at one: adunation begins from one, and is terminated at many, which are united in one. But let this, that it may be better manifested, be explained in more [cases]. For collection is only into one containing place, but not uniting, as a heap of stones is said to be collected. And these are properly called collective names, as heap, crowd, people, and others of this kind. In such things indeed the collection is perfect, but the adunation imperfect. And therefore such things are not predicated of their parts: because individual stones are not a heap, nor are individual men a people or a crowd.

Est item collectio multorum ad unum movens et ad unum finem : sicut est collectio exercitus in movente duce, et fine, qui est victoria. Et hæc collectio magis adunat quam antecedens, etiam et hæc non perfectam facit secundum naturam adunationem. Et ideo totum de parte non prædicatur, quia unicus miles non est exercitus, sed quia omnes in movente et fine uniuntur, ideo sequitur quod singuli moventur in singulis et duce, et singuli secundum analogiam suæ operationis perficiunt victoriam.

Est item collectio in unam perfectæ quantitatis figuram, sicut dicuntur fundamentum, et paries, et tectum colligi in-

unam totius integri formam : quia forma non est in partibus divisim, sed simpliciter quidem in partibus conjunctim sumptis, et in qualibet divisim non est nisi secundum quid : ideo ista forma quamvis colligat partes et adunet eas sibi, non tamen prædicatur de partibus omnibus nisi conjunctim, et non de qualibet divisim.

Juxta hanc erit adhuc alia forma, quæ quamvis colligat partes, et aliquo modo uniat, non tamen cuilibet totam suam addit potestatem perfectam, sicut est forma regni, et generaliter totius potestas regni constituitur potestatibus ut partibus, ut est præsidis, palatini, et ducis, et comitis potestas, ex quibus omnibus conficitur regnum. Et hæc forma quæ non unit secundum totam potestatem, iterum de partibus prædicari non potest simpliciter : quia præsidatus non est regnum. Talis enim forma suam potestatem partibus ordinatim communicat, et ideo quælibet pars est aliqua regni potestas, et in talibus verum est, quod quidquid potest inferior, potest et superior, sed non convertitur.

Et secundum modum isti aliquo modo similem, forma naturalis colligit et unit sibi partes materiæ quas terminat. Et ideo de materia vel de partibus materiæ non prædicatur, quia ipsa in potestate partes excedit : et sic animal non est visus, vel auditus, vel aliud hujusmodi, cum potest quod potest visus, et plus, et sic est in omnibus aliis. Est tandem forma quæ perfecte colligit et unit partes, ita quod singulas colligit et unit sibi, ita quod esse ejus in singulis idem est cum esse singulorum, vel non diversum ab ipso, et ideo prædicatur de singulis partibus : et talis forma est generis et speciei et aliorum quæ sunt universalia. Et hoc modo intelligimus hic, quod ascendens a specialissimo ad generalissimum, colligit et adunat multitudinem in unum, et quod commune sit collectivum et adunativum.

There is likewise a collection of many moving towards one and towards one end: such as is the collection of an army in a moving leader, and an end, which is victory. And this collection adunates more than the preceding, even if this also does not make a perfect adunation according to nature. And therefore the whole is not predicated of the part, because a single soldier is not an army, but because all are united in the mover and the end, therefore it follows that individuals are moved in individuals and the leader, and individuals according to the analogy of their operation perfect the victory.

There is likewise a collection into one figure of perfect quantity, as the foundation, and the wall, and the roof are said to be collected into-

one form of an integral whole: because the form is not in the parts dividedly, but simply indeed in the parts taken conjunctly, and in any of them dividedly it is not except according to something: therefore that form although it collects the parts and adunates them to itself, nevertheless it is not predicated of all parts except conjunctly, and not of any of them dividedly.

Next to this there will be yet another form, which although it collects parts, and in some way unites them, nevertheless it does not add its whole perfect power to any of them, such as is the form of a kingdom, and generally the power of a whole kingdom is constituted by powers as parts, as is the power of the governor, the palatine, and the leader, and the count, from all of which the kingdom is made. And this form which does not unite according to the whole power, again cannot be predicated of the parts simply: because the governorship is not the kingdom. For such a form communicates its power to the parts orderly, and therefore any part is some power of the kingdom, and in such things it is true, that whatever the inferior can do, the superior also can, but it is not converted.

And according to a mode in some way similar to this, a natural form collects and unites to itself the parts of matter which it terminates. And therefore it is not predicated of matter or of the parts of matter, because it exceeds the parts in power: and thus an animal is not sight, or hearing, or another thing of this kind, since it can do what sight can do, and more, and thus it is in all others. There is finally a form which perfectly collects and unites parts, so that it collects and unites individual ones to itself, so that its being in individuals is the same as the being of the individuals, or not diverse from it, and therefore it is predicated of individual parts: and such a form is of genus and species and of others which are universals. And in this mode we understand here, that one ascending from the most special to the most general, collects and adunates the multitude into one, and that the common is collective and adunative.

Assignato autem sic genere, et assignata sic specie, quid sit utrumque per definitionem, palam est ex prædictis, quod in omni divisione proxima generis in species, semper genus unum est et plures species in quas dividitur. Semper enim unius et ejusdem generis divisio est in plures species : cujus ratio est, quia differentia non dividit nec habet actum nisi per oppositionem. Nihil autem sibiipsi oppositum est, sed ei opponitur cui contrariatur. Omnis ergo differentia quæ dividit genus, sibi oppositam habet differentiam : et ideo genus conjunctum cum una differentia facit speciem aliam illi oppositam, quia alietas, ut dicit Boetius, causatur ab oppositione : propter quod dicit Aristoteles [1], quod si aliquis in diffinitione aliquid assignaverit pro differentia, considerandum est si oppositum ejus est etiam ejusdem generis differentia. Si enim non est oppositum differentia, nec hoc quod assignavit, fuit vera differentia : genus enim non dividitur nisi per oppositas differentias sive formas quæ sunt differentiæ : oppositæ autem differentiæ conjunctæ cum genere non unum, sed plures species semper constituunt.

Sunt tamen qui contra hoc quod dictum est objiciunt per id quod a principio de universali dictum est, quod scilicet ab aptitudine existendi in pluribus et dicendi de pluribus universale dicatur, et non ab actu : quod scilicet actu sit in pluribus et de pluribus : quia aliter sol non esset universale. Ex hoc enim volunt inferre, quod genus est quod non habet plures species, sed quod aptum natum sit habere plures species. Et sic non oportet genus semper in plures species dividi. Sed ad hoc dicendum, quod non est verum de genere, sed de specie specialissima solum : quia genus non dividitur nisi per ea quæ potestate naturali et substantiali sunt in ipso, et ideo per se dividitur : et oportet quod dividatur in plura quæ actu plura sunt. Species autem non dividitur-

per ea quæ sunt in ipsa : nec dividitur secundum suam substantialem potestatem, sed potius multiplicatur et numeratur quam dividatur per id quod totum substantialiter est extra naturam et essentiam ipsius, scilicet per materiam quæ nihil est formalis essentiæ suæ potestatis. Et ideo accidit speciei esse in ipsa : propter quod sola sufficit aptitudo in specie ut sit apta existere in pluribus, ad hoc quod sit universale, etiamsi actu non sit nisi in uno solo, vel forte in nullo, dummodo sit forma quæ secundum aptitudinem apta nata sit esse in pluribus [1].

But genus having been thus assigned, and species thus assigned, what each is through definition, it is clear from the aforesaid, that in every proximate division of a genus into species, the genus is always one and the species into which it is divided are many. For the division of one and the same genus is always into many species: the reason of which is, because a difference does not divide nor has it an act except through opposition. But nothing is opposed to itself, but it is opposed to that which it is contrary to. Every difference therefore which divides a genus, has a difference opposed to itself: and therefore a genus conjoined with one difference makes another species opposed to that one, because otherness, as Boethius says, is caused by opposition: on account of which Aristotle says, that if someone assigns something for a difference in a definition, it must be considered if its opposite is also a difference of the same genus. For if the opposite is not a difference, neither was that which he assigned a true difference: for a genus is not divided except through opposite differences or forms which are differences: but opposite differences conjoined with a genus always constitute not one, but many species.

There are nevertheless those who object against this which has been said through that which was said from the beginning about the universal, that namely from the aptitude of existing in many and of being said of many a universal is said, and not from the act: that namely it be in many and of many by act: because otherwise the sun would not be a universal. For from this they wish to infer, that a genus is what does not have many species, but what is apt by nature to have many species. And thus it is not necessary for a genus always to be divided into many species. But to this it must be said, that it is not true of a genus, but of the most specific species alone: because a genus is not divided except through those things which are in it by natural and substantial power, and therefore it is divided per se: and it is necessary that it be divided into many things which are many by act. But a species is not divided-

through those things which are in it: nor is it divided according to its substantial power, but rather it is multiplied and numbered than divided through that which as a whole substantially is outside its nature and essence, namely through matter which is nothing of the formal essence of its power. And therefore it happens to a species to be in it: on account of which only aptitude suffices in a species so that it may be apt to exist in many, for this that it be a universal, even if in act it is not except in one alone, or perhaps in none, provided it is a form which according to aptitude is born apt to be in many[1].

Est ergo sciendum, quod genus non est, quod non habet pluries species. Unde si ponamus non esse aliquam speciem animalis nisi hominem, tunc quidem sequitur, si homo est, animal est : sed non sequitur, quod animal sit genus propter causam quæ dicta est. In specie autem specialissima sola quidem, ut dictum est, sufficit aptitudo ad hoc quod sit universale secundum aptitudinem. Si autem hæc aptitudo ad actum reduci debeat, oportet quod actu sit in pluribus et de pluribus : et non solum est universale secundum actum, sed secundum aptitudinem solam. In his autem in quibus aptitudo ad actum reducitur, per divisionem materiæ ad actum reducitur, sicut dictum est : quia naturæ aptitudo ad plura, non est ad tot, quin possit esse ad plura : ideo continue sic in infinitum potest reduci ad actum.

In omni autem tali prædicabilium coordinatione genus quidem substantialiter et universaliter de specie prædicatur, et omnia superiora de inferioribus substantialiter et universaliter prædicantur : species autem sive subalterna sit, sive specialissima, neque prædicatur substantialiter et universaliter de proximo superiori sibi genere, neque prædicatur de superioribus sibi generibus non proximis, sed per medium sibi conjunctis. Hujus autem causa est : quia inter talia superiora de inferioribus prædicata substantialiter et universaliter prædicatio non convertitur, eo quod prædicatum in plus est quam subjectum. Unde non sequitur, si homo substantialiter et universaliter est animal, quod animal substantialiter et universaliter sit homo : est enim aliquod animal quod non est homo, ut asinus, vel leo : animal enim quamvis de intellectu sit hominis (et ideo necesse sit prædicari de ipso) non tamen e converso homo est de intellectu animalis : propter quod animal sine homine esse potest.

In omni autem ordinata prædicatione (in qua secundum naturalem ordinem prædicabilium unum de altero prædicatur) oportet æqua sive paria de æquis, sive paribus prædicari, sicut prædicatio convertibilium, sicut omne hinnibile est equus, et omnis equus est hinnibilis. In talibus enim subjectum est conversum prædicati : et ideo nec prædicatum relinquit subjectum, nec subjectum relinquit prædicatum. Aut oportet majora de minoribus prædicari : et in talibus prædicatum est de ratione subjecti : et ideo subjectum nunquam relinquit prædicatum, quamvis prædicatum possit relinquere subjectum : et talis prædicatio est ut quando animal de homine prædicatur sine conversione.

It is therefore to be known, that a genus is not that, which does not have many species. Whence if we posit there is not any species of animal except man, then indeed it follows, if man is, animal is: but it does not follow, that animal is a genus because of the cause which has been said. But in the most special species alone indeed, as has been said, aptitude suffices for this that it be a universal according to aptitude. But if this aptitude ought to be reduced to act, it is necessary that in act it be in many and of many: and not only is it a universal according to act, but according to aptitude alone. But in those things in which aptitude is reduced to act, through the division of matter it is reduced to act, as has been said: because the aptitude of nature to many, is not to so many, that it could not be to more: therefore continuously thus it can be reduced to act into infinity.

But in every such coordination of predicables a genus indeed substantially and universally is predicated of a species, and all superiors of inferiors substantially and universally are predicated: but a species whether it be subaltern, or most special, neither is predicated substantially and universally of the genus proximate superior to it, nor is it predicated of genera superior to it not proximate, but conjoined to it through a medium. But the cause of this is: because between such superiors predicated of inferiors substantially and universally the predication is not converted, in that the predicate is in more than the subject. Whence it does not follow, if man substantially and universally is an animal, that an animal substantially and universally is a man: for there is some animal which is not a man, as a donkey, or a lion: for animal although it is of the intellect of man (and therefore it is necessary to be predicated of him) nevertheless conversely man is not of the intellect of animal: because of which animal can be without man.

But in every ordinate predication (in which according to the natural order of predicables one is predicated of another) it is necessary for equals or peers to be predicated of equals, or peers, as the predication of convertibles, as every whinnying thing is a horse, and every horse is a whinnying thing. For in such things the subject is the converse of the predicate: and therefore neither does the predicate relinquish the subject, nor does the subject relinquish the predicate. Or it is necessary for greater things to be predicated of lesser: and in such things the predicate is of the reason of the subject: and therefore the subject never relinquishes the predicate, although the predicate can relinquish the subject: and such predication is as when animal is predicated of man without conversion.

Et si instet aliquis, quod homo de animali prædicatur, cum dicitur, aliquod animal est homo, vel hoc animal est hic homo. Nulla est instantia : quia hæc prædicatio non est substantialis et secundum ordinem prædicabilium, quia per accidens : accidit enim animali hoc animal esse quod est homo vel hic homo. Minora vero de majoribus secundum hunc modum prædicationis minime prædicantur : neque enim animal universaliter dicis esse hominem, quemadmodum hominem universaliter et substantialiter dicis esse animal [2].

Secundum autem totam coordinatio-

nem prædicabilium de quibuscumque species prædicatur sive subalterna sive specialissima, de omnibus eisdem prædicabitur universaliter et illius speciei genus, et illius generis genus, et sic usque ad generalissimum, quod ultimum in ascendendo, et primum in descendendo prædicatum est in illa prædicamentorum coordinatione. Cujus exemplum est, quod si verum est Socratem esse hominem, hominem autem animal, animal vero substantiam : verum est, quod et Socrates est homo, et quod Socrates est substantia : semper enim et substantialiter et universaliter in tali coordinatione superiora de inferioribus prædicantur et de individuo. Generalissimum autem et de genere sibi proximo sub eo posito prædicabitur, et de generibus omnibus inferioribus, si plura sint media subalterna inter ipsum et specialissimum : et prædicatur de specie specialissima, et de individuis quæ sub ipsa sunt.

Attende autem, quod sicut dictum est, forma quæ prædicatur, non prædicatur nisi sit notior, et nomen totius esse rei. Esse autem rei totum vel est in potentia remota, et sic nominatur per generalissimum : vel in potentia propinqua, et sic nominatur genere subalterno : vel in potentia propinquissima, et sic vocatur genere immediato : vel est in actu, et sic nominatur nomine speciei. De prædicatione autem differentiæ, proprii, et accidentis, inferius pertractabitur. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod non est vivens et animal, nec animal et homo simul. Talis ergo modus prædicandi concluditur ex eo qui dictus prædicabilium ordine.

Hæc autem quæ dicta sunt, in compendio dicuntur sic, quod descendentibus ad specialissima necesse est ire per multitudinem specierum dividendo genus oppositis differentiis. Ascendentibus autem a specialissimis ad generalissima necesse est colligere multitudinem in unam generis divisi naturam. Collectivum enim in unam communem naturam species est, et magis collectivum multorum est id

And if anyone insists, that man is predicated of animal, when it is said, some animal is man, or this animal is this man. There is no instance: because this predication is not substantial and according to the order of predicables, because it is by accident: for it happens to an animal to be this animal which is a man or this man. But lesser things of greater things according to this mode of predication are least predicated: for neither do you say animal universally to be man, just as you say man universally and substantially to be animal[2].

But according to the whole coordinatio-

-dination of predicables of whatever things a species is predicated whether subaltern or most special, of all the same things will be predicated universally both the genus of that species, and the genus of that genus, and thus all the way to the most general, which is the ultimate in ascending, and the first in descending predicated in that coordination of predicables. The example of which is, that if it is true for Socrates to be man, and man animal, but animal substance: it is true, that both Socrates is man, and that Socrates is substance: for always both substantially and universally in such a coordination superiors are predicated of inferiors and of the individual. And the most general will be predicated both of the genus proximate to it posited under it, and of all inferior genera, if there are many subaltern media between it and the most special: and it is predicated of the most special species, and of the individuals which are under it.

But attend, that as has been said, the form which is predicated, is not predicated unless it be more known, and the name of the whole being of the thing. But the whole being of a thing is either in remote potency, and thus it is named by the most general: or in proximate potency, and thus it is named by a subaltern genus: or in the most proximate potency, and thus it is called by an immediate genus: or it is in act, and thus it is named by the name of a species. But concerning the predication of difference, property, and accident, it will be treated below. And therefore Aristotle says that it is not living and animal, nor animal and man at the same time. Therefore such a mode of predicating is concluded from that which is called the order of predicables.

But these things which have been said, are said in compendium thus, that for those descending to the most special it is necessary to go through a multitude of species by dividing a genus by opposed differences. But for those ascending from the most special to the most general it is necessary to collect the multitude into one nature of the divided genus. For a species is collective into one common nature, and more collective of many is that

quod est genus : particularia vero et singularia semper in multitudine existentia, e contrario dividunt in multitudinem id quod est unum commune : et sic participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. Particularibus autem sic speciem dividentibus, et in multitudinem distrahentibus, unus et communis homo est plures homines : divisivum enim semper communis est id quod est singulare : collectivum autem et adunativum plurium in unum est id quod commune est.

Assignato autem sic genere et specie per diffinitivam rationem quid sit utrumque ipsorum, et genere quidem uno existente, speciebus vero pluribus per divisionem oppositarum differentiarum, semper erit in plures species divisio generis per causam superius assignatam. Genus quidem in tali ordine semper universaliter et substantialiter de specie prædicatur, et omnia superiora de inferioribus. Species autem nec prædicatur de proximo sibi superiori genere, neque de superioribus non immediate conjunctis : nec enim talis prædicatio convertitur qua genus de specie prædicatur. In omni enim substantiali ordinata prædicatione oportet aut æqualia de æquis prædicari, ut hinnibile de equo : aut oportet prædicari majora, hoc est, communiora de minoribus, ut animal prædicatur de homine, cum animal in plus sit quam homo. Minora vero de majoribus secundum hunc modum prædicabilium minime prædicantur, nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Nec enim animal universaliter dicis et prædicas hominem esse, quemadmodum hominem universaliter dicis esse animal.

De quibus autem species universaliter et substantialiter prædicatur, de his necessario et speciei genus prædicabitur, et generis genus usque ad generalissima. Si enim exempli gratia verum est dicere Socratem esse hominem, hominem autem animal, animal autem substantiam : verum est et Socratem animal dicere atque substantiam. Semper ergo naturaliter superiora de inferioribus prædicantur. Spe-

cies quidem substantialiter de individuis prædicatur. Genus autem prædicatur de specie et de individuo. Generalissimum autem prædicabitur et de genere subalterno et de generibus omnibus, si plura sint media et subalterna inter specialissimum et generalissimum : prædicabitur autem de specie specialissima et de individuis secundum totam hujusmodi prædicabilium coordinationem. Sic enim in omnibus verum est, quod quando alterum de altero prædicatur ut de subjecto, in quo specialiter per intellectum concipitur : quæcumque substantialiter de prædicato prædicantur, omnia prædicari de subjecto sit necesse. Et negative similiter quæcumque universaliter negantur de prædicato, necesse est illa etiam negari de subjecto : animal enim cum non sit lapis, necesse est etiam hominem lapidem non esse.

<!-- cap:1.4.7 -->
CAPUT VII.

De modo prædicabilium quæ prædicantur.

which is a genus: but particulars and singulars always existing in multitude, on the contrary divide into a multitude that which is one common: and thus by the participation of a species many men are one man. But by particulars thus dividing a species, and distracting it into multitude, one and common man is many men: for always divisive of a common is that which is singular: but collective and adunative of many into one is that which is common.

A genus and species being designated thus through definitional reason what each of them is, and the genus indeed being one, but the species many through the division of opposed differences, always there will be a division of a genus into many species through the cause designated above. A genus indeed in such an order always universally and substantially is predicated of a species, and all superiors of inferiors. But a species neither is predicated of the proximate superior genus to it, nor of the superiors not immediately conjoined: for neither is such predication converted by which a genus is predicated of a species. For in every substantial ordinate predication it is necessary for either equals from equals to be predicated, as whinnying of horse: or it is necessary for greater things to be predicated, that is, more common things of lesser things, as animal is predicated of man, since animal is in more than man. But lesser things of greater things according to this mode of predicables are least predicated, unless by accident, as has been said. For neither do you say and predicate animal universally to be man, just as you say man universally to be animal.

But of whatever things a species universally and substantially is predicated, of these necessarily both the genus of the species will be predicated, and the genus of the genus all the way to the most general. For if for example's sake it is true to say Socrates to be man, but man animal, but animal substance: it is true both to say Socrates animal and substance. Always therefore naturally superiors are predicated of inferiors. Spe-

-cies indeed substantially is predicated of individuals. But a genus is predicated of a species and of an individual. But the most general will be predicated both of a subaltern genus and of all genera, if there are many media and subalterns between the most special and the most general: but it will be predicated of the most special species and of individuals according to the whole coordination of predicables of this kind. For thus in all things it is true, that when one is predicated of another as of a subject, in which it is specially conceived through the intellect: whatever things are substantially predicated of the predicate, it is necessary for all to be predicated of the subject. And negatively similarly whatever things are universally denied of a predicate, it is necessary for those also to be denied of the subject: for animal since it is not stone, it is necessary also that man is not stone.

CHAPTER VII.

On the mode of predicables which are predicated.

Ex omnibus autem quæ dicta sunt, constat quod generalissimum dicimus prædicari de omnibus quæ sub ipso recto ponuntur ordine tam generibus quam speciebus et individuis. Genus enim quodlibet quod est immediate ante specialissimum, prædicatur de omnibus specialissimis, ut animal de homine et de asino et leone et speciebus aliis : prædicatur etiam et de individuis illarum specierum per hoc quod essentialiter est in illis et de illis. Id autem quod sic est species, quod solum species est, et non genus, quod est species specialissima, non prædicatur per se nisi de individuis. Individuum autem quod est certum, non prædicatur, nisi de uno solo discreto et signato, illa prædicatione quæ in antehabitis determinata est: quamvis individuum vagum de pluribus prædicetur, hoc est, prædicatione speciei, et non individui, ut dictum est. Individuum enim quod discernitur ab aliis sub eodem communi positis particularibus, dupliciter formatur : substantia enim formatur per accidentia quæ signa sunt talis discretionis, quæ in proprio nomine importantur, ut cum dicitur Socrates. Quia autem accidens non individuatur nisi per substantiam, ideo individuum accidentium per demonstrationem ad rem stantem sub accidente designatur, sicut hoc album, et hoc veniens, ut accidens tam sine tempore et motu, quam cum tempore et motu designetur. Discernitur etiam aliud per circumlocutionem, ut discretio Socratis designatur per generantem, vel locum generationis, ut cum dicitur Sophronici filius, si solus Socrates sit ejus filius : a generante enim principaliter trahit originem, quia hic generat hunc dictum : et in talibus aliquando ad majorem discretionem notandam mutamus appellationes dicendo Sophronici filium, notantes quod sub hac appellatione magis discrete noscitur, quam sub appellatione Socratis.

Individua enim dicuntur hujusmodi primæ substantiæ propter hoc, quod quantum ad discretionem non quantum ad substantiam unum quodque eorum divisim consistit ex proprietatibus, quarum earumdem in numero collectio nunquam erit in alio aliquo. Quæ (ut dicit Boetius) sunt septem, scilicet propria forma, propria figura, propria parentela secundum quam per hanc vel illam seminis decisionem a parentibus descendit, propria nominatio a proprio accidente imposita, propria patria secundum quod patria centrum dicitur nativitatis in quo respexit periodus circuli cælestis in nativitate, proprium tempus, proprius locus omnia hæc continens : hæc enim abstrahi ab hac re non possunt quia per hoc et hic et nunc. Quamvis enim hæc materia sit formæ particularis et individuationis principium et individui pars substantialis : tamen hæc accidentia quamvis non componant substantiam singularem, sunt facientia ad notitiam suæ discretionis, et si individuum non ut particularis substantia, sed ut discretum, et discrete nomen designe-

But from all things which have been said, it is established that we say the most general is predicated of all things which are posited under it in a straight order as much of genera as of species and individuals. For whatever genus which is immediately before the most special, is predicated of all the most special things, as animal of man and of donkey and lion and other species: it is also predicated both of the individuals of those species through this that it is essentially in them and of them. But that which is thus a species, that is only a species, and not a genus, which is the most special species, is not predicated through itself except of individuals. But an individual which is certain, is not predicated, except of one alone discrete and designated, by that predication which was determined beforehand: although a vague individual might be predicated of many, that is, by the predication of a species, and not of an individual, as has been said. For an individual which is discerned from other particulars posited under the same common, is formed in a twofold way: for substance is formed through accidents which are signs of such discretion, which are imported in a proper name, as when it is said Socrates. But because an accident is not individuated except through substance, therefore an individual of accidents is designated through demonstration to the thing standing under the accident, as this white thing, and this coming thing, so that the accident may be designated as much without time and motion, as with time and motion. Another is also discerned through circumlocution, as the discretion of Socrates is designated through his generator, or the place of generation, as when it is said son of Sophroniscus, if Socrates alone be his son: for from the generator principally he draws his origin, because this one generates this said one: and in such things sometimes to note a greater discretion we change appellations by saying son of Sophroniscus, noting that under this appellation he is more discretely known, than under the appellation Socrates.

For such first substances are called individuals on account of this, that as to discretion not as to substance every single one of them dividedly consists of properties, of which the same collection in number never will be in any other. Which (as Boethius says) are seven, namely proper form, proper figure, proper parentage according to which through this or that decision of seed he descended from parents, proper naming imposed from a proper accident, proper fatherland according to which the fatherland is called the center of nativity in which the period of the celestial circle looked in nativity, proper time, proper place containing all these things: for these cannot be abstracted from this thing because through this both here and now. For although this matter is the principle of particular form and of individuation and a substantial part of an individual: nevertheless these accidents although they do not compose a singular substance, are making toward the notice of its discretion, and if the individual not as a particular substance, but as discrete, and discretely the name designe-

tur : tunc accidentia sunt nomina in ratione concepta, et de essentia individui sic designati : quamvis non sint aliqua pars particularis substantiæ secundum quod substantia est, hæc enim non componitur nisi ex hac forma.

Sed proprietates quæ sunt communis hominis per hoc quod communis homo est in pluribus, inveniuntur etiam in pluribus, ut risibile, et mansuetum natura, et disciplinæ perceptibile, et hujusmodi. Hæc enim in pluribus, et plus est, in omnibus hominibus particularibus inveniuntur : sunt enim in eis per commune quod est in eis, et ideo conveniunt eis in eo quod homines sunt. Directo enim prædicabilium ordine continetur individuum sub homine, sive generaliter loquendo sub specie. Species autem continetur under genere. Est enim genus totum quoddam universale, et id quod est genus secundum quod genus est, non nisi totum. Individuum autem non est totum, sed tantum pars subjectiva totius universalis. Species vero quæ est in medio, est inter genus et individuum, et totum est et pars diversis comparata : sed pars quidem alterius generis quod est totum ad ipsam. Species enim pars est generis potestate : quia genus non secundum totam suam potestatem est in specie. Totum autem est species, non totius alicujus : quia nihil participat eam secundum partem suæ potestatis, sicut ipsa species participat genus, sed est totum omnibus aliis individuis : quia ipsa species, ut dicit Boetius, totum esse est in individuis. Nec referuntur individua ad speciem ut partes ipsius, sed potius ut singularia secundum totum esse et potestatem, in se habentia speciem et participantia.

Compendiose ergo dicendo generalissimum quidem de omnibus sub se secundum suam coordinationem positis speciebus, generibus, et individuis dicimus sive prædicamus. Genus autem subalternum, quod ante specialissimum de omnibus specialissimis et individuis prædicamus. Species autem prædicamus de individuis omnibus sub se positis.

Individuum vero de uno solo non propria prædicatione prædicamus. Individuum enim sub descriptione nominatum Socrates, vel in accidentibus hoc album vel hoc nomen per demonstrationem vel per circumlocutionem manifestioris loquelæ Sophronici filius : si enim plures haberet, tunc tali circumlocutione non discerneretur Socrates. Individua ergo voce discretionis dicuntur hujusmodi : quoniam quantum ad suam discretionem ex talibus proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quorum collectio nunquam in alio eadem erit.

-signated: then the accidents are names conceived in the reason, and of the essence of the individual thus designated: although they are not any part of the particular substance according to what substance is, for this is not composed except from this form.

But properties which are of the common man through this that the common man is in many, are found also in many, such as risible, and mild by nature, and perceptible of discipline, and of this kind. For these are in many, and what is more, they are found in all particular men: for they are in them through the common which is in them, and therefore they agree with them in that which they are men. For in the direct order of predicables the individual is contained under man, or generally speaking under species. But the species is contained under genus. For the genus is a certain universal whole, and that which is a genus according to what a genus is, [is] nothing but a whole. But the individual is not a whole, but only a subjective part of a universal whole. But the species which is in the middle, is between genus and individual, and is both whole and part compared to different things: but a part indeed of the other genus which is a whole to it. For a species is a part of a genus in power: because the genus is not according to its whole power in the species. But the species is a whole, not of any whole: because nothing participates in it according to a part of its power, as the species itself participates in the genus, but it is a whole to all other individuals: because the species itself, as Boethius says, is whole being in individuals. Nor are individuals referred to a species as its parts, but rather as singulars according to whole being and power, having the species in themselves and participating.

Briefly therefore saying, the most general indeed we say or predicate of all species, genera, and individuals placed under it according to its coordination. But a subaltern genus, which is before the most specific, we predicate of all most specific [species] and individuals. But species we predicate of all individuals placed under them.

But the individual we predicate of one alone not by a proper predication. For the individual named under a description Socrates, or in accidents this white or this name through demonstration or through a circumlocution of more manifest speech "the son of Sophronicus": for if he had many, then by such a circumlocution Socrates would not be discerned. Individuals therefore by the voice of discretion are called of this kind: since as to their discretion each one of them consists of such properties, the collection of which will never be the same in another.

Socratis enim discretiva proprietas nunquam in aliquo alio esset particulari homine. Hæ vero proprietates quæ sunt communes proprietates, erunt eædem in pluribus. Illæ enim sunt proprietates communis et non singularis secundum quod singulare est. Et, ut plus dicatur, communis hominis proprietates sunt in omnibus in quibus est una natura communis : participantia enim naturam communem, participant etiam propria illam naturam consequentia. Tales ergo hominis communes proprietates erunt in omnibus particularibus in eo quod homines sunt. Secundum ergo prædictum prædicabilium ordinem continetur individuum sub specie, species autem sub genere. Est enim genus totum quoddam in quantum genus est. Individuum autem secundum quod individuum est, pars quædam. Species vero est et totum et pars. Sed pars quidem est alterius, hoc est, generis quod secundum partem suæ potestatis participat : totum autem non est alterius quod ipsius partem participet, sed est totum aliis : partibus enim totum est, quarum quælibet ipsum totum participat.

Quod autem ea quæ de genere et specie dicta sunt ad invicem propter correlationem dependeant, uno epilogo patet : de genere quidem et de specie quid generalissimum, et quid specialissimum, et de aliis quæ eadem sunt genera et species sicut subalterna. Adhuc autem quæ etiam sint individua, sive certa, sive vaga, vel-

per demonstrationem vel circumlocutionem certificata. Adhuc autem quot modis genus dicitur, et quot modis species dicitur, quantum ad præsentem spectat intentionem logicam, sufficienter dictum est.

<!-- cap:1.5.1 -->

CAPUT I — *De distinctione nominis differentiæ quod multipliciter dicitur.*

Consequenter de universali quod differentia vocatur, pertractare est. Hæc enim quia constituit speciem, et prædicatur de specie et de ratione diffinitiva ipsius speciei, ideo ante speciem erat ponenda, nisi obstitisset correlatio ad invicem speciei ad genus, et generis ad speciem, quemadmodum in præhabitis dictum est. Antequam autem notificemus differentiam quæ sola una est de quinque universalibus, et determinemus de ipsa, oportet nos distinguere multiplicitatem nominis differentiæ : hæc enim multipliciter dicitur secundum prius et posterius.

For the discretive property of Socrates would never be in any other particular man. But these properties which are common properties, will be the same in many. For those are properties of the common and not of the singular according to what it is singular. And, that more may be said, properties of the common man are in all in which there is one common nature: for those participating in a common nature, also participate in properties following that nature. Such common properties of man therefore will be in all particulars in that they are men. According therefore to the aforesaid order of predicables the individual is contained under species, and the species under genus. For the genus is a certain whole insofar as it is a genus. But the individual according as it is an individual, [is] a certain part. But the species is both whole and part. But it is indeed a part of another, that is, of a genus in which it participates according to a part of its power: but it is not a whole of another which would participate in its part, but it is a whole to others: for it is a whole to parts, any of which participates in the whole itself.

But that those things which have been said of genus and species depend on each other on account of correlation, is clear from one epilogue: of genus indeed and of species what is most general, and what is most special, and of others which are at once genera and species such as subalterns. Moreover also what are individuals, whether certain, or vague, or-

certified by demonstration or circumlocution. Furthermore also in how many modes a genus is called, and in how many modes a species is called, as much as pertains to the present logical intention, has been sufficiently said.

<!-- cap:1.5.1 -->

CHAPTER I — *On the distinction of the name difference which is said in many ways.*

Consequently we must treat of the universal which is called difference. For because this constitutes a species, and is predicated of a species and of the definitional reason of the species itself, therefore it was to be posited before species, unless the mutual correlation of species to genus, and of genus to species had stood in the way, just as was said in the preceding things. But before we make known difference which alone is one of the five universals, and determine concerning it, it behooves us to distinguish the multiplicity of the name difference: for this is said in many ways according to prior and posterior.

Differentia igitur multipliciter dicitur, ut dicit Avicenna, non sicut genus et species : quia in genere et specie primo fuit usus horum nominum in physicis et politicis, et ab illis hæc nomina ad usum philosophiæ sumpta sunt. Sed in differentia factum est e converso. Nomen enim differentiæ primo fuit in usu Philosophorum, et ab illa transsumptum est ad usum communiter loquentium. Hæc igitur est causa vera, quod multipliciter dicitur nomen differentiæ, communiter scilicet, proprie, et magis proprie.

Communiter autem dicitur differentia, quæ est apud communiter loquentes considerando ea quæ sensibus primo objiciuntur. Communiter ergo alterum ab altero differre differentia dicitur, quando unum ab altero alteritate quadam cujuscumque communiter apprehensibilis accidentis differre dicitur, quocumque modo secundum omnia genera formarum accidentium. Nec tales differentiæ communes ideo dicuntur, quia rebus insint communiter quas faciunt differre : si enim sic esset, non dicerentur differentiæ, sed convenientiæ. Sed dicuntur differentiæ communiter, quia a communiter loquentibus sunt in usu. Vulgus enim assignando differentias rerum, talibus res differre facit, qualia forinsecus in rebus per sensum communiter apprehendit.

Sic autem in tali differentia individuum unius speciei differt ab alio individuo ejusdem speciei, ut Socrates a Platone differt accidentium sensibilium alteritate quadam, sicut dicit Apulejus, quod Plato latus fuit facie, Socrates autem non. Hac etiam differentia unum individuum unius speciei differt a seipso in duobus temporibus, sicut Socrates jam vir vel senex existens, differt a se puero per accidentia juventutis et senectutis, quæ non cito derelinquunt subjectum. Sic etiam Socrates differt a seipso quando aliquid facit, scribit, vel legit, quiescente seipso a tali opere, quæ sunt accidentia cito separabilia. Et ut generaliter dicatur, hæc differentia semper consideratur secundum aliquem modum diversimode se habendi ad seipsum, vel ad alium alteritatibus quibuscumque : vel cujuslibet generis accidentia cito vel non cito separabilia. Hæc igitur est acceptio differentiæ secundum intentionem nominis dicta apud communiter loquentes : propter quod etiam communis vocatur differentia, hoc est, quam attendunt communiter loquentes.

Juxta istum modum magis vicine ad verum modum accipitur differentia quæ vocatur propria : eo quod ei in quo est, per causam connaturalem est appropria-

Difference therefore is said in many ways, as Avicenna says, not like genus and species: because in genus and species the first use of these names was in physics and politics, and from those these names were taken for the use of philosophy. But in difference it happened conversely. For the name of difference first was in the use of Philosophers, and from there it was taken over to the use of those speaking commonly. This therefore is the true cause, that the name of difference is said in many ways, namely commonly, properly, and more properly.

But it is called common difference, which is among those speaking commonly by considering those things which are first objected to the senses. Commonly therefore one is said to differ from another by a difference, when one is said to differ from another by a certain otherness of whatever commonly apprehensible accident, in whatever mode according to all genera of accidental forms. Nor are such differences therefore called common, because they are commonly in the things which they make to differ: for if it were so, they would not be called differences, but conveniences. But they are called common differences, because they are in use by those speaking commonly. For the vulgar in assigning the differences of things, makes things to differ by such things, as it commonly apprehends from the outside in things through sense.

But thus in such a difference an individual of one species differs from another individual of the same species, as Socrates differs from Plato by a certain otherness of sensible accidents, just as Apuleius says, that Plato was broad in face, but Socrates not. By this difference also one individual of one species differs from itself in two times, as Socrates already existing a man or an old man, differs from himself as a boy through accidents of youth and old age, which do not quickly relinquish the subject. Thus also Socrates differs from himself when he does something, writes, or reads, himself resting from such a work, which are quickly separable accidents. And that it may be said generally, this difference is always considered according to some mode of having oneself diversely to oneself, or to another by whatever othernesses: or accidents of whatever genus quickly or not quickly separable. This therefore is the acceptation of difference according to the intention of the name given among those speaking commonly: on account of which also it is called common difference, that is, which those speaking commonly attend to.

Next to this mode more closely to the true mode is taken the difference which is called proper: from the fact that to that in which it is, through a connatural cause it is appropria-

ta, ut quando unum differre dicitur ab altero per accidens inseparabile : quod ideo inseparabile est, quia causam habet quæ est in subjecto in quo est, sicut est nasi simitas in simo, cujus nasus simiæ comparatur : vel cicatrix aliqua indurata vel inseparabilis, cum ex vulnere occaluerit : simitas enim inest per naturam, sed cicatricem habens differt ab eo qui cicatricem non habet, et aliquando idem cicatricem habens nunc a seipso antequam cicatricem haberet. Hæc autem dicitur propria : quia per aliquam rationem accedit ad illam, quæ vero nomine differentia vocatur : hæc enim quamvis non sit de essentia ejus in quo est et quod differre facit, habet tamen causam in essentialibus ipsius sive sint essentialia complexioni, sive sint essentialia compositioni ipsius, et sic accedit ad veræ differentiæ rationem. Quando autem dicimus, quod talis differentia causam habet in subjecto in quo est, et quod differre facit, non intelligimus de subjecto quod est specie tantum, sed de illo in numero subjecto in quo est id quod differre facit, sicut simitas in naso, vel claudicatio in tibia. Hanc differentiam considerare per rationem necesse est : et ideo jam ad usum verum differentiæ (secundum modum quo philosophia utitur differentia) appropinquat.

Secundum autem modum magis et maxime proprium alterum ab altero differre dicitur : quoniam sub alia et universali et specifica differentia differt, sicut differt homo ab equo specifica differentia : quæ quidem differentia est qualitas essentialis hominis, quæ ratio dicitur. Hæc enim differentia quamvis sit forma essentialis hominis, tamen est qualitas naturalis generis et perfectiva potentiæ ipsius et determinativa communitatis et confusionis ejus, ut dicit Avicenna, et ideo substantialis est speciei, et substantia et principium substantiæ sicut forma : et perfectiva est materiæ, et determinativa confusionis ejus, et principium rei quæ composita est ex materia et forma.

Igitur ista distinctio differentiæ vel divisio est multipliciter dicti per analogiam ad unum actum qui est facere differre unum ab altero : qui quidem convenit veræ, hoc est, secundum veram rationem differentiæ magis propriæ, aliis autem secundum quod plus vel minus faciunt differre. Et ideo prima differentia vocatur simpliciter ea quæ dicitur magis propria, secundario illa quæ vocatur propria, tertio autem illa quæ vocatur communis. Quoad nos autem per prius dicitur differentia quæ communis est : propter hoc quod prima facie notitiæ nostræ se objicit. Secundario autem dicitur ea quæ dicitur propria : quia minus communiter est apprehensibilis. Ultimo vero quæ paucioribus substantia et intellectu utentibus innotescit.

-priated, as when one is said to differ from another by an inseparable accident: which is therefore inseparable, because it has a cause which is in the subject in which it is, such as is the flatness of the nose in the snub-nosed, whose nose is compared to an ape's: or some hardened or inseparable scar, when it has become calloused from a wound: for flatness is in [it] through nature, but he having a scar differs from him who does not have a scar, and sometimes the same one having a scar now [differs] from himself before he had the scar. But this is called proper: because by some reason it approaches that which by its true name is called a difference: for this, although it is not of the essence of that in which it is and which it makes to differ, nevertheless has a cause in its essentials, whether they are essential to its complexion, or are essential to its composition, and thus it approaches the reason of a true difference. But when we say that such a difference has a cause in the subject in which it is, and which it makes to differ, we do not understand by "subject" that which is in species only, but by that subject in number in which is that which makes to differ, as flatness in a nose, or lameness in a shin. It is necessary to consider this difference by reason: and therefore it now approaches the true use of difference (according to the mode by which philosophy uses difference).

But according to a more and most proper mode one is said to differ from another: since it differs under another both universal and specific difference, as man differs from horse by a specific difference: which difference is indeed the essential quality of man, which is called reason. For this difference, although it is the essential form of man, nevertheless is a natural quality of the genus and perfective of its power and determinative of its community and confusion, as Avicenna says, and therefore it is substantial of the species, and substance and principle of substance like a form: and it is perfective of matter, and determinative of its confusion, and the principle of the thing which is composed of matter and form.

Therefore this distinction of difference or division is of a multiple [term] said by analogy to one act which is to make one differ from another: which indeed belongs to the true, that is, to the more proper difference according to its true reason, but to others according as they make [things] differ more or less. And therefore the first difference is called simply that which is called more proper, secondarily that which is called proper, and thirdly that which is called common. But as to us, that difference is said first which is common: on account of this, that it presents itself to the first face of our notice. But secondarily is said that which is called proper: because it is less commonly apprehensible. But lastly that which becomes known to fewer [people] using substance and intellect.

Hac igitur divisione sic posita, per proprios effectus uniuscujusque membri declaremus partes hoc commune dividentes, quod est differentia. Dicamus igitur, quod in hoc conveniunt duæ primæ, ea scilicet quæ est communiter differentia, et ea quæ est proprie vocata differentia, quod id in quo sunt et differre faciunt per id quod est causa differentiæ, non faciunt suum subjectum nisi solum alteratum quando cuilibet subjecto adveniunt. Illa autem differentia quæ est magis propria per id quod est causa differendi, facit aliud in substantia esse id quod differt ab eo a quo differt.

Concluditur ergo proprius effectus differentiarum, quod differentiarum quædam per id quod faciunt differre, faciunt alteratum esse solum id quod differt ab eo a quo differt. Aliæ vero per id quod differre facit, faciunt aliud in substantia esse quod differt ab eo a quo differt. Hujus autem causa est, quia differentia communis et propria non faciunt differre nisi per accidens, quod aut habet causam in subjecto, aut non habet causam in subjecto : et quocumque modo sit accidens, nullo modo potest esse perfectivum vel constitutivum substantiæ : et per se nullo modo potest facere aliud, quia aliud non est nisi quod secundum substantiam est-

aliud. Et quamvis simum et aquilum sit aliud per substantiam nasi, hoc tamen non est per simitatem et aquilitatem quæ sunt accidentia, sed potius per diversitatem substantiæ simi nasi, et per substantiam nasi aquili : sicut risibile et hinnibile differunt per substantiam, sed hujus differentiæ non est causa risibile vel hinnibile, sed formæ specificæ, et differentiæ substantiales, quibus substantialiter differunt homo et equus.

Ex hoc autem iterum surgit istarum differentiarum dividentium manifestatio, quod illæ quidem differentiæ quæ faciunt aliud in substantia et specie per id quod facit differre, dicuntur esse specificæ differentiæ, hoc est, ad speciem pertinentes et in specie constituentes. Illæ vero quæ alteratum solum faciunt, dicuntur simpliciter differentiæ : non ita quod nomen differentiæ prædicetur simpliciter de illis ratione absoluta et perfecta, sed quia super nomen differentiæ nihil addunt quod ponat eas in formam veræ et propriæ differentiæ : sicut cum dicimus, quod ens in potentia dicitur simpliciter ens, non ita dicimus hoc, quod ens in potentia entis simpliciter habeat nomen vel rationem, cum sit ens secundum quid et non simpliciter, sed dicitur ens simpliciter, hoc est, sine determinatione alicujus per quod ad ens actu trahatur et determinetur.

This division therefore having been thus posed, let us declare through the proper effects of each member the parts dividing this common, which is difference. Let us say therefore, that in this the first two agree, namely that which is commonly difference, and that which is properly called difference, that that in which they are and make to differ through that which is the cause of the difference, they do not make their subject except only altered when they come to any subject. But that difference which is more proper through that which is the cause of differing, makes [it] to be another in substance that which differs from that from which it differs.

The proper effect of differences is therefore concluded, that of differences some through that which they do to make [things] differ, make that which differs from that from which it differs to be altered only. But others through that which makes to differ, make that which differs from that from which it differs to be another in substance. But the cause of this is, because common and proper difference do not make to differ except through an accident, which either has a cause in the subject, or does not have a cause in the subject: and in whatever way it be an accident, in no way can it be perfective or constitutive of substance: and therefore by itself it cannot make [it] another, because "another" is not except what is according to substance-

another. And although the snub and the aquiline are another through the substance of the nose, this however is not through snubness and aquilinity which are accidents, but rather through the diversity of the substance of the snub nose, and through the substance of the aquiline nose: just as the risible and the neighing differ through substance, but the cause of this difference is not the risible or the neighing, but the specific forms and the substantial differences, by which man and horse differ substantially.

But from this again arises the manifestation of these dividing differences, that those differences indeed which make another in substance and species through that which makes it differ, are said to be specific differences, that is, pertaining to the species and constituting in the species. But those which only make altered, are simply called differences: not in such a way that the name of difference is predicated simply of them by an absolute and perfect rationale, but because they add nothing over the name of difference which would put them into the form of a true and proper difference: just as when we say that being in potency is simply called being, we do not say this in such a way that being in potency has the name or rationale of being simply, since it is a being in a certain respect and not simply, but it is called being simply, that is, without the determination of anything by which it would be drawn and determined to being in act.

Hoc autem quod dictum est manifestatur exemplariter : quia huic generi quod est animal, rationale adveniens in diffinitione hominis vel Dei facit id quod in substantia est alicujus aliud ab eo a quo differt per illam differentiam, facit enim rationale animal, et facit speciem subalternam animal. Illa vero quæ est communiter differentia per id quod est causa differentiæ, ut movendi quo differt aliquis a quiescente, non facit nisi alteratum et non aliud, quantum est de eo quod est causa differentiæ quod est separabile acdens. Concludit ergo quod quædam differentiarum facit aliud secundum substantiam, quædam autem non facit nisi alteratum.

Ex his igitur ostenditur, quod in procœmio istius libri dictum est, quod scilicet notitia universalium valet et utilis est ad divisiones et ad diffinitiones : quia secundum differentias quæ faciunt aliud, divisiones faciunt generum in species : et secundum easdem et per easdem diffinitiones specierum assignantur, eo quod diffinitiones veræ sunt ex genere et talibus differentiis. Sed secundum eas quæ solum faciunt alteratum et non aliud, alteratio sola in accidente consistit generaliter dicta secundum omne accidens et secundum aliquem modum se habendi per mutationes secundum omne genus prædicamenti, sive in ipso sit motus per se, sive ad ipsum sit motus per accidens. Alteratio enim proprie solum est in una specie qualitatis quæ est passio vel passibilis qualitas. Motus autem per se non est nisi in tribus prædicamentis quæ sunt qualitas, quantitas, et ubi. Per accidens etiam in omnibus est, ut dicit Aristoteles[1], et hoc modo dicimus communiter sumi penes alterationem accidentalem quamcunque sive sit per se sive per accidens : quia sequitur actum differentiæ, qui est differre facere unum ab alio, vel idem a seipso.

Sumuntur enim differentiæ istæ ab accidentibus communibus sive propriis. Et hujusmodi accidentis triplex consideratio est : si enim in se consideretur, tunc est accidens vel proprium, quæ sunt duo de quinque universalibus e diverso dividentia cum differentia hoc commune quod est universale : et sic nec differentia est accidens, nec proprium. Considerantur etiam in comparatione ad subjectum in quo sunt, et sic sunt comparata ad sua singularia de quibus prædicantur, et est similis comparatio sicut speciei ad individua. Considerantur etiam secundum quod per ea est convenientia vel differentia ad illa comparata, et sic ab ipsis su-

muntur duo differentiæ modi, qui sunt communis, et propria differentia.

But what has been said is manifested by example: because to this genus which is animal, 'rational' supervening in the definition of man or of God makes that which is in the substance of something another from that from which it differs through that difference, for it makes a rational animal, and it makes the subalternate species animal. But that which is commonly difference through that which is the cause of the difference, as of moving by which someone differs from one resting, makes nothing but an altered thing and not another, inasmuch as it comes from that which is the cause of the difference, which is a separable accident. It concludes therefore that a certain one of the differences makes another according to substance, but a certain one makes nothing but altered.

From these things therefore is shown what was said in the proem of this book, namely that the knowledge of universals is valid and useful for divisions and for definitions: because according to the differences which make another, they make divisions of genera into species: and according to the same and through the same the definitions of species are assigned, because true definitions are from genus and such differences. But according to those which only make altered and not another, the sole alteration consists generally said in accident according to every accident and according to some mode of holding oneself through mutations according to every genus of predicament, whether in it there be motion per se, or to it there be motion per accidens. For alteration is properly only in one species of quality, which is passion or passible quality. But motion per se is only in three predicaments, which are quality, quantity, and where. Per accidens it is also in all, as Aristotle says, and in this way we say it is commonly taken concerning any accidental alteration, whether it be per se or per accidens: because it follows the act of difference, which is to make one differ from another, or the same from itself.

For these differences are taken from common or proper accidents. And there is a threefold consideration of this kind of accident: for if it is considered in itself, then it is an accident or proper, which are two of the five universals dividing from a different side together with difference this common thing which is the universal: and thus neither difference is an accident, nor proper. They are also considered in comparison to the subject in which they are, and thus they are compared to their singulars of which they are predicated, and the comparison is similar as of the species to the individuals. They are also considered according to what through them is the agreement or difference towards those compared, and thus from them are ta-

two modes of difference are taken, which are common and proper difference.

Illa autem differentia quæ facit aliud, sumitur a forma specifica, quæ etiam tripliciter consideratur, in se scilicet prout est substantia quæ est forma substantiam faciens, et prout est in specie constituta, et sic est specificata : et prout per ipsam id quod ea formatum est comparatur ad aliud secundum convenientiam vel differentiam, et hoc solum modo differentia vocatur, primo autem modo forma, secundo vero modo species, secundum quam species unum est quinque universalium, dividens hoc commune quod est universale cum differentia et aliis universalibus.

Et ista quidem differentia est unum ex quinque universalibus, cujus assignationem secundum diffinitionem primam dat Avicenna dicens, quod est universale simplex prædicatum de specie in quale quid. Hæc enim est differentia magis proprie vocata differentia, quæ aliud facit, et non alteratum. Dico autem alteratum vel qualitate accidentali vel essentiali. Sed differentia magis propria non tantum alteratum, sed etiam facit aliud, quia alteratum qualitate essentiali aliud factum est. Hæc est igitur differentia magis propria, quæ est unum de quinque universalibus in quale prædicatum de specie : eo quod differentia qualitas substantialis est generis : sicut qualitas non substantialis, sed ex substantialibus manans sive fluens, est proprium : et sicut qualitas individui accidentalis non ex substantialibus fluens, est accidens commune.

Nec valet argumentum si quis objiciat: Differentia substantialis facit alteratum : id autem quod alteratum facit, est accidens proprium : ergo differentia substantialis est accidens vel proprium. Quia alteratum esse contingit dupliciter, qualitate scilicet essentiali vel accidentali, arguit autem ac si solum qualitate accidentali fieret alteratum. Hæc omnia autem dicta, sunt ab antiquis sub compendio comprehensa tali modo, quod differentia communiter, et proprie, et magis proprie dicitur, secundum divisionem multiplicis, quod medium est inter æquivocum et univocum. Communiter autem differre alterum ab altero dicitur, quando alteritate quadam differt : et quocumque modo cujuscumque accidentis quod est causa differentiæ vel a seipso in diverso tempore: differt enim Socrates a Platone alteritate quadam cujuscumque accidentis quod est in Socrate, et non in Platone. Et ipse Socrates differt a seipso in diversis temporibus : sicut Socrates jam vir factus, differt a se puero : sicut Socrates faciens aliquid, differt a seipso quiescente a tali opere.

But that difference which makes [something] "another" is taken from the specific form, which is also considered in a threefold way, namely in itself insofar as it is a substance which is a form making substance, and insofar as it is constituted in a species, and thus it is specified: and insofar as through it that which is formed by it is compared to another according to agreement or difference, and in this mode alone is it called a difference, but in the first mode a form, and in the second mode a species, according to which species is one of the five universals, dividing this common which is universal with difference and the other universals.

And this difference indeed is one of the five universals, the assignment of which according to the first definition Avicenna gives saying, that it is a simple universal predicated of the species in "of what sort somewhat" (*in quale quid*). For this is the difference more properly called a difference, which makes "another", and not [only] "altered". But I say "altered" either by an accidental or an essential quality. But the more proper difference not only [makes it] "altered", but also makes "another", because that which is altered by an essential quality has been made another. This is therefore the more proper difference, which is one of the five universals predicated of the species in [the category of] "what sort": for the reason that difference is the substantial quality of the genus: just as a quality not substantial, but emanating or flowing from substantials, is a property (*proprium*): and just as an accidental quality of an individual not flowing from substantials, is a common accident.

Nor is the argument valid if someone objects: A substantial difference makes [something] "altered": but that which makes [something] "altered" is a proper accident: therefore a substantial difference is an accident or a property. Because to be "altered" happens in two ways, namely by an essential or an accidental quality, but he argues as if it became "altered" only by an accidental quality. All these things indeed having been said, were comprehended by the ancients under a compendium in such a mode, that difference is said commonly, and properly, and more properly, according to the division of a multiple [term], which is a medium between the equivocal and the univocal. But one is said to differ commonly from another, when it differs by a certain otherness: and in whatever mode of whatever accident which is the cause of the difference or from itself in a different time: for Socrates differs from Plato by a certain otherness of whatever accident which is in Socrates, and not in Plato. And Socrates himself differs from himself in different times: as Socrates having now become a man, differs from himself as a child: as Socrates doing something, differs from himself resting from such a work.

Et causa hujus differentiæ est propter aliquem modum se habendi in aliquo accidente, quod alteritatibus aliquibus per se vel per accidens inducitur. Proprie autem differre dicitur alterum ab altero, quando inseparabili accidente alterum ab altero differre dicitur, et ideo inseparabili, quia causam inseparabilem habet in subjecto : unde quamvis inseparabile sit actu, tamen est separabile intellectu, eo quod subjectum intelligibile est sine illo, potest enim intelligi nasus sive curvitate, et homo sine risibilitate. Inseparabile autem accidens est ut nasi simitas, et cicatrix cum ex vulnere occaluerit. Magis proprie tam alterum ab altero differre dicitur, hoc est, per magis propria et per magis substantiæ intrinseca, quando specifica differentia differt, quemadmodum differt homo ab equo specifica differentia, rationali scilicet qualitate, quæ est essentialis qualitas generis, potentiam generis determinans et perficiens.

Et quia hæ differentiæ ab actu differendi dicuntur, quia scilicet differre faciunt, ideo sciendum est quod omnis differentia facit alteratum adveniens cuilibet : alteratum dico essentiali vel accidentali qualitate. Sed ea differentia quæ communiter et proprie dicta quantum est de se cum utraque sit accidens, facit alteratum solum. Illa autem quæ est magis proprie-

dicta differentia, facit aliud in substantia per hoc quod alteratum facit in qualitate substantiali. Differentiarum quidem igitur aliæ faciunt alterationem sive alteratum tantum : aliæ vero facit aliud. Illæ quidem quæ faciunt aliud in substantia formali, specificæ vocantur. Illæ vero quæ faciunt solum alteratum, vocantur simpliciter differentiæ sine additione alicujus determinationis, per quam et ad magis et vere propriam differentiam inclinentur. Huic ergo generi quod est animal differentia adveniens quæ est rationale, aliud facit, quia speciem animalis facit, quæ substantia est perfecta in forma et specie. Illa vero differentia quæ est causata per moveri vel quiescere, solum facit alteratum, et non aliud : differt enim qui movetur a quiescente. Quare hæc quidem differentia magis propria facit aliud : illa vero communis facit alteratum solum. Secundum igitur differentias aliud facientes divisiones fiunt generum, et sic dividuntur genera in species. Et secundum illas differentias diffinitiones assignantur, quia diffinitiones veræ sunt ex genere et hujusmodi differentiis. Secundum autem eas quæ solum faciunt alteratum, alteratio large et universaliter dicta sola consistit in eo quod aliquo modo se habet aliquid secundum permutationes quascumque quæ in aliquo genere fieri possunt.

CAPUT II — *De manifestatione modorum differentiæ et partium divisionis præinductæ.*

And the cause of this difference is on account of some mode of behaving in some accident, which is induced by some othernesses per se or per accident. But one is said to differ properly from another, when it is said to differ from another by an inseparable accident, and therefore inseparable, because it has an inseparable cause in the subject: whence although it be inseparable in act, nevertheless it is separable in the intellect, because the subject is intelligible without it, for a nose can be understood without curvature, and a man without risibility. But an inseparable accident is such as the flatness of a nose, and a scar when it has become calloused from a wound. More properly so one is said to differ from another, that is, through more proper and through more intrinsic things of the substance, when it differs by a specific difference, in the same way that man differs from horse by a specific difference, namely by the rational quality, which is the essential quality of the genus, determining and perfecting the power of the genus.

And because these differences are said from the act of differing, because namely they make to differ, therefore it must be known that every difference makes [something] "altered" when coming to any [subject]: I say "altered" by an essential or an accidental quality. But that difference which is called common and proper, insofar as it is of itself since both are an accident, makes "altered" only. But that which is more proper-

[called] difference, makes "another" in substance through this, that it makes [it] "altered" in substantial quality. Of differences, therefore, some make an alteration or [something] "altered" only: but others make "another". Those indeed which make "another" in formal substance are called specific [differences]. But those which make only [something] "altered" are called simply differences without the addition of any determination by which they might be inclined toward the more and truly proper difference. To this genus therefore which is "animal", a coming difference which is "rational" makes "another", because it makes a species of animal, which is a substance perfect in form and species. But that difference which is caused by being moved or resting, makes only "altered", and not "another": for he who is moved differs from one resting. Wherefore this more proper difference indeed makes "another": but that common [one] makes only "altered". Therefore, according to the differences making "another", divisions of genera are made, and thus genera are divided into species. And according to those differences definitions are assigned, because true definitions are from the genus and differences of this kind. But according to those which only make [something] "altered", alteration, broadly and universally speaking, consists alone in that which something behaves in some mode according to whatever permutations which can occur in any genus.

CHAPTER II — *On the manifestation of the modes of difference and of the parts of the division previously introduced.*

Ad manifestationem autem omnium eorum quæ de differentiæ modis dicta sunt, rursum inchoandum est a partibus præinductæ divisionis, ut omnes partes, tum per effectum, tum per causas, tum etiam per sibi convenientia manifestentur, ut sic melius intelligatur hoc quod dicendum est de differentia magis propria : hanc enim quærimus secundum intentionem propositam. A superioribus igitur iterum inchoantes dicimus, quod differen-

tiarum quidem aliæ sunt separabiles, aliæ vero sunt non separabiles. Sed hic dicamus differentias formas esse essentiales vel accidentales, a quibus sumuntur differentiæ, et quæ sunt causæ differentiarum. Moveri enim et quiescere, et hujusmodi cito et facile separabilia sunt : cum tamen multa ad invicem comparata differant illis : id enim quod movetur, differt ab eo quod non movetur, et id quod quiescit, differt ab eo quod non quiescit. Sanum autem esse et ægrum sunt accidentia non cito separabilia, et tamen separabilia : et his differt sanum a non sano, et ægrum a non ægro. Separabilia igitur sunt quæcumque per aliquam causam subjectum derelinquunt facile vel non facile, ut sunt ea quæ dicta sunt, et quæ his proxima per similitudinem sunt, et sunt separabilia. At vero aquilum e converso et simum esse, quæ sunt accidentia nasi causam stantem et manentem in naso habentia. Simitas enim ex nasi curvatione et medii nasi depressione causatur : aquilum vero ex retorsione anterioris partis nasi super labium superius causatur, quando medium nasi elevatur, et cartilago nasi anterius ad modum rostri aquilæ ad superius labium recurvatur. Hæ autem causæ cum sint de nasi compositione, stantes et manentes sunt in naso. Et ideo accidentia ex talibus figuris causata, inseparabilia sunt, quia stante causa quæ est per se causa, stabit effectus. Similiter in qualitate essentiali a qua sumitur differentia, inseparabilia sunt, ut rationale et irrationale, qui sunt actus et formæ perficientes et determinantes potentiam generis : et ideo causam habent inseparabilitatis tali actu talem potentiam determinandi. Tales igitur et tali de causa sunt differentiæ separabiles et inseparabiles.

Inseparabilium autem differentiarum duo sunt modi : quædam enim earum sunt ex his sumptæ, quæ sunt *per se* de ipsius rei (quæ differre dicitur) essentiali constitutione. Aliæ vero inseparabilium differentiarum sunt per accidens, ita scilicet quod id a quo sumitur differentia, non-

For the manifestation indeed of all those things which have been said concerning the modes of difference, we must again begin from the parts of the previously introduced division, so that all parts may be manifested both through the effect, and through the causes, and also through what is appropriate to them, so that in this way that which is to be said concerning the more proper difference may be better understood: for we seek this according to the proposed intention. Starting again therefore from higher things, we say that of differ-

ences, some are separable, but others are non-separable. But here let us say that differences are essential or accidental forms, from which differences are taken, and which are the causes of differences. For to be moved and to rest, and things of this kind, are quickly and easily separable: although nevertheless many compared to each other differ by them: for that which is moved differs from that which is not moved, and that which rests differs from that which does not rest. But to be healthy and to be sick are accidents not quickly separable, and yet separable: and by these the healthy differs from the non-healthy, and the sick from the non-sick. Separable, therefore, are whatever through some cause leave the subject easily or not easily, as are those which have been mentioned, and those which are close to these by similarity, and they are separable. But on the contrary, to be "hooked" (*aquilum*) and "flat" (*simun*), which are accidents of the nose having a standing and remaining cause in the nose. For "flatness" (*simitas*) is caused by the curvature of the nose and the depression of the middle of the nose: but "hooked" is caused by the twisting back of the anterior part of the nose over the upper lip, when the middle of the nose is elevated, and the cartilage of the nose at the front is curved back toward the upper lip in the manner of an eagle's beak. But these causes, since they are of the composition of the nose, are standing and remaining in the nose. And therefore accidents caused from such figures are inseparable, because while the cause stands, which is a cause *per se*, the effect will stand. Similarly, in the essential quality from which difference is taken, they are inseparable, as "rational" and "irrational", which are the acts and forms perfecting and determining the power of the genus: and therefore they have a cause of inseparability by such an act of determining such a power. Such, therefore, and for such a cause, are separable and inseparable differences.

Of inseparable differences indeed there are two modes: for some of them are taken from those which are *per se* of the essential constitution of the thing itself (which is said to differ). But others of inseparable differences are per accidens, namely in such a way that that from which the difference is taken, does not-

est de rei essentia et substantia, sed est inseparabile accidens. Et ideo hic strictius accipimus *per se*, quam in primo *Posteriorum* determinetur ab Aristotele : ipse enim dicit esse per se sive prædicatum sit de ratione et diffinitione subjecti, sive subjectum in diffinitione prædicati, secundum quem modum *per se* est hæc, homo est risibilis, nasus est simus vel aquilus. Nos autem *per se* hic non vocamus, nisi id quod est essentiale et veniens in rei substantialem constitutionem, ut genus et differentia. Sic enim rationale *per se* inest homini et mortale, et per intellectum disciplinæ esse perceptibile, et hujusmodi. Aquilum autem esse vel simum vel risibile esse insunt homini per accidens : non enim est diffinitio nasi ut nasus est depressus in medio, vel repansus in anteriori. In omnibus autem his differentiis vocamus formas, a quibus sumuntur differentiæ, quando res secundum convenientiam vel differentiam comparantur. Illæ igitur differentiæ quæ sunt per se essentiales, accipiunt in ratione diffinitiva data secundum substantiam rei diffinitæ: quia diffinitio colligit secundum ordinem omnia substantialia rei a prima potentia ipsius in qua esse rei inchoatur, usque ad ultimum actum ipsius a quo res est secundum quidditatem suam totam.

Et quia differentiæ sic dictæ accipiuntur ab hoc quod sunt formæ substantiales et perfectivæ ipsius esse, ideo faciunt aliud secundum substantiam ab eo a quo differt : quia si unum completivum esse substantialis facit unam substantiam, necesse est quod oppositum illius faciat aliam substantiam, quia diversarum substantialium formarum diversi et oppositi sunt effectus secundum substantiam. Illæ vero differentiæ quæ sumuntur a formis accidentalibus, quæ esse rei non constituunt, sed potius causantur a subjecto, et esse non habent nisi in subjecto, nec ingrediuntur in ratione diffinitiva substantiæ sive substantialis quidditatis rei, non faciunt aliud secundum substantiam quantum est de se, sed faciunt alteratum solum secundum formam accidentalem.

Unde quamvis aliquando non conveniant nisi aliis et aliis secundum substantiam, ut aquilum esse et simum non conveniunt eidem, sed homini, et asino, qui sunt aliud et aliud secundum substantiam : tamen substantiæ alietatem non faciunt, sed potius fiunt ab alia et ab alia substantia secundum formam et naturam.

Adhuc autem et per aliud manifestatur differentia talium differentiarum, qua illæ quidem differentiæ quæ per se sunt (ita quod sunt sumptæ a substantialibus formis, quæ diffinitionem substantialem perficiunt in eo in quo sunt) non suscipiunt per intentionem magis et minus. Cujus causa est, quia tales formæ substantiales simplices sunt, suis oppositis sive contrariis formis non permixtibiles, sicut rationale impermextibile est irrationali, quia formæ a quibus sumuntur illæ differentiæ, humanitas scilicet, et asineitas vel asinitas sunt incommixtibiles.

is of the essence and substance of the thing, but is an inseparable accident. And therefore here we take *per se* more strictly, than as it is determined in the first of the *Posterior Analytics* by Aristotle: for he says that it is per se whether the predicate is of the rationale and definition of the subject, or the subject in the definition of the predicate, according to which mode *per se* is this, man is risible, the nose is snub or aquiline. But we do not call *per se* here, except that which is essential and coming into the substantial constitution of the thing, as genus and difference. For thus rational *per se* is in man and mortal, and through the intellect to be perceptible of discipline, and such like. But to be aquiline or snub or to be risible are in man per accidens: for it is not the definition of a nose that a nose is depressed in the middle, or bent back in the front. But in all these differences we call forms those from which differences are taken, when things are compared according to agreement or difference. Therefore those differences which are per se essential, receive in the definitive rationale given according to the substance of the defined thing: because the definition collects according to order all the substantials of the thing from its first potency in which the being of the thing is initiated, up to its ultimate act by which the thing is according to its whole quiddity.

And because differences thus called are taken from the fact that they are substantial forms and perfective of being itself, therefore they make another according to substance from that from which it differs: because if one completive of substantial being makes one substance, it is necessary that the opposite of it makes another substance, because the effects of diverse substantial forms according to substance are diverse and opposite. But those differences which are taken from accidental forms, which do not constitute the being of the thing, but rather are caused by the subject, and do not have being except in the subject, nor do they enter into the definitive rationale of the substance or substantial quiddity of the thing, do not make another according to substance inasmuch as it is of itself, but make an altered thing only according to accidental form.

Whence although sometimes they may not agree except with others and others according to substance, as to be aquiline and snub do not agree with the same thing, but with a man, and an ass, which are another and another according to substance: nevertheless they do not make the alterity of the substance, but rather they are made by another and by another substance according to form and nature.

But moreover the difference of such differences is manifested through another thing, whereby those differences indeed which are per se (so that they are taken from substantial forms, which perfect the substantial definition in that in which they are) do not undergo more and less through intention. Of which the cause is, because such substantial forms are simple, not mixable with their opposite or contrary forms, just as the rational is unmixable with the irrational, because the forms from which those differences are taken, namely humanity, and asinity or donkey-hood, are unmixable.

Cum enim fiat intentio secundum ascensum ad terminum, ad veram nominis impositionem secundum majorem vel minorem contrariis admixtionem, ut dicit Aristoteles [1], constat quod illæ formæ quæ simplices sunt et nihil de contrario habent admixtum, semper in termino sunt, et ideo intendi non possunt. Illæ vero differentiæ quæ sunt per accidens, ita quod a forma accidentali sumuntur, quamvis forte hoc accidens sit inseparabile, tamen suscipiunt intensionem et remissionem.

Habet tamen id quod dictum est dubitationem : quia risibile vel rudibile vel aquilum esse vel simum, sunt formæ, quæ permixtibiles invicem sibi non sunt : et ideo secundum inductam rationem non suscipiunt magis et minus ; quod falsum est, quia est simo simior, et aquilo aquilior, et risibili risibilior, et sic de aliis. Contra quod etiam quidam objiciunt dicentes, quod quæcumque æqualiter par-

ticipant aliquod commune, æqualiter debent participare id quod est illud commune universaliter consequens : participatur autem hoc commune quod est homo æqualiter ab unoquoque individuorum : videbitur etiam forte alicui, quod risibile quod est universaliter consequens hominem, ab unoquoque homine æqualiter debeat participari. Adhuc autem etiam illæ quæ sunt *per se* differentiæ videntur suscipere magis et minus : videmus enim quod est unus homo rationabilior alio. Præterea in *Ethicis* quidam vocantur peculiares sive brutales homines, et quidam longius ab usu rationis remoti vocantur homines arborei : videtur igitur quod et differentiæ substantiales magis et minus suscipiant, et sic verum non esse videtur quod dictum est.

Sed ad hæc omnia respondet Avicenna. Ad primum quidem dicens, quod duplex est intentio, et duplex est intentionis causa. Una quidem per contrarii majorem vel minorem admixtionem, ut dictum est : et illa sunt in quibus motus est de uno ad alterum, sicut est in qualitatibus quæ dicuntur sensibiles qualitates, sive passiones, vel passibiles passiones inferentes, vel illatæ. Cum enim motus sit actus de potentia ad actum, vel forma post formam fluens, ut dicit Averroes [1], oportet quod in toto motu actus privationi permixtus sit : privatio autem est in contrario, et ideo unum in toto motu suo contrario permixtum est. Et ideo in talibus intentio est secundum contrarii separationem : per talem enim separationem continue accedit ad esse in termino cui vere nomen impositum est. Hoc enim nomen *album* veræ albedini est impositum, sive vere albo : verum enim album est, cujus albedo nihil contrarii habet admixtum.

For since intention is made according to the ascent to a term, to the true imposition of a name according to the greater or lesser admixture with contraries, as Aristotle says, it is established that those forms which are simple and have nothing of the contrary admixed, are always in the term, and therefore cannot be intended. But those differences which are per accidens, so that they are taken from an accidental form, although perhaps this accident may be inseparable, nevertheless undergo intension and remission.

However what has been said has a doubt: because to be risible or braying or aquiline or snub, are forms which are not mutually mixable to each other: and therefore according to the induced rationale they do not admit more and less; which is false, because there is from the snub a more snub, and from the aquiline a more aquiline, and from the risible a more risible, and so of others. Against which also some object saying, that whatever equally par-

-ticipate some common thing, they ought equally to participate that which is that universal consequent of the common thing: but this common thing which is man is equally participated by everyone of the individuals: therefore it will also perhaps seem to someone, that the risible which is a universal consequent of man, ought to be equally participated by every individual man. But moreover even those which are differences *per se* seem to undergo more and less: for we see that one man is more rational than another. Besides in the *Ethics* some are called peculiar or brutal men, and some further removed from the use of reason are called arboreal men: it seems therefore that substantial differences also undergo more and less, and thus what has been said does not seem to be true.

But to all these things Avicenna responds. To the first indeed saying, that intention is twofold, and the cause of intention is twofold. One indeed through the greater or lesser admixture of the contrary, as has been said: and those are the ones in which there is motion from one to another, just as it is in qualities which are called sensible qualities, whether passions, or passible inferring passions, or inferred. For since motion is the act from potency to act, or form flowing after form, as Averroes says, it is necessary that in the whole motion the act be mixed with privation: but privation is in the contrary, and therefore one in its whole motion is mixed with its contrary. And therefore in such things intention is according to the separation of the contrary: for through such separation it continuously approaches to being in the term to which the name is truly imposed. For this name *white* is imposed on true whiteness, or on the truly white: for the truly white is that whose whiteness has nothing of the contrary admixed.

Hic ergo unus modus est intentionis, et hanc quæ dicta est habens causam. Secundus modus est in his quæ permixtibilia non sunt, sed causantur a subjectis in quibus sunt. Hæc igitur quia sunt esse subjecti consequentia, necesse est accidentia esse : quia omne quod sequitur esse subjecti in quo secundum naturam et intellectum est, est accidens, cum omne quod est substantiale alicujus sit principium esse ipsius : principium autem est ante id cujus est principium secundum naturam et intellectum. Taliter autem formæ accidentales sunt ea quæ dicuntur propria, et ab habitudinibus principiorum essentialium causantur. Et ideo illis habitidunibus magis et minus existentibus, necesse est etiam tales formas intendi vel remitti : propter quod habilior ad admirandum, risibilior est, et minus ad admirandum habilis, minus risibilis est, et nasus curvior, est simior, et minus curvus, minus est simus, et sic de aliis. Et in his formis non est motus, sed sunt suorum subjectorum motus quosdam consequentes, sicut motum quemdam nasi sequitur simum esse vel aquilum, et sic est in aliis. Omnes enim sequuntur suorum motus ac mutationes subjectorum, et ex illis suscipiunt magis et minus, et non ex seipsis.

Ad hoc autem quod de differentiis essentialibus et substantialibus objicitur, solvit Avicenna sic, quod forma substantialis a qua sumitur differentia, tripliciter consideratur, scilicet ut forma esse conferens : et ut differentia, quia una species comparatur ad aliud alterius speciei : et ut actionis naturalis sive substantialis principium. Et primo quidem modo magis et minus non suscipit. Tertio autem modo consideratur actio cujus ipsa est principium, dupliciter : scilicet ex parte formæ quæ actionis est principium, et ex parte subjecti sive exparte compositi, cujus ipsa actio est sicut agentis proprie. Et primo quidem modo magis et minus non suscipit : secundo autem modo aliquando habet in subjecto ea quæ ad agendum promovent : aliquando autem quæ ad agendum impediunt. Et hoc modo secundum actionem videtur magis et minus suscipere, et hoc est per accidens, et non per se,

et ideo per se nec magis nec minus suscipiunt. Hoc autem per inductionem probatur : quia nec genus secundum magis et minus prædicatur de eo cujus est genus : cum tamen genus sit forma quæ est notio ejus quod est in potentia. Non enim animal secundum magis prædicatur de homine, et secundum minus de asino, sed æque de utroque. Nec differentiæ generis quæ dividunt genus et cum genere constituunt speciem, secundum magis et minus prædicantur de speciebus quarum sunt differentiæ : quia homo non est magis rationale, et asinus minus irrationale, sed æque.

This therefore is one mode of intention, and having the cause which has been stated. The second mode is in those things which are not mixable, but are caused by the subjects in which they exist. Therefore because these are consequents of the being of the subject, they must necessarily be accidents: because everything which follows the being of the subject in which it is according to nature and intellect, is an accident, since everything which is substantial to something is the principle of its being: but the principle is before that of which it is the principle according to nature and intellect. But in such a way accidental forms are those which are called proper, and are caused from the habitudes of essential principles. And therefore with those habitudes existing more and less, it is necessary that such forms also be intended or remitted: on account of which one who is more apt to wonder, is more risible, and one less apt to wonder, is less risible, and a more curved nose, is more snub, and a less curved one, is less snub, and so of others. And in these forms there is no motion, but they are certain consequents of the motions of their subjects, just as to be snub or aquiline follows a certain motion of the nose, and so it is in others. For they all follow the motions and mutations of their subjects, and from them they undergo more and less, and not from themselves.

But to this which is objected concerning essential and substantial differences, Avicenna solves it thus, that the substantial form from which the difference is taken, is considered in three ways, namely as a form conferring being: and as a difference, because one species is compared to another of another species: and as the principle of natural or substantial action. And indeed in the first way it does not undergo more and less. But in the third way the action of which it is itself the principle is considered, in a twofold manner: namely on the part of the form which is the principle of the action, and on the part of the subject or on the part of the composite, of which the action itself is as of the agent properly. And indeed in the first way it does not undergo more and less: but in the second way sometimes it has in the subject those things which promote acting: but sometimes those which impede acting. And in this way according to action it seems to undergo more and less, and this is per accidens, and not per se,

and therefore per se they undergo neither more nor less. But this is proved through induction: because neither is the genus predicated according to more and less of that of which it is the genus: although nevertheless the genus is the form which is the notion of that which is in potency. For animal is not predicated according to more of a man, and according to less of an ass, but equally of both. Nor are the differences of the genus which divide the genus and with the genus constitute the species, predicated according to more and less of the species of which they are differences: because a man is not more rational, and an ass less irrational, but equally.

Illæ enim differentiæ sunt, quæ uniuscujusque speciei complent rationem diffinitivam, et sunt actus complentes esse ipsius. Esse autem uniuscujusque substantiale sive dicatur nomine generis secundum quod est in potentia, sive significetur nomine differentiæ secundum quod est in actu, est unum et idem non suscipiens magis et minus secundum quod est effectus substantialium principiorum. Sic enim nec intentionem nec remissionem suspiciens est. Sed aquilum esse vel simum vel coloratum esse, aliquo modo intensionem vel remissionem suscipiunt : eo quod, sicut dictum est, plures modi sunt intensionis et remissionis.

Declaratum est igitur quod a superioribus rursus inchoanti dicendum est differentiarum alias quidem esse separabiles, alias autem inseparabiles. Moveri enim et quiescere, et sanum esse et ægrum, et omnia quæ his proxima sunt et a talibus facile vel difficile mobilibus sumuntur accidentibus, sunt separabiles sive separabilia quædam. At vero aquilum vel simum esse, vel rationale vel irrationale, sive ab accidentibus separabilibus, sive a formis substantialibus sumpta, sunt quædam inseparabilia. Inseparabilium autem differentiarum, aliæ quidem sunt per se, hoc est, a formis substantialibus sumptæ : aliæ vero per accidens, hoc est, ab accidentibus inseparabilibus sumptæ. Nam rationale per se, hoc est, per substantialem formam inest homini, et mortale, et perceptibile disciplinæ. At vero aquilum esse vel simum, vel risibile, secundum accidens inest homini, et non per se. Illæ igitur differentiæ quæ per se insunt, in subjecto ratione diffinitiva accipiuntur, et faciunt aliud secundum substantiam ab eo a quo faciunt differre. Illæ vero quæ sunt secundum accidens, nec accipiuntur in substantiæ ratione diffinitiva, nec de se faciunt aliud, sed alteratum solum. Et illæ quidem quæ per se sunt et substantiales, non suscipiunt magis et minus. Illæ vero quæ sunt per accidens, quamvis inseparabiles sint, tamen aliquo modo intentionem suscipiunt et remissionem. Nam neque genus cum sit forma substantialis secundum magis et minus prædicatur de eo cujus fuerit genus. Similiter neque generis differentiæ secundum quas dividitur genus : ipsæ enim sunt quæ uniuscujusque rationem complent diffinitivam, et non suscipiunt magis et minus. Cujus causa est, quia esse quod est rei quidditas uniuscujusque, unum et idem est secundum quod a principiis essentialibus formaliter constituitur. Sic enim nec intensionem nec remissionem suscipiens est, quamvis secundum quod est in subjecto, per diversas materiæ præparationes in accidentibus magis et minus impeditum vel expeditum sit. Aquilum autem esse vel simum vel coloratum, aliquo modo sive per mixtionem contrarii, vel per causam quam habent in subjecto, intenduntur, vel remittuntur.

For those are the differences, which complete the definitive rationale of each species, and are the acts completing its being. But the substantial being of each thing whether it be said by the name of the genus according as it is in potency, or signified by the name of the difference according as it is in act, is one and the same not undergoing more and less according as it is the effect of substantial principles. For thus it is undergoing neither intension nor remission. But to be aquiline or to be snub or to be colored, somehow undergo intension or remission: because, as has been said, there are several modes of intension and remission.

Therefore it has been declared that beginning again from the superiors it must be said that of the differences indeed some are separable, but others are inseparable. For to be moved and to rest, and to be healthy and to be sick, and all that are akin to these and are taken from such easily or difficultly movable accidents, are separable or certain separable things. But on the other hand to be aquiline or to be snub, or to be rational or irrational, whether taken from separable accidents, or from substantial forms, are certain inseparable things. But of the inseparable differences, some indeed are per se, that is, taken from substantial forms: but others are per accidens, that is, taken from inseparable accidents. For rational per se, that is, through the substantial form is in ma-

-n, and mortal, and perceptible of discipline. But on the other hand to be aquiline or to be snub, or to be risible, is in man according to an accident, and not per se. Those differences therefore which are in per se, are taken in the subject by a definitive rationale, and make another according to substance from that from which they make it differ. But those which are according to accident, are neither taken in the definitive rationale of the substance, nor of themselves do they make another, but an altered thing only. And those indeed which are per se and substantial, do not undergo more and less. But those which are per accidens, although they are inseparable, nevertheless somehow undergo intension and remission. For neither is the genus since it is a substantial form predicated according to more and less of that of which it is the genus. Similarly neither are the differences of the genus according to which the genus is divided: for they themselves are those which complete the definitive rationale of each thing, and do not undergo more and less. Of which the cause is, because the being which is the quiddity of each thing, is one and the same according as it is formally constituted from essential principles. For thus it is undergoing neither intension nor remission, although according as it is in the subject, through diverse preparations of matter in accidents it may be more and less impeded or expedited. But to be aquiline or to be snub or colored, in some way either through the mixture of the contrary, or through the cause which they have in the subject, are intended or remitted.

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CAPUT III.
Qualiter differentiæ substantiales sunt constitutivæ, et qualiter sunt divisivæ.

Omnibus autem divisionibus et speciebus differentiarum sic determinatis, illa sola differentia est unum de quinque Prædicabilibus, prout hic de universalibus intendimus, quæ est per se et substantialis differentia. Hoc autem sic probatur : quia cum tres modi differentiæ,

ut prædictum est, considerentur, scilicet communis, propriæ, et magis propriæ; adhuc autem cum quædam quidem sint separabiles, quædam autem inseparabiles propter rationem quæ in antehabitis dicta est ; et rursus cum inseparabilium differentiarum quædam quidem sint per se, quædam per accidens, ut nuper dictum est : patet quod si eas quæ sunt per se consideremus per comparationem ad ea quorum sunt differentiæ, inveniemus quod per se differentiarum quædam sunt secundum quas dividimus genera in species, potestatem et non essentiam generis dividentes. Essentia enim generis in omnibus per divisionem acceptis integra manet et indivisa in quolibet : potestas autem partitur, et secundum aliquid ejus est in uno dividentium, et secundum aliquid manet in alio, et in nullo secundum totum. Aliæ autem earum differentiarum quæ per se et substantiales sunt, tales sunt secundum quas ea quæ per divisionem generum accepta sunt, specificantur.

Hæc autem divisio differentiarum per se non nisi modi divisio est : qui modus sumitur a proprio differentiæ effectu. Si enim differentia in oppositione actuali accipitur ad id a quo facit differre, pro certo hoc modo divisiva est et separativa. Oppositio enim dividit et separat, nec potest esse una et eadem potestas oppositorum secundum actum acceptorum. Si autem accipiatur differentia ut actus completivus actu potentiæ generis et determinativus, sic differentia generi et potentiæ adveniens, in speciem genus determinat, et constituit speciem. Si autem forma a qua sumitur differentia, in se secundum id quod est consideratur, cadem differentia est quæ genus dividit, et speciem constituit. Sed tamen secundum rationem prius est differentia dividens quam differentia constituens : quia oportet quod differentia prius per divisionem quam facit a genere exeat, antequam adveniens generi speciem constituat.

Hoc autem facilius scitur si exempla subjiciantur. Per se enim differentiæ om-

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CHAPTER III.
How substantial differences are constitutive, and how they are divisive.

But with all the divisions and species of differences thus determined, that difference alone is one of the five Predicables, according as we intend here concerning universals, which is per se and a substantial difference. But this is proved thus: because since the three modes of difference,

as has been said before, are considered, namely common, proper, and more proper; further indeed since some are separable, but others are inseparable on account of the reason which has been mentioned in the previous sections; and again since of inseparable differences some indeed are *per se*, others *per accidens*, as has recently been said: it is clear that if we consider those which are *per se* by comparison to those of which they are differences, we shall find that of *per se* differences there are some according to which we divide genera into species, dividing the power and not the essence of the genus. For the essence of the genus remains whole and undivided in whatever things are taken through the division: but the power is partitioned, and according to something of it it is in one of the dividing [members], and according to something it remains in the other, and in none [is it] according to the whole. But others of those differences which are *per se* and substantial, are such according to which those things which have been taken through the division of genera are specified.

But this division of *per se* differences is not but a division of mode: which mode is taken from the proper effect of the difference. For if the difference is taken in actual opposition to that from which it makes to differ, for certain in this mode it is divisive and separative. For opposition divides and separates, nor can there be one and the same power of opposites taken according to act. But if the difference be taken as a completing act of the act of the power of the genus and a determinative [one], thus the difference coming to the genus and the power determines the genus into a species, and constitutes the species. But if the form from which the difference is taken be considered in itself according to that which it is, it is the same difference which divides the genus and constitutes the species. But nevertheless according to reason the dividing difference is prior to the constituting difference: because it is necessary that the difference first go out through the division which it makes from the genus, before, by coming to the genus, it constitutes the species.

But this is more easily known if examples are subjected. For all *per se* differences are of this kind:

nes sunt hujusmodi, animatum, inanimatum, per quæ dividitur corpus : sensibile, insensibile, per quæ dividitur vivum : rationale, irrationale, per quæ dividitur animal : mortale, et immortale, per quæ dividitur rationale animal, et sic de omnibus aliis quæ a formis substantialibus sumuntur, et sunt notiones ejus quod est secundum substantiam, etiam illæ eædem sunt constitutivæ : quia illa quæ erit animati sensibilis, ita quod animatum sensibile determinetur per actum essendi, erit differentia constitutiva animalis: est enim animal per diffinitionem substantialem substantia animata sensibilis, planta autem substantia animata insensibilis, lapis autem substantia inanimata insensibilis. Ea vero differentia quæ est mortalis immortalis, et rationalis irrationalis, sunt differentiæ divisivæ quidem animalis : quia per ea genera animalium dividimus in species duabus sibi succedentibus divisionibus sic: Animalium aliud mortale, aliud immortale ; aliud rationale, aliud irrationale. Per has ergo animalis species divisionem accipiunt. Sed hæ quidem differentiæ eædem quæ per sui oppositionem divisivæ dicuntur generum, sunt et completivæ et constitutivæ specierum, quando una earum sumitur ut complementum potentiæ generi adveniens: tunc enim cum ex potentia et actu compositum completum sit et perfectum, species constituta sic completa est. Dividimus enim primo hoc genus quod est animal rationali et irrationali differentiis, potentiam animalis in duo partientes : et rursus rationale animal dividimus oppositis differentiis, mortali scilicet et immortali, et eisdem differentiis constituimus species animalis, quia differentia quæ est rationalis conjuncta cum ea quæ est mortalis, constitutivæ sunt hominis, cum genere conjunctæ quod est animal. Est enim homo secundum diffinitionem quæ dicit esse substantiale, animal rationale mortale : opposita autem differentia quæ est immortale, conjuncta cum animali rationali, constitutiva est dei secundum quod de-

diis Stoici locuti sunt. Quos etiam diffiniunt, quod dii sunt natura optimi, sicut dicit Socrates, natura animales, mente rationales, tempore autem æterni. Illæ vero quæ sunt differentiæ dictæ irrationale et mortale, cum genere conjunctæ, constitutivæ sunt specierum animalium irrationalium, ut asini, et leonis, et aliorum brutorum animalium.

Quamvis autem in infimis generibus subalternis magis sit perspicuum ad videndum, tamen supremæ et supremorum generum differentiæ per eumdem se habent modum, sicut differentiæ per quas dividitur substantia quæ est generalissimum : sicut si dicimus illas esse differentias, quibus differunt animatæ substantiæ ab inanimatis, cum dicitur, substantiarum alia est animata, alia est inanimata : sive non proximas accipiendo dicimus, quod substantiarum alia est sensibilis, alia insensibilis : eædem enim erunt inferiorum specierum constitutivæ :

nes sunt hujusmodi, animatum, inanimatum, per quæ dividitur corpus : sensibile, insensibile, per quæ dividitur vivum : rationale, irrationale, per quæ dividitur animal : mortale, et immortale, per quæ dividitur rationale animal, et sic de omnibus aliis quæ a formis substantialibus sumuntur, et sunt notiones ejus quod est secundum substantiam, etiam illæ eædem sunt constitutivæ : because that which will be of the animate sensible, so that the animate sensible is determined by the act of being, will be the constitutive difference of animal: for animal, by substantial definition, is an animate sensible substance, while plant is an animate insensible substance, but stone is an inanimate insensible substance. But that difference which is mortal [and] immortal, and rational [and] irrational, are indeed divisive differences of animal: because through these we divide the genera of animals into species by two successive divisions thus: of animals one is mortal, another immortal; one is rational, another irrational. Through these, therefore, the species of animal receive division. But indeed these same differences which by their opposition are called divisive of genera, are also completive and constitutive of species, when one of them is taken as a complement of the power coming to the genus: for then since the composite from power and act is complete and perfect, the species thus constituted is complete. For we divide first this genus which is animal by the rational and irrational differences, partitioning the power of animal into two: and again we divide rational animal by opposite differences, namely mortal and immortal, and by the same differences we constitute species of animal, because the difference which is rational joined with that which is mortal, are constitutive of man, when joined with the genus which is animal. For man, according to the definition which says the substantial being, is a rational mortal animal: but the opposite difference which is immortal, joined with the rational animal, is constitutive of God according to that which-

the Stoics spoke concerning the gods. Whom they also define, that the gods are by nature the best, as Socrates says, by nature animals, in mind rational, but in time eternal. But those differences which are called irrational and mortal, when joined with the genus, are constitutive of the species of irrational animals, such as of the ass, and of the lion, and of other brute animals.

But although it be more clear to see in the lowest subaltern genera, nevertheless the highest differences and those of the highest genera behave in the same mode, as the differences through which substance, which is the most general, is divided: as if we say that those are the differences by which animate substances differ from inanimate ones, when it is said: of substances one is animate, another is inanimate: or, taking those not proximate, we say that of substances one is sensible, another insensible: for those same ones will be constitutive of the lower species:

differentia enim animata et sensibilis ad substantiam sicut ad genus congregatæ et adjunctæ ut actus ad potentiam, animal perficiunt, quod est species substantiæ : est enim animal per diffinitionem substantia animata sensibilis. Substantia enim quamvis aliquando dividatur per corporeum et incorporeum, tamen non est propria divisio : quia corporeum proprie mathematicum est, quod proprie loquendo non est substantia : et ideo hic non tali utimur divisione. Corpus autem animatum et inanimatum dicimus differentias.

Quidam impugnant per id quod Aristoteles in libro de Anima dicere videtur [1], quod partes animalium quorumdam anulosorum animatæ sunt, et quod non convalescant, causam esse, quia organa nutrimenti non habent in partibus, ut os, et stomachum, et universaliter ea per quæ fit cibi digestio et egestio : partes tamen illæ non sunt animalia. Non igitur esse animatum sensibile animal esse videtur :

quod est contra ea quæ dicta sunt. Hæc autem objectio nihil valet penitus : et si valeret, naturalis esset, et nihil faceret ad propositam intentionem. Est enim animatum simpliciter sensibile, et est animatum sensibile secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem animatum est, cujus endelechia est anima, qua fluunt virtutes sive potentiæ particulares particulariter in membris, vitam et motum et sensum operantes : et esse sic animatum est animal. Animatum autem secundum quid est, in quo sensus et motus est per spiritum et fluxum ab anima, qui cum expirat, deficit sensus et motus. Causa autem expirandi est, quia organa reficientia et restituentia spiritum non habent. Restituuntur autem spiritus per nutrimentum in organis in nutrimento operantibus : et hæc quia non nisi secundum quid animata sunt, ideo animalia non sunt. Animatum igitur quod simpliciter animatum est, nihil prohibet differentiam animalis esse constitutivam.

Avicenna etiam hanc differentiam quam mortale diximus impugnare videtur, dicens quod a privatione non tantum secundum nomen, sed etiam secundum rem nomen accipit. Privatio autem non est forma. Cum igitur omnis differentia a forma aliqua sumpta sit, videtur mortale differentia non esse. Ad hæc autem ipsemet Avicenna videtur respondere, quod ea quæ pro differentiis hic assignantur, gratia exempli ponuntur : et non est vis de nomine, dummodo per nomina res quocumque modo designentur. Sed aliter dicendum est, quod mortale dicitur dupliciter. Uno quidem modo dicit actum in materia privationem ejusdem actus secundum potentiam concipientem : et sic mortalis est forma substantialis, et notio ejus quod potentiam habet ad moriendum : et sic dictum mortale nihil prohibet esse differentiam, quando per talem formam ad sui oppositum vel disparatum secundum eamdem formam compa-

for the animate and sensible difference, gathered and joined to substance as to a genus, like act to power, perfect animal, which is a species of substance: for animal, by definition, is an animate sensible substance. For although substance is sometimes divided through corporeal and incorporeal, nevertheless it is not a proper division: because the corporeal is properly mathematical, which properly speaking is not substance: and therefore here we do not use such a division. But we call animate and inanimate body [as] differences.

Some attack [this] through that which Aristotle seems to say in the book *On the Soul*, that the parts of certain ringed animals are animate, and that they do not recover, the cause being because they do not have organs of nourishment in the parts, such as mouth, and stomach, and universally those things through which the digestion and egestion of food occurs: nevertheless those parts are not animals. Therefore to be animate [and] sensible does not seem to be animal:

which is against those things which have been said. But this objection is worth nothing at all: and if it were worth [anything], it would be natural, and would do nothing toward the proposed intention. For there is that which is animate sensible simply, and there is that which is animate sensible according to something. Animate simply indeed is that whose entelechy is the soul, through which flow virtues or particular powers particularly into the members, operating life and movement and sense: and to be thus animate is [to be] animal. But animate according to something is that in which sense and movement is through a spirit and a flow from the soul, which when it expires, sense and movement fail. But the cause of expiring is because they do not have organs refilling and restoring the spirit. But spirits are restored through nourishment in organs operating in nourishment: and these, because they are not animate except according to something, therefore they are not animals. Therefore, as for the animate which is animate simply, nothing prohibits it from being the constitutive difference of animal.

Avicenna also seems to attack this difference which we called "mortal", saying that it receives its name from privation not only according to the name, but also according to the thing. But privation is not a form. Since therefore every difference be taken from some form, it seems that mortal is not a difference. But to these things Avicenna himself seems to respond, that those things which are assigned here for differences are put for the sake of example: and there is no force [to the argument] concerning the name, provided that through the names the things are designated in whatever mode. But it must be said otherwise, that mortal is said in two ways. In one way indeed it says an act in matter conceiving the privation of the same act according to potency: and thus mortal is a substantial form, and the notion of that which has the potency for dying: and thus called mortal, nothing prohibits it from being a difference, when through such a form it is compared to its opposite or disparate according to the same form.

ratur. Dicitur etiam mortale simpliciter, in quo est privatio potentiæ ad vitam perpetuam, et sic ab eo non sumitur differentia. Cum autem dicitur irrationale et immortale differentiæ quæ per privationes importantur in nomine, positiones intelliguntur formarum oppositarum a quibus sumuntur differentiæ. Et quia horum nomina non habemus, ideo necesse est, quod eas privatione suorum oppositorum significemus.

Ex his omnibus patet, quod eædem secundum quod sunt differentiæ, acceptæ alio et alio modo, et ad aliud comparatæ, sunt et constitutivæ et divisivæ : et omnes sive divisivæ sive constitutivæ vocantur specificæ, quæ cum suis generibus conjunctæ faciunt species et subalternas et specialissimas. Et his differentiis quia per se sunt et substantiales, maxime opus est ad divisiones generum quæ in suas potestates particulares dividuntur. Et hæ etiam perutiles sunt ad specierum diffinitiones, quæ omnes tales a prima usque ad ultimam cum genere colligunt ad speciei plenam diffinitionem, quæ diffinitio non esset, nisi a primo usque ad ultimum finem (in quo complementum est) omnia essentialia per debitum ordinem congregaret, secundum quod res a prima inchoatione sui esse procedit usque ad ultimum complementum. His autem differentiis quæ sunt secundum accidens inseparabiles, quia de esse rei non sunt : et his quæ sunt secundum accidens separabiles, quæ longius sunt ab esse rei quam inseparabiles, non utimur ad generum divisiones et diffinitiones specierum : et ideo non sunt de hac nostra intentione, nisi illæ quæ per se sunt et substantiales.

Ad hæc tamen quidam objiciunt dicentes, quod esse rei mortalis immaterialis est, quæ propter contrariorum commixtionem in continua est passionum alteratione. Omnis autem passio magis facta, abjicit a substantia : propter quod dicit. Aristoteles [1] quod non est eadem sanitas

in mane et vespere. Videtur ergo quod etiam esse rei intenditur et remittitur, et similiter rei essentialia principia, et sic non videntur differentiæ esse quæ dictæ sunt : quia non secundum esse æque participantur ab his, quorum sunt ut subjectorum. Adhuc ad idem inducunt, quod si esse rei staret secundum esse unum et idem penitus, tunc secundum esse non susciperent designationem præteriti et futuri, sed præsentis tantum. Et hoc præsens esset instans et non movens se : et sic dicere non possemus, homo fuit, et homo erit, sed tantum homo est.

pared. It is also called "mortal" simply, in which there is the privation of the power for perpetual life, and thus a difference is not taken from it. But when "irrational" and "immortal" are called differences which are imported in the name through privations, the positions of the opposite forms from which the differences are taken are understood. And because we do not have names for these, therefore it is necessary that we signify them by the privation of their opposites.

From all these things it is clear, that the same ones according as they are differences, taken in one way and another, and compared to another thing, are both constitutive and divisive: and all, whether divisive or constitutive, are called specific [differences], which when joined with their genera make species both subaltern and most specific. And of these differences, because they are *per se* and substantial, there is the greatest need for the divisions of genera which are divided into their particular powers. And these are also very useful for the definitions of species, which collect all such [differences] from the first even to the last with the genus for the full definition of the species, which definition would not be, unless it gathered all essential things through a due order from the first even to the last end (in which there is the complement), according as the thing proceeds from the first inchoation of its being even to the last complement. But as for these differences which are inseparable according to accident, because they are not of the being of the thing: and as for those which are separable according to accident, which are further from the being of the thing than the inseparable ones, we do not use them for the divisions of genera and the definitions of species: and therefore they are not of our intention here, except those which are *per se* and substantial.

To these things nevertheless some object saying, that the being of a mortal thing is immaterial, which on account of the mixing of contraries is in a continual alteration of passions. But every passion made greater, casts out from the substance: on account of which Aristotle says that health is not the same

in the morning and in the evening. It seems therefore that even the being of a thing is intended and remitted, and similarly the essential principles of a thing, and thus those which have been mentioned do not seem to be differences: because according to being they are not equally participated in by those of which they are as [differences] of subjects. Further toward the same [point] they induce, that if the being of a thing stood according to one and the same being entirely, then according to being they would not receive the designation of past and future, but of the present only. And this present would be an instant and not moving itself: and thus we could not say, "man was", and "man will be", but only "man is".

Et ad hoc quidem dicendum est, quod esse rei dupliciter consideratur, si secundum comparationem ad id in quo est et cujus esse est, et secundum comparationem ad id a quo est formaliter constituente ipsum. Et primo quidem modo esse mobilis mobile est, et esse temporalis est temporale : et hoc esse non est omnino idem mane et vespere ex parte ejus in quo est. Sic autem est et mobile et temporale, aliquid abjiciens, et aliquid suscipiens continue secundum quod determinatur ad præteritum et ad futurum. Secundo autem modo consideratum est essentiæ simpliciter actus : quæ, inquam, essentia secundum se incorruptibilis est et ingenerabilis : neque generatur, neque corrumpitur, nisi secundum accidens, et sic esse immobile est et intemporale. Differentiæ autem cum ab actu differendi quem faciunt, dicuntur, sumuntur ab esse quod sic ambo hæc habet, scilicet quod est actus essentiæ in eo quod est, et ideo utroque modo designantur. Hoc igitur est, quod antiqui sub compendio de differentia dixerunt, quod cum tres species sive tres modi differentiæ considerentur, et cum hæ quidem sint separabiles, illæ vero inseparabiles : et rursus cum inseparabilium quidem hæ sint per se sive substantiales, illæ vero per accidens a formis accidentalibus sumptæ: et rursus earum quæ per se sunt differentiarum, aliæ sunt secundum quas dividimus genera in species, aliæ vero secundum quas ea quæ divisa sunt genera specificantur : sicut cum per se differentiæ omnes hujusmodi sint in prædicamento substantiæ, animatum, inanimatum ; sensibile, insensibile ; rationale, irrationale ; mortale, et immortale quæ divisivæ sunt generum : ea quidem quæ est animati et sensibilis differentia cum substantia congregata constitutiva est animalis, secundum quod animal est species subalterna : est enim animal per diffinitionem substantia animata sensibilis. Ea vero quæ est mortalis et immortalis differentia, et rationalis et irrationalis, divisivæ sunt animalis differentiæ secundum quod animal est genus subalternum : per cas enim dividimus genera quæ sunt animal, et rationale animal, quod est circumlocutio generis subalterni quod sub animali continetur. Dividimus, inquam, genera illa in species, aut subalternas, aut specialissimas. Sed hæ quidem exdem differentiæ quæ generum dicuntur esse divisivæ, et completivæ et constitutivæ dicuntur esse specierum : dividimus enim animal ut genus rationali et irrationali differentia, et rursus rationale animal dividimus mortali et immortali differentia : sed eadem quæ est rationalis differentia, et mortalis animalis quidem divisiva, conjuncta ad genus, constitutiva efficitur hominis differentia. Rationalis vero et immortalis cum genere conjuncta, constitutiva est dei, prout Socrates de diis loquitur, et Apuleius dicit in libro de Deo Socratis. Illæ vero differentiæ quæ sunt irrationalis et mortalis, conjunctæ cum genere, animalium irrationalium specierum sunt constitutivæ.

And to this indeed it must be said, that the being of a thing is considered in two ways, if [it is] according to the comparison to that in which it is and whose being it is, and according to the comparison to that by which it is formally constituting it. And in the first way indeed the being of the movable is movable, and the being of the temporal is temporal: and this being is not altogether the same morning and evening on the part of that in which it is. But so it is both movable and temporal, casting out something and receiving something continually according as it is determined to the past and to the future. But in the second way, being considered is simply the act of the essence: which essence, I say, according to itself is incorruptible and ungenerable: neither is it generated, nor corrupted, except according to accident, and thus being is immobile and intemporal. But differences, since they are said from the act of differing which they make, are taken from the being which thus has both these, namely that it is the act of the essence in that which it is, and therefore they are designated in both ways. This therefore is what the ancients said under a compendium concerning difference, that since three species or three modes of difference are considered, and since some of these are separable, others indeed inseparable: and again since of the inseparable ones these are *per se* or substantial, those indeed *per accidens* taken from accidental forms: and again of those which are *per se* differ-

ences, some are according to which we divide genera into species, but others according to which those genera which have been divided are specified: as when all *per se* differences of this kind are in the predicament of substance: animate, inanimate; sensible, insensible; rational, irrational; mortal, and immortal, which are divisive of genera: that indeed which is the difference of animate and sensible, gathered with substance, is constitutive of animal, according as animal is a subaltern species: for animal is by definition an animate sensible substance. But that which is the mortal and immortal difference, and rational and irrational, are divisive differences of animal according as animal is a subaltern genus: for through these we divide the genera which are animal, and rational animal, which is a circumlocution of a subaltern genus which is contained under animal. We divide, I say, those genera into species, either subaltern or most specific. But indeed these same differences which are said to be divisive of genera, are also said to be completive and constitutive of species: for we divide animal as a genus by the rational and irrational difference, and again we divide rational animal by the mortal and immortal difference: but the same [difference] which is the rational difference, and the mortal [one], being divisive indeed of animal, being joined to the genus, is made the constitutive difference of man. But the rational and immortal [difference] joined with the genus, is constitutive of God, as Socrates speaks of the gods, and Apuleius says in the book *On the God of Socrates*. But those differences which are irrational and mortal, joined with the genus, are constitutive of the species of irrational animals.

Sic etiam sunt supremæ substantiæ differentiæ, quæ sunt vocatæ animati sive sensibilis, congregatæ ad substantiam quæ est supremum genus, animal perficiunt quod est species subalterna substantiæ. Quoniam ergo eædem differentiæ aliquo modo acceptæ sunt constitutivæ, alio autem modo sunt divisivæ, omnes tamen dicuntur specificæ et vocantur : quia potius a constitutione accipiunt nomen quam a divisione, quia divisio fit propter constitutionem. Et his differentiis maxime opus est ad divisiones generum, et specierum diffinitiones : sed non his quæ secundum accidens sumptæ sunt, quamvis sint inseparabiles. Magis autem ad divisiones et diffinitiones non utimur differentiis quæ sunt separabiles, ab accidentibus separabilibus sumptis.

CAPUT IV — *Qualiter per differentiam abundet species a genere, et qualiter potestate genus habet differentias.*

Omnibus (quæ de multiplicitate differentiæ dicenda videbantur) jam habitis, nunc intendendum est de differentia secundum quod unum est de quinque universalibus, et secundum quod de ea intenderunt Philosophi qui Peripatetici dicuntur. Hi enim differentiam determinantes sive describentes dicunt, quod differentia est qua abundat species a genere. Quod exemplariter simul et inductive probant : quia homo cum sit species tantum, et non genus, plus habet ab animali (quod est genus hominis) rationale et mortale quæ sunt differentiæ. Animal enim secundum quod est genus, neque ipsum secundum se acceptum, actu aliquid horum est. Neque enim animal est rationale secundum seipsum : quia si secundum se esset rationale vel mortale, sequeretur quod omne animal esset mortale, quod falsum est secundum ea quæ ante determinata sunt. Cum autem dicimus quod species differentia vel differentiis abundat a genere, intelligimus, quod id quod abundat aliquo, habet illud intra se quo abundat et actu et intellectu : ita scilicet quod posita specie intra ipsius essentiam, actu speciem constituens, ponitur differentia : et quod intellecta specie intelligitur differentia, et est principium intelligendi speciem : quorum neutrum facit genus. Si enim genus-actu haberet differentiam, omnia quæ exiguntur ad speciei positionem haberet. Et si differentia prout est principium intelligendi speciem, esset in intellectu generis, non oporteret, quod in diffinitione speciei posito genere poneretur differentia : quia in nomine generis intelligeretur, et esset nugatio, quando in diffinitione cum genere poneretur. Igitur differentia nec actu nec intellectu est in genere : in specie autem et actu et intellectu. Differentia igitur est, qua abundat species a genere, sive superat genus et actu et intellectu.

So also are the differences of the highest substance, which are called animate or sensible, gathered to substance which is the highest genus, they perfect animal which is a subaltern species of substance. Since therefore the same differences taken in one way are constitutive, but in another way are divisive, nevertheless all are called

and are named specific: because they receive their name from constitution rather than from division, because division occurs for the sake of constitution. And of these differences there is the greatest need for the divisions of genera, and the definitions of species: but not of those which are taken according to accident, although they be inseparable. But much more we do not use for divisions and definitions differences which are separable, taken from separable accidents.

CHAPTER IV — *How species abounds from genus through difference, and how genus has differences in power.*

With all things (which seemed necessary to be said concerning the multiplicity of difference) now having been held, now we must intend concerning difference according as it is one of the five universals, and according as the philosophers who are called Peripatetics intended concerning it. For these, determining or describing difference, say that difference is that by which the species abounds from the genus. Which they prove exemplarily at once and inductively: because man, since he is a species only, and not a genus, has more than animal (which is the genus of man) [namely] rational and mortal, which are differences. For animal according as it is a genus, neither taken according to itself, is actually any of these. For neither is animal rational according to itself: because if according to itself it were rational or mortal, it would follow that every animal would be mortal, which is false according to those things which have been determined before. But when we say that species abounds from the genus by difference or differences, we understand that that which abounds by something, has that within itself by which it abounds both in act and in intellect: namely in such a way that the species having been posited within its essence, the difference is posited actually constituting the species: and that the species having been understood, the difference is understood, and is the principle of understanding the species: neither of which the genus does. For if the genus-

were to actually have the difference, it would have all things which are exacted for the position of the species. And if the difference according as it is the principle of understanding the species, were in the intellect of the genus, it would not be necessary, that in the definition of the species the genus having been posited the difference would be posited: because it would be understood in the name of the genus, and it would be a nugation, when it were posited in the definition with the genus. Therefore difference in neither act nor intellect is in the genus: but in the species it is both in act and in intellect. Therefore difference is, by which the species abounds from the genus, or overcomes the genus both in act and in intellect.

Abundat autem actu, ut species sit in actu sive in effectu : intellectu vero abundat, quia est de intellectu speciei differentia, nec intelligi potest in actu nisi per differentiam sine qua non intelligitur nisi in potentia.

Tali autem assignatione non potest diffiniri neque differentia communis, neque differentia propria. Hæ enim, ut per antedicta manifestum est, non constituunt simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sive secundum esse formæ accidentalis : et ideo non sunt in actu constitutionis in esse specifico, quando sunt in specie : sed sunt in ipsa sicut in subjecto, quod non constituitur ab accidente, sed potius in esse constituit accidens quod est in eo : et hoc est quod dicit Avicenna, quod subjectum est ens in se completum, quod est occasio alteri, hoc est, accidenti existenti in eo. Hæ etiam differentiæ, communis scilicet et propria, non sunt de intellectu speciei, sed principium intelligendi eam : quia accidens, ut docet Aristoteles [1], non diffinit subjectum, sed potius subjectum cadit in diffinitione ipsius loco differentiæ, et non e converso : sicut patet cum diffinitur simum, et dicitur quod est nasi curvitas : Curvitas enim quod est formale ad simum, est ut genus ambiens et curvitatem in naso et in tibia. Nasus autem in diffinitione illa positus, contrahit curvitatem ad simitatem. Cum igitur differentia in diffinitione sit contrahens genus et determinans ad speciem, patet quod subjectum est ut differentia : et curvitas quæ formale est, in diffinitione est ut genus : et hoc est ideo, quia accidens causatur a subjecto, et non essentialiter ab eo quod formaliter est in ipso, eo quod essentialitatem propriam a seipso non habet, nec etiam est ens proprie loquendo, sed in hoc habet entitatem, quia est entis vel mensura vel dispositio vel aliqua alia passio ipsius. Planum igitur est, quod assignatio nec convenit communi, neque propriæ differentiæ, sed tantum ei quæ est magis propria et per se, et per essentiam differentiæ.

Si autem quæritur, cum proprium sit qualitas speciei, accidens autem qualitas individui, sicut differentia est qualitas generis, quare differentia quæ est unum quinque universalium potius sumitur a qualitate generis quam a qualitate speciei vel individui, maxime cum unum posset comparari ad alterum per qualitatem speciei et individui, sicut per qualitatem generis

But it abounds in act, so that the species may be in act or in effect: but in intellect it abounds, because difference is concerning the intellect of the species, nor can it be understood in act except through difference without which it is not understood except in potency.

But by such an assignation neither common difference nor proper difference can be defined. For these, as is manifest through the afore-said things, do not constitute simply, but according to something, or according to the being of an accidental form: and therefore they are not in the act of constitution into specific being, when they are in the species: but they are in it as in a subject, which is not constituted from accident, but rather constitutes into being the accident which is in it: and this is that which Avicenna says, that a subject is an entity complete in itself, which is the occasion for another, this is, to the accident existing in it. Also these differences, namely the common and proper, are not concerning the intellect of the species, but the principle of understanding it: because accident, as Aristotle teaches, does not define the subject, but rather the subject falls into its definition in place of the difference, and not conversely: as is clear when the snub is defined, and it is said that it is the curvature of a nose: For curvature which is formal to the snub, is as a genus ambient both of curvature in a nose and in a shinbone. But a nose having been posited in that definition, contracts curvature to snubness. Therefore since a difference in definition is contracting the genus and determining to the species, it is clear that the subject is as a difference: and curvature which is formal, is in definition as a genus: and this is therefore, because accident is caused from the subject, and not essentially from that which formally is in it, by this that it does not have proper essentiality from itself, nor also is it an entity properly speaking, but in this it has entity, because it is either the measure or disposition or some other passion of an entity itself. It is plain therefore, that the assignation convenes neither with the common, nor with the proper difference, but only to that which is most proper and *per se*, and through the essence of a difference.

But if it is asked, since the proper is a quality of the species, but the accident the quality of the individual, just as the difference is the quality of the genus, why the difference which is one of the five universals is rather taken from the quality of the genus than from the quality of the species or of the individual, especially since one could be compared to another through the quality of the species and of the individual, just as through the quality of the genus.

Dicendum quod differentia in vero actu et effectu differentiæ sumi non posset, nisi ab eo quod vere facit differre, vere autem non facit differre, nisi illud quod facit aliud secundum substantiam formæ, quia ea quæ differunt per materiam non differunt per verum esse : cum, sicut dicit Boetius, species sit totum esse individuorum. Cum igitur communis et propria differentia non faciant aliud, non potest ab eis sumi verum prædicabile quod est differentia, quod est unum quinque universalium. Sed remanent simpliciter propria vel accidentia, et secundum quid facientia differre ea quæ secundum ipsa comparantur ad invicem. Differentia autem per se et substantialis secundum respectum quem habet ad subjectum, est forma determinans materiam: et secundum hoc non est prædicabile, sed potius secundum respectum quem habet ad genus, quod dividit et determinat et habet deducere ad speciem. Et sic divisio

secundum intellectum prior est in ea quam constitutio : quia dividendo determinat ad speciem, et constituit eam. Et ideo per actum dividendi (qui prior est in ea) nomen accipit differentiæ quæ est unum de quinque prædicabilibus, ut dictum est. Sic ergo patet quod assignatio conveniens est, qua dicitur quod differentia est, qua abundat species a genere.

Sed his sic determinatis, quæstio est, unde species habent differentias quibus sic abundant a genere : aut enim habebunt a seipsis, aut a nihilo, aut a genere. Et siquidem habent eas a seipsis, tunc idem est constituens seipsum seipso : et sic idem erit faciens et factum, et formatum : eo quod differentia est faciens et formans et constituens speciem. Si enim species a seipsa habet differentiam, tunc oportet quod differentia secundum seipsam sit species, et species secundum seipsam sit differentia : quia aliter species a seipsa et secundum seipsam non haberet differentiam : secundum seipsam enim habere, et essentialiter habere idem est.

Si autem a nihilo haberet differentiam, tunc sequeretur aliquid fieri perfectum in esse ex nihilo : quod omnes negaverunt Philosophi. Sequeretur etiam, quod differentia esset ens primum creatum, quod solum fit ex nihilo. Fit enim non supposito quodam alio per intellectum. Hoc autem falsum est, quia differentia supposita quoddam aliud supponitur secundum intellectum, sicut patet in hoc quod est rationale : supposito enim rationali supponitur vivum, et substantia, et ens. Patet igitur quod non habet ex nihilo.

It must be said that difference in the true act and effect of difference could not be taken, unless from that which truly makes to differ, but it truly does not make to differ, except that which makes it other according to the substance of form, because those things which differ through matter do not differ through true being: since, as Boethius says, species is the whole being of individuals. Therefore since common and proper difference do not make [it] other, a true predicable which is difference, which is one of the five universals, cannot be taken from them. But there remain simply proper or accidental things, and according to something making to differ those things which according to themselves are compared to each other. But a *per se* and substantial difference according to the respect which it has to the subject, is a form determining matter: and according to this it is not a predicable, but rather according to the respect which it has to the genus, which it divides and determines and has to deduce to the species. And thus a division

according to the intellect it is prior in it than constitution: because by dividing it determines to the species, and constitutes it. And therefore through the act of dividing (which is prior in it) it receives the name of difference which is one of the five predicables, as has been said. Thus therefore it is clear that the assignation is convenient, by which it is said that it is the difference, by which the species abounds from the genus.

But these things having been thus determined, the question is, from where species have the differences by which they thus abound from the genus: for they will have them either from themselves, or from nothing, or from the genus. And if indeed they have them from themselves, then the same thing is constituting itself by itself: and thus the same thing will be the maker and the made, and the formed: because the difference is the maker and former and constituent of the species. For if the species has the difference from itself, then it is necessary that the difference according to itself be the species, and the species according to itself be the difference: because otherwise the species from itself and according to itself would not have the difference: for to have according to itself, and to have essentially, is the same.

But if it were to have the difference from nothing, then it would follow that something becomes perfect in being from nothing: which all Philosophers have denied. It would also follow, that the difference would be the first created entity, which alone is made from nothing. For it is made not having presupposed some other thing through the intellect. This, however, is false, because the difference having been presupposed some other thing is presupposed according to the intellect, as is clear in this which is rational: for the rational having been presupposed, the living is presupposed, and substance, and entity. It is clear therefore that it does not have it from nothing.

Si autem haberet eas ex genere, tunc cum non sit differentia, nisi per oppositionem, eo quod oppositio causa est differendi, sequitur quod habet oppositas in genere : non enim est ratio, quod una unius speciei differentia sit in genere, et non alia sibi opposita. Adhuc autem opposita nata sunt circa idem fieri. Si autem sic est, tunc sequitur quod opposita sunt simul in eodem : quod est impossibile.

Solvunt autem hoc antiqui Philosophi Peripatetici dicentes, quod potestate omnes differentiæ positæ sunt sub genere in eodem genere, et a potestate generis sunt in specie, sed actu non sunt simul in ipso genere. Nec est inconveniens, ut dicunt, in eodem potestate esse opposita. Et sic dicunt quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod ex nihilo aliquid fiat : fit enim ex aliquo quod est in potentia aliquid quod est in actu. Nec etiam sequitur quod opposita secundum actum simul sint in eodem.

Hæc autem determinatio Peripateticorum multas videtur habere difficultates. Videtur enim genus actu habere differentias oppositas simul. Istæ enim actu veræ sunt, animal est rationale, animal est irrationale : sicut istæ actu simul sunt veræ, homo est albus, homo est niger : nec essent simul veræ nisi actu animal esset rationale, et actu animal esset irrationale : videtur ergo, quod in hoc genere quod est animal, simul actu sint differentiæ oppositæ, quæ sunt rationale et irrationale.

Sed adhuc quæritur, concesso quod potestate et non actu oppositæ differentiæ sint in uno et eodem genere, qualis sit illa potestas : aut est materialis, aut activa, aut formalis, aut finalis ; oportet enim, quod secundum aliquam sit alicujus causæ potestatem. Si enim materialis est, tunc oporteret quod per motum vel per mutationem educeretur de illa : quia, sicut dicit Aristoteles [1], potentia passiva sive materialis est principium transmutandi ex alio secundum quod est aliud : et tunc oporteret assignare quod esset movens in educendo hujusmodi potestatem ad actum : eo quod, sicut vult Aristoteles [2] et Averroes [3], nihil est in potentia in aliquo, nisi quod uno motore educitur-

de illo ad actum. Quid autem sit movens ad hoc, quod potestas generis materialis in actum exeat, a Peripateticis non est assignatum. Postea quod est in potestate materiali, est sicut in imperfecto. Imperfectum autem causa perfecti esse non potest. Differentia autem causa est perfectionis speciei. Et sic differentia non potest esse in specie a potestate generis (ut videtur) etiam si dicatur potestate esse in genere. Adhuc autem Peripatetici dicunt quod differentiæ in genere sunt potestate. Quæritur igitur, utrum idem sit habere differentias potestate, et habere differentias potentia ?

But if it were to have them from the genus, then since there is no difference, except through opposition, because opposition is the cause of differing, it follows that it has opposite ones in the genus: for there is no reason, that one difference of one species be in the genus, and not another opposite to it. Furthermore, however, opposite things are by nature born to become around the same thing. If, however, it is so, then it follows that opposites are simultaneously in the same thing: which is impossible.

But the ancient Peripatetic Philosophers solve this saying, that in power all differences are posited under the genus in the same genus, and from the power of the genus they are in the species, but in act they are not simultaneously in the genus itself. Nor is it inconvenient, as they say, for opposites to be in the same thing in power. And thus they say that from this it does not follow, that something becomes from nothing: for from something which is in potency, something which is in act becomes. Nor also does it follow that opposites according to act are simultaneously in the same thing.

But this determination of the Peripatetics seems to have many difficulties. For the genus seems to have opposite differences simultaneously in act. For these are actually true, *animal is rational*, *animal is irrational*: just as these are actually true simultaneously, *man is white*, *man is black*: nor would they be simultaneously true unless animal were actually rational, and animal were actually irrational: it seems therefore, that in this genus which is animal, there are simultaneously in act opposite differences, which are rational and irrational.

But it is still asked, granted that opposite differences are in one and the same genus in power and not in act, what sort that power is: whether it is material, or active, or formal, or final; for it is necessary, that it be according to the power of some cause. For if it is material, then it would be necessary that it be led out from it through motion or through mutation: because, as Aristotle says, passive or material potency is the principle of transmuting from another according as it is another: and then it would be necessary to assign what would be the mover in leading out this sort of power to act: because, as Aristotle and Averroes wish, nothing is in potency in something, unless it is led out by one motor from it-

from it to act. But what may be the mover to this, that the material power of the genus should go out into act, has not been assigned by the Peripatetics. Afterward that which is in material power, is as in the imperfect. But the imperfect cannot be the cause of the perfect. But difference is the cause of the perfection of the species. And thus difference cannot be in the species from the power of the genus (as it seems) even if it be said to be in the genus in power. Furthermore, however, the Peripatetics say that differences are in the genus in power. It is asked therefore, whether it is the same to have differences in power, and to have differences in potency?

Si enim hoc dicatur esse idem, tunc videtur quod differentiæ sint in genere sicut formæ sunt in materia. Materia autem nullo modo causa est quod forma sit, vel quod actu sit : et sic videtur quod genus nullo modo sit causa quod differentia sit, vel quod actu sit. Adhuc autem quæritur, an differentia sit in genere per hoc, quod genus habet potestate differentias? Si enim in genere sit differentia, cum idem sit esse in genere et esse sub genere, tunc differentia erit generi supposita. Suppositum autem generi species est. Videbitur ergo differentia species esse, quod omnino falsum est. Adhuc autem si differentia esset in genere, esset ut genus participans secundum essentiam et intellectum, quod omnino est absurdum : quia tunc differentia esset composita ex genere et quodam alio contrahente, quod contrahens non posset esse nisi differentia, et sic differentiæ esset differentia : et tunc idem sequeretur de illa differentiæ differentia, et abiret hoc in infinitum.

Si autem non est in genere, tunc videtur falsum quod in ante habitis determinatum est, quia decem genera sunt sicut prima decem rerum principia : non enim primum principium in ordine rerum esse potest, ad quod non omnes res illius ordinis reduci possunt : differentiæ enim substantiæ, substantiæ sunt, quia substantiam perficiunt : et tamen ad substantiam ut ad genus primum reduci non possunt, ut videtur per inductam rationem.

Si forte aliquis dicat, quod sunt in genere potestate secundum potestatem causæ formalis, tunc sequetur quod genus sit forma differentiæ : quod penitus est falsum, cum Porphyrius dicat quod genus est sicut materia, et differentia ut forma, species autem sicut constituta ex materia et forma: Adhuc autem si genus esset sicut forma, esset genus ut qualitas essentialis. Prædicaretur ergo in quale, et non in quid, quod est contra ea quæ de genere prædeterminata sunt.

Quod autem non sint in genere sicut in potestate causæ finalis, ex eodem probatur : quia in naturis eorum idem est forma et finis secundum rem, quamvis differant secundum rationem suæ causalitatis, quia finis est secundum quod quiescit in ea motus moventis, forma autem secundum quod dat esse ei, quod est secundum formam.

For if this be said to be the same, then it seems that differences are in the genus just as forms are in matter. But matter is in no way the cause that form is, or that it is in act: and thus it seems that the genus is in no way the cause that difference is, or that it is in act. Furthermore it is asked, whether difference is in the genus through this, that the genus has differences in power? For if difference be in the genus, since it is the same to be in the genus and to be under the genus, then the difference will be a subject of the genus. But the subject of a genus is the species. Therefore it will seem that the difference is a species, which is entirely false. Furthermore if the difference were in the genus, it would be as participating the genus according to essence and intellect, which is entirely absurd: because then the difference would be composed from the genus and some other contracting thing, which contracting thing could not be unless it were a difference, and thus of a difference there would be a difference: and then the same thing would follow concerning that difference of a difference, and this would go off into infinity.

But if it is not in the genus, then it seems false what has been determined in the things previously held, because the ten genera are as the first ten principles of things: for there cannot be a first principle in the order of things, to which all things of that order cannot be reduced: for the differences of substance are substances, because they perfect substance: and yet they cannot be reduced to substance as to the first genus, as seems through the induced reason.

If perhaps someone says, that they are in the genus in power according to the power of the formal cause, then it will follow that the genus is the form of the difference: which is entirely false, since Porphyry says that the genus is as matter, and the difference as form, but the species as constituted from matter and form: Furthermore, however, if the genus were as form, the genus would be as an essential quality. It would therefore be predicated in the *of what sort* (quale), and not in the *what* (quid), which is against those things which have been pre-determined concerning the genus.

But that they are not in the genus as in the power of the final cause, is proved from the same thing: because in their natures form and end are the same according to the thing, although they differ according to the reason of their causality, because the end is according to that which the motion of the mover rests in it, but the form according as it gives being to it, which is according to form.

Quæratur ergo, si sunt in genere secundum potestatem causæ efficientis ? Hoc enim videtur dicere quidam, quia quæstio hæc quam fecerunt Peripatetici, unde habeant species differentias, nihil videtur quærere, nisi de causa efficiente. Si enim detur quod sint in genere sicut in potestate materiali differentiæ, adhuc restat quærere, unde sive quo movente et educente differentiam de genere ad actum species habeat differentias, et sic videtur differentia esse in genere secundum potestatem causæ efficientis. Si autem hoc concedatur, videbitur accidere inconveniens : quia potestas efficientis per hoc est completa ad agendum, quod agit ad speciem et formam qua ipsum agens est actu. Genius ergo similiter agens ad actum differentiæ, est in actu differentiæ. Et sic genus ut genus habet actu differentias. Et sequitur inconveniens supra dictum, quod scilicet in eodem essent actu opposita, quod absurdum est. Videtur ergo, quod nullo modo potestatis differentiæ potestate sunt in genere. Si forte aliquis dicere velit, quod sunt-

in genere sicut in semine sive in causa seminativa vel causa seminali : dicit enim Aristoteles [1] quod semen per virtutem seminativam quæ in ipso est, in spiritu naturalis seminis (præter substantiam sicci et humidi quæ in ipso sunt sicut materia) est causa movens, sive unde, sive efficiens : et quod genus hæc duo in se habeat, scilicet subjectum, quod quidem formabile est per differentiam, et virtutem formativam differentiæ, qua ipsum genus formatur ad speciem. Quæratur de ipsa formativa virtute, unde sit in genere : non enim genus habet eam a seipso, secundum quod ipsum primum subjectum est : secundum enim quod est subjectum, non est formativum, sed formabile, nec de facili videri potest aliquid aliud in genere, a quo concipiat hujusmodi virtutem. Adhuc autem concesso quod talis virtus formativa sit in genere, quæratur ex quo format differentiam quam producit in specie : non enim format eam de formabili specie, quod est generis substantia, quia sic formabile et formans essent idem, quod esse non potest. Si autem format ex alio, quæratur quid sit illud, et qualiter sit in genere : hoc enim et hujusmodi valde difficile est invenire, et ab antiquis videntur esse non tacta per determinationem sufficientem.

Ad omnia autem hæc determinanda prænotandum est, quod ut dicit Averroes [2], genus not est materia, sed forma generalis, et confusa, et indistincta, et diffusa in materia non determinata per formam : quam diffusam formam et confusam vocant quidam formæ inchoationem : propter quam inchoationem formæ in materia diffusam ipsa materia a quibusdam antiquis locus formæ dicebatur, in quo latent formæ : et ideo latentiam formarum principium fecerunt, ut dictum est in *Physicis*, et erat hoc dictum Anaxagoræ :

Let it be asked, therefore, if they are in the genus according to the power of the efficient cause? For some seem to say this, because this question which the Peripatetics made, from where species have differences, seems to ask nothing except concerning the efficient cause. For if it is granted that differences are in the genus as in material power, it still remains to ask, from where or by what mover and leader-out of the difference from the genus to act the species has differences, and thus it seems the difference is in the genus according to the power of the efficient cause. If, however, this is granted, it will seem that an inconvenience happens: because the power of the efficient is complete for acting by this, that it acts toward the species and form by which the agent itself is in act. Therefore the genus similarly acting toward the act of the difference, is in the act of the difference. And thus the genus as genus has differences in act. And the inconvenience said above follows, that namely in the same thing there would be opposites in act, which is absurd. It seems therefore, that in no way are the powers of the difference in the genus in power. If perhaps someone should wish to say, that they are-

in the genus just as in seed or in a seminative cause or seminal cause: for Aristotle says that seed through the seminative virtue which is in it, in the spirit of natural seed (besides the substance of the dry and the moist which are in it as matter) is the moving cause, or from where, or the efficient [cause]: and that the genus has these two in itself, namely the subject, which indeed is formable through the difference, and the formative virtue of the difference, by which the genus itself is formed toward the species. Let it be asked concerning the formative virtue itself, from where it may be in the genus: for the genus does not have it from itself, according as it itself is the first subject: for according as it is a subject, it is not formative, but formable, nor can there easily be seen some other thing in the genus, from which it might conceive this sort of virtue. Furthermore, granted that such a formative virtue is in the genus, let it be asked from what it forms the difference which it produces in the species: for it does not form it from the formable species, which is the substance of the genus, because thus the formable and the forming would be the same, which cannot be. But if it forms from another, let it be asked what that is, and in what way it is in the genus: for this and this sort of thing is very difficult to find, and by the ancients they seem not to have been touched through a sufficient determination.

To all these things to be determined it must be pre-noted, that as Averroes says, the genus is not matter, but a general form, both confused, and indistinct, and diffused in matter not determined through form: which diffused and confused form some call the inchoation of form: on account of which inchoation of form diffused in matter matter itself was called by some ancients the place of form, in which forms lie hidden: and therefore they made the latency of forms a principle, as was said in the *Physics*, and this was the saying of Anaxagoras:

propter quod etiam Aristoteles et omnes Peripatetici dixerunt educi de materia omnes formas, et non esse eas a datore extrinseco.

Cum autem jam ante probatum sit, quod forma non prædicatur secundum quod est forma materiæ, nec etiam secundum quod est forma totius, sed prædicatur prout ipsa est notio totius esse, vel in potentia existentis, vel existentis in actu, sequitur necessario quod genus est forma totius existentis in potentia, et quod nomen generis et res prædicatur secundum quod genus per abstractionem intellectus dicit notionem totius existentis in potentia. Differentia autem dicit notionem actus totum esse determinantis, secundum quod est actu indeterminato : quia aliter prædicari de specie non posset. Species autem dicit notionem totius sic determinati et distincti, et ideo quia quod distinctum dicit et determinatum, in quid et non in quale prædicatur. Similiter autem et genus, quia quid distinguibile dicit, in quid et non in quale prædicatur. Differentia autem, quia actu distinguens dicit, et non distinguibile secundum potentiam, nec distinctum secundum actum, ideo in quale et non in quid habet prædicari. Si autem esset notio differentiæ nomen, quod diceretur distinguere potentia, et non actu distinguens, prædicaretur in abstracto et non in concreto, et diceretur quod homo esset rationalitas, et non rationalis, quod absurdum est.

Dicemus ergo, quod differentiam habet species a genere, et differentia est in generis potestate sicut distinctio in indistincto confuso : sicut color secundum esse formale est in lumine indistincto et confuso diaphani sive perspicui, qui distinguitur non alio quodam distinguente, sed esse formale ipsius ejusdem luminis diffusione determinata ad superiorem determinati corporis : propter quod dicitur, quod ipsum lumen et ex se et de se format colores secundum esse formale quod est in ipsis. Et hæc est Avicennæ determinatio, sicut colligi potest-

in *prima philosophia* ipsius. Propter quod dicitur genus potestate habere differentias potius quam potentia : quia potentia ad esse et non esse indifferens est, potestas autem est potentia stans per actus inchoationem. Et hæc est causa, quare inter genus et differentiam cum in una et eadem diffinitione colliguntur, non est naturarum diversarum congregatio : quia si hoc esset, diffinitio esset multa et non unum. Non tamen hoc dicere intendimus, quod genus et differentiæ non sint diversæ naturæ.

on account of which also Aristotle and all the Peripatetics said that all forms are led out from matter, and that they are not from an extrinsic giver.

Since, however, it has already been proved before, that form is not predicated according as it is the form of matter, nor also according as it is the form of the whole, but it is predicated as it itself is the notion of the whole being, either existing in potency, or existing in act, it follows necessarily that the genus is the form of the whole existing in potency, and that the name of the genus and the thing is predicated according as the genus through the abstraction of the intellect says the notion of the whole existing in potency. But the difference says the notion of act determining the whole being, according as it is in an undetermined act: because otherwise it could not be predicated of the species. But the species says the notion of the whole thus determined and distinct, and therefore because it says that which is distinct and determined, it is predicated in the *what* (quid) and not in the *of what sort* (quale). But similarly also the genus, because it says a distinguishable *what*, it is predicated in the *what* and not in the *of what sort*. But the difference, because it says that which is actually distinguishing, and not distinguishable according to potency, nor distinct according to act, therefore it has to be predicated in the *of what sort* and not in the *what*. But if the notion of the difference were a name, which would be said to distinguish in potency, and not actually distinguishing, it would be predicated in the abstract and not in the concrete, and it would be said that man were rationality, and not rational, which is absurd.

We shall say therefore, that the species has difference from the genus, and difference is in the power of the genus just as distinction in the indistinct confused: just as color according to formal being is in the light indistinct and confused of the diaphanous or perspicuous, which is distinguished not by some other certain distinguishing thing, but the formal being of that same light by a diffusion determined to the upper part of a determined body: on account of which it is said, that the light itself both from itself and of itself forms colors according to formal being which is in them. And this is the determination of Avicenna, as can be gathered-

in the *first philosophy* of his. On account of which it is said that the genus has differences in potency [potestate] rather than in potency [potentia]: because potency [potentia] is indifferent to being and not being, but potency [potestate] is a potency standing through the inchoation of an act. And this is the cause, why between the genus and the difference when they are gathered in one and the same definition, there is not a congregation of diverse natures: because if this were so, the definition would be many and not one. Nevertheless we do not intend to say this, that the genus and differences be not diverse natures.

Sed intendimus quod non sunt naturæ diversorum generum, sicut sunt substantia et accidens, quantitas et qualitas : sunt enim naturæ ejusdem generis ordinabiles ad unum idem sicut potentia et actus. Nec posset aliquis dicere quod actus hujus potentiæ esset actus, et non alterius, nisi per aliquid actus esset inchoatus in potentia : neque hæc potentia inchoaret hunc actum, nisi aliquid simile actui esset inchoatum in potentia.

Sic ergo et tali potestate genus habet potestate differentias : et non est inconveniens sic habere simul oppositas, quia opposita sibi non repugnant, nisi distincta, non confusa : aut cum omnium oppositorum sit radix una ex qua oriuntur, non est inconveniens ea sic simul esse in eodem : propter quod generaliter verum est unum esse genus oppositorum, sicut in *Phædone* dicit Socrates unum esse caput omnium oppositorum [1]. Et sic dicit Empedocles multorum capite germanorum in prima confusione fuisse sine cervice : cervix enim distinguit capita germana, ita quod unum est unius, et alterum alterius. Hoc igitur modo differentiæ sunt in generis potestate.

Quod autem quæritur : secundum quam causam sit illa potestas, dicendum, in veritate est, sicut et Averroes dicit quod est causæ formalis confusæ in materiæ confusione : quæ tamen similis est potestati materiæ, quæ materia non est materia per hoc quod est nudum subjectum formæ ab omni forma denudatum, sed potius in materia ad formam per inchoationem formæ in ipsa. Et ideo dicitur [2] quod materia desiderat formam, sicut fœmina masculum : non in quantum est fœmina, sed in quantum est imperfecta. Nec imperfectum est (supple quod est impossibile ad perfectionem) sed potens perfici imperfectum : nec perfici potest, in quo non est aptitudo ad perfectionem. Aptitudo autem illa necessario aliquid est perfectionis, quia aliter non appeteret ad perfectionem. Per hoc autem quod est simplex subjectum non in potentia ad formam, sed in composito est alterum componentium. Genus ergo quod est notio existentis in potentia, secundum totum esse formale ipso suo nomine significat, sicut dictum est potestate in se habere differentias.

Et quod objicitur de potestate finis, patet jam esse solutum : quia sicut idem est forma et finis, sic etiam una est potestas formæ et esse finalis : et ideo forma finis est desiderii quod materia habet quando desiderat formam, non ut imperfectionis tantum, sed prout distinguens et determinans est causa perfecti.

But we intend that they are not natures of diverse genera, just as substance and accident, quantity and quality are: for they are natures of the same genus ordinable to one and the same just as potency and act. Nor could anyone say that the act of this potency were the act, and not of another, unless through something the act were inchoated in potency: neither would this potency inchoate this act, unless something similar to the act were inchoated in potency.

Thus therefore even by such a potency [potestate] the genus has differences in potency [potestate]: and it is not inconvenient thus to simultaneously have opposites, because opposites do not repugn themselves, unless distinct, not confused: or since of all opposites there is one root out of which they arise, it is not inconvenient that they be thus simultaneously in the same thing: on account of which it is generally true that one is the genus of opposites, just as in the *Phaedo* Socrates says that one is the head of all opposites. And thus Empedocles says of many german heads in the first confusion to have been without a cervix: for a cervix distinguishes german heads, so that one is of one, and another of another. In this mode therefore differences are in the potency of the genus.

But what is asked: according to what cause that potency [potestas] be, it must be said, in truth it is, just as also Averroes says that it is of a formal confused cause in the confusion of matter: which nevertheless is similar to the potency of matter, which matter is not matter through this that it is the bare subject of form denuded from every form, but rather in matter to form through the inchoation of form in it. And therefore it is said that matter desires form, just as a female a male: not into as much as she is a female, but into as much as she is imperfect. Nor is the imperfect (supply that which is impossible to perfection) but the imperfect potent to be perfected: nor can it be perfected, in which there is not an aptitude to perfection. But that aptitude is necessarily something of perfection, because otherwise it would not appetite to perfection. But through this that it is a simple subject not in potency to form, but in the composite it is the other of the components. Therefore the genus which is the notion of existing in potency, according to the whole formal being signifies by its own name itself, just as it was said to have differences in itself in potency [potestate].

And what is objected concerning the potency of the end, is already clear to be solved: because just as the form and the end is the same, thus also one is the potency of the form and of the final being: and therefore the form of the end is of the desire which matter has when it desires form, not only as of imperfection, but according as distinguishing and determining it is the cause of the perfect.

Quod autem de potestate causæ efficientis objicitur, et de causa seminali, valde est conveniens : quia per inchoationem confusam differentiæ quasi seminaliter sunt in genere. Et ideo, ut dictum est, ad idem secundum naturam pertinent cum genere, et non ad diversum. Virtus autem quæ ex generante effectivo est in semine, (et formativa vocatur in physicis), aliquid simile etiam habet in genere : et hoc est lumen intelligentiæ agentis, quod agit omnes formas : virtute enim illius luminis (quod expansione spirituali non corporali confusum perducit ad distinctum per distinguens et determinans) specie.

actualiter differentiam educit de genere in ipso esse speciei : et hoc modo genus habet in se aliquid de virtute efficientis : propter quod etiam supra in tractatu de *Genere* genus ipsum patri est assimilatum. Sic igitur intelligitur genus habere differentias potestate.

Et quod quæritur, an differentia sit in genere, jam plane solutum est. Cum enim genera sint prima rerum principia, oportet quod differentiæ sint in genere, si non sunt in genere sicut genera, vel species, vel individua. Et generaliter dicendo non sunt in genere, sicut ipsum genus per essentiam et intellectum participantes, sed sunt in genere, sicut in principio confuso suæ inchoationis. Multipliciter enim aliqua sunt in genere : aliqua enim sunt in genere, sicut coordinata sub genere per modum participantis, et participati : et hoc modo sunt in genere genera, et species, et individua. Quædam sunt in genere sicut via ad rem generis : et sic motus et mutatio sunt in genere. Quædam vero sunt in genere sicut principia rei generis illius, sicut forma et materia dicuntur esse in substantia sicut in genere. Quædam tandem sunt in genere ut in principio suæ inchoationis, et hæc secundum potestatem sunt in genere, et non secundum actum participantia genus : et sic differentiæ cujuslibet generis sunt in genere. Quædam etiam in genere sunt sicut principia, unde fluunt naturæ generum secundum imaginationem, sicut punctum et unitas sunt in genere quantitatis. Pro eis quæ dicta sunt, patet quod differentia simplex actus est, constituens speciem cum genere, et qualiter potestate differentia est in genere, et qualiter species habet differentiam ut formantem, genus autem est in specie, ut imperfectum formabile, vel formatum : et sic facile est solvere omnia quæ sunt quæsita, vel dubitata.

Caput V

Qualiter diffinitur differentia secundum quod est universale de specie prædicabile.

But what is objected concerning the potency of an efficient cause, and concerning a seminal cause, is very convenient: because through the confused inchoation of differences they are as if seminally in the genus. And therefore, as was said, they pertain to the same according to nature with the genus, and not to the diverse. But the virtue which from an effective generator is in the seed, (and is called formative in [the] physics), has something similar even in the genus: and this is the light of the active intelligence, which acts all forms: for by the virtue of that light (which by spiritual not corporal expansion leads the confused to the distinct through distinguishing and determining) species.

actually it leads out the difference from the genus in the very being of the species: and in this way the genus has in itself something of the virtue of an efficient [cause]: on account of which also above in the treatise *Of Genus* the genus itself was assimilated to a father. Thus therefore the genus is understood to have differences in power.

And that which is asked, whether difference is in the genus, has already been clearly solved. For since genera are the first principles of things, it is necessary that differences be in the genus, if they are not in the genus just as genera, or species, or individuals. And generally speaking they are not in the genus, as participating the genus itself through essence and intellect, but they are in the genus, as in the confused principle of their inchoation. For in many ways things are in a genus: for some things are in a genus, as coordinated under the genus by way of participating, and of that which is participated: and in this way genera, and species, and individuals are in a genus. Some things are in a genus as a way to the thing of the genus: and thus motion and mutation are in a genus. But some are in a genus as principles of the thing of that genus, as form and matter are said to be in substance as in a genus. Finally some are in a genus as in the principle of their inchoation, and these are in the genus according to power, and not participating the genus according to act: and thus the differences of any genus are in the genus. Some also are in the genus as principles, from where the natures of the genera flow according to the imagination, as the point and unity are in the genus of quantity. Through those things which have been said, it is clear that difference is a simple act, constituting the species with the genus, and in what way in power difference is in the genus, and in what way the species has difference as forming, but the genus is in the species, as the formable or formed imperfect: and thus it is easy to solve all things which have been asked, or doubted.

Chapter V

How difference is defined according as it is a universal predicable of species.

Habito qualiter differentia species abundat a genere, et qualiter differentia in genere est, et qualiter species differentiam acquirit a genere restat dicere qualiter, ut universale prædicabile de specie diffinitur. Sic autem considerata diffinitur hoc modo. Differentia est universale quod essentialiter de pluribus, et specie differentibus in eo quod quale est prædicatur. Cum enim dicitur, quod est universale, dicit Avicenna quod hoc in hac diffinitione ponitur ut genus. Cum enim quodlibet istorum quinque universale sit, universale hæc quinque continet ut genus : et hoc primum in diffinitione est ponendum cujuslibet istorum quinque : quod tamen antiquiores Peripatetici non fecerunt, quia cum ponerent quod de pluribus prædicatur, dixerunt intelligi quod genus sit universale, quia nihil prædicatur de pluribus nisi universale, quia universale est quod est in multis et de multis : et ideo cum ponerent, prædicatur de pluribus, intellexerunt quod esset universale, et quod universale non oporteret in diffinitione explicite poni.

Hoc autem quod dicitur essentialiter, ponitur, ut dicit Avicenna, ad accidentis exclusionem, quod secundum quod universale est, prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, et prædicatur in quale : sed non est essentiale prædicatum, quod sit per se in subjecto et actu et intellectu, sicut differentia. Aristoteles autem dicit quod de pluribus specie differentibus ponitur ad speciei exclusionem, quæ non prædicatur de pluribus nisi numero differentibus, eo quod non comparatur communitas ejus nisi ad individua. Primus autem respectus comparationis differentiæ non est ad individua, sed ad species : et ideo non oportuit, quod diffinitur ad individua, sed ad species. Ad genus enim

(ut genus est) ut universale est, diffiniri non poterat : quia prout universale est, non continet genus, nec continetur a genere nisi potestate tantum, et ideo prædicari de genere non potest. Cum igitur prædicandi specialem modum habere debeat, oportuit quod ut prædicabile ad speciem haberet respectum : non autem potutile prædicabile esse de uno, quia sic esset individuum : oportuit ergo quod esset prædicabile de pluribus specie differentibus. Adhuc autem non potutile diffiniri ut prædicatum convertibile cum specie in quale, quia sic esset proprium : nec ut prædicatum convertibile in quid, quia sic esset diffinitio vel synonymum. Relinquitur ergo, quod diffinietur non ut convertibile, et sic diffinitur ut prædicatum de pluribus differentibus specie.

Having had in what way difference abounds from the genus in species, and in what way difference is in the genus, and in what way species acquires difference from the genus, it remains to say in what way, as a universal predicable of species, it is defined. For thus considered it is defined in this way. Difference is a universal which is predicated essentially of many things, and differing in species in that which is of what sort (quale). For when it is said, that it is a universal, Avicenna says that this in this definition is posited as a genus. For since each of these five is a universal, universal contains these five as a genus: and this is first to be posited in the definition of each of these five: which however the more ancient Peripatetics did not do, because when they posited that it is predicated of many, they said it is understood that the genus is universal, because nothing is predicated of many except a universal, because a universal is that which is in many and of many: and therefore when they posited, *it is predicated of many*, they understood that it would be a universal, and that a universal would not need to be posited explicitly in the definition.

But this which is said *essentially*, is posited, as Avicenna says, for the exclusion of accident, which according as it is a universal, is predicated of many differing in species, and is predicated in the *of what sort*: but it is not an essential predicate, which is *per se* in the subject both in act and in intellect, as is difference. But Aristotle says that *of many things differing in species* is posited for the exclusion of species, which is not predicated of many except differing in number, by this that its community is not compared except to individuals. But the first respect of comparison of difference is not to individuals, but to species: and therefore it was not necessary, that it be defined to individuals, but to species. For to the genus

(as it is a genus) as it is a universal, it could not be defined: because according as it is a universal, it does not contain the genus, nor is it contained by the genus except only in power, and therefore it cannot be predicated of the genus. Since therefore it ought to have a special mode of predicating, it was necessary that as a predicable it should have respect to the species: but it could not be a predicable of one, because thus it is an individual: it was necessary therefore that it be a predicable of many things differing in species. Furthermore, however, it could not be defined as a predicate convertible with the species in the *of what sort*, because thus it would be a proper [attribute]: nor as a predicate convertible in the *what*, because thus it would be a definition or a synonym. It remains therefore, that it will be defined not as convertible, and thus it is defined as a predicate of many things differing in species.

Quia vero et genus prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, ideo additur quod prædicatur in quale. Genus enim de pluribus specie differentibus prædicatur in eo quod quid. Hæ igitur fuit necessitas propter quam antiqui sic differentiam diffinierunt. Et ut hæc melius intelligantur, sciendum quod quale in hoc differt a qualitate, quod qualitas est accidens secundum quod aliud dicitur quale : quale autem dicitur subjectum qualitate formatum.

Unde prædicatum in quale dicitur id quod prædicatur ut est in subjecto, quia aliter de subjecto prædicari non posset. Nihil enim prædicari potest de subjecto, nisi quod est in subjecto, et nisi sit acceptum et signatum prout est in subjecto, de subjecto non prædicatur nec prædicari potest. Unde rationalitas, vel animalitas, vel humanitas, vel risibilitas, vel albedo non prædicantur, sed rationale, et animal, et homo, et risibile, et album sunt prædicata de suis subjectis. Unde logice loquendo tria qualia sunt composita. Species cum differentia est quale essentiale, et dicitur quale secundum differentiam et non secundum se, et quale ipsum differentia in subjecto existens. Secundum autem quale est proprium, quod quale secundum qualitatem dicitur proprietatis, id est, proprii. Tertium est quale accidentis, quod quale dicitur secundum qualitatem accidentis. Talis igitur est hujusmodi diffinitionis explanatio.

Hoc autem adhuc melius manifestatur in exemplis : quia rationale et mortale quæ sunt differentiæ hominis, a qualitatibus quæ sunt rationalitas et mortalitas sumpta prædicantur de homine, non in eo quod quid est, cum nullo modo dicant quid formatum talibus formis, sed potius dicant formas id quod quid est formantes et distinguentes : forma enim subjective et formabilitate non est quid, sed quale vel qualitas formans, nullo modo formabilis, quia actus est et ideo formari non potest : sola enim potentia formabilis est per actum : propter quod etiam species aptitudine quasi potentiali formatur per proprium, ut in sequentibus habebitur : et subjectum prout est in se perfectum et occasio alterius existendi in eo, per ipsum quod occasio est alteri, potentialiter se habet ad ipsum, et formatur accidente secundum quod est hujusmodi. Hæ igitur vera causa est secundum Philosophos, quare differentiæ non in quid, sed in quale prædicari competit.

Because truly also the genus is predicated of many things differing in species, therefore it is added that it is predicated in the *of what sort* (quale). For the genus is predicated of many things differing in species in that which is *what* (quid). This therefore was the necessity on account of which the ancients thus defined difference. And so that these things may be better understood, it must be known that *of what sort* differs from quality in this, that quality is an accident according to which another is said [to be] *of what sort*: but *of what sort* is said of a subject formed by quality.

Whence a predicate in the *of what sort* is said that which is predicated as it is in a subject, because otherwise it could not be predicated of a subject. For nothing can be predicated of a subject, unless it is in the subject, and unless it be accepted and signified according as it is in the subject, it is not predicated of the subject nor can it be predicated. Whence rationality, or animality, or humanity, or risibility, or whiteness are not predicated, but rational, and animal, and man, and risible, and white are predicates of their subjects. Whence speaking logically three *of what sorts* are composed. A species with a difference is an essential *of what sort*, and is said *of what sort* according to the difference and not according to itself, and the *of what sort* itself is the difference existing in the subject. But the second *of what sort* is the proper, which is said *of what sort* according to the quality of property, that is, of the proper. The third is the *of what sort* of an accident, which is said *of what sort* according to the quality of an accident. Such therefore is the explanation of this sort of definition.

But this is manifested still better in examples: because rational and mortal which are differences of man, having been taken from the qualities which are rationality and mortality, are predicated of man, not in that which is *what* (quid), since in no way do they say *what* is formed by such forms, but rather they say the forms forming and distinguishing that which is *what*: for form subjectively and in formability is not a *what*, but an *of what sort* or a forming quality, in no way formable, because it is act and therefore cannot be formed: for only potency is formable through act: on account of which also the species by a quasi potential aptitude is formed through the proper, as will be had in the following things: and the subject according as it is complete in itself and the occasion for another existing in it, through that which is the occasion for another, holds itself potentially to it, and is formed by an accident according as it is of this sort. This therefore is the true cause according to the Philosophers, why it is competent for differences to be predicated not in the *what*, but in the *of what sort*.

Cujus adhuc ulterior manifestatio est, quia interrogatis nobis ab aliquo quærente de natura et subjecto hominis et dicente, quid est homo? conveniens est nobis dicere ad hanc quæstionem respondendo, quod homo est animal : animal enim proximum substantiale subjectum est non formans, sed formabile forma hominis in homine. Et ideo homo in animali est sicut in potentia formabili ad hominem : et cum de hac potentia movetur ad formam, prius est animal quam homo, ut dicit Aristoteles [1]. Si autem ulterior procedat quærens dicens, quale animal sit homo? convenienter respondemus ad hanc quæstionem, quod homo est animal rationale mortale significantes quod potentia distincta per hunc actum, qui est rationale mortale, et-

formata est homo : designantes quod homo in rationali et mortali non est sicut in quid potentiæ et subjecti formabilis, sed est in eo sicut in actu formante et distinguente secundum esse actuale et formatum et distinctum.

Quod adhuc in simili poterit manifestari : quia enim ars imitatur naturam, ideo quæ in arte sunt, secundum aliquid similia sunt his quæ sunt in natura. Rebus igitur ex materia constantibus in his quæ habent materiam, vel constantibus ex talibus suæ compositionis principiis quæ sunt in eis ad similitudinem et proportionem materiæ, sicut in his quæ non habent materiam, sed componuntur a duabus naturis formalibus, quarum una proportionatur materiæ, et altera formæ, sicut genus et differentia componunt speciem : ostenditur nobis hoc, quod jam dictum est, sicut est videre in statua, sive imagine, vel idolo. In statua enim idoli æs de quo fit, est sicut materia formabilis, et est in ære idoli in potentia forma quæ dat æri esse idolum vel statuam : quæ statua dicitur, quia statuit imaginem quam intendimus : ipsa, inquam, forma hoc faciens et perficiens est figura inducta per artificem. Sic est in his quæ non habent materiam, sicut est homo communis acceptus in specie, non acceptus ut hic et ille qui sunt ex materia : communis autem homo qui est in pluribus et est specialis sive in communitate speciei acceptus, consistit in sua compositione secundum quamdam similitudinem et secundum quamdam proportionem, quamvis secundum veritatem non sit compositus ex materia et forma, sed totus sit in esse formali sumptus, quia aliter non esset communis, nec prædicabilis de aliqua re secundum veram prædicabilis rationem : secundum quamdam enim similitudinem et secundum quamdam ad materiam proportionem est in eo genus ut primum subjectum potentialiter formabile et distinguibile ad hominem, et est in eo differentia ut formans et distinguens ad speciem hominis, totum essentiale sic perfectum et constitutum, quod est animal rationale mortale, est homo secundum speciem proportionaliter, quemadmodum in artificialibus totum constitutum ex ære et figura fuit statua secundum imaginem, cujus similitudinem statuit ante oculos eam intuentium.

Of which there is still a further manifestation, because when we are asked by someone inquiring concerning the nature and subject of man and saying, *what is man?* it is convenient for us to say in responding to this question, that man is an animal: for animal is the next substantial subject, not forming, but formable by the form of man in man. And therefore man is in animal as in a potency formable to man: and when it is moved from this potency to form, it is animal before it is man, as Aristotle says. But if the inquirer should proceed further saying, *of what sort of animal is man?* we conveniently respond to this question, that man is a rational mortal animal, signifying that the potency is distinct through this act, which is rational mortal, and-

is a form[ed man]: designating that a man in rational and mortal is not just as in the what of a potency and of a formable subject, but is in it just as in an act forming and distinguishing according to actual and formed and distinct being.

Which still could be manifested in a similar thing: for because art imitates nature, therefore those things which are in art, according to something are similar to these things which are in nature. To things therefore consisting out of matter in these things which have matter, or consisting out of such principles of their own composition which are in them to the similitude and proportion of matter, just as in these things which do not have matter, but are composed by two formal natures, of which one is proportioned to matter, and the other to form, just as a genus and difference compose a species: this is shown to us, which has already been said, just as is to see in a statue, or image, or idol. For in the statue of an idol the bronze out of which it is made, is just as formable matter, and in the bronze of the idol there is in potency a form which gives to the bronze to be an idol or a statue: which is called a statue, because it statuates the image which we intend: that form itself, I say, doing and perfecting this is the figure induced through the artifice. Thus it is in these things which do not have matter, just as is common man taken in a species, not taken as this and that which are out of matter: but a common man which is in many and is special or taken in the community of a species, consists in its composition according to a certain similitude and according to a certain proportion, although according to truth it be not composed out of matter and form, but the whole be taken in formal being, because otherwise it would not be common, nor predicable of any thing according to the true notion of a predicable: for according to a certain similitude and according to a certain proportion to matter the genus is in it as the first subject potentially formable and distinguishable to man, and the difference is in it as forming and distinguishing to the species of man, the whole essential thus perfect and constituted, which is a rational mortal animal, is man according to species proportionally, just as in artificial things the whole constituted out of bronze and figure was a statue according to an image, the similitude of which it statuated before the eyes of those intuiting it.

Hæc igitur est antiquorum Peripateticorum de differentia data diffinitio, et, ut dictum est, declaranda et intelligenda. Et ideo quæstio nulla est, quam quidam quærunt, utrum scilicet sic in materia (quæ genus dicitur) sit dispositio ad formam et necessitas, sicut est in materia naturali ad formam, et in materia artificiali. Hoc tamen quæri posset, si genus vere esset materia : nunc autem hoc non dicitur, sed tantum quia secundum quamdam similitudinem et secundum quamdam proportionem sit materiæ comparatum, in eo quod homo in potentia inchoationis est in animali, et sicut in subjecto quod secundum id quod est, formabile est actu hominis. Dispositio enim et necessitas non sunt nisi in materia, quæ mutationi subjecta per agentia procedit ad esse generati. Talis igitur quæstio nulla est.

Nec dicitur species componi ex genere et differentia tanquam ex duobus diversis, quorum utrumque sit pars compositi, quia sic diffinitio in qua ponuntur genus et differentia, non esset unum sed multa. Et si sic esset, neutrum per se esset prædicabile de specie, sed totum simul compositum tantum de specie prædicaretur. Genus enim totum esse dicit speciei, sed in potentia, ut dictum est : et nomen generis notio est totius esse speciei in potentia, quia aliter non posset de specie prædicari. Et differentia ut quale non ut qualitas sumpta, dicit totum esse speciei, sed in actu : et secundum quod est notio totius esse in actu, sic prædicatur de specie : et diffinitio dicit totum esse in potentia et actu, et ideo prædicatur convertibiliter.

Differentia autem, ut dicit Aristoteles [1], cum sit generalis, ad prædicationem generis non convertibilem habet reduci, sicut probatur in sequentibus.

Hoc igitur est quod antiqui de differentia prout de specie prædicabilis est, dixerunt, quod quidem sub compendio dici potest, quod antiqui determinantes differentias sive describentes dicunt, quod differentia est qua abundat species a genere, habens differentiam in se et actu et intellectu, quam non habet genus nisi potestate : homo enim ab animali plus habet rationale et mortale : quæ conjunctim posita differentiam hominis constitutivam perficiunt. Animal enim genus ipsum secundum seipsum nihil horum est actu et intellectu, quod ex hoc patet : nam quæritur unde habeat species differentias :

This therefore is the definition given by the ancient Peripatetics concerning difference, and, as was said, to be declared and understood. And therefore there is no question, which certain ones ask, whether namely thus in matter (which is called a genus) there be a disposition to form and necessity, just as there is in natural matter to form, and in artificial matter. Nevertheless this could be asked, if a genus truly were matter: but now this is not said, but only because according to a certain similitude and according to a certain proportion it is compared to matter, in this that man in the potency of inchoation is in animal, and just as in a subject which according to that which it is, is formable by the act of man. For disposition and necessity are not except in matter, which subject to mutation proceeds through agents to the being of the generated. Such a question therefore is none.

Nor is a species said to be composed out of a genus and difference as if out of two diverse things, of which either one be a part of the composite, because thus a definition in which a genus and difference are posited, would not be one but many. And if it were thus, neither by itself would be predicable of a species, but only the whole simultaneously composite would be predicated of a species. For a genus speaks the whole being of a species, but in potency, as was said: and the name of a genus is the notion of the whole being of a species in potency, because otherwise it could not be predicated of a species. And difference taken as what sort not as quality, speaks the whole being of a species, but in act: and according as it is the notion of the whole being in act, thus it is predicated of a species: and a definition speaks the whole being in potency and act, and therefore it is predicated convertibly.

But difference, as Aristotle says, since it is general, must be reduced to the nonconvertible predication of a genus, as is proved in the following.

This therefore is what the ancients said concerning difference according as it is predicable of a species, which indeed can be said under a compendium, that the ancients determining or describing differences say, that difference is that by which a species abounds from a genus, having difference in itself both in act and in intellect, which the genus does not have except in power: for man has more than animal rational and mortal: which placed conjunctively perfect the constitutive difference of man. For the genus animal itself according to itself is none of these in act and intellect, which is evident from this: for it is asked from where a species may have differences:

a genere non habet, ita quod actu sint in genere : neque enim genus oppositas habet differentias : non enim in eodem simul actu sunt opposita. Sed de hoc est quemadmodum probant Philosophi Peripatetici, quod genus potestate quidem sub se habet omnes differentias, actu vero nullam : ac si nihil contingit inconveniens, quia sic non sequitur, quod aliquid fit ex his quæ non sunt, si diceretur quod a nihilo haberet differentias : nec sequitur quod opposita sint in eodem vel circa idem, sed fit id quod fit ex his quæ in genere sunt potestate.

Diffiniunt etiam Peripatetici hoc modo propter ea quæ dicta sunt : differentia est universale quod de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale est prædicatur. Rationale enim et mortale de homine prædicantur, non in eo quod quid, sed in eo quod quale est. Quid enim est homo interrogatis nobis ab aliquo, conveniens est dicere sive respondere animal. Quale autem animal sit homo inquisiti ab aliquo, quod rationale mortale animal sit, respondemus convenienter : quia sic formam assignamus quæ dat speciem.

Rebus enim ex materia et forma constantibus in natura vel arte, vel constantibus rebus ad similitudinem proportionemque materiæ et formæ in logicis constitutionem habentibus, quemadmodum statua ex materia æris est, et forma figura : sic et homo communis et specialis qui in multis est, ex materia quidem similiter proportionaliter consistit, genere scilicet, et ex forma differentia : quæ tamen ut partes divisæ non compositæ sunt, sed dicuntur partes essentiales, quia duobus modis divisis esse significant speciei, scilicet in potentia, et in actu : totum autem hoc quod est animal rationale mortale homo, est species, quemadmodum illic in arte totum constitutum ex ære et figura, est statua.

CAPUT VI. *De dubitationibus contra diffinitionem differentiæ, et erroribus male solventium, et de vera omnium solutione.*

Hæc sunt quæ de differentia prout est universale de specie prædicabile antiqui tradiderunt Peripatetici : et sunt circa ea multæ dubitationes et errores. Aristoteles [2] et ibidem Averroes in comment. expresse dicunt et probant, quod ultima differentia cujuslibet speciei constitutiva convertibilis est cum ea, ita quod non convenit eam nisi de illa specie prædicari. Differentia ergo illa non nisi de illa specie prædicatur : non ergo prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, ut videtur.

Hoc autem idem dicit Boetius in libro Divisionum dicens, quod si non esset penuria nominum, in qualibet diffinitione non nisi duobus terminis uteremur, nomine scilicet generis, et nomine differentiæ ultimæ, quæ ad speciem genus restringit et coarctat. Si ergo illa tunc differentia convertibilis esset cum specie, hujusmodi convertibilitatis causa cum non possit esse genus, relinquitur ergo quod

it does not have them from the genus, so that they be in the genus in act: for neither does a genus have opposite differences: for opposites are not in the same thing simultaneously in act. But concerning this it is just as the Peripatetic Philosophers prove, that a genus indeed has all differences under itself in power, but in act none: as if nothing inconvenient happens, because thus it does not follow, that something is made out of those things which are not, if it were said that it had differences from nothing: nor does it follow that opposites are in the same or about the same, but that which is made is made out of those things which are in the genus in power.

The Peripatetics also define in this way on account of those things which have been said: difference is a universal which is predicated of many differing in species in that which is of what sort. For rational and mortal are predicated of man, not in that which is what, but in that which is of what sort. For if we are asked by someone *what is man? *, it is convenient to say or to respond *animal*. But if inquired by someone *of what sort of animal is man?*, we respond conveniently, *that he is a rational mortal animal*: because thus we assign the form which gives the species.

For to things consisting out of matter and form in nature or art, or to things consisting to the similitude and proportion of matter and form having their constitution in logic, just as a statue is out of the matter of bronze, and the form of a figure: so also common and special man who is in many, indeed consists from matter similarly proportionally, namely from a genus, and from the form difference: which nevertheless are not composed as divided parts, but are called essential parts, because in two divided ways they signify the being of a species, namely in potency, and in act: but this whole which is a rational mortal animal man, is a species, just as there in art the whole constituted out of bronze and figure, is a statue.

CHAPTER VI. *On the doubts against the definition of difference, and the errors of those solving badly, and on the true solution of all.*

These are the things which the ancient Peripatetics handed down concerning difference according as it is a universal predicable of a species: and there are many doubts and errors concerning them. Aristotle and there Averroes in the commentary expressly say and prove, that the ultimate constitutive difference of any species is convertible with it, so that it is not fitting for it to be predicated except of that species. Therefore that difference is not predicated except of that species: therefore it is not predicated of many differing in species, as it seems.

But Boethius says this same thing in the book of *Divisions* saying, that if there were not a penury of names, in any definition we would not use except two terms, namely the name of the genus, and the name of the ultimate difference, which restricts and narrows the genus to the species. If therefore that difference then were convertible with the species, since the genus cannot be the cause of this kind of convertibility, it remains therefore that

talis differentia causa esset convertibilitatis. Sequitur ergo necessario, quia illa sit convertibilis : non ergo prædicabilis est de pluribus specie differentibus.

Hoc autem dicit Averroes, dicens quod omnia intermedia inter genus et ultimam differentiam circumlocutio sunt proximi generis, qua circumlocutione opus non esset si nomina proximorum generum haberemus. Adhuc autem hoc ratione inevitabiliter probatur sic : aut enim ultima differentia convertibilis est, et soli illi speciei conveniens, aut communis illi speciei et aliis. Si est convertibilis, habetur propositum. Si autem illi et aliis communis, ergo illa species ab alia specie non differt, sed convenit. Quod autem principium convenientiæ est, non est principium differentiæ : ergo illa ultima differentia non fuit. Si autem dicatur quod illa differentia habet aliam differentiam per quam differt, tunc quæro iterum de illa differentia, utrum sit communis, vel propria : et sequitur idem quod prius, et ibit hoc usque in infinitum : vel oportet dicere, quod ultima propria est, et illi soli speciei conveniens quam constituit. Non ergo differentia omnis prædicatur de pluribus specie differentibus : et sic diffinitio inducta vitiosa esse videtur.

Adhuc autem si omnino quod differt, differentia differt, quæratur qua differentia differentia differt a differentia. Si enim illa differt alia differentia, tunc hoc ibit in infinitum, quia de illa differentia quæreretur sicut de prima.

Ad hoc etiam quidam respondere videntur, quod in divisione generum per differentias et specierum constitutiones sic se habet, quod quanto species sunt inferiores, tanto sunt certiores, id est, quod certissimæ species sunt quæ specialissimæ dicuntur, et quanto differentiæ per quas fit divisio sunt superiores, tanto sunt certiores. Et ideo notiores sunt primæ dividentes genus generalissimum, quam dividentes genus subalternum : ita quod tandem differentiæ specierum in paucis sunt notæ et nominatæ, quamvis illæ notissimæ sunt et certæ. Et quia primæ generales differentiæ notæ et certæ de pluribus differentibus specie prædicantur, ideo de omnibus dictum est logica probabilitate, cui sufficit quod in pluribus verum sit, quod differentia de pluribus et differentibus specie prædicatur. Sed hæc responsio in philosophia valde irridenda est, quod hoc generaliter per diffinitionem determinetur, cujus contradictorium convincitur esse verum. Concluditur enim de necessitate, quod differentia quædam non prædicatur de pluribus specie differentibus. Scitur enim et notum est omni Philosopho, quod diffinitio debet convenire omni et soli. Ergo si differentia diffinitur per prædicari de pluribus differentibus specie, hoc debet omni differentiæ convenire et soli, quæ magis propria est differentia : et ideo ridiculosa est ista solutio.

such a difference would be the cause of convertibility. It follows necessarily, therefore, that it is convertible: therefore it is not predicable of several things differing in species.

Averroes says this, stating that all intermediate terms between the genus and the ultimate difference are a circumlocution of the proximate genus, which circumlocution would not be needed if we had the names of the proximate genera. Moreover, this is inevitably proven by reason as follows: for either the ultimate difference is convertible, and proper only to that species, or it is common to that species and to others. If it is convertible, the proposition is established. If, however, it is common to that and to others, then that species does not differ from another species, but agrees with it. But what is a principle of agreement is not a principle of difference: therefore that was not the ultimate difference. And if it is said that this difference has another difference by which it differs, then I ask again concerning that difference, whether it is common or proper: and the same follows as before, and this will go on to infinity: or it must be said that the ultimate difference is proper, and belonging only to that species which it constitutes. Therefore, not every difference is predicated of several things differing in species: and thus the introduced definition seems to be faulty.

Furthermore, if everything that differs, differs by a difference, let it be asked by what difference a difference differs from a difference. For if it differs by another difference, then this will go on to infinity, because one would ask about that difference just as about the first.

To this also some seem to respond that, in the division of genera by differences and the constitutions of species, the situation is such that the lower the species are, the more certain they are; that is, the most certain species are those which are called the most special, and the higher the differences by which the division is made, the more certain they are. And therefore the first differences dividing the most general genus are more known than those dividing a subalternate genus: so that finally the differences of species are known and named in few cases, although they are most known and certain. And because the first general differences, known and certain, are predicated of several things differing in species, therefore it is said of all with a logical probability, for which it is sufficient that it be true in most cases, that a difference is predicated of several things differing in species. But this response in philosophy is highly to be ridiculed, that this should be determined generally by definition, the contradictory of which is convicted of being true. For it is concluded of necessity that a certain difference is not predicated of several things differing in species. For it is known and recognized by every philosopher that a definition ought to apply to all and only. Therefore, if difference is defined by being predicated of several things differing in species, this ought to apply to every difference and only to it, which is more properly a difference: and therefore this solution is ridiculous.

Propter quod dicunt alii, quod est differentia simplex, et differentia composita. Et simplicem dicunt illam quæ in una sola consistit, sicut generalissimæ differentiæ quæ sunt corporeum et incorporeum, vel corporis differentiæ, quæ sunt animatum et in animatum, vel animati differentiæ quæ sunt sensibile et insensibile. Sed differentiæ ultimæ specierum constitutivæ dicunt, quod non sunt nisi duarum vel plurium congregatione sufficientes ad constitutionem. Rationale enim solum speciem non facit, nisi addatur mortale vel immortale : et hoc non fuit in superioribus differentiis, quarum una sola conjuncta generi facit et sufficit facere speciem subalternam. Dicunt ergo quod illæ differentiæ quæ simplices sunt, per se solas specierum cum genere constitutivæ, prædicantur de pluribus differentibus specie. Quæ autem nec per se sunt sufficientes, nec constituunt speciem nisi una alteri conjungatur, non sunt differentiæ solum, sed aliquid simile differentiæ. Et ideo illæ non de pluribus specie differentibus prædicantur, sicut rationale mortale simul sumpta non prædicantur nisi de homine. Hæc autem solutio magis adhuc deridenda est quam prior : quia rationale mortale dicta de homine circumlocutio sunt unius simplicis differentiæ, quæ est unicus et simplex actus, cujus est unum esse quod perficit : et quamvis illius aliquando nomen non habeatur, tamen in talibus licet nomina fingere. Dicamus igitur quod illa differentia vocetur A : tunc A differentia prædicabitur de una sola specie, et non de pluribus specie differentibus, et tunc sequitur diffinitionem vitiosam esse sicut prius.

Propter hoc dicunt alii, quod cum dicitur, universale est quod prædicatur de pluribus sibi subjectis, hoc dictum est, non quod actu prædicetur de multis, sed quod aptitudinem habet quod sit in multis, quamvis actu non sit nisi in uno solo, ut sol est universale unum. Unde cum species subjectum sit de quo prædicari habet hoc universale differentia, dicunt quod aptitudine prædicatur de pluribus, quamvis aliqua differentia actu non sit nisi in una sola specie. Et hanc opinionem recitat Avicenna, et est omnino nulla. Quod statim patet, quia species certa non est certa, nisi quia unica differentia est constituta, quæ nullo modo habet aptitudinem quod sit in alia specie. Falsum ergo est, quod aptitudinem habeat ad hoc quod prædicetur de pluribus specie differentibus.

Dicit autem iterum Avicenna, quod quidam dictam diffinitionem inductam sic intelligunt, quod sit sensus, quod differentia prædicatur de pluribus quæ quidem plura differunt specie : quia ex differentia constitutiva non habent, quod differant numero, sed specie tantum. Et tunc sensus est, quod differentia prædicatur de hoc quod in pluralitate est, quorum quodlibet differt specie ab altero, et non quod differentia dicatur de pluribus speciebus semper. Dant exemplum sicut quando dicitur, quod omnis homo percutit gladio :

For this reason others say that there is a simple difference, and a composite difference. And they call simple that which consists in one alone, such as the most general differences which are corporeal and incorporeal, or the differences of body, which are animate and inanimate, or the differences of the animate which are sensible and insensible. But they say that the ultimate differences constituting species are not sufficient for constitution except by the congregation of two or more. For rational alone does not make a species, unless mortal or immortal is added: and this was not the case in the higher differences, of which one alone joined to the genus makes and suffices to make a subalternate species. Therefore they say that those differences which are simple, constituting species with the genus by themselves alone, are predicated of several things differing in species. But those which are neither sufficient by themselves, nor constitute a species unless one is joined to another, are not only differences, but something similar to a difference. And therefore they are not predicated of several things differing in species, just as rational and mortal taken together are not predicated except of man. But this solution is still more to be derided than the prior one: because rational mor-

such things said of man are the circumlocution of one simple difference, which is a unique and simple act, of which there is one being which it perfects: and although sometimes there is no name for it, nevertheless in such cases it is allowed to feign names. Let us say therefore that that difference be called A: then the difference A will be predicated of only one species, and not of many differing in species, and then it follows that the definition is faulty as before.

On account of this others say, that when it is said, a universal is that which is predicated of many subject to it, this is said, not that it is predicated of many in act, but that it has the aptitude that it be in many, although in act it be not except in one only, as the sun is one universal. Whence since a species is the subject of which this universal difference has to be predicated, they say that by aptitude it is predicated of many, although some difference be not in act except in one only species. And Avicenna recites this opinion, and it is altogether null. Which is immediately evident, because a certain species is not certain, except because a unique difference is constituted, which in no way has the aptitude that it be in another species. Therefore it is false, that it has the aptitude for this, that it be predicated of many differing in species.

Moreover Avicenna says again, that certain ones understand the said definition induced thus, that the sense is, that difference is predicated of many which indeed many differ in species: because they do not have from the constitutive difference, that they differ in number, but only in species. And then the sense is, that difference is predicated of this which is in plurality, of which each one differs in species from the other, and not that difference is always said of many species. They give an example just as when it is said, that every man strikes with a sword:

non enim sensus est, quod quilibet homo singulariter gladio aliquo percutiat, sed quicumque percutit, non nisi gladio percutit : ita dicunt, quod omnis differentia prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, non quod omne de quo prædicatur differentia sit plura secundum 商品を specie, sed quod omne de quo prædicatur differentia, differt aliqua specie a suis oppositis vel disparatis. Hanc autem expositionem Avicenna dicit extortam, et non contineri in intellectu hujus orationis qua dicitur, quod differentia prædicatur de pluribus specie differentibus. Diffinitio enim cum detur causa innotescendi, ut dicit Aristoteles, plene debet notificare diffinitum. Adhuc autem cum de genere dictum est, quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, sic intellectum fuit quod prædicatur de pluribus speciebus. Cum ergo dicat Aristoteles quod differentia cum sit generalis cum genere collocanda est, videtur quod eumdem modum prædicandi cum genere retineat. Et sic prædicari de pluribus differentibus specie, idem est quod prædicari de pluribus speciebus. Sic redit idem inconveniens quod supra dictum est vel inductum est.

Omnibus autem his erroribus abjectis, dicendum cum Avicenna quod differentia in se tria habet, scilicet quod est simplex divisiva, et per hoc est differentia ; et quod est simpliciter constitutiva, et hoc habet ab eo quod est divisiva ; habet et tertio quod est ad certam speciem determinativa, et hoc non habet ex hoc quod est divisiva, nec ex hoc quod est constitutiva, sed hoc habet ex hoc quod est certa rei specialis natura et forma propria et essentialis. Quod autem ex hoc quod est divisiva, habeat quod sit differentia, probatur ex eo quod divisio separatio est. Separatio autem causa est differentiæ separatorum. Et quod ex hoc quod divisiva sit constitutiva, ex hoc probatur, quod divisio est ex hoc quod separat, separata contrahit et coarctat ab ambitu generis divisi : et hoc est constituere sub genere et generis communitate. Quod autem certificat et appropriat, ex nullo habere potest. Et ideo est quod generalissimum non habet differentias nisi divisivas, et specialissimum non habet nisi constitutivas. Et quod proprium efficitur, habet a propria

natura, per quam ex consequenti differt ab aliis, et per hoc quod illa natura in aliis non invenitur ; et illa natura in se continet quasi virtutem termini diffinitivi, quia sic est in talibus, quod semper prior differentia est in consequenti, sicut corporeum in animato, et animatum in sensibili, et sensibile in rationali, sicut trigonum in tetragono.

for the sense is not, that any man strikes singularly with some sword, but whoever strikes, does not strike except with a sword: thus they say, that every difference is predicated of many differing in species, not that everything of which the difference is predicated be many according to species, but that everything of which the difference is predicated, differs by some species from its opposites or disparates. But Avicenna says this exposition is extorted, and is not contained in the understanding of this speech by which it is said, that difference is predicated of many differing in species. For since a definition is given as a cause of becoming known, as Aristotle says, it ought fully to notify the thing defined. Moreover when it was said of the genus, that it is predicated of many differing in species, it was thus understood that it is predicated of many species. Therefore since Aristotle says that difference since it is general is to be collocated with the genus, it seems that it retains the same mode of predicating with the genus. And thus to be predicated of many differing in species, is the same as to be predicated of many species. Thus returns the same inconvenience which was said above or was induced.

But all these errors having been rejected, it must be said with Avicenna that difference has three things in itself, namely that it is a simple divisive, and through this it is a difference; and that it is simply constitutive, and this it has from that which is divisive; and it has thirdly that it is determinative to a certain species, and this it has not from this that it is divisive, nor from this that it is constitutive, but it has this from this that it is a certain special nature of a thing and a proper and essential form. That however it has from this that it is divisive, that it be a difference, is proved from this that division is separation. But separation is the cause of the difference of the separated. And that from this that it is divisive it be constitutive, is proved from this, that division is from this that it separates, it contracts and narrows the separated from the ambit of the divided genus: and this is to constitute under the genus and the community of the genus. But that which certifies and appropriates, it can have from nothing. And therefore it is that the most general does not have differences except divisive, and the most specific does not have except constitutive. And that which is made proper, it has from its proper

nature, by which consequently it differs from others, and by this that that nature is not found in others; and that nature contains in itself as it were the power of a definitive term, because it is thus in such things, that the prior difference is always in the consequent, just as corporeal is in animate, and animate in sensible, and sensible in rational, like a triangle in a quadrangle.

Et ideo quod proprium est unius naturæ, non vero nomine est differentia, nec est simplicis virtutis : quia quamvis sit simplex actus, tamen non est unius simplicis virtutis, sed virtus omnium aliorum est ex quibus fluit secundum ordinem, sicut ex causis primariis. Quod ergo dicitur, quod differentia prædicatur de pluribus differentibus speciebus, intelligendum est de his quæ sunt veræ differentiæ, simplicis virtutis, quæ simpliciter dividunt, et dividendo sub genere constituunt, et de his est verum. Quæ autem certificant et determinant, non veræ differentiæ sunt, sed veræ quibus aliquid alteri comparatum potest differre. Nec sunt virtutis simplicis differentiæ, sed sunt virtutis simplicis ut terminus diffinitivus. Et est sententia tam Avicennæ quam Alfarabii, et Averrois. Et hoc est quod dicit Aristoteles[1]: differentia cum sit generalis, cum genere ordinanda est. Generalis enim non est, quæ ad certam naturam determinat.

Quod autem quæritur, quommodo differt differentia a differentia : dicendum quod seipsa, et non itur in infinitum, principia enim omnia differunt seipsis. Et per hoc patet solutio omnium inductorum. Nec potest dici, quod generalis, ut quidam dicunt, quia sit pars essentialis vel speciei sicut genus. Ex hoc enim cum genere in modo prædicandi in problematibus ordinanda non esset, sed potius in modo differendi cum genere esset ordinanda.

Ex hoc autem patet illud quod dicit Aristoteles [2], quod scilicet partes in diffinitione sunt in plus, totum autem in æque. Ibi enim docet venari diffinitionem per divisionem. Veræ autem differentiæ sunt, quæ sunt divisivæ, ut dictum est. Differentia enim divisiva eo quod generis est divisiva, pars est esse rei in potentia, et non in actu : esse enim in potentia pars est esse, et non totum, et ideo quælibet talis est in plus. Totum autem duplex est, scilicet explicite totum esse, et in potentia et in actu colligens, et sic diffinitio dicit totum esse. Dicitur etiam totum quod in se virtute habet esse totum, quia præcedentia omnia sunt virtute in ipso, sicut in causis formalibus ultimum continet omnia quæ præcedunt ex quibus fluit, sicut vita habet esse et sentire in se habet esse et vivere, et esse rationale habet in se et esse et vivere et sentire, ut nuper ante dictum est. Et ideo etiam hoc totum est quod est in æque cum eo quod constituit : quamvis enim sit actus purus et simplex, secundum essentiam tamen omnia præcedentia virtute et causalitate sunt in potentia, et in eo influunt super causatum sicut causæ primariæ influunt in causas secundarias, sicut in prima propositione libri *Causarum*.

And therefore what is proper to one nature is not a difference in true name, nor is it of simple power: because although it may be a simple act, yet it is not of one simple power, but it is the power of all the others from which it flows according to order, as from primary causes. Therefore, what is said, that a difference is predicated of several different species, is to be understood of those which are true differences, of simple power, which simply divide, and by dividing constitute beneath the genus, and of these it is true. But those which certify and determine, are not true differences, but true ones by which something compared to another can differ. Nor are they differences of simple power, but they are of simple power as a definitive term. And this is the opinion as much of Avicenna as of Alfarabi, and Averroes. And this is what Aristotle says: since difference is general, it is to be ordered with the genus. For that which determines to a certain nature is not general.

But as to what is asked, how a difference differs from a difference: it must be said that by itself, and there is no going to infinity, for all principles differ by themselves. And by this the solution of all the things introduced is clear. Nor can it be said, that it is general, as some say, because it is an essential part even of the species just like the genus. For from this it would not be ordered with the genus in the mode of predication in problems, but rather it would be ordered with the genus in the mode of differing.

From this, moreover, is clear that which Aristotle says, namely that the parts in a definition are 'in more', but the whole is 'in equally'. For there he teaches to hunt for a definition through division. But true differences are those which are divisive, as has been said. For a divisive difference, by the fact that it is divisive of the genus, is a part of the being of the thing in potency, and not in act: for being in potency is a part of being, and not the whole, and therefore any such is 'in more'. But the whole is twofold, namely explicitly the whole being, and collecting in potency and in act, and thus the definition says the whole being. Also it is called a whole that which has the whole being in itself virtually, because all preceding things are virtually in it, just as in formal causes the ultimate contains all that proceed from which it flows, just as life has being and feeling has in itself being and living, and rational being has in itself both being and living and feeling, as has just been said before. And therefore also this is a whole which is 'in equally' with that which it constitutes: for although it may be a pure and simple act, yet according to essence all preceding things are in potency virtually and by causality, and they flow into the caused in it just as primary causes flow into secondary causes, as in the first proposition of the book *De Causis*.

Ex omnibus quæ dicta sunt patet quod differentia duos habet respectus immediatos : unum scilicet ad genus quod dividit, et secundum hoc cum divisione prædicatur de genere sic, quod animal est aut rationale, aut irrationale : dividentis enim est prædicari sub divisione de eo quod dividit. Alterum autem ad speciem quam constituit, et de illa prædicatur absolute. Sic homo est rationale. Et hi sunt respectus mediati ejus ad particulare, ad quod non respicit nisi per speciem quam ipsum particulare participat : sicut cum dicimus, hic homo est rationalis. Et ideo non habet particulare proprium quod sibi respondeat immediate, sicut habet genus et species. Et hoc est ideo, quia a forma sumitur quæ secundum se est speciei et communis, et per speciem est particularis speciem participantis.

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CAPUT VII.

De descriptione differentiæ prout respicit genus.

Propter multas comparationes differentiæ quibus habet comparari, tum ad genus, tum ad speciem, multas habet a Philosophis descriptiones : quamvis diffinitionem propriam non habet, eo quod omnis diffinitio est ex genere et differentia : et ideo si differentia diffinitionem haberet, oporteret quod illa constaret ex genere et differentia, et sic differentiæ diffinitionem esset ex differentia, et hoc abiret in infinitum. Adhuc autem cum nihil diffiniri possit proprie nisi species, si differentia diffinitionem in vera ratione diffinitionis haberet, oporteret quod differentia esset species, quod esse non potest. Potest tamen habere descriptiones ex fine, vel ex posteriori, vel ex effectu, vel ex comparatione ad ea ad quæ comparatur.

Quamvis ergo descripta sit ex comparatione ad speciem quam constituit, cum dicebatur, quod differentia est id quod prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale est, tamen adhuc Peripatetici describunt hujusmodi differentiam per respectum quem habet ad genus hoc modo, differentia est quæ apta nata est dividere ea quæ sunt sub eodem genere. Illa enim est (ut dictum est) quæ prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Proprius enim effectus differentiæ nomen accipit.

Hanc autem differentiæ descriptionem Peripatetici introductionis modo per exempla manifestant : quia rationale et irrationale, quæ oppositæ differentiæ sunt, hominem et equum a se invicem dividunt, qui sub eodem sunt genere quod est animal : quamvis una sola forma sive differentia quæ a forma sumitur, præsentia et absentia facit mutationem ab esse ad non esse, vel a non esse ad

From all that has been said it is clear that a difference has two immediate respects: one, namely, to the genus which it divides, and according to this with a division it is predicated of the genus thus, that an animal is either rational or irrational: for it belongs to the dividing thing to be predicated under division of that which it divides. The other, however, to the species which it constitutes, and of that it is predicated absolutely. Thus a man is rational. And these are its mediate respects to the particular, to which it does not respect except through the species which the particular itself participates in: just as when we say, this man is rational. And therefore it has no proper particular that immediately corresponds to it, as the genus and species have. And this is so, because it is taken from a form which according to itself belongs to the species and is common, and through the species it is of the particular participating in the species.

<!-- cap:1.5.7 -->

CHAPTER VII.

On the description of difference as it respects the genus.

On account of the many comparisons of difference by which it has to be compared, both to the genus and to the species, it has many descriptions from the philosophers: although it does not have a proper definition, because every definition is from genus and difference: and therefore if difference had a definition, it would be necessary that it consist of genus and difference, and thus the definition of difference would be from difference, and this would go to infinity. Furthermore, since nothing can be defined properly except species, if difference had a definition in the true rationale of a definition, it would be necessary that difference be a species, which cannot be. Nevertheless, it can have descriptions from the end, or from the posterior, or from the effect, or from the comparison to those things to which it is compared.

Therefore, although it was described from the comparison to the species which it constitutes, when it was said that difference is that which is predicated of several things differing in species in that what sort it is, nevertheless still the Peripatetics describe this kind of difference through the respect which it has to the genus in this way, difference is what is naturally apt to divide those things which are under the same genus. For it is that (as has been said) which is predicated of several things differing in species. For the proper effect of the difference receives the name.

The Peripatetics manifest this description of difference by way of introduction through examples: because rational and irrational, which are opposite differences, divide man and horse from each other, which are under the same genus which is animal: although a single form or difference which is taken from a form, by its presence and absence makes a mutation from being to non-being, or from non-being to being, just as also an animal is

esse, sicut et animal est, aut rationale, aut irrationale : et sic quando fit per contradictionem divisio, fit una differentia per affirmationem, et alia per negationem accepta : tamen quia disparata sunt quæ sunt sub eodem genere, et unumquodque dividentium in sua differentia et forma accipitur, oportet quod fiat divisio per differentias oppositas sic : animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale. His enim differentiis a se invicem differunt quæ sunt sub eodem genere. Quamvis enim, sicut dicunt Avicenna et Alfarabius, irrationale et alia similia privative, vel negative accepta, non dicant vero nomine differentias (eo quod differentia non nisi positive potest significari), tamen quia propria nomina differentiarum non habemus, unam notam differentiam ponimus, et aliam per privationem ejusdem significamus, quæ est speciei subalternæ quæ ponitur sub genere.

Sed valde notandum est, quod etiam ante diximus, quia quando dividitur genus, non dividitur nisi secundum potestatem, et non secundum essentiam. Essentia enim generis cum simplex sit, tota simul potest esse in omnibus dividentibus ipsum : unde tota est in homine, et tota est extra hominem in equo : et hæc est in equo, quia nec hoc aliquid est, nec hic, nec nunc, sed ipsa est quodlibet, et ubique, et semper, sicut jamdudum de universali diximus : non enim est hoc aliquid per materiam, nec hic per loci circumscriptionem, nec nunc est per temporis vel temporalis differentiæ determinationem. Et ideo tota est in quolibet, et tota est extra quodlibet secundum se acceptum, quod proprium est naturæ simplicis. Et quamvis tota sit comprehensa a rationali, quando rationale conjungitur ad conjunctionem speciei, et simul cum hoc tota comprehensa ab irrationali, quando irrationale conjungitur eidem ad alterius speciei constitutionem cum partem et partem in essentia non habeat, tamen secundum quod comprehensa ab irrationali, a rationali non comprehensa est. Et ideo non sequitur, quod animalitas cum rationali comprehensa eadem est animalitas secundum esse in rationali, et ir-

rationali. Sic enim rationale transmutatur in irrationale, quod negat Aristoteles[1] fieri posse. Hoc autem ideo est, quia animalitas una inchoatio est et rationalis et irrationalis, et unum et idem inchoationis principium in essentia: quod tamen ut comprehensum est ab uno, tractum est ad esse principiati. Et ideo secundum hoc non potest esse comprehensum ab alio: quod secundum partem suæ potestatis est in alio.

either rational or irrational: and thus when a division is made through contradiction, one difference is made through affirmation, and the other accepted through negation: nevertheless, because those things which are under the same genus are disparate, and each one of the dividing things is accepted in its own difference and form, it is necessary that the division be made by opposite differences thus: of animals one is rational, another irrational. For by these differences those things which are under the same genus differ from each other. For although, as Avicenna and Alfarabi say, irrational and other similar things understood privatively, or negatively, do not state differences in true name (because a difference cannot be signified except positively), nevertheless because we do not have proper names of differences, we posit one known difference, and we signify the other through the privation of the same, which is of the subalternate species which is posited under the genus.

But it must be very much noted, because we also said it before, that when a genus is divided, it is not divided except according to power, and not according to essence. For the essence of the genus, since it is simple, can be the whole simultaneously in all the things dividing it: whence the whole is in man, and the whole is outside man in the horse: and this is in the horse, because it is neither this something, nor here, nor now, but it itself is whatever, and everywhere, and always, just as we said long ago about the universal: for it is not this something through matter, nor here by the circumscription of place, nor now is it by the determination of time or temporal difference. And therefore the whole is in whatever, and the whole is outside whatever taken according to itself, which is proper to a simple nature. And although the whole may be comprehended by rational, when rational is conjoined to the conjunction of the species, and simultaneously with this the whole is comprehended by irrational, when irrational is conjoined to the same for the constitution of another species, since it does not have part and part in essence, nevertheless according as it is comprehended by irrational, it is not comprehended by rational. And therefore it does not follow, that animality comprehended with rational is the same animality according to being in rational, and ir-

rational. For thus rational is transmuted into irrational, which Aristotle denies can be done. But this is for this reason, because animality is one inchoation of both rational and irrational, and one and the same principle of inchoation in essence: which nevertheless as it is comprehended by one, is drawn to the being of the principled thing. And therefore according to this it cannot be comprehended by another: because according to part of its power it is in the other.

[Objectio]. Et si quis objiciat, quod potestas sive virtus radicatur in essentia, et ideo videtur sequi, quod in quo genus est secundum totam suam essentiam, in eodem etiam sit per totam suam virtutem et potestatem: **[Solutio].** dicimus, quod hoc non sequitur. Essentia enim generis simplex est natura. Potestas autem non radicatur in ea prout unica est et indivisibilis essentia, sed potius in ambitu suæ communitatis, et ideo nihil prohibet quod diviso ambitu communitatis essentia simplex maneat indivisa.

Attendendum etiam est, quod quamvis differentiæ in genere sint potestate, tamen secundum quod dividunt genus, oportet quod actu sint acceptæ per intellectum dividentem: cum non intellectus dividat, nisi actu acciperet id quo dividit: quo autem dividit, est differentia, et sic oportet differentiam actu esse, et genus secundum ambitum suæ communitatis esse in potentia divisibile. Secundum autem quod genus est principium inchoationis differentiarum, sunt in genere differentiæ potestate. Sed ex illa potestate ad actuale esse per intellectum adducuntur quando per ipsas dividitur generis potestas.

Sic ergo intelligitur quod Peripatetici dicunt, quod differentia est quod aptum natum est dividere ea quæ sunt sub eodem genere. Diximus enim in antehabitis, quod differentia per hoc quod dividit, contrahit genus, et id quod per divisionem acceptum est, ponit sub genere, et sic constituit speciem secundum quod species est id quod sub assignato ponitur genere.

Et ideo et ea quæ sunt sub genere per divisionem differentiarum dividuntur, et ipsum genus dividitur alio et alio modo. Genus enim dividitur, quia potestas partitur. Ea autem quæ sub genere sunt, dividuntur, quia per differentiarum divisionem (quam faciunt ab invicem) separantur: sed genus dividitur quantitate communitatis suæ. Ea autem quæ sub genere sunt, dividuntur separatione suæ oppositionis ab invicem.

Hoc ergo est quod dicunt Philosophi qui hoc modo describunt differentiam, quod differentia est quod aptum natum est per suam oppositionem dividere sive sejungere ea quæ sub eodem sunt genere: et hoc manifestum faciunt tali exemplo, quod rationale et irrationale hominem et equum qui sub eodem sunt genere quod est animal dividunt sive sejungunt: utentes privatione rationis (quæ per irrationale signatur) loco communis differentiæ, quam nos brutalitatem consuevimus nominare.

[Objection]. And if anyone should object, that power or virtue is rooted in essence, and therefore it seems to follow, that in whatever the genus is according to its whole essence, in the same it also is through its whole virtue and power: **[Solution].** we say that this does not follow. For the essence of the genus is a simple nature. But power is not rooted in it according as it is a unique and indivisible essence, but rather in the ambit of its community, and therefore nothing prevents that, the ambit of community being divided, the simple essence remains undivided.

It must also be attended to, that although differences are in the genus in power, nevertheless according as they divide the genus, it is necessary that they be accepted in act by the dividing intellect: since the intellect would not divide, unless it actually accepted that by which it divides: but that by which it divides, is the difference, and thus it is necessary that the difference be in act, and the genus according to the ambit of its community be divisble in potency. But according as the genus is the principle of inchoation of differences, differences are in the genus in power. But from that power they are brought to actual being by the intellect when the power of the genus is divided by them.

Thus therefore it is understood what the Peripatetics say, that difference is what is naturally apt to divide those things which are under the same genus. For we said in the preceding things, that difference, by fact that it divides, contracts the genus, and places that which is accepted through division under the genus, and thus constitutes the species according to which the species is that which is placed under an assigned genus.

And therefore both those things which are under the genus are divided through the division of differences, and the genus itself is divided in one way and another. For the genus is divided, because the power is partitioned. But those things which are under the genus are divided, because they are separated through the division of differences (which they make from each other): but the genus is divided by the quantity of its community. But those things which are under the genus are divided by the separation of their opposition from each other.

This therefore is what the philosophers say who describe difference in this way, that difference is what is naturally apt to divide or disjoin through its opposition those things which are under the same genus: and they make this manifest by such an example, that rational and irrational divide or disjoin man and horse which are under the same genus which is animal: using the privation of reason (which is signified by irrational) in place of a common difference, which we are accustomed to name brutality.

Et hoc patet, quia si non esset aliquod animal nisi homo et equus, et hinnibile esset differentia equi constitutiva, divideremus sic, animalium aliud rationale, aliud hinnibile, et privatione differentiam non faceremus.

<!-- cap:1.5.8 -->
CAPUT VIII.

Descriptio differentiæ prout ponit differentiam.

Adhuc autem eamdem differentiam antiqui Peripatetici describunt et assignant per respectum, per quem unum differentium refertur ad alterum secundum differentiam qua differunt ab invicem, definientes eam sic: Differentia est qua differunt a se singula. Ea enim quæ differunt, differentiis suis a se invicem differunt, Suas autem et proprias habent singula differentias, quibus differunt ab omnibus aliis, in quibus sunt differentiæ. Probant autem hanc assignationem hoc modo:

quia ea quæ oppositis differentiis differunt, et quæ ab uno et eodem oriuntur genere, non differunt secundum genus, sed potius in genere conveniunt, cum æqualiter actu et intellectu genus participent : quia genere non differunt, nisi quæ sunt in diversis generibus vel generalissimis vel proximis : et secundum hoc quod genere differunt, sic genus est quod facit differentiam inter ea : et hæc sunt, quorum una natura non est in communi proximo quod est primum subjectum formabile et determinabile ad esse per proprias differentias communes, secundum ea quæ per unam et eamdem divisionem diversarum differentiarum ab uno et eodem genere exeunt : illa vero differunt secundum genus. Et hoc per exempla manifestatur. Sumus enim animalia et nos homines, et etiam irrationalia sunt animalia. Et sic genere non differimus ab eis : sed appositum nobis hominibus rationale pro differentia disjungit nos ab illis, et ita essentialem habemus ad ea differentiam, quamvis in genere conveniamus cum illis. Ab alia autem parte secundum quod convenimus cum diis in hoc genere quod est rationale animal, eo quod nos et dii sumus animalia rationalia, appositum nobis mortale essentialiter separat nos ab ipsis : quia ipsi secundum Stoïcos sunt immortalia animalia, nos autem mortalia. Cum autem sic dicunt antiqui, quod differentia est qua differunt, diffiniunt vel describunt differentiam et proprium effectum ipsius : et est aliqua nominis manifestatio, quamvis non sit vera diffinitio. Nec etiam antiqui has assignationes pro veris induxerunt diffinitionibus.

And this is evident, because if there were not any animal except man and horse, and capable-of-whinnying were the constitutive difference of a horse, we would divide thus, of animals one is rational, another capable-of-whinnying, and we would not make a difference by privation.

<!-- cap:1.5.8 -->
CHAPTER VIII.

Description of difference as it posits a difference.

Furthermore, the ancient Peripatetics describe and assign the same difference through the respect, by which one of the differing things is referred to another according to the difference by which they differ from each other, defining it thus: Difference is that by which single things differ from each other. For those which differ, differ from each other by their differences. But single things have their own and proper differences, by which they differ from all others, in which there are differences. Moreover they prove this assignment in this way:

because those things which differ by opposite differences, and which arise from one and the same genus, do not differ according to genus, but rather agree in genus, since they participate in the genus equally in act and intellect: because those things do not differ in genus, except those which are in diverse genera either most general or proximate: and according to this that they differ in genus, thus it is the genus that makes the difference between them: and these are those, of which there is not one nature in a proximate common [genus] which is the first subject formable and determinable to being through proper common differences, according to those things which through one and the same division of diverse differences go forth from one and the same genus: but those differ according to genus. And this is manifested through examples. For we humans are animals, and irrational beings are also animals. And thus we do not differ from them in genus: but 'rational' added to us humans as a difference disjoins us from them, and thus we have an essential difference from them, although we agree with them in genus. But on another part according as we agree with the gods in this genus which is rational animal, because we and the gods are rational animals, 'mortal' added to us essentially separates us from them: because they according to the Stoics are immortal animals, but we are mortal. But when the ancients thus say, that difference is that by which they differ, they define or describe difference and its proper effect: and it is a certain manifestation of the name, although it is not a true definition. Nor did the ancients induce these assignments as true definitions.

Si vero objiciatur, quod secundum antecedentia quæ dicta sunt de figura arboris describentis a generalissimo usque ad specialissima, duo sunt, animal rationale et animal mortale, quorum unum est sub alio. Talia autem unam æque immediatam speciem non dicuntur habere, sed potius unum debet esse species alterius, et id quod inferius est, habere sub se speciem specialissimam. Contrarium autem similiter videtur, quando dicitur quod homo est animal rationale mortale. Et dicendum ad hoc, quod in rei natura secundum opinionem antiquorum Stoïcorum sic est ut procedit objectio. Et cum dicitur quod homo est animal rationale, ponitur hoc totum complexum pro circumlocutione proximi generis, et mortale additum est differentia ulterius determinans ad speciem specialissimam : et hoc non est inconveniens, quinimo necessarium quod differentia superioris generis cum differentia inferioris et proximi generis in eadem specie conjugatur in diffinitione speciei. Sed differentiæ diversorum generum non subalternatim positorum sunt oppositæ, et illæ non conveniunt in eadem speciei diffinitione. Attendendum est cum dicitur, qua differunt singula quod singula quidem ab aliis differunt suis propriis quæ illis et non aliis conveniunt. Sed tamen in ante habitis dictum est, quod propria (cum sint accidentia et non dividant substantiam) non propriam faciunt alietatem, sed per alteritatem ostendunt alietatem quasi jam ante propria factam per propriam differentiam substantialem, quæ propria est speciei, quia sic convenit uni quod non alii. Et ideo differentia essentialis est, qua primo et per se differunt singula, aut per formam, aut per materiam, aut per proprium esse formæ in hac materia vel illa.

Si autem quæritur, cum dicitur quod differentia est qua differunt a se singula, utrum differant per unam aut per plures differentias: Dicendum quod per unam differunt ab omnibus differentiam illam secum non communicantibus, sicut per rationale differt homo ab omnibus rationem secum non communicantibus, sed ab his quæ secum communicant in una, differunt in alia.

Si autem quis objiciat dicens, quod singularia numero sunt infinita ad minus quoad nos, et sic videntur differre ab in-

finitis : Dicendum quod nihil est inconveniens.

Si ulterius arguet, quod qui novit diffinite unum contrariorum, diffinite novit et alterum. Novit autem homo suam qua a singulis differt differentiarum : igitur videtur quod diffinite novit infinitas singularium differentias, quibus ab ipso differunt, et sic momento novit quasi omnia.

But if it should be objected, that according to the preceding things which were said about the figure of the tree describing from the most general down to the most special, there are two, rational animal and mortal animal, of which one is under another. But such are not said to have one equally immediate species, but rather one ought to be the species of the other, and that which is lower, to have under it the most special species. But the contrary similarly seems to be the case, when it is said that man is a mortal rational animal. And it must be said to this, that in the nature of reality according to the opinion of the ancient Stoics it is thus as the objection proceeds. And when it is said that man is a rational animal, this whole complex is posited for the circumlocution of the proximate genus, and 'mortal' is added [as] a difference further determining to the most special species: and this is not unfitting, rather it is necessary that the difference of the superior genus with the difference of the inferior and proximate genus be conjoined in the same species in the definition of the species. But the differences of diverse genera not placed subalternately are opposite, and those do not agree in the same definition of a species. It must be attended to when it is said, 'by which single things differ', that single things indeed differ from others by their own properties which are agreeable to them and not to others. But nevertheless in the preceding it was said, that properties (since they are accidents and do not divide substance) do not make proper otherness, but through altereity they show an otherness as if already made prior to the properties by a proper substantial difference, which is proper to the species, because it so agrees to one that it does not to another. And therefore it is the essential difference, by which single things primarily and per se differ, either through form, or through matter, or through the proper being of the form in this or that matter.

But if it is asked, when it is said that difference is that by which single things differ from each other, whether they differ by one or by many differences: It must be said that through one they differ from all those not communicating that difference with them, just as through 'rational' man differs from all things not communicating reason with him, but from those which communicate with him in one, they differ in another.

But if anyone should object by saying, that singulars in number are infinite at least with respect to us, and thus they seem to differ from in-

finite: It must be said that nothing is unfitting.

If he should argue further, that he who knows one of the contraries definitively, knows the other definitively. But man knows his own difference by which he differs from singulars: therefore it seems that he definitively knows the infinite differences of singulars, by which they differ from him, and thus in a moment he knows almost all things.

Dicendum, quod sequitur quod noscat omnia illa in quantum cum ipso non conveniunt, et hoc est nosse in universali, et in potentia, et non proprie secundum naturam uniuscujusque : et hoc non est inconveniens, quod momento aliquo modo universali et potentiali noscat multa vel infinita.

De exemplo autem quod antiqui induxerunt de mortali, quod habent pro differentia, cum differentia sit pars esse rei, et mortale causam abesse dicere videatur :

Dicendum quod si mortale dicat viventis passionem, pro certo tunc dicit causam abesse, et non est differentia constitutiva alicujus viventis. Si autem dicit compositi viventis formam quæ est notio tali vita viventis, pro certo est differentia constitutiva et hoc modo est essentia incorruptibilis, sicut et aliæ differentiæ.

Quod autem dicunt rationale esse formam in qua communicant homines et dii, pro certo secundum opinionem quorumdam Stoicorum dictum est, qui dicebant univoce et nos et deos esse rationalia animalia : et animal non dicebant per denominationem ab anima, sed per hoc quod est forma animati corporis et moti voluntatis motu, cui postea ex inferiori genere (quod est compositum ex corpore commixto ex contrariis et anima) advenit sensus. Et ideo non sequitur, si Deus est animal, quod Deus sit substantia animata sensibilis, eo modo quo deos animalia Stoici esse dicebant, sicut superius jam expositum est, et in libro *de natura deorum* invenitur.

Assignan etiam Peripatetici hoc modo, videlicet dicentes quod differentia est qua differunt a se singula : namque secundum genus non differunt quæ ab eodem genere per eamdem accipiuntur divisionem. Cujus exemplum est, quod sumus et nos homines animalia, et irrationalia per eamdem rationem sunt animalia sicut et nos : sed additum generi quod est animal, ratione pro differentia hominis constitutiva et Dei, disjungit nos et deos ab illis quæ sunt irrationalia. Adhuc nos et dii rationales sunus in genere quod est animal rationale non differentes, sed mortale pro differentia constitutiva appositum ad animal rationale quod est genus, separat nos homines a diis immortalibus.

<!-- cap:1.5.9 -->

CAPUT IX.

De diffinitione quæ soli differentiæ magis proprie convenit.

It must be said, that to follow is that he knows all those things in so far as they do not agree with him, and this is to know in the universal, and in potency, and not properly according to the nature of each one: and it is not unfitting, that in a moment in some universal and potential way he should know many or infinite things.

But concerning the example which the ancients induced about 'mortal', which they have for a difference, since difference is part of the being of a thing, and 'mortal' seems to say that a cause is absent:

It must be said that if 'mortal' says a passion of a living thing, certainly then it says that a cause is absent, and it is not a constitutive difference of any living thing. But if it says the form of a living composite which is the notion of living such a life, certainly it is a constitutive difference and in this way is an incorruptible essence, just like other differences.

But what they say that 'rational' is the form in which humans and gods communicate, is certainly said according to the opinion of certain Stoics, who said strictly that both we and the gods are rational animals: and they did not say 'animal' through denomination from soul, but through the fact that it is the form of an animated body and moved by the movement of the will, to which afterwards from an inferior genus (which is a composite of a body commixed out of contraries and a soul) sense arrives. And therefore it does not follow, if God is an animal, that God is a sensible animated substance, in the way in which the Stoics said the gods are animals, just as was already expounded above, and is found in the book *On the Nature of the Gods*.

The Peripatetics also assign in this way, namely saying that difference is that by which single things differ from each other: for things which are accepted by the same division from the same genus do not differ according to genus. An example of which is, that we humans are animals, and irrationals are animals by the same reason just like us: but reason, added to the genus which is animal, as a constitutive difference of man and God, disjoins us and the gods from those which are irrational. Furthermore we and the gods are equal non-differing rationals in the genus which is rational animal, but 'mortal' added for a constitutive difference to rational animal which is the genus, separates us humans from immortal gods.

<!-- cap:1.5.9 -->

CHAPTER IX.

On the definition which more properly fits the difference alone.

Subtiliorem autem adhuc omnibus præinductis assignati onibus Peripatetici differentiæ diffinitionem quantum ad intrinseca et essentialia sibi sunt perscrutantes, et speculantes eam per ea quæ non conveniunt nisi differentiæ, quæ differentia dicitur magis propria : et nullo modo nec per se, nec ex consequenti conveniunt differentiæ quæ dicitur propria, nec etiam ei quæ dicitur differentia communis. Propriæ enim ex consequenti ad minus convenire potest, quod per ipsam species abundet a genere. Et etiam hoc quod dicitur prædicari de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale est, potest ex consequenti convenire communi differentiæ. Et similiter id quod dicitur, quod aptum natum est dividere ea quæ sunt sub eodem genere, propriæ differentiæ potest convenire. Et similiter id quod differentia est qua differunt a se singula : propriis enim differentiis differunt a se singula. Et ideo nulla talium assignationum per intrinseca differentiæ data videtur esse.

Sed interius eam perscrutantes, et subtiliter per essentialia speculantes, quæ soli magis propriæ differentiæ dictæ conveniunt, dicunt, quod non quodlibet eorum quæ sunt sub eodem genere, et dividunt ea quæ sunt sub eodem genere, duo oportet modo divisionis est differentia magis proprie dicta. Et dicunt hoc solum esse differentiam magis proprie dictam, quod conducit ad esse, et quod ejus quod est ratio rei pars est. Quod autem hoc differentia sit probant, quia propria sunt de his quæ sunt sub eodem genere dividentia ea quæ sub genere sunt. Dicamus enim dividendo ea quæ sub genere sunt. Animalium aliud aptum natum est arte nautica navigare, et aliud non : cum tamen aptum esse arte nautica navigare sit proprium hominis, et non de esse et essentia ipsius : talibus enim differentiis sæpe utimur genus dividentes, cum tamen talia sint propria consequentia esse speciei. Quæ autem sunt esse consequentia, non possunt esse completiva esse ipsius, nec perfectiva substantiæ, nec pars essentialis esse ipsius substantialis : quamvis compleatur in esse quodam quod non est esse simpliciter, sed est aptitudo quædam esse substantiale consequens. Et ideo talis differentia propria non est, quales sunt differentiæ magis propriæ, quæ specificæ dicuntur differentiæ, quia sunt speciei in esse specifico constitutivæ. Erunt ergo specificæ illæ solæ quæcumque essentiali qualitate alia aliam faciunt speciem, et quæcumque in eo quod quale de specie constituta prædicantur. Differentiæ enim, sicut superius dictum est, et ad genus et ad speciem comparantur, et ad utrumque illorum habent respectum : ad genus quidem prout sunt divisivæ, ad speciem autem prout sunt constitutivæ. Et ideo sunt sub genere et genus contrahentes, et sunt species sub ipsis. Et species antecedentes sunt ipsæ differentiæ : quia sunt actu et intellectu in ipsis speciebus sicut constituentes in eisdem.

But still searching for a definition of difference more subtle than all the previously induced assignments on the part of the Peripatetics with respect to things intrinsic and essential to it, and speculating upon it through those things which do not agree except with the difference, which is called the more proper difference: and in no way either per se or consequently do they agree with the difference which is called proper, nor even with that which is called common difference. For it can at least consequently agree with the proper difference, that through it the species is abundant from the genus. And also what is said to be predicated of many differing in species in respect of what kind it is, can consequently agree with common difference. And similarly what is said, that it is naturally apt to divide those which are under the same genus, can agree with the proper difference. And similarly what difference is by which single things differ from each other: for by proper differences single things differ from each other. And therefore no such assignment seems to have been given through the intrinsics of the difference.

But examining it more interiorly, and speculating subtly through essentials, which agree only with the more proper difference as it is called, they say, that not any of th-

[th]ings which are under the same genus, and divide those things which are under the same genus, in two ways of division there must be difference more properly called. And they say that this alone is difference more properly called, which leads to being, and which is a part of that which is the reason of a thing. That this is a difference they prove, because properties are from those things which are under the same genus dividing those things which are under the genus. For let us say in dividing those things which are under the genus. Of animals one is born apt to navigate by nautical art, and another not: although nevertheless to be apt to navigate by nautical art be a property of man, and not from his being and essence: for we often use such differences in dividing a genus, although nevertheless such things be properties following the being of a species. But those things which are following being, cannot be completive of its being, nor perfective of substance, nor an essential part of its substantial being: although it be completed in a certain being which is not being simply, but is a certain aptitude following substantial being. And therefore such a difference is not proper, as are the more proper differences, which are called specific differences, because they are constitutive of the species in specific being. Therefore those alone will be specific which by an essential quality make one species other than another, and which are predicated in that which is of what sort of a constituted species. For differences, as was said above, are compared both to a genus and to a species, and have respect to either of them: indeed to the genus according as they are divisive, but to the species according as they are constitutive. And therefore they are under the genus and contracting the genus, and there are species under them. And the differences themselves are antecedents to the species: because they are in act and in intellect in the species themselves as constituting in them.

Cum autem consequentes sint in esse generum prout genera sunt, et omne quod sequitur esse alicujus, sit de genere accidentium, ut dicit Avicenna, videbitur forte alicui, quod sint accidentia generis, sicut propria sunt accidentia speciei, eo quod propria sunt de consequentibus esse specierum. Sed ad hoc dicendum, quod non est similis habitudo generis ad differentiam, et speciei ad proprium. Species enim se habet ad proprium ut ens perfectum quod est de ratione proprii : sicut subjectum est de ratione passionis non existens de essentia ipsius, sed tantum subsistere faciens in seipso. Genus autem se habet ad differentiam et ponitur ut ens imperfectum perficiendum per differentiam, sicut materia per formam, et ut ad eductum de potestate ipsius sicut forma educitur de materia. Et quia nihil perficit substantiam ad esse substantiæ, nisi substantia, ideo genus perficitur ad esse speciei per differentiam. Species vero est substantia. Oportet ergo, quod differentia sic respiciens genus et speciem, sit substantia et substantialis forma.

Et quod dicitur quod est consequens esse generis : Dicendum quod esse generis ut genus, est esse imperfecti. Et ideo quod consequitur ipsum sic, est sicut actus qui consequitur potentiam, propter quod oportet quod sit substantia. Si autem generis esse, perfecti esset esse, de necessitate sequeretur quod differentia esset accidens generis : et tunc non posset esse substantia speciei : quia quod est uni accidens, nulli potest esse substantia, ut dicit Aristoteles [1]. Si tamen consideretur genus non ut genus, sed ut universale prædicatum de pluribus, quod propria habet individua sicut animal prædicatur de hoc animali, et illo, sicut in tractatu de *Genere*, est determinatum. Dicunt quidam, quod sic consideratur ut ens perfectum in esse proprio, et sic comparatur ad ipsum differentia ut consequens ipsum. Dicunt, quod sic considerata differentia, est accidens generis. Sed re vera non est accidens secundum

naturam accidentis : sed in hac consideratione modum habet accidentis, et non naturam : quod patet in prædicatione qua differentia prædicatur de genere solo, ut cum dicitur, animal est rationale : vel sub disjunctione ad oppositam differentiam, ut cum dicitur, animal est rationale vel irrationale : utraque enim istarum propositionum est in secundo modo dicendi per se, in quo subjectum est de ratione prædicati. Et in illo modo subjectum quidem est causa esse prædicati, et nihil est de essentia ipsius : et hoc est ideo, quia, sicut vult Aristoteles[1], accidens potius est esse quam essentia.

But since they are following in the being of genera according as they are genera, and everything which follows the being of something, is from the genus of accidents, as Avicenna says, it will perhaps seem to someone, that they are accidents of the genus, just as properties are accidents of the species, because properties are from the things following the being of species. But to this it must be said, that the relation of a genus to a difference is not similar to that of a species to a property. For a species relates to a property as a perfect being which is from the notion of the property: just as a subject is from the notion of a passion not existing of its essence, but only making it subsist in itself. But a genus relates to a difference and is posited as an imperfect being to be perfected through the difference, just as matter through form, and as to that which is educed from its power just as form is educed from matter. And because nothing perfects a substance to the being of substance, except substance, therefore a genus is perfected to the being of a species through difference. But a species is a substance. Therefore it is necessary, that a difference thus regarding a genus and species, be a substance and a substantial form.

And as to that which is said that it is following the being of a genus: It must be said that the being of a genus as a genus, is the being of an imperfect thing. And therefore that which follows it thus, is just as an act which follows a potency, on account of which it is necessary that it be a substance. But if the being of a genus were the being of a perfect thing, it would follow of necessity that a difference were an accident of the genus: and then it could not be a substance of a species: because what is an accident to one, can be a substance to none, as Aristotle says. If nevertheless a genus be considered not as a genus, but as a universal predicated of many, which has proper individuals just as animal is predicated of this animal, and that, as was determined in the treatise on *Genus*. Certain ones say, that thus it is considered as a perfect being in its own being, and thus difference is compared to it as following it. They say, that a difference thus considered, is an accident of the genus. But in truth it is not an accident according to

the nature of an accident: but in this consideration it has the mode of an accident, and not the nature: which is evident in the predication by which the difference is predicated of the genus alone, as when it is said, *animal is rational*: or under disjunction to the opposite difference, as when it is said, *animal is rational or irrational*: for either of these propositions is in the second mode of saying *per se*, in which the subject is from the notion of the predicate. And in that mode indeed the subject is the cause of the being of the predicate, and is nothing of the essence of itself: and this is for this reason, because, as Aristotle wishes, an accident is rather a being than an essence.

Sic enim aliter se habet subjectum ad rationem prædicati, quam in ea in qua prædicatur vere accidens : cum enim dicitur, animal est rationale, non potest intelligi sic subjectum in ratione prædicati ut positum absoluta natura a re prædicati, sed cum potestate progrediente in actum, et in qua jam inchoatio est differentiæ ut prædicatum sit in subjecto. Sed quando proprium prædicatur de specie, species quidem est de ratione proprii, ita quod proprium non est in specie ut in potentia, sed in specie jam completum esse habente per solam naturæ aptitudinem ad quædam, quæ nihil naturæ sunt in esse : sicut patet cum dicitur, homo est risibilis : in hoc enim quod homo est animæ intellectivæ, quæ nata est suspendi et admirari ea quæ apprehensione ejus objiciuntur, efficitur risibilis ad cognita lætificantia, et flebilis ad cognita contristantia : cum tamen admiratio talis nihil sit naturalium, hoc est, eorum quæ sunt de constituentibus naturam hominis. Sic autem non se habet genus ad differentiam quando de ipso prædicatur : et ideo quamvis prædicatio illa reducatur ad secundum modum ejus quod est per se, tamen etiam aliquid habet de primo : sed quod hoc est inordinata prædicatio, quia secundum rem ipsam potius subjectum debet esse prædicatum, quam e converso.

Sic ergo differentia ad genus se habet. Ad speciem autem habet se sicut substantia formalis et perfectiva et determinativa potentiæ generis, sicut in ante habitis determinatum est in tractatu de *Specie*.

Secundum igitur ea quæ dicta sunt, patet quod genus est primum principium differentiæ et speciei, et per consequens etiam proprii et accidentis : quia etiam genus primum subjectum est in natura, a quo habet species, quod subjectum est individui : sicut enim sæpius dictum est, principium formabile et determinabile in natura omni primum est subjectum in illa natura, sicut materia primum formabile, est primum subjectum in physicis. Est autem et species subjectum secundum aliquid formabile a proprio. Et individuum est subjectum secundum aliquid formabile ab accidente. Etenim subjectum cum sic inveniatur in pluribus per unam rationem communem existentem in illis, oportet quod sit in uno primo quod est causa quare conveniat omnibus aliis, sicut docet Aristoteles [2] : et hoc modo ad genus substantiæ reducuntur et species et individua et differentiæ et propria et accidentia : hoc enim modo genus omnium principium est.

For thus the subject relates otherwise to the notion of the predicate, than in that in which a true accident is predicated: for when it is said, *animal is rational*, the subject cannot be understood in the notion of the predicate as posited with an absolute nature from the thing of the predicate, but with a power progressing into act, and in which there is already the inchoation of the difference so that the predicate be in the subject. But when a property is predicated of a species, the species indeed is from the notion of the property, so that the property is not in the species as in potency, but in a species already having completed being through the mere aptitude of nature for certain things, which are nothing of nature in being: as is evident when it is said, *man is risible*: for in this that man is of an intellective soul, which is born to be suspended and to wonder at those things which are objected to its apprehension, he is made risible towards joyous cognized things, and weepable towards sorrowful cognized things: although nevertheless such wonder be nothing of natural things, that is, of those things which are of the constituents of the nature of man. But the genus does not relate thus to the difference when it is predicated of it: and therefore although that predication be reduced to the second mode of that which is *per se*, nevertheless it also has something of the first: but that this is an inordinate predication, because according to the thing itself the subject ought rather to be the predicate, than conversely.

Thus therefore difference relates to the genus. But to the species it relates as a formal and perfective and determinative substance of the power of the genus, as was determined in the things held before in the treatise on *Species*.

According therefore to those things which have been said, it is evident that the genus is the first principle of the difference and the species, and by consequence also of the property and the accident: because also the genus is the first subject in nature, from which the species has, that it is the subject of the individual: for as was said quite often, the formable and determinable principle in every nature is the first subject in that nature, just as matter, the first formable thing, is the first subject in physics. Moreover the species is also a subject according to something formable from a property. And the individual is a subject according to something formable from an accident. For indeed since the subject is thus found in many through one common notion existing in them, it is necessary that it be in one first thing which is the cause why it belongs to all others, as Aristotle teaches: and in this way to the genus of substance are reduced species and individuals and differences and properties and accidents: for in this way the genus is the principle of all.

Eo autem modo quo genus est principium eorum quæ in una sunt coordinatione prædicabilium, sic genus principium est differentiæ et speciei : et ideo tota coordinatio illa reducitur ad genus, et non ad differentiam : quamvis enim differentia sit formalis respectu generis, et in hoc videatur esse dignior quam genus : tamen quia principiatur a genere, et non est principium generis, reducitur ad genus ut ad principium : et cum summa in prædicabilibus et prima sint sicut prima principia, ut in ante habitis determinatum est, oportet quod prima ad quæ reducuntur omnia alia, sint prima genera, et non propriæ differentiæ.

Est tamen etiam in differentiis ordo qui

est superiorum ad inferiores : qui est ordo superioris et inferioris, quo differentiæ inferiores per additionem ad genera fiunt compositiores et minoris communitatis : sicut est ordo in causis formalibus primariis et secundariis, in quo ordine primariæ causæ virtus est in secundaria, et remanet virtus superioris in causato, quando secundaria subtrahit a causato suam causalitatem. Etiam in hoc ordine quidquid causalitatis habet secunda, totum habet a prima. Sed iste ordo non est ad primum recurrens principium, quia primum omnium principium est genus. Et hæc est vera causa quare differentia non potest esse primum et generalissimum, sed oportet quod primum vel generalissimum esse generi attribuat.

Hoc est ergo quod Peripatetici de differentia tradiderunt dicentes quod intellectus perscrutans et speculans differentiam, non quodlibet eorum quæ sunt sub genere eodem dividentium esse facit differentiam, sed quod conducit ad esse, et quod ejus quod est esse rei pars est. Et dant exemplum : neque enim quod aptum natum est navigare per scientiam nauticam, erit differentia hominis, quamvis soli conveniat homini et sit proprium hominis : dicimus enim animal dividentes, animalium quædam apta nata sunt ad navigandum, illa vero minime, proprie animal dividentes ab his quæ non sunt apta nata ad navigandum : sed hoc proprium quod est esse aptum natum ad navigandum non erit essentiale principium completivum : neque enim pars est essentialis, sed aptudo quædam ejus, et idcirco proprium non est talis aptitudo, quales sunt quæ specificæ et substantiales dicuntur differentiæ.

Ex his ergo quæ dicta sunt, patet quod erunt specificæ differentiæ, quæ alteratione qualitatis essentialis aliam faciunt speciem, et cum hoc in eo quod quale est prædicantur.

Moreover in that way in which the genus is the principle of those things which are in one coordination of predicables, thus the genus is the principle of the difference and the species: and therefore that whole coordination is reduced to the genus, and not to the difference: for although difference be formal with respect to the genus, and in this it may seem to be worthier than the genus: nevertheless because it is principled from the genus, and is not the principle of the genus, it is reduced to the genus as to a principle: and since the highest and first things in predicables are just as first principles, as was determined in the things held before, it is necessary that the first things to which all others are reduced, be first genera, and not proper differences.

There is nevertheless also in differences an order which

is of superior ones to inferior ones: which is the order of superior and inferior, by which inferior differences through addition to genera become more composite and of lesser community: just as is the order in primary and secondary formal causes, in which order the virtue of the primary cause is in the secondary, and the virtue of the superior remains in the caused thing, when the secondary subtracts its causality from the caused thing. Also in this order whatever of causality the second has, it has totally from the first. But this order does not run back to a first principle, because the first principle of all things is the genus. And this is the true cause why difference cannot be the first and most general, but it is necessary that it attribute being first or most general to the genus.

This therefore is what the Peripatetics handed down about difference saying that the intellect scrutinizing and speculating difference, makes difference to be not any of those things which divide those that are under the same genus, but that which conduces to being, and which is part of the being of the thing. And they give an example: for neither will that which is naturally apt to navigate through nautical science be the difference of man, although it agrees to man alone and is proper to man: for dividing animal we say, of animals some are naturally apt for navigating, but those not at all, properly dividing animal from those which are not naturally apt to navigating: but this property which is to be naturally apt to navigate will not be an essential completive principle: for it is not an essential part, but a certain aptitude of his, and therefore a property is not such an aptitude, of what sort are those which are called specific and substantial differences.

From these things therefore which were said, it is evident that there will be specific differences, which by alteration of an essential quality make another species, and with this are predicated in respect of what kind it is.

Quale enim quid non est simpliciter quale, sed est quale essentiale quid substantiam perficiens : propter quod manifestum est, quod differentia est id quod ad esse speciei adducit, et quod est pars esse illius rei quæ simpliciter et perfectum esse habet : conducit enim ad speciem quæ est totum esse individuorum, et est pars esse illius formalis, et conducit ad esse rei quæ est individuum, cujus totum esse est species : et conducit ad esse speciei, et est pars esse rei, hoc est, diffinitionis quæ est dicens esse rei diffinitæ : quia diffinitio constat ex genere et differentia sicut ex partibus, quarum utraque est assignatio totius : sed dicuntur partes, quia una dicit totum in potentia, altera dicit totum in actu : cum totum consistat ex potentia et actu sicut essentialibus partibus : non est enim inconveniens, quod totum essentiale sit in qualibet sua parte secundum esse diversum : et secundum hoc diffinitio totum dicens esse, constat ex genere et differentia, quia quamvis differentia sit ut forma totum dicens esse in actu, tamen sola non potest diffinire sine genere propter duas causas, quarum prima est quia differentia sine generis positione caderet a ratione differentiæ, non enim differentia est aliquorum nisi in genere convenientium : et si non poneretur genus, non haberet differentiæ rationem et actum, quia nesciretur inter quæ poneret differentiam. Secunda autem causa est quia tunc diffinitio non respiceret nec in se haberet primum esse ipsius et principium, quod genus est, sicut diximus, et non differentia et sic non esset diffinitio, quia a fine uno usque ad alium esse rei non explicaret : est enim unus finis, a quo incipit genus quod est finis secundum potentiam. Alius autem finis est in quo terminatur esse secundum actum quod est differentia. Et ideo diffinitio dicitur diffinitio, quia a fine uno ad alterum, et totum esse finita complectitur. Et sic de differentiis communibus et propriis et magis propriis quantum ad intentionem logicam spectat, ista quæ dicta sunt sufficiunt : alia enim quæ sunt, spectant ad primum Philosophum.

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CAPUT I.

De intentione proprii secundum quam de ipso intendit logicus.

For what kind a thing is is not simply what kind, but is an essential what kind perfecting a substance: on account of which it is manifest, that difference is that which leads to the being of the species, and which is part of the being of that thing which has simple and perfect being: for it leads to the species which is the whole being of individuals, and it is part of its formal being, and it leads to the being of the thing which is the individual, whose whole being is the species: and it leads to the being of the species, and is part of the being of the thing, that is, of the definition which is declaring the being of the defined thing: because a definition consists of genus and difference as of parts, of which each one is the assignment of the whole: but they are called parts, because one declares the whole in potency, the other declares the whole in act: since the whole consists of potency and act as essential parts: for it is not unfitting, that an essential whole be in any of its parts according to a diverse being: and according to this a definition declaring the whole being, consists of genus and difference, because although difference is as a form declaring the whole being in act, nevertheless alone it cannot define without the genus on account of two causes, of which the first is because difference without the position of the genus would fall from the ratio of difference, for there is no difference of any things except those agreeing in a genus: and if a genus were not posited, it would not have the ratio and act of difference, because it would not be known among what things it would posit difference. But the second cause is because then the definition would not respect nor have within itself its first being and principle, which is the genus, as we said, and not the difference, and thus it would not be a definition, because it would not explicate the being of a thing from one end all the way to another: for there is one end, from which the genus begins, which is the end according to potency. But there is another end in which being is terminated according to act, which is the difference. And therefore a definition is called a definition, because from one end to another, it embraces the whole finite being. And thus concerning differences common and proper and more proper as much as pertains to logical intention, those things which have been said suffice: for other things which there are, pertain to the First Philosopher.

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CHAPTER I.

On the intention of property according to which the logician considers it.

Post tractatum de *Differentia* quæ perficit speciem ad esse speciei, intendendum est de *Proprio*, quod ut dicit Boetius, manat de essentialibus speciei jam per differentiam præconstitutæ per intellectum : non enim manat de genere secundum quod est genus, quia tunc esset indistinctum : nec manat de differentia secundum quod est hujusmodi, quia ultima differentia est una, et sic proprium non esset nisi uno modo, quod falsum est : et si sequeretur naturam aliarum differentiarum, tunc multiplicaretur secundum habitudines illarum differentiarum, et hoc iterum est falsum. Est ergo proprium quod manat de substantia speciei jam constitutæ per differentiam conjunctam generi in speciei constitutione.

Hujus autem substantiæ quæ est species, diffinitivum habens esse ex genere et differentia, duplex est consideratio. Consideratur enim prout substantia absoluta et species, et consideratur prout habet esse per inclinationem ad materiam in qua est. Et primo quidem modo non sequitur speciem aliqua habitudo, ex qua manat aliquid aliud quam species, aut non solum illud accidens quod est specialitas et universalitas et hujusmodi quæ non sunt propria hoc modo quo logicus intendit de proprio, et secundum quod proprium est unum de quinque universalibus. In secunda autem consideratione qua consideratur per inclinationem sive per respectum ad materiam in qua est secundum naturam, multas habet habitudines, ex quibus oriuntur multa consequentia propria. Sicut ex parte quidem materiæ hominis hominem esse carnis nitidæ, equum autem et asinum esse carnis duræ, et hominem esse latorum unguium, rapacia autem ut leones esse rotundorum unguium et acutorum, et hujusmodi : et ex parte formæ hominem esse disciplinæ perceptibilem propter subtilitatem sanguinis et spiritus claritatem, quædam autem animalia esse indisciplinabilia et quædam media esse, et hujusmodi quæ consequuntur formam complexionis : et ex parte quidem animæ intellectualis, hominem esse animal admirativum de auditis et visis et generaliter de sensu apprehensis, quædam animalia non esse hujusmodi : et hominem esse risibilem vel flebilem, quædam autem non : et multa talia sunt quæ speciem per respectum inclinationis ad materiam talem et debitam speciei consequuntur naturam, et non consequuntur individuum secundum quod est individuum hoc vel illud : et si conveniunt in individuo, hoc est, quia individuum illud speciem participat : propter quod etiam proprium de sola specie immediate prædicatur, et non habet proprium individuum, sed prædicatur de individuo speciei per speciei participationem.

Jam ergo manifestum in parte, quod proprium de quo intendit logicus, est unum quinque universalium, et quartum inter ea, quod est accidens communem naturam speciei consequens in materia speciei de-

After the treatise on *Difference* which perfects the species to the being of the species, we must consider *Property*, which as Boethius says, flows from the essentials of the species already preconstituted through difference by the intellect: for it does not flow from the genus according as it is a genus, because then it would be indistinct: nor does it flow from the difference according as it is of this sort, because the ultimate difference is one, and thus the property would not be except in one way, which is false: and if it followed the nature of other differences, then it would be multiplied according to the dispositions of those differences, and this again is false. Therefore property is that which flows from the substance of the species already constituted through the difference conjoined to the genus in the constitution of the species.

But of this substance which is the species, having definitive being from genus and difference, there is a twofold consideration. For it is considered according as it is an absolute substance and species, and it is considered according as it has being through inclination to the matter in which it is. And in the first way indeed no disposition follows the species, from which something other than the species flows, or not only that accident which is speciality and universality and things of this sort which are not properties in this way in which the logician intends concerning property, and according as property is one of the five universals. But in the second consideration in which it is considered through inclination or through respect to the matter in which it is according to nature, it has many dispositions, from which many consequent properties arise. Just as on the part indeed of the matter of man, that man is of neat flesh, but a horse and a donkey are of hard flesh, and that man has broad nails, but rapacious animals like lions are of round and sharp nails, and things of this sort: and on the part of the form, that man is perceptible of discipline on account of the subtlety of blood and clarity of spirit, but some animals are indisciplinable and some are intermediate, and things of this sort which follow the form of the complexion: and on the part indeed of the intellectual soul, that man is an animal capable of admiration concerning things heard and seen and generally apprehended by sense, some animals are not of this sort: and that man is capable of laughing or weeping, but some are not: and there are many such things which follow the nature of the species through the respect of inclination to such matter due to the species, and do not follow the individual according as it is this or that individual: and if they agree in the individual, this is, because that individual participates in the species: on account of which also the property is predicated immediately of the species alone, and does not have a proper individual, but is predicated of the individual of the species through participation in the species.

Now therefore it is manifest in part, that the property of which the logician intends, is one of the five universals, and the fourth among them, which is an accident following the common nature of the species in the matter of the species de-

terminata secundum naturam : et secundum quod illa natura variatur in materia speciei debita, sic multiplicantur propria. Non ergo proprium logicum est solum quod vocatur proprie proprium, quod convenit omni, soli, et semper, sed hoc etiam est proprium logicum, quod convenit omni et non soli, sicut esse bipedem : et id quod convenit soli speciei etsi non omni individuo ejusdem speciei, ut esse medicum, vel agricolam, vel navigatorem, per artem medicinæ, vel agriculturæ, vel navigationis disciplinam : et etiam quod convenit omni et soli, sed aliquando et non semper, sicut hominem in senectute canescere, vel albescere senem, aut in processu temporis ætatis nigrescere, et cygnum in ultimo ætatis albos omnes dentes habere, et hujusmodi multa inveniuntur. Propter quod Aristoteles tripliciter assignat proprium. Proprium igitur quando, et proprium ad aliquid, et proprium simpliciter : quia proprium ad aliquid duo comprehendit, scilicet quod convenit omni, sed non soli, et quod convenit soli, sed non omni : et secundum hanc intentionem proprii est unum de quinque universalibus, et prædicatur de specie non essentialiter, quod respondetur ad quæstionem factam per quale, et non de genere, sed de specie. Interrogatis enim nobis quid sit Socrates, convenienter respondemus, quod homo est : rursus autem interrogatis nobis, qualis homo sit Socrates, vel qualis species animalis, convenienter respondemus, quod est risibilis, vel bipes, vel medicus, vel canus.

Attendatur quod proprium prout est universale prædicabile illo modo, cadit in modum prædicandi accidentis, quia accidens prædicatur ut commune : quia ex communibus causatur uni speciei et alii, et ex communi uni individuo et alii, et non causatur ex principiis adæquatis speciei secundum naturam illius speciei, quam habet in propria materia. Illa enim principia aut sunt adæquata omnino principiis proprii, aut sunt excessa a principiis pro-

prii, vel excedentia proprii principia. Si sunt adæquata : aut sunt intransmutabilia, propter hoc quod se tenent ex parte speciei : aut transmutabilia, propter hoc quod se tenent magis ex parte materiæ. Et siquidem sunt adæquata principiis speciei et intransmutabilia : tunc manat ex illis proprium quod convenit omni et soli et semper, et convertibiliter prædicatur de specie, sicut risibile de homine. Si autem transmutabiliter adæquata : tunc aut est transmutatio ex necessitate naturæ : aut est per voluntatem vel appetitum animæ.

-termined according to nature: and according as that nature is varied in the matter due to the species, thus properties are multiplied. Therefore logical property is not only what is properly called property, which agrees to every one, to it alone, and always, but this also is logical property, which agrees to every one and not to it alone, just as to be a biped: and that which agrees to the species alone even if not to every individual of the same species, as to be a doctor, or a farmer, or a navigator, through the art of medicine, or agriculture, or the discipline of navigation: and also what agrees to every one and to it alone, but sometimes and not always, just as for a man in old age to become grey, or an old man to become white, or in the progress of the time of age to become black [dark], and for a swan in its final age to have all white teeth, and many things of this sort are found. On account of which Aristotle assigns property in three ways. Property therefore 'when', and property 'toward something', and property 'simply': because property 'toward something' comprehends two, namely what agrees to every one, but not to it alone, and what agrees to it alone, but not to every one: and according to this intention of property it is one of the five universals, and is predicated of the species not essentially, because it is responded to the question set by 'what kind', and not of the genus, but of the species. For when we are interrogated what Socrates is, we conveniently respond, that he is a man: but again when we are interrogated, what kind of man Socrates is, or what kind of species of animal, we conveniently respond, that he is capable of laughing, or [is] a biped, or a doctor, or grey-haired.

It must be attended to that property as it is a universal predicable in that way, falls into the mode of predicating an accident, because an accident is predicated as a common thing: because from common things it is caused to one species and to another, and from a common thing to one individual and to another, and it is not caused from principles adequate to the species according to the nature of that species, which it has in its proper matter. For those principles are either entirely adequate to the principles of the property, or are exceeded by the principles of the pro-

perty, or exceeding the principles of the property. If they are adequate: they are either intransmutable, on account of this that they hold themselves on the part of the species: or transmutable, on account of this that they hold themselves more on the part of matter. And if indeed they are adequate to the principles of the species and intransmutable: then from them flows the property which agrees to every one and to it alone and always, and is convertibly predicated of the species, just as capable of laughing [is predicated] of man. But if they are transmutably adequate: then either the transmutation is from the necessity of nature: or it is through the will or appetite of the soul.

Et si per necessitatem naturæ : tunc est proprium quando, quod convenit omni et soli et non semper. Si autem non est per necessitatem, sed per appetitum animæ : tunc est proprium ad aliquid, et non semper, illud scilicet quod convenit soli et non omni, et est proprium ad illa ejusdem speciei quibus convenit, et non ad alia ejusdem speciei quibus non convenit. Si autem principia speciei excedentia sunt principia intrinseca proprii, tunc convenit soli et non omni. Si vero e converso principia speciei excedantur a principiis essentialibus proprii, tunc erit proprium quod convenit omni, sed non soli.

Oportet enim scire, quod principia speciei substantiæ sunt : quia species est substantia quæ ex principiis speciei fit : non autem fit substantia ex non substantiis, et ideo principia speciei necessario substantiæ sunt. Cum autem proprium sit de natura accidentis, quod non est pars esse substantialis, relinquitur quod principia suæ essentiæ essentialiter ipsum constituentia sunt accidentia : hæc tamen principia proprio essentialia causantur ab illis principiis quæ sunt speciei substantialia. Cujus exemplum dat Avicenna satis conveniens : ex hoc enim quod homo est animal rationale, vel intellectuale per principia homini essentialia, sequitur quod sit admirativus de visis et auditis, et quod vehementis sit caloris et spiritus ad faciem, ubi sunt sensus perceptivi protensius vel propensius. Prætenso autem calore et spiritu ad faciem, fit faciei et mem-

brorum in facie positorum dilatatio. Est igitur aptus natus ad ridendum, etiamsi actu non rideat. Econtra autem si non desiderata sed contraria percipiat, sequitur ad cor caloris et spiritus retractio et cordis constrictio, cujus constrictionem sequitur faciei constrictio et cerebri, quo constricto et per panniculos cerebri compresso sequitur hujus lacrymabilis expressio distillans per poros cerebro continuatos, per venas et nervos, et tunc fluit per oculos, per nasum et os, quod est esse flebile. Quas proprietates non possunt participare animalia, quæ hujusmodi prudentiam et admirationem de apprehensis habere non possunt. Proportionabiliter autem est in aliis propriis, quæ propria sunt quando et ad aliquid, ut facile patet cuilibet principia speciei in materia intuenti per modum qui paulo ante dictus est.

And if through the necessity of nature: then it is a property 'when', which agrees to every one and to it alone and not always. But if it is not through necessity, but through the appetite of the soul: then it is a property 'toward something', and not always, that namely which agrees to it alone and not to every one, and it is a property toward those of the same species to which it agrees, and not toward other things of the same species to which it does not agree. But if the exceeding principles of the species are intrinsic principles of the property, then it agrees to it alone and not to every one. But if conversely the principles of the species are exceeded by the essential principles of the property, then it will be a property which agrees to every one, but not to it alone.

For it is necessary to know, that the principles of the species are of substance: because the species is a substance which is made from the principles of the species: but substance is not made from non-substances, and therefore the principles of the species are necessarily of substance. But since the property is of the nature of an accident, which is not part of substantial being, it remains that the principles of its essence essentially constituting it are accidents: nevertheless these principles essential to the property are caused by those principles which are substantial to the species. Avicenna gives an example of which that is quite convenient: for from this that man is a rational animal, or intellectual through principles essential to man, it follows that he is capable of admiration concerning things seen and heard, and that he is of vehement heat and spirit toward the face, where the perceptive senses are stretching forth or inclined forth. But when heat and spirit are stretched forth to the face, it is made of the face and the mem-

[mem]bers placed in the face. He is therefore apt by nature for laughing, even if he does not laugh in act. Conversely however if he perceives not desired but contrary things, there follows to the heart a retraction of heat and spirit and a constriction of the heart, whose constriction is followed by a constriction of the face and of the brain, which being constricted and compressed through the membranes of the brain, there follows this tearful expression distilling through the pores continued to the brain, through the veins and nerves, and then it flows through the eyes, through the nose and mouth, which is to be weepable. Which properties animals cannot participate in, which cannot have this kind of prudence and wonder concerning things apprehended. Moreover it is proportionally in other properties, which are properties *when* and *to something*, as is easily evident to anyone intuiting the principles of a species in matter through the mode which was said a little before.

Ex hoc autem solvitur difficultas quam quidam induxerunt dicentes, quod si proprium manet ex principiis speciei, principia autem speciei substantiæ sunt, ex substantiis non fit non substantia : ergo patet, ut videtur, quod proprium sit substantia. Ad hoc autem si dicatur, quod duplicia sunt principia : quædam essentialia proprio, quæ sunt habitudines principiorum per speciem constituentium, et hæc sunt accidentia. Sunt etiam principia remota, quæ sunt essentialia speciei, et hæc sunt substantiæ, et sunt principia istorum quæ sunt principia essentialia proprio. Adhuc autem concludere videntur quod intendunt per propositionem hanc, quod quidquid est principium principii est principium principiati : et si principia speciei sunt principia principiorum proprii, tunc sunt etiam principia proprii : et tunc videtur sequi idem quod prius. Est autem solutio hujus, quod quamvis eadem sint principia speciei et principia proprii, non tamen eodem modo : sed per habitudinem actus ad potentiam sunt principia speciei, et per habitudinem essentiæ totius ad actus vel passiones consequentes naturam speciei in materia sunt principia proprii : et ideo non oportet quod sit proprium substantia, quia talis habitudo consequitur esse perfectum, et ideo est de accidentalibus.

Sed ad hoc objiciunt fortius dicentes, quod cum prædicatur proprium de specie, sicut cum dicitur, homo est risibilis, in ista propositione subjectum est de ratione prædicati, ut dicit Aristoteles : est igitur subjectum in intellectu acceptum et clausum in prædicato : quod enim secundum intellectum conceptum est et clausum in alio, per se et essentialiter convenit illi : ergo idem est essentiale principium illius, et quod per se et essentialiter est principium alicujus est de essentia ipsius. Cum ergo subjectum sit substantia, oportet quod etiam prædicatum quod est proprium sit substantia. Adhuc idem confirmatur sic : cum proprium prædicatur de specie, species est causa proprii : aut ergo est causa per se et univoca, aut per accidens et æquivoca. Si sit per accidens et æquivoca, tunc hæc non est per se, homo est risibilis, quod est falsum, quia est in secundo modo dicendi per se. Si autem est per se et univoca causa, sed causa per se et univoca causato dat naturam sui essentiam et nomen : et si dat naturam et essentiam et nomen, est essentialis causa, et quid de essentia prædicati : et sic cum subjectum fit substantia, erit prædicatum substantia, ut videtur, et sic non erit passio, vel proprium, sed species, et sic non erunt quinque universalia, sed quatuor tantum, ut videtur.

From this moreover the difficulty is solved which certain ones introduced saying, that if a property remains from the principles of a species, but the principles of a species are substances, from substances there is not made a non-substance: therefore it is evident, as it seems, that a property is a substance. To this moreover if it be said, that there are double principles: some essential to the property, which are the relations of the principles constituting through the species, and these are accidents. There are also remote principles, which are essential to the species, and these are substances, and are the principles of those things which are the essential principles to the property. Moreover they still seem to conclude what they intend through this proposition, that whatever is the principle of a principle is the principle of the thing principled: and if the principles of a species are the principles of the principles of a property, then they are also the principles of the property: and then it seems to follow the same as before. Moreover the solution of this is, that although the principles of the species and the principles of the property be the same, nevertheless not in the same way: but through the relation of act to potency they are the principles of the species, and through the relation of the essence of the whole to the acts or passions following the nature of the species in matter they are the principles of the property: and therefore it is not necessary that a property be a substance, because such a relation follows completed being, and therefore it is from the accidentals.

But to this they object more strongly saying, that when a property is predicated of a species, just as when it is said, *man is risible*, in that proposition the subject is from the notion of the predicate, as Aristotle says: the subject is therefore taken in the intellect and enclosed in the predicate: for that which according to the intellect is conceived and enclosed in another, per se and essentially belongs to it: therefore the same is the essential principle of it, and that which per se and essentially is the principle of something is from the essence of itself. Since therefore the subject is a substance, it is necessary that the predicate also which is the property be a substance. This same thing is further confirmed thus: when a property is predicated of a species, the species is the cause of the property: either therefore it is a cause *per se* and univocal, or by accident and equivocal. If it be by accident and equivocal, then this is not *per se*, *man is risible*, which is false, because it is in the second mode of saying *per se*. But if it is a *per se* and univocal cause, but a cause *per se* and univocal gives to the thing caused its own nature, essence and name: and if it gives nature and essence and name, it is an essential cause, and something from the essence of the predicate: and thus since the subject becomes a substance, the predicate will be a substance, as it seems, and thus it will not be a passion, or property, but a species, and thus there will not be five universals, but four only, as it seems.

Hæc autem faciliter et cito solvuntur si ad memoriam revocentur ea quæ in antehabitis determinata sunt : cum enim subjectum est in ratione prædicati, non est in ratione ejus sicut quid existens de essentia ejus, sed est in eo sicut causa per modum qui est dictus, scilicet aptitudinis consequentis esse subjecti : et ideo non sequitur quod proprium sit substantia sicut subjectum, sed sequitur quod subjectum quod est quid et substantia, sit causa quod talis passio consequatur ipsum, et sit in ipso, cujus inhærentia in ipso causa est, quod prædicatur de ipso : sed si esset in ipso sicut quid vel esset principium ipsius, tunc

bene sequeretur id quod conclusum est. Id autem quod objicitur de essentiali, dicendum quod essentiale dupliciter dicitur : est enim essentiale quod est quid essentiæ, et de hoc verum est quod probat objectio. Est iterum essentiale quod est causa non derelinquens essentiam, cum tamen non sit quid essentiæ, et de hoc non est verum. Hoc modo subjectum est essentiale prædicato et conceptum in ipso, quando proprium de specie prædicatur, et generaliter propria passio de subjecto : tale ergo est proprium quod quartum est inter quinque. Sic ergo proprium est universale.

Quamvis proprium et universale secundum rationem nominum proprii et universalis repugnare videantur, quia proprium est quod uni soli convenit, universale autem quod convenit multis. Sed ad hoc est dicendum, quod quamvis proprium conveniat soli, hoc tamen solum est species communis, quæ est in multis potentia, vel actu, vel simul actu et potentia : et quamvis sic soli conveniat, tamen est in multis et de multis, in quibus et de quibus est illud solum cujus ipsum est proprium : et hoc non est contra rationem universalis, ut in ante habitis in tractatu de universalibus in communi determinatum est. Attendendum est enim, quod vere proprium est, quod convenit omni et soli et semper, et conversim prædicatur de illis : et per respectum ad illud accipiunt alia propria, scilicet illud quod convenit soli, sed non omni, aut omni, sed non soli, aut omni et soli, sed non semper. Diffinitio autem convenit omni et soli semper, sed est quid, sed non quale. Prædicationem ergo universalis habet proprium, quanquam individua propria non habeat, ut dictum est.

Ideo contra hoc quidam objiciunt dicentes, quod si hoc universale quod est proprium, non habet particulare, ergo non habet particulare, nisi per aliquid : si autem non habet particulare nisi per aliquid, cum universale dicatur ad particulare, videtur sequi quod non est universale nisi per aliquid : quod autem non est universale nisi per aliquid, est universale per accidens : proprium ergo non est universale nisi per accidens, et sic non quinque sunt universalia per se, quod est falsum.

But these things are easily and quickly solved if those things which were determined in the things held before be recalled to memory: for when the subject is in the notion of the predicate, it is not in the notion of it as some *what* existing of its essence, but it is in it as a cause through the mode which has been said, namely of an aptitude following the being of the subject: and therefore it does not follow that the property be a substance just as the subject, but it follows that the subject which is a *what* and substance, be the cause that such a passion follows it, and be in it, whose inherence in it is the cause that it is predicated of it: but if it were in it as a *what* or were its principle, then

what was concluded would follow well. But to that which is objected concerning 'essential', it must be said that 'essential' is said in two ways: for that is essential which is a somewhat of the essence, and concerning this what the objection proves is true. Again that is essential which is a cause not abandoning the essence, although nevertheless it is not a somewhat of the essence, and concerning this it is not true. In this way the subject is essential to the predicate and conceived in it, when property is predicated of the species, and generally a proper passion of a subject: such therefore is the property which is the fourth among the five. Thus therefore property is a universal.

Although property and universal according to the ratio of the names of property and universal seem to be repugnant, because property is what agrees to one alone, but universal [is] what agrees to many. But to this it must be said, that although property agrees to one alone, nevertheless this alone is a common species, which is in many in potency, or in act, or simultaneously in act and potency: and although it thus agrees to one alone, nevertheless it is in many and of many, in which and of which is that alone of which it is the property: and this is not against the ratio of a universal, as was determined in the preceding points in the treatise on universals in common. For it must be attended to, that what is truly a property, is what agrees to every one and to it alone and always, and is conversely predicated of them: and through respect to that other properties are received, namely that which agrees to it alone, but not to every one, or to every one, but not to it alone, or to every one and to it alone, but not always. But definition agrees to every one and to it alone always, but it is a what, but not a what kind. Property therefore has the predication of a universal, although it may not have proper individuals, as was said.

Therefore against this some object saying, that if this universal which is property, does not have a particular, therefore it does not have a particular, except through something: but if it does not have a particular except through something, since universal is said [in relation] to particular, it seems to follow that it is not a universal except through something: but what is not a universal except through something, is a universal per accidens: therefore property is not a universal except per accidens, and thus there are not five universals per se, which is false.

Sed ad hoc dicendum est, quod proprium revera prædicatur de specie cujus est proprium, immediata prædicatione. Sed, ut dictum est, respicit speciem prout est in materia et particulari, ideo prædicatio ejus per se refertur ad particularia : et sic per se et non per accidens est universale.

Si autem dicatur quod duorum universalium quorum unum sub altero non continetur, non debent esse eadem particularia : sicut diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversæ sunt species et differentiæ, etiam ita debent esse diversa individua. Dicendum quod est verum de generibus et speciebus : sed de universalibus sic est, quod plura eorum referuntur ad invicem sicut genus ad speciem et species ad genus, et similiter differentia refertur ad utrumque illorum, et sic etiam proprium refertur ad speciem : et ideo possunt habere individua eadem, non tamen eodem modo. Alius enim modus individui est hoc animal, et hic homo, hoc rationale, et hoc risibile : quamvis per suppositum omnia hæc eadem sint, est enim Socrates hoc animal, et hic homo, et hoc risibile. Et si individuum formaliter accipiatur, tunc formaliter diversa sunt individua, sicut diversa sunt universalia. Sed in hoc est differentia, quod hoc animal non habet esse hoc rationale per hoc quod est hic homo, sed per se : sed hoc risibile habet esse hoc risibile per hoc quod est hic homo, quia risibile principiatur ab homine sive ab hominis specie, animal autem et rationale ab homine non principiantur, sed potius principia sunt hominis. Hoc igitur est quod intendimus de proprio secundum logicam intentionem.

<!-- cap:1.6.2 -->

CAPUT II

De diffinitione proprii et explanatione portium ejus.

Hoc autem totum facile patet si considerentur dicta antiquorum in proprii divisione. Proprium Peripatetici quadrifariam dividunt : quadrifariam autem dividere est quatuor modis fari, quia divisio ejus est multipliciter data. Quod non est omnino æquivocum, nec est pure univocum, sed plurium convenientium in uno nomine relatorum ad unum, cui principaliter et perfecta ratione convenit ratio nominis. Nam dicitur proprium quod soli alicui convenit speciei, et si non omni convenit individuo ejusdem speciei, tamen erit proprium quia manat de substantialibus principiis speciei, quamvis principia essentialia proprii non adæquantur principiis speciei, et per transmutationem voluntariam referuntur ad principia speciei : et hoc modo medicum esse vel geometram proprium est homini, et est proprium ad aliquid suæ speciei.

But to this it must be said, that property in reality is predicated of the species of which it is the property, by immediate predication. But, as was said, it respects the species according as it is in matter and in the particular, therefore its predication is referred per se to particulars: and thus per se and not per accidens it is a universal.

But if it is said that of two universals of which one is not contained under the other, they ought not to have the same particulars: just as of diverse genera and those not posited subalternately there are diverse species and differences, also so there ought to be diverse individuals. It must be said that it is true of genera and species: but of universals it is thus, that several of them are referred to each other just as genus to species and species to genus, and similarly difference is referred to both of them, and thus also property is referred to species: and therefore they can have the same individuals, nevertheless not in the same way. For another mode of the individual is this animal, and this man, this rational [thing], and this capable of laughing [thing]: although through the supposit of these things all are the same, for Socrates is this animal, and this man, and this capable of laughing [thing]. And if the individual is taken formally, then individuals are formally diverse, just as universals are diverse. But in this is the difference, that this animal does not have the being of this rational [thing] through this that it is this man, but per se: but this capable of laughing [thing] has the being of this capable of laughing [thing] through this that it is this man, because capable of laughing is principled from man or from the species of man, but animal and rational are not principled from man, but rather are principles of man. This therefore is what we intend concerning property according to logical intention.

<!-- cap:1.6.2 -->

CHAPTER II

On the definition of property and the explanation of its parts.

But all this is easily evident if the sayings of the ancients in the division of property are considered. The Peripatetics divide property fourfold: but to divide fourfold is to speak in four ways, because its division is given in many ways. Which is not entirely equivocal, nor is it purely univocal, but of many things agreeing in one name referred to one, to which the ratio of the name agrees principally and by a perfect ratio. For it is called property what agrees to one species alone, and if it does not agree to every individual of the same species, nevertheless it will be a property because it flows from the substantial principles of the species, although the essential principles of the property are not equated to the principles of the species, and through voluntary transmutation they are referred to the principles of the species: and in this way to be a doctor or a geometer is proper to man, and it is a property 'toward something' of his species.

Et est proprium, quod omni individuo speciei accidit, sed non soli accidit speciei, eo quod principia proprii excedunt propria principia speciei, quamvis non excedant omnia principia ipsius : quemadmodum proprium est homini esse bipedem. Et est proprium, quod convenit soli speciei et omni individuo ejusdem speciei per aptitudinem naturæ communis, quamvis per accidens impediatur in aliquo, sed non convenit semper, sed aliquando, ut canescere in senectute. Cum enim homo habeat cerebrum maximum respectu sui corporis et humidissimum, quod non terminatur nisi quamdiu calor naturalis fuerit fortis, necesse est, quod procedente ætate frigescente calore resolvente ipsum, et non dirigente, nec terminante ipsum, putrescere incipiat : et tunc canescit et albescit secundum naturam. Quamvis hoc per accidens impediatur in his in quibus est subtile et pingue humidum facile per

modicum calorem terminabile : propter quod qui molles et subtiles pilos habent, aut non canescunt, aut tarde : mollities enim et subtilitas pilorum, signum est subtilis et pinguis humidi, et hoc est proprium quando. Est etiam proprium quod omni convenit individuo speciei, et soli speciei, et semper convenit, eo quod principia proprii adæquantur penitus principiis speciei et immobiliter manant ex ipsis : et hoc est proprie proprium : sicut risibile convenit homini per aptitudinem naturæ hominis, etiam quando non ridet secundum actum et operationem usus, dicitur esse risibile, non quod actu rideat, sed quod aptus natus ad ridendum est, et hoc modo equo convenit esse hinnibile, et asino esse rudibilem, et bovi esse mugibilem : et sic sua propria habet quodlibet animal, et etiam quælibet specierum, quamvis nomina propriorum non sint posita, propter hoc quod nobis sunt incognita. Dicimus tamen quod species et res sub speciebus contentæ multas habent operationes non a qualitatibus activis et passivis quæ sunt in ipsis, sed a tota specie, sicut scamonea dicitur purgare choleram, et saphyrus tremores et antraces pellere : et hoc dicitur esse eis proprium. Hæc autem sic dicuntur proprie propria, quoniam etiam convertuntur et conversim prædicantur de specie universaliter : quidquid enim est equus, est hinnibile, et quidquid est hinnibile, est equus. Attendendum est, quod quamvis risibile sit proprium hominis, tamen risibilitas non est ejus proprium, quia proprium est universale prædicabile : risibilitas autem de homine prædicari non potest, sicut nec prædicatur in differentia rationalitas, sed prædicatur rationale.

And there is a property, which happens to every individual of the species, but does not happen to the species alone, because the principles of the property exceed the proper principles of the species, although they do not exceed all its principles: just as it is proper to man to be a biped. And there is a property, which agrees to the species alone and to every individual of the same species through the aptitude of common nature, although it may be accidentally impeded in something, but it does not agree always, but sometimes, as to become grey in old age. For since man has the largest brain in respect to his body and the most humid, which is not terminated except as long as the natural heat is strong, it is necessary that, as age proceeds and the heat cooling and resolving it, and not directing, nor terminating it, it begins to putrefy: and then he becomes grey and white according to nature. Although this may be accidentally impeded in those in whom there is a subtle and fat humidity easily

terminable through a moderate heat: on account of which those who have soft and thin hairs, either do not become grey, or [do so] late: for the softness and thinness of the hairs, is a sign of a subtle and fat humidity, and this is property 'when'. There is also a property which agrees to every individual of the species, and to the species alone, and always agrees, because the principles of the property are inwardly equated to the principles of the species and immovably flow from them: and this is properly a property: just as capable of laughing agrees to man through the aptitude of the nature of man, even when he does not laugh according to act and the operation of use, he is said to be capable of laughing, not that he actually laughs, but that he is naturally apt to laugh, and in this way it agrees to a horse to be capable of neighing, and to a donkey to be capable of braying, and to an ox to be capable of mooing: and thus any animal has its own properties, and also any of the species, although the names of the properties are not posited, because they are unknown to us. Nevertheless we say that species and things contained under species have many operations not from active and passive qualities which are in them, but from the whole species, just as scammony is said to purge choler, and sapphire to repel tremors and anthrax: and this is said to be a property to them. But these are thus called properly properties, since also they are converted and conversely predicated of the species universally: for whatever is a horse, is capable of neighing, and whatever is capable of neighing, is a horse. It must be attended to, that although capable of laughing is a property of man, nevertheless capability of laughing is not his property, because a property is a predictable universal: but capability of laughing cannot be predicated of man, just as neither is rationality predicated in difference, but rational is predicated.

Et hujus causam dicit Avicenna satis convenientem : quia cum universale notio sit totius ejus de quo prædicatur, et dicat ipsum totum vel secundum potentiam vel secundum actum vel secundum naturalem potentiam consequentem ipsum in eo in quo est, sic di-

cit totum proprium. Taliter autem totum non potest significari per abstractum, sed significatur per concretum. Oportet enim universale concretionis more significari per nomen.

Quamvis enim sic quatuor universalia quæ sunt genus et species, differentia et proprium, concretionis modo significari habeant, non tamen propter hoc sunt denominativa, sed sunt totius esse nomina nomen et rationem dantis ei de quo prædicantur: quod non faciunt denominativa, quia ista non sunt nisi vel essentialia ejus de quo prædicantur, vel ex essentialibus principiis manantia : denominativa autem formantur ab aliena natura, quæ per causam non essentialem, sed infinitam esse habent in subjecto, et ideo non essentialiter, sed denominative possunt prædicari : sicut cum dicitur, homo est albus vel niger vel aliquid hujusmodi. Hæc autem in doctrina prædicamentorum habent determinari. Talis ergo est intentio proprii apud logicos, et talis est divisio ipsius. De proprio ergo hæc dicta sufficiant.

<!-- cap:1.7.1 -->

CAPUT I — *De differentia proprii et accidentis prout accidens est quintum prædicabile.*

Antequam de assignationibus accidentis tractemus quibus Antiqui accidens descripserunt, oportet nos de differentia proprii et accidentis secundum quod est unum de quinque universalibus determinare. In hoc enim Avicenna dicit antiquos qui de quinque tractaverunt universalibus esse diminutos, qui descriptiones accidentis posuerunt antequam distinguerent in qua significatione accidens accipitur, secundum quod est unum quinque universalium. Cum enim omne quod est sit substantia, vel accidens, ut dicit Aristoteles, et proprium propter hoc quod sequitur esse completum speciei sit accidens, videbitur de necessitate, quod proprium sit accidens. Et sic si accidens sumitur pro omni eo quod non est substantia, videtur quod proprium non sit divisum ab accidente, et universalia non sunt quinque, sed quatuor tantum.

Adhuc autem proprium non potest dici essentiale speciei : quia ex quo proprium sequitur totam compositionem speciei, et completum esse ipsius, species intelligitur sine proprio : et cum non sit essentiale speciei, erit ut accidentale speciei, et sic est in natura sicut accidens : et cum in comparatione ad proprium subjectum sit accidentale, totum ponetur in naturam et essentiam accidentis : non ergo erit in aliqua consideratione nisi accidens, et sic

And Avicenna says a quite convenient cause of this: because since a universal is the notion of the whole of that of which it is predicated, and says that whole either according to potency or according to act or according to the natural potency following it in that in which it is, thus it di-

-rects the whole property. But in such a way the whole cannot be signified through the abstract, but is signified through the concrete. For it is necessary that the universal be signified more by concretion through a name.

For although thus the four universals which are genus and species, difference and property, have to be signified in the mode of concretion, nevertheless on account of this they are not denominative, but they are names of the whole being giving the name and the ratio to that of which they are predicated: which denominatives do not do, because those are nothing but either essentials of that of which they are predicated, or flowing from essential principles: but denominatives are formed from an alien nature, which through a non-essential cause, but an infinite one have being in the subject, and therefore they can be predicated not essentially, but denominatively: as when it is said, man is white or black or something of this sort. But these have to be determined in the doctrine of predicaments. Such therefore is the intention of property among logicians, and such is its division. Therefore let these sayings concerning property suffice.

<!-- cap:1.7.1 -->

CHAPTER I — *On the difference of property and accident according as accident is the fifth predicable.*

Before we treat of the assignments of accident by which the Ancients described accident, it is necessary for us to determine concerning the difference of property and accident according as it is one of the five universals. For in this Avicenna says that the ancients who treated of the five universals were deficient, who posited the descriptions of accident before they distinguished in what signification accident is received, according as it is one of the five universals. For since everything that is is a substance, or an accident, as Aristotle says, and property on account of this that it follows the complete being of the species is an accident, it will seem of necessity, that property is an accident. And thus if accident is taken for all that which is not a substance, it seems that property is not divided from accident, and the universals are not five, but only four.

But still property cannot be said [to be] essential to the species: because since property follows the whole composition of the species, and its complete being, the species is understood without the property: and since it is not essential to the species, it will be as accidental to the species, and thus it is in nature just like an accident: and since in comparison to its proper subject it is accidental, the whole will be posited into the nature and essence of an accident: therefore it will not be in any consideration except an accident, and thus

iterum sequi videtur, quod non sint quinque universalia, sed quatuor tantum. Si autem aliquis dicere velit, quod duplex est comparatio accidentis ad subjectum : idem enim accidens comparatur ad subjectum ut ad substantiam tantum, et hoc est accidens : aut comparatur ad subjectum non ut ad subjectum, sed ad causam, et hoc emanat de principiis subjecti, et est proprium subjecto, et sic differt proprium ab accidente. Hoc stare non potest : quia omne accidens, ut dicit Aristoteles[1], causatur a substantia et stabilitur et ordinatur ab ipsa, et sine ipsa est fluens et indeterminatum : et sic sequeretur quod omne accidens sit proprium, et sic iterum sequeretur, quod non essent nisi quatuor universalia, scilicet genus, differentia, proprium, et accidens. Hoc etiam probatur ratione : quia omne quod secundum ordinem naturæ est prius aliquo, est causa ad illud, ut determinatur in libro *Causarum*, et in libro *fontis vitæ* : non potest autem negari quin ordine naturæ substantia sit ante accidens : accidens ergo sic comparatur ad substantiam sicut ad subjectum et ad causam. Hoc autem etiam dicit ratio nominis *substantiæ* quæ dicitur a *substando*, eo quod accidenti substet ut subjectum et causa.

Adhuc accidens dividitur in accidens separabile, et inseparabile. Inseparabile autem accidens est, quod causatur a principiis subjecti : proprium autem est accidens a principiis subjecti causatum. Videtur ergo quod proprium sit pars accidentis, et in minori ambitu communitatis quam accidens.

Adhuc Avicenna quærit, quid vocatur accidens, quando accidens dicitur unum quinque universalium? Si enim accidens dicitur id cujus tota natura est accidens, ut color, vel albedo : cum talia sint et genera et species et differentiæ et propria, videtur quod quinque universalia non differant re, sed modo tantum, ut videtur. Postea talia quædam sunt modum tantum quemdam dicentia, sicut cum dicitur, corpus est creatura, vel non creatura, vel factum, vel æternum : tunc talis prædicatio nihil de subjecto prædicaret, nec talis prædicatio posset reduci ad aliquem modum prædicationis quinque universalium. Si autem talis natura non dicitur accidens, sed accidens vocatur denominatum ab accidente, ut album, tunc accidens est idem quod accidentale, quod omnino falsum esse videtur, quia accidentale dicit plus quam accidens, et dicit subjectum quod non est de essentia vel natura accidentis.

again it seems to follow, that there are not five universals, but only four. But if someone wishes to say, that the comparison of an accident to a subject is twofold: for the same accident is compared to the subject as to a substance only, and this is an accident: or it is compared to the subject not as to a subject, but to a cause, and this flows from the principles of the subject, and is proper to the subject, and thus property differs from accident. This cannot stand: because every accident, as Aristotle says[1], is caused by a substance and is established and ordered by it, and without it is flowing and undetermined: and thus it would follow that every accident is a property, and thus again it would follow, that there were not except four universals, namely genus, difference, property, and accident. This also is proved by reason: because everything which according to the order of nature is prior to something, is a cause to it, as is determined in the book *Of Causes*, and in the book *of the fount of life*: but it cannot be denied but that in the order of nature substance is before accident: accident therefore is thus compared to substance just as to a subject and to a cause. But this also the ratio of the name of *substance* says which is called from *substanding*, because it stands under an accident as subject and cause.

Still accident is divided into separable and inseparable accident. But an inseparable accident is, what is caused by the principles of the subject: but a property is an accident caused by the principles of the subject. It seems therefore that property is a part of acci-

[acci]dent, and in a smaller ambit of community than an accident.

Further Avicenna asks, what is called an accident, when an accident is said to be one of the five universals? For if an accident is said to be that whose whole nature is an accident, such as color, or whiteness: since such things are also genera and species and differences and properties, it seems that the five universals do not differ in thing, but only in mode, as it seems. Afterwards some such things are saying only a certain mode, just as when it is said, *the body is a creature*, or *not a creature*, or *made*, or *eternal*: then such a predication would predicate nothing of the subject, nor could such a predication be reduced to some mode of predication of the five universals. But if such a nature is not called an accident, but an accident is called what is denominated from an accident, such as *white*, then an accident is the same as an accidental, which seems to be altogether false, because accidental says more than accident, and it says a subject which is not of the essence or nature of the accident.

Adhuc quæritur de comparatione hujus universalis quod est accidens ad individua de quibus prædicatur. Si enim non habet propria individua, sed habet individua substantiæ, tunc videtur quod non sit proprie et per se universale. Si autem habet individua propria et per se non ab alio universali : tunc sequitur quod cum omne universale habeat esse completum et perfectum quando est in suis individuis, quod accidens completum esse habeat et perfectum, quando est in suis individuis, ut album in hoc albo : et sic accidens completum esse habere potest sine substantia, quod omnino est impossibile. Restat ergo quæstio, quid sit accidens secundum quod est unum quinque universalium secundum Avicennam et Alfarabium?

Ad hæc et similia non est difficile respondere si bene revocentur ad memoriam, quæ in tractatu primo de universalibus dicta sunt. Dictum est enim quod omnia ista quinque quantum ad communem modum prædicandi de pluribus universalia sunt, ita quod sunt in multis et de multis, et quod non æquivoce prædicantur de multis in quibus sunt, et quod suis particularibus dant nomina sua et rationem, ita quod unumquodque suo particulari nomen suum dat et rationem, genus scilicet ut genus, species ut species, differentia ut differentia, proprium ut proprium, et accidens ut accidens : sicut album dat nomen et rationem suam secundum prædicationem accidentis huic albo, de quo prædicatur ut accidens, et cui accidit sive inest ut accidens.

Et quod quæritur de differentia proprii et accidentis secundum quod sunt diversa universalia prædicabilia de suis subjectis, *Dicendum* quod differunt in hoc quod proprium est accidens manans de principiis essentialibus speciei, et maxime proprie proprium, cujus principia principiis speciei immobiliter sunt adæquata, quemadmodum in tractu de *Proprio* dictum est. Sunt autem sub principiis speciei principia substantialia individui componentia ipsum, sicut talis anima, et tale corpus, et talis complexio, et talis membrorum compositio, et talis habitudo, et hujusmodi, ex quibus oritur et manat accidens individui, quod secundum quod totum esse significat, et est notio totius under esse talis accidentis, prædicabile de ipso est, nec idem est ipsi : et hoc sub hoc communi, quod est universale prædicabile de inferioribus, specialem dicit modum prædicandi, qui non est aliquis aliorum quatuor modorum, et ideo ipsum est universale quintum, et ideo etiam vocatur accidens in dividui, cum proprium dicatur accidens speciei propter causam quæ sæpius dicta est : et ideo deficerent prædicabilia nisi apponeretur aliis quatuor prædicabile accidens. Ideo etiam dicitur accidens commune, quia talis habitudo principiorum communiter in diversis generibus et speciebus particularium invenitur. Ideo etiam vocatur accidens infinitum, quia principia stantia non sunt, sed mobilia motu per accidens, qui

Further it is asked concerning the comparison of this universal which is an accident to the individuals of which it is predicated. For if it does not have proper individuals, but has individuals of substance, then it seems that it is not properly and *per se* a universal. But if it has individuals proper and *per se* not from another universal: then it follows that since every universal has completed and perfect being when it is in its individuals, that the accident has completed and perfect being when it is in its individuals, as white in *this white*: and thus the accident can have completed being without substance, which is altogether impossible. The question therefore remains, what an accident is according as it is one of the five universals according to Avicenna and Alfarabi?

To these and similar things it is not difficult to respond if those things which were said in the first treatise on universals be well recalled to memory. For it was said that all these five as to the common mode of predicating of many are universals, so that they are in many and of many, and that they are not predicated equivocally of the many in which they are, and that they give to their particulars their names and notion, so that each one gives to its particular its name and notion, namely genus as genus, species as species, difference as difference, property as property, and accident as accident: just as white gives its name and notion according to the predication of an accident to *this white*, of which it is predicated as an accident, and to which it happens or is in as an accident.

And as to what is asked concerning the difference of property and accident according as they are diverse predicable universals of their subjects, *it must be said* that they differ in this that a property is an accident emanating from the essential principles of a species, and most properly a property, whose principles are immovably adequate to the principles of the species, just as was said in the treatise on *Property*. Moreover there are under the principles of the species the substantial principles of the individual composing it, such as such a soul, and such a body, and such a complexion, and such a composition of members, and such a habit, and such like, from which arises and emanates the accident of the individual, which according as it signifies the whole being, and is the notion of the whole under the being of such an accident, is predicable of itself, nor is it the same as itself: and this under this common [thing], which is a universal predicable of inferiors, says a special mode of predicating, which is not any of the other four modes, and therefore it is the fifth universal, and therefore it is also called an accident of the individual, while a property is called an accident of the species on account of the cause which was said quite often: and therefore the predicables would be deficient unless the predicable accident were added to the other four. Therefore it is also called a common accident, because such a relation of principles is found commonly in diverse genera and species of particulars. Therefore it is also called an infinite accident, because the principles are not standing, but mobile by a motion by accident, which

omnibus est et infinitus. Et ideo etiam dicitur accidens per accidens, quia talia principia essentialia individuis non sunt determinate de intellectu accidentis, ita quod concipiatur in ratione diffinitiva accidentis sicut determinata subjecta, quemadmodum concipitur determinatum subjectum in diffinitione accidentis per se. Tale ergo universale prædicabile de multis per hoc quod notio totius est sub esse accidentali hujus accidentis (ut dicit Alfarabius) est universale quintum quod vocatur accidens. Et quia nullum abstracte significatum potest esse notio totius subjecti secundum quod est under esse substantiali vel accidentali, propter hoc accidens in solo genere accidentis signatum, ut color, vel albedo, non potest esse universale sic prædicabile ut accidens, quamvis possit esse universale ut genus, vel species, vel differentia, vel proprium. Quod dicit Avicenna, quod accidentale hic accidens vocatur, quando accidens quintum universale dicitur esse, quamvis etiam hoc subjectum dicat et accidens, quæ sunt diversarum naturarum non ad idem ordinatarum, ut potentia et actus, tamen non prædicatur nisi secundum esse accidentis, quod habet in subjecto, et ideo totum prædicatum vocatur accidens.

Et secundum hoc non est difficile respondere quæ objiciendo inducta sunt. Quando enim dicitur quod omne quod est, aut est substantia, aut est accidens: hoc verum est secundum quod substantia est ens per se, et accidens est ens per aliud in alio: hæc enim divisio reducitur ad hanc quæ est, quod omne quod est, aut est per se ens, aut non per se ens, quæ dividuntur per affirmationem et negationem: et sic proprium, ut dicit Boetius, est de genere accidentium. Secundum autem quod sunt diversi modi entis per se, secundum quos variatur prædicatum substantiale in quid et in quale, sic sunt diversi modi entis in alio et per aliud, secundum quos variatur modus prædicationis sive prædicabilis accidentalis. Quoddam enim est in alio et per aliud, ita quod principia ejus sunt adæquata isti, et immobiliter sunt in ipso: et hoc habet modum proprii quod simpliciter est proprium, quia proprium quando et proprium ad aliquid deficiunt a proprio simpliciter: et ideo accipiunt secundum aliquid modum accidentis. Propter quod dicit Aristoteles[1] quod nihil prohibet accidens fieri proprium quando, et ad aliquid. Unde talia sunt accidentia aliquid convenientiæ habentia cum proprio.

[to] all and infinite. And therefore it is also called an accident *per accidens*, because such essential principles for individuals are not determinately of the understanding of an accident, so that it be conceived in the definitive notion of an accident as determined subjects, just as a determined subject is conceived in the definition of an accident *per se*. Therefore such a universal predicable of many through this, that it is the notion of the whole under the accidental being of this accident (as Alfarabi says), is the fifth universal which is called an accident. And because nothing signified abstractly can be the notion of a whole subject according as it is under substantial or accidental being, on account of this an accident signified in the genus of accident alone, such as color, or whiteness, cannot be a universal thus predicable as an accident, although it can be a universal as a genus, or species, or difference, or property. As to what Avicenna says, that here the accidental is called an accident, when the accident is said to be the fifth universal, although this also says a subject and an accident, which are of diverse natures not ordered to the same thing, as potency and act, nevertheless it is not predicated except according to the being of the accident, which it has in the subject, and therefore the whole predicate is called an accident.

And according to this it is not difficult to respond to those things which were introduced by objecting. For when it is said that everything which is, either is a substance, or is an accident: this is true according as a substance is a being *per se*, and an accident is a being through another in another: for this division is reduced to this one, which is, that everything which is, either is a being *per se*, or not a being *per se*, which are divided through affirmation and negation: and thus a property, as Boethius says, is from the genus of accidents. But according as there are diverse modes of being *per se*, according to which the substantial predicate is varied into *what* and into *of what sort*, so there are diverse modes of being in another and through another, according to which the mode of predication or of the accidental predicable is varied. For something is in another and through another, so that its principles are adequate to it, and are immovably in itself: and this has the mode of a property which is simply a property, because a property *when* and a property *to something* fall short from a property simply: and therefore they take according to something the mode of an accident. On account of which Aristotle says that nothing prohibits an accident from becoming a property *when*, and *to something*. Whence such are accidents having something of convenience with the property.

Ad hoc quod dicit, quod accidens per se non est essentiale subjecto, eo quod subjectum secundum esse perfectum natura et intellectu est ante illud. Dicendum quod quidem verum est, quod proprium non est essentiale speciei et subjecto de quo prædicatur: nec hoc dictum fuit, sed potius e converso, quod subjectum per principia universalia specificata est essentiale proprio, quia subjectum est in ratione proprii, et non proprium in ratione subjecti: nec dicitur subjectum essentiale proprio sive per se accidenti, quia sit aliquid de natura prædicati, sed quia est causa ipsius a qua fit et in qua fit secundum esse: et ideo dicitur essentiale sibi sicut non derelinquens ipsum actu et intellectu, et non sicut conceptum ut quid: vel quale essentiale ipsius, sicut genus et differentia componuntur in intellectu speciei. Hoc autem modo substantia non se habet ad accidens commune sive ad accidens per accidens, sed habet se tantum ut terminus ad quem terminatur esse accidentis sine quo fluidum et incertum est accidens, et sicut fundamentum quo fundatur: et hoc habet substantia ut substantia est, et non ut hæc substantia vel ista, et ideo non per se accipitur in ratione sive diffinitione accidentis. Et ideo hæc non est per se, sed per accidens, cum dicitur, homo est albus: quamvis hæc sit per se, homo est risibilis. Cum enim dicitur homo est albus, notatur hominem subjectum esse

fluxus albedinis, et illud in quo fundatur album, ut sit albedo in ipso, et subjectum non dicat causam quare accidens sit tale in ipso. Cum autem dicitur homo est risibilis, homo dicit causam quare risibilitas sit in ipso, et ideo diversus est modus prædicandi hic et ibi.

Ad hoc autem quod dicitur de accidente separabili et inseparabili, quod unum comparetur ad subjectum ut ad subjectum tantum, alter autem comparetur ad subjectum ut ad subjectum et ad causam, et sic proprium sit pars accidentis : *Dicendum* quod quamvis accidens inseparabile comparetur ad subjectum ut ad causam, tamen non sequitur quod proprium sit pars accidentis. Comparatur enim proprium ad subjectum quod est species per principia incorruptibilia et immobilia, ut sæpius dictum est : accidens autem inseparabile comparatur ad principia individui quæ sunt mobilia et corruptibilia ut ad complexionem hanc vel ad compositionem hanc facientia, quamvis propter aliquam causam non mutetur subjecto manente, sicut nigredo ad Æthiopem, ut dicit Aristoteles [1], quia semen in matrice decoquitur decoctione forti, et ideo resolvitur humidum clarum, et remanet nigrum terrestre et non clarum. Et cum alia sit comparatio proprii et inseparabilis accidentis ad subjectum, patet quod proprium non est pars accidentis, nisi forte proprium quando, et ad aliquid, quæ sunt simpliciter de natura accidentis, et secundum quid propria, ut dictum est.

To this which he says, that an accident *per se* is not essential to the subject, because the subject according to perfect being in nature and intellect is before it. It must be said that it is indeed true, that a property is not essential to the species and to the subject of which it is predicated: nor was this said, but rather conversely, that the subject specified through universal principles is essential to the property, because the subject is in the notion of the property, and not the property in the notion of the subject: nor is the subject called essential to the property or to a *per se* accident, because it be something of the nature of the predicate, but because it is the cause of it from which it is made and in which it is made according to being: and therefore it is called essential to it just as not abandoning it in act and intellect, and not as conceived as a *what*: or an essential *of what sort* of itself, just as genus and difference are composed in the intellect of the species. But in this way substance does not relate to a common accident or to an accident *per accidens*, but relates only as a terminus at which the being of the accident is terminated without which an accident is fluid and uncertain, and as the foundation by which it is founded: and this a substance has as it is substance, and not as *this* substance or *that*, and therefore it is not taken *per se* in the notion or definition of the accident. And therefore this is not *per se*, but by accident, when it is said, *man is white*: although this be *per se*, *man is risible*. For when it is said *man is white*, it is noted that man is the subject

flowing of whiteness, and that in which the white is founded, such that whiteness is in it, and the subject does not say the cause why the accident is such in it. But when it is said man is capable of laughing, man says the cause why the capability of laughing is in him, and therefore the mode of predicating here and there is diverse.

But to this which is said concerning separable and inseparable accident, that one is compared to the subject as to the subject only, but the other is compared to the subject as to a subject and to a cause, and thus property is a part of accident: *It must be said* that although an inseparable accident is compared to the subject as to a cause, nevertheless it does not follow that property is a part of accident. For property is compared to a subject which is a species through incorruptible and immovable principles, as has often been said: but an inseparable accident is compared to the principles of the individual which are movable and corruptible as making towards this complexion or towards this composition, although on account of some cause it is not changed while the subject remains, just like blackness to the Ethiopian, as Aristotle says[1], because the seed in the matrix is decocted by a strong decoction, and therefore the clear humid is resolved, and the terrestrial black and not clear remains. And since the comparison of property and of an inseparable accident to the subject is another, it is evident that property is not a part of accident, unless perhaps property 'when', and 'toward something', which are simply of the nature of accident, and properties according to a certain respect, as was said.

Ad hoc autem quod quæritur, quid hic dicatur accidens, jam patet responsio in supradictis. Quod autem quæri posset, quæ differentia sit accidentis et accidentalis, ex quo accidens hic dicitur accidentale, ut dicit Avicenna, solvendum est per eumdem Avicennam dicentem, quod *accidens* dicitur per oppositionem ad substantiam : *accidentale* autem denominatum est ab accidente et ratione esse accidentalis quod habet prædicatum, et non ratione esse

substantialis quod habet subjectum : et ideo dicit quod album non dicit albedinem, sed rem albam sub esse albedinis designatam. Et hoc quia in præcedentibus determinatum est universale non prædicari nisi per hoc quod est notio totius esse sui subjecti, hoc sæpius dictum est.

Ad hoc autem quod de individuo hujus universalis quæritur : *Dicendum* quod (sicut alia) quædam propria habet individua : quia aliter non esset per se et univoce universale sicut alia : et hoc verum est, quod universale ut universale non habet perfectum esse secundum actum et naturam, nisi in suo particulari : et sic hoc album dat perfectum esse albo in universali designato. Sed ex hoc ulterius non sequitur, quin hoc accidentale esse dependeat ad substantiam, ut ad terminum sui fluxus, et sui esse fundamentum, et sic indiget individuo substantiæ. Et hoc ideo, quia est universale quod est accidens, et in quantum universale habet individuum. Et in quantum hoc universale quod est accidens, indiget individuo substantiæ, sicut et de proprio dictum est in antehabito tractatu : propter enim talem diversum modum prædicandi diversum est ab illis hoc universale. Sic igitur secundum Peripateticos posteriores determinandum est de intentione accusantis, antequam procedatur ad assignationes accidentis. Propter quod Avicenna Porphyrium redarguit, quod omissa determinatione accidentis, cujus intentio nota non erat, statim processit ad descriptiones ipsius.

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CAPUT II.

De prima assignatione accidentis data a Porphyrio.

Assignationes accidentis datæ a Porphyrio et ab aliis Peripateticis, multipliciter dicuntur esse vitiosæ et reprehensibiles, et dicta de accidente prout universale est ab Avicenna et Algazele et Alfarabio

rium.

et Jacob filio Alchindi, minus veritatis habere, et esse multipliciter imperfecta, in quibusdam non vera, et in quibusdam imperfecta, et in quibusdam ad rem non pertinentia.

But to this which is asked, what is here called an accident, the response is already evident in the aforementioned things. But what could be asked, what is the difference of an accident and of something accidental, from the fact that accident here is called accidental, as Avicenna says, must be solved through the same Avicenna saying, that *accident* is so called through opposition to substance: but *accidental* is denominated from an accident and by reason of the accidental being which the predicate has, and not by reason of the

substantial being which the subject has: and therefore he says that white does not say whiteness, but a white thing designated under the being of whiteness. And this because it was determined in the preceding points that a universal is not predicated except through this that it is the notion of the whole being of its subject, this has often been said.

But to this which is asked concerning the individual of this universal: *It must be said* that (just like others) it has certain proper individuals: because otherwise it would not be per se and univocally a universal just like others: and this is true, that a universal as a universal does not have perfect being according to act and nature, except in its particular: and thus this white gives perfect being to white designated in a universal. But from this it does not further follow, that this accidental being does not depend on substance, as to the terminus of its flowing, and the foundation of its being, and thus it needs the individual of a substance. And this therefore, because it is a universal which is an accident, and insofar as it is a universal it has an individual. And insofar as this universal which is an accident, needs the individual of a substance, just as also was said concerning property in the preceding treatise: for on account of such a diverse mode of predicating this universal is diverse from them. Thus therefore according to the later Peripatetics it must be determined concerning the intention of defining [the accident], before one proceeds to the assignments of accident. On account of which Avicenna refutes Porphyry, that the determination of accident having been omitted, whose intention was not known, he immediately proceeded to its descriptions.

<!-- cap:1.1.2 -->

CHAPTER II.

On the first assignment of accident given by Porphyry.

The assignments of accident given by Porphyry and by other Peripatetics, are in many ways said to be vicious and reprehensible, and the sayings of Avicenna and Algazel and Alfarabi concerning accident according as it is a universal

-ry.

[and] Jacob the son of Al-Kindi, [say?] to have less of truth, and to be manifoldly imperfect, in some things not true, and in some things imperfect, and in some things not pertaining to the matter.

Quod enim dicunt antiqui in prima accidentis assignatione, quod accidens est quod adest et abest præter subjecti corruptionem, debuit esse generis. Debuit ergo dici quod accidens est universale. Universale enim quinque generibus est pro genere. Adhuc addi debuit differentia contrahens ad prædicabile, quod est accidens, et separans ipsum ab aliis in modo de pluribus prædicandi : ut diceretur sic, accidens est universale prædicatum de pluribus non essentialiter, sed in quale et non in quid : hoc enim esset quare adest vel abest ei de quo prædicatur præter subjecti corruptionem. Adhuc sicut abest præter subjecti corruptionem, ita abest præter subjecti constitutionem, motus enim secundum accidentia, sicut dicit Aristoteles[1], est de subjecto ad subjectum eodem subjecto remanente et salvato sub utroque terminorum motus : et hæc est causa quare adest et abest præter subjecti de quo prædicatur corruptionem.

Dicit etiam Avicenna vitium esse in hoc quod secundum hanc assignationem accidentis dividunt accidens in accidens separabile, et inseparabile: dicentes quod dormire vel sedere est separabile accidens, nigrum vero esse corvo et Æthiopi inseparabiliter accedit. Et si objiciatur quod hoc oppositum esse videtur ei quod dicitur in assignatione accidentis, quia si eidem adest et abest præter subjecti corruptionem, tunc omne accidens videtur separabile et nullum inseparabile subjecto manente. Dant responsionem valde calumniosam dicentes, quod accidens separabile est a subjecto secundum intellectum, quia potest subintelligi corvus albus et Æthiops nitens candore sive colore: nitens autem color non est nisi albus. Hæc autem responsio valde videtur debilis, quia separabile secundum actum, et separabile secundum opinionem vel intellectum, sunt separabilia æquivoce et talia in assignationibus diffinitionum poni non debent.

Adhuc autem falsum videtur quod dicunt, quod præter subjecti corruptionem possit intelligi corvus albus et Æthiops nitens candore: nigredo enim comparatur ad corvum et ad Æthiopem, ut ad subjectum et ad causam substantialem materiæ et subjecto corvi et Æthiopis : et ideo manente corvo secundum quod corvus est, non potest intelligi corvus albus, ut videtur : quia corvo posito ut subjecto, ponitur causa nigredinis, et posita causa nigredinis non potest intelligi quod albedo insit corvo : vitiosa igitur, ut videtur, talis accidentis assignatio est : et hæc omnia concedit Avicenna.

Adhuc autem etiam falsum videtur : quia mors accidit homini, et combustio domui : et neutrum illorum adest præter subjecti corruptionem : adhuc autem generatio. Sic ergo Arabes Philosophi hanc Porphyrii accidentis reprehenderunt descriptionem.

For what the ancients say in the first assignment of an accident, that an accident is that which is present and absent without the corruption of the subject, ought to have been of the genus. Therefore it ought to have been said that an accident is a universal. For the universal is for the genus to the five kinds. Further there ought to have been added a difference contracting to the predicable, which is the accident, and separating it from others in the mode of predicating of many: so that it would be said thus, an accident is a universal predicated of many not essentially, but in *what sort* and not in *what*: for this would be why it is present or absent to that of which it is predicated without the corruption of the subject. Further just as it is absent without the corruption of the subject, so it is absent without the constitution of the subject, for motion according to accidents, as Aristotle says, is from subject to subject with the same subject remaining and saved under either of the terms of the motion: and this is the cause why it is present and absent without the corruption of the subject of which it is predicated.

Avicenna also says that there is a vice in this, that according to this assignment of an accident they divide the accident into a separable and an inseparable accident: saying that to sleep or to sit is a separable accident, but to be black belongs inseparably to a crow and an Ethiopian. And if it be objected that this seems to be opposite to that which is said in the assignment of an accident, because if it is present and absent to the same without the corruption of the subject, then every accident seems separable and none inseparable with the subject remaining. They give a very calumnious response saying, that an accident is separable from the subject according to the intellect, because a white crow and an Ethiopian shining with whiteness or color can be understood: but a shining color is not except white. But this response seems very weak, because separable according to act, and separable according to opinion or intellect, are separable equivocally and such things ought not to be put in the assignments of definitions.

Moreover it still seems false what they say, that without the corruption of the subject a white crow and an Ethiopian shining with whiteness could be understood: for blackness is compared to the crow and to the Ethiopian, as to a subject and to a substantial cause of matter and to the subject of the crow and the Ethiopian: and therefore with the crow remaining according as it is a crow, a white crow cannot be understood, as it seems: because with the crow posited as a subject, the cause of blackness is posited, and with the cause of blackness posited it cannot be understood that whiteness is in the crow: therefore such an assignment of an accident is faulty, as it seems: and Avicenna concedes all these things.

Moreover it still also seems false: because death happens to man, and combustion to a house: and neither of those is present without the corruption of the subject: moreover still generation. Thus therefore the Arab Philosophers reprehended this description of an accident by Porphyry.

Ad hoc quidam Latinorum finxerunt quasdam responsiones, quas quia deliramenta reputo, de eis nullam faciemus mentionem. Est autem veritas de his quæ Antiqui dixerunt, quod accidens est quod abest et adest præter subjecti corruptionem. Ex prima enim universalis divisione in quinque universalia subintelligi volunt universale, ut sit sensus. Accidens est universale, quod de subjecto prædicatur non essentialiter, et ideo potest inesse subjecto eidem, et abesse ab eodem : nec oportuit ponere, quod per divisionem a quolibet subintelligi poterat. Similiter dixerunt de hoc quod dicitur de modo prædicandi non essentiali : hic modus intelligitur ex determinatis in aliis, quæ omnia essentialiter prædicantur secundum primum vel secundum modum dicendi per se, sicut in ante habitis dictum est. Et cum solum accidens residuum sit inter

universalia et ultimum, eo quod minus habet de ratione prædicabilis, relinquebatur quod non essentialiter prædicaretur; et sic indifferenter ad affirmandum et negandum habet se ad suum subjectum, quod adest et abest eidem subjecto, subjecto eodem remanente incorrupto : quod non convenit alicui aliorum universalium quæ se non habent ad subjecta de quibus prædicantur modo affirmando et modo negando : quia ipsa insunt subjectis actu et intellectu, vel subjecta insunt ipsis prædicatis secundum intellectum, quod non inest subjecto accidentis, nec etiam prædicato.

Quod autem subjungitur de divisione accidentis, ratio est ut ostendatur assignatio vera de utroque accidente. Et de separabili quidem planum est quod dicitur. De inseparabili etiam verum est, quia docet Aristoteles quod alteratio est, quando eodem manente subjecto motus fit in suis passionibus : motu autem facto secundum inseparabile accidens non potest negari quin sit motus alterationis et non substantiæ : oportet igitur quod maneat idem subjectum salvatum secundum esse substantiale : quia aliter motus esset aut de non subjecto ad subjectum, aut de subjecto ad non subjectum : et hæc est necessitas quæ compulit antiquos dicere, quod secundum inseparabilia accidentia prædicatio est accidentis, quod adest et abest præter subjecti corruptionem. Est enim constitutio subjecti duplex, scilicet secundum esse simpliciter, et secundum esse talis vel talis complexionis. Secundum esse simpliciter constituitur solis principiis substantiæ quæ sunt forma et materia ad speciem vel ad individuum speciei determinata. Secundum autem esse talis vel talis complexionis constituitur ex qualitatibus principiorum substantialium et non ex ipsis principiis.

To this certain of the Latins feigned certain responses, which because I repute them to be deliraments, we will make no mention of them. But the truth of those things which the Ancients said is, that an accident is that which is absent and present without the corruption of the subject. For from the first division of the universal into five universals they wish the universal to be understood, so that the sense be. An accident is a universal, which is predicated of a subject not essentially, and therefore it can be in the same subject, and be absent from the same: nor was it necessary to posit, that through division it could be understood by anyone. Similarly they said concerning this which is said about the non-essential mode of predicating: this mode is understood from the things determined in others, which are all predicated essentially according to the first or according to the second mode of saying *per se*, as was said in the things held before. And since only the accident be remaining among

[among the] universals and the last, because it has less of the notion of a predicable, it was remaining that it should not be predicated essentially; and thus it relates indifferently to affirming and denying towards its subject, which is present and absent to the same subject, with the same subject remaining uncorrupted: which is not fitting for any other of the universals which do not relate to the subjects of which they are predicated now by affirming and now by denying: because they themselves are in the subjects in act and in intellect, or the subjects are in the predicates themselves according to the intellect, which is not in the subject of an accident, nor even in the predicate.

Moreover as to what is subjoined concerning the division of an accident, the reason is that a true assignment concerning either accident be shown. And concerning the separable indeed what is said is plain. Concerning the inseparable it is also true, because Aristotle teaches that alteration is when, with the same subject remaining, a motion is made in its passions: but when a motion is made according to an inseparable accident it cannot be denied that it is a motion of alteration and not of substance: it is necessary therefore that the same subject remain saved according to substantial being: because otherwise the motion would be either from non-subject to subject, or from subject to non-subject: and this is the necessity which compelled the ancients to say, that according to inseparable accidents the predication is of an accident, which is present and absent without the corruption of the subject. For the constitution of a subject is twofold, namely according to being simply, and according to being of such or such a complexion. According to being simply it is constituted by the alone principles of substance which are form and matter determined to the species or to the individual of the species. But according to being of such or such a complexion it is constituted from the qualities of the substantial principles and not from the principles themselves.

Cujus signum est : quia si ovum corvi accipiatur, et argento vivo in humore viscoso sicut est unguentum anseris vel cati (quæ frigida sunt animalia) circumliniatur, et nidus in frigidissimo sit loco, sicut in summis montibus frigidis, erit ex ovo corvus albus, et aliquando erit albus ex sola loci frigiditate : et hoc non esset nisi principia substantialia a talibus accidentibus essent separabilia. Est enim manifestum quod Æthiops in locis frigidis paulatim albescit propter eamdem causam.

Quod autem objicitur, quod talia inseparabilia ad subjectum comparantur ut ad causam : et hoc est, quia subjectum ibi cum substantia et principiis substantiæ talem in ratione et in nomine suo designant complexionem. Si autem subjectum sine tali complexione supponatur, tunc manente eodem subjecto adest et abest accidens. Et quod dicit separationem secundum opinionem vel intellectum, et separationem secundum actum esse in æquivocis, dicendum quod verum esse, nisi separabilitas illa non esset nisi in anima et non in subjecto : ille autem intellectus refertur ad rem, ut dictum est : et ideo non est peccatum æquivocationis.

Ex hoc patet solutio ejus quod objici potest, quod ita etiam subjectum proprii potest intelligi sine proprio, et sic separari secundum intellectum posset istud quod est proprie proprium. Quia patet quod hoc non est verum : quia proprium dependet per substantialia principia ad speciem. Et ideo intelligi non potest sine specie, quia species est in intellectu proprii, ut prius dictum est.

Quod autem contra assignationis illius veritatem objicitur de morte et combustione : *dicendum* quod deliramentum est in veritate quod dicunt Latini, quod et post combustionem domus adhuc intelligatur : hic enim intellectus penitus est contra rei naturam. Quod etiam dicatur quod adhuc remanet in elementis mortuus vel in prima materia, absurdissimum est : quia yle, ut dicit Aristoteles [1], sub-

jectum est generationis et corruptionis, et non motus illius qui est secundum accidentia : illius enim motus subjectum est subjectum in forma substantiali salvatum secundum Aristotelis doctrinam.

Of which there is a sign: because if the egg of a crow be taken, and be smeared with quicksilver in a viscous humor just as is the ointment of a goose or a cat (which are cold animals), and the nest be in a very cold place, just as on the summits of cold mountains, there will be a white crow from the egg, and sometimes it will be white from the coldness of the place alone: and this would not be unless the substantial principles were separable from such accidents. For it is manifest that an Ethiopian in cold places gradually becomes white on account of the same cause.

As to what is objected, that such inseparables are compared to the subject as to a cause: and this is because the subject there with the substance and principles of substance designate such a complexion in its notion and name. But if the subject be supposed without such a complexion, then with the same subject remaining the accident is present and absent. And as to what he says that separation according to opinion or intellect, and separation according to act are among equivocal things, it must be said that it would be true, unless that separability were not except in the soul and not in the subject: but that intellect is referred to the thing, as was said: and therefore there is no sin of equivocation.

From this is evident the solution of what can be objected, that thus also the subject of a property can be understood without the property, and thus that which is properly a property could be separated according to the intellect. Because it is evident that this is not true: because a property depends through substantial principles on the species. And therefore it cannot be understood without the species, because the species is in the intellect of the property, as was said before.

As to what is objected against the truth of that assignment concerning death and combustion: *it must be said* that in truth it is a delirament what the Latins say, that even after the combustion of a house it may still be understood: for this understanding is inwardly against the nature of the thing. As to what is also said that the dead man still remains in the elements or in the first matter, it is most absurd: because hyle, as Aristotle says, sub-

[the sub]ject of generation and corruption, and not of that motion which is according to accidents : for the subject of that motion is a subject saved in substantial form according to the doctrine of Aristotle.

Unde dicendum quod mors mortuo non est accidentale, nec etiam combustio combustibili domui, quinimo et per se et essentialale est, hoc mortuum in esse substantiali interiit, et combustum interiit [1], sicut hoc decollatum per se interiit vel interfectum interiit secundum interfectionem : mors enim est dissolutio principiorum vitæ substantialium in eo quod mortuum non est, et combustio dissolutio principiorum continentium figuram domus : tale ergo prædicatum, mortuum non est, vel combustum non est, per se et essentialiter est in subjecto, et ideo inter accidentalia computandum non est : accidens enim de quo intenditur hic, non est id quod dividit ens cum substantia, sed est idem quod accidentale prædicatum, quod est accidentalis notio sive designatio.

Et si objiciatur quod tale accidens est fluxibile et corruptibile, et ideo universale non potest esse, quia universale est incorruptibile, *Dicendum* quod accidens ut hoc accidens vel illud in hac materia vel alia acceptum est corruptibile et fluxibile: sed ut abstractum ab hoc et illo in universali acceptum, est per rationem incorruptibile, sicut et alia universalia. Sic enim salvatur dicta assignatio Peripateticorum.

CAPUT III. *De secunda et tertia assignatione accidentis data a Porphyrio.*

Sic autem assignata accidentis descriptione per modum inhærentiæ subjecto de quo prædicatur, aliam etiam induxerunt accidentis assignationem penes causam inhærentiæ sumptam, dicentes quod accidens est quod contingit eidem inesse vel non inesse. Sic enim intelligitur quod dicunt, quod contingit eidem inesse et non inesse, ut contingens sit ad utrumque. Contingit enim inesse quod non habet essentialem causam esse prædialem : et contingit eidem non inesse quod non habet essentialem causam quæ impediat quod non insit : et est conveniens omni accidenti, etiam inseparabili, sicut nuper ostensum est : principia enim quæ in subjecto accipiuntur et sunt accidentis inhærentis principia, contingentia et non essentialia sunt principia, et ideo quidquid ex talibus principiis contingit inesse, contingit etiam non inesse contingenter mutatis principiis. Et hæc assignatio separat hoc prædicatum quod est accidens ab omnibus aliis. Genus enim prædicatum est quod essentialiter inest ei de quo prædicatur, ut ens de ratione ejus de quo prædicatur. Similiter differentia tale est prædicatum, et eodem modo species :

Whence it must be said that death to the dead is not accidental, nor even combustion to a combustible house, but rather it is both *per se* and essential, this dead thing perished in substantial being, and the combusted thing perished, just as this beheaded thing perished *per se* or the slain thing perished according to the slaying : for death is the dissolution of the substantial principles of life in that which is not dead, and combustion is the dissolution of the principles containing the figure of the house : therefore such a predicate, *it is not dead*, or *it is not combusted*, is *per se* and essentially in the subject, and therefore it is not to be computed among accidentals : for the accident which is intended here, is not that which divides being with substance, but is the same as the accidental predicate, which is an accidental notion or designation.

And if it be objected that such an accident is fluxible and corruptible, and therefore it cannot be a universal, because a universal is incorruptible, *it must be said* that an accident as *this* accident or *that* taken in this matter or another is corruptible and fluxible: but as abstracted from this and that taken in a universal, it is incorruptible through reason, just as other universals. For thus the said assignment of the Peripatetics is saved.

CHAPTER III. *On the second and third assignment of an accident given by Porphyry.*

But having thus assigned the description of an accident through the mode of inherence to the subject of which it is predicated, they also introduced another assignment of an accident taken with respect to the cause of inherence, saying that an accident is that which happens (contingit) to be in or not to be in the same. For thus it is understood what they say, that it happens to be in and not to be in the same, so that it be contingent to both. For it happens to be in that which does not have an essential cause of being predial : and it happens to the same not to be in that which does not have an essential cause which prohibits that it not be in : and it is fitting for every accident, even the inseparable one, as was shown just now : for the principles which are taken in a subject and are the principles of an inherent accident, are contingent and not essential principles, and therefore whatever from such principles happens to be in, also happens not to be in when the principles are contingently changed. And this assignment separates this predicate which is an accident from all others. For a genus is a predicate which essentially is in that of which it is predicated, as a being from the notion of that of which it is predicated. Similarly difference is such a predicate, and in the same way species :

proprium autem non inest nisi per intellectum speciei in propria. Solum autem accidens per contingentem causam dicitur inesse, et per contingentem causam dicitur non inesse : propter quod etiam minime habet de ratione prædicationis, et per consequens minime habet de ratione universalis : quamvis forte de pluribus prædicetur quam genus, vel species, vel proprium, vel differentia. Est tamen universale et prædicabile quod contingit totum et sub esse tali accidentali designatur : et ideo nomen *tale* (esse totius subjecti designans) notio est ipsius, ut idem prædicatur de subjecto.

Propter quod etiam tertiam induxerunt accidentis assignationem dicentes, quod accidens est quod nec genus, nec species, nec differentia, nec proprium sit, semper autem subjecto inest subsistens. Quam diffinitionem non satis rationabiliter reprehendit Avicenna dicens, quod hoc quod apponitur, semper autem subjecto inest subsistens : omnino otiose apponitur, et contra intellectum eorum quæ in aliis assignationibus dicta sunt. Otiose quidem,

quia cum accidens dicatur quasi cadens, eo quod non sit simpliciter ens, et sit potius entis quam ens, non oportuit ponere quod in subjecto est : non enim proprie est in subjecto, sed est aliquo modo subjecti aliquid potius quam sit, hoc est, esse habeat in subjecto : non enim habet esse in subjecto, sed subjectum secundum quod subjectum habet esse secundum ipsum. Et quod dicitur subsistens accidens, dicit Avicenna nihil significare : sed vox est non significativa, sicut buba, vel bultrix : accidens enim si accidens est, nullo modo subsistit, quia non habet subsistentiam aliquam, sed in subjecto tantum est, ita quod hæc determinatio in subjecto determinat rationem essendi vel subsistendi. Et non est nisi secundum quid, quod non nisi in subjecto est, et sic superflue ponitur subsistens : et est sensus, quod accidens est subsistens, hoc est, quamdiu est, in subjecto est : et quando in subjecto non est, tunc non subsistit, nec est.

Hæc autem assignatio aliis impugnatur modis : quia eadem ratione posset dici de quolibet aliorum universalium sic, quod genus est quod nec accidens, nec species, nec differentia, nec proprium est, semper autem in subjecto est. Et similiter posset de aliis dici per negationem aliorum. Adhuc autem accidens non semper est in subjecto si adest et si abest præter subjecti corruptionem.

but a property does not be in except through the understanding of the species in the proper [things]. But only an accident is said to be in through a contingent cause, and is said not to be in through a contingent cause : on account of which also it has the minimum of the notion of predication, and by consequence the minimum of the notion of a universal : although perhaps it be predicated of more than a genus, or species, or property, or difference. It is nevertheless a universal and a predicable which happens [to] the whole and is designated under such accidental being : and therefore the name *such* (designating the being of the whole subject) is the notion of itself, as the same is predicated of the subject.

On account of which they also introduced a third assignment of an accident saying, that an accident is that which is neither a genus, nor a species, nor a difference, nor a property, but always is in the subject subsisting. Which definition Avicenna reprehends not sufficiently reasonably saying, that this which is added, *but always is in the subject subsisting*: is added altogether idly, and against the understanding of those things which were said in other assignments. Idly indeed,

Because since an accident is said as if "falling" (*cadens*), for the reason that it is not simply a being, and is rather of a being than a being, it was not necessary to posit that it is in a subject : for it is not properly in a subject, but is in some way something of the subject rather than that it *is*, that is, has being in a subject : for it does not have being in a subject, but the subject according as it is a subject has being according to it. And as for what is called a "subsisting accident," Avicenna says it signifies nothing : but the word is not significative, like *buba* or *bultrix* : for an accident, if it is an accident, in no way subsists, because it does not have any subsistence, but is in a subject only, so that this determination "in a subject" determines the reason of being or subsisting. And it is only according to something (*secundum quid*), which is only in a subject, and thus "subsisting" is posited superfluously : and the sense is, that an accident is subsisting, that is, as long as it is, it is in a subject : and when it is not in a subject, then it does not subsist, nor is it.

But this assignment is impugned by other modes : because by the same reason it could be said of any of the other universals thus, that a genus is that which is neither an accident, nor a species, nor a difference, nor a property, but always is in a subject. And similarly it could be said of others through the negation of the others. Moreover, an accident is not always in a subject if it is present and if it is absent without the corruption of the subject.

His autem omnibus et similibus non est difficile respondere, consideratis secundum logicam intentionem universalibus : hoc enim modo accidens prædicatum maxime ab inhærentia subjecti deficiens est, et ideo per negationem aliorum describitur. Sed est privatio per negationem habitus, non quod penitus sit privatio, sed quia privationi simile et privationi propinquum, quia privatur inhærentiæ certa causa, et hoc non est in aliis. Quamvis negatio nihil certificet, tamen cum terminatur ad ea quæ negat, certificat aliquo modo.

Et quod dicitur, quod non semper est in subjecto : Dicendum quod ista objectio provenit ex malo intellectu illius assignationis : non enim vult dicere, quod simpliciter sit in subjecto, sed potius quod accidens prædicatum subsistens, hoc est, dum est, non habet esse nisi in subjecto, et ideo ad subjectum secundum suum esse semper habet inclinationem, et quando non est in subjecto, tunc non est. Hoc est ergo quod Antiqui de accidente dixerunt, quod accidens est quod adest et abest præter subjecti corruptionem. Dividitur autem in duo, scilicet in separabile, et in insepabile. Dormire separabile accidens est, nigrum vero inseparabile est corvo et Æthiopi, et tamen utrique accidit, potest enim subintelligi corvus albus et Æthiops nitens candore præter subjecti corruptionem.

Diffinitur autem accidens adhuc sic, accidens est quod contingit eidem inesse et non inesse. Adhuc ergo diffinitur sic, accidens est quod nec genus, nec species, nec differentia, nec proprium est, semper autem subjecto inest subsistens.

Omnibus his ergo universalibus secundum intentionem logicam sigillatim determinatis, quæ proposita sunt in enuntiatione superius habita in primo tractatu, dico autem genus, speciem, proprium, differentiam et accidens : dicendum deinceps quæ eisdem communia, et quæ propria sint.

CAPUT I. *De eo in quo communicant omnia quinque universalia.*

Omnibus autem quæ de universalibus sigillatim dicenda videbantur exsecutis, nunc demum restat dicere de omnibus in quibus conveniunt, et de differentiis in quibus differunt ad invicem. Primum autem dicemus de his quæ omnibus simul sunt communia. Dicemus autem quod commune est quidem omnibus simul, quod inest eis de pluribus prædicari. Hoc enim omnibus necesse est convenire, quia universale quod est genus ipsorum, etiam per hoc diffinitur : quia universale est quod est in multis et de multis :

But to all these and similar things it is not difficult to respond, when the universals have been considered according to the logical intention : for in this way the accidental predicate is most of all deficient from the inherence of the subject, and therefore it is described through the negation of others. But it is a privation through the negation of a habit, not that it is entirely a privation, but because it is similar to a privation and near to a privation, because it is deprived of a certain cause of inherence, and this is not in others. Although a negation certifies nothing, nevertheless when it is terminated at those things which it negates, it certifies in some way.

And as to what is said, that it is not always in a subject : it must be said that this objection proceeds from a bad understanding of that assignment : for it does not wish to say, that it is simply in a subject, but rather that the accidental predicate is subsisting, that is, while it is, it does not have being except in a subject, and therefore it always has an inclination toward the subject according to its being, and when it is not in a subject, then it is not. This is therefore what the Ancients said concerning an accident, that an accident is that which is present and absent without the corruption of the subject. But it is divided into two, namely into the separable and into the inseparable. To sleep is a separable accident, but black is inseparable to a crow and an Ethiopian, and nevertheless it happens to both, for a white crow and a shining white Ethiopian can be understood under-intellected without the corruption of the subject.

But an accident is still defined thus, an accident is that which happens to be in and not to be in the same. Still, therefore, it is defined thus, an accident is that which is neither a genus, nor a species, nor a difference, nor a property, but always is in the subject subsisting.

All these universals, therefore, according to the logical intention having been determined individually, which were proposed in the enunciation held above in the first treatise, I mean genus, species, property, difference, and accident : it must be said next what are common to them, and what are proper.

CHAPTER I. *On that in which all five universals communicate.*

Having executed all things which seemed to be said about the universals individually, now finally it remains to speak about all those things in which they agree, and about the differences in which they differ from one another. But first we shall speak about those things which are common to all at once. We shall say, therefore, that it is common to all at once, that it belongs to them to be predicated of many. For it is necessary for this to fit all, because the universal which is their genus, is also defined through this: because a universal is that which is in many and of many :

in multis autem esse causa est, quod prædicetur de illis, et de multis esse idem est ei quod est de multis prædicari. Hoc autem quamvis omnibus quinque commune sit, differenter tamen convenit eis, quia genus quidem de speciebus suis et individuis generis et speciei prædicatur per hoc quod est in illis secundum actum et secundum intellectum. Et similiter differentia cum sit generalis, prædicatur de speciebus et de individuis specierum per hoc quod ut quale essentiale est in illis secundum actum et secundum intellectum. Et quod de differentia ultima convertibili cum specie posset contra hoc objici, jam in tractatu de *Differentia* determinatum est. Species autem prædicatur de pluribus, quia prædicatur in quid de ipsis quæ sub ipsa sunt individuis. Similiter autem et proprium prædicatur de pluribus, quia quamvis de una sola specie prædicetur, tamen quia species est in individuis ut totum esse individuorum, propter hoc etiam proprium prædicatur de omnibus illis speciei individuis et sic de pluribus prædicatur. Accidens autem etiam de pluribus speciebus et aliquando de pluribus generibus, ut album de cygno, et de nive, et cæteris, et etiam prædicatur de individuis tam generum quam specierum.

Hoc autem et inductione probatur et exemplo : animal enim quod est genus, de homine et de bove prædicatur, quæ sunt plures species et de equo : prædicatur etiam de hoc equo, et de hoc homine, quæ sunt individua. Irrationale vero quod est differentia vel loco differentiæ divisivæ positum, de equo, de bove, et de harum specierum particularibus prædicatur. Species autem specialissima quæ solum species est et non genus, prædicatur de pluribus : prædicatur enim de his quæ sunt illius speciei particularia, ut homo de his qui sunt particulares homines. Proprium vero quod est risibile, prædicatur de homine ut de una sola specie, et prædicatur de his qui sunt particulares homines. Nigrum autem quod est accidens inseparabile, prædicatur et de specie corvorum et de his qui sunt particulares corvi.

Sed differenter se habet in prædicando accidens ad proprium : quia prædicatio proprii per speciem venit ad individua. Prædicatio autem accidentis cum accidens sit in individuo per se, prius prædicatur de individuo, et per individuum venit ad speciem : et hoc quidem est accidens in-

separabile. Similiter prædicatur moveri de homine et de equo et de eorum individuis quod est accidens separabile. Sed, sicut dictum est, accidens principaliter prædicatur de individuo : secundo vero loco prædicatur de his speciebus quæ continent sub se individua.

but to be in many is the cause that it be predicated of them, and to be of many is the same as that which is to be predicated of many. Although this is common to all five, nevertheless it fits them differently, because a genus indeed is predicated of its species and of the individuals of the genus and species through this, that it is in them according to act and according to intellect. And similarly difference, since it is general, is predicated of species and of individuals of species through this, that as an essential "of what sort" (*quale*) it is in them according to act and according to intellect. And as for what could be objected against this concerning the ultimate difference convertible with the species, it has already been determined in the treatise on *Difference*. But the species is predicated of many, because it is predicated in "what" (*in quid*) of those individuals which are under it. Similarly also the property is predicated of many, because although it be predicated of one species alone, nevertheless because the species is in individuals as the whole being of the individuals, on account of this also the property is predicated of all those individuals of the species and thus is predicated of many. But an accident is also predicated of many species and sometimes of many genera, as white of a swan, and of snow, and others, and it is also predicated of individuals both of genera and of species.

This is also proved by induction and by example : for animal, which is a genus, is predicated of man and of ox, which are many species, and of horse : it is also predicated of this horse, and of this man, which are individuals. But "irrational," which is a difference or posited in the place of a divisive difference, is predicated of horse, of ox, and of the particulars of these species. But the most specific species, which is species only and not a genus, is predicated of many : for it is predicated of those things which are particulars of that species, as man of those who are particular men. But a property, which is "risible," is predicated of man as of one species alone, and is predicated of those who are particular men. But black, which is an inseparable accident, is predicated both of the species of crows and of those who are particular crows.

But an accident has itself differently in predicating than a property : because the predication of a property comes through the species to the individuals. But the predication of an accident, since an accident is in the individual *per se*, is first predicated of the individual, and through the individual it comes to the species: and this indeed is an in-

separable. Similarly to be moved is predicated of man and of horse and of their individuals, which is a separable accident. But, as was said, an accident is principally predicated of the individual: but in the second place it is predicated of those species which contain individuals under them.

Huic autem communitati adducunt Avicenna et Algazel ex ista aliam causam, quæ similiter omnibus communis est universalibus : et hæc est, quod quæcumque essentialiter prædicantur de prædicato, omnia etiam prædicantur de subjecto : ut si animal ut genus prædicatur de homine, omne quod substantialiter prædicatur de animali, prædicatur essentialiter de homine : ut si animal est vivum et substantia, erit homo vivum et substantia. Similiter in differentia si homo est rationalis, et rationale sensibile, et si sensibile animatum, et homo animatum erit. Similiter de specie : quia si Socrates est homo, et homo animal, et animal substantia, erit Socrates animal et substantia. Eodem autem modo est de proprio : quia si homo est risibile, et risibile admirativum, et admirativum suspensivum ad rerum investigationem, erit homo admirativum, et rerum investigativum. Et sic est de accidente : quia si homo est album coloratum vel visus disgregativum, erit homo hujusmodi. Et sic est generaliter in omnibus. Et hoc est propter quod ista quinque univoce sunt universalia, et ideo quæcumque prædicantur de prædicato, omnia de subjecto convenit prædicari.

CAPUT II.

De tribus communibus generi et differentiæ.

Signata communitate omnium simul, commune generi et differentiæ dicamus quæ prima sunt inter universalia, ut habitum est in præmissis. Dicitur ergo quod generi et differentiæ commune est, quod utrumque species contineat in ambitu suæ communitatis : continet enim differentia species, quamvis non omnes illas species contineat, quas continet genus : et hoc ideo est quod differentia est divisiva, et per hoc quod est divisiva, ponitur sub genere, et efficitur minus communis quam genus. Rationale enim quod est differentia, etiam quamvis non contineat ea animalia quæ sunt irrationalia, quæ opposita differentia constituuntur, quæ continet genus quod est animal divisum rationali et irrationali ut oppositis differentiis, continet tamen plures species, continet enim hominem et Deum vel deos, quæ secundum Stoicos sunt species animalis. Quod quidem exemplum, quamvis simpliciter inconveniens sit, tamen utimur eo, quia non discutimus hic de veritate exemplorum, sed utimur tantum eis ad propositæ intentionis manifestationem. Tam genus autem quam differentia prædicatur de pluribus speciebus, dicit Avicenna, quod quamvis non sit necessarium, tamen non est impossibile, quia in pluribus hoc invenitur. Dubium tamen quod ex hoc oriri posset, in præcedentibus est solutum tam ex parte generis, quam ex parte differentiæ : sed certum est quod dicit Avicenna, quod quamvis non sit necessarium, tamen non est impossibile : quia in pluribus hoc invenitur, quod quantum est de aptitudine naturæ tam genus quam differentia in pluribus sunt speciebus.

But to this commonality Avicenna and Algazel adduce from that another cause, which is similarly common to all universals : and this is, that whatever are essentially predicated of the predicate, all are also predicated of the subject : as if animal as a genus is predicated of man, everything which is substantially predicated of animal is predicated essentially of man: as if animal is living and substance, man will be living and substance. Similarly in difference, if man is rational, and rational is sensible, and if sensible is animated, man will also be animated. Similarly concerning the species: because if Socrates is man, and man is animal, and animal is substance, Socrates will be animal and substance. But in the same way it is concerning property: because if man is risible, and risible is admirative, and admirative is suspensive toward the investigation of things, man will be admirative and investigative of things. And thus it is concerning accident: because if man is white, colored, or dispersive of sight, man will be of this sort. And thus it is generally in all. And this is why these five are univocally universals, and therefore whatever are predicated of the predicate, all are fitting to be predicated of the subject.

CHAPTER II.

On the three things common to genus and difference.

Having marked the commonality of all at once, let us speak of the common things to genus and difference, which are the first among the universals, as was held in the premises. It is said, therefore, that it is common to genus and difference, that each contains species in the ambit of its commonality : for difference contains species, although it does not contain all those species which the genus contains : and this is for the reason that difference is divisive, and through this, that it is divisive, it is posited under the genus, and is made less common than the genus. For rational, which is a difference, although it does not contain those animals which are irrational, which are constituted by the opposite difference, which the genus that is animal divided into rational and irrational as opposite differences contains, nevertheless it contains many species, for it contains man and God or the gods, which according to the Stoics are species of animal. Which example indeed, although it be simply inconvenient, nevertheless we use it, because we do not discuss here the truth of examples, but we use them only for the manifestation of the proposed intention. But both genus and difference are predicated of many species, Avicenna says, which although it be not necessary, nevertheless is not impossible, because this is found in many. But the doubt which could arise from this has been solved in the preceding things both on the part of the genus and on the part of the difference : but it is certain what Avicenna says, that although it be not necessary, nevertheless it is not impossible: because this is found in many, that as much as is from the aptitude of nature, both genus and difference are in many species.

Secundum autem quod generi et differentiæ commune est, hoc est, quia quæcumque prædicantur de genere ut genus subjecti sive de specie, et hoc essentiali prædicatione, prædicantur etiam de his speciebus quæ sunt sub ipso genere. Similiter quæ prædicantur de differentia essentialiter, ut differentia differentiæ ipsius, prædicabuntur etiam de specie quæ est sub ipsa differentia. Est autem sub differentia species constituta per differentiam. Hoc autem patet exemplo : cum enim genus sit animal, prædicatur de eodem substantia ut genus, et animatum ut differentia : et non solum de eodem animali hæc prædicantur, sed prædicantur etiam hæc eadem de his speciebus

quæ sunt sub animali usque ad individua, de quibus etiam prædicantur, quia illa ultima illarum specierum sunt subjecta. Similiter cum rationale sit differentia, de hac prædicatur ut differentia, quod est ratione uti : quod quidem ratione uti non solum prædicatur de differentia quæ est rationalis, sed prædicatur etiam de his speciebus quæ sub hac sunt differentia quæ est rationale, et de individuis eorum, et de homine, et de diis.

Quod autem dicitur aliquid prædicari de differentia ut differentia, convenire non videtur his quæ in tractatu de *Differentia* dicta sunt : ibi enim probatur, quod differentiæ non est differentia.

Quamvis autem differentia non habeat differentiam ut formam, differentia tamen cum sit naturalis potentia, habet actum et finem : et sic ad actum et finem comparata, aliquid habet prædicatum de ipsa per modum differentiæ, et hoc non est contrarium his quæ in ante habitis dicta sunt.

Adhuc autem est tertia communitas generis et differentiæ, quod perempto genere et differentia, necesse est simul perimi species quæ sunt sub ipsis : si enim non sit animal, sequitur quod non sit equus vel homo, et similiter si non sit rationale quod est differentia, sequitur quod nullum erit utens ratione, sicut homo, vel Deus. Et hujusmodi causa est, quia genus est quid et substantia speciei, differentia autem forma essentialis : et ideo peremptis his necesse est destrui species quæ sunt sub ipsis.

CAPUT III. ### *In quibus differunt genus et differentia.*

Proprium autem est generis et differentiæ in quo genus et differentia distinguuntur, ita quod generi quidem convenit de pluribus prædicari quam differentia : quia cum differentia sit divisiva, partem accipit unam eorum de quibus prædicatur genus. In hoc autem etiam

But the second thing which is common to genus and difference is this, because whatever are predicated of the genus as the genus of the subject or of the species, and this by essential predication, are also predicated of these species which are under the genus itself. Similarly those things which are predicated of the difference essentially, as the difference of the difference of itself, will also be predicated of the species which is under the difference itself. But under the difference is the species constituted through the difference. But this is clear by example: for since the genus be animal, substance is predicated of the same as genus, and animated as difference : and not only of the same animal are these predicated, but these same things are also predicated of these species

which are under animal down to individuals, of which also they are predicated, because those ultimate [individuals] of those species are the subjects. Similarly since rational be a difference, of this is predicated as a difference, what it is to use reason : which indeed to use reason is not only predicated of the difference which is rational, but is also predicated of those species which are under this difference which is rational, and of their individuals, and of man, and of the gods.

But what is said, that something is predicated of the difference as a difference, does not seem to fit those things which were said in the treatise on *Difference*: for there it is proved, that a difference does not have a difference.

But although a difference does not have a difference as a form, nevertheless a difference, since it is a natural power, has an act and an end : and thus compared to act and end, it has something predicated of it in the mode of a difference, and this is not contrary to those things which were said in the things held before.

Moreover, there is a third commonality of genus and difference, that when the genus and difference are taken away, it is necessary for the species which are under them to be taken away at the same time : for if there be not animal, it follows that there be not horse or man, and similarly if there be not rational, which is a difference, it follows that no one will be using reason, such as man, or God. And the cause of this sort is, because the genus is the "what" and the substance of the species, but the difference is the essential form: and therefore when these are taken away, it is necessary for the species which are under them to be destroyed.

CHAPTER III. ### *In what things genus and difference differ.*

But proper to genus and difference is that in which genus and difference are distinguished, so that it indeed fits the genus to be predicated of more than the difference : because since the difference is divisive, it accepts one part of those of which the genus is predicated. In this however also

a specie et proprio distinguitur genus : quia de pluribus quam species et proprium prædicatur, cum species de solis individuis, proprium autem de sola specie et de his quæ sub specie sunt individuis prædicetur. Genus autem ut genus prædicatur de his quæ continentur sub oppositis differentiis, et de speciebus pluribus quam accidens : quia cum accidens non individuetur nisi per substantiam, prædicabitur de substantiæ individuis non omnibus : genus autem et maxime generalissimum de valde pluribus prædicatur, et subalternis et specialissimis.

Et hoc quidem patet per inductionem et per exemplum : animal enim quod est genus, de homine, equo, ave, et serpente prædicatur, quæ differunt genere et specie bipedis et quadrupedis et volatilis et gressibilis et reptibilis : quadrupes autem quod est differentia, prædicatur tantum de quatuor pedes habentibus : homo vero quia est species, de solis individuis prædicatur, cum species sit et non genus, et sit species specialissima. Et hinnibile cum sit proprium de solo equo prædicatur, et de his particularibus quæ sunt sub equo. Accidens autem etiam similiter prædicatur de paucioribus quam genus, quia non potest esse quod unum accidens omnibus quæ sunt in genere conveniat, ut album, vel nigrum.

Quod aliquis autem instet sophistice contra ea quæ dicta sunt, quod genus scilicet de pluribus prædicatur quam differentia : Dico quod oportet accipere differentias quibus genus dividitur : quia illæ veræ sunt differentiæ, patet per hoc quia sunt generis divisivæ, et speciei sub genere constitutivæ : acceperunt enim partem generis quod dividunt et ponunt sub genere , et ideo in pauciora sunt quam ipsum genus.

Amplius autem secunda differentia est, quod genus continet differentiam potestate, ut in ante habitis determinatum est. Hoc autem per exemplum probatur : quia animal genus duo est per prædica-

tionem : est enim et hoc rationale, et hoc irrationale, et prædicatur de utrisque : differentia autem de altero tantum prædicatur.

tem, ut homo, solum de his qui sunt particulares homines prædicatur. Proprium autem quod est risibile prædicatur de homine, et de his qui sunt particulares homines. Nigrum autem de specie corvorum, et de his qui sunt particulares corvi prædicatur : quod nigrum est accidens inseparabile. Moveri autem de homine et equo prædicatur quod est separabile accidens : sed prius quidem de individuo prædicatur cum sit accidens individui, secundo vero loco prædicatur et de speciebus quæ continent individua.

from the species and property the genus is distinguished : because it is predicated of more than the species and property, since the species be predicated of individuals alone, but the property of the species alone and of those individuals which are under the species. The genus however as genus is predicated of those which are contained under opposite differences, and of more species than an accident : because since an accident is not individuated except through substance, it will be predicated of individuals of substance, not all : but the genus, and especially the most general one, is predicated of very many, both subalterns and most specific ones.

And this indeed is clear through induction and through example : for animal, which is a genus, is predicated of man, horse, bird, and serpent, which differ in genus and species of biped and quadruped and volatile and gressible and reptible : but quadruped, which is a difference, is predicated only of those having four feet : but man indeed, because it is a species, is predicated of individuals alone, since it is a species and not a genus, and is the most specific species. And whinnible, since it is a property, is predicated of horse alone, and of those particulars which are under horse. But an accident also similarly is predicated of fewer than the genus, because it cannot be that one accident fits all things which are in the genus, as white, or black.

As for someone who insists sophistically against those things which were said, that the genus, namely, is predicated of more than the difference : I say that it is necessary to accept the differences by which the genus is divided: because those are true differences, it is clear through this because they are divisive of the genus, and constitutive of the species under the genus : for they received a part of the genus which they divide and posit under the genus, and therefore they are in fewer things than the genus itself.

Moreover, the second difference is, that the genus contains the difference in power, as was determined in the things held before. This indeed is proved through example: because the genus animal is two through predica-

tion : for it is both this rational [thing], and this irrational [thing], and it is predicated of both: but the difference is predicated of only one of them.

...tem, as man, is predicated only of those who are particular men. But a property which is risible is predicated of man, and of those who are particular men. But black is predicated of the species of crows, and of those who are particular crows: which black is an inseparable accident. But to be moved is predicated of man and horse, which is a separable accident: but it is predicated first of the individual since it is an accident of the individual, but in the second place it is also predicated of the species which contain individuals.

Commune autem est generi et differentiæ : primo quidem continentia specierum, continet enim differentia species, etsi non tot quot continet genus : rationale enim, etsi non continet irrationalia, quemadmodum irrationalia continet animal, tamen continet hominem et Deum qui sunt species animalis . Commune etiam generi et differentiæ est, quod quæcumque prædicantur de genere ut genus, et de his quæ sunt under ipso speciebus prædicantur. Et quæcumque de differentia, ut differentia prædicantur, etiam de ea quæ sub ipsa est specie prædicantur ; nam cum genus sit anima, non solum de eodem genere prædicantur ut genus substantia et animatum sive vivum, quæ genera animalis sunt, sed prædicantur etiam de his quæ sub animali sunt speciebus usque ad earundem specierum et generum individua. Cumque rationalis sit differentia, prædicatur de ea ut differentia id quod est uti ratione : et hoc non solum prædicatur de eo quod rationale, sed etiam de his quæ sunt sub rationali speciebus prædicabitur, scilicet ipsum quod est uti ratione. Commune est item generi et differentiæ, quod perempto genere et perempta differentia simul perimi species est necesse quæ sunt sub ipsis : quemadmodum si non sit animal, non est equus nec homo : aut si non sit rationale, nullum erit animal quod utatur ratione.

Proprium autem generis (quod genus distinguit a differentia) est de pluribus prædicari, quam differentia, et species, et proprium, et accidens. Animal enim de homine, de equo, et ave, et serpente prædicatur. Quadrupes autem quod est differentia, non prædicatur nisi de quatuor pedes habentibus animalibus. Homo vero cum sit species, de solis prædicatur individuis hominis. Et hinnibile cum sit proprium, de solo prædicatur equo, et de his qui sunt equi particulares. Et accidens similiter de paucioribus prædicatur quam animal, quia non contingit unum accidens commune omnibus accidere. Ne autem sophistice aliquis instet contra prædicta, dicimus quod oportet accipere differentiam divisivam qua dividitur genus, et non eas quæ complent substantiam generum in specierum constitutione, sicut actus complet potentiam. Amplius autem differunt in hoc quod genus quidem suæ communitatis ambitu potestate continet differentias . Animal enim cum sit genus, est etiam hoc rationale, vel illud irrationale. Amplius autem adhuc differunt, quia genera quidem priora sunt his quæ sunt sub se positæ differentiis : propter quod simul ablata auferunt differentias , non autem simul auferuntur ablatis differentiis , sublato enim animali auferuntur rationale et irrationale, quæ ejus sunt differentiæ. Differentiæ autem ablatæ non simul auferunt genus : nam si omnes differentiæ animalis interimantur, tamen substantia animata sensibilis potest intelligi : non autem posset intelligi , nisi secundum esse intelligibile remaneret.

Common however to genus and difference is: first indeed the containment of species, for the difference contains species, although not as many as the genus contains : for rational, although it does not contain irrational things, in the way that irrational things are contained in animal, nevertheless it contains man and God who are species of animal . Common also to genus and difference is, that whatever are predicated of the genus as genus, are also predicated of the species which are under it. And whatever are predicated of the difference, as difference, are also predicated of that species which is under it; for since the genus be soul [anima?], not only are substance and animated or living, which are genera of animal, predicated of the same genus as genus, but they are also predicated of those species which are under animal down to the individuals of the same species and genera. And since rational be the difference, there is predicated of it as a difference that which is to use reason: and this is not only predicated of that which is rational, but it will also be predicated of those species which are under the rational, namely, the very act of using reason. It is likewise common to genus and difference, that when the genus is taken away and the difference is taken away, it is necessary for the species which are under them to be taken away at the same time: just as if there be not animal, there is not horse nor man: or if there be not rational, will be no animal that uses reason.

But proper to genus (which distinguishes genus from difference) is to be predicated of more than the difference, and species, and property, and accident. For animal is predicated of man, of horse, and bird, and serpent. But quadruped, which is a difference, is not predicated except of animals having four feet. But man indeed, since it is a species, is predicated of the individuals of man alone. And whinnible, since it is a property, is predicated of horse alone, and of those which are particular horses. And an accident similarly is predicated of fewer than animal, because it does not happen that one common accident happens to all. Lest anyone however insist sophistically against the aforesaid things, we say that it is necessary to accept the divisive difference by which the genus is divided, and not those which fulfill the substance of the genera in the constitution of species, just as act fulfills power. Moreover they differ in this, that the genus indeed in the ambit of its commonality contains differences in power. For animal, since it is a genus, is also this rational [thing], or that irrational [thing]. Moreover they still differ, because genera indeed are prior to the differences placed under them: on account of which being taken away at the same time they take away the differences, but they are not taken away at the same time when the differences are taken away, for when animal is taken away, rational and irrational, which are its differences, are taken away. But differences being taken away do not take away the genus at the same time: for if all the differences of animal be destroyed, nevertheless the animated sensible substance can be understood: but it could not be understood, unless it remained according to intelligible being.

Amplius et in hoc differunt, quod genus quidem in eo quod quid est, differentia vero in eo quod quale quid est, quemadmodum dictum est, prædicatur. Amplius etiam in hoc differunt, quod genus unum est unitate essentiæ generis secundum unamquamque speciem : non constituitur enim species nisi in uno genere existente in ipsa, sicut hominis genus unum est id quod est animal. Differentiæ vero sunt plurimæ in unius speciei constitutione, propinquæ scilicet et remotæ, in homine

rationale mortale, mentis disciplinæque perceptibile, quibus ab aliis animalibus differt homo. Amplius etiam in hoc differt genus a differentia, quod in speciei constitutione, genus quidem consimile est materiæ, differentia vero consimilis est formæ. Cum autem et alia multa sint communia in quibus conveniunt, et propria in quibus differunt genus et differentia, nunc ad propositam intentionem ista quæ dicta sunt sufficiant.

<!-- cap:1.4.5 -->

CAPUT V — *De communibus et propriis generis et speciei.*

Nunc autem assignanda sunt communia et propria generis et speciei. Dicimus ergo, quod genus quidem et species commune habent de pluribus prædicari, per hoc quod utrumque eorum universale est quod est in multis et de multis. Sed talis communitas quamvis conveniat tam generalissimo quam generi subalterno, et similiter specialissimæ speciei subalternæ, tamen secundum quod hic communia generi assignamus et speciei, intendimus quod genus sumatur ut genus et non ut species, et species sumatur ut species et non ut genus : quamvis ad diversa comparata quædam istorum possint esse genera et species : ideo maxime ista convenit generi quod est genus tantum, et speciei quæ est species tantum : quamvis enim genus sumptum ut genus prædicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, et differentibus numero, et species sumpta ut species prædicatur de pluribus differentibus numero solum : tamen in hoc communi genus et species conveniunt, quamvis in modo differant : quia genus prædicatur ut pars, species autem ut totum esse eorum de quibus prædicatur : sed de differentibus hic modis non curamus.

Secunda autem communitate iterum conveniunt genus et species, quod utrumque prius est eo de quo prædicatur. Et hujus causa est, quia sunt principia es-

sentialia eorum de quibus prædicantur : principium autem natura et intellectu prius est eo cujus est principium.

Tertiam autem habent communitatem, quia utrumque illorum totum quoddam est ad ea de quibus prædicatur : continens autem totum est ad id quod continet, nec prædicatur de eo nisi ut ipsum est notio totius, sicut in ante habitis sæpius dictum est.

Moreover they also differ in this, that the genus indeed is predicated in "what" it is (*in eo quod quid est*), but the difference in "of what sort somewhat" it is (*in eo quod quale quid est*), just as was said. Moreover they also differ in this, that the genus is one by the unity of the essence of the genus according to each species: for a species is not constituted except in one genus existing in itself, just as the genus of man is one, that which is animal. But differences are very many in the constitution of one species, namely the proximate and the remote, in man...

rational mortal, perceptible of the mind and discipline, by which man differs from other animals. Further also a genus differs from a difference in this, that in the constitution of a species, a genus indeed is similar to matter, but a difference is similar to form. But since there are also many other things common in which they convene, and proper things in which genus and difference differ, now for the proposed intention let those things which have been said suffice.

<!-- cap:1.4.5 -->

CHAPTER V — *On the common and proper things of genus and species.*

But now the common and proper things of genus and species must be assigned. We say therefore, that a genus indeed and a species have it in common to be predicated of many things, through this that each of them is a universal which is in many and of many. But although such community convenes as much to the most general as to the subalternate genus, and similarly to the subalternate most specific species, nevertheless according as we here assign common things to genus and species, we intend that the genus be taken as a genus and not as a species, and the species be taken as a species and not as a genus: although compared to different things certain of these could be genera and species: therefore this most of all convenes to a genus which is only a genus, and to a species which is only a species: for although a genus taken as a genus is predicated of many things differing in species, and differing in number, and a species taken as a species is predicated of many things differing in number alone: nevertheless in this common thing genus and species convene, although they differ in mode: because a genus is predicated as a part, but a species as the whole being of those things of which it is predicated: but we do not care here concerning the different modes.

But in a second community again genus and species convene, that each is prior to that of which it is predicated. And the cause of this is, because they are the essential principles

of those things of which they are predicated: but a principle by nature and intellect is prior to that of which it is the principle.

But they have a third community, because each of them is a certain whole to those things of which it is predicated: but a whole containing is towards that which it contains, nor is it predicated of it except as it itself is the notion of the whole, just as was very often said in the things previously held.

Assignatis autem convenientiis inter genus et speciem, oportet etiam ponere differentias : quia quæ in omnibus conveniunt, et in nullo differunt, eadem sunt et non differentia. Differentia autem sunt genera et species, et ideo oportet distinguere differentias eorum ad invicem. Differunt autem prima differentia sumpta ex ambitu communitatis eorum, ex eo quod genus continet sub se species, species vero continetur et non continet genera per talem continentiæ modum : quamvis contineantur genera alio modo, ut scilicet pars essentialis quæ quasi materia continetur in toto composito. Et est hoc compositum ex dictis Avicennæ. Probatio autem hujus differentiæ est, quod genus in pluribus est secundum ambitum suæ quantitatis quam species, sicut patet ex antedictis.

Secunda autem differentia est, quod genera secundum intellectum præjacere oportet speciebus. Cujus probatio et causa est, quia genera non possunt perficere species, non informata specificis differentiis. Sed cum formatum constituit aliquid, præjacet illi, sicut cuprum præjacet formæ statuæ.

Propter quod concluditur tertia differentia, scilicet quod genera naturaliter, ut causa secundum intellectum sunt priora speciebus.

Ex hoc iterum concluditur differentia quarta, quod interemptis scilicet generibus, simul interimuntur species, sicut principium corruptum interimit principiatum : sed non convertitur, quia sicut supra dictum est, omnibus differentiis et speciebus interemptis, adhuc salvatur ge-

nus secundum esse intellectuale : et ideo species quidem cum sit posita, etiam genus de necessitate positum est, eo quod in specie est genus actu et intellectu : genus vero cum sit positum, non sequitur omnino quod sit species, quia species non nisi potentia est in genere, posita autem potentia, non propter hoc actu ponitur ens, quia in potentia ens non est secundum actum.

Quinta autem differentia est, quia genera quidem univoce de speciebus prædicantur, eo quod dant eis nomen suum et substantiam et rationem : quod solum vocatur univoce prædicari. Species vero de genere minime prædicatur ordinata prædicatione : non enim prædicatur de generibus nisi per accidens, ut cum dicitur, quoddam animal est homo. Secundum autem quod non est per se, non est univoca prædicatio quamvis quoddam animal homo sit, et ratio cujusdam homini conveniat universali.

But with the conveniencies between genus and species having been assigned, it is also necessary to posit the differences: because those things which convene in all things, and differ in nothing, are the same and not different. But genera and species are different, and therefore it is necessary to distinguish their differences from one another. But they differ by a first difference taken from the ambit of their community, from the fact that a genus contains species under itself, but a species is contained and does not contain genera through such a mode of containment: although genera are contained in another mode, as namely an essential part which is contained like matter in the whole composite. And this is composed from the sayings of Avicenna. But the probation of this difference is, that a genus is in more things according to the ambit of its quantity than a species, just as is patent from the foresaid things.

But the second difference is, that genera according to intellect must pre-exist species. The probation and cause of which is, because genera cannot perfect species, not being informed by specific differences. But since the formed constitutes something, it pre-exists it, just as copper pre-exists the form of a statue.

On account of which a third difference is concluded, namely that genera naturally, as a cause according to intellect, are prior to species.

From this again a fourth difference is concluded, that namely with the genera destroyed, simultaneously the species are destroyed, just as a corrupted principle destroys the principiate: but it is not converted, because just as was said above, with all differences and species destroyed, still the ge-

nus according to intellectual being: and therefore indeed a species since it is posited, also a genus of necessity is posited, from the fact that a genus is in a species in act and intellect: but a genus since it is posited, it does not follow altogether that a species is, because a species is only in potency in a genus, but with a potency posited, not on account of this is a being in act posited, because a being in potency is not according to act.

But the fifth difference is, because genera indeed are predicated univocally of species, from the fact that they give to them their name and substance and reason: which alone is called to be predicated univocally. But a species is in no way predicated of a genus by an ordered predication: for it is not predicated of genera except by accident, as when it is said, a certain animal is a man. But according to that which is not *per se*, it is not a univocal predication although a certain animal may be a man, and the reason of a certain man may convene to the universal.

Amplius autem sexta differentia est, quod genera quidem abundant de speciebus in continentia earum quæ sub genere sunt specierum : quia secundum ambitum communitatis species non continent genera. Species vero constitutæ abundant a generibus continentia propriarum differentiarum, per quas constituuntur : quia illæ in speciebus sunt actu contentæ, cum genus non habeat eas nisi potestate, ut in ante habitis dictum est.

Amplius autem alia differentia est in hoc, quod species secundum aliquem modum dicta sive specialissima sive subalterna nunquam potest fieri generalissimum, quia hoc est contra rationem generalissimi. Generalissimum autem est, quod cum sit genus, nunquam potest fieri species : et similiter id quod est aliquo modo genus sive generalissimum sive subalternum, nunquam fit specialissimum : hoc enim esset contra specialissimi rationem, quia ratio specialissimi est, quod cum sit species, nunquam potest fieri genus.

Hoc autem totum est, sicut dicit Porphyrius. Genus autem et species commune quidem habent de pluribus (quemadmodum dictum est) prædicari. Sumitur autem species ut species non ut genus, si fuerit idem genus et species. Commune autem est his, scilicet generi et speciei, etiam eorum priora esse, græcus enim genitivus pro ablativo ponitur, de quibus prædicantur. Commune est etiam eis quoddam totum esse eorum de quibus prædicantur, ita quod utrumque quoddam totum est subjectorum suorum.

Differunt autem ab invicem, eo quod genus continet sub se species continentia suæ communitatis. Species vero continetur et non continet genera. Et hoc ideo est, quia in pluribus est genus quam species, et ideo genera præjacere oportet speciebus, cum in speciebus sint formata specificis differentiis ad hoc quod possint perficere species : unde et priora sunt naturaliter genera.

Et ex hoc sequitur, quod ipsis interemptis, simul interimentia sunt species, licet simul non interimantur speciebus interemptis. Ex hoc iterum sequitur, quod species quidem cum sit positum sit genus, genus vero cum sit positum, non sequitur omnino quod sit posita species. Et genera quidem univoce de speciebus prædicantur : dant enim eis nomen suum et substantiæ rationem. Species vero de generibus minime prædicantur, nisi per accidens : accidit enim animali cuidam hominem esse. Amplius quidem genera abundant continentia suæ communitatis earum quæ sub se sunt specierum continentia. Species vero abundat a generibus propriis differentiis, quas actu et intellectu in se habet, suæ substantiæ constitutivis. Amplius neque species quocumque modo species sit, unquam fiet generalissimum : nec genus quocumque modo genus sit, unquam fiet specialissimum.

But further the sixth difference is, that genera indeed abound concerning species in the containment of those which are species under a genus: because according to the ambit of community species do not contain genera. But constituted species abound from genera by the containment of their proper differences, through which they are constituted: because those are contained in act in the species, since a genus does not have them except in potency, as was said in the things previously held.

But further another difference is in this, that a species according to any mode said whether most specific or subalternate can never become most general, because this is against the reason of the most general. But the most general is that, which since it is a genus, can never become a species: and similarly that which is in any mode a genus whether most general or subalternate, never becomes most specific: for this would be against the reason of the most specific, because the reason of the most specific is, that since it is a species, it can never become a genus.

But this whole is, just as Porphyry says. But a genus and a species

have it in common indeed (just as was said) to be predicated of many things. But a species is taken as a species not as a genus, if it were the same genus and species. But it is common to these, namely to genus and species, also that they are prior to those, for a Greek genitive is posited for an ablative, of which they are predicated. It is also common to them to be a certain whole of those things of which they are predicated, such that each is a certain whole of its subjects.

But they differ from one another, from the fact that a genus contains species under itself by the containment of its community. But a species is contained and does not contain genera. And this is because a genus is in more things than a species, and therefore genera must pre-exist species, since they are formed in species by specific differences to this that they can perfect the species: whence also genera are naturally prior.

And from this it follows, that with these destroyed, simultaneously they are an interiment of species, although they are not simultaneously destroyed with the species destroyed. From this again it follows, that a species indeed since it is posited there is a genus, but a genus since it is posited, it does not follow altogether that a species is posited. And genera indeed are predicated univocally of species: for they give to them their name and the reason of their substance. But species are in no way predicated of genera, except by accident: for it happens to a certain animal to be a man. Further indeed genera abound by the containment of their community in the containment of those species which are under them. But a species abounds from genera by its proper differences, which it has in itself in act and intellect, constituting its substance. Further neither a species in whatever mode it is a species, will ever become most general: nor a genus in whatever mode it is a genus, will ever become most specific.

Nunc autem assignandæ sunt communitates et differentiæ generis et proprii secundum consequentiæ ordinem. Dicimus igitur quod prima inter genus et proprium communitas sive convenientia est, quod utrumque horum prædicabilium sequitur speciem de qua prædicatur. Sequi autem dicimus non secundum naturam, quia sic genus est prius specie, sed dicimus sequi secundum consequentiæ rationem : sequitur enim si homo est, animal est, et si homo est, risibile est. Sed quando proprium sequitur ad speciem, est simul cum consequentiæ ratione etiam ordo naturæ et intellectus : quia species est causa proprii, et non e converso.

Secunda autem convenientia generis et proprii est, quod tam genus quam proprium, non secundum magis et minus prædicantur de speciebus, de quibus prædicantur quæ ipsum proprium participant. Participare hic autem large sumimus non proprie : proprie enim participant inferiora sua superiora quæ in substantiis eorum sunt nomine et essentia et ratione, ut dicit Aristoteles [1] ; sed hic large sumimus participationem, prout tunc proprium participat speciem ut sui causam et subjectum : æqualiter enim et non secundum magis et minus homo et bos qui sunt species animalis sunt animal, quod est genus, participantes, et æqualiter Cato et Cicero (qui sunt speciei hominis individua) sunt risibile (quod est proprium hominis) participantes, large dicta participatione, nec participant suæ speciei proprium secundum magis et minus.

Tertia enim convenientia est inter genus et proprium, quod commune est eis, quia genus univoce prædicatur de propriis speciebus suis omnibus, ita quod dat eis nomen et substantiæ rationem secundum nomen quo prædicatur de ipsis. Similiter et proprium (quorum est proprium de quibus prædicatur) dat eis nomen suum et rationem : quamvis aliter proprium quam genus suo subjecto nomen suum dat et rationem. Potest enim diffiniri proprium ut proprium, et tunc subjectum est in ratione proprii. Et si hoc modo rationem suam daret subjecto, esset idem in diffinitione ipsius, et idem prædicatur de seipso. Est enim risibile prout diffinitur ut proprium homo aptus natus ridere. Si hanc rationem daret subjecto, tunc sic diceretur, homo est homo aptus natus ridere. Sed potest aliter diffiniri proprium prout dicit rem quæ est accidens ordinabile in genere prædicamenti : tunc risibile est aptum natum ridere, et isto modo suam dat ei de quo prædicatur rationem. Unde hæc communitas generis et proprii in communi sumpta est, ita quod de modo quo utrumque, genus scilicet et proprium, proprie univoce prædicatur, non sit cura quantum ad hujus communitatis intentionem.

But now the communities and differences of genus and property must be assigned according to the order of consequence. We say therefore that the first community or conveniency between genus and property is, that each of these predicables follows the species of which it is predicated. But we say "to follow" not according to nature, because thus a genus is prior to a species, but we say "to follow" according to the reason of consequence: for it follows if it is a man, it is an animal, and if it is a man, it is capable of laughter. But when a property follows a species, there is simultaneously with the reason of consequence also the order of nature and intellect: because the species is the cause of the property, and not conversely.

But the second conveniency of genus and property is, that both genus and property are not predicated according to more and less of the species of which they are predicated, of those which participate in the property itself. But here we take "to participate" largely, not properly: for properly their inferiors participate their superiors which are in their substances in name, essence, and reason, as Aristotle says; but here we take participation largely, according as then a property participates a species as its cause and subject: for equally and not according to more and less man and ox, which are species of animal, are participating in animal, which is a genus; and equally Cato and Cicero (who are individuals of the species man) are participating in capable of laughter (which is a property of man), with participation said largely, nor do they participate in the property of their species according to more and less.

For the third conveniency is between genus and property, that it is common to them, because a genus is univocally predicated of all its proper species, such that it gives them its name and the reason of its substance according to the name by which it is predicated of them. Similarly also a property (of those things of which the property is predicated) gives them its name and reason: although a property gives its name and reason to its subject otherwise than a genus. For a property can be defined as a property, and then the subject is in the reason of the property. And if in this mode it gave its reason to the subject, it would be the same in the definition of itself, and the same would be predicated of itself. For capable of laughter, according as it is defined as a property, is a man apt by nature to laugh. If it gave this reason to the subject, then it would be said thus: a man is a man apt by nature to laugh. But a property can be defined otherwise according as it says a thing which is an accident ordinable in the genus of a predicament: then capable of laughter is apt by nature to laugh, and in this mode it gives its reason to that of which it is predicated. Whence this community of genus and property is taken in common, such that concerning the mode by which each, namely genus and property, is properly and univocally predicated, there is no care as to the intention of this community.

Differunt autem ab invicem genus et proprium in hoc, quod genus quidem prius est natura et intellectu eo de quo prædicatur. Proprium autem posterius est natura et intellectu eo de quo prædicatur, id est, specie de qua prædicatur. Cujus probatio est, quia quando genus de specie prædicatur sicut animal de speciebus animalium, ut de homine et leone, oportet quod animal sit prius ut principium specierum : et patet hoc sic, posito animali secundum intellectum antequam accipiatur in speciebus de quibus prædicatur : dehinc oportet ipsum dividi specificis differentiis, quæ sunt generi speciem constituenti propriæ. Propter quod prius actu et natura et intellectu est genus quam species de qua ipsum genus prædicatur. Proprium autem cum causetur a specie de qua prædicatur et fluit de principiis.

speciei, sequitur speciem secundum naturam et intellectum.

[Left Margin]: Secunda differentia generis et proprii. Differunt autem secunda differentia, quod genus oportet de pluribus speciebus prædicari. Non enim potest esse genus quod plures species non habeat, sicut in tractatu de *Genere* determinatum est[1]. Proprium vero prædicari convenit de una sola specie cujus est proprium : quia si pluribus conveniret, non proprium esset salvata ratione nominis sui.

[Left Margin]: Tertia differentia. Adhuc autem tertia est differentia, quod proprium quidem conversim prædicatur de eo cujus est proprium : si enim risibile est, homo est, et e converso si homo est, risibile est. Genus vero de nullo sigillatim sumpto cujus est genus convertibiliter et universaliter prædicatur : quod patet, quia non sequitur, si animal est, homo est : nec sequitur, si animal est, risibile est : quamvis e converso sequitur, si homo est, animal est, si risibile est, animal est. Sed inter proprium et speciem est e converso : quia si homo est, risibile est, et conversim si risibile est, homo est.

[Left Margin]: Quarta differentia.

Amplius quarta differentia inter genus et proprium est, quia proprium inest omni speciei de qua prædicatur et soli et semper. Genus autem omni quidem inest speciei de qua prædicatur, ita quod prædicatur de omni suo individuo : inest etiam semper, sed non inest soli illi speciei, quia inest aliis speciebus ejusdem generis, sicut animal non soli homini, sed etiam asino, et leoni, et aliis speciebus brutorum.

But genus and property differ from one another in this, that a genus indeed is prior by nature and intellect to that of which it is predicated. But a property is posterior by nature and intellect to that of which it is predicated, that is, the species of which it is predicated. The proof of which is, because when a genus is predicated of a species, just as animal of the species of animals, as of man and lion, it is necessary that animal be prior as the principle of the species: and this is patent thus, with animal posited according to the intellect before it is accepted in the species of which it is predicated: from hence it is necessary that it itself be divided by specific differences, which are proper to the genus constituting the species. On account of which a genus is prior in act and nature and intellect than the species of which the genus itself is predicated. But a property, since it is caused by the species of which it is predicated and flows from the principles.

of the species, it follows the species according to nature and intellect.

[Left Margin]: The second difference of genus and property. But they differ by a second difference, that a genus must be predicated of multiple species. For there cannot be a genus which does not have multiple species, just as was determined in the treatise on *Genus*[1]. But a property convenes to be predicated of one sole species of which it is the property: because if it convened to multiple things, it would not be a property with the reason of its name saved.

[Left Margin]: The third difference. But still there is a third difference, that a property indeed is predicated conversely of that of which it is the property: for if it is capable of laughing, it is a man, and conversely if it is a man, it is capable of laughing. But a genus is predicated conversely and universally of nothing taken individually of which it is the genus: which is patent, because it does not follow, if it is an animal, it is a man: nor does it follow, if it is an animal, it is capable of laughing: although conversely it follows, if it is a man, it is an animal, if it is capable of laughing, it is an animal. But between property and species it is conversely: because if it is a man, it is capable of laughing, and conversely if it is capable of laughing, it is a man.

[Left Margin]: The fourth difference.

Further the fourth difference between genus and property is, because a property is in every species of which it is predicated and in it alone and always. But a genus indeed is in every species of which it is predicated, such that it is predicated of every individual of it: it is also in it always, but it is not in that species alone, because it is in other species of the same genus, just as animal is not in man alone, but also in ass, and in lion, and in other species of brutes.

[Left Margin]: Quinta differentia.
Amplius adhuc quinta differentia est, quia species quidem interemptæ non interimunt illa genera quorum sunt species, quia non sequitur, si homo non est, quod animal non sit : propria autem interempta simul interimunt ea quibus sunt propria, et e converso, quia interemptis substantiis sive speciebus quarum sunt propria, sequitur interemptio ipsorum propriorum. Sequitur enim quod si equus

non est, hinnibile non est. His igitur genus differt a proprio.

Hoc autem Porphyrius et alii antiqui sic dixerunt, quod generis quidem et proprii commune est quidem sequi species : nam si homo est, animal est, et si homo est, risibile est. Commune est etiam æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus genus prædicari de illis (quarum est genus) speciebus : et proprium æqualiter non secundum magis et minus prædicari de his quæ illo participant large accepta participatione : æqualiter enim et non secundum magis et minus homo et bos sunt animal, et Cato et Cicero risibile. Commune adhuc autem est eis, scilicet generi et proprio, univoce prædicari de his quorum sunt ; genus quidem de speciebus suis, et proprium de his quorum est proprium, ea univocatione de qua dictum est.

Differunt autem genus et proprium, quoniam genus prius est his de quibus prædicatur, ut speciebus : posterius autem est proprium his de quibus prædicatur : oportet enim prius esse animal in esse generis, dehinc autem dividi differentiis magis proprii, et sic speciem constituit. Oportet autem et genus de pluribus prædicari speciebus, proprium vero de una sola specie cujus est proprium prædicatur. Adhuc autem quia genus de nullo conversim prædicatur, cujus est genus, sicut speciei vel proprio convenit : nam neque si animal est, homo est, neque si animal est, risibile est. Proprium autem conversim prædicatur : quia si homo est, risibile est, et si risibile est, homo est. Amplius proprium inest omni speciei cujus est proprium, et omni individuo, et soli speciei, et semper. Genus autem omni quidem inest speciei de qua prædicatur et semper : non autem soli, quia etiam de oppositis speciebus prædicatur. Amplius alia differentia. Species quidem interemptæ non simul interimunt genera quorum sunt species. Propria autem in-

[Left Margin]: The fifth difference.
Further still the fifth difference is, because species indeed having been destroyed do not destroy those genera of which they are species, because it does not follow, if man is not, that animal is not: but properties having been destroyed simultaneously destroy those things of which they are properties, and conversely, because with the substances or species of which they are properties having been destroyed, the destruction of those

properties follows. For it follows that if there is no horse,

there is no capable of whinnying. By these therefore a genus differs from a property.

But Porphyry and other ancients said this thus, that indeed it is common to genus and property to follow the species: for if it is a man, it is an animal, and if it is a man, it is capable of laughing. It is also common for a genus to be predicated equally and not according to more and less of those species (of which it is the genus): and a property to be predicated equally not according to more and less of those which participate in it with participation accepted largely: for equally and not according to more and less man and ox are animal, and Cato and Cicero are capable of laughing. But still it is common to them, namely to genus and property, to be predicated univocally of those of which they are; a genus indeed of its species, and a property of those of which it is the property, by that univocation of which it was spoken.

But genus and property differ, since a genus is prior to those of which it is predicated, as to species: but a property is posterior to those of which it is predicated: for it is necessary that animal be prior in the being of a genus, and from hence that it be divided by the differences more of a property, and thus it constitutes a species. But it is necessary also that a genus be predicated of multiple species, but a property is predicated of one sole species of which it is the property. But still because a genus is predicated conversely of nothing, of which it is the genus, as convenes to a species or a property: for neither if it is an animal, is it a man, nor if it is an animal, is it capable of laughing. But a property is predicated conversely: because if it is a man, it is capable of laughing, and if it is capable of laughing, it is a man. Further a property is in every species of which it is the property, and in every individual, and in it alone, and always. But a genus indeed is in every species of which it is predicated and always: but not in it alone, because it is also predicated of opposite species. Further another difference. Species indeed having been destroyed do not simultaneously destroy the genera of which they are species. But properties hav-

terempta simul interimunt species quorum sunt propria. Et hæc ideo quia proprium fluit ex principiis speciei, et species est causa ipsius adæquata : cum proprio interempto effectu convertibili cum causa necessarium est etiam causam perimi, et e converso his speciebus quorum sunt propria interemptis, et ipsa propria necesse est interimi : quia destructa causa adæquata, necesse est effectum destrui.

CAPUT VII — *De communitatibus et differentiis generis et accidentis.*

[Left Margin]: Convenientia generis et accidentis. Consequenter agendum est de communitatibus et differentiis generis et accidentis, secundum quod utrumque est universale. Dicimus igitur quod generis et accidentis commune quidem est, quod utrumque de pluribus prædicatur, quemadmodum sæpius dictum est : hoc enim competit utrique eorum secundum quod sunt universalia. Et hoc quidem convenit tam accidenti separabili, quam inseparabili. Moveri enim quod est accidens separabile, de pluribus et de multis valde prædicatur. Nigrum vero quod est accidens inseparabile, prædicatur et de omnibus corvis, et de omnibus Æthiopibus, et etiam de aliquibus inanimatis, ut de carbone, et quercu putrefacta, et de ebeno abscissa, et aliis multis hujusmodi.

Quamvis autem multæ sint communitates accidentis ad genus, tamen illæ ex prædictis vel per se sunt manifestæ, ut dicunt quidam, sicut est non conversim prædicari, et alia hujusmodi : omnis enim corvus est niger, sed non omne nigrum est corvus : sicut omnis homo est animal, sed non omne animal est homo.

[Left Margin]: Prima differentia generis et accidentis. Differentia est inter genus et accidens, primo quidem, quoniam genus sicut principium est ante species de quibus prædicatur : quamvis enim aliquod accidens sit inseparabile, tamen secundum naturam prius est id cui accidit, quam ipsum accidens : subjectum enim oportet quod sit ens in se completum, ut dicit Avicenna, antequam sit occasio vel causa quod ens accidens sit in ipso.

[Right Margin]: Secunda differentia. Secunda autem est differentia, quia omnia illa quæ participant genera ut genera, æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus participant illa. Et hujus quidem causa est, quia participant illa in termino, et quia esse unum est quod non recipit magis et minus. Genus autem principium est esse illorum quæ participant ipsum.

...destroyed simultaneously they destroy the species of which they are properties. And this is because a property flows from the principles of the species, and the species is its adequate cause: since with a property destroyed, an effect convertible with the cause, it is necessary that the cause also be destroyed, and conversely with those species of which they are properties destroyed, it is necessary that the properties themselves be destroyed: because with the adequate cause destroyed, it is necessary that the effect be destroyed.

CHAPTER VII — *On the communities and differences of genus and accident.*

[Left Margin]: Conveniency of genus and accident. Consequently, we must deal with the communities and differences of genus and accident, according to which each is a universal. We say therefore that it is common to genus and accident, that each is predicated of many things, as has been said more often: for this belongs to each of them according to which they are universals. And this indeed fits as much the separable accident as the inseparable. For "to be moved," which is a separable accident, is predicated of many and of very many things. But "black," which is an inseparable accident, is predicated both of all crows, and of all Ethiopians, and even of some inanimate things, as of coal, and of putrefied oak, and of cut ebony, and many other things of this sort.

But although there are many communities of accident to genus, nevertheless those from the things aforesaid are manifest through themselves, as some say, such as not to be predicated conversely, and other things of this sort: for every crow is black, but not every black thing is a crow: just as every man is an animal, but not every animal is a man.

[Left Margin]: First difference of genus and accident. There is a difference between genus and accident, first indeed, because a genus as a principle is before the species of which it is predicated: for although some accident may be inseparable, nevertheless according to nature that to which it happens is prior to the accident itself: for it is necessary that the subject be a being complete in itself, as Avicenna says, before there is an occasion or cause that an accidental being be in it.

[Right Margin]: Second difference. But the second difference is, because all those things which participate in genera as genera, participate in them equally and not according to more and less. And the cause of this indeed is, because they participate in them in the term, and because being is one which does not receive more and less. For a genus is the principle of being of those which participate in it.

Accidentia vero insunt et inæqualiter his quæ participant : ipsa enim accidentium participatio suscipit intensionem et remissionem, eo quod in termino ponitur nomen accidentis, vel secundum accessum ad veram nominis impositionem, vel secundum intensionem et remissionem causæ, quam habet in subjecto : sicut enim potest subintelligi per naturam corvus albus, ita salvo corvo per naturam potest intelligi corvus minus niger et magis niger. Generum vero participatio minime et nullo modo suscipit magis et minus propter causas quæ dictæ sunt.

[Right Margin]: Tertia differentia. Alia adhuc est differentia, quia accidentia principaliter et immediate subsistunt in individuis : quia accidentium communium propria sunt subjecta. Genera vero et species magis proprie naturaliter priora sunt individuis quæ eis substant. Genera enim sunt principia specierum, et species sunt totum esse individuorum : et quod est principium principii, est etiam principium principiati.

[Right Margin]: Quarta differentia. Adhuc autem et alia est differentia : quia genus quidem in eo quod quid est, prædicabile est de his quæ sub ipsis sunt speciebus (in quo tamen differt genus et a differentia et a proprio et ab accidente). Accidentia vero quæ absolutum habent esse, prædicantur in eo quod aliquid est quale, scilicet qualitas et quantitas. Quæ autem habent esse comparationis sive comparationi admixtum, ut ad aliquid, agere et pati, et hujusmodi alia, prædicantur in eo quod quomodo se habent.

unumquodque eorum de quibus prædicatur. Si quis enim interrogatus fuerit, qualis est Æthiops? congrue respondet quia niger est. Si autem interrogatus fuerit, quomodo Socrates se habet in corporis dispositione ? congrue respondet quia sedet vel stat. Si quæratur quomodo se habet agendo, dicet quod ambulat vel aliquid aliud agit.

Hæ ergo sunt differentiæ generis et accidentis : et hoc quidem, sicut dicit Porphyrius. Generis autem et accidentis commune est de pluribus (quemadmodum dictum est) prædicari, sive de numero separabilium accidentium, sive de numero inseparabilium.

Etenim moveri de pluribus prædicatur, quod est de numero separabilium. Nigrum quidem quod est de numero inseparabilium, etiam de pluribus prædicatur, ut de corvis omnibus, et de Æthiopibus, et de aliquibus inanimatis. Differunt autem genus ab accidente, quoniam genus ante species est secundum naturam et intellectum, de quibus prædicatur. Accidentia vero speciebus de quibus prædicantur sunt posteriora secundum naturam : nam si etiam inseparabile sumatur accidens, de quo tamen minus videtur, sed tamen prius natura est subjectum cui accidit quam id quod accidit sibi.

But accidents are present even unequally in those which participate: for the participation of accidents itself admits of intension and remission, from the fact that the name of an accident is placed in the term, either according to access to the true imposition of the name, or according to the intension and remission of the cause, which it has in the subject: for just as a white crow can be sub-understood through nature, so with the crow saved through nature a less black and more black crow can be understood. But the participation of genera in no way and in no mode admits of more and less on account of the causes which have been said.

[Right Margin]: Third difference. There is yet another difference, because accidents principally and immediately subsist in individuals: because the proper subjects of common accidents are the individuals. But genera and species are more properly and naturally prior to the individuals which stand under them. For genera are the principles of species, and species are the whole being of individuals: and what is the principle of a principle, is also the principle of the thing principled.

[Right Margin]: Fourth difference. But yet another difference is: because a genus indeed is predicable in that which it is (*in eo quod quid est*) of those which are species under them (in which nevertheless genus differs both from difference and from property and from accident). But accidents which have absolute being are predicated in that which is a certain sort of thing (*in eo quod aliquid est quale*), namely quality and quantity. But those which have the being of comparison or mixed with comparison, such as relation, acting, and suffering, and other things of this sort, are predicated in the mode in which they have themselves (*in eo quod quomodo se habent*).

...each of those of which they are predicated. For if someone were asked, of what sort is an Ethiopian? he congruously responds because he is black. If however he were asked, how does Socrates have himself in the disposition of his body? he congruously responds because he sits or stands. If it is asked how he has himself in acting, he will say that he walks or does something else.

These therefore are the differences of genus and accident: and this indeed, just as Porphyry says. But it is common to genus and accident to be predicated of many things (as has been said), whether from the number of separable accidents, or from the number of inseparable ones.

For indeed "to be moved" is predicated of many things, which is from the number of the separable. Black indeed, which is from the number of the inseparable, is also predicated of many things, as of all crows, and of Ethiopians, and of some inanimate things. But genus differs from accident, because genus is before the species according to nature and intellect, of which it is predicated. But accidents are posterior according to nature to the species of which they are predicated: for even if an inseparable accident be taken, concerning which nevertheless it seems less, yet the subject to which it happens is prior by nature than that which happens to itself.

Et genera quidem etiam in hoc differunt ab accidente, quod quæ participant genera, æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus participant ea. Accidentia vero ea quæ participant, non æqualiter participant. Intensionem enim et remissionem suscipit accidentium participatio. Generum vero participatio minime suscipit intensionem et remissionem.

Est etiam differentia, quia accidentia quidem in individuis (de quibus prædicantur) principaliter subsistunt, et tunc individua priora sunt accidentibus quæ in ipsis sunt. Genera vero et species naturaliter priora sunt individuis de quibus prædicantur.

Est autem adhuc differentia, quod genera in eo quod quid prædicantur de speciebus et individuis quæ sunt sub ipsis ; accidentia vero prædicantur in eo quod quale aliquid sit, vel qualiter se habeat unumquodque eorum de quibus prædicatur. Et hoc probatur exemplo : tu enim qualis est Æthiops interrogatus, dicis niger : vel interrogatus quomodo Socrates se habet in positione corporis vel actione, congrue dicis quoniam sedet vel ambulat.

Genus ergo in quo ab aliis quatuor differt, dictum est quantum ad præsentem sufficit intentionem. Contingit sive consequens est, post hoc dicere qualiter unumquodque aliorum a genere universalium differt ab aliis a se quatuor universalibus : comparato enim quolibet illorum quinque ad alia quatuor, viginti fient omnes differentiæ, quia quater quinque sunt viginti : sed semper posteriorum differentiis enumeratis, posteriorum comparatorum differentiæ superantur una differentia quam plus habent ipsis ea quæ ante comparata sunt : eo quod illa differentia jam ante comparatis sumpta sive habita est. Tertio autem loco comparata superantur a tribus. Quarto vero loco comparata superantur a quatuor differentiis. Relinquitur quod non restant dicendæ nisi decem differentiæ. Secundo vero loco quando differentia comparatur speciei et proprio et accidenti, et omittitur illa quæ fuit differentiæ ad genus, eo quod illa in comparatione generis ad differentiam habita est, et eadem est differentia generis ad differentiam, quæ est differentiæ ad genus : tunc separatur sequens comparatio in una, et iterum sequens superatur a præcedente : cum enim species comparatur ad proprium et accidens, omittitur comparatio speciei ad genus et ad differentiam, eo quod illæ jam in comparatione generis ad speciem et in comparatione differentiæ ad speciem habitæ sunt. Et sic de aliis, quia semper sequens unam minus habet quam immediate præcedens : et tunc omnes quæ residuæ sunt, non fiunt nisi decem, quatuor scilicet in comparatione differentiæ ad alia, et tres in comparatione speciei ad alia, et duæ in comparatione proprii ad.

alia, et una in consideratione universalis ultimi et comparationis.

And genera indeed also in this differ from accident, that those things which participate in genera, participate in them equally and not according to more and less. But accidents, those things which participate in them, do not participate equally. For the participation of accidents admits of intension and remission. But the participation of genera in no way admits of intension and remission.

There is also a difference, because accidents indeed principally subsist in individuals (of which they are predicated), and then the individuals are prior to the accidents which are in them. But genera and species are naturally prior to the individuals of which they are predicated.

But there is yet a difference, that genera are predicated in that which it is (*in eo quod quid*) of species and individuals which are under them; but accidents are predicated in that which a thing is of what sort (*in eo quod quale aliquid sit*), or how each of those things of which they are predicated has itself. And this is proved by example: for you, asked what sort is an Ethiopian, say black: or asked how Socrates has himself in the position of his body or in action, congruously say since he sits or walks.

Genus therefore, in what it differs from the other four, has been said as much as suffices for the present intention. It happens or is consequent, after this to say how each of the others from the genus of universals differs from the other four universals from itself: for with any one of those five compared to the other four, all the differences will become twenty, because five times four are twenty: but always with the differences of the posterior ones enumerated, the differences of the posterior ones compared are overcome by one difference which those compared before have more than them: from the fact that that difference has already been taken or held for those compared before. But those compared in the third place are overcome by three. But those compared in the fourth place are overcome by four differences. It remains that there do not rest to be said except ten differences. But in the second place when a difference is compared to species and property and accident, that one is omitted which was of the difference to genus, from the fact that that was held in the comparison of genus to difference, and the same is the difference of genus to difference, which is of difference to genus: then the following comparison is separated in one, and again the following is overcome by the preceding: for when a species is compared to property and accident, the comparison of species to genus and to difference is omitted, from the fact that those have already been held in the comparison of genus to species and in the comparison of difference to species. And thus concerning the others, because always the following has one less than the immediately preceding: and then all which are residue, do not become except ten, four namely in the comparison of difference to the others, and three in the comparison of species to the others, and two in the comparison of property to.

...others, and one in the consideration of the last universal and the comparison.

Vel si hæ numerentur ex parte comparatorum ad invicem, tunc primo comparat differentiam ad alia tria, et quarta est habita prius, quæ est comparatio ad genus. Et tertio fit comparatio speciei ad alia duo, et duæ comparationis species sunt habitæ : una quidem comparatio speciei ad genus et alia comparatio speciei ad differentiam. Et quarto fit comparatio proprii ad accidens, et tres sunt habitæ, scilicet proprii ad genus, et proprii ad differentiam, et proprii ad speciem. Ultima autem est accidentis comparatio quæ quatuor habet ante, scilicet accidentis comparatio ad genus, et accidentis ad differentiam, et accidentis ad speciem, et accidentis ad proprium : genus enim differt a differentia, specie, proprio et accidente.

Quatuor ergo sunt differentiæ omnes ipsius generis ad alia quatuor. Differentia vero quo differat a genere dictum est, quando quo genus differt a differentia dicebatur. Relinquitur igitur dicere quo differentia differat a specie, proprio, et accidente, et sunt tres differentiæ. Rursus species quo differat a differentia dictum est, quando quo differat differentia a specie dicebatur. Residuum est ergo dicere quo differat species a proprio et accidente. Duæ ergo sunt istæ differentiæ. Proprium autem quo differat ab accidente relinquitur dicere, nam quo a genere et differentia et specie differat, dictum est in illorum differentiis ad ipsum. Quatuor ergo sumptis differentiis generis ad alia, tribus vero differentiæ ad alia, duabus autem speciei ad alia, una autem proprii ad accidens, decem omnes erunt differentiæ : quarum quatuor erunt generis ad alia, ut jam superius demonstravimus. De aliis consequenter dicemus.

CAPUT VIII ### *De communibus et propriis differentiæ et speciei.* Dicamus igitur quod commune est differentiæ et speciei æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus a suis inferioribus participari. Et hoc est manifestum per exempla : hominem enim quod est species, æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus participant particulares homines, et similiter non secundum magis et minus participant rationale quod est differentia. Et hujus causa jam superius assignata est : quia scilicet species est totum esse individuorum, et differentia est pars esse speciei et individuorum, et non recipit magis et minus : si enim magis et minus reciperet secundum esse, vel adderetur vel minueretur aliquid ab esse vel ad esse ; tunc non esset idem esse quod prius, quod falsum est et impossibile.

Or if these are numbered from the part of the things compared to one another, then first he compares the difference to the other three, and a fourth has been held before, which is the comparison to the genus. And thirdly the comparison of species is made to the other two, and two species of comparison have been held: one indeed the comparison of species to genus and the other the comparison of species to difference. And fourthly the comparison of property to accident is made, and three have been held, namely of property to genus, and of property to difference, and of property to species. But the last is the comparison of accident which has four before it, namely the comparison of accident to genus, and of accident to difference, and of accident to species, and of accident to property: for a genus differs from difference, species, property, and accident.

Four therefore are all the differences of the genus itself to the other four. But in what a difference differs from a genus has been said, when it was said in what a genus differs from a difference. It remains therefore to say in what a difference differs from species, property, and accident, and there are three differences. Again, in what a species differs from a difference has been said, when it was said in what a difference differs from a species. It remains therefore to say in what a species differs from property and accident. These therefore are those two differences. But in what a property differs from an accident it remains to say, for in what it differs from genus and difference and species has been said in their differences to it. Therefore with four differences of genus taken to the others, three of difference to the others, two of species to the others, and one of property to accident, all the differences will be ten: of which four will be of genus to the others, as we have already demonstrated above. Concerning the others we will speak consequently.

CHAPTER VIII ### *On the common and proper things of difference and species.* We say therefore that it is common to difference and species to be participated in equally and not according to more and less by their inferiors. And this is manifest through examples: for man which is a species, particular men participate in equally and not according to more and less, and similarly they participate in rational which is a difference not according to more and less. And the cause of this has already been assigned above: because namely a species is the whole being of individuals, and a difference is a part of the being of species and individuals, and it does not receive more and less: for if it received more and less according to being, either something would be added or diminished from the being or to the being; then the being would not be the same as before, which is false and impossible.

Commune vero secunda communitate est semper adesse speciem et differentiam his quæ ipsis participant, et non alteratur ab ipsis, sicut fit alteratio in accidentalibus formis. Et hoc hic dicetur exemplo : semper enim est Socrates rationalis, et semper Socrates est homo. Habitudo enim ista quæ est particularis ad universale essentiale, sive sit totum esse ut species, sive sit pars esse ut differentia, perpetua est. Et ideo dicunt Avicenna et Algazel, quod hæc semper vera est, Socrates est homo, et hæc, homo est animal, et animal est substantia, et omnis illa propositio in qua prædicatum est de ratione subjecti et clauditur in intellectu ejus.

Si quis autem sic inferat, homo semper est animal, vel animal semper est substantia, et esse hominem vel esse substantiam non diminuit ab esse, sicut cum dicitur, homo mortuus : ergo si homo semper est animal, homo semper est. Patet quod non sequitur, et est ibi fallacia.

simpliciter et secundum quid : quia cum dicitur, homo semper est animal, quod dico *semper*, non dicit nisi sempiternitatem habitudinis subjecti ad prædicatum : et conclusio infertur ac si dicat sempiternitatem simpliciter. Hujus tamen consequentiæ aliam dicunt causam Avicenna et Algazel : dicunt enim has esse per se, hic homo est homo, et homo est animal, et animal est substantia, et semper esse veras propter causam quæ dicta est, quod scilicet prædicatum clauditur actu et intellectu in subjecto. Si autem inferatur, homo est substantia, ergo homo est : dicunt non sequi, quia illud est, est idem quod actu : et hoc accidit, accidit enim esse actu ei quod dicitur, homo est substantia, sive homo sit actu, sive non sit actu, hæc semper vera est, homo est substantia.

Assignatis etiam convenientiis differentiæ et speciei tangenda etiam propria sunt. Diximus jam quod proprium est differentiæ (quo differt a specie, cum tamen utrumque horum universalium sit prædicatum essentiale) quia differentia prædicatur in eo quod quale. Speciei vero convenit prædicari in eo quod quid est. Quamvis enim homo communis velut qualitas aliquando accipiatur (sicut commune sive genus, sive species quale quid significat : quod ex opposito secundum modum aliquem accipitur ad hoc aliquid) non tamen propter hoc simpliciter erit qualitas alicujus, sicut differentia est qualitas generis, et proprium qualitas speciei, et accidens qualitas individui : sed erit qualitas quædam secundum humanitatem secundum id quod differentiæ (quæ qualitates essentiales sunt) generi advenientes speciem ut quale quid est constituerunt : omne enim commune hoc modo quale quid, qualitate suæ communis formæ est constitutum.

But it is common by a second community that species and difference are always present in those which participate in them, and are not altered by them, as alteration occurs in accidental forms. And this will be said here by example: for Socrates is always rational, and Socrates is always a man. For that habitude which is of a particular to an essential universal, whether it be a whole being as a species, or be a part of being as a difference, is perpetual. And therefore Avicenna and Algazel say, that this is always true: "Socrates is a man," and this: "man is an animal," and "animal is a substance," and every that proposition in which the predicate is of the reason of the subject and is closed in its intellect.

But if someone should thus infer: man is always an animal, or animal is always a substance, and being a man or being a substance does not diminish from being, as when it is said, "a dead man": therefore if man is always an animal, man always is. It is patent that it does not follow, and there is there a fallacy.

simply and according to something: because when it is said, a man is always an animal, what I say *always*, does not say except the sempiternity of the habitude of the subject to the predicate: and the conclusion is inferred as if it says sempiternity simply. Nevertheless Avicenna and Algazel say another cause of this consequence: for they say these are *per se*, this man is a man, and a man is an animal, and an animal is a substance, and they are always true on account of the cause which was said, because namely the predicate is enclosed in act and intellect in the subject. But if it is inferred, a man is a substance, therefore a man is: they say it does not follow, because that is, is the same as in act: and this happens, for to be in act happens to that which is said, a man is a substance, whether a man is in act, or is not in act, this is always true, a man is a substance.

With the conveniencies of a difference and a species assigned also their proper things must be touched upon. We said already that the proper thing of a difference is (by which it differs from a species, although nevertheless each of these universals is an essential predicate) because a difference is predicated in that which specifies 'what kind' something is. But it convenes to a species to be predicated in that which specifies 'what' it is. For although common man as a quality is sometimes taken (just as a common thing whether a genus, or a species signifies a certain 'what kind': which from the opposite according to some mode is taken to this something) nevertheless not on account of this simply will it be a quality of something, just as a difference is the quality of a genus, and a property the quality of a species, and an accident the quality of an individual: but it will be a certain quality according to humanity according to that which differences (which are essential qualities) arriving to a genus have constituted a species as what kind it is: for every common thing in this mode a certain 'what kind', is constituted by the quality of its common form.

Amplius secunda quidem proprietas est qua differentia et species distinguuntur, quod differentia cum sit generalis, ut in ante habitis dictum est, sæpe in pluribus speciebus consideratur, sicut et genus,

quemadmodum quadrupes consideratur ut universale in pluribus animalibus specie differentibus. Cujus causam dicunt Avicenna et Averroes esse, quia talis differentia pro genere ponitur, et circumlocutio est generis : species vero quæ species est et non genus, non consideratur secundum esse in pluribus specie differentibus, sed in his solis individuis quæ sub eadem sunt specie. Si enim accipitur species ut genus subalternum, tunc non hic sed in ante habitis differentia differentiæ, et talis generis posita est : et ideo hic non loquitur nisi de specie quæ non potest esse genus.

Amplius tertia differentia est, quia differentia quidem natura et intellectu prima vel prior est ea specie quæ est secundum ipsam differentiam constituta, sicut principium essentiale prius est principiato. Cujus probatio est, quia prius est hoc modo a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia, ut ablato rationali quod est differentia, aufertur homo quod species : homine interempto sive ablato, non necessario sequitur quod interimatur rationale, cum adhuc interempto homine Deus secundum Stoicos rationale quoddam sit. Et quod hic potest objici de differentia ultima convertibili, jam in præhabito de *Differentia* tractatu solutum est. Avicenna tamen dicit hæc omnia per ignorantiam esse dicta a Porphyrio.

Amplius quarta quidem differentia est, quod differentia componitur cum alia differentia præcipue ad speciem constituendam. Et hoc exemplo manifestum est : quia rationale et mortale unum cum alio compositum est in constitutione sive compositione hominis, sive in substantia nominis constituenda. Species vero speciei non componitur ut gignat aliquam speciem quæ eadem sit in substantiis, sive suppositis, sive individuis illarum specierum, sicut differentia cum differentia componitur ad substantiam speciei constituendam, quæ eadem habet supposita, quæ habet altera duarum differentiarum.

Eadem enim sunt supposita rationalis et mortalis. Quamvis enim quidam equus cuidam asinæ permisceatur ad muli generationem, equus tamen si simpliciter sive universaliter sit acceptus, et in specie asinæ permisceatur universaliter, nunquam perficit mulum.

Quod autem hic dicitur quod differentia differentiæ componitur, sciendum quod impossibile est si utraque differentiarum ut actus ultimus accipiatur : si autem una accipiatur ut imperfecta et in potentia ad aliam, tunc prima est sicut genus ad alteram, et secunda est sicut actus et perfectio, et tunc est possibile.

Further the second property indeed is by which difference and species are distinguished, that a difference since it is general, as was said in the things previously had, often in multiple species is considered, just as also a genus,

just as a quadruped is considered as a universal in multiple animals differing in species. The cause of which Avicenna and Averroes say is, because such a difference is posited for a genus, and is a circumlocution of a genus: but a species which is a species and not a genus, is not considered according to being in multiple things differing in species, but only in those individuals which are under the same species. For if a species is taken as a subalternate genus, then not here but in the things previously had the difference of a difference, and of such a genus was posited: and therefore here he does not speak except of a species which cannot be a genus.

Further the third difference is, because a difference indeed by nature and intellect is first or prior to that species which is constituted according to the difference itself, just as an essential principle is prior to the principiate. The probation of which is, because it is prior in this mode from which the consequence of subsisting is not converted, as with rational removed which is the difference, man is removed which is the species: with man destroyed or removed, it does not necessarily follow that rational is destroyed, since still with man destroyed God is according to the Stoics a certain rational thing. And what here can be objected concerning an ultimate convertible difference, already in the previously had treatise on *Difference* was solved. Avicenna nevertheless says all these things are said through ignorance by Porphyry.

Further the fourth difference indeed is, that a difference is composed with another difference principally for constituting a species. And this is manifest by an example: because rational and mortal one with another is composed in the constitution or composition of man, or in constituting the substance of the name. But a species is not composed with a species so that it may beget some species which is the same in the substances, or supposits, or individuals of those species, just as a difference is composed with a difference for constituting the substance of a species, which has the same supposits, which one of the two differences has.

For the supposits of rational and mortal are the same. For although a certain horse may be mixed with a certain she-ass for the generation of a mule, nevertheless a horse if it be taken simply or universally, and be mixed universally in the species of she-ass, never perfects a mule.

But as to what is said here that a difference is composed of a difference, it must be known that it is impossible if each of the differences be taken as an ultimate act: but if one be taken as imperfect and in potency to the other, then the first is like a genus to the other, and the second is like an act and perfection, and then it is possible.

Et hoc est quod dicit Avicenna, quod duæ differentiæ non ejusdem ordinis conveniunt ad speciei constitutionem : quarum una est prior, et altera posterior, sicut rationale quod est communius quam homo, et mortale quod posterius in eadem rationali natura acceptum est determinans ad speciem hominis. Quod autem dicitur quod species non conveniunt, ideo dictum est quia species est id quod actu ultimo perfectum est in illis quæ formaliter perfecta sunt : et ex duobus actu perfectis non potest fieri aliquid in aliqua natura. Et quod dicitur de equo et asina convenientibus, quod fit mulus, in multis aliis fit animalibus, sicut in cane, et vulpe, et aliis, quæ sunt vicina secundum complexionem, ita quod unum temperat semen alterius, sicut frigiditate asinæ temperatur calor seminis equi et quorum idem est tempus imprægnationis. Et tunc etiam, ut dicit Avicenna, non conveniunt ad constitutionem animalis cujus individua sunt convenientia cum individuis alterius illarum specierum, sicut constitutum a duabus differentiis idem est cum individuis utriusque illarum differentiarum, quia individua muli non conveniunt cum individuis asini nec cum individuis equi. Quod autem quidam dicunt, et videtur Porphyrius dicere, quod scilicet quidam equus et quædam asina conveniunt ad muli generationem, et quod equus simpliciter et asina simpliciter conveniunt ad muli hujus generationem, valde inconsiderate dictum est : quia etiam equus simpliciter cum equa simpliciter non conveniunt ad hujus equi generationem : actiones enim et operationes non sunt universalium, sed tantum particularium : et universalia non generantur nisi per accidens, vel per consequens in particularium generationem. Simpliciter enim universalia ingenerabilia sunt et incorruptibilia. Hoc igitur est quod antiqui dixerunt de communibus et propriis differentiæ et speciei : hoc enim patet ex verbis eorum.

Dicunt enim sic : Commune ergo differentiæ et speciei est æqualiter, et non secundum magis et minus participari ab his de quibus prædicantur : hominem enim participant æqualiter particulares homines, et similiter rationalem differentiam. Commune vero est eis et adesse semper his quæ horum participant : semper enim Socrates rationale est, et semper Socrates homo est. Proprium autem differentiæ omnino est, in eo quod quale sit prædicatur : species vero in eo quod quid sit prædicatur. Si autem homo communis velut qualitas accipiatur, non tamen simpliciter et absolute erit qualitas, sed secundum id quod generi advenientes differentiæ, eum qui species est hominem constituunt : sic enim est quale quid, et non simpliciter quale vel qualitas : quia quid generis differentia formatum est in ipso. Amplius aliud habent proprium quo differunt, quia differentia una divisiva et communis in pluribus speciebus in quibus actu et simul est consideratur : quemadmodum quadrupes consideratur in pluribus animalibus specie differentibus.

And this is what Avicenna says, that two differences not of the same order convene to the constitution of a species: of which one is prior, and the other posterior, just as rational which is more common than man, and mortal which is taken posterior in the same rational nature is determining to the species of man. But as to what is said that species do not convene, it was said for this reason because a species is that which is perfected in an ultimate act in those which are formally perfect: and from two things perfected in act nothing can become in any nature. And what is said concerning a horse and a she-ass convening, that a mule is made, this occurs in many other animals, just as in the dog, and the fox, and others, which are near according to complexion, such that one tempers the seed of the other, just as by the coldness of the she-ass the heat of the seed of the horse is tempered and of those whose time of impregnation is the same. And then also, as Avicenna says, they do not convene to the constitution of an animal whose individuals are convening with the individuals of the other of those species, just as the thing constituted from two differences is the same with the individuals of both of those differences, because the individuals of a mule do not convene with the individuals of an ass nor with the individuals of a horse. But as to what some say, and Porphyry seems to say, that namely a certain horse and a certain she-ass convene to the generation of a mule, and that horse simply and she-ass simply convene to the generation of this mule, it was said very inconsiderately: because even horse simply with mare simply do not convene to the generation of this horse: for actions and operations are not of universals, but only of particulars: and universals are not generated except by accident, or by consequence in the generation of particulars. For simply universals are ingenerable and incorruptible. This therefore is what the ancients said concerning the common and proper things of difference and species: for this is patent from their words.

For they say thus: It is common therefore to difference and species to be participated in equally, and not according to more and less by those of which they are predicated: for particular men participate in man equally, and similarly in the rational difference. But it is common to them also to be present always in those which participate in these: for Socrates is always rational, and Socrates is always a man. But it is altogether proper to difference, to be predicated in that which it is of what sort (*in eo quod quale sit*): but a species is predicated in that which it is (*in eo quod quid sit*). But if man should be taken commonly as a quality, nevertheless he will not be a quality simply and absolutely, but according to that which the differences coming to the genus constitute the species man: for thus he is "of what sort somewhat" (*quale quid*), and not simply of what sort or a quality: because the "what" (*quid*) of the genus is formed by the difference in him. Further they have another property by which they differ, because one difference, divisive and common, is considered in more species in which it is in act and simultaneously: just as quadruped is considered in more animals differing in species.

Species vero quæ solum species est, consideratur in solis quæ sub ipsa sunt individuis. Amplius autem adhuc differunt, quia differentia est prima vel prior ab ea specie quæ est secundum ipsam constituta : cujus signum est, quod simul ablatum rationale interimit hominem : homo vero interemptus interimit rationale, cum adhuc sit Deus homine.

non existente. Amplius quidem adhuc differunt, quod differentia cum generalis sit, et non ultima et convertibilis, componitur cum alia differentia. Rationale enim et mortale unum cum alio compositum, ut potentia et actus est in substantia hominis quæ est species : species vero speciei non componitur ut gignat speciem aliquam aliam. Et si objicitur de asina et equo in muli generatione, dicimus quod quædam asina cuidam equo permiscetur ad muli generationem, equus autem simpliciter asinæ simpliciter conveniens nunquam perficit mulum.

CAPUT IX.

De communitatibus et differentiis differentiæ et proprii.

<!-- cap:1.8.9 -->

Nunc dicamus differentias et communia differentiæ et proprii. Differentia igitur et proprium commune quidem habent prima communitate, quod æqualiter et non secundum intentionem et remissionem a suis de quibus prædicantur suppositis participantur : utrumque enim illorum in termino participatur, eo quod unum, videlicet differentia, pars formalis est ipsius esse, quod (sicut dictum est sæpius) unum est et non recipit magis et minus : proprium autem ab aptitudine naturalis potentiæ formaliter imponitur : quæ aptitudo in potentia per habitum completur, et non actum qui est operatio, cum sit completio major qua potentia completur per habitum, et rem suam dicit in termino : et ideo non potest suscipere magis et minus : quamvis, sicut in ante habitis dictum est, impedientia vel expedientia ad actum in substantia possit habere, quibus expeditius vel minus expedite agat per potentiam illam : sed hæc non variant potentiam stantem in habitu naturali : participantur ergo hæc duo æqualiter ab his quæ participant ea. Ea enim quæ rationalia sunt (de quibus prædicatur rationale) æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus rationalia sunt, et

similiter ea quæ sunt risibilia (de quibus prædicatur risibile) sunt æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus risibilia.

But a species which is only a species, is considered in only those individuals which are under it. But yet further they differ, because a difference is first or prior to that species which is constituted according to it: a sign of which is, that rational being taken away simultaneously destroys man: but man being destroyed does not destroy rational, since there is still God with man.

not existing. But indeed further still they differ, that a difference since it is general, and not ultimate and convertible, is composed with another difference. For rational and mortal composed one with another, as potency and act are in the substance of man which is a species: but a species is not composed with a species so that it may beget some other species. And if it is objected concerning an ass and a horse in the generation of a mule, we say that a certain ass is mingled with a certain horse for the generation of a mule, but a horse simply convening to an ass simply never perfects a mule.

CHAPTER IX.

On the commonalities and differences of a difference and a property.

<!-- cap:1.8.9 -->

Now let us say the differences and common things of a difference and a property. Therefore a difference and a property indeed have a common thing in the first commonality, that equally and not according to intension and remission they are participated by their supposits of which they are predicated: for each of those is participated in the term, on account of the fact that one, namely a difference, is a formal part of being itself, which (just as was said very often) is one and does not receive more and less: but a property from the aptitude of a natural potency is formally imposed: which aptitude in potency is completed by a habit, and not the act which is an operation, since it is the major completion by which a potency is completed by a habit, and it says its thing in the term: and therefore it cannot sustain more and less: although, just as in the things previously had it was said, it can have impeding or expediting things to an act in the substance, by which it may act more expeditiously or less expeditiously through that potency: but these do not vary the potency standing in a natural habit: therefore these two are participated equally by those which participate them. For those which are rational (of which rational is predicated) equally and not according to more and less are rational, and

similarly those which are risible (of which risible is predicated) are equally and not according to more and less risible.

Amplius et in hoc conveniunt, quod utrumque, differentia scilicet et proprium, semper et omni sive universaliter adsunt illis de quibus prædicantur : quia secundum naturæ potentiam et aptitudinem attribuuntur illis de quibus prædicantur et non secundum actum. Quamvis enim uno vel utroque pede careat qui secundum naturam bipes est, non propter hoc perit substantia formalis in ipso qua formatur ad habendos duos pedes, sed potius id quod tali natura ad bipes formatum est, semper bipes dicitur per naturæ aptitudinem, sicut et risibile a potentia naturali cum naturali habitu completa semper dicitur risibile, quamvis non semper rideat secundum effectum, nec plus habet potentiam naturalem in actu quando ridet, quam quando plorat, Si aliter habet eam et ad aliquid habuerit eam, semper est in aptitudine æquali quam non exercet secundum actum.

Proprium autem quo differentia a proprio distinguitur, est quod aliqua differentia, quæ scilicet ultima non est et veræ differentiæ nomen habet, semper dicitur de pluribus speciebus sicut et genus. Et hoc exemplo probatur : quia rationale quod est differentia, prædicatur de homine, et de Deo secundum Stoicos et Epicureos, qui deos et deas multas rationales esse posuerunt. Proprium vero non prædicatur nisi de una sola specie cujus est proprium, et de illius speciei individuis. Et hæc omnia plana sunt ex præmissis.

Adhuc etiam differunt in hoc, quod differentia quidem sequitur universaliter ad ea quorum est differentia absque conversione sicut genus : sequitur enim, si homo est, rationale est : sed non convertitur, quod si sit rationale, propter hoc sequatur hominem esse secundum Stoicos. Propria vero conversim prædicantur de his quorum sunt propria : si enim homo est, risibile est, et si risibile est,

homo est. Et hæc quidem fere sub eisdem verbis dixit Porphyrius, et ideo verba ejus ponere non oportet.

<!-- cap:1.1.10 -->

CAPUT X.

De communitatibus et differentiis differentiæ et accidentis.

[Drop Cap] Differentiæ autem et accidenti, ut dicit Porphyrius, commune est de pluribus prædicari in quantum utrumque illorum universale est: hoc enim omni quidem convenit universali in quantum est in multis, et de multis. Ad inseparabile autem accidens specialiter habet differentia communitatem, quod scilicet tam differentia quam inseparabile accidens semper adest omnibus de quibus prædicatur.

Further also in this they convene, that each, namely a difference and a property, are always and to all or universally present to those of which they are predicated: because according to the potency and aptitude of nature they are attributed to those of which they are predicated and not according to act. For although he who is naturally a biped may lack one or both feet, not on account of this does the formal substance perish in him by which he is formed to have two feet, but rather that which by such a nature is formed to a biped, is always called a biped through the aptitude of nature, just as also risible from a natural potency completed with a natural habit is always called risible, although he may not always laugh according to effect, nor does he have more natural potency in act when he laughs, than when he cries. If he has it otherwise and has had it to something, he always is in an equal aptitude which he does not exercise according to act.

But the property by which a difference from a property is distinguished, is that some difference, which namely is not ultimate and has the name of a true difference, is always said of multiple species just as also a genus. And this is proved by an example: because rational which is a difference, is predicated of a man, and of God according to the Stoics and Epicureans, who posited there to be many rational gods and goddesses. But a property is not predicated except of one single species of which it is the property, and of the individuals of that species. And all these things are plain from the premises.

Still also they differ in this, that a difference indeed follows universally to those of which it is the difference without conversion just as a genus: for it follows, if it is a man, it is rational: but it does not convert, because if it is rational, on account of this it may follow to be a man according to the Stoics. But properties are conversely predicated of those of which they are properties: for if it is a man, it is risible, and if it is risible,

is a man. And these things indeed almost under the same words Porphyry said, and therefore it is not necessary to posit his words.

<!-- cap:1.1.10 -->

CHAPTER X.

On the commonalities and differences of a difference and an accident.

[Drop Cap] But to a difference and an accident, as Porphyry says, it is common to be predicated of multiple things insofar as each of those is a universal: for this indeed convenes to every universal insofar as it is in many things, and of many things. But to an inseparable accident specially a difference has commonality, because namely both a difference as well as an inseparable accident are always present to all those of which they are predicated.

Quod exemplo probatur et inductione : quia bipes semper adest corvis, cum sit differentia de corvis et hominibus prædicata : nigrum etiam esse, quod tanquam accidens inseparabile prædicatur de corvis, semper adest corvis, quamvis etiam posset fieri corvus albus vel ætate vel arte : tamen quia corvus non tantum nominat speciem, sed in tali complexione, quæ causa nigredinis est, designatur subjectum materiale, et hoc accidens nominato tali subjecto semper est accidens inseparabile.

In hoc etiam differunt differentia et accidens, quia differentia quidem continet ambitu suæ communitatis ea de quibus prædicatur. Continere enim est ea de quibus prædicatur intra suam communitatem claudere : continet ergo differentia et non continetur ab his de quibus prædicatur. Sic enim continet hæc differentia quæ est rationale, totum hominem et particularia ipsius. Accidentia vero nec proprie nec vere, sed quodammodo continent quædam eorum de quibus prædicantur secundum quod in pluribus sunt, et excedunt ea de quibus prædicantur. Quodam autem modo continent, eo quia subjecta eorum de quibus prædicantur, non omnia susceptibilia sunt horum sed

plurimorum : et omnia continent quibus insunt, et exceduntur ab his quibus non insunt. Album enim prædicatur de hominibus albis et quodam modo continet ea, de non albis autem non prædicatur : et aliquis homo est non albus, et quoddam album non est homo, quia potest esse in alio subjecto quam in homine. Ideo cum dicitur, homo est albus, homo continetur : sed ista continentia non est propria, quia continere est formæ substantialis : et ideo accidens in quantum est forma continet, in quantum autem est accidens fluidum, habet esse et continetur a subjecto. Et sermo quidem Porphyrii obscurus est, sed hunc quem dixi veriorem puto esse intellectum.

Alia autem adhuc est differentia inter differentiam et accidens : quia differentia quidem non est intensibilis et remissibilis, sicut patet ex supradictis, ubi etiam soluta sunt quæ contra hoc dictum objiciuntur. Accidentia autem magis et minus suscipiunt, eo quod causas habent materiales, et secundum seipsa non sunt nominantia rem suam in termino. Et hæc omnino plana sunt ex supradictis.

Adhuc autem alia est differentia, quod impermiscibiles sunt contrariæ differentiæ ad alicujus speciei constitutionem : ex rationali enim et irrationali non constituitur aliqua species una. Contraria autem accidentia mixta sunt ad alterius constitutionem, sicut si miscerentur contrarii colores et sapores ad medii constitutionem.

Which is proved by an example and induction: because a biped is always present to crows, since it is a difference predicated of crows and men: also to be black, which as an inseparable accident is predicated of crows, is always present to crows, although it could also become a white crow either by age or by art: nevertheless because a crow not only names a species, but in such a complexion, which is the cause of blackness, the material subject is designated, and this accident with such a subject named is always an inseparable accident.

In this also a difference and an accident differ, because a difference indeed contains in the ambit of its commonality those things of which it is predicated. For to contain is to enclose those things of which it is predicated within its commonality: therefore a difference contains and is not contained by those of which it is predicated. For thus this difference which is rational, contains the whole man and his particulars. But accidents neither properly nor truly, but in a certain mode contain certain of those things of which they are predicated according as they are in multiple things, and exceed those of which they are predicated. But in a certain mode they contain, because the subjects of those things of which they are predicated, are not all susceptible of these but

of very many things: and they contain all those in which they are in, and are exceeded by those in which they are not in. For white is predicated of white men and in a certain mode contains them, but of non-white things it is not predicated: and some man is non-white, and a certain white thing is not a man, because it can be in another subject than in man. Therefore when it is said, man is white, man is contained: but this containing is not proper, because to contain is of substantial form: and therefore an accident insofar as it is form contains, but insofar as it is a fluid accident, it has being and is contained by a subject. And the speech indeed of Porphyry is obscure, but this intellect which I said I think to be truer.

But there is still another difference between a difference and an accident: because a difference indeed is not intensible and remissible, just as is patent from the supradicted things, where also those things are solved which are objected against this dictum. But accidents sustain more and less, on account of the fact that they have material causes, and according to themselves they do not name their thing in the term. And these things are altogether plain from the supradicted things.

But still there is another difference, that contrary differences are impermiscible to the constitution of some species: for from rational and irrational not any one species is constituted. But contrary accidents are mixed to the constitution of another, just as if contrary colors and flavors were mixed to the constitution of a middle.

Et si objicitur, quod etiam colores contrarii contrarias habent differentias et species. *Dicendum* quod de hoc modo quo colores et differentiæ colorum formales considerantur, per quas color in genere qualitatis ordinatur, hic non loquitur, sed potius de esse materiali accidentis prout est universale prædicatum de his quæ denominantur ab ipso. Sic autem constat quod recipit intensionem et remissionem per contrarii admixtionem vel contrariorum, vel depurationem, eo quod albius est hoc modo nigro impermixtius,

ut dicitur in quarto *Topicorum* [1]. Cum autem recipit magis et minus, recipit illud aliquando quod recessit a contrario, sicut malum pejus quod recessit a bono. Aliquando autem quia accessit ad terminum, ut bonum melius quod summo bono est propinquius : aliquando autem secundum contrarii admixtionem, ut album albius, ut dictum est. Hujusmodi ergo sunt communitates et proprietates differentiæ, et cæterorum universalium.

CAPUT XI. ### *De convenientiis et differentiis speciei et proprii.*

Post hoc sequitur dicere convenientias et differentias speciei et proprii : in quo enim species differat a genere et a differentia dictum est prius in capitulis in quibus diximus quomodo genus differret a cæteris universalibus, et quomodo differentia differt ab aliis. Dicimus ergo quod speciei quidem et proprio commune est de se invicem prædicari : quod patet per exemplo, quia si homo est, risibile est, et e converso si risibile est, homo est : cujus conversionis causa est, quia species principiis substantialibus ponit aptitudinem, quæ proprium est, sicut causa propinqua et adæquata ponit effectum. Similiter ipsa aptitudo quæ est proprium, derelinquit tale subjectum, et ponit ipsum sicut effectus proprius et causæ adæquatus ponit suam causam. Hoc etiam facit proprium quod est risibile, ideo quoniam non dicitur secundum actum ridere, sed dicitur secundum aptitudinem secundum quam natum est : et hæc aptitudo semper est in subjecto proprii, sicut sæpe jam in ante habitis dictum est.

Secunda autem convenientia est æqualiter participari, et non secundum magis et minus ab his quæ participant species : et similiter propria æqualiter participantur ab his quorum sunt propria : nec hic facimus hoc in participatione propriissime dicta : large enim dicimus participare id quod aliquid habet in seipso, et participatum esse id quod inest alii, sive per se insit sive per accidens.

And if it is objected, that also contrary colors have contrary differences and species. *It must be said* that concerning this mode by which colors and formal differences of colors are considered, through which color is ordered in the genus of quality, here he does not speak, but rather concerning the material being of an accident as it is a universal predicated of those things which are denominated by it. But thus it is constant that it receives intension and remission through the admixture of a contrary or of contraries, or depuration, on account of the fact that whiter is in this mode more unmixed with black,

as is said in the fourth [book] of the *Topics* [1]. But when it receives more and less, it sometimes receives that which has receded from a contrary, just as a bad [thing is] worse which has receded from the good. But sometimes because it has approached towards a term, as a good [thing is] better which is closer to the supreme good: but sometimes according to the admixture of a contrary, as a white [thing is] whiter, as has been said. Therefore of this sort are the commonalities and properties of a difference, and of the rest of the universals.

CHAPTER XI. ### *On the agreements and differences of species and property.*

After this it follows to speak of the agreements and differences of species and property: for in what a species differs from a genus and from a difference was said before in the chapters in which we said how a genus differs from the rest of the universals, and how a difference differs from the others. We say therefore that to a species and a property it is common to be predicated of each other in turn: which is patent through an example, because if it is a man, it is capable of laughter, and conversely if it is capable of laughter, it is a man: the cause of which conversion is, because a species by its substantial principles posits the aptitude, which is a property, just as a proximate and adequate cause posits an effect. Similarly the aptitude itself which is a property, leaves such a subject, and posits it just as a proper effect and [one] adequate to a cause posits its cause. This also makes the property which is capable of laughter, therefore because it is not said according to the act of laughing, but it is said according to the aptitude according to which it is born: and this aptitude is always in the subject of the property, as has already often been said in the preceding things.

But the second agreement is to be participated equally, and not according to more and less by those which participate in the species: and similarly properties are equally participated by those of which they are properties: nor here do we do this in participation most properly so called: for we say broadly that to participate is that which something has in itself, and to be participated is that which is in another, whether it be in it per se or per accidens.

His autem omnibus speciei et proprio communibus assignatis, assignanda sunt in quibus differunt ab invicem. Dicimus ergo quod species quidem in hoc differt a proprio, quia ea quæ est species ad unum, ad aliud potest esse genus : sed hoc non est verum de specie specialissima : proprium autem cum sit hujus speciei proprium quæ est specialissima, impossibile est proprium esse aliarum specierum : si tamen esset proprium speciei subalternæ quæ est genus ad aliud, non esset impossibile esse proprium illarum specierum, quæ continentur sub illa, ut dicit Avicenna. Unde in hac differentia accipit Porphyrius speciem non specialissimam, quod in aliarum assignatione differentiarum non fecit. Proprium autem refert ad speciem specialissimam, cum ante posuerit subalternam : et ideo quod dicit, non satis est secundum artem dictum.

Secunda autem differentia est, quod species quidem per intellectum et naturam ante subsistit in esse et substantia quam proprium : proprium autem posterius jam sumpta specie secundum esse fit in specie ex principiis speciei jam in natura subsistentis. Hoc autem exemplo probatur : quia oportet hominem prius esse ut ex illo causetur risibile, et ideo homo recipitur in diffinitione risibilis, sicut recipitur subjectum in diffinitione passionis.

Amplius tertia est differentia, quod species quidem semper actu est in subjecto de quo prædicatur : quia participatur actu, cum sit totum esse ejus de quo prædicatur : proprium vero aliquando actu inest, potestate autem aptitudinis semper inest. Quod exemplo docetur : quia Socrates semper actu est homo hu-.

mana operans et agens, non semper vero ridet, quamvis de naturæ aptitudine semper sit risibilis.

Amplius autem quarto differunt, quia quorum sunt termini sive diffinitiones differentes, et ipsa diffinita sunt differentia : diffinitio autem speciei omnis est, quod sit sub assignato genere, et diffinitio speciei specialissimæ est, quod de pluribus solo numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit prædicabilis, et cætera hujusmodi quæ in tractatu de Specie dicta sunt : proprii vero quod vere proprium est, diffinitio est, quod et soli et omni et semper adest : quæ diffinitiones differentes sunt. Hanc autem ideo differentiam hic ponimus, ne credantur idem esse per essentiam species et proprium, propter hoc quod conversim prædicantur. Hæc ergo sunt communia et propria speciei et proprio.

<!-- cap:1.5.12 -->

CAPUT XII.

De convenientiis et differentiis proprii et accidentis.

But with all these common things of species and property assigned, those in which they differ from each other must be assigned. We say therefore that a species indeed in this differs from a property, because that which is a species to one thing, can be a genus to another: but this is not true of the most specific species: but a property since it is a property of this species which is most specific, it is impossible for the property to be of other species: yet if it were a property of a subaltern species which is a genus to another, it would not be impossible for it to be a property of those species which are contained under it, as Avicenna says. Whence in this difference Porphyry takes species not most specific, which he did not do in the assignment of other differences. But he refers property to the most specific species, although he previously posited the subaltern: and therefore what he says is not sufficiently said according to the art.

But the second difference is, that a species indeed through the intellect and nature subsists before in being and substance than a property: but a property [is] posterior, with the species already taken according to being, it becomes in the species from the principles of the species already subsisting in nature. But this is proved by an example: because it is necessary for a man to be first so that from that the capability of laughter may be caused, and therefore man is received in the definition of the capability of laughter, just as a subject is received in the definition of a passion.

Further, the third is the difference, that a species indeed is always actually in the subject of which it is predicated: because it is participated actually, since it is the whole being of that of which it is predicated: but a property sometimes is actually in, but in the power of aptitude it is always in. Which is taught by an example: because Socrates is always actually a hu-.

operating and acting, but he does not always laugh, although from the aptitude of nature he is always risible.

But further fourthly they differ, because those of which the terms or definitions are different, those defined things themselves are different: but the definition of every species is, that it is under an assigned genus, and the definition of a most special species is, that of multiple things differing only in number in that which specifies 'what' it is it is predicable, and other things of this kind which in the treatise on *Species* were said: but of a property that which is truly a property, the definition is, that it is present to it alone and to every one and always: which definitions are different. But this difference therefore we posit here, lest they be believed to be the same through essence a species and a property, on account of the fact that they are conversely predicated. These therefore are common and proper to a species and a property.

<!-- cap:1.5.12 -->

CHAPTER XII.

On the conveniencies and differences of a property and an accident.

Speciei autem et accidentis commune quidem est, quod de pluribus prædicantur in quantum sunt universalia. Aliæ vero communitates inter speciem et accidens sunt nullæ, eo quod plurimum valde differunt ab invicem id cui accidit ut species, et id quod accidit secundum modum essendi : id enim cui accidit, substantia est ; id autem quod accidit, est accidens : quæ differunt sicut ens per se, et ens non per se, sed in alio.

Et si objicitur quod inter multum distantia maxime quærendæ essent convenientiæ, Dicendum quod hoc verum est si invenirentur ; quia autem in nullo communicant, ideo non inveniuntur speciales, sed sola ista invenitur quæ omnium est generalis.

Sed differentiæ plures inveniuntur. Propria enim quibus distinguuntur utriusque sunt, quia speciei quidem convenit, quod in eo quod quid est prædicatur : in eo vero quod quomodo se habet, conve-

nit accidenti quod est mixtum cum respectu et compositione ad aliquid et ad omnia alia prædicamenta.

Alia autem differentia est, quod contingit unamquamque substantiam individuam quæ proprie substantia est, una quidem specie tantum participare, quæ totum est formale esse ipsius : uno enim existente quod est formale esse et totum, non potest esse alterum quod sit totum esse, sed unamquamque substantiam contingit participare pluribus accidentibus et separabilibus et inseparabilibus, sicut ultimo patet in multis exemplis.

Adhuc autem tertia est differentia, quia species quidem subintelligi potest in se existens ex suis substantialibus principiis ante accidentia quæ sunt in ipsa, quamvis etiam sint inseparabilia. Cujus probatio est, quod oportet supponere subjectum esse in se completum, ut illi postea aliquid accidat. Accidentia autem ad hoc quod sint, ante se supponunt esse subjectum, quia respectu subjecti posterioris generis entia sunt et adventitiæ naturæ : quia posterioris sunt generis. Ideo vocantur accidentia quasi ad cadentia, quia cadunt ad subjectum, quia sunt adventitiæ naturæ : ideo non de intrinsecis adveniunt et affluunt.

But to a species and an accident it is common indeed, that they are predicated of multiple things insofar as they are universals. But other commonalities between a species and an accident are none, on account of the fact that very much they differ from each other that to which it happens as a species, and that which happens according to the mode of being: for that to which it happens, is a substance; but that which happens, is an accident: which differ just as a being *per se*, and a being not *per se*, but in another.

And if it is objected that between things distant by much mostly conveniencies must be sought, *It must be said* that this is true if they were found; but because in nothing they communicate, therefore special ones are not found, but only that one is found which is general of all.

But multiple differences are found. For the properties by which they are distinguished are of each, because to a species indeed it convenes, that in that which specifies 'what' it is it is predicated: but in that which specifies 'how' it holds itself, it con-

venes to an accident which is mixed with respect and composition to something and to all other predicaments.

But another difference is, that it happens to every individual substance which is properly a substance, to participate only one species indeed, which is the whole formal being of it: for with one existing which is the formal and whole being, there cannot be another which is the whole being, but it happens to every substance to participate multiple accidents both separable and inseparable, just as lastly is patent in many examples.

But still a third is a difference, because a species indeed can be subunderstood existing in itself from its substantial principles before the accidents which are in it, although they also be inseparable. The probation of which is, that it is necessary to suppose the subject to be complete in itself, so that to it afterwards something may happen. But accidents for this that they may be, before themselves suppose to be a subject, because with respect to the subject they are beings of a posterior genus and of an adventitious nature: because they are of a posterior genus. Therefore they are called accidents as if falling to (*ad cadentia*), because they fall to a subject, because they are of an adventitious nature: therefore they do not arrive and flow from the intrinsic.

Adhuc autem speciei quidem participatio istis subjectis est æqualiter, et non secundum magis et minus : accidens vero participatur ab his de quibus prædicatur (etiamsi sit inseparabile accidens) secundum magis et minus, non æqualiter. Contingit enim quod Æthiops respectu alterius Æthiopis habet colorem nigrum intensum, vel nigrum in nigredine remissum : et ideo de communibus et propriis speciei et accidentis dictum est. Restat igitur de proprio et accidente dicere communia et propria : quo enim proprium a specie et differentia et genere differat, dictum est in illorum ad ipsum differentiis.

<!-- cap:1.8.13 -->
CAPUT XIII. — *De communibus proprii et inseparabilis accidentis, ac eorum differentiis.*

Dicimus igitur quod commune quidem proprii et inseparabilis accidentis est, quod præter ea nunquam consistunt illa sua subjecta in quibus sunt, et de quibus prædicantur, et quibus inesse considerantur, quod patet: quemadmodum enim præter risibile (quod est proprium) non subsistit homo qui est subjectum de quo prædicatur proprium, sic præter nigredinem nunquam subsistit Æthiops, dummodo Æthiops nomine suo importet complexionem Æthiopis nigredinem causantem, ut in ante habitis dictum est. Et hujus quidem causa id quod secunda est proprii et inseparabilis accidentis communitas, quia quemadmodum semper et omni adest proprium, sic etiam inseparabile accidens : adest enim et semper, quamvis non adsit soli ut proprium, propter quod et non conversim prædicatur.

Aliæ autem communitates sunt ad quædam, sicut non essentialiter prædicari in quale de pluribus, sicut per ante habita jam constat. Accidens autem separabile propriam communitatem non habet nisi in quale, et non in quid prædicari: sed

hoc jam in his quæ de omnibus simul universalibus communibus jam dictum fuerat.

Differunt autem ultima duo universalia ab invicem in hoc primo, quoniam proprium uni soli speciei adest cujus est proprium, quemadmodum risibile adest homini. Inseparabile vero accidens, ut nigrum, non solum adest Æthiopi, vel soli corvo, sed etiam adest carboni et ebeno, et quibusdam aliis: ita proprium subjectum sibi non determinat.

Adhuc autem secunda est differentia, quod proprium conversim prædicatur et æqualiter, non secundum magis et minus de eo cujus proprium est: accidens vero inseparabile propter hoc quod non determinatum sibi determinat subjectum, non conversim prædicatur.

But still the participation indeed of a species by those subjects is equally, and not according to more and less: but an accident is participated by those of which it is predicated (even if it be an inseparable accident) according to more and less, not equally. For it happens that an Ethiopian with respect to another Ethiopian has an intense black color, or a black remiss in blackness: and therefore of the common things and properties of a species and an accident it has been said. It remains therefore to say the common and proper things of a property and an accident: for by what a property differs from a species and a difference and a genus, was said in their differences to it.

<!-- cap:1.8.13 -->

CHAPTER XIII. — *On the common things of a property and an inseparable accident, and their differences.*

We say therefore that it is common indeed to a property and an inseparable accident, that those subjects of theirs never subsist besides them in which they are, and of which they are predicated, and in which they are considered to be in, which is patent: for just as besides risible (which is a property) man does not subsist who is the subject of which a property is predicated, thus besides blackness an Ethiopian never subsists, provided that an Ethiopian by his name imports the complexion of an Ethiopian causing blackness, as was said in the things previously had. And of this indeed the cause is that which is the second commonality of a property and an inseparable accident, because just as a property is present always and to every, thus also an inseparable accident: for it is present also always, although it may not be present to alone as a property, on account of which also it is not conversely predicated.

But other commonalities are to certain things, just as not essentially being predicated in what kind of multiple things, just as through the things previously had it is already constant. But a separable accident does not have a proper commonality except in what kind, and not in what being predicated: but

this already in those things which concerning all the universal common things simultaneously already had been said.

But the ultimate two universals differ from each other in this first, since a property is present to one single species of which it is the property, just as risible is present to man. But an inseparable accident, as black, is not only present to an Ethiopian, or only to a crow, but also is present to coal and ebony, and to certain others: thus a property does not determine a subject for itself.

But further the second difference is, that a property is conversely predicated and equally, not according to more and less of that of which it is the property: but an inseparable accident on account of the fact that it does not determine a determined subject for itself, is not conversely predicated.

Adhuc autem sicut in ante habitis dictum est, proprium quidem æqualis et non secundum magis et minus a suis substantiis est participatio. Accidentium vero hoc quidem secundum magis, illud autem secundum minus est participatio, propter causas in ante habitis determinatas.

Sunt autem et aliæ quidem communitates et proprietates eorum universalium quæ dicta sunt: sed hæc quæ dicta sunt sufficiant ad discretionem eorum ab invicem et communitatis eorum quam habent ad invicem traditionem et doctrinam.

<!-- cap:1.9.1 -->
CAPUT I.

Qualiter hæc omnia in unum coincidunt.

Quamvis in ante habitis jam determinatum sit id quod de quinque universalibus tradidit Porphyrius, tamen adhuc sunt quædam quæ utile est scire de his quæ ex logicis doctrinis Arabum in Latinum transtulit Avendar Israelita Philosophus, et maxime de logica Avicennæ. Primum capitulum hujus doctrinæ est de comparatione istorum quinque inter se, et hæc ad perfectionem doctrinæ ponimus. Dicimus ergo primo de primo universali quod est genus, quod non est uniuscujusque rei sive omnium rerum, sed illius solius genus, quæ est sub ipso species : similiter et differentia non est differentia uniuscujusque rei, sed secundum hoc quod est divisiva, non est differentia nisi generis quod dividit : et secundum hoc quod est constitutiva, est differentia illius speciei quam constituit sub genere diviso.

Sciendum autem quod unumquodque istorum potest esse genus vel quasi genus ad alterum, unumquodque potest esse quasi species, et unumquodque potest esse quasi differentia, et unumquodque potest esse quasi proprium, et unumquodque quasi accidens. Sensibile enim est quasi species hujus quod dicimus apprehensivum. Omne enim sensibile apprehensivum est et non convertitur, scilicet quod omne apprehensivum sit sensibile sive sen-

sitivum. Et hoc ipsum sensibile est quoddam genus audienti. Omne enim audiens, sensibile est et non convertitur. Et similiter est genus audientis et olfacientis et gustantis et tangentis, et hoc ipsum sensibile differentia est animalis. Similiter gressibile est genus bipedis et quadrupedis, et est species mobilis, et est proprium sive proprietas animalis et commune accidens hominis. Aliquando autem ista quinque in uno solo secundum rem conveniunt, et ideo hæc omnia quinque in unum et idem aliquando coincidunt : quamvis modus prædicandi eorum secundum quod diversa universalia sunt nunquam sit unus.

But further just as was said in the things previously had, the participation indeed of a property by its substances is equal and not according to more and less. But of accidents this indeed is a participation according to more, that however according to less, on account of the causes determined in the things previously had.

But there are also other commonalities indeed and properties of those universals which have been said: but these which have been said may suffice for their discretion from each other and the tradition and doctrine of their commonality which they have to each other.

<!-- cap:1.9.1 -->
CHAPTER I.

How all these things coincide into one.

Although in the things previously had it has already been determined that which Porphyry handed down concerning the five universals, nevertheless there are still certain things which it is useful to know concerning those things which from the logical doctrines of the Arabs Avendar the Israelite Philosopher translated into Latin, and mostly concerning the logic of Avicenna. The first chapter of this doctrine is concerning the comparison of those five among themselves, and these things we posit to the perfection of the doctrine. We say therefore first concerning the first universal which is a genus, that it is not of every single thing or of all things, but the genus of that alone, which is a species under it: similarly also a difference is not the difference of every single thing, but according to this that it is divisive, it is not a difference except of the genus which it divides: and according to this that it is constitutive, it is the difference of that species which it constitutes under the divided genus.

But it must be known that each one of these can be a genus or quasi a genus to another, each one can be quasi a species, and each one can be quasi a difference, and each one can be quasi a property, and each one quasi an accident. For sensible is quasi a species of this which we call apprehensive. For every sensible is apprehensive and it is not converted, namely that every apprehensive is sensible or sen-

sitive. And this sensible itself is a certain genus to hearing. For every hearing thing, is sensible and it is not converted. And similarly it is the genus of smelling and tasting and touching, and this sensible itself is a difference of animal. Similarly gressible is the genus of biped and quadruped, and it is a species of mobile, and it is a property or property of animal and a common accident of man. But sometimes these five coincide in one alone according to the thing, and therefore all these five into one and the same sometimes coincide: although their mode of being predicated according as they are diverse universals is never one.

Et etiam adducendum est quod genus non est genus differentiæ aliquo modo, nec differentia potest esse species generis. Si enim differentia esset species generis, cum species non efficiatur species nisi per differentiam, tunc differentia egeret alia differentia per quam species efficeretur et tunc differentia esset differentiæ, quod non potest : differentia enim est intellectio sive notio quædam, quæ secundum intellectum est extra materiam generis : rationale enim non est idem quod animal habens rationem, sed est idem quod quiddam habens rationem, quamvis per consequentiam sequatur id esse animal : animal enim habens rationem homo est. Si autem animal esset per intellectum clausum vel conceptum intra rationem rationalis, tunc cum diceretur, animal rationale, idem esset ac si diceretur, animal quod est animal habens rationem, quæ sunt idem se-

cundum intentiones suas. Cum autem differentia prædicetur, est sicut cum prædicatur accidens inseparabile de eo quod prædicatur. Differentia enim se habet ut accidens ad genus, in quantum sequitur esse generis : et non est unum esse differentiæ et esse generis, sed genus est ad differentiam quasi materia se habens, et differentiæ comparatio ad genus est quodammodo sicut proprii quod non competit omni, et hoc est accidens inseparabile, ut in ante habitis dictum est. Differentia vero constituit genus et dat esse ei in effectu distinctum. Quamvis autem ipsa differentia non sit intra diffinitionem generis, et ipsius esse differentiæ non sit intra esse generis, sicut esse rerum qualium est intra quale, et esse rerum quantarum est intra quantum, tamen differentia est qualitas generis, et genus et esse generis est in differentia sicut intra suum quale essentiale. Differentia enim est qualitas generis, sicut forma est qualitas materiæ, faciens ipsam qualem secundum esse substantiale. Hoc autem sic se habet quando differentia est absoluta et simpliciter differentia generis : ita quod nullo modo differentia est extra naturam generis, sed est de natura ipsius sicut actus est de natura potentiæ : quia si actus non esset de natura potentiæ, potentia nullo modo desideraret actum.

Si vero diligenter et subtiliter attendatur quid sit genus et quid differentia, tunc non omnino vere prædicantur genus et differentia, nisi de specie : quia in specie genus in actu est, et differentia est actus speciei dans esse. Comparatio autem generis ad differentiam est sicut comparatio subjecti ad accidens inseparabile, quod non est commune accidens, eo quod est consequens, si est ut proprium quod convenit omni et non soli. Accidens autem commune aliquando comparatione generis est proprietas, et aliquando comparatione speciei est accidens commune : sicut motum voluntario motu qui vocatur motus processivus, quod est proprietas animalis et commune accidens hominis.

And also it must be adduced that a genus is not the genus of a difference in any mode, nor can a difference be a species of a genus. For if a difference were a species of a genus, since a species is not made a species except through a difference, then the difference would need another difference through which the species would be made and then a difference would be of a difference, which cannot be: for a difference is a certain intellection or notion, which according to intellect is outside the matter of the genus: for rational is not the same as an animal having reason, but it is the same as a certain thing having reason, although through consequence it follows that it is an animal: for an animal having reason is a man. But if animal were through intellect enclosed or conceived within the reason of rational, then when it would be said, a rational animal, it would be the same as if it were said, an animal which is an animal having reason, which are the same ac-

cording to their intentions. But when a difference is predicated, it is just as when an inseparable accident is predicated of that of which it is predicated. For a difference holds itself as an accident to a genus, insofar as it follows the being of the genus: and the being of a difference and the being of a genus is not one, but a genus is to a difference quasi holding itself as matter, and the comparison of a difference to a genus is in a certain mode just as of a property which does not compete to every, and this is an inseparable accident, as was said in the things previously had. But a difference constitutes a genus and gives to it a distinct being in effect. But although the difference itself is not within the definition of the genus, and the being itself of the difference is not within the being of the genus, just as the being of 'what kind of' things is within 'what kind', and the being of 'how much' things is within 'how much', nevertheless a difference is a quality of the genus, and the genus and the being of the genus is in the difference just as within its essential 'what kind'. For a difference is a quality of the genus, just as form is a quality of matter, making it 'what kind' according to substantial being. But this holds itself thus when a difference is absolute and simply a difference of a genus: thus that in no mode is a difference outside the nature of the genus, but it is of the nature of it just as act is of the nature of potency: because if act were not of the nature of potency, potency in no mode would desire act.

But if it is diligently and subtly attended what a genus is and what a difference is, then not altogether truly are a genus and a difference predicated, except of a species: because in a species a genus is in act, and a difference is the act of a species giving being. But the comparison of a genus to a difference is just as the comparison of a subject to an inseparable accident, which is not a common accident, on account of the fact that it is a consequent, if it is as a property which convenes to every and not alone. But a common accident sometimes by comparison to a genus is a property, and sometimes by comparison to a species is a common accident: just as to be moved by voluntary motion which is called processive motion, which is a property of animal and a common accident of man.

Aliquando etiam accidens commune proprietas est generis superioris sicut albedo quæ est de proprietatibus corporis compositi terminati, et est commune accidens hominis : aliquando est de proprietatibus generis generalissimi, et aliquando etiam accidens commune non est proprietas alicujus generis, eo quod alii accidit quod est extra genus illud, vel etiam accidit ei quod est extra totam illam categoriam secundum ordinem prædicabilium illius generalissimi sive prædicamenti : cujus exemplum est id quod est non recipere magis et minus, quod est de communitatibus hominis secundum participationem speciei, et est commune illi et multis aliis, nec est proprietas alicujus hominis, alia enim generalissima habent hoc. Comparatio autem animalis ad hoc animal, quando animali additur designatio singularis non considerata in hoc animali rationalitate quæ facit ipsum hominem, est sicut comparatio generis ad individua propria, quæ ex se habet et non mediante specie : tunc enim animal prædicatur de hoc animali immediate, ut species de suis individuis immediate prædicatur : et tunc non prædicatur ut genus, generis enim prædicatio est de differentibus specie : animal igitur genus est in comparatione singulorum animalium secundum quod facta sunt rationalia vel in alia specie constituta.

Similiter autem rationale comparatum ad hoc rationale non considerata animalitate in hoc rationali, prædicatur de eo ut species, secundum intentionem quam diximus, quod differentia aliquando ut species accipitur, et non prædicatur tunc ut differentia, Differentia enim est animalium singulorum specie differentium. Diximus autem rationale hoc considerari considerata animalitate. Similiter autem et risibile prædicatur de illo risibili non considerato secundum quod est homo : non est enim proprium nisi hominis et individuorum. Adhuc autem risibile comparatum est prædicatum ut species. Similiter etiam

album quod est communiter accidens huic albo in singulari designato, est prædicatum sicut species et non ut accidens. Accidens enim commune non est accidens, nisi ei quod est subjectum ipsius denominatum ab ipso ut dicatur ab ipso ut sit album : non autem est accidens huic albo non considerato subjecto in quo est, illi enim comparatur ut species.

<!-- cap:1.2.2 -->

CAPUT II. *Qualiter hæc omnia quinque universalia ad invicem miscentur.*

Oportet autem scire quod hæc quinque non tantum coincidunt omnia vel plura in unum, sed etiam inter se quodammodo commiscentur. Et hoc fit multis modis. Genus enim commiscetur aliquando cum differentia. Apprehensivum enim est quasi quædam differentia hominis quod est rationale. Omne enim rationale apprehensivum est et non convertitur. Et similiter animatum sive habens animam est genus rationalis, et prædicatur in quid de rationali : et tunc est genus differentiæ.

Also sometimes a common accident is a property of a superior genus just as whiteness which is from the properties of a terminated composite body, and it is a common accident of man: sometimes it is of the properties of a most general genus, and sometimes also a common accident is not a property of any genus, on account of the fact that it happens to another which is outside that genus, or also it happens to that which is outside all that category according to the order of predicable things of that most general or predicament: an example of which is that which is not to receive more and less, which is of the commonalities of man according to the participation of the species, and it is common to him and to many others, nor is it a property of any man, for other most generals have this. But the comparison of animal to this animal, when a singular designation is added to animal with rationality not considered in this animal which makes him a man, is just as the comparison of a genus to its proper individuals, which it has from itself and not mediating a species: for then animal is predicated of this animal immediately, as a species is predicated of its individuals immediately: and then it is not predicated as a genus, for the predication of a genus is of things differing in species: animal therefore is a genus in comparison to singular animals according as they are made rational or constituted in another species.

Similarly also rational compared to this rational with animality not considered in this rational, is predicated of it as a species, according to the intention which we said, that a difference sometimes is taken as a species, and then it is not predicated as a difference. For a difference is of singular animals differing in species. But we said that this rational is considered with animality considered. Similarly also risible is predicated of that risible not considered according as it is man: for it is not a property except of man and individuals. But still risible compared is a predicate as a species. Similarly also

white which is commonly an accident to this white designated in the singular, is a predicate just as a species and not as an accident. For a common accident is not an accident, except to that which is its subject denominated by it so that it is said by it to be white: but it is not an accident to this white if the subject in which it is is not considered, for it is compared to that as a species.

<!-- cap:1.2.2 -->

CHAPTER II. *How all these five universals are mixed together with each other.*

But it is necessary to know that these five not only all or many coincide into one, but also they are mixed together with each other in a certain mode. And this happens in many ways. For a genus is mixed sometimes with a difference. For "apprehensive" is just as a certain difference of man which is "rational". For every rational [being] is apprehensive and it is not converted. And similarly "animated" or "having a soul" is the genus of the rational, and it is predicated in [the sense of] "what" of the rational: and then it is the genus of the difference.

Et patet quod accidit ei ut differentia generis superioris : animatum enim differentia est corporis quod est unum de generibus mediis. Aliquando etiam commiscetur genus cum accidente sicut color qui est genus eorum quæ accidunt homini, quæ sunt ut albedo, et nigredo, et hujusmodi. Hæc autem compositio sive commixtio differt a prima : non enim sic potest esse, quod genus differentiæ constitutivæ sit genus constitutivum speciei : oportet autem quod genus accidentis sit genus accidentis ad ipsam speciem accidentis constitutivum. Genus ergo differentiæ est aliquando differentia constitutiva generis vel speciei, et præter hoc genus accidentis aliquando est accidentis generis, et aliquando speciei, sicut hoc ipsum apprehensivum est constitutivum animalis habentis apprehensionem per spiritum vel intellectum, et color est accidentis animalis et hominis, cum sit genus color specialium. Permixtio autem generis cum proprietate est sicut admirans in arctu admirantis, quod se habet ut genus ad ridens in actu : et tunc vociferans ex appetitu se habet ut genus ad hinnibile, quod est proprium equi.

Differentia autem aliquando miscetur cum genere, sicut sensibile quod est differentia gradibilium miscetur cum rationali. Miscetur etiam aliquando cum proprietate, sicut comparatio trium ad duos rectos angulos trianguli, qui tres angulos habet æquales duobus rectis. Hæc enim est differentia ejus quod est proprietas trianguli rectilinei. Aliquando autem miscetur cum accidente, sicut disgregativum visus, quod est differentia albedinis, quod accidit visui.

Proprietas etiam aliquando miscetur cum genere : gressibile enim est differentia animalis quod est genus hominis, et est proprium homini quod convenit omni non soli. Etiam aliquando miscetur cum differentia et cum specie : quia si desit proprium speciei, et cum est communior proprio species, hoc fit cum differentia fuerit communior. Cujus exemplum est dividi in duo æqualia, quod est paris numeri. Aliquando autem miscetur cum accidente communi : visibile enim est proprietas colorati, coloratum autem est accidens commune communi.

Accidens autem aliquando miscetur cum genere, nec propter hoc desinit esse accidens speciei : est enim accidens speciei, nec tamen est commune accidens generi, sed est proprietas generis : et est aliquid quod est accidens commune utrique, generi scilicet et speciei, et cum hoc etiam similiter accidens differentiæ et proprietatis.

<!-- cap:1.2.3 -->

CAPUT III. *Qualiter hæc quinque sunt naturæ quædam, et qualiter universalia, et qualiter intelligibilia, et qualiter simplicia.*

And it is patent that it happens to it as a difference of a superior genus: for "animated" is the difference of body which is one of the middle genera. Sometimes also a genus is mixed with an accident, just as color which is the genus of those things which happen to man, which are such as whiteness, and blackness, and of this sort. But this composition or mixture differs from the first: for it cannot be thus, that the genus of a constitutive difference be the constitutive genus of a species: but it is necessary that the genus of an accident be the genus of the accident constitutive of the species of the accident itself. Therefore the genus of a difference is sometimes the constitutive difference of a genus or species, and besides this the genus of an accident is sometimes of the genus of an accident, and sometimes of the species, just as this "apprehensive" itself is the constitutive [principle] of an animal having apprehension through spirit or intellect, and color is of the accident of animal and man, since it is the genus of special colors. But the mixture of a genus with a property is just as "admiring in act", which behaves as a genus to "laughing in act": and then "shouting from appetite" behaves as a genus to "capable of neighing", which is the property of a horse.

But a difference sometimes is mixed with a genus, just as "sensible" which is the difference of things capable of walking is mixed with the rational. It is also mixed sometimes with a property, just as the comparison of three [angles] to two right angles of a triangle, which has three angles equal to two right [angles]. For this is the difference of that which is the property of a rectilinear triangle. But sometimes it is mixed with an accident, just as "disruptive of sight", which is the difference of whiteness, which happens to sight.

A property also sometimes is mixed with a genus: for "capable of walking" is the difference of animal which is the genus of man, and it is a property for man which convenes to all [but] not only [him]. Also sometimes it is mixed with a difference and with a species: because if a property of a species is lacking, and since the species is more common than the property, this happens when the difference was more common. An example of which is "to be divided into two equals", which is of an even number. But sometimes it is mixed with a common accident: for "visible" is the property of the colored, but "colored" is a common accident to the common.

But an accident sometimes is mixed with a genus, nor on account of this does it cease to be an accident of the species: for it is an accident of the species, nor yet is it a common accident to the genus, but it is a property of the genus: and it is something which is a common accident to both, namely to the genus and the species, and with this also similarly an accident of the difference and the property.

<!-- cap:1.2.3 -->

CHAPTER III. *How these five are certain natures, and how universals, and how intelligibles, and how simples.*

Attendendum autem est, quod omnia.

quinque tripliciter considerari possunt. Si enim in se accipiantur, ita quod ipsa res sive natura sine aliquo respectu sibi composito accipiantur, et ipsa natura simplex consideretur, sic sunt naturæ quædam ista quinque, et præcipue genera, et species quæ absoluto intellectu assequi possunt : tamen de aliis est verum quando non accipitur id quod est differentia in ratione differentiæ, sed in ratione entis vel naturæ cujusdam : et hoc est verum de proprio quando accipitur id quod est proprium non in proprii ratione, sed in simplicitate cujusdam entis : et hoc etiam verum est de accidente quando accipitur ut pars entis, et non in ratione qua addit ad substantiam. Sic ergo hæc præaccepta sunt naturæ quædam, ut dicunt Avicenna et Alfarabius.

Si autem accipiunt hæc prædicta secundum quod naturæ illi simplici additur aptitudo ad hoc quod sint in pluribus inferioribus, tunc illa jam efficiuntur universalia, quia universale ab habere aptitudinem dicitur universale, et non ab actu quo efficiatur actu universale. Utrum autem hæc aptitudo sit in re quæ sua simplicitate apta sit existere in pluribus, et per multiplicationem differentiæ dividentis, vel per divisionem materiæ in pluribus actu efficiatur : vel sit in solo intellectu, ita quod nihil naturæ sit in pluribus, sed solus intellectus similitudinem naturæ unius ad eamdem naturam in specie in alio accipiat et in seipso assimilet, quæstio fuit. Et primo quidem modo illi dixerunt qui *reales* vocabantur. Secundo autem modo dixerunt hi qui dicebantur *nominales*. Et hoc ad præsens non est disserendum : tamen in præcedentibus in tractatu communi de *universalibus* hoc sustinuimus quod dixerunt reales. Quocumque autem modo, patet quod simplex natura non est universale, sed natura accepta in tali aptitudine.

Hæc autem eadem natura accepta in lumine intelligentiæ, cujus ipsa est splendor quidam et radius, secundum quod dicimus, quod omnis forma sive natura

simplex splendor est, et radius intelligentiæ in anima similis sibi in esse spirituali, sive intellectuali, propter hoc quod ipsa natura per intellectualem naturam quæ in ipsa est ut pars essentialis ejus, operatur ad esse spirituale, sicut lumen in perspicuo operatur colorem secundum esse spirituale, quem tamen in corpore terminato operatur secundum esse materiale ipsius : eo quod actus activorum sunt in patientibus bene dispositis secundum possibilitatem recipientium actus illos, et non secundum potentiam agentis. Hoc ergo modo ista quinque vel sunt naturæ simplices, vel universalia, vel intellectus quidam in anima existentes.

But it must be attended to, that all.

five can be considered triply. For if they are taken in themselves, thus that the thing or nature itself be taken without any respect composite to it, and the simple nature itself be considered, thus these five are certain natures, and principally genera, and species which can be followed with an absolute intellect: nevertheless of the others it is true when that which is a difference is not taken in the reason of a difference, but in the reason of a being or of a certain nature: and this is true of a property when that is taken which is a property not in the reason of a property, but in the simplicity of a certain being: and this also is true of an accident when it is taken as a part of a being, and not in the reason by which it adds to a substance. Thus therefore these pre-taken things are certain natures, as Avicenna and Alfarabi say.

But if they take these predirected things according as to that simple nature is added an aptitude to this that they be in multiple inferior things, then those already are made universals, because a universal from having an aptitude is called a universal, and not from the act by which it is actively made a universal. Whether but this aptitude be in the thing which by its simplicity is apt to exist in multiple things, and through the multiplication of a dividing difference, or through the division of matter in multiple things is actively made: or it be in the intellect alone, thus that nothing of the nature be in multiple things, but the intellect alone takes the similitude of one nature to the same nature in species in another and assimilates it in itself, was a question. And the first mode indeed those said who were called *realists*. But the second mode these said who were called *nominalists*. And this for the present is not to be dissertated: nevertheless in the preceding things in the common treatise on *universals* this we sustained which the realists said. But in whatever mode, it is patent that a simple nature is not a universal, but a nature taken in such an aptitude.

But this same nature taken in the light of intelligence, of which it itself is a certain splendor and ray, according to what we say, that every simple form or nature

is a splendor, and a ray of intelligence in the soul similar to itself in spiritual being, or intellectual being, on account of the fact that the nature itself through the intellectual nature which is in it as its essential part, operates to spiritual being, just as light in a transparent thing operates color according to spiritual being, which nevertheless in a terminated body it operates according to its material being: on account of the fact that the acts of active things are in well-disposed patient things according to the possibility of those receiving those acts, and not according to the potency of the agent. This mode therefore these five either are simple natures, or universals, or certain intellects existing in the soul.

Sciendum est autem, quod hæc quinque in lumine intelligentiæ accepta sunt absque omni multiplicitate, sed per hoc quod in singularibus terminantur ad materiam, secundum esse dividuntur, et sic agunt multiplicitatem per hoc quod in quolibet sunt secundum totum esse ipsorum et secundum totam essentiam, et sic quidem secundum se sunt ante omnem multitudinem. Per hoc autem quod in sensibilibus et in materia efficiuntur ad quantitatem actus intelligentiæ operantis in natura, per hoc efficiuntur multa secundum diversas multiplicationes speciei vel individua.

Si ergo in se accipiantur, naturæ sunt simplices, et nec singularia, vel universalia. Si enim in natura simplici haberent quod essent universalia, cum natura simplex non sit nisi unum, universale non esset nisi unum, nec posset esse in multis, et de multis, quod est contra rationem universalis. Si autem a natura simplici haberent quod essent singularia, non posset universale esse nisi unum singulare, et omnia alia similia illi non reciperent prædicationem illius, quod iterum esse non potest. A natura igitur simplici nec habent quod sint universalia, nec quod sint singularia, sed habent hoc a respectu qui additur naturæ simplici, ut dictum est.

Adhuc autem secundum quod sunt naturæ simplices et separatæ, nec sunt in intellectu, nec extra ipsum, sed secundum quod sunt in lumine intelligentiæ agentis, et lumine suo facientis omnes formas, sic sunt ut moventia potentialem intellectum qui est anima : et per hæc anima intellectuali convertente se ad ipsas efficiuntur in anima, dummodo non sit impedimentum in anima intellectuali, prout intellectum est sicut adepta : et sic accipit universale quod est in intellectu: et ideo oportet quod sit natura illa a sensibilibus, et materialibus, et particularibus separata et abstracta, et in solo accepta lumine intelligentiæ, cujus luminis ipsa est splendor et effectus. Et cum intellectus componit cum ea aptitudinem existendi in pluribus, tunc accipit eam ut universale logicum, et ratiocinatur de ipsa sicut de universali. Et per oppositum illius accipit particulare ipsius, quando componit cum ea illa quæ determinant ipsam ad materiam hanc et illam, et individuantia, quorum collectio in pluribus non potest inveniri, et per quæ afficitur hoc aliquid designatum.

But it must be known, that these five taken in the light of intelligence are without all multiplicity, but through this that in singular things they are terminated to matter, they are divided according to being, and thus they act multiplicity through this that in whatever they are according to the whole being of themselves and according to the whole essence, and thus indeed according to themselves they are before all multitude. But through this that in sensible things and in matter they are made to the quantity of the act of intelligence operating in nature, through this they are made many according to diverse multiplications of a species or individuals.

If therefore they are taken in themselves, they are simple natures, and neither singulars, or universals. For if in a simple nature they had that they were universals, since a simple nature is not except one, a universal would not be except one, nor could it be in many things, and of many things, which is against the reason of a universal. But if from a simple nature they had that they were singulars, a universal could not be except one singular, and all other things similar to it would not receive the predication of it, which again cannot be. From a simple nature therefore they neither have that they are universals, nor that they are singulars, but they have this from the respect which is added to the simple nature, as was said.

But further according as they are simple and separated natures, neither are they in the intellect, nor outside of it, but according as they are in the light of the active intelligence, and making all forms by its light, thus they are as moving the potential intellect which is the soul: and through these things by the intellectual soul converting itself to them they are made in the soul, provided that there is not an impediment in the intellectual soul, as it is understood just as an adept one: and thus it takes the universal which is in the intellect: and therefore it is necessary that that nature be separated and abstracted from sensible, and material, and particular things, and taken in the light of intelligence alone, of which light it itself is the splendor and effect. And when the intellect composes with it the aptitude of existing in multiple things, then it takes it as a logical universal, and ratiocinates concerning it just as concerning a universal. And through the opposite of that it takes a particular of it, when it composes with it those things which determine it to this and that matter, and the individuating things, the collection of which in multiple

things cannot be found, and through which this designated something is affected.

Et sic illa natura simplex in quadruplici esse accipitur, scilicet in esse naturæ simplicis, et in esse aptitudinis ad multa, et in esse luminis intelligentiæ cujus ipsa est splendor, et in esse individui designati per individuantia : et ideo habet rationem naturæ per primum, et habet rationem universalis per secundum, et rationem intellectus speculativi per tertium, et rationem particularis et individui per quartum. Et quamvis hoc ad primam pertineat philosophiam, tamen hic posuimus, ut doctrina sit magis perfecta, et quia hoc quidam Arabes præcipui in doctrina de universalibus posuerunt. Cum autem primus actus rationis sit ordinare dicibilia, ut in ante habitis diximus, jam rationes ordinabilium exsecuti sumus: de dicibilibus autem ordinandis in generibus, et speciebus, differentiis, propriis, et accidentibus, deinceps attingemus ad pertractandum.

And thus that simple nature in a fourfold being is taken, namely in the being of a simple nature, and in the being of an aptitude to many things, and in the being of the light of intelligence of which it itself is the splendor, and in the being of a designated individual through individuating things: and therefore it has the reason of a nature through the first, and it has the reason of a universal through the second, and the reason of a speculative intellect through the third, and the reason of a particular and an individual through the fourth. And although this to first philosophy pertains, nevertheless we posited it here, so that the doctrine may be more perfect, and because certain principal Arabs posited this in the doctrine concerning universals. Since however the first act of reason is to ordinate the dictable things, as we said in the things previously had, already we have executed the reasons of the ordinable things: but concerning the dictable things to be ordinated in genera, and species, differences, properties, and accidents, successively we will attain to treat thoroughly.